An Examination of Tribal Nation Integration in
Homeland Security National Preparedness
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Background
The September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks have influenced U.S. homeland
security policies and programs aimed to mitigate threats to citizens and resources.
However, a more collaborative approach to policy that incorporates stakeholders and
resources into the national preparedness effort is the most effective way to collectively
prepare for emergent threats in an evolving homeland security environment. Based on a
gap in the extant literature there is the potential for this study to add to the body of
research on homeland security national preparedness (hereafter referred to as national
preparedness), and to influence positive change by assisting policymakers to secure and
protect U.S. citizens.
In this study I explored stakeholder narratives, with a central focus on Native
American tribal nations in order to understand differing perspectives on tribal nation
integration in national preparedness. A characteristic of the current homeland security
environment is that no single stakeholder has the resources or the wherewithal to
unilaterally deal with catastrophic events, whether of human or environmental origin
(Clovis, Jr., 2006). Consequently, all stakeholders require some type of support from
other stakeholders, and some stakeholders may have almost nothing they need (Barber,
2000). From this perspective, integration of stakeholders in the collective national
preparedness effort becomes not simply a desired outcome, but is more suggestive of a
collective imperative. Gaps in national preparedness integration remain vulnerable to
exploitation by hostile actors, as well as to the cascading network effects of catastrophic
natural disasters. To more effectively protect against, mitigate, and respond to these gaps
requires the vertical and horizontal integration and aggregation of capabilities of all
stakeholders (Clovis, Jr., 2006).
Introduction to National Preparedness Policy
National preparedness, and the concomitant all-of-government integration of
stakeholder efforts, is grounded in national policy by Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8
(National Security Staff [NSS], 2011); and is further shaped by federal legislation
including the Homeland Security Act (Public Law 107-292, 2002); the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act (Public Law 109-295, 2006); the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief Act (Public Law 93-288, 1988); and the Sandy Recovery Improvement
Act (Public Law 113-2, 2013). National policy is compulsory to the degree that it directs
national preparedness agencies and activities at the federal level, and mandates
development of the various national preparedness framing documents issued by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): the National Preparedness Goal
(FEMA, 2011); and the National Preparedness System (FEMA, 2011) comprised of the
national planning frameworks (or mission areas) for “prevention, protection, mitigation,
response, and recovery” (FEMA, 2014, p. 2; NSS, 2011, p. 3).
When conceived on a temporal and spatial spectrum, the national planning
frameworks codify a holistic approach to national preparedness beginning with pre-event
prevention and protection, continuing though mitigation during an event, and extending
through post-event activities such as response and recovery. The national framing
documents further establish the tenets by which stakeholders are integrated into, and
benefit from national preparedness. This holistic approach represents a whole community
or all-of-nation approach to collective planning to reduce vulnerabilities to both human
and environmental threats (FEMA, 2011, p. 1).
Problem Statement
A gap exists between national preparedness policy and practice in the integration
of the 566 federally recognized Native American tribal nations as stakeholders in the
collective national effort (Department of the Interior [DOI], 2014). This gap
encompasses both the people and their lands. In context of the historical and enduring
disenfranchisement and impoverishment of tribal nations, Native Americans remain
vulnerable to further exploitation by other nation state and nonstate actors, and
susceptible to the effects of homegrown radicalization (Lynch & Stretesky, 2012; Mueller
& Salt, 2011; Vargas, 2011).
Tribal nation reservations, some of which are strategically placed on international
borders, are some of the most isolated and economically depressed areas in the nation
(DOI, 2014). Yet, as Kueny (2007) indicated, they include within their boundaries, or are
crossed by, state and national critical infrastructure networks. Multiple sources have
found that tribal nation reservations are also conduits for the illegal trafficking of money,
drugs, weapons, and humans into and out of the United States (Government
Accountability Office (GAO), 2013; Police Magazine, 2011; Spencer, 2011).
National preparedness policy calls for an “integrated, all-of-Nation” approach
which includes all stakeholders, including tribal nations (NSS, 2011, p. 1). Despite their
unique historic, social, and economic circumstances, and their critical relevance to
homeland security, however, national policy in relation to tribal nation people and
resources has been at best disjointed and inconsistent. The proliferation, and the
repetitive rewriting over time, of court decisions, legislative acts, executive orders, and
government policy documents relative to tribal nations has had a destabilizing impact on
the integration of tribal nations in national preparedness. In this study, I examine this
uncertain, complex, and polarizing issue in order to examine the narratives of
stakeholders with the hope of gaining better understanding and adding to the body of
extant research (Roe, 1994).
Purpose of the Study
In this study I sought to understand the impacts of national preparedness policies
on tribal nations as revealed in comparison of stakeholder narratives. The conventional
or federal government narrative account was drawn from FEMA for its lead role in
national preparedness policy development and implementation, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) for its role in administering tribal national disaster preparedness, and from
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) for its unique military support role
in national preparedness. The counter or tribal nation narrative account was drawn from
federally recognized tribal nations for their unique status in relation to the federalist
model for national preparedness; and from nongovernmental organizations, the Tribal
Emergency Management Association (iTEMA), and National Tribal Emergency
Management Council (NTEMC), that work on behalf of, and in collaboration with tribal
nations for national preparedness. The definition of national preparedness used in this
study is established in national policy by Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8 (NSS,
2011).
Nature of the Study
The nature of this study was qualitative with a narrative policy analysis approach.
A narrative policy analysis was appropriate because it sought to understand the
“uncertainty, complexity, and polarization” in differing narrative accounts of federal
government and tribal nation stakeholders in the national preparedness integration of
federally recognized tribal nations (Roe, 1994, p. 2). This study also incorporated
elements of hermeneutic inquiry to establish the situational context of the homeland
security environment since 9/11. Hermeneutic inquiry also helped establish the context of
my personal experiences as well as those of other homeland security scholar-practitioners
(Patton, 2002).
Theoretical Framework
From a theoretical perspective, policy for national preparedness can be found at
the convergence of both social contract theory and human conflict theory. The social
contract theory used is related to the principles of government found in a democratic
constitutional republic, and which have their origins in the writings of Rawls (1999) and
such Age of Enlightenment theorists as Hobbes (1994), Locke (2010), and Rousseau
(1968). Broadly stated, the social contract posits that people surrender, or relinquish,
some of their inherent rights to the authority of a state in return for collective protection
of their remaining rights and interests by the state. The human conflict theory used is
Clausewitz’s (1984) rationalist view of war which came to the fore with the emergence
of modern nation states in the period following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It is
grounded in the interactions of sovereign nation states, and espouses that war, and by
extrapolation human conflict as reflected in those activities since 9/11 referred to as the
“war on terror,” “is part of man’s social existence,” and is “an instrument of
[government] policy, which makes it subject to reason alone” (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 89).
Research Questions
The research questions are discussed more fully in Chapter 3. The primary
research question was: How have tribal nations experienced the effects of national
preparedness policy in homeland security since 9/11?
The research sub-questions were:
1. What have tribal nations experienced in national preparedness, and how
have they experienced it, as a result of homeland security policies
implemented since 9/11?
2. What have been the tribal nation responses (stories to be told) to these
experiences?
3. What meanings (turning points) do stakeholders ascribe to these
experiences?
4. What are the implications of these experiences?
Study Limitations
In this study I utilized a narrative policy analysis approach to produce a
metanarrative from differing stakeholder narratives on national preparedness, from which
conclusions, insights, and recommendations were drawn (Roe, 1994). The study
combined elements of both written and spoken narrative accounts. As a narrative policy
analysis, the study lends itself to questions of: determining empirical or factual merit
concerning policy issues; focusing on the stories behind issues rather than the substance
of the issues themselves; establishing the primacy of conflicting views on the uncertainty,
complexity, and polarization on issues; tolerating multiple, even conflicting, narratives;
addressing the role of power and politics in the larger society; and accounting for
technical and legal uncertainties behind issues (Roe, 1994). Issues of trustworthiness
related to researcher bias, and reactivity of those interviewed to the researcher, are
paramount to this study. These issues were addressed through a combination of methods,
including:
1. Triangulation through the use of standardized interviews of a diverse
range of individuals, built around a common lexicon, to generate high-value data for
automated coding and systematic analysis (Patton, 2002; Maxwell, 2005).
2. The use of rich, thick description drawn from stakeholder interviews and
researcher observations (Cresswell, 2007; Maxwell, 2005).
3. Clarification of researcher bias based on experience, and controlling for it
in data collection and interpretation (Cresswell, 2007; Maxwell, 2005).
Definitions
For clarity of understanding of issues associated with national preparedness, and
to support establishment of a common narrative lexicon, the operational definitions below
were applied to this study.
War on terror: The phrase “war on terror” achieved prominence following the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. Despite frequent and popular usage of the phrase in political,
government and media forums, no commonly accepted definition of the term exists.
Nevertheless, for the theoretical framework of this study war on terror was defined as,
Government efforts including, but not limited to, diplomatic, intelligence, military,
economic, health, and law enforcement actions, taken since 9/11 to protect the
nation’s people, resources, and interests against terrorist attack.
National policy: National policy is at the heart of issues related to homeland
security and national preparedness. National policy was defined as,
“A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government
at the national level in pursuit of national objectives” (Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
2010).
Policy narratives: Policy narratives, or the stories of stakeholders, help to clarify
the social issues that stem from national policy. They may come in the form of narratives,
counter-narratives, and metanarratives. Policy narratives were defined as: “…stories
(scenarios and arguments) which underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for
policymaking in situations that persist with many unknowns, a high degree of
interdependence, and little, if any, agreement” (Roe, 1994, p. 34).
National preparedness: National preparedness, in homeland security, is clearly set
in both policy (NSS, 2011) and practice (FEMA, 2011). National preparedness was
defined as:
“…the actions to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain
the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of,
respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the
security of the Nation” (NSS, 2011, p. 5).
Integration: Integration permeates both the policy, and the national framing
documents for the practice of national preparedness, yet the term is never succinctly
defined. Depending on the source, integration, for the purpose of national preparedness
refers or is applied, variously, to “guidance, programs, and processes” (NSS, 2011, p. 2);
“national planning frameworks” (NSS, 2011, p. 3); information sharing (FEMA, 2011, p.
2) and planning (FEMA, 2011, p. 5); “public and community institutions” (FEMA, 2011,
p. 21); and “critical stakeholders” (FEMA, 2013, p. 21) at all levels of government
(FEMA, 2013, p. 40). To assimilate these elements into a single useful classification, for
the purpose of this study integration in national preparedness was defined as: Vertical (at
all levels of government/nongovernment) and horizontal (across agency boundaries)
partnering of stakeholders for: pre-event (prevention, protection, mitigation) policy
development, planning, resourcing, exercising, operating, and human capital
development; and for post-event (response, recovery) synchronous and asynchronous
information sharing and collaboration.
Stakeholders: The whole government approach to national preparedness must, of
necessity, encompass the full range of potential stakeholders. Therefore, national
preparedness stakeholders were defined as:
“…individuals, families, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors,
faithbased organizations, and local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and
Federal governments” (FEMA, 2013, p. 4).
Tribal nations: The tribal nations are those recognized by the DOI and listed in
the Federal Register. They were defined as:
“…the current list of 566 tribal entities recognized and eligible for funding and
services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs by virtue of their status as Indian
tribes” (DOI, 2014).
Native Americans: The phrase Native American is used throughout the study to
refer to the aboriginal people of the United States and is accepted as synonymous with
American Indian or Alaska Native. The full definition of Native American, taken from
the 2010 United States Census, was:
“…a person having origins in any of the original peoples of North and South
America (including Central America) and who maintains tribal affiliation or
community attachment.” (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012, p. 2)
Two sets of narrative themes were used in data analysis for this study: narrative
policy analysis themes, and tribal nation themes.
Narrative policy analysis themes include:
Uncertainty: Uncertainty refers to “the analyst’s lack of knowledge about what
matters” (Roe, 1994, p. 2).
Complexity: Complexity refers to “an issue’s internal intricacy and/or its
interdependence with other policy issues” (Roe, 1994, p. 2).
Polarization: Polarization refers to the manner in which an issue “crystallizes as
the concentration of groups around an issue” (Roe, 1994, p. 2).
Tribal nation themes include:
People: People refers to recognized members of tribal nations. Although
membership varies by tribal nation, people are also considered as stakeholders in
accordance with the definition provided above.
Resources: Resources refers to the funding and material means available to
tribal nations.
Approaches: Approaches refers to policies applied to tribal nations and national
preparedness.
Assumptions
This study accepted three assumptions on the basis of their underlying logic, but
which require further study before they can be accepted as fact. The first assumption,
found in national preparedness policy, was that an integrated approach to national
preparedness will strengthen the collective security and resilience of stakeholders for the
full range of emerging threats in the homeland security environment. The second
assumption was that federally recognized tribal nations are not fully integrated into
national preparedness. Finally, it was assumed the federally recognized tribal nations will
find it in their individual and collective interests to be fully integrated in national
preparedness.
Significance of the Study
This study offers to contribute to the metanarrative of national preparedness, and
is therefore of primary importance to homeland security efforts at all levels (federal,
tribal, state, local, nongovernmental), and of general importance to the security of the
nation’s stakeholders and resources. There are at least two contributions of this study:
(a) an increased understanding of the national preparedness metanarrative which will
contribute to the body of knowledge for reducing existing gaps in policy and practice, and
(b) a set of research and policy recommendations for greater integration of tribal nations
in national preparedness. True positive social change consists of giving voice to a
heretofore marginalized group (Roe, 1994), Native Americans, by allowing tribal nations
to contribute to the metanarrative of national preparedness in homeland security.
Summary
This chapter has provided the background for a study in the form of a narrative
policy analysis of tribal nation integration into national preparedness in homeland
security. Chapter 2 provides a review of extant literature on the subject. Chapter 3
introduces the research design and approach for the study.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter reviews extant literature relevant to this study. The review
emphasizes stakeholder narratives related to integration in national preparedness,
particularly to gain greater understanding of issues associated with integration of the
federally recognized tribal nations. Due to the dearth of peer-reviewed literature directly
related to stakeholder integration in national preparedness, and to accommodate the range
of sources necessary to understand stakeholder narratives, the review adopted two
approaches. First, it expanded its sources to include not only peer-reviewed articles and
publications, but also additional relevant publications with stakeholder narratives on
national preparedness, such as scholarly books and journals, government policy
documents, and media publications. Second, it examined the convergence of social
contract theory and human conflict theory, and their relationship to the homeland security
environment, national preparedness integration, and stakeholder narratives.
The literature review begins with an examination of the theoretical framework for
this study. The theoretical framework is founded in the convergence of social contract
theory and human conflict theory in a democratic constitutional republic, as revealed in
the interaction of the elements common to both theories: people/rights, means/consent,
and government/authority. From the theoretical framework, the literature review
proceeds to an overview of the homeland security environment, and the emerging threats
within it, to gain an understanding of its impact on, and its imperatives for, national
preparedness integration. Following the overview of the homeland security environment,
the literature review explores federal government and tribal nation stakeholder narratives
involving tribal nation integration in national preparedness, and attempts to place them
into hermeneutical context in relation to the theoretical framework and the homeland
security environment.
References for this study were drawn extensively from a number of sources,
including:
1. Walden University Online Library, including the EBSCO, ProQuest, and
SAGE search engines.
2. Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security,
Homeland Security Digital Library.
3. University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center.
4. Google and Google Scholar search engines.
5. Government, academic and other relevant non-government Internet
websites in the public domain.
Theoretical Framework
As a nascent endeavor that has arisen since 9/11, Bellavita (2011) argued that
homeland security has yet to prove itself as a discipline or academic field. Bellavita
found that national safety since 9/11 has more to do with the work of practitioners and
improvements in other component disciplines (e.g., police, fire, intelligence, military,
finance, etc.), rather than improvements in homeland security writ large. The dearth of
foundational homeland security theory can be observed in two sources. The absence of
an overarching grand theory of homeland security was noted by Bellavita (2012), and
Kiltz and Ramsay (2012) highlighted through multiple overlapping conceptual lenses the
proliferation of limited theories that individually do not span the complexity of the many
components that comprise homeland security as a whole. Across the homeland security
enterprise, national preparedness stands out as a critical venture that combines
overlapping components. The manner in which human conflict has played a significant
role in human societal evolution was illustrated by Keeley (1996), with cross-cultural
studies indicating that some 90-95% of known human societies have engaged in warfare.
Any attempt to truncate national preparedness for more detailed study potentially
encounters Poincaré’s notion of chance as a function of analytical blindness (Beyerchen,
1992). The analytical process of separating a concept into components for easier study,
as postulated by Poincaré, in itself makes it difficult to achieve a comprehensive
understanding of the concept as an interconnected whole. When Poincaré’s notion is
applied to national preparedness the natural desire is to truncate it into components or
individual theories that are more easily explored. The risk is that the interactions of these
truncated components or theories over time may be mistaken for chance due to an
inability on the part of the observer to see the relative relationship of each component or
individual theory to national preparedness in its entirety. Resulting efforts to comprehend
national preparedness in the form of separate or isolated components and theories may
therefore increase the potential for misinformed observation due to analytical blindness.
To reduce the potential for analytical blindness the concept of national
preparedness can be viewed through the convergence of key elements of both social
contract theory and human conflict theory that are embedded within it. Presidential
Policy Directive/PPD-8 (NSS, 2011) incorporated social contract theory into national
preparedness policy by implying that an “integrated, all-of-nation” (p. 1) participatory
approach at all levels of government will benefit stakeholders by safeguarding the nation
and its citizens. It incorporated human conflict theory into national preparedness policy
by specifying a risk-based planning approach to address the spectrum of human and
environmental “threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including
acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters” (p. 1).
The National Preparedness System (FEMA, 2011) established the underlying national
preparedness policy principle grounded in these two theoretical approaches – that the
whole community (comprised of all the stakeholders that constitute the nation)
contributes to, and benefits from, reductions in the risk of human and environmental
threats. The theoretical framework for this study, to be applied to the concept of national
preparedness integration, can be found at the convergence of both social contract theory
and human conflict theory.
Social Contract Theory
For this study there are several elements of the social contract that relate to
national preparedness in a democratic constitutional republic, including: retention of
natural rights, consent to restriction of select liberties, assumption of select duties, and the
consolidation of collective authority (Roland, 2012). The theoretical basis for these
elements can be broadly stated in several broad tenets of social contract theory:
1. People are rational, free, and equal in a state of nature, and they have
inalienable rights (Hobbes, 1994; Lloyd & Sreedhar, 2013; Locke, 2010; Uzgalis, 2012).
Views on people in a state of nature differ – in such a state, Locke saw people as
cooperative and industrious; and Hobbes thought of them as poor, nasty, and brutish
(Zack, 2006).
2. To improve their situation, people consent to transfer some of their rights
to the authority of the central government of a state while retaining others (Hobbes, 1994;
Locke, 2010; Lloyd & Sreedhar, 2013). Both Locke and Hobbes believed that
government authority, in the form of powers, derives from the consent of its constituents
(Zack, 2006). In social cooperation, when forming a society people choose the
principles by which basic rights and obligations are assigned, and by which social
benefits are determined (Rawls, 1999)
3. In the resulting social contract between people and government, people
remain free while enjoying the protection of the common force associated with the
authority of the state in its furtherance of the good of society (Bertram, 2012; Rousseau,
1968; Zack, 2006). The continued existence of government remains dependent on the
consent of its people, and that consent places obligations on government (Zack, 2006).
The authority of the state extends to the passage of laws for regulating and employing the
force of the community, and in defense of the commonwealth, for the public good
(Locke, 2010; Uzgalis, 2012). Consent to join the community is binding and cannot be
withdrawn; and the right of the state to pursue the public good outweighs the rights of
individuals (Locke,
2010; Uzgalis, 2012).
Elements of social contract theory are embedded in the American concept of
federal government and can be found in its principal founding documents as a
constitutional republic: the United States Declaration of Independence (Continental
Congress, 1776) and the United States Constitution (Constitutional Convention, 1787).
Together, these documents reinforce the principles of the social contract that relate to
national preparedness. References to free consent to the restriction and protection of
natural and constitutional individual rights, by due process of law, are explicit in both of
these documents.
The United States Constitution opens by stating its purpose to “insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty…” (Constitutional Convention, 1787). With this language, the
Constitution reinforced the principles of the social contract that relate to national
preparedness. Zack (2006) highlighted the manner in which Locke’s (2010) influence on
American democracy can be found in the references to free consent to both restriction of,
and protection of, natural and constitutional individual rights, by due process of law, that
are spelled out in the Constitution and its amendments. Similarly, the Constitution
established responsibility for assumption of “militia” duties by “citizen soldiers”
(Random House, 2003, p. 1220) to be exercised collectively under assembled authority.
These militia duties are not restricted to the national defense, but may also include
activities such as law enforcement and disaster response as they are related to executing
the “Laws of the Union” as authorized by Article 1, Section 8 (Constitutional
Convention, 1787).
Human Conflict Theory
Clausewitz’s rationalist view of human conflict can be placed into context – in
relation to national preparedness against the threats facing stakeholders and resources –
through the three elements that comprise his concept of war as “a paradoxical trinity”
(Clausewitz, 1984, p. 89). As a social endeavor, Clausewitz described the elements of
his trinitarian concept of war as composed of forces (irrational, nonrational, and rational)
and actors (people, army, and government) (Beyerchen, 1992; Klinger, 2006; Mastapeter,
2008):
1. A blind or irrational natural force (Mastapeter, 2008, p. 184) of
“primordial violence, hatred, and enmity” associated with the people of a society
(Clausewitz, 1984, p. 89).
2. A nonrational force (Mastapeter, 2008, p. 184) associated with the play of
“chance and probability” involving the army or the means of waging war (Clausewitz,
1984, p. 89).
3. A rational force (Mastapeter, 2008, p. 184) associated with government
and therefore making war “an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason
alone” (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 89).
Within Clausewitz’s trinity, the people are the constituents of the society who are
to be protected; the army represents the means of waging conflict on behalf of and to
protect the people; and the government is the collective state authority for directing the
means of waging conflict. Waldman (2010) argued that these elements impart to human
conflict a “measure of rational utility” (p. 2) while maintaining its status as a “multilateral
and interactive phenomenon” (p. 5).
The concept of the trinity hypothesized by Clausewitz can be seen in the post9/11
federal approach to national preparedness and, in keeping with Klinger (2006), is
consistent with Clausewitz’s argument that the defense, rather than the offense, is the
strategically stronger form of war. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8 (NSS, 2011)
embodies this strategic defensive approach by advocating a national policy of: 1)
preventing or mitigating the threats (human and environmental) to stakeholders and
resources; 2) through the employment of necessary means or capabilities; 3) as a shared
responsibility at all levels of government. The presumption is that this approach equates
to faster responsiveness, and thus greater security, for stakeholders and resources.
Theory Convergence
The relationship between social contract theory, human conflict theory, and
national preparedness integration in the homeland security environment is illustrated in
Figure 1. Using a methodological approach, Figure 1 portrays national preparedness on a
conceptual bifurcated left-to-right spectrum bounded by high threat/low security
(people/rights) at the left end, and high security/low threat (government/authority) at the
right end. The middle is represented by a seam of vulnerability that must be bridged by
national preparedness policy (means/consent). Seam issues affecting stakeholders
include: integration and shared responsibility for national preparedness established by
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8 (NSS, 2011); mitigation of threats through combined
efforts embodied in the National Preparedness Goal (FEMA, 2011, p. 2); collective
capabilities-based planning implemented in the National Preparedness System (FEMA,
2011, p. 4); and shared understanding of needs, improved relationships, greater
empowerment, and improved resilience for all stakeholders, resulting in a higher level of
collective national preparedness as envisioned in A Whole Community Approach To
Emergency Management (FEMA, 2011, p. 3).
National preparedness policy can be found at the convergence of the individual
elements of social contract theory and human conflict theory. Both theories are similar in
their focus on the interests and well-being of stakeholders at the high threat/low security
(left) end of the spectrum, and the application of state/government authority at the high
security/low threat (right) end of the spectrum. At the high threat/low security end of the
spectrum people in their natural state as envisioned by Locke and Hobbes are paired with
the irrational force of the people of a society described by Clausewitz. In this state,
people act in their own individual self-interest, in “bellum omnium contra omnes” or a
state of war of “all against all” (Hobbes, 1994; Kavka, 1983), without the benefits of, or
the obligations imposed by, the collective authority of government (Rousseau, 1968). At
the high security/low threat end of the spectrum, the social pact envisioned by Rousseau
(1968) is paired with the rational force of government described by Clausewitz (1984),
and war is no longer between individuals but between the governments of states
(Rousseau, 1968). In this state, the authority of the government works to protect the
collective interests and well-being of the society formed by its people.
Figure 1. Theory convergence.
The two theories align in the middle of the spectrum for national preparedness
integration: social contract theory through the assumption of mutual duties and benefits
by people; and human conflict theory through the government application of means,
including the employment of force, that are derived from and employed with the consent
of people. The prevalence of this principle in the military forces comprised of citizen
soldiers employed by the United States and other Western democracies was highlighted
by Avant (2000) and Kelty (2009). The practice is so predominant in the history of
Western democracies that “in terms of sustaining democratic values we have to consider
whether the citizen-soldier role, essential for creating mature democratic states in
Western Europe and North America, is also essential for enacting democratic values in
the present” (Burke, 2002, p. 23).
The process by which people become enfranchised as citizen soldiers with
interests that coincide with those of the larger society at the mid-point of the spectrum
was described by Schuurman (2010):
The secondary trinity forms a link between the abstract elements of war’s nature
and the real world by providing an example of how these forces can come to be
represented in society. In the case of democratic states the categorization into
government, armed forces, and people that Clausewitz uses is still applicable.
Using a state as an example, it can be argued that, although the armed forces are
most actively involved in waging war, they do so for goals set exclusively by the
government and under its constant supervision and direction. Furthermore, both
government and armed forces are dependent on the people. From a military
perspective, the people are an essential source of recruits. For the government,
maintaining the support of the citizens who voted it into power is vital to its
continued existence. (p. 96)
The symbiotic relationship between people and government in a democracy,
necessary to the establishment of citizen armies for the purpose of greater collective
security, also has application to national preparedness integration for homeland security.
In Figure 1, the government establishes national preparedness policy for homeland
security to bridge the seam between threats and security. Similar to the citizen soldiers
example above, to achieve effective national preparedness integration to carry out its
policies government draws its resources from its people, who can be viewed as both
stakeholders and constituents, but is also reliant on the support of those same people for
its legitimacy.
The question of what moral obligation government has to its people respective to
national preparedness was raised by Zack (2006). In the aftermath of a human-caused or
environment-caused incident, issues arise related to the at least temporary diminution of
the government’s ability to secure the well-being of its people, juxtaposed against the
varying abilities of various people to self-respond or function in the brief interim without
government (Zack, 2006) . When a disaster occurs, people and resources are not likely to
be thrown back into the original metaphorical state of nature described by Hobbes (1994)
and Locke (2010). It is reasonable to expect, however, that following a disaster people
will find themselves temporarily in a “second state of nature” (Zack, 2006, p. 4).
The length and impact of this second state of nature depends on the scale of the
event and the severity of its consequences. Due to social and economic differences
disasters do not affect all people equally. Whether the second state of nature is more
Hobbesian (poor, nasty, and brutish) or Lockean (cooperative and industrious) in nature is
dependent on many factors, including the socioeconomic status of the various people
involved and the degree to which they have been integrated in national preparedness.
Natural disaster prevention and response was tied by Nix-Stevenson (2013) to the social
capital of communities, as related to their relative social, political, and economic
empowerment or disempowerment. The argument of Nix-Stevenson was based on
Portes’s definition of social capital as “…the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue
of membership in social networks or other structures” (Portes, 1998, p. 3).
Beyond the immediate need for government to save lives, reduce suffering, and
reduce critical infrastructure damage, it can be argued that government has a moral
obligation in the aftermath of a disaster to achieve the “difference principle” described by
Rawls (1999). This obligates government, as argued by Zack (2006), to ensure that the
lives and circumstances of those people who are already disadvantaged in a society are
not diminished further by the effects of a disaster. The moral obligation of government
was further linked by Zack (2006) to national preparedness policy:
Government has a continual obligation to benefit those governed by rendering
them better off than they would have been in the first state of nature. The
temporary dysfunction of government in disasters results in a second state of
nature for those governed. Therefore, government has an extended obligation to
render citizens better off than they may be in a second state of nature. That is,
government is obligated to ensure adequate disaster preparation and planning, for
all probably disasters, in precisely those ways in which the public has
demonstrated its inabilities. (p. 5)
The Homeland Security Environment
National preparedness policy has undergone a fundamental evolution as a result of
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8 (NSS, 2011). This evolution, as an outgrowth of the
impact of 9/11 as a transformative event and catalyst, can be better understood through
several factors, including: the evolving nature of the homeland security environment; the
nature of emerging threats; the nature of the national preparedness approach; and
stakeholder narratives on national preparedness.
Evolving Environment
Numerous scholars and homeland security practitioners have described with
consistency a complex and uncertain homeland security environment in the post-9/11 era.
As a precursor, Kaplan (2000) referred to “the coming anarchy” of the post-Cold War era
and described a world in which the national boundaries of nation-states are geographic
artificialities that cannot stop the spread of global problems (p. 38). The post-9/11 world
was described by Friedman as “flat” (Friedman, 2007, p. 38) as a result of globalization
so that historical and geographical divisions are irrelevant. A post-American world was
depicted by Zakaria, characterized by the “rise of the rest” (Zakaria, 2008, p. 2) in the
form of emerging nation-state powers and the rise of nonstate actors. The post-9/11 era
was characterized by the Department of Defense (DOD) (2014) as being in a state of
constant flux, influenced by shifting geopolitical centers of gravity, the accelerating
spread of information, and emerging global trends which interact dynamically. The
post9/11 era was described by the U.S. Army as one of “persistent conflict” (Department
of the Army, 2008, p. 1).
This homeland security environment has been further shaped by geopolitical
trends. The manner in which the current homeland security environment is susceptive to
the effects of social, economic, technological, conceptual, and political drivers of change
that differentiate the information age from the industrial age which preceded it was
outlined by Reed (2008). The homeland security environment was described by the
National Security Strategies (NSS) as being shaped by globalization and the increasing
pace of technological advancements which accompany it (NSS, 2010), as well as “fluid”
with power “shifting below and beyond the nation state” (NSS, 2015, pp. 4-5). Shifting
global demographics and transfers of wealth were identified by the National Intelligence
Council [NIC] (NIC, 2008), as well as growing natural resource demands and scarcities,
and the rising influence of non-state actors and individuals, as influencing the homeland
security environment (NIC, 2012).
The cumulative result of these trends in the homeland security environment,
according to Williams (2008), is a conglomeration of national preparedness problems that
are increasingly interconnected, intractable, and volatile (p. 3). These problems,
according to the Project on National Security Reform (2008) require qualitatively more
demanding responses. Similarly, the NIC (2008) identified a national need for holistic
national preparedness approaches to balance competing, yet inextricably intertwined
foreign and domestic priorities. An outcome of the intermingling of foreign and domestic
priorities, described by the National Security Strategy (NSS, 2010), is the erosion of
distinctions between homeland security and national security, so that the security of
stakeholders and resources is critical to the success of both. From these descriptions of
the evolving homeland security environment, four variables can be derived that further
define it: increased network interconnectedness, expanded domains of conflict, the
blurring of boundaries that have traditionally defined human conflict, and elimination of
traditional security buffers.
Levels of stakeholder interconnectedness have increased as social and physical
infrastructure systems have taken on the characteristics of networks. Networks offer
tremendous advantages, but as a result of interdependencies that are inherent to their
nature, are also vulnerable to incidents that can potentially cause catastrophic cascading
network failures. The impact of this development has been to create not only higher
levels of interconnectedness, but also higher levels of dependability as well as
vulnerability for both stakeholders and resources.
In the last half of the 20th Century American (DOD, 2005) and Chinese (Liang &
Xiangsui, 2002) military strategists, and other scholars, recognized that the nature of
conflict was expanding exponentially beyond the traditional industrial age domains (land,
air, maritime, space, and cyber) to encompass the physical domain (which incorporates
the land, sea, air, and space domains) where capabilities are moved through time and
space; the knowledge domain (which incorporates the cyber domain) where information
is created, refined, and shared; the cognitive domain where concepts, intent, doctrine, and
procedures reside; and the social domain where the necessary elements of the human
enterprise such as attitudes, decisions, and interactions reside (DOD, 2005, p. 20). A
significant outcome of this trend according to Liang and Xiangsui (2002), is that, with the
end of the Cold War and the advent of the post-9/11 era, human competition and conflict
have not been diminished but have “only re-invaded society in a more complex, more
extensive, more concealed, and more subtle manner…using all means, including armed
force or non-armed force” (p. xv). In essence, in the post-9/11 era it can be argued that
the nature of conflict now encompasses all aspects of the human experience.
Accompanying this expansion of the domains of conflict, Reed (2008) argued that
the boundaries that have traditionally defined war and restricted warfare to specified
limits have become blurred. The boundaries may be physical, virtual, technological,
ideological, or moral. Regardless, in the current homeland security environment it is
increasingly difficult to distinguish between weapons and non-weapons, acts of war and
criminal acts, combatants and noncombatants, the actions of nation states and nonstate
actors, and actions that are within accepted bounds of morality and those that lack moral
considerations.
As a result of the expansion of the domains of conflict and the blurring of
boundaries – and likely as an outcome of it – in the information age, time, distance, and
borders have been reduced or eliminated as traditional security buffers for people and
resources. This includes the foreign-domestic divide referenced by the 9/11 Commission
(2004). An implication is that time, distance, and borders are increasingly transcended
and rendered irrelevant by information age threats and issues. Borders – whether
physical/geographical (e.g., local, state, tribal, federal, or international) or virtual (e.g.,
cyber) – as identified by Whitfield (2011), can be transgressed in real time by emerging
hostile actors, with little to no warning. From the perspective of threats and issues that
are not constrained by borders, and which may have national as well as local
implications, the historical adage that “all disasters are local” (Pittman, 2011) no longer
holds strictly true. As suggested by Bellavita (2011), in the current homeland security
environment it may be necessary to acknowledge the far-ranging consequences of
disasters across local, state, regional, national, and global boundaries. The National
Response Framework (FEMA, 2013) adopted the approach that disasters may be rendered
simultaneously local, as well as national and even international. This expansion of the
impacts of disasters, according to Clovis (2006), requires the near-simultaneous
integration of capabilities and responses at all levels of government for effective
prevention, response and recovery.
Emerging Threats
The emerging threats confronting the United States in the post-9/11 homeland
security environment can be divided into two broad categories for greater understanding.
Human threats, such as terrorist attacks, are adversarial in nature; the product of the
exercise of human will and the intent to do harm, by animate and sentient actors capable
of adapting their strategies and means to the potentialities of the homeland security
environment. In contrast, environmental threats such as natural disasters and manmade
accidents, though potentially catastrophic in their destructive impacts, due to their
nonanimate nature are not capable of forming the sentient intent, will, and adaptability
characteristic of human adversaries. Both categories of threats, whether human or
environmental, are similar in that they are not restricted by time, distance, or borders
(whether physical or virtual). In this respect, both categories of threats have the potential
to affect stakeholders from the local to the national level.
Understanding the nature of emerging threats is key to efforts to national
preparedness efforts to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from them.
The effects of human and environmental disasters, in the view of FEMA, are becoming
“more frequent, far-reaching, and widespread” (FEMA, 2011, p. 1), and due to their
complexity are increasingly more difficult to manage. The FEMA experience reinforces
the view of Stockton (2011) that efforts should be made to prepare for complex
catastrophes which differ quantitatively and qualitatively from more common disasters,
and which have the potential to cause catastrophic cascading network failures across
multiple infrastructure sectors, and throughout large regions. In contrast to Stockton,
Kiltz (2011) argued that a multidisciplinary approach is necessary to understanding future
“risks, threats, and vulnerabilities” (p. 1) and developing a homeland security education
discipline to prepare practitioners for them.
Potential human threats take several forms. Ascendant states, identified by the
NIC (2008), seek greater global roles politically, economically, militarily, and socially.
In contrast to ascendant states, according to DOD, rogue states threaten regional or global
stability through their sponsorship of terrorism, their pursuit of nuclear and missile
technology, and illicit activities such as counterfeiting currency and trafficking in
narcotics (JCS, 2008). Operating outside the structure of nation states, transnational
networks – criminal, drug, terrorist, insurgent, social issue, religious, and other extremist
organizations – according to Filkins (2005), have achieved the flexibility and agility of
networks, without clear centers of gravity, leadership, or hierarchy. Finally,
superempowered groups and individuals with specialized knowledge and means, have
been identified by DOD (United States Joint Forces Command, 2008), as being capable
of employing technology to achieve mass effects “out of all proportion to their size and
resources” (p. 36).
The exponential increases in technological means and availability have further
expanded human threats, thereby increasing their interconnectedness, intractability, and
volatility as argued by Williams (2008). Among other developments, according to
Clapper (2014), the expansion in human threats is exemplified by cyber threats; the
continued diversification of both international and domestic terrorism, including
homegrown violent extremists; and the increasing sophistication of transnational crime as
a major threat to United States economic and national security, including illicit trafficking
of drugs, humans, money, and natural resources. Supporting Clapper’s argument,
Carafano (2011) identified the advent of social networking as reshaping national security
approaches by giving rise to the ability of nonstate groups and actors to self-organize; and
by making possible the appearance of virtual currencies such as
BitCoin (The BitCoin Foundation, 2014), and virtual marketplaces such as Silk Road
(Hoey, 2013), which enable illicit peer-to-peer transactions by malicious actors with near
anonymity (Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2013).
Potential environmental threats can be further sub-divided into two categories.
Natural disasters are naturally occurring events such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes,
tsunamis, wildland fires, and pandemics. Manmade accidents include industrial,
chemical, biological, nuclear, and infrastructure accidents. Environmental threats,
whether natural or manmade, may be deterministic in nature, in the sense that they are
often well defined. Their defining characteristics such as size, location, and speed of
development can all be measured. Nevertheless, they are also indeterminate because they
cannot always be predicted with great accuracy, and because slight changes and inputs to
their defining characteristics can produce great outputs in their ultimate intensity,
duration, and scale of impact that cannot be controlled – representative of the tenets of
chaos theory as described by Lorenz (1993). As with human threats, environmental
threats can also be catastrophic, as argued by Stockton (2011) and according to the
National Response Framework (FEMA, 2013) can result in “extraordinary levels of mass
casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure,
environment, economy, national morale, or government functions” (p. 1).
National Preparedness Integration
National preparedness policy establishes the collective effort for shaping the
evolving homeland security environment and for preparing stakeholders for the full
spectrum of emerging threats within it. Preventing terrorist attacks, and by implication
other human and environmental threats, was observed by Gomez (2010) as being
dependent on information sharing. It was further maintained by Wolslayer (2011) that
integrated homeland security policy is dependent on the engagement of all stakeholders,
both government and nongovernment. As illustrated in Figure 1, national preparedness
policy for the integration of stakeholders bridges the seam of vulnerability between
threats and security in national preparedness.
The broad tenets which shape the implementation of national preparedness can be
found in its framing documents: the National Preparedness Goal (FEMA, 2011), the
National Preparedness System (FEMA, 2011), and the national planning frameworks for
“prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery” (NSS, 2011, p. 3). By
mandating the manner in which national preparedness will be accomplished these tenets
serve a dual-purpose. They first establish the foundation of the federal narrative for
national preparedness. In doing so, they further tie the all-of-government approach to
national preparedness to both theory and practice. Among the tenets are:
1. The integration of homeland security and national security into a holistic
whole, with seamless coordination between “Federal, state, and local” (NSS, 2010, p. 2)
stakeholders to “prevent, protect against, and respond” (NSS, 2010, p. 2) to human and
environmental threats.
2. Shared responsibility of all stakeholders (federal, state, tribal, territorial,
local, private, nonprofit, and faith-based) for an integrated, “whole community” or “all-
ofnation” approach to security and resilience spanning 35 core capabilities across 5
mission areas (prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery) (FEMA, 2011,
p. 1).
3. A risk-based, integrated and synchronized planning approach to building,
delivering, and sustaining core capabilities; through allocation of finite resources
according to prioritized preparedness; grounded in a collaboratively developed set of
national frameworks for prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery
(FEMA, 2011, p. 4).
4. Mutual benefit and an increase in the common welfare as a result of
enhanced preparedness, greater resilience, and thus reduced vulnerability at both
stakeholder and national levels (FEMA, 2011, p. 3).
While the tenets of national preparedness integration outline a methodological
allof-nation or whole community approach to improving the common welfare, their
implementation, particularly when applied to historically disenfranchised stakeholders
such as tribal nations, is more problematic. Implementing whole community efforts
predicated on “maximum of maximum” or “mega-disaster” scenarios may, per Caudle
(2012), set the preparedness bar too high for some stakeholders, especially those with
fewer resources, to achieve. The policy provisions of Presidential Policy Directive/PPD8
(NSS, 2011) were seen by Kahan as representing a “wicked problem,” one that is difficult
to “define, delimit, and understand, reflecting uncertainties, and having many moving
parts that interact often in unknown ways” (Kahan, 2014, p. 6). Further, Kahan argued
that national preparedness can be improved by increasing stakeholder engagements in
their own interests. Kahan’s argument was supported by Biedrzycki and Koltun who
observed that, too often, inclusion of stakeholders in whole community preparedness
efforts is reduced to” invitations to participate in pro forma processes” (Biedrzycki &
Koltun, 2012, p. 3) that have been pre-formulated by government, rather than seeking
national preparedness solutions that are uniquely tied to the needs of stakeholders. In the
case of tribal nations, it may be advantageous as Dynes (2006) suggested, to use the
established social system as the base of emergency actions related to national
preparedness.
Stakeholder Narratives
Three types of narratives that are necessary to a policy narrative analysis were
identified by Roe (1994): the conventional narrative, the counter narrative, and the
metanarrative. For this study, the conventional narrative consists of the story drawn from
government stakeholder accounts that conform to the accepted or orthodox view of
national preparedness integration. The counter narrative is the story drawn from tribal
nation stakeholder accounts that run counter to the conventional or dominant narrative on
national integration. The metanarrative is derived through the process of comparing the
conventional and counter narratives, and is used to recast the issue of national
preparedness integration of tribal nations “in such a way as to make it more amenable to
decision making and policymaking” (p. 3).
The all-of-nation or whole community approach raises questions related to what
constitutes a stakeholder in national preparedness, the overlapping relationships between
stakeholders and communities, and what it means to achieve national preparedness
integration among stakeholders. From the federal government perspective, established by
FEMA, “there are many different kinds of communities, including communities of place,
interest, belief, and circumstance, which can exist both geographically and virtually…”
(FEMA, 2011, p. 3). Jensen (2006) found that this concept is important due to the
outreach that is necessary in national preparedness to build relationships across
community history, culture, and language barriers. An advantage of this broad definition
is it recognizes that in the information age the concept of community itself is evolving,
and it permits flexibility in national preparedness policy.
Still, a definition of stakeholders is needed since the whole community concept is
meant to integrate into national preparedness the full capacity of a broad variety of
stakeholders. Those stakeholders identified by FEMA include “individuals, families,
communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and local, state,
tribal, territorial, insular area, and Federal governments” (FEMA, 2013, p. 4). The
relative narratives of stakeholders, when viewed in hermeneutic context to national
preparedness, offer an unsurpassed opportunity to develop a metanarrative relative to
tribal nation integration in national preparedness.
The Conventional (Government) Narrative
The conventional, or federal government narrative, for this study is drawn from
FEMA for its lead federal role in national preparedness policy development and
implementation; BIA for its role in administering tribal nation disaster preparedness; and
from USNORTHCOM for its unique military support role in national preparedness.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. Presidential Executive Order 12127
(The White House, 1979) established FEMA on March 31, 1979, in order to consolidate
the various separate disaster-related functions of the Federal government under a single
agency. The FEMA website (FEMA, 2014) indicated that, today, FEMA has its
headquarters in Washington, D.C., ten Regional Offices, the National Emergency
Training Center, the Center for Domestic Preparedness, and other various locations. At
any given time FEMA has personnel deployed to temporary Joint Field Offices
throughout the nation to oversee ongoing disaster response and recovery following
Presidential disaster declarations. A well-resourced and robust FEMA was identified by
Moynihan (2013) as necessary to national preparedness, particularly preparation for and
response to disasters. In relation to the theory convergence model in Figure 1, FEMA
represents the government application of means in human conflict theory, subordinate to
the authority of government; and which are derived from and employed for the benefit of
the people, with the consent of the people in social contract theory.
Four shifts in focus and organization, driven by combinations of congressional
legislation and changes in agency leadership, were identified by Adamski, Kline, and
Tyrrell (2006) in the 35-year history of FEMA. Two of those shifts resulted in slow,
uncoordinated and unprepared national responses to natural disasters; the fourth shift is
currently underway and is the catalyst for much of the current conventional national
preparedness narrative. As an outcome of the disastrous response to Hurricane Katrina,
Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (Public Law
109295, 2006). The Post-Katrina Reform Act initiated the fourth shift for FEMA and is
the foundation for its current mission:
…to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards,
including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by
leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency
management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and
mitigation. (p. SEC 503)
Several sources outlined a number of ways in which passage of the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act (Public Law 109-295, 2006) enhanced the current
FEMA organization and method of operating:
1. A renewed focus on comprehensive emergency management consisting of
preparedness, response, recovery, and hazard mitigation (Bea, 2007).
2. Greater organizational autonomy, with direct access to Congress (Bea,
2007). 3. New authority to facilitate and strengthen disaster response operations
(Bea,
2007).
4. Greater autonomy and delegated responsibility in the ten FEMA Regional
Administrations for creating Regional Advisory Councils, integrating comprehensive
emergency management, developing mutual aid agreements, planning for national
catastrophes, and operating Regional Response Coordination Centers (Bea, 2007).
5. A more anticipatory and preemptive approach to collaboration with
stakeholders, including tribal nations, for disaster preparedness and response (Cannon,
2008).
6. An emphasis on building consensus among stakeholders in order to lead
innovative collective planning and adaptive approaches to emergency management in
light of the changing homeland security environment (FEMA, 2011).
In order to deal with the evolving nature of the homeland security environment
and the threats within it, Comfort and Waugh argued that future FEMA research and
efforts will have to continue to become more “interdisciplinary, interorganizational, and
interjurisdictional” (Comfort & Waugh, Jr., 2012, p. 547). Their position supported that
of Williams (2008), that national preparedness problems are increasingly interconnected,
intractable, and volatile. Emergency management was also characterized by Comfort and
Waugh (2012) as no longer being limited to local concern, but a matter of national and
even international involvement as well. This argument is consistent with the National
Response Framework (FEMA, 2013) position that the impacts of disasters may be
simultaneously local, as well as national and even international; and with Bellavita’s
(2011) suggestion that the effects of disasters may have consequences that cross local,
state, regional, and even global boundaries.
Building consensus among stakeholders as directed by national policy,
particularly for the integration of tribal nations in national preparedness, has been a
continuing challenge for FEMA. A review of the extant national preparedness policy and
framing documents, including internal FEMA documents, revealed literally hundreds of
uses (including variations) of the phrase “local, state, territorial, tribal (emphasis added),
and federal” in conjunction with concepts of stakeholder integration in national
preparedness. The phrase is so prevalent in FEMA publications that it begins to take on
aspects of a mantra for national preparedness.
As part of its overall whole community doctrine for national preparedness FEMA
has made efforts to improve the integration of tribal nations into the national collective
effort. As published on the FEMA web site (FEMA, 2013), in 2013, in response to
passage of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (Public Law 113-2, 2013), the chief
executives of tribal nations can directly request disaster or emergency declarations from
the President, much as governors can for their states. The FEMA Emergency
Management Institute web site listed a full curriculum of in-resident emergency
management courses designed for “tribal emergency management/response personnel,
tribal government employees, and tribal leaders” (EMI Tribal Curriculum, 2013). Since
Fiscal Year 2011, according to the Fiscal Year 2014 Tribal Homeland Security Grant
Program (FEMA, 2013), FEMA allocated approximately $46 million to federally
recognized tribal nations. These funds were to be used for “the building, sustainment and
delivery of core capabilities to enable Tribes to strengthen their capacity to prevent,
protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from potential terrorist attacks and other
hazards” (FEMA, 2013). Finally, in 2014 FEMA published the Tribal Declarations Pilot
Guidance: First Draft (FEMA, 2014), which outlines tribal nation procedures for
obtaining disaster assistance from the federal government, uniquely designed to meet
tribal needs. Following publication of the pilot guidance, FEMA embarked on a series of
listening sessions to consult with and obtain the input of tribal nation officials on further
refinement of the document before its final publication (FEMA, 2014).
Bureau of Indian Affairs. The BIA was originally established as the Office of
Indian Affairs within the War Department in 1824, and transferred to the Department of
the Interior in 1849. Throughout its history, the BIA has been the primary federal agency
for working with tribal nations. The BIA headquarters is located in Washington, D.C.,
with its Office of Indian Services, Office of Justice Services, and Office of Trust
Services; and has 12 regional offices located throughout the nation. The stated mission of
the BIA is to "… enhance the quality of life, to promote economic opportunity, and to
carry out the responsibility to protect and improve the trust assets of American Indians,
Indian tribes, and Alaska Natives" (DOI, 2015). Similar to FEMA, in relation to the
theory convergence model in Figure 1, BIA represents the government application of
means in human conflict theory, subordinate to the authority of government; and which
are derived from and employed for the benefit of the people, with the consent of the
people in social contract theory.
Within BIA, the Emergency Management Division (EMD) has primary
responsibility for working with tribal nations on matters related to national preparedness
(DOI, 2015). The EMD has regional representatives located throughout the nation.
Through its Tribal Assistance Coordination Group (TAC-G) the EMD, when requested,
works with tribal nations that have been impacted by disasters, and with other
departments and agencies such as FEMA and USNORTHCOM to coordinate response
efforts. In this manner the BIA operates primarily in an advisory role to national
preparedness stakeholders on tribal nation issues and concerns.
United States Northern Command. The DOD established USNORTHCOM on
October 1, 2002, in response to the 9/11 attacks, in order to defend the American
homeland against external threats (DOD, 2013). As a product of the post-9/11 era, the
command is an emergent actor in the homeland security environment and a relative
newcomer to national preparedness. In addition to its headquarters at Peterson Air Force
Base, Colorado, USNORTHCOM has a number of subordinate Service (Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps) headquarters located across the United States (including Alaska).
Similar to the FEMA and the BIA, in relation to the theory convergence model in Figure
1, USNORTHCOM represents the government application of means in human conflict
theory, subordinate to the authority of government; and which are derived from and
employed for the benefit of the people, with the consent of the people in social contract
theory.
The USNORTHCOM mission includes the responsibility assigned by the Unified
Command Plan (NSS, 2011) to provide “support to civil authorities, to include Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) at U.S. federal, tribal, state, and local levels, as
directed [italics added]” (p. 14). The phrase “as directed” is recognition that
USNORTHCOM has a critical role within DOD and under the U.S. Constitution of
national defense, and thus does not act unilaterally to support civil authorities, but only as
directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Military forces providing DSCA
for domestic incidents under the direction of USNORTHCOM do not fully integrate into
the unified command concept within the National Incident Management System (FEMA,
2008), but maintain a separate chain of command under the Secretary of Defense
consistent with the National Response Framework (FEMA, 2013, p. 19).
Nevertheless, in order to accomplish its mission USNORTHCOM must contribute
to enhanced effectiveness of broader societal systems as described by Bryson (2004).
Since military power alone is not sufficient to achieve national preparedness in the
current homeland security environment, the USNORTHCOM mandate is one of
continuous collaboration and integration of its planning and preparedness efforts with
other stakeholders. This integration of efforts is subject to at least one restrictive
mandate. For more than 130 years, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 USC, 1385; The
Posse Comitatus Act, 1878) has generally forbidden the use of Federal military forces to
enforce civil law. This act applies broadly to USNORTHCOM and all active federal
military forces.
The USNORTHCOM Theater Strategy (USNORTHCOM, 2011) established
among the command’s priorities that of expanding and strengthening interagency
partnerships. This responsibility is led by the command’s Joint Interagency Coordination
Group (JIACG). The JIACG Directory (USNORTHCOM, 2013) listed more than 30
full-time representatives from other DOD and interagency stakeholders at
USNORTHCOM headquarters, including representatives from FEMA; and 20 full-time
USNORTHCOM liaison officers at other agencies. Notably, and despite DOD policy to
“Build stable and enduring government-to-government relations with federallyrecognized
tribal governments” (DOD, 2006), the JIACG Directory did not reflect representation
from the DOI, the BIA, or any tribal nations. It was suggested by Shelstad (2011) that
USNORTHCOM could more efficiently integrate with its interagency partners in national
preparedness efforts. Shelstad’s position was supported by Apte and Heath (2011) who
pointed out that stakeholders lack understanding of the DOD, and thus the
USNORTHCOM, role in disaster relief. They further highlighted that advantages could
be gained by mutual understanding among stakeholders in disaster relief of the roles and
capabilities of other stakeholders.
A significant challenge for USNORTHCOM in integrating its efforts into national
preparedness revolves around the definitions and authorities that derive from national
policy. The definition of national preparedness is framed in broad, conceptual terms
which, as Grund, Levy, Speers, and Thorpe (2011) asserted, are difficult to reduce to
more narrow, practicable terms. Further, just as the homeland security environment and
the threats within it continue to evolve, the concept of national preparedness is also
evolving along with it.
This challenge for USNORTHCOM is further compounded by national
preparedness policy itself. Presidential Policy Directive 8/PPD-8 (NSS, 2011) defined
national preparedness as a shared responsibility and integrated activity at all levels of
government, but also exempted the DOD and the authority of the Secretary of Defense,
and thus the vast resources of the DOD, from its mandates. The policy principle is that
the first and primary mission for the DOD, and thus for USNORTHCOM, remains
national defense vice national preparedness for homeland security, unless, as stated in the
Unified Command Plan (NSS, 2011), directed by the President or the Secretary of
Defense to support civil authorities.
No precise or official definition for DOD support to national preparedness
currently exists. Within the national frameworks, USNORTHCOM, representing DOD,
is not identified as a primary coordinator for any of the 15 Emergency Support Functions
(ESF), but in the National Response Framework (FEMA, 2013) is assigned a supporting
role to all of them. An outcome of this is that the command places more focus on its role
in the response framework of national preparedness, rather than the prevention,
protection, mitigation, and recovery frameworks. This role is further reinforced by DOD
Directive 3025.18: Defense Support of Civil Authorities (2010) which specified that
USNORTHCOM, and other DOD stakeholders, can provide civil support only after being
requested by civil authorities in response to domestic emergencies or other domestic
activities.
The Counter (Tribal Nation) Narrative
The counter narrative for this study is taken from the federally recognized tribal
nations for their unique sovereign status in relation to the federalist model for national
preparedness; and from nongovernmental organizations, iTEMA and NTEMC, with
membership bases comprised primarily of Native Americans, that have evolved to advise
tribal nations on national preparedness.
Tribal Nations. The history of the 566 federally recognized tribal nations (DOI,
2014) predates the U.S. Constitution (Constitutional Convention, 1787) and creation of
the United States, thus making them the nation’s oldest stakeholder community related to
national preparedness. Native Americans, both members and non-members of tribal
nations, make up an estimated 2.9 million people or 0.9 percent of the American
population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012), and tribal lands constitute an archipelago
spanning 55 million acres (DOI, 2014) throughout the nation. When all people classified
as Native American are taken into account, including those of mixed race, the number
grows to an estimated 5.2 million people, or 1.7 percent of the American population (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2012).
The U.S. Constitution (Constitutional Convention, 1787) established tribal nations
as sovereign governments in Article III, Section 8, Clause 3, also known as the
Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause states that, “The Congress shall have the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and with
the Indian tribes” (Constitutional Convention, 1787). According to the U.S. Senate
(Committee on Indian Affairs, 2002), this clause has been the basis for more than 200
years of Congressional legislation, Presidential policies, and U.S. Supreme Court
decisions relating to the incorporation of tribal nations into the social contract.
The relation of tribal nations to the theory convergence model in Figure 1 is
complex. Tribal nations, as the sovereign representatives of Native Americans occupy a
unique dual role in relation to Figure 1. In one role, tribal nations, though sovereign
entities, remain dependent on the federal government for resources and authority. In
another role, similar to the federal government, tribal nations represent sovereign
government authority for their members, for the application of means in human conflict
theory; and derive those same means from, and employ them for the benefit of and with
the consent of, the people in social contract theory.
The history of sovereign tribal nations was contended by Prygoski as being
embedded in the “military, social, and economic development” (Prygoski, 1995, p. 1) of
the nation. In a cruel paradox, the same social contract theory upon which the democratic
constitutional republic of the United States was formed, however, was also used to deny
Native Americans the benefits of full membership and participation in the new nation.
The manner by which the Presidential policies of Jefferson and Jackson instituted a
history of displacement, disenfranchisement, and near annihilation of tribal nations was
documented by Nichols (2005). Jefferson, Nichols argued, used the writings of Hobbes
(1994) and Locke (2010) on the social contract to deny Native Americans the benefits of
the social contract due to their status as indigenous savages. Native Americans were
viewed by Hobbes (1994) as embodying the brutish state of nature, and thus to be
avoided by civil society (Nichols, 2005); and Locke (2010) regarded Native Americans as
forfeiting the rights to ownership of their lands because they did not make proper use of
them for agriculture (Nichols, 2005). When Native Americans refused to assimilate into
white American society, Jefferson’s policy solution was to forcefully displace them onto
lands unsuitable for white settlement (Nichols, 2005).
Jackson continued Jefferson’s policies of denying Native Americans the benefits
of the social contract. As documented by Calfee (2002), Jackson implemented a policy of
forced Native American relocation in order to open lands east of the Mississippi River to
white settlement. These actions by Jefferson and Jackson set in motion more than two
centuries of congressional acts and court decisions resulting in sustained trauma to Native
Americans, as presented by the BIA (2014), in the form of government corruption,
involuntary boarding schools, forced assimilation, loss of culture and language, broken
promises, and denial of the historical legacy of the tribal nations.
Two hundred years after Jefferson’s and Jackson’s policies were implemented,
their effects on tribal nations can still be seen. Native Americans have suffered historical
trauma, as argued by Kirmayer, Gone, and Moses (2014) but that does not fully explain
the complex issues of today’s generation of Native Americans. Instead, they contended
that tribal nation issues such as poverty and discrimination are rooted in structure and
institutionalized violence toward Native Americans. The finding of Kirmayer, Gone, and
Moses (2014) were supported by Roberts who documented the manner in which a
disaster agency’s security culture was used as justification for “plans that would have
included discriminatory practices against marginalized groups” (Roberts, 2013, p. 387).
Such acts, contended Roberts (2013) are unjust because they violate Rawls’ (1999)
arguments on due process and equal protection that are due to all citizens.
The people. Today, Native Americans fare much more poorly than other ethnic
groups in American society in terms of per capita income, poverty, unemployment,
housing quality, disease factors, and health care – suggestive of “…a variety of forms of
social and economic inequality and injustice” (Lynch & Stretesky, 2012, p. 108). Figures
from the U.S. Census Bureau placed Native Americans below the national poverty
threshold. The median annual income of single-race Native Americans households is
only 69% ($35,310) of the national median ($51,371); and more than 29% of single-race
Native Americans live below the national poverty threshold, the highest rate of any ethnic
group in the nation (DOI, 2013). Education levels for tribal nations also lag behind the
rest of the nation, with 79% having at least a high school equivalency (compared to 86%
of the total population), and 13.5% having a bachelor’s degree or higher (compared to
29% of the total population) (DOI, 2013).
When these economic and education demographic statistics are paired with the
historical and institutionalized disenfranchisement of tribal nations, it raises questions of
their potential vulnerability to the effects of homegrown radicalization as suggested by
two variables. One variable is the history of radical activism demonstrated by Native
American groups in the past, particularly during the period from 1968 to 1975. Some of
the more significant events which took place during this time period have been
documented by multiple sources:
1. Establishment of the American Indian Movement (AIM) in Minneapolis,
Minnesota in 1968 (Mueller & Salt, 2011). Among its earliest actions, AIM adopted
tactics similar to those of the Black Panther Party by forming an Indian Patrol to protect
Native American neighborhoods from police abuse (Calfee, 2002).
2. Occupation of the formal federal penitentiary on Alcatraz Island in San
Francisco Bay by a group calling itself the Tribes of all Nations in 1969. The occupation
inspired additional acts of civil disobedience among Native Americans before it was
forcibly ended by government agencies after 19 months (Calfee, 2002).
3. The Trail of Broken Tears campaign which AIM launched in 1972,
culminating in a week-long occupation of the BIA building in Washington, D.C.
Following the occupation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) labeled AIM an
extremist group and began subjecting it to closer surveillance (Calfee, 2002).
4. Armed confrontations between AIM and law enforcement agencies,
including the FBI, in the town of Custer and the Wounded Knee massacre site in South
Dakota. Following a number of gun battles between the occupiers and law enforcement
agencies, the AIM occupation of Wounded Knee was ended through negotiation after 71
days, but not before the deaths of several people (Mueller & Salt, 2011).
5. The Pine Ridge Indian Reservation gun battle between AIM members and
FBI agents in 1975 in which people died on both sides, including two FBI agents (Calfee,
2002). As a result of this incident, AIM activist and leader Leonard Peltier was convicted
of murder in 1977 and sentenced in federal court to two consecutive life sentences in
prison. Peltier remains imprisoned today, and is a polarizing figure for AIM (AIM, 2014)
and global groups such as Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2013).
Another variable is the degree to which indicators and drivers of potential
homegrown radicalization are present today in tribal nations, and the extent to which
efforts are made to mitigate them. One such indicator identified by Davies (1962) is the
effect of long-term degradation on producing revolution when an intolerable gap
develops between what people want and what they get. Long-term degradation was also
tied by Vargas (2011) to other psychosocial factors to the process of radicalization in
jihadist narratives. Precipitating conditions were identified by Sauer (2011) as another
indicator, such as the impacts on stakeholders of the effects of globalization, shifting
demographics, cultural pressures, and militaristic approaches to homeland security. It
was suggested by Bach and Kaufman (2009) that engagement of communities to solicit
their full participation in national preparedness, may serve as a means to disrupt the
process by which well-established stakeholders become disenfranchised radicals willing
to take hostile actions.
In the absence of a single formula for the process of radicalization, three drivers
have been identified by the U.S. Congress (Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
2011) and the Bipartisan Policy Center (National Security Preparedness Group, 2011) as
common to most radicalization processes. One is the perception of grievance – conflicted
identities, injustice, oppression, or socio-economic exclusion, for example – which can
make people receptive to extremist ideas. Another is the adoption of an extremist
narrative or ideology that speaks to the grievance and provides a compelling rationale for
what needs to be done. Also important are social and group dynamics, given that
radicalization often happens in “dense, small networks of friends,” and that extremist
ideas are more likely to resonate if they are articulated by a credible or charismatic leader.
(National Security Preparedness Group, 2011, p. 15))
Numerous sources have identified current situations which reflect the effects of
long-term degradation forced on tribal nations by the majority American society, and the
presence of potential precipitating drivers and conditions:
1. An increase in Native American youth gang activity on tribal nation
reservations in the past two decades was documented by the Department of Justice
(Major, Egley, Howell, Mendenhall, & Armstrong, 2004) which, according to the U.S.
Congress (Committee on Indian Affairs, 2009) is vulnerable to exploitation for criminal
and terror purposes by other hostile state and nonstate actors. This increase in youth gang
activity has been connected by Vigil (2002) to the effects of “multiple marginalization”
stemming from “depressed social and economic conditions” (p. 7); and by the
Department of Justice (Major, et al., 2004) to reservation family dysfunction and
dislocations, poverty, substance abuse, cluster housing, and waning cultural and kinship
ties. Native American gang activities were associated by The FBI (National Gang
Intelligence Center, 2011) with distribution of drugs and money laundering, as well as
physical assaults and intimidation.
2. The appearance on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in 2007 of a Native
American activist movement calling itself the Republic of Lakota (ROL) was
documented by Sauer (2011). Although not recognized by any legal body, on its Internet
website the ROL (2014) unilaterally declared itself a sovereign nation separate from the
United States due to grievances over broken treaties and historical treatment of Native
Americans. The ROL has declared itself apart from the colonial apartheid system with a
six-point platform advocating political activism, education, health, energy/economics,
international awareness, and sustainable housing (ROL, 2014). The ROL has also
demonstrated its ability and willingness to use social media in the form of a Facebook
page (Defender Eagle, 2012) to advance its narrative. The ROL has also been tied to the
development of a virtual currency, MazaCoin (MazaCoin, 2014), which is similar to
BitCoin and which declared itself the “Official National Currency of the Traditional
Lakota Nation” (MazaCoin Development Team, 2013).
3. Exploitation by domestic and international organizations with terrorist
connections was documented by several sources. In 2003, the domestic Sovereign
Citizen Movement established a fictitious tribal nation, the Pembina National Little Shell
Band of North America, for the purpose of fraudulent evasion of taxes and other
government fees (Bjelopera, 2013). Similarly, corroborating Internet media reports have
suggested that Islamic interest groups, including some with radical Islamist ties, have
sought to make inroads with Native American groups in both North America (Pajamas
Media, 2012) and South America (Barillas, 2010). These reports are further supported by
the existence of websites such as that of the Autonomia Islamica Wayuu, or Wayuu
Islamic Autonomy (Autonomia Islamica Wayuu, 2009) which represents Hezbollah Latin
America and its link with the Wayuu Guajira Indians of Venezuela and Colombia, and
claims activity in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, and Mexico (Barillas, 2010).
4. The appearance in 2012 of Idle No More, a Canadian First Nation
aboriginal protest movement, which advocates “peaceful revolution to honour Indigenous
sovereignty and to protect the land & water” (Idle No More, 2012). Idle No More makes
extensive and effective self-organizing use of social networking via Facebook (Idle No
More Community, 2012) to advance its message and objectives. Although its interests
exist primarily in Canada, Idle No More has organized Native American solidarity
demonstrations and flash mobs in at least 12 American states, including a flash mob at
the Mall of America in Minnesota in 2012 (Nelson A. , 2012).
The land. Tribal nation lands also have a critical role in national preparedness
integration. The BIA characterized tribal reservations as “some of the most isolated and
economically depressed areas” (DOI, 2014) throughout the nation. More than 25 tribal
nations with land adjacent to international borders or national sea coasts of the nation
were identified by Virden (2003); with 86 miles of the United States-Canada border, and
68 miles of the United States-Mexico border traversing 13 tribal nation reservations. In
addition, as Kueny (2007) pointed out tribal nation lands include within their boundaries,
or are crossed by, critical national infrastructure networks including dams, water
reservoirs, drinking water and wastewater systems, and electrical generation plants that
are part of the larger state and national networks.
Tribal reservations were identified by Whitfield (2011) as potential safe havens
for criminal enterprises including terror networks and operatives to gain access to the
United States. Due to conflicting interpretations and applications of federal laws across
over-lapping jurisdictions (Nelson J. M., 2013), and shared borders that inhibit
interdiction (National Gang Intelligence Center, 2011), tribal nation lands are vulnerable
to illegal international cross-border trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans, and
potentially terrorists into and out of the United States (GAO, 2013; Spencer, 2011; Police
Magazine, 2011).
National preparedness narrative. The narrative for tribal nations in national
preparedness is founded in their legal status and issues historically associated with tribal
sovereignty. Two diametric positions on which tribal sovereignty issues are centered
were identified by Prygoski: whether tribal nations have full sovereignty stemming from
their aboriginal status which predates the United States; or whether tribal nations have
only the “attributes of sovereignty” (Prygoski, 1995, p. 15) accorded to them by Congress
under the authority of the Indian Commerce Clause (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3) of the
U.S. Constitution (Constitutional Convention, 1787). Over the past 200 years, according
to the U.S. Congress (Committee on Indian Affairs, 2002) federal policy toward tribal
nations has vacillated between “treaties, relocations, reservations, allotment, assimilation,
termination, and…self-determination” (p. 3). A series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions
has established the relationship of tribal nations to the United States federal government
as “domestic dependent nations” (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 1831); with limited local
autonomy, but lacking the full autonomy of fully sovereign nations. The resulting special
trust relationship between the federal government and tribal nations has been affirmed in
government rulings and court decisions which have generally protected the tribal nations
from efforts by the various states to encroach upon their sovereignty.
As domestic dependent nations, tribal nation affairs are managed by the DOI and
the BIA (DOI, 2014)), but their integration in national preparedness falls under the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA in accordance with Presidential
Policy Directive/PPD-8 (NSS, 2011). The prevailing federal narrative established by the
national preparedness framing documents, is that tribal nations are fully integrated
partners in national preparedness and domestic incident management. This narrative
further acknowledges unique geographical, cultural, political, and economic issues
associated with domestic incident management on tribal lands (FEMA, 2008). Groom, et
al (2009), and Granillo, et al (2010) found that pro forma approaches may not be
effective in the integration of tribal nations into national preparedness. Instead, means
that are tailored to the unique needs of tribal communities (Groom, et al., 2009), and take
into account tribal nation cultural differences (Granillo, Renger, Wakelee, & Burgess,
2010) are likely to be more effective.
Despite the prevailing federal narrative, and the importance of tribal nation people
and resources to homeland security, national preparedness policy in relation to tribal
nations has been at best inconsistent, and often conflicting. A prime example is Public
Law 83-280 (PL 83-280) which was passed by Congress in 1953 (Tribal Law and Policy
Institute, 2015). The effect of PL 83-280 was to mandate several states (AL, CA, MN,
NE, OR, WI) to assume jurisdiction from the federal government over crimes committed
on tribal nation lands, and to allow other states to assume jurisdiction over crimes
committed on tribal nation lands if the tribal nations consented. The consequences of PL
83-280 were “multi-dimensional problems” cited by Muhr (Muhr, 2013, p. xvii) which
continue to the present. Among those problems are tribal nation dissatisfaction as a result
of loss of tribal sovereignty and increased lawlessness on tribal reservations, and states’
dissatisfaction with being given in effect an unfunded mandate from the federal
government (Muhr, 2013, p. 15). In the application of PL 83-280, Jiminez and Song
(Jiminez & Song, 1998) refer to acknowledgement by Congress that, perhaps as an
unintended consequence, the law has actually degraded criminal justice and due process
for tribal nations.
The status of sovereign dependent nations accorded to tribal nations by the
judicial branch has been affirmed by the executive branch. Executive order 13175,
Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments (The White House,
2000), later reaffirmed by the executive branch (Office of Management and Budget,
2010), directed federal departments and agencies to consult with tribal officials in the
development of federal policies with tribal implications, with the intent to improve
government-to-government relationships between the tribal nations and the federal
government. This is consistent with Wolslayer’s (2011) identification of information
requirements necessary to vertical and horizontal integration in homeland security. Yet,
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-292, 2002), enacted by the
legislative branch and signed into law by the executive branch in the aftermath of 9/11,
relegated the tribal nations to the status of local governments, below the level of state
governments in homeland security policy. Similarly, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief Act (Public Law 93-288, 1988), reinforced by the National Response Framework
(FEMA, 2008, p. 57) required tribal nations to route their requests for disaster relief
through the governors of the states in which they are geographically located (Committee
on Indian Affairs, 2011, p. 13). This effectively subordinated tribal requests for
emergency disaster relief to the interests of the states, in contradiction of their historical
status as domestic dependent nations, autonomous from the various states.
The effectiveness of Executive Order 13175 was further weakened in 2010 by the
executive branch, with publication of Presidential Executive Order 13528 establishing the
Council of Governors (The White House, 2010). The purpose of the Council of
Governors is to “…further the partnership between the Federal Government and State
governments to protect our Nation and its people and property…” (p. 1). The DHS and
the DOD are members of the Council of Governors, but the tribal nations are omitted
from membership, thus excluding Native American people and lands from effective
integration and representation in this significant national preparedness initiative. The
result is a national preparedness policy gap that remains potentially vulnerable to
exploitation.
In January, 2013, Congress amended the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act
(Public Law 93-288, 1988) with passage of The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act
(Public Law 113-2, 2013). Among other policy changes, the Sandy Recovery
Improvement Act authorized the chief executives of the federally recognized tribal
nations (DOI, 2013) to make direct requests (through FEMA) to the President of the
United States for relief from major emergency or disaster declarations (Brown,
McCarthy, & Liu, 2013). In 2013, tribal nations were the recipients of six major disaster
declarations (FEMA, 2013). In addition, the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act gave the
President greater flexibility in waiving the normal 75% federal/25% state cost share for
Public Assistance to 90% federal/10% for tribal nations (Brown, McCarthy, & Liu,
2013). The long-term impacts of this legislative change – through the provision of
disaster relief – are unknown, but the presumption is that the intent of Congress is one of
improvement in homeland security overall, and for improved integration of tribal nations
into national preparedness specifically.
Nongovernmental Organizations. Parallel to passage of the Sandy Recovery
Improvement Act (Public Law 113-2, 2013) has been the appearance of the Tribal
Emergency Management Association (iTEMA) (2014), and of the National Tribal
Emergency Management Council (NTEMC) (2011). Membership in both organizations
is open to all federally recognized tribal nations. The mission of iTEMA, which billed
itself as an emerging national Tribal association is to “promote a collaborative,
multidisciplinary approach to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and
mitigate against all hazards that impact our Tribal communities” (iTEMA, 2014). By
comparison, NTEMC described itself as a newly founded organization with a mission to:
…provide guidance and tools for member tribes to develop sustainable and allhazard
approaches to Emergency Management and Homeland Security, through an approach that
emphasizes both inter and intra jurisdictional cooperation to maximize resources in
mutual aid, training, exercises, planning, and equipping by sharing information and best
practices. (NTEMC, 2011)
The manner in which iTEMA and NTEMC collaborate with one another to avoid
unnecessary competition, mission overlap, and duplication of effort was not intuitively
evident from a review of their respective websites.
Summary
This chapter has provided a review of extant literature on the subject of tribal
nation integration in national preparedness. Chapter 3 introduces the research design and
approach for the study.
Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
This chapter describes the research approach used for this study, in order to
understand the impacts of national preparedness policies and approaches on tribal nations,
as revealed in stakeholder narratives. Specifically, the chapter outlines the research
design, the role of the researcher, research methodology, the setting and sampling
strategy, the data collection and analysis method used, instrumentation and materials
used, and measures for ethical protection of participants.
Research Design
This research plan for this study was envisioned as applied research to address a
societal issue related to homeland security (Patton, 2002). As indicated in Chapter 1, a
narrative policy analysis approach was deemed appropriate for this study because it seeks
to understand the differing narratives of stakeholders in the integration of federally
recognized tribal nations in national preparedness. The historical writing and rewriting of
national policy toward tribal nations has been inconsistent and conflicting. This
continuous deconstructing and reconstructing of national policy over time has produced a
gap between policy and practice concerning the status of tribal nations and their
integration into national preparedness that is subject to “(mis)reading only” (Roe, 1994,
p. 24). Such gaps in national preparedness are potentially vulnerable to exploitation by
hostile actors, or to the cascading effects of catastrophic natural disasters, and thus of
general concern to the nation, and of specific concern to the particular stakeholders
involved.
This particular gap is of such complexity and uncertainty that it has the effect of
polarizing, even if inadvertently, the various stakeholders (Roe, 1994). The degree of
complexity and uncertainty involved does not lend itself to quantitative study. What
remains is to qualitatively examine the narratives of stakeholders to gain better
understanding of associated issues. For these reasons the study adopted a narrative
approach focused on the experiences of key stakeholder representatives as expressed in
their stories.
Role of the Researcher
The role of the researcher in data collection, and in structuring this study and for
organizing its conclusions, was in accordance with Patton’s Dimensions of Fieldwork
Variations (Patton, 2002, p. 277):
1. The researcher’s role was both as homeland security observer and full
participant.
2. An insider (emic) perspective predominated the research.
3. The author was the sole researcher.
4. The researcher’s role and observation were overt; with full disclosure to
participants.
Research Questions
Consistent with a qualitative study, the primary research question was developed
to be exploratory in nature to investigate a phenomenon characterized by uncertainty, and
about which little is understood (Cresswell, 2007):
How have tribal nations experienced the effects of national preparedness policy
since 9/11?
Consistent with a narrative policy analysis approach the research sub-questions
were developed to be procedural in nature: they seek to produce a stakeholder
metanarrative of what tribal nations have experienced (stories), and how they view their
experiences (meanings), in order to distill the implications of their collective experiences
(Cresswell, 2007):
What have tribal nations experienced in national preparedness, and how have they
experienced it, as a result of homeland security policies implemented since 9/11?
What have been the tribal nation responses (stories to be told) to these
experiences?
What meanings (turning points) do stakeholders ascribe to these experiences?
What are the implications of these experiences?
Research Methodology
As a narrative policy analysis, the study sought to understand the differing
narratives of stakeholders, in order to develop a metanarrative for the integration of
federally recognized tribal nations in national preparedness. The analysis sought to
identify specific issues, and proceeded in four steps identified by Roe (1994, p. 155):
1. Identifying the conventional, or federal government narrative.
2. Identifying the counter, or tribal nation, narrative to the conventional
narrative.
3. Comparing the conventional narrative and the counter-narrative to
generate a metanarrative.
4. Analyzing the metanarrative for recommendations on how to recast policy
on tribal nation integration into national preparedness for homeland security.
Setting and Sampling Strategy
The research was conducted in a natural setting using a purposeful sampling
strategy. Given the applied research purpose, and the narrative policy analysis approach
of the study, there were two rationales for purposeful sampling. The first rationale was
combined criterion sampling to establish quality assurance by picking cases that “meet
some criterion” (Patton, 2002, p. 243). The second rationale was stratified purposeful
sampling to facilitate comparisons of “particular subgroups of interest” (Patton, 2002, p.
244). Using these rationales, five national preparedness stakeholder groups were
identified for this study:
1. FEMA – the conventional or federal government narrative.
2. BIA – the conventional or federal government narrative.
3. USNORTHCOM – the conventional or federal government
narrative.
4. Tribal nations – the counter or tribal nation narrative.
5. Nongovernmental organizations, iTEMA and NTEMC – the
counter or tribal nation narrative.
Data Collection and Analysis
Data collection came from interviews with stakeholder representatives in positions
of subject matter authority, who have a combination of general knowledge of tribal
nations and of national preparedness. Three to five interviews per stakeholder group
were conducted.
Data consisted of interview transcripts, case study notes, and public record
archival documents. Contact with study participants was by telephone or email; with
interviews conducted by telephone; and written transcripts produced from recorded
interviews and/or researcher notes. The relationship between researcher and study
participants was observer/practitioner to practitioner.
Interview questions were developed and aligned with key elements from the
convergence of social contract theory and human conflict theory (people/rights,
means/consent, government/authority) using the worksheet at Appendix A. Interviews
were conducted with standardized interview questions, and pre-coded using the
worksheet at Appendix B. As a narrative policy analysis, coding consisted of narratives
(conventional narrative, counter-narrative) and context (uncertainty, complexity,
polarization; people, resources, approaches) designed to produce themes (derived
phenomena) for metanarrative development (Cresswell, 2007). The narrative codes were
pre-coded (Miles & Huberman, 1994) consistent with the study’s conceptual framework,
and are etic in nature – founded in the researcher’s concepts (Maxwell, 2005). The
context and the themes codes are more emic in nature – developed from study
participants’ inputs, and the results of case study observations, literature review, and other
media reviews (Maxwell, 2005).
The initial strategy of pre-coding the narrative categories was to fracture or
rearrange the data into categories for comparison, and to aid in theme development
(Maxwell, 2005). The use of connecting strategy (as opposed to a fracturing strategy for
interview results provided a means to understand data in context. Finally, the NVivo
software coding program was used for automated coding and data retrieval.
Ethical Protection of Participants
Informed consent and assured confidentiality of participants was of primary
importance due to the often sensitive nature of homeland security information. Public
revelation of preparedness gaps renders them vulnerable to exploitation by hostile actors,
thus potentially placing stakeholders and resources at greater risk. In the absence of
hostile actors, perceptions by the public, even if uninformed, of inadequate national
preparedness measures for homeland security can still leave both elected and appointed
officials vulnerable to legal, political, fiduciary, or personal liabilities. To avoid these
potentialities, the names of study participants have not and will not be revealed; results of
the interviews have been placed under secure storage by the researcher and will not be
released to third parties; and data collection was restricted to information in the public
domain.
Summary
Using the Introduction to the Study in Chapter 1, and the Literature Review in
Chapter 2, this chapter has outlined the research design for conducting a narrative policy
analysis of tribal nation integration into homeland security national preparedness.
Chapter 4 presents the research findings from the various stakeholder narratives. Chapter
5 presents an interpretation of the findings, and suggests a metanarrative drawn from the
research findings.
Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
This qualitative study used a narrative policy analysis approach to examine the
impacts of national preparedness policies on federally recognized tribal nations. The
research questions which informed the study were:
What have tribal nations experienced in national preparedness, and how have
they experienced it, as a result of homeland security policies implemented since 9/11?
What have been the tribal nation responses (stories to be told) to these
experiences?
What meanings (turning points) do stakeholders ascribe to these experiences?
What are the implications of these experiences?
This chapter outlines how data for the study were collected and analyzed,
describes how issues of trustworthiness were addressed, and summarizes the findings
gleaned from the data using inductive reasoning.
Setting
This study was designed to examine two narratives from homeland security
practitioners in positions of subject matter authority or with specific knowledge of issues
related to tribal integration in national preparedness. The conventional or federal
government narrative comprises the composite views of participants from FEMA, BIA,
and USNORTHCOM. The counter or tribal narrative comprises the composite views of
participants from federally recognized tribal nations, and from nongovernmental
organizations, iTEMA and NTEMC, that work on behalf of tribal nations for national
preparedness. The metanarrative comprises the study findings comparing the
conventional (federal government) and counter (tribal nation) narratives.
Demographics
Study participants were selected solely by virtue of their positions of subject
matter authority on national preparedness and knowledge relating to tribal nations. All of
those interviewed for the conventional or federal government narrative were current
federal government employees. None of those interviewed for the counter or tribal
narrative were current federal government employees. No consideration was given in
study participant selection to age, gender, race, tribal affiliation, political or religious
affiliation, or any other demographic.
Data Collection
Data collection for this narrative policy analysis consisted primarily of participant
interviews, supplemented by the researcher’s field notes. Thirty-nine potential
participants were initially approached, and twenty-one participants (fifty-four percent)
responded and consented to be interviewed. Participants for the conventional or federal
government narrative came from FEMA, BIA, and USNORTHCOM (12 total
participants). Participants for the counter or tribal narrative came from tribal officials and
tribal nongovernmental organizations, iTEMA and NTEMC (9 total participants). Study
participants were individually interviewed across a range of natural settings including
work, home, and while traveling. Participants were interviewed at the times and locations
of their choosing in order to minimize distractions and to enable them to focus on the
substance of the interviews. The total time for all interviews was 17.87 hours; averaging
just under an hour (51 minutes) per interview.
The researcher’s dual role as both preparedness practitioner and academic
researcher was fully disclosed to participants. Interviews were open ended, conducted by
telephone using standardized interview questions, and recorded with participants’
consent. The interview audio recordings were then transcribed into Microsoft (MS)
Word 2010 documents maintaining a standardized format, and the MS Word 2010 written
transcripts were then uploaded to NVivo 10 for subsequent automated coding and
analysis.
Data Analysis
NVivo 10 was the sole software program used for analyzing participant
interviews. Data analysis proceeded in three steps. In step one, the interview questions
were pre-coded as a fracturing strategy to re-arrange the data into categories for
comparison, and to aid in emergent theme development. The pre-coded nodes were used
to build a node tree in NVivo 10. Each interview was then reviewed by the researcher
and salient data points were coded to the pre-coded nodes. Using the query features from
NVivo 10 emergent themes were identified. In step two, using the query features of
NVivo 10, and a connecting strategy, the emergent themes from step one were further
coded to pre-established narrative themes. Finally, in step three, the query features of
NVivo 10 were used to take the results of step two, and further separate them into
conventional (federal government) and counter (tribal nation) narratives. No discrepant
cases were identified in participants’ interviews, or during data analysis. The results of
steps one, two, and three are further presented below.
For step one analysis using NVivo 10, six primary parent nodes were created, with
forty-one child nodes, as shown in Table 1. As each interview transcript was reviewed by
the researcher, salient points were coded directly to the relevant parent and child nodes.
The total number of coding selections for step one was 2,311. Parent nodes consisted of:
government narrative, tribal narrative, tribal nation experiences, tribal nation responses,
stakeholder ascribed meanings, and stakeholder ascribed implications.
Within government narrative the child nodes were FEMA, BIA, and USNORTHCOM.
Within tribal narrative the child nodes were tribal nations and tribal NGOs. Within
tribal nation experiences the child nodes were preparedness impacts, preparedness
threats, preparedness needs, and preparedness integration challenges/obstacles. Within
tribal nation responses the child nodes were preparedness experiences, unique policy
conditions/complexities, partnerships effective yes, partnerships effective no, partnerships
effective depends, tribal nations self actions taken, initiatives working, initiatives not
working. Within stakeholder ascribed meanings the child notes were tribal preparedness
program familiarity yes; tribal preparedness program familiarity no; tribal preparedness
program familiarity depends; current state of capacity, capability, funding; how improve
capacity, capability, and funding; impact of 2013 SRIA [Sandy Recovery Improvement
Act] good; impact of 2013 SRIA bad; impact of 2013 SRIA depends; tribal nations
understand disaster declaration administrative requirements yes; and tribal nations
understand disaster declaration administrative requirements no. Within stakeholder
ascribed implications the child nodes were federal disaster relief thresholds too high yes;
federal disaster relief thresholds too high no; federal disaster relief thresholds too high
depends; other criteria/approaches yes; other criteria/approaches no; how prepare tribal
nations for impacts or threats; what policies/criteria needed; role for national tribal
EMAC [Emergency Management Assistance Compact] yes; role for national tribal
EMAC no; role for national tribal EMAC depends; role for tribal ESF [Emergency
Support Function] in NRF [National Response Framework] yes; role for tribal ESF in
NRF no; and role for tribal ESF in NRF depends. A need for additional nodes was not
indicated during the review and coding of the interviews in step one. Table 1 shows the
key parent and child nodes, and the relevant coding saturation of each node resulting from
step one.
Table 1
Primary Nodes and Number of Coding Data Points by Node
Government Narrative 481
FEMA 210
BIA 165
USNORTHCOM 106
Tribal Narrative 457
Tribal Nations 302
Tribal NGOs 155
Tribal Nation Experiences 536
Preparedness Impacts 64
Preparedness Threats 115
Preparedness Needs 157
Preparedness Integration Challenges/Obstacles 200
Table Continues
Parent Node Data Points
Child Node
Tribal Nation Responses 410
Preparedness Experiences 76
Unique Policy Conditions/Complexities 156
Partnerships Effective Yes 2
Partnerships Effective No 1
Partnerships Effective Depends 90
Tribal Nations Self Actions Taken 35
Initiatives Working 20
Parent Node
Child Node
Data Points
Initiatives Not Working 30
Stakeholder Ascribed Meanings 227
Tribal Preparedness Program Familiarity Yes 14
Tribal Preparedness Program Familiarity No 19
Tribal Preparedness Program Familiarity Depends 14
Current State of Capacity, Capability, Funding 40
How Improve Capacity, Capability, Funding 91
Impact of 2013 SRIA Good 31
Impact of 2013 SRIA Bad 1
Impact of 2013 SRIA Depends 6
Tribal Nations Understand Admin Requirements Yes 1
Tribal Nations Understand Admin Requirements No 6
Tribal Nations Understand Admin Requirements Depends 4
Stakeholder Ascribed Implications 200
Federal Disaster Relief Thresholds Too High Yes 36
Federal Disaster Relief Thresholds Too High No 2
Federal Disaster Relief Thresholds Too High Depends 8
Other Criteria/Approaches Yes 21
Other Criteria/Approaches No 4
How Prepare Tribal Nations for Impacts or Threats 33
What Policies/Criteria needed 8
Role for National Tribal EMAC Yes 42
Role for National Tribal EMAC No 0
Role for National Tribal EMAC Depends 5
Role for Tribal ESF in NRF Yes 18
Role for Tribal ESF in NRF No 10
Role for Tribal ESF in NRF Depends 13
Using the query features of NVivo 10, emergent themes from step one were
further identified. The nineteen themes identified were: tribes/tribal; lack
funding/resourcing; emergency/disaster; government; tribal size, different, sovereign;
tribal voice/seat at the table; states; borders; federal; federal; policy; preparedness;
emergency management assistance compact; infrastructure; sandy recovery improvement
act; threats; understand; tribal councils; tribal cultures; and emergency support function.
For step two analysis using NVivo 10, for further coding of emergent themes from
step one using a connecting strategy, to pre-established narrative themes in step two, two
primary pre-established parent nodes were created, with six pre-established child nodes.
Table 2 shows the pre-established parent and child nodes for step two and the relative
coding saturation of each node.
Table 2
Pre-Established Narrative Themes and Number of Emergent Coding Data Points by Node
Parent Node
Child Node
Data
Points
Narrative Policy Themes 561
Uncertainty (knowledge of what matters)
Complexity (intricacy/interdependence with other issues)
Polarization (concentration of groups around extremes)
Tribal Nation Themes
80
316
165
563
People (stakeholders)
Resources (materials/funding)
Approaches (policy)
162
164
237
The total number of data points for emergent themes identified in step one, and
use as coding selections for step two was 1,124. The pre-established parent nodes
consisted of: narrative policy themes and tribal nation themes. Within narrative policy
themes the pre-established child nodes were uncertainty (knowledge of what matters),
complexity (intricacy/interdependence with other issues), and polarization (concentration
of groups around extremes). Within tribal nation themes the pre-established child nodes
were people (stakeholders), resources, and approaches (policy).
For step three, the NVivo 10 query tools were used to analyze the emergent
themes from step one, and the pre-established narrative themes from step two, and to
align the emergent themes and pre-established narrative themes by combined
(conventional and counter-narratives) and individual narratives. The word frequency and
text search tools of NVivo 10 were used to associate key words with pre-established
themes, and to produce word trees and word clouds for further analysis. Word saturation
was used to further understand the relationships between key emergent themes from step
one and pre-established narrative themes from step two, and between narratives. The
results of step three are shown in Tables 3 through 8.
Table 3 shows the frequency of combined (conventional and counter-narrative)
emergent themes from step one by pre-established themes for narrative policy analysis
from step two. Relative word saturation is evident across pre-established themes of
uncertainty, complexity, and polarization.
Table 3
Frequency of Combined Emergent Themes by Pre-Established Narrative Policy Analysis
Themes
Narrative Policy Analysis Themes
Combined Emergent Themes Total Uncertainty Complexity Polarization
Tribes / Tribal 1,887 574 666 647
Lack Funding / Resourcing 450 136 171 144
Emergency / Disaster 344 107 134 105
Government 295 89 96 112
Tribal Size, Different, Sovereign 187 55 48 66
Tribal Voice / Seat at Table 140 40 42 58
States 133 38 43 52
Borders 128 23 39 23
Federal 127 40 45 44
Policy 126 22 45 30
Preparedness 117 37 47 34
Emergency Manage Assist Compact 105 34 19 76
Infrastructure 99 29 41 31
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act 98 28 38 32
Threats 91 32 31 28
Understand 63 24 21 18
Tribal Councils 49 15 0 18
Tribal Cultures 49 15 0 18
Emergency Support Function 0 0 0 0
Table 4 is similar to Table 3 but shows the frequency only of conventional
(federal government) narrative emergent themes from step one by pre-established
narrative policy analysis themes from step two. Again, relative word saturation is evident
across pre-established themes of uncertainty, complexity, and polarization.
Table 4
Frequency of Conventional (Federal Government) Narrative Emergent Themes by
PreEstablished Narrative Policy Analysis Themes
Narrative Policy Analysis Themes
Conventional Narrative Emergent
Themes Total Uncertainty Complexity Polarization
Tribes / Tribal 651 162 254 235
Lack Funding / Resourcing 106 24 52 30
Emergency / Disaster 112 29 56 27
Government 108 26 33 49
Tribal Size, Different, Sovereign 54 7 20 27
Tribal Voice / Seat at Table 19 0 0 19
States 54 6 15 33
Borders 20 0 20 0
Federal 37 5 17 15
Policy 9 0 0 9
Preparedness 34 9 19 6
Emergency Manage Assist Compact 19 6 0 13
Infrastructure 13 0 13 0
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act 24 0 15 9
Threats 6 6 0 0
Understand 6 6 0 0
Tribal Councils 12 5 0 7
Tribal Cultures 33 17 7 9
Emergency Support Function 41 10 17 14
Table 5 is also similar to Table 3 but shows the frequency only of counter (tribal
nation) narrative emergent themes from step one by pre-established narrative policy
analysis themes from step two. Again, relative word saturation is evident across
preestablished themes of uncertainty, complexity, and polarization.
Table 5
Frequency of Counter (Tribal Nation) Narrative Emergent Themes by Pre-Established
Narrative Policy Analysis Themes
Narrative Policy Analysis Themes
Counter-Narrative Emergent
Themes Total Uncertainty Complexity Polarization
Tribes / Tribal 690 173 270 247
Lack Funding / Resourcing 158 47 72 39
Emergency / Disaster 136 37 64 35
Government 105 25 32 48
Tribal Size, Different, Sovereign 38 7 12 19
Tribal Voice / Seat at Table 76 11 21 44
States 46 9 14 23
Borders 56 11 34 11
Federal 72 21 26 25
Policy 53 10 25 18
Preparedness 49 14 24 11
Emergency Manage Assist Compact 8 0 0 8
Infrastructure 53 13 25 15
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act 41 9 19 13
Threats 52 19 18 15
Understand 36 15 12 9
Tribal Councils 8 0 0 8
Tribal Cultures 7 7 0 0
Emergency Support Function 0 0 0 0
Table 6 shows the frequency of combined (conventional and counter-narrative)
emergent themes from step one by pre-established tribal nation themes from step two.
Relative word saturation is evident across pre-established themes of people, resources,
and approaches.
Table 6
Frequency of Combined Emergent Themes by Pre-Established Tribal Nation Themes
Tribal Nation Themes
Combined Emergent Themes Total People Resources Approaches
Tribes / Tribal 1,887 615 870 674
Lack Funding / Resourcing 450 139 228 147
Emergency / Disaster 344 117 168 110
Government 295 97 131 111
Tribal Size, Different, Sovereign 187 59 82 73
Tribal Voice / Seat at Table 140 42 61 57
States 133 38 61 53
Borders 128 26 63 26
Federal 127 43 57 47
Policy 126 39 57 32
Preparedness 117 40 55 38
Emergency Manage Assist Compact 105 20 74 56
Infrastructure 99 29 57 29
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act 98 30 44 38
Threats 91 32 42 30
Understand 63 23 29 20
Tribal Councils 49 0 23 19
Tribal Cultures 49 19 0 0
Emergency Support Function 18 0 0 18
Table 7 is similar to Table 6 but shows the frequency only of conventional
(federal government) narrative emergent themes from step one by pre-established tribal
nation themes from step two. Again, relative word saturation is evident across
preestablished themes of people, resources, and approaches.
Table 7
Frequency of Conventional (Federal Government) Narrative Emergent Themes by
PreEstablished Tribal Nation Themes
Tribal Nation Themes
Conventional Narrative Emergent
Themes Total People Resources Approaches
Tribes / Tribal 649 201 188 260
Lack Funding / Resourcing 118 27 62 29
Emergency / Disaster 112 39 41 32
Government 108 34 26 48
Tribal Size, Different, Sovereign 48 9 6 33
Tribal Voice / Seat at Table 20 0 0 20
States 58 10 14 34
Borders 6 0 6 0
Federal 33 7 5 21
Policy 11 0 0 11
Preparedness 35 13 11 11
Emergency Manage Assist Compact 25 6 9 10
Infrastructure 15 0 15 0
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act 39 7 7 15
Threats 23 17 6 0
Understand 0 0 0 0
Tribal Councils 18 5 5 8
Tribal Cultures 44 22 15 7
Emergency Support Function 31 0 10 21
Table 8 is also similar to Table 6 but shows the frequency only of counter (tribal
nation) narrative emergent themes from step one by pre-established tribal nation themes
from step two. Again, relative word saturation is evident across pre-established themes
of people, resources, and approaches.
Table 8
Frequency of Counter (Tribal) Narrative Emergent Themes by Pre-Determined Tribal
Nation Themes
Tribal Nation Themes
Counter-Narrative Emergent Themes Total People Resources Approaches
Tribes / Tribal 684 217 198 269
Lack Funding / Resourcing 164 53 73 38
Emergency / Disaster 136 47 49 40
Government 105 33 25 47
Tribal Size, Different, Sovereign 50 18 0 32
Tribal Voice / Seat at Table 92 19 21 52
States 46 9 13 24
Borders 54 15 24 15
Federal 72 24 20 28
Policy 41 10 11 20
Preparedness 50 18 16 16
Emergency Manage Assist Compact 0 0 0 0
Infrastructure 53 13 27 13
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act 41 11 11 19
Threats 61 19 25 17
Understand 36 14 11 11
Tribal Councils 0 0 0 9
Tribal Cultures 40 31 0 9
Emergency Support Function 0 0 0 0
A sample connecting strategy text search word tree is at Appendix C.
A sample connecting strategy word cloud is at Appendix D.
Evidence of Quality and Trustworthiness
The purposeful sampling strategy used in this study ensured that data collection in
the form of interviews came from established mid- and late-career professionals with
established knowledge of national preparedness and tribal nation issues (combined
criteria sampling). It further allowed study participants to be divided into two groups for
narrative comparison and analysis (stratified purposeful sampling). Use of standardized
interview questions enabled the use of a pre-coding strategy to fracture the data into
categories for comparison, and subsequently to use a connecting strategy to examine the
data in the context of emergent themes and pre-established narratives.
Twenty-one interviews were conducted, producing nearly eighteen hours of audio
transcript. This produced 2,065 data points which were subsequently coded and analyzed
using NVivo 10. The number of data points resulted in the emergence of derivative
themes, and contextual relationships between emergent themes and pre-established
narratives. Table 1 shows the data point saturation results of the use of pre-coding
strategy to fracture the data. Table 2 shows the data point saturation results of connecting
strategy to understand the data in the context of pre-established narrative themes. Tables
3 to 5 show the saturation frequency of stakeholder key emergent themes by narrative
policy analysis themes. Tables 6 to 8 show the saturation frequency of stakeholder key
emergent themes by tribal nation issues themes.
Findings – The Conventional and Counter-Narratives
The findings for each research question were drawn from the NVivo analysis of
data from participant interviews, and researcher insights drawn directly from participant
interviews. Collectively, the findings represent a metanarrative for tribal nation
integration in national preparedness.
Tribal Nation Experiences
The research question for this portion of the study was: What have tribal nations
experienced in national preparedness, and how have they experienced it, as a result of
homeland security policies implemented since 9/11? The focus of this question was the
impact of both national preparedness policies as well as homeland security threats on
tribal nations; people and resource needs of tribal nations; and challenges and obstacles to
integrating tribal nations into the collective national preparedness effort.
Analysis. Conventional narrative themes addressed by government study
participants when responding to this question included: the Sandy Recovery
Improvement Act; the spectrum of human and environmental threats facing tribal nations;
the wide degree of diversity among tribal nations, combined with the need for both
greater resourcing and inclusion in national preparedness; and differences in culture, and
lack of understanding between federal government departments and tribal nations.
Among key arguments that government study participants put forth regarding
issues of complexity and approaches was passage of the Sandy Recovery Improvement
Act, which many viewed as being advantageous to tribal nations over time. They noted
that passage of the act has brought several implications for complexity. The tribal nations
were not prepared for the administrative and financial burdens of the Sandy Recovery
Improvement Act in advance so, in some circumstances, their expectations and
understanding were not managed. In relation to polarization, prior to implementation of
the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act tribal nations were often treated as subordinate to
states (despite tribal sovereignty), but with passage of the Sandy Recovery Improvement
Act tribal nations now have more of a “seat at the table.” An implication of the Sandy
Recovery Improvement Act for federal agencies in relation to people is potentially more
workload when dealing with tribal nations. Government study participants articulated the
sheer complexities involved in trying to conduct outreach and work with 566 individual
sovereign and diverse tribal cultures. Several indicated a lack of government department
understanding of tribal nations exists and, as one government study participant indicated,
the federal government and tribal nations “don’t know what they don’t know about one
another.” This may necessitate the hiring of more full-time tribal liaison officers, as
opposed to continued reliance on part-time or “collateral duty” tribal liaison officers.
Government study participants also emphasized the complexity of threats to
people and resources that tribal nations face, similar to threats confronting other
communities (e.g., the effects of climate change and natural disasters, and man-made
disasters such as terror attacks, narcoterrorism, and illicit trafficking); but for tribal
nations the threats are often exacerbated by contributing factors such as economic
downturns, poverty, lack of resources, and social factors resulting from drug and alcohol
abuse. To improve tribal nation resiliency and self-reliance a number of government
participants recommended greater tribal nation inclusion in national preparedness
education and training, planning, operations, and exercise participation. This could
potentially improve upon narrative policy issues of uncertainty and polarization.
A number of challenges to greater integration of tribal nations into national
preparedness, most of which were connected with issues of uncertainty and polarization
related to people, were identified by government study participants. From a federal
government narrative perspective, short terms of office of tribal council members, high
tribal council turnover, and a shortage of full-time tribal emergency managers, combined
with the part-time/collateral duty status of federal tribal liaison officers potentially
contributes to issues of uncertainty and polarization. Cultural factors also play a role.
The federal government culture was characterized as impersonal, mechanistic and task
oriented; while tribal cultures were characterized as being more rooted in nativism and an
emphasis on traditional cultures and relationships. Government study participants made
reference to a lack of government understanding of, and cultural sensitivity toward, tribal
nations in the form of a “pan-Indian” view. They also cited tribal cultural challenges.
Specifically, they observed that tribal cultures have concepts of time that differ from that
of the federal government; and they cited a common tribal cultural view that “to plan for
evil is to invite evil,” which runs counter to the concept of national preparedness.
Tribal nation study participants were in general agreement with government study
participants on many issues, but brought additional perspectives not found in the federal
government narrative. Counter narrative themes emphasized by tribal nation study
participants stressed: greater inclusion of tribal nations in national preparedness; and
greater focus on threats, resources, and mutual respect and understanding. While being
interviewed, tribal narrative study participants frequently referred to long-standing
grievances of tribal nations resulting from broken treaties, historical disenfranchisement,
and mistreatment by the federal government. Frequent reference was also made to the
special trust relationship between the federal government and tribal nations, and the
obligations it places on the federal government. The history of disenfranchisement of
Native Americans is well-documented. During interviews with tribal nation study
participants it came across as a polarizing factor between the conventional (federal
government) and counter (tribal) narratives on national preparedness.
Central arguments that tribal nation study participants advanced regarding issues
of complexity related to people and resources included the nature of the threats they face.
They pointed out that natural disasters are not new to tribal nations; that they have
historically been forced to respond to them on their own. What has changed for tribal
nations is the nature of disasters, and federal government requirements with which they
must comply if they desire federal assistance. Tribal nation study participants made
numerous references to unsecured international borders, and the frequency of illegal
cross-border trafficking by drug cartels onto and through tribal reservations. In one
interview, reference was made to a tribal nation that is prohibited from using some of its
reservation land for traditional ceremonies, or for the gathering of herbs and medicines,
due to the prevalence of cartel “snipers” who openly shoot at tribal members. Frequent
reference was also made during interviews to the impacts of climate change and how,
increasingly, tribal nations are finding it more difficult to use their lands for traditional
sustenance. While most of these arguments revolve around issues of complexity, they
also contain elements of polarization related to threats to tribal sovereignty, and
uncertainty related to support from the federal government.
Several additional points were highlighted by tribal nation study participants
related to this portion of the study. Concerning issues of complexity, they argued a
significant need for resources, along with simplification of federal government processes.
A critical resource complication for tribal nations is the absence of a government tax base
to draw upon, similar to states and municipalities. Tribal nations are dependent primarily
on either government grants, or the revenue stream from tribal enterprises. In the latter
case, the majority of tribal nations with independent revenue streams are just meeting the
basic needs of their members. The implication is that the “playing field” for tribal nations
to receive resources for preparedness is not “level.”
Related to the complexity issue above is an issue of uncertainty and people, with
overtones of culture. The tribal nation study participants often viewed federal tribal
liaisons as well-meaning, but with little tribal experience. Frequent reference was made
to the part-time status, and the frequent turnover of federal tribal liaisons. In some cases,
such as USNORTHCOM, they pointed out there is no resident tribal liaison established to
work tribal collaboration issues for homeland defense or civil support. By contrast, they
also acknowledged that many tribal nations lack full-time emergency managers.
Underlying the situation is a cultural view shared by many tribal nations: that outsiders
should not be trusted, that ideas for improvement need to originate within the tribal
nations and not be forced upon them from outside, and that “to plan for evil is to invite
evil.” The cumulative result of this is a need for greater education and understanding on
the part of both government and tribal preparedness practitioners.
Finally, the polarizing issue of lack of inclusion in national preparedness policy
was emphasized repeatedly by tribal nation study participants. They maintained
frequently and clearly their views that historically, tribal nations have not been included
in national preparedness policy development and decisions; that they have not had a “seat
at the table;” that tribal nations are not like states and cities; that they don’t have tax
bases; and that they are not benefitting equally from homeland security grant programs.
The pointed out that states and tribal nations do not always work well together and that
pro forma, “one-size-fits-all” policies for national preparedness, originally designed for
states, will not work for tribal nations due to their widely varying circumstances. Tribal
nation study participants expressed strong views that the federal government has not met
its trust responsibilities with the tribal nations. They acknowledged that tribal nations are
different, that they lack a unified tribal voice, but they know the threats they face, they are
sovereign and, as multiple tribal nation study participants stated, should not be “treated
like children.” One tribal nation study participant stated that representatives of both the
federal government and tribal nations both have “chips on their shoulders.”
Illustrative Participant Narratives. The following sample narratives, taken
from the interviews, are representative of participants’ views on this research question on
what tribal nations have experienced in national preparedness, and how they have
experienced it.
Government study participants.
On policy impacts on tribal nations: “Well, the Homeland Security Act of 2002
set back tribes and tribal relations decades because it placed tribes in the same box as
local government. And that has taken, I mean, it still isn't solved now. And that was
because that was such a big deal. Everybody read it, and when we're fighting to get some
traction both on the federal government side and the tribal side, people pointed to that and
said tribes are the same as local government. Which, which is horribly wrong”
On policy impacts on tribal nations: “Well, I think the change in the Stafford Act
is huge because now tribes - their egos, their nationalism, their sovereignty, is fired up
saying ‘right on, we can do this ourselves,’ but the down side is that the cost share, and
the administrative burden is huge, so there is a management of expectation that is now a
challenge for us.”
On policy impacts on tribal nations: “I think the Sandy Recovery Improvement
Act is probably the most significant one because it corrected something that was long
overdue.”
On policy impacts on tribal nations: “I think there was this, this communication
gap. In other words I think we assumed that the states were working with the tribes and
funneling money to them. And I think the states assumed we were working with the
tribes because the tribes had a government-to-government relationship, but the truth is
nobody was working with them unless there was a disaster that directly impacted tribal
governments, or the tribes actually, you know, said ‘we need help’.”
On policy impacts on tribal nations: “States have been getting all this money and
then they funnel it down to local communities, to counties, whatever. None of that
funding ever, or rarely ever, made it to tribal governments.”
On policy impacts on tribal nations: “When I get into deep conversations I
compare the inner city of the south side of Chicago to tribes. There are kids there who
are smart. There are kids there who have a potential future. But when there's no future,
there's no path, there's no open door. You gotta make money so, I’m a smart kid, so I’ll
be a good drug dealer.”
On policy impacts on tribal nations: “What tribal folks will point to is probably
the greatest inequity they had, was all the money that came out post-9/11 from then until
now. There were billions of dollars that went to states that, in theory, I guess, everybody
thought would be shared with tribes, except it just never happened. So all those
preparedness dollars that got just poured out and poured out and poured out just a fraction
of nothing ended up down to the tribes realistically for most of it. But the tribes really
needed it. They’ve got challenges with drugs and alcohol abuse and all these other
things. And you know, it’s just as the disasters keep rolling.”
On preparedness threats: “A tribal government may perceive the high rate of
teenage suicide as a huge threat to them. But, yet, that’s not really considered a
‘hazard’.”
On preparedness threats: “I think the majority of tribes would say that natural
hazards far outweigh any manmade hazards. There's always gonna be exceptions. Your
border tribes obviously.”
On preparedness threats: “Natural disasters. Except for tribes that have high
profile casinos and that would be a terrorism, homeland security threat. Also there's a
threat of further economic downturn.”
On preparedness threats: “I'd say natural disasters for sure. And the cartels, that
is a problem now. They've got cartel members who come up and marry into these native
communities, and start to cause all kinds of problems with narcoterrorism if you wanna
call it that.”
On preparedness threats: “You cannot plan for all possibilities. Some tribes can’t
plan for anything because they just don’t have the funds. So, I would say, economically,
one of the risks tribes face is economic.”
On preparedness needs: “I think that policies have not been looked at carefully
enough to be flexible to accommodate tribal government situations. Especially the
economic situations. For example, this million dollar threshold for making a declaration
request. Most tribes can't meet that million dollar threshold. Their infrastructure isn't
worth that much. Because it's old, or they don't have it. And so that's probably one of the
biggest things is how are we gonna adjust that threshold? Because when you have a tribal
community with only 25 homes, but ten of those homes are wiped out, that is a major
disaster for that tribe.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “Sometimes I feel there is a
miscommunication or a misunderstanding in government of tribal finances.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “The cultural aspect is extremely
important in intergovernmental communications. The ability of tribal governments to
communicate in a ‘timely manner’ differs across the country. This inability to
communicate quickly is overlooked by many government agencies when seeking tribal
information, reviewing policy, providing feedback, or meeting deadlines.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “Well, there’s a huge variation from one
tribe to the next. Certain tribes get it; certain tribes are very involved in it; other tribes
don't get it or they just don't have the dedicated resources. The Tribal Council has so
many issues on their platter that disaster preparedness can be very low.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “We have to try and overcome the
preconceptions on all sides, on our side and their side and remember to give them the
extra TLC because they are relationship oriented and we are task oriented and the two
ways of doing business are quite different. We both have to try and catch our breath and
try to work with each other in the other’s style.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “They don't have the money to fund
these programs. They don't have the ability to tax like states and local governments, so
they don't have, a lot of them won't have that funding conduit if you will. Even if they
could charge taxes, they wouldn't be able to collect many. Because as you're probably
aware tribal governments are probably some of the most economically depressed areas in
the country.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “From the tribal side, there's no single
voice or even consolidated unified voice for emergency management within tribal
organizations. We don't have a shining star on the federal government side.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “There are a few tribes that still very
closely hold the [cultural] belief that if you prepare for a disaster you're gonna bring on a
disaster.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “If it's a larger organization, and on the
multiple agency side, there's just a lack of understanding about tribes in general. How
they function. There's sometimes a lack of cultural sensitivity. There's just a huge blank
area. And there could be a lot of folks who are very well-meaning, but they don't
understand how tribes are structured and how they might best reach out. And then, also,
they are constrained by their funding.”
Tribal nation study participants.
On preparedness impacts: “Probably what affects the tribes the most is NIMS
[National Incident Management System] requirements. It’s not that it’s a bad thing. It’s
just an unfunded mandate to say the least.”
On preparedness impacts: “I think it's been difficult from a tribal perspective. It
all depends on what type of an agency you come from. The tribes are really different
from other groups as far as the terrorism perspective goes. They’re kind of oblivious [to
terrorist threats] and part of that is the lack of emergency services programs. Part of that
is the lack of interaction with the local jurisdictions. Part of that is the lack of the
[federal] government's inclusion of the tribes and involvement of the tribes in anything.
We think we're kind of being an afterthought.”
On preparedness impacts: “Serving as an elected member of my council gave me
that understanding from a government perspective the need for tribes or the struggle the
tribes have of operating in basically two worlds. You know, one in the tribal capacity
dealing with family and history and that immediate community, And then also having to
deal with the outside, and also the lack of relationships between the outside world, you
know, the local governments, or the state government, or even the federal.”
On preparedness impacts: “You know, historically, tribes are survivalists. They
have survived a lot of things that have been thrown at them. Whether it's mother nature,
whether it's climate change, whether you know, it's genocide, whether it was dealing with
the government. They have survived. And so, they have that inherent ability to respond
when there is an issue in their tribal community. But what they weren't understanding
was the outside functional side of it. So with homeland security there is this relationship
building that's had to occur for so many years. The tribes really didn't want it because of,
historically, their feelings of the government. And, you know, this understanding that,
the outside wants to come in and control what we're doing.”
On preparedness impacts: “When it comes to tribal or any jurisdiction disaster
has no boundaries, no borders…From a homeland security perspective we can’t be
exclusive.”
On preparedness threats: “There is a reservation with seventy-five miles of
border that is basically a broken barbed wire fence because they don’t get border security
funds. So, I mean, we’re making a big stink about keeping people out. We’re making a
big stink about putting these big giant, you know, metal gates in. And finding, and
busting all these cartels with their drug tunnels. When we have seventy-five, eighty,
miles of border that has only a broken barbed wire fence. It’s just not even protected
whatsoever. You guys can secure as much as you want, but if you don’t listen to the
tribes or work with us, then it’s like this huge sieve that’s letting all these different bad
things in, because you’re ignoring us.”
On preparedness threats: “One of the things he [tribal elder] shared with me is
that their elders, because of the cartels, their elders cannot even go down to the river and
collect herbs or their medicines that they use anymore, because [cartel] snipers shoot at
them. He said ‘the only ceremony we have left is the death ceremony’.”
On preparedness threats: “Climate change. We have to prepare for extreme
weather circumstances. And the medicines and the herbs. We have less of them up the
mountains and you have to go higher up in the mountains to find certain medicines
because it’s getting too hot in the areas where they used to grow. So now we’re having to
go to the higher elevations, and it’s like we’re losing.”
On preparedness threats: “We have rail service and pipelines coming through our
tribal areas. We transport over a million gallons of crude oil in our area every week. And
you can see that whether it be homegrown terrorists or whatever other motivation, you
know, we're not going to be immune to it.”
On preparedness threats: “I think the biggest one is just the lack of integration [in
national preparedness] of the tribes in general. And then, from an overall perspective, if
we can't, as a nation, figure out how, agency-to-agency we interact and do business, how
in the world do we ever expect to be one step ahead of the bad guy or the terrorist, if you
will?”
On preparedness threats: “You know, we are our own threat and our own worst
enemy because we're so busy creating policy, after policy, after policy, and really with no
ultimate goal in mind, just, you know, whoever's political agenda for that month or year,
or whatever.”
On preparedness threats: “I think they [tribes] face anything anybody else does
but I think it's the way that they either fail to deal with it because they don't understand it,
or because they see it as being too complicated, they don't deal with it at all.”
On preparedness threats: “I think just fundamentally the understanding that tribes
are not exempt from terrorism or disaster. Historically, tribes have been great at
response. They just dealt with whatever was thrown at them without seeking any relief
from any alphabet agency. Rarely did they ever get any support when there was any kind
of disaster within their community.”
On preparedness threats: “We don't know what the long-term effects are going to
be of climate change. We know it's happening. Some people will admit to it. Others
don't. So we have a conflict there. Indian country, as a whole, believes that there is
climate change.”
On preparedness threats: “Tribes have typically been concerned about the federal
government efforts to secure the borders or not. Because tribes have not been included.
Again, in a lot of the discussions except for a few very vocal tribes along the southern
border that have insisted that their sovereign rights be protected.”
On preparedness threats: “Another major issue is drug trafficking and human
trafficking. Several years ago I spoke with a tribal leader from Kansas, who told me a
story about the women on his reservation who were being quartered and were marrying
people from Mexico. And then they were being used as mules to carry drugs back and
forth across the border up into Kansas. And if we have not secured our border, and the
drug trafficking and stuff is already in Kansas, where is it going to go from there? There
has been little mention and little work done to secure the northern border because we
have friends across the border in the north to Canada and that doesn't or hasn't gotten a
whole lot of attention until just recently but guns and human trafficking in Indian country
is rampant. It's getting worse and tribes are just not being included. We're not at the table
where we should be. We're not receiving a fair share of federal dollars. If they've
[traffickers] gotten to the interior, they can get to the city. And that concerns me. It
concerns a lot of people in Indian country, especially tribal leaders who are trying to
protect their lands and their people. It's a real problem.”
On preparedness needs: “Our greatest need is a truly integrated type of
emergency management program where we can work with local partners. Another is a
funding mechanism to sustain programs. I mean, there’s funding sources for equipment
and projects, but not actually meant to sustain a program.”
On preparedness needs: “There’s just a lot of tribes out there that they’re in the
same boat we’re in, where they don’t have casinos, and they’re finding it very difficult to
fund these types of emergency management programs.”
On preparedness needs: “We don’t have 911 calling on the reservation. We have
call forwarding of 911 which actually causes us a lot more problems than actually having
911. So when you make a 911 call here on the reservation it depends who your carrier is
and if you’re calling from a land line or a cell phone. There was a woman that passed
away on the reservation last year because she did not receive medical attention for over
six hours. Because of the fact that people couldn’t get through 911.”
On preparedness needs: “Approximately seventy-five percent of the roads on the
reservation are dirt roads.”
On preparedness needs: “The tribes’ needs are more technical assistance
available to them from federal agencies. Because right now, we ask for it, and we don’t
get it. Also, a place at the table. The tribes have a lot of experience and information. We
have a lot of issues that we can bring to the forefront.”
On preparedness needs: “We need to have more tribal involvement with the
federal agencies. Working hand-in-hand. And even President Obama wrote it in his
consultation policy, Executive Order 13175. You need to consult with them [tribes].
You need to cooperate with them [tribes]. You need to collaborate. But a lot of these
[federal] agencies just don’t know how. They don’t know how.”
On preparedness needs: “The way the Constitution was written, tribes have a
special status. You break a treaty, you break a law. People don’t understand that. States
don’t understand that. We should be getting much more funding than we’re getting. We
should get a seat at the table due to our special status as tribes.”
On preparedness needs: “Our greatest needs are resources for maintaining. We
have a response, we have a fire department. You know, of course, our law enforcement,
our conservation department, and for a tribe we have very comprehensive response
capabilities and the tribe is funding that right now. If we're here, if we're funded just to
meet tribal interests is one thing. But we're not. We're here also to meet the national
interest.”
On preparedness needs: “I think that there's a huge gap between how the counties
interact with the tribes, versus how the states interact with tribes, versus how the feds
interact with the tribes. And, you know, the government has this idea of one, one shoe
fits and it doesn't. So, not only do we not have policy in place, but we don't train
together, we don't talk, we don't work together. We don't, you know, we don't anything
for the greater good.”
On preparedness needs: “I think their [tribes] biggest need is [federal
government] understanding that their culture and their operations are different, and that a
standard model, even though it helps, doesn't meet their needs.”
On preparedness needs: “Most tribes don't even have an emergency manager.
They don't see the value in it. They're just now slowly starting to understand that you
need to have somebody that is working actively, and working throughout the entire year
on just preparing the community.”
On preparedness needs: “States, counties, cities, are getting tens of millions of
dollars to build their infrastructure and their capacity with training equipment, modern
communication systems, the whole thing. Tribes are not getting that. And Indian country
doesn't believe that that's right. And we believe that the Federal Government has failed in
its trust responsibility to provide those resources so that tribes can build their
infrastructure. Because tribes have many small populations, there's not a lot of tribal
people who have been exposed to a lot of the educational opportunities, training
opportunities that are available across the country.”
On preparedness needs: “First of all, simplification of the process. Quit dropping
more administrative garbage in there that gets in your way and we have to learn how to
work it. Emergency management is not nearly as complex as people like to make it.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “In our tribe they say that words are
powerful. A lot of other tribes are the same way. It’s hard to get people to preparedness
training because of the fact you’re gonna bring it [evil] to fruition. If you talk about it, if
you train for it, then something bad’s gonna happen.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “I think there needs to be education on
both sides. I think the biggest challenges that the tribes face is that we are so different.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “The Stafford Act changes came with no
implementation plan so they’re unfunded mandates.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “You know, here you have all these
technical assistance availability programs, you have all of this stuff available. Yet there's
been nothing done to identify what the very basic needs of a tribal emergency
management program are.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “We see some [federal government]
tribal liaisons being brought in who have no idea or experience in tribal country. They
might be very well meaning and very well polished. But they haven't the faintest idea
how the tribes work. And I think that's trying to plug a person into a slot. I mean, it's
fine if you're in the military in some cases, but we're talking about culture, and lands, and
homes. A very diverse, organization of peoples.”
On preparedness integration challenges: “An opportunity came up for the tribes to
have a representative on the homeland security advisory council for our state. And when
I first walked into that meeting they didn't know how many tribes were in the state.”
Tribal Nation Responses
Research question: What have been the tribal nation responses (stories to be told)
to these experiences? The focus of this question was on the preparedness experiences of
tribal nations, unique policy conditions and complexities, the relative effectiveness of
partnerships, and preparedness initiatives that are working or not working for tribal
nations.
Analysis. In responding to this question, much of the conventional narrative
themes addressed by government study participants revolved around: policy conditions
and complexities that affect tribal nations; the relative effectiveness of partnerships; and
the relative effectiveness of initiatives. Concerning issues of complexity and people,
government study participants reiterated the difficulties of trying to work with the sheer
number of 566 tribal nations that are independently sovereign, but with no single
collaborating voice. Several pointed out that, from the federal side, tribal liaison is often
a collateral duty, and from the tribal nation side there often are no full-time emergency
managers with which to work. For many tribal nations, preparedness may be a luxury,
and subordinate to getting basic resources for tribal members.
In relation to complexity and approaches, government study participants pointed
out a number of complicating factors. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 set tribal
nations back by denying their sovereignty and special status and treating them like
counties, subordinate to states. Although today’s approaches place more emphasis on
tribal nation sovereignty, there is no clear “shining star” or federal lead on tribal issues
related to preparedness. Despite the federal government’s trust responsibility regarding
tribal nations, the FEMA Office of Tribal Affairs is a single person, USNORTHCOM has
no tribal liaison officer, and tribal NGOs that advocate on behalf of tribal nations are not
always or equally recognized by the federal departments.
On questions of complexity and approaches, tribal nation study participants
echoed many of the observations of the government study participants. In addition, they
pointed out that tribal nations have to compete with one another, and with the states for
preparedness funding, but they lack the resources of states and often they lack the people
and resources to develop the necessary mitigation plans. Tribal lands are often vulnerable
with undeveloped infrastructure, inadequate 911 response services, and porous or
unsecured borders, including international borders. Tribal nation study participants
emphasized the need for greater inclusion in national preparedness policy development,
as well as greater representation in federal departments, including at DHS, FEMA, and
USNORTHCOM.
In response to a question on the effectiveness of preparedness partnerships, and
how they affect issues of complexity and polarization, as well as people, resources, and
approaches, both government study participants and tribal nation study participants were
in strong agreement. Both groups responded overwhelmingly with “it depends”
(government participants = 8 “depends;” tribal nation participants = 2 “yes,” 7
“depends”). Both groups agreed that the effectiveness of preparedness partnerships
differs by state and by tribal nation. Tribal nation study participants were further of the
view that tribal nation partnerships were generally better with federal partners; but with
state and local partners it depended, with some being better than others. Some tribal
nation study participants recognized this as a polarizing issue requiring attention, and
observed that “disasters don’t recognize political boundaries” and that “tribal
preparedness interests are also national preparedness interests.”
In response to a question on which national preparedness policies have worked or
not worked for tribal nations, and how they have affected issue of complexity and
polarization, and people and resources, both government study participants and tribal
nation study participants were again in strong agreement. Both groups responded
overwhelmingly that “it depends” or “no” (government participants = 1 “yes,” 2 “no,” 7
“depends:” tribal nation participants = 1 “yes,” 3 “no,” 5 “depends”). Responses from
government study participants highlighted a lack of government focus on tribal nations
until recently; the relative sizes of the various tribal nations; the role played by internal
tribal politics; and the varying relationships between federal departments, tribal nations,
and tribal NGOs. They pointed out the ongoing collaborative effort by FEMA to
socialize the draft Tribal Declarations Pilot Guidance with tribal nations. Responses from
tribal nation study participants suggested that national preparedness policies have had
mixed results for tribal nations since many are without full-time emergency managers or
resources, but all must meet the same federal government pro forma requirements. They
further indicated that federal departments and agencies are not always in synchronization
with one another and it overwhelms at the tribal nation level. A common refrain from
tribal nation study participants was “don’t tell tribal nations what to do; ask them what
they need.”
Illustrative Participant Narratives. The following sample narratives, taken
from the interviews, are representative of participants’ views on this question on tribal
nation responses to their preparedness experiences.
Government study participants.
On policy conditions/complexities: “It's not all government's fault, they can't wait
until 566 tribes have a council meeting, and then three months later have another council
meeting or discussion, and then three months after that vote on whether they're supportive
of things or not.”
On policy conditions/complexities: “I think, it's very difficult to be a collateral
duty emergency manager, and that's what the majority of tribal folks are.”
On policy conditions/complexities: “Tribal priorities may not be in preparedness,
so that economically they may not be supporting preparedness efforts. Maybe they're
more, especially tribes that have fewer resources, concerned about just getting basic
resources for their folks. And preparing may seem to be a luxury.”
On policy conditions/complexities: “There are 566 federally-recognized tribes
and they’re all individual and they all have different government structures. And this sort
of pan-Indian concept, we just have to be careful with that.”
On policy conditions/complexities: “They [tribes] have to do it their way and
probably in their own timeframe too. Things probably move at a different pace for Indian
nations. So you have to respect that.”
On partnership effectiveness: “Tribal relationships with government agencies in
whole is hard to define. State relationships can differ with the change of governmental
positions (Governors, State appointees, Tribal Executives, Tribal appointees), as elections
occur. Lack of personal knowledge and understanding of tribal culture can interfere in
conducting formal government business.”
On partnership effectiveness: “It depends. Certain tribes have a wonderful
partnership. Others do not. Part of the issue is historic. First of all from the federal
government end, there have been how many broken treaties and unfilled promises, and
the tribes go back to their history and if you and I may not have done them wrong and the
federal government has done them wrong over history and they don't forget that, so it
already creates a barrier in some cases.”
On initiatives working or not working: “Another area where there's a disconnect
is on tribal enterprises. Our government, the federal government, and state government,
and county government, and city government can tax the rest of the citizens. Tribal
governments cannot tax. And so to generate revenue for their activities they have what
they call tribal enterprises which are tribal businesses: their casinos, oyster beds, timber.
So the catch 22 right now is if the tribal enterprise is damaged…say the casino...we don't
pay for repairing casinos.”
On initiatives working or not working: “I think that probably the biggest disaster
ever facing Indian country, was the arrival of Europeans. And the subsequent treatment
from the federal government. So now we have told these tribal governments, this is your
land and here's where you have to stay. Well, in my opinion then, the federal government
has a responsibility to make it right, whatever that looks like. The flip side of that is that
tribes don’t want a handout. They want a hand up. They want a peace offering.”
Tribal nation study participants.
On policy conditions/complexities: “They [federal government] really need to
take into consideration the culture of tribes. Emergency preparedness is something that
we’ve been doing, you know, for ages before homeland security. If it’s a natural threat,
most of us will just hunker down in place because we’ve already got the resources we
need to take care of ourselves and our communities.”
On policy conditions/complexities: “When they [federal government] put these,
these dollar marks on what, what’s a major disaster to a tribe, it’s really not looking at the
tribe as a whole. So, if we have a million dollar threshold for a disaster declaration and
we fall short of it, but forty percent of our power, or our communications, or our road
infrastructure has been destroyed or made unusable, we’re still devastated.”
On policy conditions/complexities: “When you recognize the distinct sovereign
interests between the states and the tribes, it does get used politically both ways. But at
the same time disasters do not recognize political boundaries, so that's your override.”
On policy conditions/complexities: “There's no wrong answer. The reality is
looking at how tribes function and they don't function like any other government
anywhere. And I say that because they don't have a tax base. Their tax base is their
forprofit operation. Which doesn't mean they can't be protected like any other asset a
government has. But the difference is, when you look at the federal government they
don't deal with assets, they deal with resources. Which there's a legal definition
difference between assets and resources. And it's being able to understand that there's a
way tribes can do it and protect their assets, and still meet the requirements of the federal
government.”
On policy conditions/complexities: “You know, going in and interacting with the
tribal community does not happen overnight. Tribes, because of the history, are very
leery of the outs. I don't care who you are. They're very leery sometimes of being shown
the way to do something. We heard that once before. And that's why we don't have our
land anymore. Or, that's why we lost our languages. Or, that's why we're where we are.”
On policy conditions/complexities: “My grandma used to always tell me, and she
was tribal chair here, it's gotta be their [the tribe’s] idea. If it's not their idea, they will not
buy into it. Tribal communities, it's gotta be their idea. It's gotta come from within, be
the tribe's idea.”
On policy conditions/complexities: “We get real tired of having to train new
[federal government] people who have no idea about tribes. They think we all came from
a John Wayne movie.”
On partnership effectiveness: “Let them [tribes] sit at the table. And they're
gonna make mistakes. And let them learn from it. They're sovereign, so they have the
ability to make decisions themselves.”
On partnership effectiveness: “I have a tribal colleague who walked out of a
federal government meeting exceptionally upset that tribal professionals were treated like
children.”
On partnership effectiveness: “At the federal level you folks aren't working
totally in sync with each other, and when it gets to our [tribal] level it's severely
overwhelming.”
On initiatives working or not working: “There's never any input from the tribe
until, until there's already a draft [policy] guidance in place. Well, one, you've already
turned a bunch of people off, they don't even want to have that conversation. And, two,
the people who were writing it to begin with don't have a good understanding of what
goes on in Indian country or how things work in general to even make that decision.”
Stakeholder Ascribed Meanings
Research question: What meanings (turning points) do stakeholders ascribe to
these experiences? The focus of this question was on tribal preparedness program
familiarity; the current state of tribal nation capacity, capability, and funding; how to
improve tribal nation capacity, capability, and funding; impact of the Sandy Recovery
Improvement Act; and how well tribal nations understand disaster declaration
administrative requirements.
Analysis. When asked whether tribal nations are familiar with preparedness
programs available to them, the responses centered primarily on uncertainty and
complexity related to people, resources and approaches. Both government study
participants and tribal nation study participants were generally in agreement with the
majority responding either “no” or “it depends” (government participants = 2 “yes,” 3
“no,” 4 “depends:” tribal nation participants = 2 “yes,” 5 “no,” 1 “depends”).
Government study participants offered that most tribal nations may have basic familiarity
with preparedness programs, but lack great familiarity unless they have been through a
disaster. Contributing factors cited were the lack of full-time emergency managers and
emergency management structures in many smaller tribal nations, and the tendency for
tribal nations to be overwhelmed at times. Tribal nation study participants also indicated
that, while tribal nations may not be prepared, it depends on the sophistication of each
tribal nation; they understand disaster response but are not familiar with funding or
recovery. They indicated that progress is being made overall and gave as an example
tribal nation participation in the staffing process for the FEMA draft Tribal Declarations
Pilot Guidance.
When queried about the current state of tribal nation capacity, capability, and
funding, and how to improve them, the majority of responses revolved around issues of
complexity related to people and resources. Government study participants listed as
factors a ten to twelve year lag between tribal nations and the rest of the nation in
preparedness; wide disparities in prosperity between tribal nations; and a need for
dedicated and greater funding to build tribal nation capability and capacity, so tribal
nations wouldn’t have to compete with the states for funding. These efforts could be
enhanced through improved partnerships and expanded collaboration of regional
intertribal councils. Tribal nation study participants listed as tribal nation needs assured
funding to eliminate reliance on government grants and revenue streams; full-time
emergency management directors; improved tribal nation infrastructure including secured
borders, 911 call response, and capacity to respond and shelter; technical assistance from
federal agencies; and expanded training and education opportunities.
Government study participants and tribal nation study participants both viewed
the impact of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act as generally good for tribal nations
(government participants = 6 “yes,” 2 “depends:” tribal nation participants = 7 “yes,” 2
“depends”). The responses spanned the full spectrum of narrative policy elements –
uncertainty, complexity, and polarization; as well as tribal nation issues of people,
resources, and approaches. Government study participants suggested that messaging,
process understanding, and expectation management of tribal nations in relation to the
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act could have been better managed. The Sandy
Recovery Improvement Act imposes administrative and cost-sharing burdens on tribal
nations; but they now have the options of pursuing disaster relief through the states or
directly through federal channels. Tribal nation study participants’ responses suggested
implementation of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act may have been hastened for
political expediency, but it reinforces tribal nation sovereignty and therefore empowers
them. Since the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act was implemented and disaster
declarations for tribal nations were approved before federal guidelines were formulated,
preparedness for tribal nations has become more complicated. In response, the federal
government should continue educating tribal nations on the ramifications of the Sandy
Recovery Improvement Act, and how to take advantage of it.
Illustrative Participant Narratives. The following sample narratives, taken
from the interviews, are representative of participants’ views on this question on the
meanings stakeholders ascribe to tribal nation experiences.
Government study participants.
On preparing tribal nations: “Continued efforts in outreach at all levels of
government need to be stressed. Formal education of governmental leaders and officials
that interact with tribes must be part of their acceptance to office.”
On improving tribal nation capacity/capability: “So, I think more dedicated
funding for tribes. First of all, more opportunities for dedicated funding, and then larger
sums of dedicated funding.”
On improving tribal nation capacity/capability: “I think that Congress needs to
appropriate funding that is specifically targeted to tribal governments to begin building
capability. So they don't have to compete with the states and all the big cities for that
money. They shouldn't have to compete for that money.”
On impact of the SRIA: “Well, that whole, unfortunately, BS of tribes can go
directly to the President, that was just a bold-faced fib.”
On impact of the SRIA: “There’s still gonna be a threshold, there’s gonna be
limits, there’s gonna be all these things that’s gonna leave tribes out.”
On tribal preparedness program familiarity: “With 566 tribes, if 50 are ready and
able to take advantage of those [disaster relief programs] when the federal government
comes to town after a disaster, that would surprise me…There are some humongous gaps
in knowledge and experience.”
On tribal preparedness program familiarity: “It's difficult when a tribal
emergency manager has to try to justify their needs above other tribal needs. Above law
enforcement or fire EMS needs. They're handicapped before they even start talking.”
Tribal nation study participants.
On impact of the SRIA: “You know, I think, I believe it’s a positive impact. It’s
allowed tribes to exercise their sovereignty.”
On impact of the SRIA: “It just, it cuts to the chase. It pulls out the middle man
and we don’t have to beg somebody to be able to write a letter for us and, and to do all
these things on our behalf. We don’t have to do that, we do it on our own.”
On impact of the SRIA: “If the federal government does their due diligence and
provides information, training and policy to the tribes, the federal government in the end
is gonna win too, because the tribes will be better prepared. They will better understand
the ramifications and implications of any of the policy and, and legislative changes.
They'll be able to prepare their people and their lands in cooperation and in conjunction
with the rest of the United States.”
On impact of the SRIA: “This is something we worked after. And I think it
basically is a good thing. The devil is in the fine print. The tribes are supposed to have a
tribal coordinating officer. Now they didn't define it down enough to tell you if every
tribe had to have one, or if every state needed one, or if every tribal organization needed
to have one. And we can't get definition of this required officer.”
On tribal preparedness program familiarity: “It is not humanly possible for me to
be able to provide the same amount of data and do the same type of paperwork that the
state can do, yet I'm held to, most of the time, the same standards, and sometimes more
standards than the state or local jurisdictions are held to.”
On tribal preparedness program familiarity: “We'd love to be able to do some of
this type of stuff, but the normal day to day, month to month operations of a tribal, native
sovereign nation, are such that we are stretched very, very thin. And we have people
multi-tasking, which invariably means they don't do all their jobs properly.”
Stakeholder Ascribed Implications
Research question: What are the implications of these experiences? The focus of
this question was on whether federal disaster relief thresholds are too high; whether other
criteria or approaches might be appropriate for tribal nations; whether there is a role for a
national tribal emergency management assistance compact; and whether there is a role for
a tribal emergency support function in the National Response Framework.
Analysis. Government study participants and tribal nation study participants were
generally in agreement that federal disaster relief thresholds are too high for tribal
nations, that other criteria or approaches for disaster relief should be considered for tribal
nations, and that there is a role for a national tribal emergency management assistance
compact, but they split on the issue of a role for a tribal emergency support function in
the National Response Framework.
When asked about disaster relief thresholds the majority of study participants
were in agreement that the thresholds are too high, or not appropriate to the circumstances
of tribal nations (government participants = 8 “yes,” 2 “no”, 1 “depends:” tribal nation
participants = 7 “yes,” 1 “depends”). The majority of reasons concerned narrative issues
of complexity and polarization relating to tribal issues of people, resources, and
approaches. Responses from government study participants observed that current pro
forma disaster relief thresholds were designed for the states and therefore exclude tribal
nations from the process because many tribal nations are too small or lack resources to
meet the thresholds. In many cases, current disaster relief thresholds may simply be not
appropriate for tribal nations, and may lead to bad decisions. Responses from tribal
nation study participants were in agreement that most tribal nations are small and lack the
resources and infrastructure of states, and are more greatly impacted by current disaster
relief thresholds.
Consistent with their positions that disaster relief thresholds are too high or
inappropriate for tribal nations, the majority of study respondents were also in agreement
that other disaster relief criteria or approaches should be considered for tribal nations
(government participants = 9 “yes,” 2 “no:” tribal nation participants = 7 “yes”).
Suggestions for alternative disaster relief criteria put forth by both government study
participants and tribal nation study participants included: per-capita approaches based on
the percent of effect on individual tribal population and resource demographics; percent
impact on revenue generating assets and subsequent loss of revenue; regionalization of
disaster declarations so that multiple tribal nations could apply under a single disaster
declaration; assignment of cultural criteria; and percent impact on neighboring
jurisdictions. Government study participants and tribal nation study participants both
recognized that the establishment of separate disaster relief criteria for tribal nations
would have the potential to increase polarization leading to push back from states.
In responding to whether there is a role for a national tribal emergency
management assistance compact, government study participants and tribal nation study
participants agreed strongly that such a role would be beneficial to tribal nations, but that
significant challenges would have to be overcome to develop an acceptable concept
(government participants = 9 “yes,” 2 “depends:” tribal nation participants = 10 “yes”).
Government study participants pointed out that funding and legal complexities would
have to be resolved, and inter-tribal rivalries would have to be overcome. They raised the
issue of whether it would be better to establish a separate emergency management
assistance compact for tribal nations, or to incorporate tribal nations into the
alreadyexisting emergency management assistance compact for states. Tribal nation
study participants indicated that the issue has been discussed for years but the timing may
not have been right. Currently, many tribal nations are members of regional tribal
assistance groups. They suggested additional considerations such as whether a tribal
emergency management assistance compact should be national, regional, or state focused;
and who would lead such an initiative, including the potential for tribal NGO leadership,
since tribal nations are often resistant to outside or nontribal interests.
On the question of whether there is a role for a tribal emergency support function
in the National Response Framework, study participants were split, with tribal nation
study participants being strongly in favor of the concept, and government study
participants being evenly split for and against it (government participants = 5 “yes,” 5
“no,” 1 “depends:” tribal nation participants = 7 “yes,” 1 “no”). Tribal nation study
participants in favor of the concept argued that the current system, with tribal affairs
aligned under Emergency Support Function 15, External Affairs, in the National
Response Framework does not adequately address tribal nation interests. Tribal nations
and lands are insular and require a separate emergency support function to articulate their
unique needs; further the concept would be consistent with implementation of the Sandy
Recovery Improvement Act. One tribal nation study participant who disagreed with the
concept suggested the current ESF system should be made to work for all, including tribal
nations. Hesitation to support the concept from government study participants iterated
that the National Response Framework is designed to support anyone authorized, and a
separate tribal emergency support function could detract from the effectiveness of other
emergency support functions. One government study participant who supported the
concept suggested that a tribal emergency support function could function in a
“crosscutting” manner to the other emergency support functions in order to assure
representation of unique tribal needs across all emergency support functions.
Illustrative Participant Narratives. The following sample narratives, taken
from the interviews, are representative of participants’ views on this question on the
implications of tribal nation experience.
Government study participants. On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations:
“Cost share was a huge concern. Level of damage was a huge concern. How to count
population was a huge concern. So then also the exclusion of tribal enterprises from
benefits was a concern.”
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “I'll say that they're not
appropriate. What the number is, why the people who were assigned to make these
decisions made all kinds of wrong decisions. But a lot of it is based on how long we've
ignored tribes in our horrible federal government history of lying to tribes.
‘Sign this treaty and we'll do all this stuff for you’ and we don't.”
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “In some cases, we’ve got tribes
who are living in disaster conditions already.”
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “You’re gonna exclude probably
seventy-five percent of tribes from that process, even if you go down to half-a-million
dollars.”
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “One-size-fits-all doesn’t work, I
don’t think, under any circumstances, let alone just tribal circumstances.”
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “I think the current system suffices
when it comes to tribes, because the population is small. The area is large. And the
possibility of affecting a large amount of people is slim.”
On a tribal nation EMAC: “It has already been mentioned by tribes. So there is
collaboration among the tribes. I think there is a great deal of willingness to assist among
the tribes.”
On a tribal nation EMAC: “I think so, and I think the tribes should want it too,
because it comes with money, you know. You’re talking about when they deploy to help
assist other tribes.”
On a tribal nation EMAC: “In theory, it sounds great. But there is a financial
part, and there are internal tribal politics.”
On a tribal nation EMAC: “It has a lot to offer. There's just a lot of tribes that are
doing well and they have a lot resources and a lot of capabilities and are not only willing
to assist, but want to assist. And, for some tribes there's not another outlet, they don't
have a great relationship through the state as a whole.”
On a tribal nation ESF in the NRF: “Why create a new wheel?”
On a tribal nation ESF in the NRF: “I think if there were a separate ESF it would
be cut off from the main stream of what's being made available. I think good tribal
liaison out of external affairs provides the extra customer service that the tribes need.”
On a tribal nation ESF in the NRF: “I think so in that the role of that ESF is to
make sure that there’s an appropriate interface with tribes from the other ESFs.”
On a tribal nation ESF in the NRF: “I don’t see any harm in it. Why not?”
On a tribal nation ESF in the NRF: “Absolutely, and we’ve asked for it. Asked
for it flat out and gotten mixed reviews.”
On a tribal nation ESF in the NRF: “The ESFs are set up based on function,
mission. Tribal is not a mission.”
On a tribal nation ESF in the NRF: “You gotta say it’s a cross-cutting ESF, like
private sector, so it will play into each of the other ESFs as well.”
On a tribal nation ESF in the NRF: “I think if there was a tribal ESF you’d be
diluting the authorities of other government agencies or ESFs.”
Tribal nation study participants.
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “Within a state, multiple counties
can declare disaster. Or the state can have multiple counties that have a disaster. You
know, for [multiple] tribes willing to work together I think that should be an option.”
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “Yes, it is too high. Especially for
the smaller tribes. I feel for the smaller tribes. They can’t make the million dollar
threshold.”
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “Tribes have been quite limited in
their ability to tax. Their ability to own assets. To acquire a land base that’s taxable.
You get both hands tied behind your back. We feel it’s not an equal playing field for us.”
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “You know I think it depends on
the tribe. You could talk to a tribe that has no land base, no government, and all they
have is, you know, the cultural sites, and, yeah, that's ridiculous. They're never, ever
gonna meet that threshold. So, I think they need to look at either a per capita based
approach or a different type solution, like looking at the population base.”
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “Ours [tribal emergency
management plan] is not based on dollar thresholds but impact percentage of destruction,
or loss of use of critical facilities and infrastructure. So ours is at 25%, so when we hit
25% we're gonna declare a disaster. Now, when do we get a disaster declaration from the
president? Well, it depends on how big it is, but if we lose 25% of our infrastructure the
jurisdictions around us are fairly well damaged. So I've been trying to get the federal
government to understand it's not about a dollar amount. And it's not entirely about a
presidential declaration. It's about a government's ability to protect its assets.”
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “When the Stafford Act was first
passed in to law, that million dollars threshold was an arbitrary number. It was not based
on scientific information, or mathematical formula, or anything like that. It was an
arbitrary number… If you look at some of the tribal communities across the country some
of them are very small. Some of them don't have a lot of infrastructure. Because some of
the populations are so small a million dollar incident completely wipes out a tribe.”
On disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations: “Keep in mind the scope of the
disaster is actually relevant to the demographics of the community. If you have a flood
that takes out a rancher in New Mexico or a Pueblo, it might only affect 30 people. But
it's a major disaster for them because they've been cut off from their food and their water.
Suddenly their animals are dead and everything else. There's a scope there. And I know
we like to quantify on the federal government side disasters up to x. Well that's fine, but
many of these tribes are smaller, and they don't have resources which will come up to that
size. So I'm gonna say the [threshold] guidelines in place for that support are a problem.”
On a tribal nation EMAC: “Yes, but again, it would have to depend on the
funding.”
On a tribal nation EMAC: “Yes. And the reason why, I would say, is damage
assessments or something like that cause [tribes are] maybe a little bit more apprehensive
about allowing nontribal interests into the reservations. It's a cultural thing where they'd
be more open for representatives from other tribes.”
On a tribal nation EMAC: “There is absolutely a need to either include us in the
states’ EMAC or to create, whether it be state tribal EMAC, or regional tribal EMAC, or
however, national. I don't care how they do it. But there has to be some sort of avenue, a
driving force, to put that together. Because, historically, if you look back to the 2007
fires, it was the tribes who stepped in to help the other tribes.”
On a tribal nation EMAC: “I know that there's folks that have been talking about
this for some time, and that ability to be in the game. Being a resource would be
mutually beneficial. I think if you were able to take a collective survey of the resources
that tribes have now, in the way of emergency management, I think some people would
be absolutely floored. Whether it's equipment or staffing, just really would be floored at
what tribes have.”
On a tribal nation EMAC: “That's something that we've been discussing for quite
a few years now, actually… Timing is everything, but with these kinds of projects it may
not have been the right time. There may not have been enough interest, or there may not
have been enough tribal emergency managers that were able to participate in that. But it
really hasn't gotten very far in Indian country yet. I think there's a possibility that within
the next few years, we're going to see more of a consolidated effort in Indian country to
do something similar. And probably expand on that tribal EMAC concept.”
On a tribal nation ESF in the NRF: “No, I don’t think there’s a tribal ESF needed.
However, when it comes to learning, how to do everything ESF focused.”
On a tribal nation ESF in the NRF: “If you do not have a specific tribal ESF the
tribal concerns are completely left out. They (other ESFs) don't care. They deal with
other stuff. So I think there's some value to that.”
On a tribal nation ESF in the NRF: “In one word, absolutely… In light of the
Stafford Act changes, the Sandy Recovery Act, several of the other initiatives that are
going on around the country. The Blue Campaign for human trafficking and some of the
other kinds of things that are going on with customs and border protection. It's about
time, it's overdue, it needs to be included.”
Summary
The purposeful sampling strategy for this study allowed an in-depth examination
of tribal nation integration in national preparedness with a small select group of
knowledgeable practitioners. The narrative policy analysis approach was used to
compare two narratives: the conventional (federal government) narrative and the counter
(tribal nation) narrative. Emergent themes from those narratives were further explored
by aligning them with pre-established narrative policy analysis themes (uncertainty,
complexity, and polarization), and pre-established tribal nation themes (people, resources,
approaches). The study findings represent the conventional (federal government) and
counter (tribal nation) narratives for tribal nation integration in national preparedness.
Chapter 5 explores the implications of these findings, and presents the metanarrative in
the form of recommendations for further study.
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
This qualitative study used a narrative policy analysis approach to examine the
effects of national preparedness policy on tribal nations since 9/11. It addressed the
following research questions:
What have tribal nations experienced in national preparedness, and how have
they experienced it, as a result of homeland security policies implemented since 9/11?
What have been the tribal nation responses (stories to be told) to these
experiences?
What meanings (turning points) do stakeholders ascribe to these experiences?
What are the implications of these experiences?
The findings in Chapter 4 highlighted key similarities and differences between the
conventional (federal government) and counter (tribal nation) narratives concerning the
integration of tribal nations into national preparedness. The study findings confirmed
significant and fundamental practical and cultural differences between the two narratives,
with much room for improvement. The differences between the two narratives were
further underscored by the findings related to narrative policy themes (uncertainty,
complexity, polarization) and tribal nation themes (people, resources, approaches). The
results revealed by the two narratives revealed that tribal nations have not benefited
equally from the advantages of full integration into the “whole community” or “all-
ofnation” approach to national preparedness. This has resulted in a national gap of
vulnerability and both sets of stakeholders have a common interest in closing it.
Interpretation of the Findings
The premise for this study was a gap in national preparedness policy and practice
in the integration of the federally recognized tribal nations into the collective national
effort for national preparedness. The theoretical foundation for this study was established
in the convergence of contract theory and social conflict theory, illustrated in Figure 1 in
Chapter 2. The convergence of these two theories emphasized the symbiotic relationship
between people and government in a democracy concerning the interaction of people and
rights, means and consent, and government and authority. In this relationship, relative to
national preparedness, government has a moral obligation to secure the well-being of its
people, and is at the same time reliant on the support of its people for its legitimacy. The
moral obligation of government extends to the enfranchisement of its people, who can
also be viewed as both stakeholders and constituents. This dual obligation and reliance of
government is especially critical when extended to elements of society, including tribal
nations, which have historically been disenfranchised.
The literature review in Chapter 2 revealed a dearth of peer-reviewed literature
directly related to the subject of tribal nation integration in national preparedness. The
peer review was therefore expanded to address corollary issues related to tribal nations
and national preparedness; and it considered additional scholarly books and journals,
government policy documents, and media publications. The literature showed a complex
and uncertain homeland security environment, with evolving threats, in which the
integration of all stakeholders in national preparedness takes the form of an imperative.
As the nation’s oldest stakeholder community, tribal nations have historically
been disenfranchised. The people have fared much more poorly than other ethnic groups
in American society, and lag behind the rest of the nation in income, education, and
health care. Many of the reservations upon which tribal nation members reside, although
they are critical to national preparedness, are also some of the most economically
depressed in the nation. The literature review revealed that in the current homeland
security environment disenfranchised segments of society, including tribal nations, are
more vulnerable to the impacts of disasters, as well as to potential exploitation and
radicalization by hostile actors. The implication of this set of conditions is not in the
collective preparedness interests of tribal nations or the nation as a whole.
The narrative policy analysis approach of this study was designed to better
understand the conventional (federal government) and counter (tribal nation) narratives
on tribal nation integration in national preparedness. The research findings in Chapter 4
revealed two fundamentally different narrative views, although with some significant
points of agreement. Greater understanding of these views is critical to finding ways
forward that accommodate the national preparedness requirements and needs of both sets
of stakeholders.
The data collected from interviews with tribal nation study participants revealed
that tribal nations tend to be nativistic, meaning they tend to emphasize traditional
customs, and are resistant to outside influences. Tribal nation cultures tend to be
relationship oriented, rather than task oriented. They have found this approach necessary
both as a means of survival in the face of historical disenfranchisement in the form of
broken treaties and agreements by the federal and state governments, and as a means of
maintaining their cultures. The data further revealed that tribal nations are not all alike;
they vary greatly by language, culture, and socioeconomic factors. There is no single
collective voice for tribal nations in national preparedness. Tribal nation governments do
not function like, and do not have the resources of states. They do not have tax bases, but
are reliant on resource streams from tribal enterprises or from federal grants to fund their
preparedness efforts. This leaves them often unable to take advantage of federal
government pro forma approaches to national preparedness.
By comparison, the federal government is mechanistic in nature, meaning it relies
on formal structures and processes. Given the sheer number of states, tribal nations,
counties, municipalities, and nongovernmental stakeholders it must deal with, the federal
government must, of necessity, take pro forma approaches to national preparedness. Post
9/11 government approaches to integrate tribal nations into national preparedness have
included such initiatives as the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act and the FEMA Tribal
Declarations Pilot Guidance. These efforts, while laudatory, are pro forma in nature and
thus, have their limitations. Fundamentally, they require tribal nations to function as
states, thus perpetuating an unequal playing field for tribal nations.
Limitations of the Study
The narrative policy analysis approach of this study relied on a purposeful
sampling strategy. This produced a small group of study participants (21), which allowed
for in-depth exploration of issues related to tribal integration in national preparedness.
As a narrative policy analysis the study focused on the narratives (stories to be told) and
views of study participants. The study did not seek to identify discrepant cases; all
individual narratives were accepted into the collective narrative. The study did not seek
to determine empirical or factual merit concerning participant narratives on policy issues;
at times focused on the stories behind issues rather than the substance of the issues
themselves; did not seek to establish the primacy of conflicting views on the uncertainty,
complexity, and polarization on issues; tolerated multiple, often conflicting, narratives;
did not address the role of power and politics in the larger society; and did not account for
technical and legal uncertainties behind issues.
Access to study participants came primarily as a result of the researcher’s role
both as a national preparedness observer and full study participant. The researcher’s role
was fully disclosed to study participants. In some cases, study participants agreed to be
interviewed as a result of being informed of the researcher’s role as a fellow preparedness
practitioner. For this reason, issues of trustworthiness related to researcher bias, and
reactivity of participants to the researcher, cannot be completely ruled out. Potential
researcher bias was controlled for through triangulation in the use of standardized
interviews to generate high-value data for automated coding and systematic analysis; and
through the use of rich, thick descriptions drawn from participant interviews and
researcher observations.
Recommendations – The Metanarrative
Considerations for further study and policy development, drawn from the
conventional (federal government) and counter (tribal nation) narratives discussed in
Chapter 4, are presented below. They represent the metanarrative for tribal nation
integration in national preparedness.
1. Given the small size of the study population, and the great amount of
diversity across tribal nations, future studies should consider addressing larger study
populations.
2. Studies of the nature and quality of tribal nation preparedness partnerships
at the federal, state, and local levels should be conducted.
3. More in-depth studies of narrative policy analysis themes (uncertainty,
complexity, polarization) and tribal nation themes (people, resources, approaches)
relating to tribal nation integration in national preparedness should be conducted.
4. Legislative and policy means should be explored to give tribal nations
greater participation (i.e., a “seat at the table”) in policy development related to national
preparedness. Currently, as related by study participants, tribal nations are significantly
under-represented in federal policy development. The charter for the President’s Council
of Governors (The White House, 2010) should be modified to establish tribal nation
representation. Tribal nation representation in federal departments and agencies should
be expanded. Greater inclusion of Native Americans as federal tribal liaison officers
should be established.
5. Federal department roles in working with tribal nations should be further
clarified in the body of national response frameworks to eliminate conflicts, potential
duplication of efforts, and overwhelming imposition of requirements on tribal nations.
6. Legislative means should be explored to establish tax bases (or
equivalents) for tribal nations to reduce their reliance on enterprise revenue streams or
government grants for preparedness, and to “level the playing field” for them with
counties and states.
7. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act should be modified to provide
alternative flexible policies for disaster relief thresholds for tribal nations, to relieve them
from current pro forma approaches which require them to meet the same disaster relief
thresholds as states, and to put disaster relief within reach for them. Consideration should
be given to per-capita approaches based on the percent of effect on individual tribal
population and resource demographics; percent impact on revenue generating assets and
subsequent loss of revenue; regionalization of disaster declarations so that multiple tribal
nations could apply under a single disaster declaration; assignment of cultural criteria;
and percent impact on neighboring jurisdictions.
8. Legislative and policy means should be explored to establish a national
emergency management assistance compact for tribal nations. Consideration should be
given to leveraging tribal nongovernmental organizations for this purpose in a manner
similar to the way the National Emergency Management Association administers the
states’ Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) (EMAC, 2015).
9. Policy means should be explored to establish greater, more effective
integration of tribal nation needs and interests in the emergency support functions in the
National Response Framework.
Implications for Social Change
True positive social change will come from giving tribal nations a greater voice in
the form of a “seat at the table” in national preparedness. This carries with it both moral
and practical implications. Under social contract theory, the nation has a moral obligation
to tribal nations, to fulfill its commitments, and to integrate them into the social contract
on an equal basis with other social and ethnic groups. Under conflict theory, in the
current homeland security environment a practical imperative exists to fully integrate
tribal nations into the collective effort for national preparedness.
Conclusion
National interests and tribal nation interests are inextricably intertwined. Threats
and disasters, whether environmental or human in origination, are not limited by
boundaries. Gaps in preparedness are vulnerable to exploitation by hostile actors, posing
risk to all. Consequently, tribal nation interests in preparedness are synonymous with
national interests, and the concerns of all stakeholders – federal, tribal, state, local, and
nongovernmental.
