PLCY 702
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY
Helms School of Government
Analysis of American Revolutionary Government
Submitted to Dr. ABC, Instructor
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the completion of
PLCY 2
By
PLCY 702
Representation and consent were among the battleground issues that started the British-
American war. The British argued for colonial assemblies that provide the mechanism for
exercising the right of consent and freedom of representation. The colonies countered that
representation in the Assemblies was based on the Magna Carta and the fundamental laws of the
Empire that the English had rejected and that the rights flowing from these instruments were
favors from the King of England to his subjects, rather than constitutional rights of the colonies.1
Scholars Pablo Beramendi and Jeffrey Jensen (Comparative Political Studies) surveyed the
effects of political inequality and legislative malapportionment legacies of the British Empire in
the thirteen colonies.2 According to the two scholars, the representation system established in
each of the colonial legislatures' town, parish, or counties deeply undermined people’s voices in
every level of government. Large populations were systematically underrepresented and unable
to access the “corporate” representation structure the British professed to have established.
But the lack of representation and consent were only symbolic of much more profound
causes of the rift between the Crown and her American colonies. The incompatible aspirations
for self-government demanded by the colonies and the Empire’s mission to keep absolute control
and sovereignty of her colonies were deep that no amount of diplomatic accommodation could
provide sustainable solutions. Dickinson (The Letters from Pennsylvania Farmer, 1768) and by
proxy Kelly, Harbison, and Belz exposes the incompatibilities through the Federal Theory of
Empire as applied to the administration and policy of internal and external taxes, between
aspects of commerce, trade, and taxation, and powers exercised by the Parliament since the early
periods of colonization.3 A case to make is that even though the Empire would have
accommodated adjustment in the colonies’ social and economic pursuits, the colonies remained
subordinate to the Crown, and the colonies’ determination for self-government would not be
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quenched. Such compromises could strengthen inequality and further solidifies the existing
“slave-master” relationship. It appears, therefore, that extending the debate over the scope of
colonies’ powers would recurrently invoke the irreconcilable differences between the Empire’s
mission and the colonies’ aspirations.
The Declaration of Independence provided an impetus for the rapid conversion of the
country to republicanism. But converting monarchy and aristocracy and mixed government
based on constitutional monarchy to republicanism based on popular sovereignty proved to be a
challenging task that required dismantling various components of Imperial democracy embedded
in the old colonial system of government. To the colonies, “republicanism” was evident through
ideas and practices that modeled pro-people than pro-Crown philosophy, pro-individual right
over pro-patriotism and common good, a rejection mixed government, the separation of powers
between the branches of government, and the preeminent role of government as guardians of the
rights and liberties of the people advanced by the republicanism advocates. The revolution was a
success in introducing republicanism as a philosophy and theory of change and action and the
restoration of the fundamental law that enshrines man’s inalienable rights to life, liberty, and
pursuit of happiness in the New World.
The American version of republican constitutionalism emerged organically, from small
autonomous geographical communities to state-level dialogues that codified the Declaration of
Independence into State Constitutions and laws. In fact, according to Alfred H. Kelly, Winfred A.
Harbison, and Belz, “Americans first defined themselves as national people at the state level.”4
Constitutional development is an extensive process of people’s engagement that requires
human and physical resources and a significant amount of logistics. Limited provision of
resources reduces the process to mere symbolic representation. Although constitutional
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development at the State level did not complete simultaneously, local efforts to produce State
Constitution were a success to the “republican spirit of ’76.”5 The depth of people’s consultation
provoked positively by factional struggles pushed the constitution to be subject to popular
conventions. The process of constitution-building exactly described as “organic” in the
republican philosophy, galvanized the sovereignty of people where the government is subject to
the will of the people.6
There is historical precedence in the application of republican constitutionalist theory in
early America. Analyzing the true form of the US constitution, Donald S. Lutz (Publius)
collected over 80 documents including state constitutions, compacts, and covenantal documents
demonstrating republican constitutionalist’s practices in various ways that date back to first half
of the 1600s.7 The practices were replaced over time by the British Empire with a system of laws
and policies of taxation, and representation and trade and commerce policies to fulfill the
Crown’s imperial mission.
The Fundamental Orders of Connecticut of 1639 is one such document that presents the
schema of government structure in the republican constitutionalist’s framework.8 Although the
Order was established to achieve prosperity among the three river towns, it demonstrated a
liberal political system based on the “social compact” regarded as one of the pioneering
constitutions in western-colonized societies. It provided a distinction between the three branches
of government, i.e., executive (headed by a governor), legislative (12 deputies, 3 from each
town), and judiciary (6 magistrates) to ensure checks and balance and adequate representation for
each city in law and policy. The application of checks and balances and representation of people
in governance highlights the Fundamental Orders of 1639. However, a civilization evolved in an
increasingly complex and dynamic way, new knowledge to refine the seamless boundaries of
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structural relationships was required. The absence of knowledge solutions, therefore, undermined
the stability and legitimacy of the entire system.
For instance, in the late 1700s, government activities were divided into the national and
state. While it has increasingly become clearer that the Federal government dealt with issues of
national relevance such as inter-state and foreign matters, some provisions of the Articles of
Confederation about the role of the federal and state government included the development of
policies of national in scope that belong to Congress. In contrast, some State governments fought
over some issues that were of federal jurisdiction, such as land distribution. The Federal
constitution was set to correct the confusion through a gradual process of government re-
structuring that allowed the Federal and State governments to focus on their respective scope of
work mandates.
The Articles of Confederation played an important role in laying the foundation of the
1787 Constitution. Although lacking in legislative and legal power and authority in its
constitution, it embodied the “nationality” spirit by unifying the States to achieve freedom and
independence and demarcate the states and central authority boundary that foreshadows the 1787
Constitution. Both the Orders of 1639 and Federalist 51 enshrines people’s sovereignty upon
which government is built and established to serve the people. The difference between the two
instruments lies with the structure of specificity and depth of checks and balances. Federalist 51
provides a more elaborate framework for ensuring how checks and balances work within the
internal structure and system of government.
Overcoming the problems of representation and consent is vitally important in setting up
government structures. James Madison addressed these issues by establishing proportionality and
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representation in the Articles of Confederation Federalist No. 62.9 According to Madison, States
have equal power in the Senate. Regardless of geographic, demographic, and economic size, the
States are equal. The Senate ensures small States enjoy the same amount of power as the larger
States—this would foreshadow the Electoral College system adopted in US national elections.
The “bottom-up” ingenious innovation contrasts with the imperial “top-down” approach by
empowering the people to empower the government.
Meanwhile, the House of Representatives provides another venue for the people to
exercise their right to representation. In contrast to senators that are voted to represent their
States' constituency, House representatives are voted to represent the people.
The system of representation also provides checks and balances in the passing of laws
that serve the interest of a few constituency and increase efficiency of both chambers by
discouraging many unnecessary laws from being passed. The Articles of Confederation,
Federalist paper No. 61-70 guarantees every citizen's right to participate in the selection of
representatives, whether as a candidate or to select a candidate.
Issues of representation through elections and the limits of Federal and State’s authority
remain a subject of intense debate up to this day. When writing the constitution, only white men
and freemen had a voice in forming the New Government—act viewed by skeptics as protecting
the interest of few elites against the majority who were not. James Madison in Federalist 51
responds with a deep insight: “the freeholders of the country would be the safest depositories of
republican liberty.”10 James Madison’s statement resonates to anti-republican constitutionalists
even though the Constitution has been amended 27 times with specific amendments giving the
right to vote to every American regardless of sex or color.
1 Alfred H. Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison, and Belz Herman. The American Constitution: Its Origins and
Development. 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.), 1991, 25.
2 Pablo Beramendi and Jeffrey Jensen, Economic Geography, Political Inequality, and Public Goods in
the Original 13 U.S. States, Comparative Political Studies 52, no. 13–14 November 2019, 2235–82.
3 Alfred H. Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison, and Belz Herman, 48-49.
4 Alfred H. Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison, and Belz Herman, 68.
5 Alfred H. Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison, and Belz Herman, 77.
6 Republican constitutionalism has its roots in the Roman public law (lex populis) pioneered by Cicero
(106 BC) through the Manilian law and used prominently during the 3rd century CE as a way of generating
consensus. Roman jurist Ulpian referred to the principles of Republican constitutionalism to distinguish "public"
from "private" good. As a public law, Republican constitutionalism is based on the doctrine of popular
sovereignty often quoted to curb the dangers of elite capture, which the Romans and by proxy Ando is "already a
monarch in the making." (Clifford Ando, The Origins and Import of Republican Constitutionalism, Cardozo Law
Review 34, no. 3, February 2013, 917-936).
7 Donald S. Lutz, From Covenant to Constitution in American Political Thought, Publius, Autumn,
1980, Vol. 10, No. 4, Covenant, Polity, and Constitutionalism, Autumn, 1980, Oxford University Press, 101-133,
also at https://bit.ly/31SJloj.
8 The Fundamental Orders of 1639, Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale University,
accessed from https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/order.asp accessed April 4, 2021.
9 Federalist No. 62, The Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, (Seattle Washington: Arawa
Editions), 2016, 76-78.
10 W. B. Allen, Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding edited by
Charles Kesler, (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 131-149.
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