The Relationship Between Religion and Politics in Somalia
Religion is a powerful factor that affects the political activity of the
nation. The research focuses on the religious influences on the
Somalian political activities. The study focuses on Islam as one of the
religions that has triggered the country to unstableness.
The research includes discussion on Islam as a government
benchmark in terms of political policies implemented within and
outside the Somalian political environment (Armstrong 27). How
religion influences politics in Somalia, especially since the country is
unstable.
Other Influences on Somalia
Religion influences Politics in Somalia, especially since the country is
unstable. First, the Islamic leaders espouse the Islamic political
system. The system prioritises the Sharia law in all its political
policies and procedures. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union had taken
control of the majority of the southern part of the country.
Consequently, the sharia law was implemented.
However, the Transitional Federal Government fought back to regain
its original political hold. With the economic investments from troops
arriving from Ethiopia, the African Union peacekeepers and air
support by the United States, the Islamic Courts Union were
unceremoniously kicked out and the Transitional Federal Government
was able to achieve its goal of regaining control of the political
environment (Reilly 4).
Islamic References
After the Islamic Courts Union’s defeat at the hands of the
Transitional Federal Government, the union disintegrated into several
groups. One splinter group, Al-Shabaab, focused on continuing its
Holy War or insurgency against the current government party. The
group’s insurgency campaign caused havoc on the nation.
Specifically, the group attacked the current Transitional Federal
Government’s grabbing of many parts of Somalia from 2007 to 2008
alone. Also, the same Islamic group was very instrumental in ensuring
the successful taking control of the internal affairs of Baidoa from the
robust Transitional Federal Government’s control in 1998.
Second, Jonathan Howe (Clarke 172) emphasized the United States
and the United Nations incorporate the religious culture of the current
political leaders of Somalia in trying to reduce the tension and bring
peace and plenty to the land. The relationship among the countries
includes: the United Nations Roster of countries with interest in
Somalia’ current and future political and religious environment, the
relationship between “the United States and the U.N. is perhaps the
most unique, complex, and essential.
Both the United States and the UN will be critical actors in defining
any future role the world organization may play in dealing with
massive humanitarian catastrophes resulting from ethnic cleansing,
genocide, or human-made starvation. Therefore, it is essential to
examine U.S.-UN relations during these entities’ demanding and
unprecedented joint effort to help the failed state of Somalia from
1992 to 1995” (Clarke 172).
In handling the Somalia political and religious turmoil, such actions
clearly indicate that the U.N. and the Unites States approach problems
from different perspectives, the United States perspective and the
United Nations perspective. The interests, liabilities, and capacities of
the United Nations are diverse compared to the interests, liabilities,
and capacities of an individual member country.
The United States’ and the United Nations’ priorities, for example, are
to its constituency. For a nation to act in a democratic manner, it
should complete the necessary requirements of its citizens. If a nation
experiences severe internal criticism, its government may not be able
to sustain an institutional commitment even if the leadership is willing
to do so.
The U.N. answers to member nations, especially the citizens of
Somalia – not to the electorate. For, it would distributed among the
180 member nations of this institution, it is more easily diffused.
Conversely, since the U.N. has no domestic constituency, it may
become a convenient scapegoat for countries that do.
The Somalian government understands the current United Nations
prioritizing the United Nations’ member states in terms or prioritizing
its scare global resources to alleviate the individual political,
economic, processes. Thus, there are other nations that also needed the
financial and other attention of the United Nations in terms of brand.
Specifically, those who work for the U.N. understandably put priority
on protecting the institution and meeting the wishes of a broad
consensus of nations. They must respond to pressures from many
different directions. For example, the United Nations may look at a
particular crisis in the framework of a global balancing act in trying to
meet worldwide demands.
A single success or failure among a dozen nation tests that include the
Somalia nation test does not necessarily look the same to the United
Nations as to the significant nations focusing on the stabilization of
Somalia. The United Nations may be willing to trade the United
Nations’ assistance in Somalian crisis situation over its help in filling
a more significant gap somewhere else.
Third, Walter Clarke (118) the current religious culture allows the
Somalian political process characterized as the foreign military
intervention in Somalia. Under the current political environment, the
root cause of the shift to the United Nations peacekeeping situation.
John Drysdale reiterated “The idea of having a foreign military
presence in Somalia was formulated by the U.N. secretariat at the turn
of the year 1991-1992 in response to events in the city of Mogadishu.
The former president of Somalia, Siad Barre, had been ousted twelve
months earlier. Since that time, the leaders of opposing factions,
Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, had conducted a
sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent, power struggle. Currently,
gunners from both sides were pounding each other’s civilian-occupied
areas indiscriminately with heavy artillery and other forms of
firepower.
The few nongovernment organizations in Mogadishu estimated tens of
thousands of casualties sustained by the civilian population” (Clarke
118). The consequences of the United Nations’ response to events in
Somalia in 1991 had precipitated to the entrenchment of the United
Nations to implement the statements enshrined in the United Nations
Charter in terms of helping beleaguered nations like Somalia.
The overthrow of the Aideed and Mahdi after Siad Barre’s overthrow
and up to the time of the United Nations answer to the crisis in was an
expected consequence. The relationship was maintained by the United
Nations secretariat and therefore, was not included in its assessment
and plan of action.
After the successful outcome of the overthrow of the Siad Barre
government, the bitter dispute over political succession to the deposed
president, Siad Barre, during the first month of the year
1991(Gebrewold 131). Fourth, Jamila A. Mubarak (Mubarak 9)
proposed the religious culture of the Somalia government affected
both the political and economic progress of the nation.
“Somalia is one of the least developed nations in the world. The
Somali state incorporates the former Italian Trust Territory of Somalia
and British Somali-land, which were united immediately after their
independence in 1960. Somalia’s per capita gross national income was
estimated at only $120 (1987 U.S. dollars) in 1989 and since then has
eroded.
With a land area of 637,540 square kilometers and a population of
about 8 million in 1990, 60% of whom are nomads, Somalia is
endowed with few known natural resources, the most promising of
which is the oil potential of North Somalia. Agriculture provides the
livelihood for about 80% of the population, and accounts for more
than 95 % of export earnings and 65 % of the GDP”.
With the current limited pastoral and arable land, insufficient and
unpredictable amount of rainfall, as well as inadequate physical and
social infrastructure, agricultural output erratically occurs,
consequently influencing Somalia’s Gross Domestic Production
output. Many of the newly created African nations during the 1960s,
especially Somalia, had very high hopes about whether the effect of
such independence could be fruitful or destructive to the economy and
politics of each African nation (Froyen 47).
Somalia’s social, political, and economic development since
independence in 1960 had been affected, more than by anything else,
by Somalia’s political makeup and reflected the popular nationalist
feelings among the ethnic Somali population in the African territory to
come together as one community under the leadership of one person
(Pan-Somalism).
The other objective had been economical and had no significant
aspiration of the Somalian government to raise the depressive
economic condition of its residents. Since independence, successive
governments have found themselves frustrated by these two
objectives. Both objectives competed for the narrow resource base of
the Somali economy.
Governments have juggled them, trying simultaneously to achieve
both in order to remain in power. In the first parliamentarian
governments of the 1960s, the Pan-Somalism issue, in particular,
dominated the political agenda. But successive governments failed to
realize the popular expectations, and public dissatisfaction and
frustration were widespread.
In addition, the religious colour of the political makeup of Somalia
can be described as a display of the many significant participants in
the warfare in Liberia and Somalia. The political actors held in strict
compliance all the activities of the Somalian army with its many
sympathizers and other loyal followers. The implementation of a
politically viable mixture includes power, legitimacy, authority and
rule.
Consequently, the political maneuvering focused on the concept of the
Trinitarian war as a valid and useful instructional compliance to
comprehend the very spirit as well as continuity in the country’s war
efforts. The political nature of the significant Somalian players of
power, legitimacy, authority and rule includes the description of
power as being operational.
Operational means the capacity to affect the rational choices of others.
Authority includes the use of legal power to achieve the nation’s goals
and objectives. Further, Somalian rule incorporates the persistent
maintenance of Somalia’s religion-inspired political situation.
Somalian political will includes taking the form of the exercise of
democratic rule by the affected individuals or autocratic rule over a
huge number of responsibilities placed on the shoulders of the
individual leaders.
The Somalian trinity of political leadership, army, and people entails
that the leading players in the religion-inspired political climate actor
will be shown to possess a military force and a group of supporters. In
addition, religion-inspired political Somalian environment included
the armed groups’ use of power.
Basically, power, in the two case studies, was used by the armed
groups organised by and around, among others, Charles Taylor and
Mohammed Aidid in Liberia and Somalia respectively. For the
purposes of this study, these two individuals and their followers will
be the main focus for analysis.
Before it can be proved that these groups exercised power (and
authority and rule) after the collapse of the state, it needs to become
clear whether they possessed power before the country broke down
and where their power was derived from. Fourth, Isabelle Duyvesteyn
(53), proposed Somalia’s political stature includes the implementation
of programs that are prioritized in uplifting its economic conditions.
Somalia’ political makeup includes the “the concepts of power,
authority and rule were applied to the social organisation or faction
itself… politics again has been defined as concerned with power,
authority and rule. Evidence will be presented in this chapter that
supports the claim that political interests drove the interaction in the
two wars”. In particular, the state was the focus of factional
confrontations.
Political interests defined the essence of the two wars. Actors involved
in armed conflict in which the state structures have collapsed do fight
for political interests. First, arguments will be put forward why
political interests are dominant (Mohamoud 73).
In terms of political interests of the defining feature of the war,
Duyvesteyn (75) the non-trinitarian perspective, was that interests
other than the political were dominant, such as control over resources
or ethnicity. However, there is strong empirical evidence that points in
the direction of a dominance of political interests.
Not only were the factions claiming to fight to remove the regime in
power, as already touched on in the previous chapter, but they moved
to the capitals to do so. After the breakdown of the state, the factions
continued their struggle because of competing claims over the future
of the country.
First, the invasions were claimed by the military factions to be
political initiatives. As described earlier, opposition had not been
possible in Liberia and Somalia. In terms of the politics of the strategy
of the African wars, there is convincing proof indicating that, with the
aid of empirical evidence, offering a Clausewitzian and Trinitarian
foundation for the wars in Somalia, which hitherto have usually been
described as non-trinitarian.
The Somalian wars were triggered by a war instrument through which
the aim is to realise political aims, even in cases where the state has
collapsed. Politics was defined as concerned with power, authority
and rule. By using these concepts to analyse the main warring factions
in the two armed conflicts, it can be demonstrated that they strove to
increase their power so as to claim legitimacy in order to acquire
authority and establish rule.
Initially, the factions exercised mainly coercive power, i.e., they
commanded fighters and weaponry. The faction leaders aimed to
transform this power into authority by claiming legitimacy.
Legitimacy was found in existing conventions, such as ethnic and clan
identity, patrimonialism, widely shared beliefs (such as the importance
of social background), military skill of the faction leaders, religion and
symbolism.
Legitimacy was further derived from the actions of those over whom
power was exercised, illustrated by the support from followers, both in
their numbers and in their compliant behaviour. Furthermore, the
actions of foreign actors, as witnessed in negotiations and peace
missions, for example, conferred legitimacy to the factions.
Also, religion was instrumental in turning some types of legitimacy
into authority. When authority had been achieved, it transformed to be
in the best interest of the factions to perpetuate it. Therefore, the
authoritative power had been put into place with less cost than
coercive power. The establishment of rule, i.e., the persistent exercise
of authority, was possible.
The possession of authority by the factions allowed them to create
more legitimacy, among other ways by using this authority. However,
faction rule faced several challenges (Braathen 3). Likewise, Einar
Braathen (15) reiterated religion and ethnicity combined to create a
new political statement. In fact, “during the dramatic events in
SubSaharan Africa issues of ethnicity and contested identities seem to
be at the heart of the matter.
But the crisis in countries like Angola, Congo-Brazzaville,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone and Somalia are really be reduced to ethnic cleavages.
Clear, ethnicity had an essential part in many of the most conflicts in
SubSaharan Africa, in the sense that ethnic affiliations often structure
the composition of groups in conflict.
As a consequence, religion is to blame for the increasing killings and
other criminal acts. Moreover, there is little doubt that one of the main
reasons why people are not having second thoughts in trying to kill
each other. The religion-based ethic political system had
metamorphosed to a certain extent to the identities around which
ethnic and national conflicts are being rivaled.
The political power that connects the different members of the
Somalian community binds them through a process that can be
identified as an adjustment or subjectification. This is a process where
two meanings of the word ‘subject’ become socially constructed
truths: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to
his/her own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.
In terms of religion, Einar Braathan (37) proposed the political
problem includes controlling the emotions of the residents. Usually,
the Somalian individual will eagerly implement an order to kill an
innocent person. Specifically, “Somalia has a new global reputation
— the world’s stereotype of abject, total and violent failure.
This image is the consequence of the implosions of early 1991,
subsequent events of mutual predation and mass starvation, failed
international intervention, and a continuing absence of even the
rudiments of viable national institutions. Given up on as an
unsalvageable people and place, popular as well as official interest in
Somalia has all but evaporated”.
Some of the references to the Somalian nation may be stated with a
sense of combined sadness. Consequently, a once-proud community
clearly accepted their dignity and self-respect. They are currently
lessened reduced to occurring in the foul debris of their socio-
economic and cultural ruin. Likewise, the residents who can escape,
are relegated to the status of unwanted messy persons in exile in
almost part of the global environment.
No one refuses the possible occurrence of the Somalian population.
Likewise, there is a popular sentiment to try to eliminate the post-
colonial environment initially. In terms of the religious of the political
management of the Somalian Economy, the 1980s time period, as well
as the early 1990s centered on the regimes of Samuel Doe in Liberia
and Siad Barre in Somalia, crashed under the continuing pressure of
the local guerrilla attacks.
The end of such kingdoms had not been followed by the
implementation of the new laws. The regimes had been defeated, but
the Somalian country had fallen. One big reason for the end of the
regimes had personalized and privatised the state. The fall of the
regimes had resulted to the demise of the nation.
In addition, Einar Braathan (109) states religion was also instrumental
in the political disintegration of the state. The Somalian disintegration
will be pinpointed as a downfall of territory-wide authority with a
concomitant breakdown of state institutions, covering everything from
civil service, army and police to schools and electricity supply, and
including internationally recognized structures of governance (Hall
61).
This does not mean there is no governance or that a state of anarchy
follows state collapse. Various political and military structures
imposed themselves on the territories of Somalia and Liberia.
Guerrilla groups like the Somali National Movement (SNM), as well
as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), had seemed
evidently organized (or disorganized) as the Somali and Liberian
states.
These two guerrilla groups established political units on parts of the
territory after the breakdown of the Liberian and Somali states.
Further, Einar Braathan (109) proposes religion aids in the
transcending of the discourse on the politics of engaging in war. The
two main ideas behind this volume have been a) to shed critical light
on the reduction of African civil wars to ethnic conflicts, and b) to
argue for the emergence of civil wars as the result of political
struggles over power, resources and identities.
The religion-inspired political Somalian environment implements its
rehabilitation of Africa by instituting some variables that are generally
used to understand the war in another locality had not been preferred
of in terms of the African civil wars (Akou,27).
In addition, Anna Simons (97) emphasized the pastoral ideology as
well as urban occurrences “Although the previous chapters set forth
the parameters of the collapse of the Somali state, we have not yet
considered the effect these expatriate and chronological impacts had
on traditional Somali institutions, or how they shaped daily life in
Mogadishu for the very Somalis on whom expatriates based their
knowledge of Somalia.
In the following chapters, I examine a variety of institutions that have
continued to persist in the urban setting, having been carried over
from pastoral sources. Although these institutions have surely altered
in meaning and purpose with the distances traveled (through space and
time), the pastoral setting itself has also evolved so that pastoralism,
as it is practiced today, is not the same pastoralism early explorers
viewed or I. M. Lewis studied”.
In addition, the theories that had originated from the pastoralism style
of religious practice had retained an integral part of the Somalian
urban environment. In addition, on the ideological level, we again see
confluences: of a rhetorically national Somalia being constructed at
the same era national politics requires the dismemberment into some
interest parts depicted as both prior to and had ever since
independence.
In addition, the combining features of all Somalis include the sharing
the same language and practicing the same Islamic religious policies
that are implemented to help produce a sense of coherent Somalian
nationalism (Morrison 13). Clearly, the two areas themselves had been
used as pawns of war.
In terms, historical religion-inspired political Somalian environment,
(Simmons 39) reiterated the “present decadence of neighboring
Berberah is caused by petty internal feuds. Girhajis the eldest son of
Ishak al-Hazrami, seized the mountain ranges of Gulays and Wagar
lying about forty miles behind the coast, while Awal, the cadet,
established himself and his descendants upon the lowlands from
Berberah to Zayla.
Both these powerful tribes assert a claim to the customs and profits of
the port on the grounds that they jointly conquered it from the Gallas.
The Habr Awal, however, being in possession, would monopolize the
right: a blood feud rages and the commerce of the place suffers from
the dissensions of the owners”. Besides, the Habr Awal tribe is
commonly having internal quarrels.
The two septs, the Ayyal Yunis Nuh and the Ayyal Ahmad Nuh,
established themselves as coming from the community known as
Berberah. The former can be identified as plentiful and numerous.
Jeffrey M. Herbst (229) insists the religion-inspired political Somalian
environment looks to the United States to protect its patrimony as well
as economic partnership (Hirschey 289).
The lessons of Somalia used for the future United States Foreign
Policy includes the United States focusing on the act to “flex its
undeniable muscle for the betterment of less fortunate peoples across
the globe depends on defining the national self-interest in a manner
that would support the existing imperatives of liberal internationalism
against the powerful, quickly allied forces of entropy, disdain,
isolationism, and national narcissism.
That is the new challenge for U.S. foreign policy and the makers of
U.S. foreign policy, wounded as it and they have been by the mistakes
made during and as a result of the U.S. intervention in Somalia”. The
above quote clearly shows that the United States continues one of its
primary functions of focusing on its national legal priorities by
centering on using force in dealing with Somalia’s affairs with other
nations around the world to ensure its political affairs trickle down to
economic gains (Foresman 20).
The processes of intrusion have differed from the classical gunboat
diplomacy to the implementation of proxy wars as well as occupation
of relevant areas. It is very clear that isolationism can be defined as
the fear of being entangled in the messy imbroglios of foreigners–has
always been second nature to Americans.
In addition, religion-inspired political Somalian environment political
implements persuasive adventures in foreign lands that include the
strive for clarification as well as the gesture to override the Somalian
population’s national interests, not just to focus on the necessities of
Somalia’s foreign policy requirements. In addition, many of the
intervention activities include controversy resolutions with external as
well as internal disputes, with criticism generated from some
generations from some disgruntled quarters.
In terms of the religion-inspired political Somalian environment,
Clarke (20) emphasized “Operation Restore Hope covered 40 percent
of Somalia. It was limited to the central and southern regions, and
neither UNITAF nor UNOSOM, with some almost irrelevant
exceptions, established a presence in the northwestern or northeastern
areas of the country.
However, the operation had an impact on all of Somalia, and its
effects countrywide are the focus of this chapter”. The religion-
inspired political Somalian environment includes the use of
international efforts to bring back the original Somali justice system
that includes fundamental flaws in operational planning and
implementation.
Hopefully, reflecting the country’s significant concentration on
Mogadishu, UNITAF did not generate a successful activity to
capitalize on the successful Australian program to restructure the
Somali police and judiciary in Baidoa and the Bay region. The
Somalian political strategy includes accepting the United States’ plan
to proceed with its Operation Restore Hope did not follow successful
lessons from the Gulf War, after which civil affairs units in Kuwait
aided in restricting the police and judiciary.
The Somalian police and judiciary, after the overthrow of Siad Barre
After January 1991, was helpless when Somalia descended into
anarchy and disintegrated into clan dominated areas. The process of
tribal fiefdoms disputes, many areas did perform politically and
economically better than other regions of Somalia.
Specifically, before January 1991, the Somali National Police Force
numbered had reached an estimated 15,000 persons around the
country. It had been segregated into eighteen regional divisions with
approximately ninety police stations located in the districts and over
100 police personnel.
Islam religion on Somalia’s Political Environment
Further, Carl Brown (9) emphasized the Islam religion was very
instrumental in the political process of government the nations. Carl
Brown reiterated “others, even if aware that the Middle East contains
many inhabitants other than Arabs, are inclined to think that the
Muslim world and the Middle East are roughly coterminous.
It is true that the Middle Eastern population is about 90 percent
Muslim, but all the Muslims of the Middle East still add up to a
minority of the world’s Muslim population. Even when defining the
Middle East broadly to embrace the entire Arab world from Morocco
to the Arabian Peninsula plus Iran, Israel, and Turkey the Muslims
thus included are only slightly more than one-third of the world’s
Muslim population” (Brown 9).
In terms of comparison, the most significant Muslim state, Indonesia,
is found in SouthEast Asia. Likewise, the first four Muslim states in
terms of population are all outside the Middle East. Those nations are:
Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and (surprising to many) India with
more than over 100 million Muslims. In terms of comparison, the
Muslim population represents 60 percent of the total Christian
community around the world.
Comparing Islam to Christianity (Schmidt 119), the Muslim “Church
Government” differs from the Christian religious teachings. In Islam,
there is no separation of church and state, of religious organization as
contrasted with a political organization. Likewise, the difference in
religious teachings proceeds to different political priorities (Nasr10).
There are several chances to offer adjustments to the assertions.
Specifically, Carl Brown (29) one significant difference between
Islam and Christianity is that Islam knows no church in the sense of a
corporate body whose leadership is clearly defined, hierarchical, and
distinct from the state. The organizational arrangement of Muslim
religious specialists, or ulama, generates an institutional disagreement
between Muslim church and Muslim state virtually impossible.
Meaning, an ‘alim may state the many negative comments and other
aspects of the ruler. However, the same person cannot canonical call a
Muslim “church council.” In addition, the Nor has opportunities to
pass his charges up the Muslim religious hierarchy until a Muslim
equivalent of pope or council or synod renders a judgment binding on
all members of the “church.” This, at least, upholds as a massive
generalization for Sunni Islam.
As for Twelver Shi’ism, the pronouncements of Iran’s Ayatullah
Khomeini and the mullahs in Iran points to the recommendation that
the clergy there are more nearly a recognizable “church” hierarchy.
This Sunni-Shi’i distinction calls for separate treatment.
In terms of the historical bases of traditional Muslim and Christian
political theory most Muslims and most Christians have for centuries
lived just like most of the people living in Somalia and other countries
where there are possible groups of Muslim residents, Even the religio-
political struggles within Christendom and Islamdom have usually
been intrafaith, such as Protestant versus Catholic or Sunni versus Shi’
I Muslim groups.
In addition, Carl Brown (68) reiterated “a perceptive British diplomat
whose long service in the Middle East began early in this century
captured the cultural counterpart to the Muslim theological tradition of
political quietism in writing: The Egyptian man in the street is very
quick to recognize the facts of power; he does not have to be blown
out of cannons, or even harshly treated to conform.
He will support long years of humiliation and, indeed, of ill-treatment,
buoyed by the golden certainty that somewhere along the road
includes a banana-skin on which the object of his dislike is bound one
day to put his heel”. Another evocative illustration comes from the
great Egyptian nationalist leader, Sa’d Zaghlul, who in an often made
public speeches before a huge crowd to express here hope that the day
will arrive come when the Egyptian ceased regarding government the
way the bird views the hunter.
The sense of impotence before Somalian leadership is also well
displayed in the story of village notables who had focused on sending
a group of representatives to the Ottoman capital asking for the
removal of an oppressive governor. When the governor was able to
know their strike plan, he called the group to his house, escorted them
to a secret room, pointed out a chest and told them to open it.
It was almost filled with lots of gold coins and other large quantities
of precious metals. Stated that he was responsible for increase the
locality’s gold reserves. Consequently, the strikers called off their
strike plans. Also, Carl Brown (52) reiterated “From this internal
perspective it is not so much that Muslim societies failed to link
Islamic thought with political practice but that the Muslim self-image
gave preeminent importance to the ideals of unity and community.
To clarify this interpretation of Islamic political thought, let us recall
two fundamental points already adumbrated in a somewhat different
context. First, the clear relationship of the traditional Muslim political
theory for all later thinking about the role of the state and the political
community plus the natural tendency of any scriptural religion to
emphasize the historical period when the scriptures were revealed
combined to give the political model of the idealized early umma an
unquestionable part in later Muslim philosophies about Somalian
politics.
In addition, a hierarchically that includes a structured clergy charged
with establishing doctrine never developed in the Islamic residents’
area, the religion-inspired political Somalian environment shows there
is no effective institutional way to reconcile differences between
religious dogma and political practice.
In terms of the roots of political pessimism, “Islamic political thought
or, more precisely, Muslim attitudes toward politics and the state
produced a paradox that can be expressed as follows:
1. Islam emphasizes the religious importance of man’s deeds in
this world. Islam decidedly does not turn its back on mundane
matters. Islam, moreover, grew up in early political success.
After that, the overwhelming majority of the world’s Muslims
usually lived free of political threat from non-Muslims—until
modern times. Muslims generally hold on the religious
philosophy that the early umma, which, unlike the early
Christian Church, was a this-worldly religious, political
community par excellence.
2. Yet, this very Islam with such character focused one created a
political culture that nurtured a pessimistic attitude toward
politics and, out of this political pessimism, a submissive
attitude toward government. While never developing anything
like the Christian separation of church and state, Islamic culture
did foster a de facto separation of state and society.
This separation of state and society was never explicitly recognized as
legitimate. The idealized early umma as led by the Prophet and after
that the four rightly guided caliphs (and the equivalent imamate of
Shi’ism) was the only legitimate model of Islamic government.
Based on the above discussion, religion affects politics in Somalia,
especially since the country is unstable. The religious influences affect
the Somalian political activities. The research shows that Islam as one
of the religions that has precipitated to the Somalian country into the
political abyss known as unstableness.
The research discussion indicates Islam is a government benchmark
guide in terms of political policies implemented within and outside the
Somalian political environment. Indeed, religion is a powerful factor
that affects the political activity of the nation.
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