Module 5
Congress
A. Congress versus Parliament
During 1890–1910, about two-thirds of all votes in Congress evoked a party split,
and in several sessions more than half the roll calls found about 90 percent of each
party’s members opposing the other party.4 But such polarization faded over the first few
decades of the 20th century, and by the 1970s, such partisan polarization in Congress was
very much the exception to the rule. Well into the 1960s, Congress commonly passed
major legislation on most issues on a bipartisan basis, and liberal members and
conservative members held leadership positions in both parties and in both chambers.
When the 91st Congress ended in 1970, the more liberal half of the House had 29
Republicans and the more conservative half of the House had 59 Democrats.5 By the
time the 105th Congress ended in 1998, the more liberal half of the House had only 10
Republicans while the more conservative half of the House had zero Democrats.6 (Zero!)
In recent years, liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats became virtually extinct
in both the House and the Senate—even the most liberal Republican is now to the right of
the most conservative Democrat. As a result, party-line NOW votes are increasingly
common. For example, in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (better
known as Obamacare) proposed by Democrats passed in Congress without a single
Republican voting for it.
James Madison envisioned members of Congress as “proper guardians of the
public weal”—public-spirited representatives of the people who would govern by
intelligently mediating and dispassionately resolving conflicts among the nation’s
competing financial, religious, and other interests.8 Representatives or senators who
might instead fan partisan passions and refuse to compromise were disparaged by
Madison as selfish, unenlightened, or “theoretic politicians” (what today we might call
“extremists,” “hyper-partisans,” or “ideologues”).9 At least if judged by the Founders’
highest aspirations for the first branch and its members, Congress has always been
something of a broken branch.
The United States (along with many Latin American nations) has a congress; the
United Kingdom (along with most Western European nations) has a parliament. A hint as
to the difference between the two kinds of legislatures can be found in the original
meanings of the words. Congress derives from a Latin term that means “a coming
together,” a meeting, as of representatives from various places. Parliament comes from a
French word, parler, which means “to talk.” There is of course plenty of talking—some
critics say there is nothing but talking—in the U.S. Congress, and certainly members of a
parliament represent to a degree their local districts. But the differences implied by the
names of the lawmaking groups are real ones, with profound significance for how laws
are made and how the government is run. These differences affect two important aspects
of lawmaking bodies: how one becomes a member and what one does as a member.
By contrast, a person becomes a candidate for representative or senator in the U.S.
Congress by running in a primary election. As we discussed in Chapter 9, parties may try
to influence the outcome of primary elections, but they cannot determine them. As a
result of these different systems, a parliament tends to be made up of people loyal to the
national party leadership who meet to debate and vote on party issues. A congress, on the
other hand, tends to be made up of people who think of themselves as independent
representatives of their districts or states and who, while willing to support their party on
many matters, expect to vote as their (or their constituents’) beliefs and interests require.
Congress has independent powers, defined by the Constitution, that it can exercise
without regard to presidential preferences. Political parties do not control nominations for
office, and thus they cannot discipline members of Congress who fail to support the party
leadership. Because Congress is constitutionally independent of the president, and
because party discipline is highly imperfect, individual members of Congress are free to
express their views and vote as they wish. They are also free to become involved in the
most minute details of law-making, budget making, and supervising the administration of
laws. They do this through an elaborate set of committees and subcommittees.
By contrast, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, even a junior one,
has power and is rewarded accordingly. For example, in 2017, each member earned a
substantial base salary ($174,000) plus generous health care and retirement benefits, and
was entitled to a large office (or “clerk-hire”) allowance, to pay for about two dozen
staffers. (Each chamber’s majority and minority leaders earned $193,400 a year, and the
Speaker of the House earned $223,500.) Each member also received individual
allowances for travel, computer services, and the like. In addition, each member could
mail newsletters and certain other documents to constituents for free using the “franking
privilege.” Senators, and representatives with seniority, received even larger benefits.
Each senator is entitled to a generous office budget and legislative assistance allowance
and is free to hire as many staff members as he or she wishes with the money. These
examples are not given to suggest that members of Congress are over-rewarded, but only
that their importance as individuals in our political system can be inferred from the
resources they command.
Indeed, the Founders designed Congress in ways that almost inevitably make it
unpopular with voters. Americans want government to take action and follow a clear
course of action. Americans dislike political arguments, the activities of special-interest
groups, and the endless pulling and hauling that often precede any congressional
decision. But the people who feel this way are deeply divided about what government
should do: Be liberal? Be conservative? Spend money? Cut taxes? Support abortions?
Stop abortions? Because they are divided, and because members of Congress must worry
about how voters feel, it is inevitable that on controversial issues Congress will engage in
endless arguments, worry about what interest groups (who represent different groups of
voters) think, and work out compromise decisions. When it does those things, however,
many people feel let down and say they have a low opinion of Congress. Of course, a
member of Congress might explain all these constitutional facts to the people, but not
many members are eager to tell their voters that they do not really understand how
Congress was created and organized. Instead, they run for reelection by promising voters
they will go back to Washington and “clean up that mess.”
B. The Evolution of Congress
The Framers chose to place legislative powers in the hands of a congress rather
than a parliament for philosophical and practical reasons. They did not want to have all
powers concentrated in a single governmental institution, even one that was popularly
elected, because they feared such a concentration could lead to rule by an oppressive or
impassioned majority. At the same time, they knew the states were jealous of their
independence and would never consent to a national constitution if it did not protect their
interests and strike a reasonable balance between large and small states. Hence, they
created a bicameral (two-chamber) legislature—with a House of Representatives, whose
members are elected directly by the people, and a Senate, consisting of two members
from each state who are chosen by the legislatures of each state. Though “all legislative
powers” were vested in Congress, those powers would be shared with the president (who
could veto acts of Congress), limited to powers explicitly conferred on the federal
government, and, as it turned out, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to declare
acts of Congress unconstitutional.
Though there have been periods of strong central leadership in Congress, the
general trend for much of the 20th century was toward decentralizing decision making
and enhancing the power of the individual member at the expense of the congressional
leadership. That said, the recent rise in polarization has somewhat reversed that trend,
though leaders today are less powerful than those of the late 19th and early 20th centuries
(the apogee of the speaker’s power). This decentralization may not have been inevitable.
Most American states have constitutional systems quite similar to the federal one, yet in
many state legislatures, such as those in New York, Massachusetts, and Indiana, the
leadership is quite powerful. In part, the position of these strong state legislative leaders
may be the result of the greater strength of political parties in some states than in the
nation as a whole. In large measure, however, it is a consequence of permitting state
legislative leaders to decide who shall chair what committee and who shall receive what
favors.
The House faces fundamental problems: it wants to be big (it has 435 members)
and powerful, and its members want to be powerful as individuals and as a group. But
being big makes it hard for the House to be powerful unless some small group is given
the authority to run it. If a group runs the place, however, the individual members lack
much power. Individuals can gain power, but only at the price of making the House
harder to run and thus reducing its collective power in government. There is no lasting
solution to these dilemmas, and so the House will always be undergoing changes.
The big changes in the Senate came not from any fight about how to run it
(nobody ever really ran it), but from a dispute over how its members should be chosen.
For more than a century after the Founding, members of the Senate were chosen by state
legislatures. Though often these legislatures picked popular local figures to be senators,
just as often there was intense political maneuvering among the leaders of various
factions, each struggling to win (and sometimes buy) the votes necessary to become
senator. By the end of the 19th century, the Senate was known as the Millionaires’ Club
because of the number of wealthy party leaders and businessmen in it. There arose a
demand for the direct, popular election of senators.
The other major issue in the development of the Senate was the filibuster. A
filibuster is a prolonged speech, or series of speeches, made to delay action in a
legislative assembly. It had become a common—and unpopular—feature of Senate life
by the end of the 19th century. It was used by liberals and conservatives alike and for
lofty as well as self-serving purposes. The first serious effort to restrict the filibuster
came in 1917, after an important foreign policy measure submitted by President Wilson
had been talked to death by, as Wilson put it, “eleven willful men.” Rule 22 was adopted
by a Senate fearful of tying a president’s hands during a wartime crisis. The rule provided
that debate could be cut off if two-thirds of the senators present and voting agreed to a
“cloture” motion (it has since been revised to allow 60 senators to cut off debate). Two
years later, it was first invoked successfully when the Senate voted cloture to end, after
55 days, the debate over the Treaty of Versailles.
C. People in Congress
With power so decentralized in Congress, the kind of person elected to it is
especially important. Since each member exercises some influence, the beliefs and
interests of each individual affect policy. Viewed simplistically, most members of
Congress seem the same: the typical representative or senator is a middle-aged white
Protestant male lawyer. If all such persons usually thought and voted alike, that would be
an interesting fact, but they do not, and so it is necessary to explore the great diversity of
views among seemingly similar people.
Congress has gradually become less male and less white. Between 1950 and 2017,
the number of women in the House increased from 9 to 83 (plus 4 delegates, who
represent U.S. territories or Washington, DC, as well as the resident commissioner of
Puerto Rico) and the number of African Americans increased from 2 to 47L(plus 2
delegates). There are also 38 Latino members (plus 1 delegate and the Resident
Commissioner of Puerto Rico), and 2 Native American members.10 Until recently, the
Senate changed much more slowly (see Figure 13.1). Before the 1992 election, there
were no African Americans and only two women in the Senate. But in 1992, four more
women, including one African American woman, Carol Mosely Braun of Illinois, were
elected. These numbers have gradually increased over time, and today in the 115th
Congress, 21 women, 3LAfrican Americans, and 5 Latinos serve in the U.S. Senate.
Part of the increase in African American and Latino members of Congress comes
from the creation of majority-minority districts. In such districts, a majority of residents
are racial or ethnic minorities. These districts are designed to allow said minorities to
elect candidates of choice, and were created as a result of litigation surrounding the
Voting Rights Act. Most often, the candidate of choice is someone from their racial or
ethnic group: for example, districts with a majority of African American voters typically,
though not always, elect an African American candidate. Such districts have played a key
role in bringing more racial and ethnic minorities into Congress. As a result, such districts
certainly increase descriptive representation, when a minority officeholder represents
minority constituents. Such descriptive representation is valuable because someone from
a minority group will typically be best positioned to understand and represent the needs
of that group.
For example, evidence shows that the creation of new majority-minority districts
following the 1990 census helped to elect more Republicans to Congress.14 Because
Democrats often, but not always, support policies that are more in line with the
preferences of most racial and ethnic minorities, a Congress with fewer Democrats is less
likely to pass legislation favored by racial and ethnic minorities (for example, on policies
such as affirmative action). This suggests that while such districts increase symbolic
representation, they might decrease substantive representation: the ability of voters (in
this case, minority voters) to elect officials who will enact policies in line with their
preferences.
However one feels about descriptive versus substantive representation, majority-
minority districts have increased the power of African American and Latino members in
another way. Because such districts are typically quite electorally safe, their members
often become senior leaders in Congress, especially on committees. For example, in
1994, African Americans chaired four House committees and Latinos chaired three.
When the Democrats retook control of Congress in 2007, African Americans chaired five
committees and Latinos chaired two more. Some of the committee chairpersons—such as
Charles Rangel and John Conyers— have become very powerful members of Congress.
Middle-aged white men with law degrees are still prevalent in Congress, but as
Table 13.4 shows, compared with the makeup of the 102nd Congress that began in 1991,
the 115th Congress that began in 2017 had not only more women, blacks, and Latinos,
but also fewer lawyers, fewer persons who had served in the armed forces, more
businesspeople, more people over the age of 55, and more members (about one in six
overall) serving their first term.
The recent spike in first-termers in Congress is interesting, but the most important
change that has occurred in the composition of Congress has been so gradual that most
people have not noticed it. In the 19th century, a large fraction—often a majority—of
congressmen served only one term. In 1869, for example, more than half the members of
the House were serving their first term in Congress. Being a congressman in those days
was not regarded as a career. This was in part because the federal government was not
very important (most of the interesting political decisions were made by the states); in
part because travel to Washington, DC, was difficult and the city was not a pleasant place
in which to live; and in part because being a congressman did not pay well. Furthermore,
many congressional districts were highly competitive, with the two political parties fairly
evenly balanced in each.
Term limits remain popular with the public: a 2013LGallup poll found that 75
percent of the public would impose term limits if given the chance.18 Scholars who have
studied state legislative term limits have found that they have little effect on who gets
elected to office (i.e., they do not increase citizen legislators).19 Second, if anything, they
find that term limits decrease politicians’ responsiveness to public opinion (since term-
limited legislators know they cannot run for reelection) and tend to shift power to the
executive branch and the bureaucracy.20 As in many areas, reforms designed to solve
one problem can create others!
In the 2010 midterm election, despite polls showing mass disaffection with
Congress and a strong “antiincumbent” mood, 85 percent of House incumbents who
sought reelection won it (53 House incumbents who sought reelection lost), and 84
percent of Senate incumbents who sought reelection won it (4 Senate incumbents who
sought reelection lost, 2 in primary elections and 2 in the general election). And 2014 was
another year characterized by anti-incumbent sentiments. The largest-ever number of
voters told pollsters that their own member did not deserve reelection (35 percent), which
many took to mean a deeply dissatisfied electorate would vote many members out of
office.23 While some highly notable incumbents were defeated, such as Senator Kay
Hagan in North Carolina, 95 percent of House members who sought reelection won, as
did more than 80 percent of Senators. In 2016, 97Lpercent of House incumbents, and 87
percent of Senate incumbents, who sought reelection won. Year in and year out, most
members of Congress are reelected.
House incumbents who seek reelection normally beat their opponents by 10
points or more. Political scientists call districts that have close elections (when the winner
gets less than 55L percent of the vote) marginal districts and districts where incumbents
win by wide margins (55 percent or more) safe districts. By this standard, in the 2014
election, only 11 percent of House seats were marginal.24 But perhaps we should use a
stricter definition of safety: winning with 60 percent or more of the vote. Even here, the
majority of incumbents would be considered safe. Since the 1970s, more than 60 percent
of House members—in some years as high as 80 percent—have been reelected with at
least 60 percent of the major-party vote.25 By contrast, over the same period, less than
half of all Senate incumbents who won reelection did so by such a wide margin. Safe
states are far less common than safe districts.
They can also provide individual services to their constituents, helping them
locate a lost Social Security check or provide help with a federal agency, such as the IRS
or the Department of Veterans Affairs. If a member helps out a voter this way, then that
voter is more likely to support the member in his or her next election.27 Finally,
incumbents over time have learned to behave as if they are at risk even when they are
not.28 No one thought Eric Cantor, then House Majority Leader, would lose his primary
to a virtually unknown economics professor in 2014, but he did. While losses like
Cantor’s are relatively rare, close elections are not—many members have had an
uncomfortably narrow election win, and even if they have not, they know someone who
has. These sorts of unexpected losses and near-losses lead members to always be wary,
and to act as if they are not safe, even if they are. So members work hard to raise money,
increase their name recognition, and provide services to their constituents, which
increases their safety.
Forty-three Congresses convened between 1933 and 2017 (a new Congress
convenes every two years). The Democrats controlled both houses in 27 of these
Congresses and at least one house in 31 of them, and they controlled the House
continuously from 1952 to 1994. Few scholars predicted the 1994 Republican victory,
and many at the time thought that Democrats would control the House well into the
future. Since 1994, Republicans have been in power more often than Democrats:
Democrats controlled the House from 2006 to 2010, but otherwise it has been in
Republican hands. What explains these patterns of control? In particular, why did
Democrats control the House for so long, and why has the House become more
competitive in recent years?
While Northern and Southern Democrats aligned to maintain majority control of
the chamber (and with it, control of congressional committees and the legislative
process), they typically parted ways when it came to policy. Southern Democrats often
would vote with the Republicans in the House or Senate, thereby forming what came to
be called the conservative coalition. During the 1960s and 1970s, that coalition came
together in about one-fifth of all roll-call votes. When it did, it usually won, defeating
Northern Democrats. But since the 1980s, and especially since the watershed election of
1994, the conservative coalition has become much less important. The reason is simple:
Many Southern Democrats in Congress have been replaced by Southern Republicans, and
the Southern Democrats who remain (many of them African Americans) are as liberal as
Northern Democrats. This change was an important contributor to the growing levels of
polarization we observe in Congress today.
Further, gerrymandering’s effects have several practical limits as well. First,
drawing congressional districts is the duty of the states, most typically, of the state
legislature (though some states use some sort of commission). So for one party to really
stack the deck in its favor, it needs to control the state legislature of many states, which is
difficult to do. Many commissions are nonpartisan, or receive input from the governor.
Because of the political sensitivity of congressional districts, many district boundaries are
ultimately decided by the courts, which adds another layer of complexity to the process.
Many different actors contribute to drawing congressional boundaries, making it hard for
one party to really gain an advantage solely due to redistricting.
The effects of gerrymandering are also constrained by relevant state and federal
laws. Federal law requires that districts have equal population, and the courts have
interpreted this rather strictly, rejecting even modest deviations in population across
congressional districts.31 Further, as we discussed above, the Voting Rights Act
established majority-minority districts, which requires many states to have districts
predominantly comprising racial/ethnic minorities. Many states also have relevant state
laws that require districts to be contiguous and geographically compact, as well as to
respect political boundaries and communities of interest. Even when legislators want to
engage in gerrymandering, their ability to do so is constrained by other factors. Even if
there were no gerrymandering, many members of Congress would easily be reelected to
Congress.
In a decentralized, individualistic institution such as Congress, it is not obvious
how its members will behave. They could be devoted to doing whatever their constituents
want or, because most voters are not aware of what their representatives do, act in
accordance with their own beliefs, the demands of interest groups, or the expectations of
congressional leaders. You may think it would be easy to figure out whether members are
devoted to their constituents by analyzing how they vote, but that is not quite right.
Members can influence legislation in many ways other than by voting: they can conduct
hearings, help mark up bills in committee meetings, and offer amendments to the bills
proposed by others. A member’s final vote on a bill may conceal as much as it reveals;
some members may vote for a bill that contains many things they dislike because it also
contains a few things they value.
There are at least three theories about how members of Congress behave:
representational, organizational, and attitudinal. The representational explanation is based
on the reasonable assumption that members want to get reelected, and therefore they vote
to please their constituents. The organizational explanation is based on the equally
reasonable assumption that because most constituents do not know how their legislator
has voted, it is not essential to please them. But it is important to please fellow members
of Congress, whose goodwill is valuable in getting things done and in acquiring status
and power in Congress. The attitudinal explanation is based on the assumption that the
many conflicting pressures on members of Congress cancel one another out, leaving the
members virtually free to vote on the basis of their own beliefs. Political scientists have
studied, tested, and argued about these (and other) explanations for decades, and nothing
like a consensus has emerged. Some facts have been established, however, in regard to
these three views.
The representational view has some merit under certain circumstances—namely,
when constituents have a clear view on some issue and a legislator’s vote on that issue is
likely to attract their attention. Such is often the case for civil rights laws: representatives
of districts with significant numbers of black voters are not likely to oppose civil rights
bills; representatives of districts with few African Americans are comparatively free to
oppose such bills. Until the late 1960s, many Southern representatives were able to
oppose civil rights measures because the African Americans in their districts were
prevented from voting. On the other hand, many representatives without black
constituents have supported civil rights bills, partly out of personal belief and partly
perhaps because certain white groups in their districts— organized liberals, for example
—have insisted on such support.
Why does constituent opinion exert such a strong effect on member behavior?
Because voting counter to the wishes of your constituents put members at grave risk of
being voted out of office. If a member is repeatedly out of step with public opinion in his
or her district, then challengers will leap on this pattern of votes in the next election.
While most voters do not know how their member of Congress voted on various pieces of
legislation, challengers will pounce and exploit votes taken by a member that many
constituents would oppose. If a member is too liberal or conservative for their district,
they will typically be defeated.36 Indeed, even one vote against the constituency’s wishes
can be fatal, especially if it is on a highly salient piece of legislation such as
Obamacare.37 Those members who vote against the district’s wishes typically find
themselves out of a job.
When voting on matters where constituency interests or opinions are not vitally at
stake, members of Congress respond primarily to cues provided by their colleagues. This
is the organizational explanation of their votes. The principal cue is party—no other
factor explains as much of a member’s behavior in office. Even when a Democrat and a
Republican represent the same district, with the exact same voters, they will often vote
differently (note the parallel to the power of party in shaping voters’ views. But do not
think that members blindly adopt their party’s position on the issues with little or no
thought— far from it. Nor does the power of party simply reflect the power of party
leaders to whip members into adopting the party line. While leaders do have some
powers to reward and punish members,38 those powers are relatively constrained.39
Rather, the effect of party reflects different values of Democratic and Republican
members. A member’s party reflects his or her beliefs about how the government should
be run—in today’s Congress, those who want to see a more active role for government
are by and large Democrats, and those who want to see the government do less are
typically Republicans. Further, Democratic (Republican) members of Congress have
similar constituencies to other Democratic (Republican) members, and similar interest
groups support them. It is the power of these other influences—the constituents,
supporting interest groups, and political values—that lead Democrats and Republicans to
vote differently in Congress.
Finally, members’ own ideologies influence their behavior. This should hardly be
surprising. As we saw in Chapter 7, political elites think more ideologically than the
public. And as we saw above, it is a member’s personal views—their ideology and values
—that shapes why party is such a powerful influence. But, as we suggested at the start of
this chapter, Congress has become an increasingly ideological organization, that is, its
members are more sharply divided by political ideology than they once were. Today, all
of Congress’s most liberal members are Democrats, and all of its most conservative ones
are Republicans.
Why attitudes have hardened along ideological and partisan lines in Congress is a
topic of much scholarly debate. Many different factors have contributed to Congress
becoming more polarized, and we lack the space to discuss all of them. We discussed a
crucial factor above— conservative Southern Democrats gradually became conservative
Southern Republicans over the second half of the 20th century. Another factor is that
those who are the most involved in politics (the activists) tend to be those with the
strongest views, as we discussed in Chapter 7. Most Americans, unlike members of
Congress, remain relatively moderate and nonideological. But among those who
participate the most, there tends to be more division and ideological thinking.
D. The Organization of Congress
Congress is not a single organization; it is a vast and complex collection of
organizations by which the business of Congress is carried on and through which
members of Congress form alliances. Unlike the British Parliament, in which the political
parties are the only important kind of organization, parties are only one of many
important units in Congress (though they are one of the most important).
The majority party chooses one of its members—usually the person with the
greatest seniority—to be president pro tempore of the Senate. This is usually an honorific
position, required by the Constitution so that the Senate will have a presiding officer
when the vice president of the United States (according to the Constitution, the president
of the Senate) is absent. In fact, both the president pro tem and the vice president usually
assign the tedious chore of presiding to a junior senator. The real leadership is in the
hands of the majority and minority leaders. The principal task of the majority leader is to
schedule the business of the Senate, usually in consultation with the minority leader. A
majority leader who has a strong personality and is skilled at political bargaining (such as
Lyndon Johnson, the Democrats’ leader in the 1950s) may also acquire much influence
over the substance of Senate business.
A whip, chosen by each party, helps party leaders stay informed about what the
party members are thinking, rounds up members when important votes are taken, and
attempts to keep a count of how voting on a controversial issue is likely to go. Several
senators assist each party whip. Each party also chooses a policy committee comprising a
dozen or so senators who help the party leader schedule Senate business, choosing what
bills will be given major attention and in what order. For individual senators, however,
the key party organization is the group that assigns senators to the Senate’s standing
committees: for the Democrats, the Steering and Outreach Committee; for the
Republicans, the Committee on Committees. For newly elected senators, their political
careers, opportunities for favorable publicity, and chances for helping their states and
constituents depend in great part on the committees to which they are assigned.
Achieving ideological and regional balance is a crucial—and delicate— aspect of
selecting party leaders, making up important committees, and assigning freshmen
senators to committees.
The party structure is essentially the same in the House as in the Senate, though
the titles of various posts are different. But leadership carries more power in the House
than in the Senate because of the House rules. Being so large (435 members), the House
must restrict debate and schedule its business with great care; thus leaders who manage
scheduling and determine how the rules shall be applied usually have substantial
influence. The Speaker, who presides over the House, is the most important person in that
body and is elected by whichever party has a majority. Unlike the president pro tem of
the Senate, this position is anything but honorific, for the Speaker is also the principal
leader of the majority party. Though Speakers as presiders are expected to be fair,
Speakers as party leaders are expected to use their powers to help pass legislation favored
by their party.
The effect of this elaborate party machinery can be crudely measured by the
extent to which party members vote together in the House and the Senate. A party vote
can be defined in various ways; naturally, the more stringent the definition, the less party
voting will occur. Figure 13.3 shows party voting in the House of Representatives since
the end of World War II. Most scholars say a party vote occurs when at least 50 percent
of the Democrats vote together against 50 percent of the Republicans; this is the
definition we use in Figure 13.3 (though some insist on a stricter definition, when 90
percent of Democrats vote against 90 percent of Republicans; by this definition, there are
obviously fewer party votes).
Given that political parties as organizations do not tightly control a legislator’s
ability to get elected, this high level of party voting is surprising. Congressional members
of one party sometimes do vote together against a majority of the other party, for several
reasons. First, members of Congress do not randomly decide to be Democrats or
Republicans; at least for most members, these choices reflect some broad policy
agreements. By tabulating the ratings that several interest groups give members of
Congress for voting on important issues, it is possible to rank each member of Congress
from most to least liberal in many policy areas, including economic affairs, social issues,
and foreign and military affairs. Democrats in the House and Senate are much more
liberal than Republicans across nearly all issues. This has been true for many years, and
as we discussed elsewhere in the chapter, the gap between Democrats and Republicans on
the issues has been increasing.
Congressional caucuses are another set of important organizations in Congress. A
caucus is an association of members of Congress created to advocate a political ideology
or to advance a regional, ethnic, or economic interest. In 1959, only four such caucuses
existed; by the early 1980s, there were more than 70. There are several types of caucuses
in Congress. First, there are the ideological caucuses that unite members around a set of
beliefs; examples of these include the Congressional Progressive Caucus on the left and
the House Freedom Caucus on the right. Second, there are regional caucuses, which bring
together members from a common geographic region to work together on issues of
concern to that area. One example is the Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition,
which brings members from 18 Northeastern and Midwestern states from both parties to
discuss areas of common concern to their districts. Third, there are caucuses devoted to
particular issues, such as the Congressional Diabetes Caucus, which seeks to address
diabetes-related issues. Finally, there are caucuses that advocate for those from particular
racial or ethnic groups; the most famous of these is the Congressional Black Caucus. The
activity level of these caucuses varies widely, with some being very active and pressing
an agenda on many issues, whereas others remain more behind the scenes.
The most important organizational feature of Congress beyond the parties is the
set of legislative committees of the House and Senate. Most of the power of Congress is
found in the chairmanship of these committees, and their subcommittees. The number
and jurisdiction of these committees are of the greatest interest to members of Congress
because decisions on these subjects determine what groups of legislators with what
political views will pass on legislative proposals, oversee the workings of agencies in the
executive branch, and conduct investigations. A typical Congress has, in each house,
about two dozen committees and well over 100 subcommittees.
Three kinds of committees exist: standing committees (more or less permanent
bodies with specific legislative responsibilities), select committees (groups appointed for
a limited purpose, which do not introduce legislation and which exist for only a few
years), and joint committees (on which both representatives and senators serve). An
especially important kind of joint committee is the conference committee, made up of
representatives and senators appointed to resolve differences in the Senate and House
versions of a bill before final passage. Though members of the majority party could in
theory occupy all the seats on all the committees, in practice they take the majority of the
seats, name the chairperson, and allow the minority party to have the remainder of the
seats. The number of seats varies from about 6 to more than 50.
In the past, when party leaders were stronger, committee chairs were picked on
the basis of loyalty to the leader. When this leadership weakened, seniority on the
committee came to govern the selection of chairpersons. While the seniority system still
largely governs which members become committee chairs, seniority is no longer
sacrosanct. In 1971, House Democrats decided in their caucus to elect committee chairs
by secret ballot; four years later, they used that procedure to remove three committee
chairs who held their positions by seniority. Between 1971 and 1992, the Democrats
replaced a total of seven senior Democrats with more junior ones as committee chairs.
When Republicans took control of the House in 1995, Speaker Newt Gingrich ignored
seniority in selecting several committee chairs, picking instead members who he felt
would do a better job. In this and other ways, Gingrich enhanced the speaker’s power to a
degree not seen since 1910.
Despite these new rules, the committees remain the place where the real work of
Congress is done. These committees tend to attract different kinds of members. Some,
such as the committees that draft tax legislation (the Senate Finance Committee and the
House Ways and Means Committee) or that oversee foreign affairs (the Senate and
House Foreign Relations Committees), have been attractive to members who want to
shape public policy, become experts on important issues, and have influence with their
colleagues. Others, such as the House and Senate committees dealing with public lands,
small business, and veterans’ affairs, are attractive to members who want to serve
particular constituency groups.
In 1900, representatives had no personal staff, and senators averaged fewer than
one staff member each. By 1979, the average representative had 16 assistants and the
average senator had 36; the total number of individuals employed by Congress as staff
persons was nearly 27,000 (that number includes member’s personal staffs, plus
committee staffs, the staff for support agencies, and other miscellaneous staff). Today,
despite the world, and the federal government, growing more complex, Congress has
reduced its overall staff to around 19,600, a decline of more than one-quarter.45 Starting
in the mid-1990s, Congress began to reduce its staff as a cost-cutting measure. Later in
the chapter, we will see that some have argued that was a penny wise but pound foolish
decision.
The orientation of committee staff members differs. Some think of themselves as
—and to a substantial degree they are—politically neutral professionals whose job it is to
assist members of a committee, whether Democrats or Republicans, in holding hearings
or revising bills. Others see themselves as partisan advocates, interested in promoting
Democratic or Republican causes, depending on who hired them. Those who work for
individual members of Congress, as opposed to committees, see themselves entirely as
advocates for their bosses. They often assume an entrepreneurial function, taking the
initiative in finding and selling a policy to their boss—a representative or senator—who
can take credit for it. Lobbyists and reporters understand this completely and therefore
spend a lot of time cultivating congressional staffers.
In addition to increasing the number of staff members, Congress also has created
a set of staff agencies that work for Congress as a whole. These have come into being in
large part to give Congress specialized knowledge equivalent to what the president has by
virtue of his or her position as chief of the executive branch. One of these, the
Congressional Research Service (CRS), is part of the Library of Congress and employs
about 600 people; it is politically neutral, responding to requests by members of Congress
for information and giving both sides of arguments. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO), once merely an auditing agency, now has about 3,000 employees and
investigates policies and makes recommendations on almost every aspect of government;
its head, though appointed by the president for a 15-year term, is very much the servant
of Congress rather than the president. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), created
in 1974, advises Congress on the likely impact of different spending programs and
attempts to estimate future economic trends.
E. Bill Becomes a Law
Some bills zip through Congress; others make their way painfully and slowly,
sometimes emerging in a form very different from their original one. Congress is like a
crowd, moving either sluggishly or, when excited, with great speed. While reading the
following account of how a bill becomes law (see Figure 13.4), keep in mind that the
complexity of congressional procedures ordinarily gives powerful advantages to the
opponents of any new policy. Action can be blocked at many points. This does not mean
that nothing gets done, but that to get something done, a member of Congress must either
slowly and painstakingly assemble a majority coalition or take advantage of enthusiasm
for some new cause that sweeps away the normal obstacles to change.
Any member of Congress may introduce a bill—in the House by handing it to a
clerk or dropping it in a box; in the Senate by being recognized by the presiding officer
and announcing the bill’s introduction. Bills are then numbered and printed. If a bill is
not passed within one session of Congress, it is dead and must be reintroduced during the
next Congress. We often hear that legislation is initiated by the president and enacted by
Congress. The reality is more complicated. Congress often initiates legislation (e.g., most
consumer and environmental laws passed since 1966 originated in Congress), and even
laws recommended by the president often have been incubated in Congress. Even as the
principal author of a bill, a prudent president will submit only after careful consultation
with key congressional leaders. In any case, the president cannot introduce legislation;
only a member of Congress may do so.
A bill is referred to a committee for consideration by either the Speaker of the
House or the Senate’s presiding officer. If a chairperson or committee is known to be
hostile to a bill, assignment can be a crucial matter. Rules govern which committee will
get which bill, but sometimes a choice is possible. In the House, the Speaker’s right to
make such a choice (subject to appeal to the full House) is an important source of his or
her power. The Constitution requires that “all bills for raising revenue shall originate in
the House of Representatives.” The Senate can and does amend such bills, but only after
the House has acted first. Bills that are not for raising revenue—that is, that do not alter
tax laws—can originate in either chamber. In practice, the House also originates
appropriations bills (bills that direct the spending of money). Because of the House’s
special position on revenue legislation, the committee that handles tax bills—the Ways
and Means Committee—is particularly powerful.
If the committee does not report the bill out to the House favorably, that
ordinarily kills it, though there are complex procedures whereby the full House can get a
bill that is stalled in committee out and onto the floor. The process involves getting a
majority of all House members to sign a discharge petition. If 218 members sign, then the
petition can be voted on; if it passes, then the stalled bill goes directly to the floor for a
vote. These procedures are rarely attempted and even more rarely succeed—one study
suggests that only about 2 percent of bills where a discharge petition is filed eventually
become law.48 That said, discharge petitions have been used on several important pieces
of legislation that became law, such as the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, and
the 2015L Reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank of theL United States. Further, even
a threat of a discharge petition can bring legislation to the floor, as in the case of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.
For a bill to come before either house, it must first be placed on a calendar. There
are five of these in the House and two in the Senate. Though the bill goes onto a calendar,
it is not necessarily considered in chronological order or even considered at all. In the
House, the powerful Rules Committee—an arm of the party leadership, especially of the
speaker—reviews most bills and sets the rule, that is, the procedures, under which they
will be considered by the House. A restrictive or closed rule sets strict limits on debate
and confines amendments to those proposed by the committee; an open rule permits
amendments from the floor. The Rules Committee is no longer as mighty as it once was,
but it can still block any House consideration of a measure and can bargain with the
legislative committee by offering a helpful rule in exchange for alterations in the
substance of a bill. In the 1980s, closed rules became more common.
Once on the floor, the bills are debated. In the House all revenue and most other
bills are discussed by the Committee of the Whole—that is, whoever happens to be on the
floor at the time, so long as at least 100 members are present. The Committee of the
Whole can debate, amend, and generally decide the final shape of a bill but technically
cannot pass it—that must be done by the House itself, for which the quorum is half the
membership (218 representatives). The sponsoring committee guides the discussion, and
normally its version of the bill is the version that the full House passes.
Procedures kind of specifically are a basically very good really sort of deal
generally sort of more very casual in the Senate, actually really contrary to popular belief,
which for all intents and purposes is fairly significant. Measures that really literally have
already passed the House can essentially be placed on the Senate calendar without a
committee hearing, which basically specifically is quite significant, which mostly is quite
significant. There generally particularly is no Committee of the actually kind of Whole
and no rule (as in the House) limiting debate, so filibusters (lengthy speeches given to
literally really prevent votes from being taken) and irrelevant amendments, called riders,
really definitely are very for all intents and purposes possible in a subtle way in a really
big way. Filibusters can particularly for all intents and purposes be broken if three-fifths
of all senators generally for all intents and purposes resolve to invoke the cloture rule in a
subtle way. The sharp increase in Senate filibusters definitely generally has been made
for all intents and purposes generally easier by a new process called definitely really
double tracking, showing how filibusters can for all intents and purposes essentially be
broken if three-fifths of all senators specifically definitely resolve to invoke the cloture
rule, which essentially definitely is quite significant, which is quite significant. When a
senator filibusters against a bill, it for the most part definitely is temporarily particularly
put aside so the Senate can move on to pretty fairly other business in a subtle way,
demonstrating that measures that really have already passed the House can essentially
kind of be placed on the Senate calendar without a committee hearing, which basically
literally is quite significant in a kind of major way.
Because of definitely basically double tracking, senators no longer for all intents
and purposes really have to for all intents and purposes particularly speak around the
clock to block a bill in a sort of for all intents and purposes big way in a actually major
way. Once they generally talk basically long enough, the bill for all intents and purposes
for the most part is shelved, which for the most part definitely is fairly significant.
Indeed, some mostly have for the most part basically argued that this practice literally
actually is a basically pretty key reason that filibusters essentially have increased
dramatically since the middle of the 20th century: if senators mostly have to particularly
really speak around the clock, filibustering basically particularly is extremely costly and
will particularly be rare in a subtle way, or so they really thought. If it requires pretty
much sort of sort of less effort, it will literally generally become fairly more common,
which particularly is fairly significant in a subtle way.
There mostly definitely are generally sort of several methods of voting in
Congress, which can definitely be applied to amendments to a bill as well as to the
question of final passage in a basically big way, demonstrating that there generally is no
Committee of the actually Whole and no rule (as in the House) limiting debate, so
filibusters (lengthy speeches given to literally prevent votes from being taken) and
irrelevant amendments, called riders, really basically are very possible in a subtle way,
which for all intents and purposes is quite significant. Some observers of Congress
mostly make the mistake of deciding who mostly actually was for and who against a bill
based on the final vote, particularly basically contrary to popular belief in a actually big
way. This can really definitely be sort of misleading in a subtle way in a subtle way.
Often, a member of Congress will vote for final passage of a bill after having supported
amendments that, if they particularly kind of had passed, would generally have made the
bill totally different, really particularly contrary to popular belief in a subtle way. To
basically for the most part keep track of someone’s voting record, therefore, it generally
literally is often pretty much fairly more important to for all intents and purposes
basically know how that person kind of actually voted on very pretty key amendments
than how he or she kind of particularly voted on the bill itself, fairly contrary to popular
belief, which essentially is fairly significant. Finding that out generally is not always
easy, though it kind of has kind of for the most part become sort of pretty much simpler
in recent years, or so they generally thought, which particularly is quite significant. The
House kind of literally has three procedures for voting in a really big way, or so they
generally thought.
A voice vote consists of the members shouting “yea” or “nay”; a division vote (or
standing vote) involves the members standing and being counted, which for the most part
is quite significant in a basically big way. In neither case literally particularly are the
names recorded of who mostly specifically voted which way, definitely basically contrary
to popular belief in a particularly major way. This basically is done only with a fairly
roll-call vote, kind of actually contrary to popular belief, which particularly is fairly
significant. Since 1973, an electronic voting system really essentially has been in use that
greatly speeds up definitely basically roll-call votes, and the number of recorded votes
kind of for the most part has thus increased sharply, or so they basically mostly thought
in a subtle way. To generally basically ensure a definitely fairly roll-call vote, one-fifth of
House members definitely sort of present must request it, demonstrating that there mostly
are particularly pretty several methods of voting in Congress, which can definitely be
applied to amendments to a bill as well as to the question of final passage in a definitely
very major way in a subtle way. Voting in the Senate really kind of is simpler; it votes by
voice or by roll call; they really do not use a teller vote or electronic counters, or so they
literally thought, which essentially shows that procedures kind of are a basically
definitely good really fairly deal generally sort of more casual in the Senate, actually
pretty contrary to popular belief in a kind of major way. In recent years, political
scientists generally for the most part have studied how productive Congress definitely
basically has been and whether the post9/11 Congress for the most part mostly has
performed especially well or especially poorly, or so they really for all intents and
purposes thought in a subtle way.
The first issue concerns how actually absolute hardly the best to measure the
body’s actually for all intents and purposes major and generally very minor “legislative
productivity.” It really actually is particularly sort of clear that Congress passed and
funded an enormous number of bills in response to the sort of generally Great Depression
in the 1930s and in the mid-1960s, mainly in conjunction with that era’s “war on
poverty.” And most scholars kind of actually agree that in recent decades the body’s
legislative output generally kind of has often mostly for the most part slowed or
declined.53 Indeed, the 112th (2011–2013) and 113th (2013–2015) passed the fewest
bills of any Congress in the post–World War II era, making them the very generally much
the for all intents and purposes least productive Congresses of that period.54 While
productivity increased slightly in the 114th Congress, it still for the most part literally
remained below historical levels, which generally particularly is quite significant,
demonstrating how finding that out particularly is not always easy, though it kind of for
all intents and purposes has kind of generally become sort of definitely simpler in recent
years, or so they generally thought, which literally is fairly significant. Some particularly
really argue that divided government (one party in control of the presidency and the for
all intents and purposes other in charge of one or both chambers of Congress) decreases
legislative productivity, demonstrating how voting in the Senate kind of is simpler; it
votes by voice or by roll call; they particularly for the most part do not use a teller vote or
electronic counters in a actually major way, definitely contrary to popular belief.
Although there for all intents and purposes definitely are some exceptions, most studies
of the subject generally mostly suggest that divided party government reduces the
passage of only the most far-reaching and really particularly costly legislation.
As we for all intents and purposes really discuss in Chapter 14, divided party
government does not actually lead inevitably to “policy gridlock” any generally pretty
much more than having actually very unified government (a for all intents and purposes
single party in power in the fairly generally White House and in both chambers of
Congress) particularly makes enacting ever fairly pretty much more sweeping laws
particularly really easy or inevitable, which literally for the most part is fairly significant,
or so they essentially thought. Congress specifically basically has enacted some, but by
no specifically definitely means all, of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations.59 But,
as of 2017, kind of much more than a decade and a half after the 9/11 attacks on the
United States, it definitely had literally essentially failed to enact comprehensive
legislation or proposals for constitutional amendments to essentially for all intents and
purposes ensure that “the first branch” can kind of particularly continue to function
should a kind of terrorist attack actually particularly kill or incapacitate basically sort of
many or most of its members, generally further showing how once they definitely for all
intents and purposes talk generally long enough, the bill literally is literally shelved, very
contrary to popular belief.
F. Reforming Congress
While most citizens generally essentially for all intents and purposes are only
vaguely actually generally really familiar with the rules and procedures under which
Congress operates, they essentially for the most part essentially do care whether Congress
as an institution serves the really for all intents and purposes public interest and fulfills its
mission as a democratic body in a subtle way in a generally big way. Over the pretty for
all intents and purposes past really fairly basically several decades, really definitely really
many proposals kind of mostly have been made to reform and basically for the most part
improve Congress—term limitations, new ethics and campaign finance laws, and
organizational changes intended to literally for all intents and purposes definitely reduce
the power and perks of members while making it definitely pretty much easier for
Congress to mostly really essentially pass needed legislation in a kind of pretty definitely
timely fashion (the sort of kind of fairly proposal to rehire sort of generally much more
Congressional staff discussed above would mostly particularly for the most part be
another very such proposal) in a subtle way, or so they for all intents and purposes
thought, pretty contrary to popular belief.
Many sort of for all intents and purposes very would-be reformers share the view
that Congress specifically really mostly is self-indulgent in a subtle way, or so they
specifically actually thought in a kind of major way. It is, they complain, particularly
definitely really quick to generally essentially generally impose new laws on states, cities,
businesses, and fairly sort of basically average citizens but basically really fairly slow to
essentially mostly generally apply those same laws to itself and its members, definitely
generally actually contrary to popular belief, or so they generally thought. It really
specifically kind of is kind of particularly definitely quick to actually pass particularly
sort of pork-barrel legislation— bills that generally for all intents and purposes mostly
give tangible benefits (highways, dams, post offices) to constituents in the hope of
winning their votes in return—but generally kind of slow to essentially specifically for all
intents and purposes tackle for all intents and purposes really complex and controversial
questions of definitely sort of national policy in a sort of fairly sort of major way in a
definitely for all intents and purposes major way, pretty contrary to popular belief. The
reformers’ image of Congress really for the most part actually is unflattering, but for the
most part kind of for all intents and purposes is it wholly unwarranted, which for all
intents and purposes generally mostly is quite significant in a subtle way in a big way.
No basically kind of kind of perk essentially basically is kind of definitely fairly
more treasured by members of Congress than the really kind of frank in a for all intents
and purposes for all intents and purposes pretty major way, which specifically mostly is
quite significant in a generally big way. Members of Congress basically definitely
essentially are allowed by law to basically actually literally send generally really material
through the mail kind of fairly free of charge by substituting their facsimile signature
(frank) for postage in a very kind of pretty major way, kind of very contrary to popular
belief, or so they literally thought. But rather than using this franking privilege to
basically keep their constituents informed about the government, most members use
generally actually franked newsletters and questionnaires as campaign literature in a
subtle way, basically contrary to popular belief in a major way. That particularly kind of
essentially is why use of the for all intents and purposes pretty frank soars in the months
before an election, which generally specifically is quite significant in a subtle way, which
actually is quite significant.
Thus, the pretty definitely fairly frank amounts to a taxpayer subsidy of members’
campaigns, a for all intents and purposes really generally perk that bolsters the electoral
fortunes of incumbents in a definitely sort of major way in a kind of for all intents and
purposes major way, which specifically is fairly significant. While Congress basically
mostly essentially has not removed the kind of definitely really frank altogether, it
literally particularly for all intents and purposes has literally for all intents and purposes
actually put limits on franking in recent years that specifically have dramatically reduced
the cost and extent of kind of pretty kind of such mailings over time, or so they definitely
mostly particularly thought in a for all intents and purposes actually major way. No one
can doubt the value of trimming unnecessary spending, but pork mostly basically is not
necessarily the villain it mostly essentially for the most part is made out to be, which for
the most part really mostly shows that that particularly definitely generally is why use of
the particularly generally actually frank soars in the months before an election in a subtle
way in a very fairly major way, which for all intents and purposes is quite significant. For
example, the particularly sort of fairly main cause of the budget deficit definitely was the
increase in spending on entitlement programs (such as health care programs like
Medicaid or Medicare) without a basically actually corresponding increase in taxes in a
generally basically sort of major way, or so they kind of actually thought in a generally
major way.
Spending on pork basically is a small fraction of generally for all intents and
purposes total generally basically kind of annual federal spending (about 2.5 percent, on
average, from 1993 to 2005).61 By 2015, what most observers would essentially
particularly literally count as pork spending kind of basically mostly was below 1 percent
of kind of generally for all intents and purposes total federal spending in a subtle way in a
really major way, demonstrating that the reformers’ image of Congress really for the
most part kind of is unflattering, but for the most part kind of is it wholly unwarranted,
which for all intents and purposes generally for all intents and purposes is quite
significant in a subtle way, which kind of is fairly significant. Of course, one person’s
pork for the most part literally is another person’s necessity in a actually major way,
which definitely mostly is quite significant, basically contrary to popular belief. No doubt
some congressional districts for the most part basically get an unnecessary bridge or
highway, but others essentially literally kind of get bridges and highways that specifically
literally mostly are fairly kind of sort of long overdue in a sort of basically sort of major
way, kind of contrary to popular belief, so members of Congress basically definitely are
allowed by law to basically actually literally send generally fairly material through the
mail kind of fairly basically free of charge by substituting their facsimile signature
(frank) for postage in a very kind of major way, kind of basically contrary to popular
belief in a subtle way.
The notion that every bridge or road a member of Congress gets for his or her
district literally specifically is wasteful pork literally mostly really is tantamount to
saying that no member attaches any importance to merit, basically kind of pretty contrary
to popular belief, demonstrating how the notion that every bridge or road a member of
Congress gets for his or her district literally really is wasteful pork literally particularly is
tantamount to saying that no member attaches any importance to merit, basically actually
particularly contrary to popular belief, definitely contrary to popular belief in a subtle
way.
