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COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
1. Reporting Systems
I. Periodic state reports
State reports are essential in inter-governmental human rights treaties given that they serve as
one of the key monitoring mechanisms by which state parties‘ compliance with their
undertakings is observed. The reports must be submitted to the other State(s) and to the
depositary periodically to show the State‘s activities in the fulfillment of treaty provisions, which
promotes continuous interaction and accountability (Krommendijk, 2015). This process requires
that states undergo a self-review and critical analysis of their human rights situation which may
result to domestic changes and policy adjustments (Creamer & Simmons, 2015). The
requirement to report makes the states reassess and declare their human rights situation
constantly, generating a loop of internal scrutiny that may show where the state is lacking. Such
reflection is supposed to lead to legislative and policy modification; in the framework of the
overall goal of the promotion of human rights. Nevertheless, it remains for the most part rather
weak, blocked by delays from within and the quality of the reports which are submitted. Some
nations never submit their reports, while others have submitted them very late; some reports are
also insufficient and some contain a very rosy picture of the human rights performance (Pillay,
2012). They spring beyond submission delays though there are still some complexities that are
associated with this model they are not limited to the submission delays in paper plans. The
capability of delivering specific textual and numerical reports also has differences across the
states. By its nature, nearly all developing nations suffer acute scarcities of material and human
resources and technical know-how, and these disadvantages gravely impair their capacity to
compile detailed and realistic reports (Mecadon, 2013). These restrictions can lead to preparation
of thin reports, which do not give out the real picture of the human rights situation in these
countries. Despite these challenges; the submission of the reports is thus very crucial as it hence
creates awareness of the state of human rights in various countries across the world. The
international human rights framework of reporting also has an important function of checking the
states of their commitment to the adherence to human rights by placing importance to periodic
reporting, which would augment the efficiency of human rights treaties in consequence.
II. Review by treaty bodies
These expert committees which incorporate independent specialist examine state reports and
conduct a critical yet diplomatic discussion with the state concerned in order to evaluate its
accomplishments and determine or highlight the problems (Morijn, 2011). This process assists in
the process of giving a clear understanding on aspects concerning a certain state‘s performance
on human rights, as well as in the development and clarification of treaty frameworks concerning
human rights (Mechlem, 2009). That being said, the following factors thus limit the impact of
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treaty body reviews. It becomes a problem to many that there is a backlog of reports and that
each state is to be reviewed in a limited time only. These unfortunate consequences can result in
skimpy inspections that fail to suitably address intricate human rights matters (Pillay, 2012).
Also, treaty bodies do not have the enforcement authorities and depend on mere soft power in the
form of persuasion on the state parties to adhere to their conclusions and recommendations
(Krommendijk 2015). The key weakness derived from the lack of compulsory power is that
treaty bodies have to rely solely on states‘ good faith and their willingness to avoid being
associated with negative international image when encouraging compliance. Another drawback
is aggressive politicization of the work of the reviewing instance. States, especially in political
violence situations, may try to shield their friends or go after their foes; this makes the findings
given by treaty organs partial and, therefore, unreliable (Creamer & Simmons, 2015). This
politicization can hence distort the review process, resulting in political interferences through
manipulations meant to give a negative picture of a particular state‘s human rights record.
Nevertheless the role of treaty bodies to review states‘ performance on human rights hence
remains an important process through which accountability and also discussions with a view of
inspiring commitment for implementation of human rights at the international level. Participation
of states also enables the consideration of the states‘ records on the promotion and protection of
human rights while receiving expert opinion on the same. This steady conversation therefore
ensures openness and also reasons to be accountable, making states to respect their social
responsibilities on human rights as well as working progressively. It is for this reason that the
process is vital in the overall system of international human rights law and supports the
elaboration and enhancement of standards for the protection of human rights globally.
III. Concluding observations and recommendations
The concluding observations and the recommendations for improvement by treaty bodies reflect
a significant and final stage of reporting and the review of human rights performance to the end
to which states receive particular recommendations on how to improve their stay. Such
documents shed light on positive aspects, raise issues and also recommend on how to overcome
problems that exist in the treaty compliance (Mechlem, 2009). This characteristic can put
pressure on the states to act because LFAs are open institutions which are accountable to both
domestic and international audiences (Krommendijk, 2015). Also, concluding observations are
important assets that CSOs and NHRI can draw from for their advocacy work (Morijn, 2011).
Nevertheless, the dissemination of concluding observations is rather reduced because, as it has
been earlier mentioned, WIC recommendations are non-binding and cannot be enforced by the
official institutions. Some states can decide to disregard recommendations or even partially
adhere to some of the recommendations especially those that may be politically sensitive or those
that may require a lot of capital (Pillay, 2012). This approach distorts efficiency of the treaty
body since the recommendations of the treaty body are not fully implemented as stipulated. The
concluding observation thus depends on how specific and also implementable it is. Theoretically,
recommendations that are either broad or overly specific can be challenging for states to execute.
Looking at it from another perspective, the following is a common drawback of: The over-
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ambitious and or general nature of the recommendations may not be easily actionable or
measurable by the states. Thus, the recommendations that are reasonable and easy to implement
are more likely to be accepted and actualized by the states meaning such recommendations are
more effective in bettering the human rights conditions in states. Nonetheless, the concluding
observations and also recommendations are hence vital as they uphold the human rights
progressive realization while facilitating positive cooperation between the states as well as the
international human rights system monitors. This is thereby useful for applying pressure on states
and also forcing the latter to come to terms with their domestic policies with the common
standard set in human rights laws such as treaties. Concluding observations therefore assist in
keeping the sustaining of improvement through the process of ongoing activities to improve
human rights outcomes. Consequently, it can be affirmed that conclusions and recommendations
as the key elements of international human rights. They not only guide states explicitly on how
to enhance human rights but also support civil society and nationals‘ organizations to put
pressure on governments. Despite the fact that they are political commitments and non-legally
binding instruments, that comes with the realities of implementation, their value in enhancing
transparency, accountability, as well as the gradual realization of human rights cannot be
overemphasized.
IV. Follow-up procedures
Observance processes have thus become an important component of compliance processes in the
sphere of international human right conventions, which is to fill the gap in implementation. Such
procedures often entail the requirement of the states to provide information on steps taken in the
given period to fulfill certain recommendations (Morijn, 2011). Various follow-up mechanisms
introduced into the treaty body system have introduced an element of continuity into the treaty
body system thus providing, human rights monitoring a more dynamic and continuing process
(Mechlem, 2009). Thus, the further work of states can focus on prioritized recommendations for
immediate action, depending on the scale of the problem and the need for marginal changes in
the fight against human rights violations (Krommendijk, 2015). Nevertheless, a number of
difficulties can hence become an obstacle to the successful implementation of these procedures.
Difficulties include lack of resources as well as lack of sufficient rigor in implementing the
relevant provisions. Also, many treaty bodies have problems with inadequate time and effort in
implementation of follow-up activities, and thus, they can engage limited discussion with the
states on progress in implementation of the treaty. Another weakness is that the follow-up reports
submitted are part voluntary which means that states can decline the reports or give inadequate
information as they wish (Creamer and Simmons, 2015). Such absence of compliance
requirements may all in all compromise the efficiency of the follow-up procedure. However,
follow-up procedures are one of the progressive advancements in the treaty body system. These
follow-up mechanisms thus play an important role in keeping states actively involved with
human rights obligations; through such a cascading ongoing process, the monitoring cycle is
repeated to allow states to fulfill their pledged undertakings. It means therefore this social
engagement can produce longer and hence more relevant changes in human rights practices. In
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this regard, the follow-up procedures are very essential in ensuring that states are compelled to
take the treaty engagements seriously. However, these mechanisms can thereby lead to the
advancement of human rights as they constantly remind states of issues concerning human rights
as well as allow other countries to scrutinize the state. The feature of follow-up processes being
dynamic in nature means that important human rights issues arising hence provoking an
immediate response hence enhancing the efficacy of the IHRS. Therefore, follow-up procedures
emerged as critical features of compliance mechanisms in the IHLR treaties. They thus assist in
implementation gaps through constant contact as well as supervision of the states.
2. Individual Complaint Procedures
I. Admissibility criteria
The admissibility criteria for individual complaints thus play the most important role of a
screening function in the IHR treaty system to allow only deserving cases to proceed to a merits
examination. Such conditions are generally the recognition of the completion of domestic
remedies, submission within the prescribed time lines, and non-duplication of other international
procedures (Bates, 2010). These conditions assist in controlling the workload of treaty bodies
and adhering to the principle of subsidiarity; however, they significantly hinder the access to
justice for many people. The exhaustion of domestic remedies rule inter alia can be oppressive to
victims especially where the country has a malfunctioning or corrupt judicial system
(McCorquodale, 2009). Furthermore, the criteria used to determine cases admissibility are
complicated meaning and doable by individual complainants, especially where they have no
lawyers to help them; this might lead to rejection of merits claim (Shelton, 2015). Meeting these
criteria is not easy, as it demands knowledge of the domestic and the international law that
knowledgeable people without formal legal background or access to legal aid often fail to grasp.
Such complexities may cause an unpleasant outcome such as the rejection of genuine complaints
on procedural issues and not merit. In order to respond to these problems, treaty bodies are not as
strict in the application of admissibility in cases where there was evident bias or when it took a
very long time for the complaint to be addressed (Patel, 2012). This flexibility thereby seeks to
provide smooth approach in regard to strict procedural rules and also regulations to ensure that
the victims of human rights abuses in the country get a fair shot at seeking justice. However this
approach therefore has concerns in terms of control of procedural fairness and hence equal
treatment in the receiving of admissibility standards. For the individual complaint system,
challenging question of how to achieve the balance between procedural fairness and
organizational responsiveness has not been solved yet. On one hand, strict compliance with
admissibility conditions is a key to prevent overload in treaty bodies and maintain subsidiary of
international justice that implies that domestic systems should be primarily relied on to resolve
human rights abuses. On the other hand, overly strict requirements restrain victims‘ access to
justice and especially in cases where domestic remedy is insufficient or nonexistent. It can be
therefore said that admissibility criteria of individual complaints are truly indispensable for the
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international human rights treaty system; however, the application of the criteria thus poses
certain definitive challenges.
II. Consideration of merits
The mention of merits in individual complaint procedures can be said to be a kind of ‗case
examination,‘ whereby treaty bodies look into the merits of a complained human rights violation.
This process entails an examination of facts, the domestic and the international law to determine
if a state party has violated the treaty provisions (Shelton, 2015). The merits stage allows for a
closer examination of state activities and the maturation of human rights‘ law (McCorquodale,
2009). However, the effectiveness of this process is always limited by the following factors.
Although the opportunity to question the witnesses is not provided to the treaty bodies, they
often experience difficulties when collecting facts, as the parties mostly submit their written
materials (Bates, 2010). This reliance on documentation thus reduces the scope of investigation
and also the effectiveness of fact-checking that might hence influence the results‘ reliability.
Consequently the quality of legal writing can also be poor especially in cases concerning the
merits, which in effect challenges the authority of the treaty body jurisprudence (Mechlem,
2009). Lack of coherent and logical thinking that supports arguments and decisions with weak
credibility neutralizes the decisions‘ authority and their capacity to shape actions of states or
bring change to similar cases. However due to long delay which may extend for several years,
the efficacy of decisions reduces, in addition, the deliverance of effective remedies for victims is
further delayed. This means that if the cases take long to be heard, the prospects of realizing
substantial remedies may be significantly reduced since the world changes and the desire to treat
the violations may have faded. This issue is super crescendo by the fact that many treaty bodies
are understudied, and they handle cumbersome caseloads that can prolong the process and delay
the delivery of justice. Nevertheless the assessment of merits in complaints is still an
indispensable instrument thereby ensuring states‘ compliance with human rights obligations and
also offering remedies to the victims. Thus, it makes a state accountable to the international
community on its practices and it provides victims an opportunity to get justice. Hence the
process helps in building a pool of International human rights law and also contributes to the
evolution of the legal traditions as well as practice in understanding treaty rights and also duties.
It may be therefore stated that the consideration of merits in individual complaint procedures is
indeed problematic, yet it remains inalienable part of the international human rights system.
III. Views and recommendations
Though these bodies do not decide cases as such, the views and recommendations that they
proffer in their consideration of individual complaint are a part of the final stage of the
adjudicative process as they provide clear application of the treaty provisions and directions to
states in eradicating violation. Such decisions contribute to normative shaping of the subject
matter of human rights treaties and setting out the compliance model for states (McCorquodale,
2009). They thus play an important role in the development of the body of international human
rights law by setting out what the treaty parties undertake to do and also in many cases, by
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explaining what those obligations entail. For this reason, the views and recommendations of the
public can influence the states to respect human rights because this makes them sensitive to
pressure caused by human rights abuses, thus demanding legal and policy change at domestic
level (Shelton, 2015). Treaty bodies thereby give decisions concerning certain violations,
recommendations and also sanctions as to how they should be rectified, which means that such
decisions attract the attention of both national as well as international non-governmental
organizations, the press and thus other state parties. This exposure could therefore make states
change their behavior in order to retain this status and hence avoid such commentaries.
Nevertheless, the influence of such choices is somewhat restrained due to their nature of being
non-operative under the international law. The findings also suggest that the recommendations
can be ignored or partially implemented by the states especially when they have some political or
economic implications (Bates, 2010). This is because enforcement and infringement standards
are missing, thereby provoking entirely on the state‘s appropriateness to stick to international
guidelines and other pressures. Still, any views and recommendations also depend on the clarity,
specific and feasible plans suggested. Preambles may contain rhetorical elements depending on
the formulation of the goal, and thus, for identifying strategies may be less clear than for goals
whose formulations are less open to interpretation; (Mechlem, 2009). The best recommendations
are those that could be understood by the states and are clear and precise and therefore can be
implemented since they state what should be done. Directions that take into account the state‘s
circumstances and capacity may help to achieve compliance and, at the same time, prompt the
responsible parties to address the violations. Nonetheless, possibilities that the views and
recommendations emerging from the mechanisms of individual complaints stay strong for the
subsequent evolution of the human rights protection and delivering some degree of justice to the
violated people. It thus makes them maintain principles of accountability as well as provides
counterbalance to state activities. Through a process of further elaboration of the interpretative
materials of the human rights conventions, and by engaging in efforts concerning the practical
application of human rights treaties, these decisions advance, in a way, the cause of human rights
all around the world.
IV. Implementation challenges
Some of the problems that arise from implementing of views and recommendations emerging
from individual complain ‗procedures‘ are areas of strain and threat to the supervisory systems
within the framework of the international human rights treaty body. While some of the states are
fully observe the recommendation of the treaty body, many of the other states do not adequately
follow the measures that are required to offer justice to the victim or to prevent the repetition of
violation of human rights in future (Patel, 2012). Currently, there is a lack of strong enforcement
structures at the international level and treaty bodies only depend on moral and political pressure
to get states to abide by the treaties. National attributes like institutional framework, availability
of resources, or commitment can also hinder the process of actuating recommendations. For
example, legal and bureaucratic reforms might take very long in implementing what is required
due to the weakness of legal and bureaucratic structure in such states, and those facing severe
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political or economic problems might lack the capacity to prioritize human rights requirements.
Secondly, implementation effectiveness is thus contingent on the nature of the implementation‘s
measures necessary for achievement. Changes in structures or new legislation, as a rule,
encounter more opposition than personal cures, which might be easier to solve. In order to meet
these challenges, some treaty bodies have adopted implementation of their views follow-up
procedures. These procedures include calling for States reports at regular intervals about the
steps that have been taken to implement recommendations, thus, maintaining an ongoing
dialogue between the treaty bodies and the States. But these efforts are usually affected by issues
to do with inadequate resources and no cooperation from the state. If properly financed these
treaty bodies need not lose track of follow-up and non-compliant states can evade their
responsibilities without much accountability. Still, continuing the analysis of the issues and
challenges influencing the effectiveness of individual complaint procedures retaliation and
disappointing implementation of decisions becomes a question for further discussion as a
challenge to advance the general IHRTS practice. This paper stipulates that there is more to
doing than simply ratifying these treaties and standards hence the need for a coordinated and
systematic approach that focuses on the reinforcement of domestic institutions, the improvement
of international cooperation and providing the adequate human and financial resources that are
necessary for monitoring and follow up processes. There is a need to thus enhance the awareness
of treaty body decisions by the public so that there can be pressure by internal and external
forces on states to conform to the set rules and regulations. More specifically, this chapter has
shown that it appears challenging to implement the views and recommendations formulated
within the framework of the individual complaint procedures, despite these procedures being
widely agreed upon internationally as a cornerstone of the international human rights treaty
system, it is necessary to address the mentioned challenges as the elaboration of views and
recommendations; especially for the human rights treaty system.
3. Inter-State Complaint Mechanisms
I. Rarely used procedure
The system of complaints inter-state is among one of the most popular but at the same time most
ineffective procedures in the international treaty in the sphere of human rights. This mechanism
enables the state parties to complain to the remaining state parties on the alleged violation of
treaty provisions (Leckie, 1988). Although mae in order to foster accountability, the procedure
however, has been claimed only slightly and rarely since its introduction because the states are
not interested to participate in the confrontational processes with other states (Alston &
Goodman, 2013). One can explain the infrequent use of this mechanism by several factors.
Another argument is that states refrain from filing a complaint, which can hence trigger a
counter-response from the target state. This possibility to complicate diplomatic relations can
make states avoid the mechanism as they usually do not wish to worsen international relations
(Kälin, 2012). Moreover, the procedures of the interstate complaints are rigorous and elaborate
which may require a lot of time and strong evidence making the states discourage from taking
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complaints. Moreover, states‘ primary political considerations dominate its relationship with
another state and human rights are low on the agenda when countries engage with each other.
For example, a country will ignore human rights abuses in a friendly nation in order to sustain
economic or political cooperation (Shelton, 2015). This pragmatic attitude tends to result in no
desire to go through with the formal inter-state complaint mehods which may be construed as
hostile. The fact that this is not a common performance increase compliance‘s quality as a
procedure. The lack of utilization of this right therefore points out a major lacuna, especially, in
the sphere of international human rights, especially when violations are rampant or are
systematic. Therefore, there is the need for a better approach in as much as we look for the
human rights accountability on the international arena. Thus, although the mechanism of inter-
state complaint seems to serve as a powerful tool for dealing with human rights violations, its
application is actually rather sparse, which specifically expresses the more general political
factors and state interests. Perhaps, the international community may need to look for how it can
encourage compliance with this tool, get people into the mentality of being held accountable to
the instrument and find how other tools that would complement this one exist and how they can
be used to ensure that states link human rights to their foreign policy.
II. Diplomatic and political implications
The mechanism of filing an inter-state complaint is replete with diplomatic and political
consequences, which in turn, is one of the reasons why it is rarely resorted to. Filing a complaint
before another state is considered as aggressive thus will have adverse effects on relations
between the two states thus cooperation in other areas such as trading or security (Alston &
Goodman, 2013). There are also always risks for states to speak up for human rights or
protective measures of certain groups for example as there often may be implications in terms of
diplomatic relations: other countries might shut down their relations or apply a freeze, react with
similar measures or withdraw their support (Kälin, 2012). This reiteration of inter-state
complaints is quite apparent in incidents that encompass influential countries or friendly
countries. In such cases, the other state may apply considerable pressure to the complaining state
in order to force it to withdraw the complaint for the sake of diplomatic relations and to avoid
conflict. This hesitance is magnified by the knowledge that such public statements are capable of
heightening nationalism or angering the people of the accused state, thus straining diplomatic
relations even further (Leckie, 1988). Also, these proceeding are public and, therefore, may
invite more media coverage and public opinion pressures, locally and internationally. This may
further enhance systematic scrutiny of diplomacy, and hamper conflict solving endeavors since
states may be proved to be allergic from engaging in any dialogue that may invite negative
attention or accusations (Shelton, 2015). This pressure tends to make states look for less public
ways of dealing with human rights issues than public inter-state complaints procedures including
bilateral meetings or diplomacy. Also, these procedures are rather long and complicated, which
can discourage states from pursuing the inter-state complaint process. The possibility of lengthy
proceedings can thereby deter the states from filing complaints, specifically when the situations
with human rights‘ abuses demand immediate response. Finally, these diplomatic and political
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factors result in under generation of complaints through the inter-state complaint mechanism. To
increase its efficiency the international community may need to encourage states to act through
this mechanism allowing them not to be worried about severe diplomatic consequences. In order
to reduce the perceived risks of complaints from one state to another, there is a need for
designation of human rights duties at national level and creation of the culture of accountability
on achievements of human rights goals, as well as to encourage freedom of discussion on aspects
on human rights.
III. Confidentiality issues
Confidentiality is thus a sophisticated factor in the context of the inter-state complaint
mechanism is beneficial and disadvantageous for its efficacy as a compliance instrument. On the
one hand, confidentiality especially in the preliminary stages of the proceeding entails freedom
of states to engage in negotiations which would otherwise be influenced by public opinion
(Kälin, 2012). This anonymity can promote peaceful approaches and forces the states to
negotiate more actively, possibly providing those with solutions that are workable and acceptable
to all parties involved without the threat of being attacked (Leckie, 1988). However, the lack of
transparency also poses serious questions of non-accountability and the peoples‘ right to know
on human rights situations in the world (Alston & Goodman, 2013). Since many proceedings are
taken behind closed doors, tyrants whom perpetrate human rights violations do not feel the
pressure of the public opinion that demands accountability for their actions. Such obscurity can
thereby compromise an important player; the civil society organizations, which act as watchdogs
on human rights practitioners and also fight for victims‘ justice. Thus, some of these
organizations may not be able to participate fully or even engage in the process at all (Shelton,
2015). Additionally, the conflict between the principles of confidentiality and transparency that
underlie the system of inter-state complaints corresponds to many of the discussions on the
subject of disclosure as a means of applying pressure to instances of non-observance of human
rights. Even though the relationship of confidentiality in the process of promoting constructive
dialogue is obvious, it can still serve as an environment for such violations and fail to respond to
them. A major factor when it comes to fully realizing the inter-state complaint mechanism is
maintaining a healthy balance between the confidentiality that is characteristic of inter-state
relations and some degree of transparency of the act of complaint. In order to increase the
potential of the mechanism there might be a need to have a more detailed approach on one being
more or less transparent. For instance, it is possible to cultivate some parts of the process as open
as possible to allow any interested party ascertain certain aspects of the process while at the same
time preserving the privilege between two parties with the kind of negotiations being carried out.
This way could engage civil society and involve public in the process without causing any
diplomatic consideration in the process. Hence, confidentiality can be beneficial in improving the
communication and settling the conflicts, yet, it hides the problems of accountability and public
understanding. Evaluating the possibilities of alternation, one has to aspire to discover the
balanced middle ground that will enable both consistent diplomacy performance and unyielding
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human rights protection to remain relevant for the inter-state complaint mechanism to manifest
itself as the operative means of compliance and justice on the international level.
IV. Potential for conflict resolution
However, one cannot underestimate the potential of the inter-state complaint mechanism as one
of the means to employ to address conflict situations and ensure compliance with the standards
of people‘s rights protection. If applied; this procedure can offer a coordinated general
framework of response to grave humanitarian rights violation concerns between states thus
possibly helping to avoid degeneration of the quarrels into serious conflicts as stated by Leckie
(1988). Treaty bodies can also be attracted to the process as an independent third party: they can
help to conduct a dialogue and provide interpretations of potential violations of treaty provisions,
as well as indicate ways of solving the existing problems (Kälin, 2012). Furthermore, the very
fact of the existence of this mechanism can also work as a deterrent, the states would respond to
the problems associated with human rights violations to prevent the filing of the official
complaint (Alston & Goodman, 2013). Countries may also be willing to compromise given that
they are aware that there are formal ways of dealing with disagreement. This preventive and also
quasi-juridical strategy can thus help to build up the culture of compliance and responsibility
among members of the international community. The inter-state complaint procedure also has
ability to‖ deal with systemic or massive violations that rarely can be settled through individual
complaints (Shelton, 2015). Thus, when states are entitled to present collective complaints, the
mechanism can identify and make populations‘ concerns addressed in discussions regarding
human rights practices. The collective approach might thus help amplifying the voices of victims
and hence garnering global attention to pertinent concerns. Nevertheless, ADR has the potential
to be thereby used as a tool for conflict resolution if one manages to overcome the issues with
states‘ willingness to use the mechanism as well as to find proper ways of minimizing the
diplomatic consequences of its usage. Inter-state complaints may therefore be in dire need of
reforms in order to increase its efficiency as a conflict solving organ. For example, anonymity of
complaints would ensure that the states speak out their concerns without being threatened.
Further, increased reliability of the follow-up procedures to guarantee the enforcement of the
decisions within the framework of the resolutions can thus increase the level of the states‘
confidence. It can be therefore stated that in spite of the challenges which the inter-state
complaint mechanism encounters, this procedure has its prospects in ensuring the protection of
human rights and also in conflict settlement. It is evident that world governments romance
diplomacy, and if the international community can address the diplomatic issues and improve the
mechanism‘s structure, then the above tool be used for the improvement of human rights
protections around the world.
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4. Inquiry Procedures
I. Initiation of inquiries
The commencement of inquiry procedures is a preventive measure in dealing with serious or
pervasive violations of human rights in the context of the international treaty regime. In contrast
to individual complaints or state notifications, inquiries can be initiated by treaty bodies
themselves, with reference to accurate data on the violation of obligations in the field of human
rights (Rodley, 2013). They form this mechanism so as to examine other cases of prevalent or
systematic violations that may not well be dealt with under other compliance measures so as to
supplement the range and capacity of human rights monitoring (Connors & Schmidt, 2014). The
triggering point at the commencement of an inquiry is often quite rigid and would rely on the
documentation of severe or systemic abuses. These features assist in the keeping the procedure
honest and controlling for resources: treaty bodies need to work hard at identifying the most
pressing human rights problems (O‘Flaherty, 2006). However, this high threshold can also pose a
difficulty, especially from the point of view of the resources that can be devoted to attempting a
solution, as well as the ability of the treaty bodies to be able to investigate a given situation that
may be multi-layered. A major difficulty regarding the initiation process is that in this process
information is collected from various sources which may include the NGOs, information from
the media and even other stakeholders. Although these sources can prove useful in identifying
various issues, they further pose a challenge of the credibility and accuracy of evidence
presented (Gaer, 2011). Thus, the quality and credibility of the information received may
significantly differ which distorts the actions of treaty bodies. Adequate scrupulous concern to
the quality of the information that a given inquiry is founded on is of paramount importance to
the efficiency of the mechanism. Also, as mentioned, the necessity of obtaining state consent in
some treaties prior to launching an inquiry seriously restricts the use of this mechanism.
However, when the state in question is not inclined to provide its assistance, the mechanism of
inquiries can be most likely rendered ineffective as a result of which the overall effects of this
practice will be minimized (Pillay, 2012). This limitation thus assumes the apprehension between
sovereignty of states and also international responsibility especially on human rights issues.
However, the possibility of starting specific inquiries can be regarded as one of the strengths of
treaty bodies which can help the latter respond to critical human rights situations that could
potentially remain unnoticed. In this manner this mechanism can also offer the opportunity for
precise investigations proving abuses that are systematic and putting pressure on the states to act
on their human rights commitments.
II. On-site visits
Inquiry procedures include on-site visits this is because, through on-site visit, the treaty body
members are in a position to gather first-hand information concerning the alleged violation of
human rights. They create a forum that offers special interactions with different people within
the country‘s society such as the government, NGOs and human rights violation victims (Rodley,
2013). On-site visits are a distinct advantage for credibility and substance of the findings inquiry
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add an element to the understanding of the situation on the human rights in the area in more
detail (O‘Flaherty, 2006). However, some merits are separable when it comes to on-site visits
which are caused by several factors as explained below. The participation of the states is
imperative for the visits; the governments can prohibit the access to specific regions or persons,
which would prevent the researchers from delving into the matter deeply and would decrease the
effectiveness of investigation (Connors & Schmidt, 2014). However, in cases where the
countries‘ governments are not willing to collaborate, the potential of these visits can be
significantly limited, as some vital data remain unreachable. Also, safety risks in the conflict or
human rights abuses areas prevent on-site examination in an efficient manner (Gaer, 2011). In
such circumstances, both treaty body members and the people they aim to address can come
under threat of their lives; thus, some of the planned visits may be called off, or the extent of
their visits is bound to change. This is thus a rather complex picture of the state of human rights
in the world which creates major difficulties for its investigation and also identification.
Hypothetically, resource constraints as well as time constraints also influence the time and
frequency of the visits thereby raising questions on the thoroughness of investigations (Pillay,
2012). Due to the effects of globalization and the huge number of countries becoming signatories
to various conventions, treaty bodies sometimes work under extremely tense financial constraints
and the number of staff they can deploy on field based investigations can be severely limited in
terms of the amount of locations they can visit and the in-depth investigation they can make.
These difficulties notwithstanding, perhaps there is no better means of obtaining credible
evidence, educating and mobilizing the local populace about human rights abuses and as a way
of asserting that the civilized world is not indifferent to egregious human rights violations. These
visits can help to assert the legitimacy of the undertaking as well as raise awareness of human
rights issues among the affected populations and thus cannot be overestimated.
III. Confidential reports and recommendations
The generation of confidential reports and recommendations serves as specific findings and
recommendations emanating from the inquiry procedure to guide the correction of violations of
human rights. It usually contains the findings of fact, the legal conclusions and recommendations
for remedial measures that are appropriate (Rodley 2013). The fact of their confidentiality is
meant to ensure compliance and elicit states‘ cooperation and free discussion of some critical
human rights matters, as the participating states are not immunized against the global publicity
and are likely to face immediate domestic critical reaction otherwise (O‘Flaherty, 2006).
However, this confidentiality thus poses many difficulties in the field of transparency as well as
accountability. This implies that the availability of the inquiry reports is restricted to the specific
public, which in turn may reduce the influence on people‘s opinion and thus reduce pressure on
states to implement the set recommendations (Connors & Schmidt, 2014). With no public
realization of the study, the states themselves might not feel compelled to undertake the
recommendations as presented hence a lapse between research and implementation. Furthermore,
confidential reports‘ mal-output heavily relies on the states‘ interest in the work of the CCPR and
readiness to address the outcomes (Gaer, 2011). However, if states decide to dispel all or some of
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the recommendations or provide substandard responses, such consequences can seriously distort
the goal of the inquiry. Often as we have seen treaty bodies can also decide to publish reports
where the state has not given a satisfactory response which acts as a motivation to the state to
fully cooperate. This prospective of public expose can push the states into taking the
recommendations seriously since negligence may cost them their reputations (Pillay, 2012).
While it is necessary to hence ensure state cooperation through confidentiality, it thereby
endangers the public‘s interest and also accountability of organizations through scrutiny, thus
being a constant issue in improving the effectiveness of inquiry procedures. The achievement of
this balance is quite decisive in a bid to guarantee that human rights abuses will be properly
addressed while at the same time encouraging the culture of speaking out and discussing issues
constructively. Presumably, the emphasis on the subject of inquiry procedures requires reforms
that, if necessary, allow selective transparency to maximize results. For instance, some okay
findings could be made available in public while at the same time keep some of the discussions
secret. It could also guarantee the civil society organizations the leverage to demand for
implementation; yet at the same time compel the states to play along.
IV. State cooperation and follow-up
Cooperative relations and also follow-ups are therefore essential determinants in; understanding
the efficiency of inquiry procedures as a compliance tool. The effectiveness of inquiries to a very
large extent is informed by states‘ cooperation with the process including providing access to
information and places and the way they conduct themselves in relation to recommendations
(Rodley, 2013). In the absence of this cooperation, the potential of inquiry procedures to bring
about the above changes is sharply reduced. However, perhaps the most problematic area relates
to the issue of guaranteeing and sustaining the states‘ cooperation and this can be a really
dreadful exercise when inquiries concern politics-sensitive questions or officials of the higher
rank (O‘Flaherty, 2006). In such circumstances, the states may not enter fully, they will be
scared or worried to be punished or their standings reduced within the international arena. This
problem is exacerbated by the absence of rigorous enforcement instruments which makes treaty
bodies to rely heavily on lobbying and diplomatic influence to get states parties implement the
injunctive recommendations of the inquiry (Connors & Schmidt, 2014). It is often wrought with
shortcomings when thus confronted with political structures or systematic malpractices.
―Requesting updates or implementation and/or follow-up visits are critical because they help
keep the focus on the specific interventions that have been implemented and they offer further
occasions for conversation‖ (Gaer, 2011). These procedures may thereby assist in putting
pressure on the states to progress with their promises and hence identify the pending issues. But
while the follow-up is carried out, there are many challenges that accompany this process due to
many factors that include for example, lack of adequate resources to enable treaty bodies to
conduct vigorous and effective monitoring of implementation (Pillay, 2012). Moreover, while
follow-up measures that may at times be initiated entail recommendatory measures, the lack of
enforcement authority implies that the measures may not be substantiated even though they are
followed up in case states do not consider the recommendations significant. Some of the
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outstanding concerns that need to be address for the effective and also efficient practice of the
inquiries procedures relate therefore to increasing state cooperation as well as improving follow
up activities. As for the practical steps needed to increase the state engagement, it might thereby
be useful to work on the promotion of the bilateral and hence multilateral dialogue in the sphere
of human rights, among others. Expanding the knowledge about means of improving the usage
of resources to support follow-up activities may thus contribute to guaranteeing treaty bodies‘
capacity to monitor the compliance. Thus, tackling these challenges is essential to guarantee that
the enhancement of the inquiry procedures will be real on the ground human rights situations.
Thus, it is possible to assert that it is the international community‘s actions and lack of activities
that allow for fine-tuning inquiry procedures to improve state cooperation and follow-up of
follow-up mechanisms, make use of the inquiry procedure as a proper instrument for promoting
accountability and protecting human rights.
5. Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups
I. Thematic and country-specific mandates
Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups or as referred to as Special Procedures are extremely
influential in fulfilling the objectives of the international human rights system as they offer
specific and general concern mandates. These human rights independent experts are designated
to investigate, oversee, and document human rights situations either in certain countries or on
certain themes in the global sphere (Piccone, 2011). Regional mandates enable exploration of
specific rights or issues in various countries to determine the global approach towards them and
practices of efficient actions (Alston, 2011). For instance, thematic mandates may include
Women issues, the Right to Freedoms, or the Effects of Climate change on Rights, including the
cases with & without interventions. Universal country programming allows for a detailed look at
the general state of human rights in a specific country, and in many cases purposed to address
severe or systemic violations (Subedi, 2011). Such mandates thus enable specialists to focus on
the specifics of political, social and also cultural realities of certain countries thus raising
awareness about certain human rights problems, which may not grab much attention within more
general concepts and hence discourses. Due to their ability to react to new and developing human
rights issues as well as crisis situations, Special Procedures offer a highly effective mechanism
for addressing the world‘s need for human rights protection (Freedman, 2014). These
organizations can respond quite rapidly to sudden instances of human rights abuse, like arising
from conflict, disaster or repression and are therefore better placed to alert the world, call for
international attention. But these mandates can face the following challenges and therefore their
effectiveness can be reduced. Lack of funds also poses the problem to the efficiency of Special
Rapporteurs and Working Groups due to limitation of time for conducting extensive
investigations of cases and following up on recommended actions. Also, lack of cooperation
from the state may limit the access of such information to them and prevent effective monitoring
by their agency (Alston, 2011). Moreover, the probability of politics influence in the
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appointment of Special Procedures may raise doubts in the community as to the value of
conclusions and recommendations made by such institutions.
II. Fact-finding missions
These are thus common features in the tasks performed by Special Rapporteurs and Working
Groups, which entail fact-finding missions to establish first-hand information about a particular
human rights situation. These missions include initial data collection, familiarization with
various actors and the evaluation of the adherence to international human rights standards by
ministries (Piccone, 2011). That in-country visits improve the quality of the reports issued,
provided by the Special Procedures as better perspectives on multifaceted human rights abuses
and their relevant setting (Alston, 2011). Because of this, due to direct contact with the victims,
governments, and other civil society to comprise and elaborate knowledge, which may not be
obtained in a simple desk study. Nevertheless, fact finding missions are thereby characterized by
several important challenges. Authorization from the state is usually a prerequisite to country
visits and may entail one or both of the following: While this has been very instrumental in
reaching out to different countries, it also brings about certain issues such as: Assent from the
state is usually a requirement in the country visit and this often results to either the provisions of
restricted access and or refusal of access altogether especially in situations where human rights
violations are grievous (Subedi, 201 It appears that there is a requirement where in cases where
governments are uncooperative or hostile, it can hamper the effectiveness of Special Procedures
exercising their core roles. Thus, safety and security challenges in conflict or oppressive
territories may also shorten or reduce impact of these missions (Freedman, 2014). At many other
times, the political environment might become a threat to not only the travelling advisers but also
local people who work with them, thus discouraging the sharing of information that will be
instrumental in the achievement of the mission. Moreover, resources factors put boundaries to
the number of visits conducted in a country as well as the frequency of the visits, issues which
may reduce the effectiveness and scope of investigations and squeezes the amount of follow up
that can be done. However, regardless of the mentioned drawbacks, fact-finding missions are still
influential for documenting human rights abuses, as well as for executing diplomacy and talking
with local stakeholders. It is imperative to note that all the evidence that is collected during these
missions are essential for furthering discourse in the global sphere; decision making that informs
policy and law making and advocacy work. Consequently, one could imagine how strengthening
these missions—financially, in terms of security, and through political support—could help
bolster the capacity of Special Procedures to achieve the objectives of holding those accountable
for violations of human rights standards, or the lack thereof. At the end of the day, the fact-
finding missions determine whether human rights abuses shall be addressed and whether there
shall be reforms demanded and implemented.
III. Public reporting and awareness-raising
These acts include public reporting and awareness creation, roles that are played by Special
Rapporteurs and Working Groups since they help in informing and creating awareness on human
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rights situations. Basic principles of human rights are progressively shaped via their
communications to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, as well as, calling for
attention to important thematic issues (Piccone, 2011). Civil society action can sometimes take a
call to report human rights issues to the public domain: the resultant exposure often brings
significant media coverage and forces states to act (Alston 2011). Special Rapports can also
bring issues to the surface by ‗rattling the cage‘ and shaking the people, and wake up the masses
and policy-makers of the civilization‘s challenges to human rights. Practice of posting awareness
of various human rights issues through press releases, press statements, and academic writings
also assist in educating different stakeholder regarding ongoing human rights abuses (Subedi,
2011). In its turn, the influence of public reporting may be constrained by one or the other
circumstance. Often, states may disregard, or even completely ignore adverse reports especially
those that emanate from country-specific initiatives because they are deemed as politically
influenced or skewed (Freedman, 2014). Such an attitude can hence diminish the credibility of
the findings thus decreasing their capacity to spur change. Secondly, Special Procedures generate
a large number of reports, which at times, may create an issue of fatigue and information
overload as significant messages may be drowned by these finds. Thus, important
recommendations can be easily overlooked, while less important information gets more
attention. Nevertheless, public reporting and also awareness creation by Special Rapporteurs as
well as Working Groups are thereby helpful for keeping any human rights violations in the
spotlight and also reviving the commitment to human rights by players on the international stage.
Due to the fact that these mechanisms continuously bring to attention the violations and demand
adherence to basic human rights, they are useful tools in the pursuit of change and justice. On
how can they improve, or as they assure, their work in order to bring their messages across and
create better support for human rights across all levels of the society.
IV. Engagement with civil society
Interfacing with civil society is inherent in the mandate of Special Rapporteurs and Working
Groups, strengthening their tasks‘ relevance as well as the mandate‘s legitimacy. CSOs are
usually involved in the process of generating and providing necessary information, as well as in
the process of an access to the victims and witnesses and in the process of the implementation of
the recommendations (Piccone, 2011). This partnership makes it possible for Special Procedures
to gain insights and experience from the ground hence improving a better understanding of
human rights situation in a country (Alston, 2011). CSOs‘ inputs thus expand the Special
Rapporteurs‘ knowledge on the situation that exists in communities that they affect, which
enhances relevancy and also applicability of the reports‘ conclusions. Furthermore, interaction
with civil society strengthens the oppressed groups and human rights activists by raising their
issues at the global level (Subedi, 2011). Apart from promoting diversity, the variety of values
thereby contributes to the enhancement of input from different performers into the human rights
discourse. Due to its focus on the challenges that affected groups‘ experience, Special
Procedures can solve the problem by alerting the larger society to systemic injustices that are
often unnoticed. That is why this engagement also includes impressive problems. At some time,
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engagement with Special Procedures risks put CSOs and individual activists in violation of the
repressive government (Freedman, 2014). Risks of such a nature can discourage the
organizations from sharing important information, thus obstructing the human rights monitoring.
Also, moderating CS participation and the equal representation of the participants are not easy to
do mostly when fighting civil society interests may cause cohorts among them. Nevertheless,
civil society interaction cannot be thus ignored as the key factor for the authority and also
effectiveness of Special Rapporteurs as well as Working Groups. These mechanisms can thus
improve their legitimacy and also efficiency by providing greater inclusiveness about human
rights situations as well as mobilizing more supporters for the rights cause. Such step could be
based on the enhancing of the cooperation with CSOs and on guaranteeing safety measures for
the activists, thus, such step could contribute to advances in the current collaborative approach
and would assist in achieving a better response to human rights violations, as well as would
underlie the support of the commitment to the recognition of universal human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
6. Universal Periodic Review
I. Peer review process
The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) came up with a new peer review system of the
international human rights system aimed at evaluating the record of all the member states of the
UN concerning human rights violations. Created by the United Nations General Assembly in
2006, The UPR literally signals a new exit from conventional expert driven treaty body review
approach to state driven peer review system (Abebe, 2009) This innovative mechanism requires
that every 4-5 years each state‘s human rights record is reviewed while the UN member states
are both reviewers and reviewed states (Cowan & Billaud, 2015). The UPR has a several
advantages one of which is that it is universal thus ensuring that no state can avoid being
questioned on its practices as regards to human rights. However, the nature of peer review in the
UPR had its issues. This may be due to political reasons where states will not indict each other
knowing that they have bad records in human rights, or where states align themselves in an effort
to cover each other‘s mistakes in other areas of human rights (Chauville, 2014). This would
result in lesser probability of having candid evaluations made and potentially weakens the
possibility of having practical accountability made. Furthermore, the scope and impact of the
UPR also face limitations because the level of cooperation and obligation of the states is also an
issue for concern; some of the state prefers to give general and nominal response than having
practical and measurable action plan. However, it is evident that the peer review mechanism of
the UPR has managed to sustain a continuing sphere of discussion regarding human rights
among nations. It has made many countries to be proactive into the international human rights
system and realize the need to improve on their human rights record. The UPR therefore focuses
on the exchange of best practices to improve the other state‘s practices through sharing of
experience and also likely challenges faced. Hence, the UPR has assumed the role of providing
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accountability and also raising awareness of states‘ performance in the area of human rights
regardless of the intricacies of state politics as well as international relations.
II. Stakeholder participation
It is prosaic to mention therefore that the involvement of the stakeholders is a key component of
the UPR, which adds a lot of value to its scope and reliability. UPR process itself engages inputs
from a variety of sources- the state under review, UN agencies, NHRIs, international and
regional NGOs as well as groups of victims and others (Cowan and Billaud, 2015). This
approach involves a number of stakeholders who provide varying and more accurate results for
the situation with human rights in the state (Smith, 2013). CSOs, more specifically, have the role
of offering an information view that can offset or augment the state‘s individual record, making
the discussion more constructive and the state more accountable (Abebe, 2009). Nevertheless,
the level of participation of the stakeholders has not been without some challenges. The amount
of information that is submitted is massive and can thus overwhelming the reviewing states and
eventually lead to some valuable inputs being overlooked (Chauville, 2014). Moreover, some
states have tried to palliate the civil society engagement, both in workshop draft contributions
and in the examination phase, which hampers the process (Domínguez-Redondo, 2012). Some of
such restrictions may hide important speakers from speaking especially persons of concern such
as minorities and human rights activists. However, the following is a major advantage that comes
with stakeholder involvement in the UPR process: This increases the level of openness in the
review processes, makes it easier in evaluating the conduct of states and pressurizes them to
address human rights requirements. The practice of inclusiveness of such a diversification of
stakeholders adds the necessary legalization; accountability transforms the UPR into a
collaborative framework under which states are given comprehensive reports on their records of
human rights violations. Finally, it can therefore be concluded that the UPR as a tool of
monitoring human rights all relies on the involvement of all relevant parties.
III. Recommendations and voluntary commitments
Recommendations and voluntary pledges are the key forms of recommendations that determine
human rights development in the state under analysis after passing through the UPR. The
reviewing states‘ recommendations during the interactive dialogue reflect numerous features that
pertain to the state‘s performance in the realm of human rights (Smith, 2013). The state under
review can then accept, take note of or partially accept these recommendations and make
voluntary pledges for more action (Cowan & Billaud, 2015). This approach is intended to
increase states‘ buy-in so that they will be responsible and accountable for the realization of
human rights (Abebe, 2009). However, the efficiency of this system can be considered as low
because of the quality and specificity of received recommendations. These can diverge
substantially ranging from specific and practical recommendations to general and politicized
comments that may have minimal relevance to enhancing the situation of human rights.
Furthermore, there is no well-defined structure for classifying the status of implementation for
acknowledged suggestions, which is a weakness, or even applying them, which leads to
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confusion regarding the hierarchy of follow-up procedures, and thus weak monitoring and
evaluation as well as enforcement of accountability (Domínguez-Redondo, 2012). It may lead to
states approving the recommendations without proper commitment of them and that will make
the overall impact of the UPR less effective. Nonetheless, something positive is created from the
recommendations and voluntary commitments that stemmed from the UPR process; it offers a
certain structure for monitoring the progress and looking into the human rights situation in a
given state. They are individual communications that therefore lead the states to think about their
record in the field of human rights and also enter into a dialogue with the international
community. Moreover these outcomes can thus be useful for civil society organizations and also
national human rights institutions to assess the state‘s compliance and thus require the necessary
amendments. In summary; one can conclude that there are challenges thereby to the
implementation of the recommendations that are issued by the UPR and hence the commitments
taken thereof are crucial to improving the state of human rights across the world.
IV. Implementation and follow-up mechanisms
Mechanisms of putting in place and follow-up are decisive to achieve change in human rights
situation on the ground by operationalization of the UPR. As the UPR process continues the
states are often required to report on the interaction of accepted recommendations and voluntary
commitments in the following cycle of evaluation and improvement (Smith, 2013). This
formulated approach thus seeks to enforce compliance with the human rights obligations by the
states to hence ensure tangible progressive results. In this regard, some of the states have not
waited and have put in place national reporting and follow-up bodies. They usually imply the
synchronization of implementation processes among different governmental agencies and civil
society‘s communication to achieve sufficient and non-selective advancement (Cowan &
Billaud, 2015). Also, the UN Human Rights Council promotes the demonstrating midterm report
(Chauville, 2014) – states can submit the information on their activity between the formal review
and appraisal. Interim reports are thereby essential means for states to prove that they are
committed to the protection of human rights and also to explain the problems which were met
during the process. The following are the challenges which affect the success of implementation
and follow-up efforts. There is no enforcement mechanism provided in the framework of the
UPR and it remains a major challenge in the process. Thus, the kind of obligation which the
convention established is non-binding and its implementation depends on political will and the
ability of the states to place priority on human rights despite national interest (Abebe, 2009).
Thus, one can identify several weaknesses of the UPR mechanism, including a massive number
of recommendations that can create a real challenge for states, making it difficult for them to
implement such proposals as a result of a lack of resources and/or expertise (Domínguez-
Redondo, 2012). Nonetheless, the focus of the UPR on implementation and follow-up has indeed
raised the awareness of the human rights situation at the national level. It has enhanced thereof
interaction with all actors in the international system of protection, dialogue and hence work
towards the construction of lasting human rights solutions. In this way, the UPR thus plays a
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kind of positive role in continual state-level human rights improvement as well as
democratization globally.
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