INTRODUCTION Major statewide Florida partisan

Major statewide Florida partisan elections in the 2010's were closely contested. President

Obama won Florida’s 29 electoral votes in 2012 by 74,309 votes, less than one percent of all

votes cast for President.1 Rick Scott was reelected governor in 2014 by 63,145 votes, only

slightly more than one percent of all votes cast for governor.2 In the same election in 2014,

Florida voters overwhelmingly approved the Water and Land Conservation Amendment,

commonly called Amendment One, by a margin of over 2.8 million votes,3 well in excess of the

60% approval threshold required for Florida constitutional amendments. Approximately 95% of

the voters who cast a ballot for governor in 2014 also cast a ballot on Amendment One. For

Amendment One to pass by such a wide margin, a significant number of Republican Rick Scott

voters voted in favor of Amendment One. Republican identifiers are becoming increasingly more

skeptical of environmental measures, and less supportive of environmental issues and spending.

Florida voters in 2014 did not demonstrate this same partisan split, at least with regard to

Amendment One. Three-fourths of voting Floridians approved required levels of spending on

land and water acquisitions, albeit from a specified fee source and not from general revenues or

new taxation. This specific environmental issue seemed to cross partisan and ideological lines, to

garner widespread, generalized support for environmental spending. This thesis will examine

general environmental attitudes in Florida; and, analyze the circumstances and conditions under

which partisan Republican voters in Florida will vote contrary to their party’s general

environmental issue opposition to support specific ballot proposals regarding environmental

programs. Simply put, why did over one million Republicans vote for the environment?4

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

The Moral and Ethical Roots of American Environmentalism

From the first moment early humans looked to the heavens, their feet remained planted

firmly in the environment. The environment gave the sustenance and materials for life; while at

the same time was the source of fear, threat, and danger. The human search for immediate

survival and eternal meaning inextricably linked the physical with the metaphysical; the heavens

with the earth. The environment was both an object of wonder, and a demon to be subdued.

In some Judeo-Christian teachings, wilderness became an evil, immoral place; the residence of

the devil and not of God. The duty of humans was to subdue and have dominion over nature.

This dominion theology influenced early Americans and early American environmental attitudes.

If wilderness were evil and corrupting of humans, God required the subjection of wilderness.

Applying this same religious belief system, pioneers moving west viewed wilderness as

something fearful to be subdued and to be converted from evil to a use that would beneficial to

humans (Nash 2001 [1967]: 15, 17, 31, 35, 262). As Americans turned to the arid west, as part of

this country’s manifest destiny to settle the entire continent, the same dichotomous view of the

environment colored their views of the desert. The desert was both an empty area to subdue, and

a specific environment with its own unique beauty (Worster 1985: 7073).

Different religious and philosophical thought provided a counterbalance to the dominion

and subjugation impulses. The wilderness and the environment were the source of awe, wonder,

and spiritual fulfillment. In Deist thought, God’s majesty and power were revealed directly in

wilderness, unaltered by cities and civilization. Romanticists were attracted to the wild, believing

happiness increased with less civilization. Transcendental thinkers such as Thoreau and Emerson

rejected the Calvinistic concept that humans were inherently sinful and would run amok in the

wilderness. To Thoreau, a person had to enter wilderness (an outward journey), to develop

inwardly. Individuals needed both wilderness and civilization to be fully human (Nash 2001

[1967], 46, 47, 86, 91, 93-94). The split in beliefs between a religious view (in the sense of

conservative domination dogma) of the environment and a more spiritual holistic view of the

environment remains observable in modern times. A view of the environment as a place to find

“god in nature” lessened the rates of adherence and support of traditional religious

denominations (Ferguson & Tamburello 2015: 12-15).

The conflicting views of environment as a resource to be managed and used, or the

environment to be set aside and protected, influenced early American environmentalism. The

conservationists were interested in the managed use of resources. Resources that ultimately must

be depleted, such as minerals, coal, and oil should be used (and ultimately depleted) in the most

efficient means possible to last the longest time possible. Renewable resources, such as timber

and water, required management to assure sufficient use for the present and availability in the

future. The conservationists represented a very utilitarian view of resources use (Pinchot 1947,

excerpted in Nash 1990: 73- 79). The second group, the preservationists, wanted portions of the

environment completely set aside and not used, free from human incursion or use. The human

presence in nature threatened nature, and therefore portions of nature should be protected from

humans (Marsh 1864, excerpted in Nash 1990: 40-44). The precious and irreplaceable properties

such as wilderness and the beauty of nature should be set aside and not used by anyone,

regardless of the value of resources located within the preserved lands (Leopold 1949, excerpted

in Nash 1990: 171-174). Pinchot and the conservationists, as part of the Progressive Era, with the

strong support of President Theodore Roosevelt, prevailed in federal governmental actions.

While the Wilderness Act did set aside lands for preservation, this preservationist legislation

passed only in 1964, and was applicable to select lands (Stegner 1960, excerpted in Nash 1990:

175-180; see also Nash headnote 1990:175). The American National Park system and National

Forest system conserved land for recreational use and availability, while permitting some

economic use. The Florida land purchase program, for which Amendment One provided specific

funding, followed this federal conservation land acquisition and use model for protection of

lands with an expressed utilitarian purpose. Florida conservation lands purchased must be

environmentally sensitive and important, but also must be available for recreational purposes.

These conflicting views of nature as evil or good, of the environment as a resource for

humans or as something of independent sacred worth, of humans possessing dominion or

exercising stewardship over the environment, of utilitarian conservation or radical preservation,

remained strong in American environmentalism. The American environmental dualism expanded

to consideration of the proper role of government in numerous policy matters, as a source of

political decisions, beliefs, and actions, will be explored in more detail in the following sections

of the research review. Dominion theology drives current conservative religious attitudes

regarding environmentalism. Economic interests and power elites call for opening of national

parks and wildernesses for even more resource utilization. Different groups view the

environment differently. The battle today may well be characterized as a fight between the

descendants of the managed conservations of the Progressive Era and those who for economic

and ideological reasons want immediate and total use of all available resources. The environment

for the environment’s sake, as an object of reverence and appreciation is all very well and good.

Americans generally “support” the environment. But such sentimentality and indeed long-range

concerns about environmental difficulties frequently yield to more immediate issues and

controversy, to period effects, and to the ideological dispute as to the proper role of government

regarding environmental matters challenging any attempt to drive political action based upon

environmental concerns.

Environmentalism in Florida

Florida has a long history of bipartisan environmental support. Florida’s tourism

economy and attractiveness to business and new residents depend on the environment. To protect

Florida’s important but fragile environment, Florida’s legislature has been willing to pass

comprehensive laws designed to protect Florida’s environment and manage its resources.

Legislation included the 1972 Water Resource Act to create five water management districts; and

gave those districts ad valorem tax authority in 1976 (MacManus, et al., 2011: 417). The Growth

Management Act in 1985 required local authorities (counties and municipalities) to create growth

management plans and established the Department of Community Affairs to approve and

regulate these plans. Developers paid impact fees; and any new development must assure

governmental authorities that infrastructures and services were in place to handle any increased

population or traffic (MacManus, et al., 2011: 412, 431-432). The Healthy Beaches Program was

enacted in 2002 (MacManus, et al., 2011: 421). Floridians may even choose from three different

wildlife automobile license plates; the proceeds from which go to protect these threatened or

endangered species (MacManus, et al., 2011: 427).

Preservation of sensitive and environmentally significant lands has been a 50-year

Florida legislative priority, beginning with the 1963 creation of the Land Acquisition Trust Fund

(deHaven-Smith 1988: 283). The legislature created the Environmental Endangered Lands

program, and voters approved a constitutional bond referendum to fund the program in 1992

(Farr & Brock 2006: 35-36). The legislature revised the land acquisitions legislation in 1980 by

enacting the “CARL” program, Conservation and Recreational Lands. First Preservation 2000

and then Florida Forever expanded and revised the CARL program. Preservation 2000 stabilized

the source for environmental land acquisition funding (Farr & Brock 2006: 42). The current

Florida Forever program, enacted in 2000 (Farr & Brock 2006: 35-38; MacManus, et al., 2011:

419), created a new governmental board for management, set performance measures, and

focused on urban and community parks in addition to more rural lands (Farr & Brock 2006: 38).

Florida created a trust fund for the acquisition and administration of environmentally sensitive

public lands. The lands were obtained for environmental reasons, but also for recreational

purposes, confirming a strong conservative management ethos in Florida regarding acquired

lands. Further land acquisition programs such as Save Our Coast and Save Our Rivers, and

specific bond funding for each program, targeted purchases of land in coastal and river areas

(Farr & Brock 2006: 36-27).

Republican governors as well as Democratic governors supported this environmental

legislation (Farr & Brock 2006: 35). Preservation 2000 was a program of Republican Governor

Bob Martinez (Farr & Brock 2006: 37). Even Governor Jeb Bush, an early leader in the

implementation of conservative right to life and defunding Planned Parenthood issues (which

remain strong conservative issues in the 2016 Republican presidential primary), took

proenvironmental positions notwithstanding his general social conservatism. The Florida Forever

program was a major initiative of Governor Bush (Farr & Brock 2006: 38). Current Republican

Governor Rick Scott seems to be breaking from this bipartisan governmental environmental

tradition in Florida. In his first term, Governor Scott championed legislation to weaken the

Growth Management Act and essentially eliminated the Department of Community Affairs

(MacManus, et al., 2011: 432-433). The current legislature and Governor Scott reduced funding

for the Florida Forever land trust in multiple legislative sessions (MacManus, et al., 2011: 419).

These cuts in funding for the land acquisition trust fund led to the 2014 Amendment One

constitutional ballot initiative to require that one-third of revenues from documentary stamps

charged to real estate buyers for all real property purchases be utilized by the Conservation and

Recreation Lands Trust Fund.

Environmentalism as a Generalized American Belief

Events of the 1960s and 1970s, such as the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring

in 1962 and Earth Day 1970, heralded the start of the modern American environmental

movement. Early research established widespread environmental support in many groups, often

only weakly associated with demographic and political variables. By the end of the 1980’s,

multiple public opinion studies summarized by Dunlap (1991) showed generalized support for

environmental positions. Polling revealed general support for increasing government spending on

the environment (71%), increasing governmental regulation of the environment (65%),

increasing environmental protection regardless of the cost (75%), and a general belief that

environmental regulation has not gone far enough to protect the environment (54%) (Dunlap

1991: 10, 12). With opposition to these various propositions at only 4% to 16%, the environment

became essentially a consensus issue in American politics (Dunlap 1991: 12). The increased

belief that environmental conditions locally and globally were declining from increasing threats

to health and human life not simply quality of life matters, and a belief that only limited efforts

had been made in improving the environment, encouraged environmental support (Dunlap 1991:

14-15). This increasing environmental support could also have been in response to the perceived

anti-environmentalist of the Reagan Administration (Dunlap 1991: 1314). Notwithstanding the

anti-environmentalism of the Reagan Administration, a strongly proenvironmental electorate

reelected President Reagan in the second largest electoral landslide in history. Environmental

position was not important in vote choice (46% said it made no difference). For respondents who

indicated that candidate environmental positions made a difference in individual voting choice,

the environment usually was not an important factor in voting choice (Dunlap 1991: 31-32).

Guber (2003) also finds national public opinion strongly “pro-environment.” Floridians

share that generalized environmental support (MacManus, et al., 2011: 414-415). Guber found

large majorities state concern for a wide range of specific environmental issues such as global

warming or species eradication. Generalized support and future concerns regarding the

environment did not translate to current voting action (Guber 2003). There was no significant

support for an environmental “Green” party in the United States. Environmental concerns were

viewed as something that could be “put off” until the future. To open ended “what’s the most

important issue” or “what’s the worse problem” questions, for present concerns, responses

regarding the environment were low. Environmental policy did not reach the level of issue

salience significant to become a significant determinative factor in a voting choice in these

studies. However, environmental harms were the highest expressed concern for the future (Guber

2003; Yeager, et al., 2011: 2, 21; Daniels, et al., 2012: 462, 467).

Even in the heady days of environmental awareness following Earth Day, other factors

were expected to cause ebbs and flows in levels of environmental support (Downs 1972). When

policy options or potential costs for environmental programs were considered with regard to

specific environmental concerns, the high levels of generalized environmental support decreased

significantly. Factors such as support for tax cutting, concerns about government regulation, and

the costs of implementing environmental protection significantly reduce public support for a

specific environmental policy proposal (Guber 2003). When considered in relation to other

issues, such as crime or economic issues, environmental concerns were less salient than other

issues. Even before the partisan divide on environmental issues became pronounced, as discussed

below, the generalized environmental support lessened when actual policy choices are presented

(Guber 2003; Fisher, et al. 2013; Downs 1972). Period effects, including changes in economic

conditions or security concerns, also affected the level of support for environmental issues

(Scruggs & Benegal 2012; Daniels, et al., 2012: 470). During times of general economic well

being, there may be increased support for governmental expenditures for environmental

protection. Initial enthusiasm for environmental concerns after Earth Day 1970, including public

opinion polling showing environmental quality as the top voter priority, lessened significantly as

a result of the 1974 energy crisis and oil embargo (Lake 1983). Intensity of environmental

support decreased from 2000 to 2006, as a result of the intervening issue salience of the 9/11

terrorist events and subsequent war in Iraq (McCright and Dunlap 2008). Varied levels of media

concern over time affected the salience of an issue at any particular time. Increased media

coverage of an environmental issue, such as pollution, increased the level of support for spending

on environmental issues (Elliot et al., 1995). Conservative media outlets may encourage

conservative political action including the rise of Tea Party support (Williamson, et al. 2011:

2930). Tea Party support is discussed below as one factor in the increasing anti-

environmentalism in the Republican Party. Considerations of policy options and costs, salience

of other issues, period effects, and media coverage affected the levels of environmental support.

Environmentalism therefore may be described more properly as a consensus social movement

(characterized by general societal acceptance, but with other more immediate concerns

determining political actions such as voting), with the possibility of personal and political action,

rather than an ideology (which would be a compelling basis for actions such as voting) (Meyer

and Staggenborg, 1996: 1629, 1633; McCright and Dunlap 2008).

Environmental concern and action may also indicate a postmaterialistic worldview.

Postmaterialism posits that once material and security needs were met for an individual and a

country in general, respondents would be socialized in a materially secure country and develop a

worldview emphasizing quality of life issues. Inglehart created an initial scale based on four

questions (respondents were asked to chose national goals of two of four possible responses: (1)

maintain national order (2) more input into governmental action (3) protect free speech or (4)

maintain a high rate of economic growth); and subsequently expanded the question sets to create

a materialism/postmaterialism scale from a series of four option questions (Inglehart &

Abramson 1999). Environmentalism indicated a concern with the quality of life, and therefore

was more likely a trait of postmaterialists (Inglehart 1995; Kidd & Lee 1997, 5-6, 8-9 Table 1

and Table 2). Other researchers have found strong environmental support in poor economic

countries as well as in wealthier more industrialized countries (Dunlap & York 2008, 542, 550),

calling into question the link between postmaterial values and environmental support.

Even widespread consensus movements, such as environmentalism, create the conditions

for a countermovement to arise. Conservative supporters of the existing political and economic

power and social structures were likely to oppose environmental actions (McCright and Dunlap

2013: 215, 223; Dunlap and Van Liere 1984: 1015). The political and economic elites took

actions to protect the dominant power structure (McCright & Dunlap 2010), including funding

conservative think tanks to attack the science of environmental issues such as global warming, to

undermine the need for policy and lifestyle changes necessary to mitigate and adapt to climatic

change and other environmental issues (Jacques, et al. 2008; McCright & Dunlap 2012, 215).

These political and ideological changes have been the underpinnings for the countermovement of

the anti-environmentalists (Meyers and Staggenborg, 1996: 1633). This countermovement then

promoted the rise of anti-environmentalism as an immediate political force, lessening the

generalized pro-environmental attitude of American respondents. The results found by both

Dunlap (1991) and Guber (2003) did not anticipate the effects of this anti-environmental

countermovement.

Partisanship and American Environmentalism

Partisan identification has emerged in recent research as the strongest explanation for

variance in levels of environmental support. Ideology, rather than party identification, previously

explained variance in environmental support in a megastudy of environmental research. Liberal

ideology was strongly associated with environmental support, while party identification was at

best weakly associated (Dunlap 1980: 191-192). An early study found that environmental voters

indeed trended conservative and Republican in California (Lake 1983). Over the past ten years,

the previous consensus found on environmental support which cut across other voting cleavages

such as party identification and ideology (Guber 2003; Guber 2001b; Dunlap 1991) has given

way to sharp partisan divides on support for environmental propositions (Dunlap & McCright

2008; Uyeki & Holland 2000). Most recent studies have found a robust relationship between

Democratic identification and strong environmental support (Uyeki & Holland 2000). Partisan

identification is now the strongest explanatory variable in determining environmental support

(Coan & Holman 2008). Guber’s finding of generalized support (2003) and her statement that no

candidate will come out against environmental concerns (2001: 466) may no longer be true in

this more highly charged and divided political milieu with marked partisan differences on

environmental issues and with an active countermovement attempting to lessen consensus

attitudes regarding the environment.

Public opinion polling for 30 years showed increasing levels of belief in scientific

consensus, human causes for climate changes, and feeling personally “very worried” about

climate change (consistent with the findings of Dunlap 1991), until 2008, when all levels of

public support for environmental positions dropped precipitously (Scruggs & Benegal 2012).

Gaps in level of support for environmental beliefs, driven by party identification, have emerged

for the belief that global warming is already happening (Democrats support this proposition by

34 points more than Republicans), the belief that media coverage of global warning is

exaggerated (Republicans support this proposition by 42 points more than Democrats), whether

there is a consensus among scientists regarding the causes of climate change (Democrats support

this proposition by 24 points more than Republicans), and whether there are human causes for

climate change (Democrats support this proposition by 32 points more than Republicans)

(Dunlap & McCright 2008).

Guber’s most recent research indicated that the previous generalized consensus regarding

environment is lessening. Studying Gallop poll results in ten-year intervals (for years 1990, 2000,

and 2010), Guber found that partisan differences existed on environmental beliefs, including the

human causation effects on global warming, air pollution, loss of tropical rain forest, and other

environmental issues. Republicans, Democrats, and Independents expressed similar levels of

concern regarding the six environmental issues in 1990, but an interparty divide in levels of

support emerged in 2000 and grew larger in 2010 (2013: 103 Figure 2, 103, 104).

The partisan divide on environmental issues was larger than on other economic and policy issues

(Guber 2013: 95, 105, 106 Figure 3). General concern regarding the environment was declining,

perhaps as an issue period effect (Guber 2013: 100 Figure 1, 101; cf. Downs 1972). Guber’s OLS

multivariate regression of levels of environmental support showed that partisanship and ideology

were significant in 2000 and 2010. Demographic controls generally were not significant in 1990

and 2000; but by 2010, statistically significant increased levels of environmental support

expressed by non-whites existed; with decreased levels of environmental support stated by male

and higher income respondents (Guber 2013: 104 Table 1). Environmental support that previous

cut across other cleavages appeared increasingly identified with certain groups. This divide will

lessen the ability to achieve consensus on environmental values, reducing the previously

generalized “pro-environmental” attitudes of the American public (Guber 2013: 108).

Partisan differences have emerged in other aspects of political behavior, campaign

activities, and elite actions. Although not studying environmental voting or activism, per se,

Dolan demonstrated the identification of environmental policy with party choice and ideology

(2005). For both female and male Democratic candidates, the environment was the fifth issue

mentioned on campaign websites. Environmental issues were not listed for either male or female

Republican candidates. Gender alone does not explain the difference as female candidates acted

like male candidates in the same party. The party identification and ideology of the candidate

determined whether or not the candidate took a pro-environmental stance. Presumably, the

Democratic candidate would express a general policy preference of “protecting the environment”

and the Republican candidate would express a general policy preference “against government

regulation” and to avoid costs to businesses and taxpayers for such regulations. Voters expected

the Democratic candidate to mention environmental issues. Candidates listed environmental

issues to attract those voters who ideological positioning includes environmental policy as part of

their ideology (Dolan 2005). Elite partisan differences on environmental issues have long

appeared. Northern Democratic members of the 92nd Congress supported roll-call environmental

measures; northern Republican members in the same Congress did not. Party identification, not

regional differences, explained environmental support (Dunlap and Allen 1976).

It may, however, be too simplistic to view the partisan divide on environmental attitudes

and issues as strictly a Democratic versus Republican divide. The emergence of strong Tea Party

influence within the Republican Party (Williamson, et al., 2011), based both upon a deep seated

mistrust of governmental action and the intentional conservative think tank attacks on science,

especially climate science (Jacques, et al., 2008: 356, 357), have polarized support regarding

environmental issues. Tea party members are among the most conservative Republicans

(Skocpol & Williamson 2012; Williamson, et al., 2011). Compared to non-Tea Party supporters,

those with a favorable opinion of the Tea Party voted overwhelming Republican even when

generally distrustful of the Republican Party as being too cooperative with Democrats (and

especially President Obama); strongly identified themselves as conservative; and were more

likely to support the 2011 government shutdown than non-Tea Party Republicans or

Independents (Skocpol & Williamson 2012: 27-28). Tea Party Republicans expressed higher and

more vocal levels of mistrust of Obama. Ninety-one percent of Tea Party members expressed an

unfavorable opinion of President Obama, compared with 68% of non-Tea Party Republicans

(Skocpol & Williamson 2012: 210 n25). A split of opinion within the Republican Party,

therefore, may drive the difference in environmental support between Democratic and

Republican identifiers.

The differences between Tea Party Republicans and non-Tea Party Republicans may

explain a significant portion of the variance in levels of support for environmental concerns

between Republicans and Democrats (Hamilton & Saito 2015). Partisan identification has been

measured as a three point self-identification scale (Democrat, Republican, Independent), or on a

seven point scale derived from a follow up question designed to develop the strength of partisan

identification (strong or weak identifier) and the partisan leaning of respondents initially

selfidentifying as “independent” (lean Democrat, lean Republican). The seven point scale has

been called more reliable, as “leaner” independents often behave similar to strong identifiers, and

that the changes in partisan identification are better understood as short-term changes in intensity

responding to period events rather than long-term changes in actual partisan identification

(Magelby, et al., 2011; Rice & Hilton 1996). Hamilton & Saito considered the three-point

partisan identification scale as reliable as the seven-point scale for predicting environmental

support (2015: 213). Hamilton & Saito argue, however, that a four-point partisan identification

scale may be more accurate than the traditional three-point partisan identification scale to explain

variances in environmental support. Tea Party supporters are primarily Republican identifiers

(Hamilton & Saito 2015: 223) and among the most conservative Republicans (Williamson, et al.,

2011: 26-27). Among Republican identifier respondents, Tea Party identifiers have lower levels

of support for climate change questions, while non-Tea Party Republicans have support levels

similar to Independents on most environmental issues. Republicans are further from Tea Party

Republicans than Republicans are from Independents on policy positions (Hamilton & Saito

2015: 219, 221, 224). Tea Party support within the Republican Party therefore performed as a

fourth partisan identification explaining some of the variance in environmental responses

between Democratic identifiers and Republican identifiers (Hamilton & Saito 2015: 224).

Florida Tea Party supporters also may differ with non-Tea Party Florida Republicans in

respect to environmental attitudes. Rick Scott was elected with Tea Party support (Skocpol &

Williamson 2012:168, 192; Williamson, et al., 2011: 34-35). In Florida polling conducted in 2011

and 2014 [not the part of any particular study], very conservative respondents in Florida were

more likely to approve of Scott, and express the willingness to vote for him in 2011 and in

2014 than levels expressed by somewhat less conservative respondents. [The 2011 results:

approval: 46% somewhat conservative, 65% very conservative; vote again: 56% somewhat

conservative, 81% very conservative. The approval gap between somewhat conservative and

very conservative narrowed in September 2014 (63% and 83%) and even narrower in November

2014 at election time when all Republicans would be expected to express support for the party

nominee (64% and 75%).] Differences regarding disapproval of President Obama expressed

within conservatism were not as pronounced as differences regarding Governor Scott, but still

observable. [The 2011 results: somewhat conservative 74% disapproval, very conservative 84%

disapproval; September 2014: 79% and 94%; November 2014: 80% and 85%.] (Public Policy

Polling, March 29, 2011; Public Policy Polling, September 9, 2014; Public Policy Polling,

November 2, 2014). While being “very conservative” or viewing President Obama unfavorably

do not measure directly Tea Party approval, as Tea Party supporters are among the most

conservative Republicans and most strongest opponents of President Obama (Skocpol &

Williamson 2012; Williamson, et al., 2011), the observable differences in approval levels for

Governor Scott and President Obama between somewhat conservative and very conservative

Floridians hinted at possible Tea Party divisions within the Republican Party in Florida. Further

empirical studies should be undertaken to determine if this observable difference in attitudes is

driven by differences in levels of Tea Party approval.

Question framing may also contribute to the partisan divide in environmental attitudes.

Schuldt, et al., used the 2009 American Life Panel randomized internet survey, alternating the

climatic question to reference that the temperature was “going up” with resulting global warming

with a question referencing that temperature was “changing” resulting in climate change (2001,

118). When the issue was categorized as “climate change” instead of “global warming,” the

partisan divide on whether or not the phenomenon existed decreased from 42.9% for “global

warming” to 26.2% for “climate change” (Schuldt, et al., 2011: 120). This decrease in the

partisan divide resulted from the unacceptability of the term “global warming” to Republicans

(44.0% of Republicans believed “global warming” is real compared to 60.2% who believed

“climate change” is occurring). Independents had observable slightly lower percentages of

support than Democrats, but no statistically significant variance in responses regardless of the

question phrasing (Schuldt, et al., 2011: 122). This difference in the observable divide between

Republicans and Democrats depending on question wording was driven by the conservative

think tank attacks on global warming and its science discussed above. Conservative think tanks

attack the phrase global warming, making that term an anathema to Republicans (Schuldt, et al.,

2011: 117; cf. Jacques, et al., 2008). Global warming also implied human causation requiring

adaptive and mitigation responses opposed by economic elites. Climate change seemed to be a

natural phenomenon and therefore not threatening to the elites, as policy changes could not affect

what is caused naturally (McCright & Dunlap 2010: 120). Villar and Krosnick similarly found

that Independents considered “climate change” and “global warming” equally seriously,

Republicans perceived “climate change” as more serious than “global warming,” and Democrats

believed “global warming” was more serious than “climate change” (2011: 4-5).

Regardless of the cause of the observable and measurable difference in Democratic and

Republican attitudes regarding the environment, the question remained as to whether these

differences in environmental support were associated with vote choice. In presidential elections,

respondents perceived Democratic Party policies as better able to care for the environment

(Guber 2003). Thirty-one percent of Republicans indicated that the Democratic Party was better

able to handle environmental matters. However, identification of the Democratic Party as the

“pro” environmental party did not cause any shift of Republicans voting for Democrats,

notwithstanding strong environmental concern. This result was consistent with findings that the

intensity and depth of environmental support, partisan identification, more pressing immediate

issues, and beliefs regarding the role of government, influence national elections (Guber 2003).

Guber studied the 1996 presidential election, and found that environmental issues did not

influence presidential voting choice because of: (1) the low salience of environmental issues; (2)

no perceived differences between the candidates on the environment in 1996; and (3) the

generalized environment support which cuts across other voting cleavages such as party

identification and ideology (Guber 2001b). Guber’s (2001b) methodology and findings have

been challenged (Davis & Wurth 2003).

Guber measured environmental support (2001b) using the 7-point Likert scale question

regarding environment versus jobs as her independent variable. Respondents selected whether

the environment or the economy were more important, or took a position somewhere in between.

Davis & Wurth used a question of “should governmental spending on the environment

increase/decrease/remain the same” as the independent variable (Davis & Wurth 2003). Davis &

Wurth, unlike Guber (2001b), found that voters in the 1996 presidential election did consider the

candidates’ environmental positions in evaluating the candidate and in making presidential vote

choice. Davis & Wurth found that responses regarding levels of governmental environmental

spending were (a) significant in predicting the feeling thermometer evaluations of candidates;

and (b) significant (.01 level) in predicting presidential votes (2003). Using a different

independent variable developed the concept of “buying” a clean environment, not measuring

simply the trade-off between environment and jobs as mutually exclusive positions.

Expanding presidential vote choice analysis beyond just the 1996 presidential election

studied by Guber (2001b) and Davis & Wurth (2003), Davis, et al., studied presidential elections

from 1984 to 2000 (2008: 526). Davis, et al., also used the “spending on environment” question

as their independent variable (2008: 530) with the candidate feeling thermometer as the

dependent variable. Support for increased environmental spending was statistically associated

with a higher rating for the Democratic candidate in all five elections. For Republican candidate

ratings, the rating for George H.W. Bush in 1988 was positive, but for the other four Republican

candidates, those who supported environmental spending rated the Republican candidate lower

(Davis, et al., 2008: 531). With vote choice as the dependent variable, environmental positions

were statistically significant in vote choice in four of five elections - all elections studied except

2000 (Davis, et al., 2008: 534). In 2000, environmental spending opinions were significant in

candidate evaluation, but not in voting choice. (Davis, et al., 2008: 534) Davis, et al., found what

Guber (2001b) did not: the ability to discern a difference between candidates on environment, the

importance of the environment as an issue, and a belief that a candidate supported or opposed

environmental spending thereby explaining the variance in the impact of environmental positions

on presidential voting (Davis, et al., 2008: 539). As expected, partisanship and, to a lesser degree

ideology, explained a substantial portion of the variance in vote choice. The environmental

spending issue, however, was the third most explanatory issue affecting voting decisions, after

economics and abortion (Davis, et al., 2008: 532, 540). Davis, et al., concluded that there was in

fact an environmental vote (2008: 541). The environmental vote was not a separate Green Party,

but entrenched at least as to some issues within the Democratic Party.

The Effect of Demographics – Environmentalism by Subgroup

The findings regarding the effects of demographic variables such as age, race, income,

education, and gender have been mixed. Most studies finding environmental attitude association

with various respondent characteristics also found a strong association with ideology or partisan

identification, making references to ideology and party identification (discussed in more detail in

the section above) unavoidable when discussing the demographic variables. Many studies

include a variety of demographic aspects as control variables, often finding one or more

demographic variables significantly associated with environmentalism, while similar studies with

similar demographic variables find other characteristics significant. Variables are discussed

individually, to the extent possible. Exploration of the literature regarding demographic variables

often necessitates discussion of multiple variables within the study as that study is discussed,

rather than discussing each variable one by one.

Dunlap (1980) provided an early theoretical framework as to why a particular

demographic variable may be significant in explaining levels of environmental support:

x Younger respondents are more environmentally supportive either as being less invested

in the economic system, or as being socialized during times of increased

environmental awareness of concern. Age should therefore be inversely related to

environmental support.

x Education, income, and occupation prestige, as indicators of higher social classes,

should be positively associated with environmental support; either from increased

knowledge and interest, or increased time and resources for participation; essentially

a Postmaterialist view of environmentalism.

x Residence of the respondent, with urban persons more environmentally concerned

having more direct exposure to environmental hazard, and rural residents less

environmentally supportive being dependent for personal livelihood on the ability to

use environmental resources without regulation for agriculture, and in the extractive

industries of mining and timber.

x Party Identification and ideology, with Democrats and liberals being more

environmentally supportive.

x Gender. Males could be more environmentally supportive having the education and

resources to be politically active. Alternatively, men could be concerned about jobs

and economic growth, and therefore less environmentally supportive. [Remember,

this is research from before 1980!]

(Summary of literature review; Dunlap 1980: 182-186, theory organization by Dunlap). In his

synthesis and review of previous literature, Dunlap found general but not complete support for

the age thesis, some support for increased education levels increasing pro-environmental

attitudes, contradictory findings regarding income, only moderate support for occupational

prestige, residence most associated with localized environmental concerns, inconclusive

evidence on gender, only a modest and weak correlation for party identification, and strong

support for ideological differences in environmental support (Dunlap 1980: 189-192,

summarized in Table 1: 186-187). The age thesis, part of the Postmaterial thesis regarding

education, and ideology seemed supported by the research reviewed by Dunlap (1980) with only

limited support at best for the other theories.

The studies finding generalized environmental support, such as Guber (2003),

hypothesized that certain variables would affect environmental support. However, age, income,

education and race were not significant in explaining the variance in levels of support for the

environment. All groups seemed to be favorable to environmental concerns. Only partisanship

and ideology seemed to have significance, but only explained a limited amount of variance in

levels of environmental support. Voters have partisan and ideological differences of views of

government activism, not any real difference in the underlying concern for environment. Black

and poor respondents may be slightly more aware of environmental impacts; but performed

environmentally related participatory actions less frequently. Therefore, it seemed that

environmental concern may be not be elitist, but the ability to take action (as in multiple policies

realms) may be elitist (Guber 2003).

Other studies of the impact of demographic variables regarding variance in levels of

environmental support and political choices have provided mixed results. Van Liere and Dunlap

(1980), for example, found a moderate association between age, education, and political ideology

with environmental concern. Several other studies, however, have not found a strong partisan

correlation, or significant correlations with demographic attributes. Utilizing results from a 1974

poll of 548 respondents in Wisconsin, Buttel and Finn (1978) did find some positive correlation

between identification as a Democrat and support for environmental policy; and a negative

correlation for support for environment from Republicans. The demographic variables were not

significant.

Early studies showed no gender differences in environmental concern and support for

environmental politics (van Liere and Dunlap 1980). Theories developed for gender differences

on environmental support include (1) simple gender socialization, with women raised to be

concerned and caregivers; (2) a more complex gender socialization based upon knowledge, with

women having less scientific knowledge and confidence in scientific ability than men, and

therefore perceived more risk; or (3) the social roles of women (McCright 2010: 68-72).

Utilizing annual Gallop Polls taken each March in 2001-2008, inclusive, McCright created two

dependent variables (an additive scale of three scientific knowledge questions and an additive

scale of three questions regarding concern about climate change). Using gender as the

independent variable, and controlling for ideology, party identification, education, age, race, and

annual income (2010: 73, 75), McCright found that women had more actual knowledge than

men, while men THINK they have more knowledge; and women expressed higher concern

regarding the environment than expressed by men. There was a small but statistically significant

difference regarding climate change concern between the genders at the .001 level. Increased

knowledge was also associated with education, being liberal, and Democratic Party

identification. Increasing age and being black were negatively associated with knowledge.

Religiosity was negatively associated with knowledge (.05 confidence) but not significant

regarding concern about the environment (McCright 2010: 76, 77, 81). McCright rejected the

extended socialization theory because of increased knowledge, and found social role variables

(employment, parenthood, and/or homemaker) did not reach statistical significance in regressions

with party identification, ideology, knowledge, age, race, and education. McCright therefore

found support only for the simple socialization theory that women were more caring (concerned)

and therefore expressed higher levels of environmental support. Feminist theory posited that

gender differences in levels of environmental support may not be based on biological or

socialization aspects of gender, but rather on whether a respondent’s ideology was influenced by

a critique against the dominate portions of society (Somma & Tolleson-Reinhart 1997: 162163).

Both women and the environment were considered to be in subjugation to the dominant social

and power elites, who tended to be male. Any increased difference in levels of environmental

support by women compared to men therefore resulted because more women than men expressed

a feminist worldview.

Racial disparity in environmental attitudes may result from (a) a “hierarchy of needs” in

the Maslow understanding, in which poor and minorities have more immediate survival needs,

and do not have the time or resources to support less immediate concerns such as

environmentalism; or (b) “environmental deprivation” in which those most immediately affected

by environmental hazards have higher levels of environmental concern while wealthier (and

white) persons could live away from immediate impacts and would be more concerned with long

range environmental concerns (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 435). The Maslow hierarchy underlies the

Postmaterialism theory that people in more highly industrialized and wealthier societies removed

from the immediate survival struggle focus on matters considered “postmaterial” such as

environmentalism (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 426).

In the General Social Survey (GSS) data from 1973 to 1990, race was not significant in

predicting environmental concern (Jones & Dunlap 1992). Blacks and whites were focused upon

different environmental concerns (Mohai & Bryant 1998). Baldassare and Katz (1992) indicated

that a perception of environmental threat to the respondent was a more likely predictor of support

for environmental actions (such as recycling and driving less) than party identification, or the

demographic factors of age, gender, education or income. General concern levels between white

and blacks are often similar (Mohai 1990). Whittaker, et al., used 21 years of survey data (1980

through 2000, inclusive) from California Field Polls to determine differences in racial and ethnic

groups to six environmental issues (2005: 439). The six issues were: (1) Are you extremely

concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned or not concerned at all regarding water

pollution; (2) levels of concern of protecting the state’s environment; (3) levels of concern

regarding toxic waste; (4) should spending be increased, remain the same, or decreased for

environmental spending: (5) whether the respondent self identified as an “environmentalist;” and

(6) support or opposition to offshore drilling (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 440 Table 1). On the

concern for water pollution, protecting the state, and toxic waste questions, Latino concern

started low and increased over time. (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 442-443). African Americans

showed similar levels of support as whites, except African Americans showed higher levels of

support for environmental spending. (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 444) Party identification, ideology,

and gender were statistically significant for all six environmental support measures (Whittaker, et

al., 2005: 445, 443 Table 2). In summary, white respondents tended to be trending away from

environmental support, while minority support was increasing over time. The high level of

minority concern argued against the hierarchy of needs and Postmaterial theories; with the

highest levels of minority support on the direct matters such as toxic waste. There was a decline

in all groups in self-identification as environmentalist perhaps because of the negative attacks on

environmentalism (Whittaker, et al., 2005: 445-446). A later study indicated that race also was

correlated to perception of environmental threat, with African Americans perceiving more

environmental threat when other variables are controlled (Jones and Rainey 2006).

Environmental support among women and minorities may be a reflection of increased

perception of risk of harm from environmental factors experienced by minorities and women; or

stated another way, the significantly lower level of perceived risk among while males, the “white

male effect” (Satterfield, et al., 2004; Kalof, L., et al., 2002; Flynn, et al., 1994). Baldassare and

Katz find that young respondents, women, liberals, and Democrats perceived a higher threat of

environmental harm. These are the usual demographic groups associated with a higher concern

for environmental issues (1992). The perception of environmental threat to the respondent

(Baldassare & Katz 1992) may be a result of environmental injustice issues, such as the

disproportionate placement of environmental risks in minority communities (Mohai, et al., 2009:

405, 406-7, 410, 422; Satterfield, et al., 2004: 116). Different theories have been developed for

the reasons for disparate impacts in minority neighborhoods (Jones & Jacques 2014: 418-419;

see also Mohai, et al., 2009 and Whittaker, et al., 2005: 435, 438, for the history of the

environmental justice movement). Some studies asserted that non-minorities had more economic

resources, were more mobile, and more likely to move from locations with environmental

impacts (Pulido 2000), while other studies indicated that the environmental harms were placed in

existing minority neighborhoods so that the disparate impact resulted from the initial siting

decision (Chakraberty 2012: 165, 178, 180; Mohai, et al., 2009: 417; Penderhughes 1996: 235-7,

243; Ringquist 1997: 818; Pollock & Vittas 1995: 303; Ringquist 2005: 224, 233, 235, 241;

Pastor, et al., 2001). The initial siting of environmental harms into minority neighborhoods

increased, as environmental harms become more known (Mohai, et al., 2009: 413). Such

placement led to institutionalized racism (Schlosberg 2013: 39). Minorities in Florida were also

exposed to the environmental risk from environmental harm siting in minority neighborhoods.

(Chakraberty 2012: 165, 178, 180; Pollock & Vittas 1995: 303)

In the Satterfield, et al., study, white males consistently showed lower risk assessments

from 19 activities. White women and non-white males conveyed almost identical increased risk

assessment, with the highest levels of risk assessment among non-white women (except for

assessment of motor vehicle risk in which non-white female risk assessment was identical to that

of white males) (2004: 118-119; 118: Figure 1). McCright & Dunlap (2012: 222) found lower

risk concern expressed by conservative white males across eight environmental issues.

Subjective feelings of discrimination and the personal evaluation of environmental justice issues

also influenced assessment of risk, so that white males who perceived themselves as vulnerable

and highly concerned with environmental justice, perceived the risks similarly to other groups

(Satterfield, et al., 2004: 127-128, 127: Table IV, Table V). While gender and race remain

significant explanatory variables in assessment of environmental risk, some portion of the “white

male effect” may be explained because white males saw themselves less at risk (as part of the

dominant social structure of which neither minorities nor women are a part) and may live in less

stressed areas. Conservative white males drive the white male effect (McCright & Dunlap 2011).

White males who are not conservative stated similar attitudes as did non-white males across

various environmental issues. Overall, the conservative white males were less supportive of the

environment (McCright & Dunlap 2012: 220-221). Age, income, fulltime employment, and

parenthood were not statistically significant (McCright & Dunlap 2012: 221). Again, attitudes

regarding the role of environment in response to environmental concerns affected levels of

environmental support. Accepting that the environmental risk of climate change existed, for

example, meant accepting government regulation and threatened the conservative white male’s

status in the power and elite structure (McCright & Dunlap 2012: 212). Conservative white

males also made up a significant portion of the Tea Party identifiers (Williamson, et al., 2011:

27), potentially driving a significant portion of the Tea Party supporters’ anti-environmental

attitudes.

Age seems mixed in determining environmental attitudes. Some studies found that

increasing age increased environmental support because of lower taxable income (and therefore

less personal cost to achieve the generalized good of an improved environment or with less cost

to obtain the environmental good from private purchase) and increased perception of health and

other risks from environmental threat (Khan 2002). Other studies find that younger respondents

were socialized with a general Postmaterialistic outlook after the modern environmental

movement emerged; and therefore expressed higher levels of support for environmental matters

(Inglehart 1981; Daniels, et al., 2012: 471).

Increased education was weakly correlated with environment support. Education effects

on environmental beliefs may vary by partisan identification (Guber 2013). Gallop respondents

with little information regarding global warming shared similar low levels of concern regarding

global warming regardless of party identification. Obtaining information regarding global

warming greatly increased concern about global warming for Democrats and somewhat for

Independents; but being “well informed” about global warming decreased concern by

Republicans (Guber 2013: 107 Figure 4). Guber suggested that the increased information

included partisan cues regarding the different party positions on global warming (2013: 106).

Therefore, this information may well increase the awareness of Democrats that they should be

concerned about global warming and of Republicans that environmental concern would lead to

unpalatable governmental regulation. Awareness both increased support among those who were

ideologically predisposed for environmental concern, and triggered the opposition to

environmental issues among those ideologically predisposed to oppose environmental measures,

especially those from the government. [For every movement there is a countermovement!]

Education was an important factor in causing the Tea Party attitudinal split within the Republican

Party (discussed above), with higher levels of education tending to decrease Tea Party support

and increase environmental support (Hamilton & Saito 2015: 220-221, 222; Hamilton 2012).

Religious preferences also affected environmental voting. Conservative Christian

ideology, religious tradition, and active participation in religious practices all have strong

bivariant negative correlation to support for environmental policy. In a multivariate analysis,

possessing conservative religious beliefs was the strongest predictor of anti-environmental policy

support (Guth, et al, 1995). Religion and theological beliefs have long influenced outlooks

regarding the environment. Different religious beliefs influenced views of whether the

environment should be feared, subdued, and conquered as the residence of evil and the devil (a

dominion over nature theology, which influenced early Puritan views of nature, for example)

(Nash [1967] 2001, p. 15, 17, 31, 35, 262); or appreciated both for human recreation and for its

own beauty reflecting God’s creation (the spiritual basis for efforts to establish National Parks

and set aside wilderness, for example) (Nash [1967] 2001, p. 46, 88, 91, 194-95, 197). Religious

influences upon environmental policy decisions have traditionally been theorized as negative,

with a view of human dominion over nature and the belief in end times leading to opposition to

environmental concerns (White 1967; Hand & van Liere 1984; Sherkat and Ellison 2007, p. 71;

Barker and Bearce 2013, p. 268). The so called “Lynn White Thesis,” that conservative religious

beliefs have a negative impact on environmental support, has been challenged as not fully

descriptive of the impact of religion on environmental support (Djupe & Hunt 2009). Evangelical

anti-environmentalism may be weakening, especially among younger evangelicals (Djupe &

Gwiasda 2010). Other theological impulses may actually lead to environmental concern and

support (Kearns 1996). Individuals with liberal theological views use stewardship theology to

increase environmental support (Mockabee, et al. 2012). Congregational make up may also

impact the effect of religious beliefs on environmental support (Djupe & Olson 2010).

Place of residence may affect levels of environmental support. The rural/urban split in

political opinions, so significant in other areas (McKee 2008; Bishop & Cushing 2008), may also

appear regarding support of environmental ballot initiatives (Alm & Witt, 1995). Residents of

urban counties supported environmental ballot measures at a higher level as compared to rural

counties (Lowe & Pinhey 1982). Possible explanations of the variance in environmental

responses between urban and rural respondents included that urban voters observed the effects of

environmental changes (the differential exposure theory), while rural voters saw the land as

something to exploit and develop or were more likely employed in extractive mining or

agricultural activities (extractive theory) (Blankenau, et al., 2008: 58; van Liere & Dunlap 1980).

Other studies found variances in urban versus rural environmental support but find other

demographic factors more significant in explaining variances in levels of environmental support

(Salka 2003).

Environmentalism is not limited to blue states. Studying Nebraska, with a strong

Republican Party and few Democratic office holders, Blankenau, et al., utilizing the telephonic-

conducted 2003 Nebraska Conservation and Environmental Literacy and Awareness Survey,

considered the effect of party identification (Republican, Democrat, and Independent) and place

of residence (farm, rural, urban) on (1) environmental support on the question of trade offs

regarding the economy and the environment; (2) the role of government in environmental

education; (3) the environmental knowledge of respondents; and (4) the likelihood a respondent

engaged in environmental friendly behavior (2008: 66). Republican respondents showed support

for the environmental attitude questions, albeit at a lower level than Democrats. Partisan

identification was statistically significant in a multivariate analysis; but the partisan divide on

environmental matters was not as large as the divide that existed regarding moral issues

(Blankenau, et al., 2008: 68, 71). Urban or rural residence was not statistically significant, failing

to provide support to either the differential exposure theory or the extraction theory (Blankenau,

et al., 2008: 72). Age was inversely significant, with increasing age decreasing environmental

support and knowledge, except for performing environmentally friendly acts where increased age

increased environmentally positive behaviors, perhaps as a result of older respondents being

socialized in the scarcity of the 1930’s and 1940’s (Blankenau, et al., 2008: 72-72).

Environmental Referenda Elections in America

One type of election in which environmental attitudes should be important in voting

decisions is environmental referenda elections. Even in the time period in which environmental

attitudes did not seem to influence vote choice, Guber (2003) found that statewide referenda on

environmental issues passed about as frequently as statewide referendums on other matters. This

result demonstrated that people were willing to vote in favor of an identifiable environmental

proposal. Guber studied environmental referenda in multiple states, including polling of support

during the course of the election cycle. Support for environmental issues was high when the

referenda were announced reflecting the consensus opinion in favor of the environment. During

the course of the campaign, organized opposition may have emerged. If the organized opposition

engaged in negative advertising and raised concern about the costs of the environmental

proposal, previous high levels of support were dramatically reduced during the course of the

campaign, making passage problematic. Guber suggested that environmental referenda be limited

in scope, making only small specific changes in environmental policy, so as to be less likely to

result in unified opposition. Major changes to environmental policy were more likely to be

defeated by voters (Guber 2003). Ballot initiative framing may affect whether the initiative

attracted broad and organized opposition. A ballot initiative was more likely to pass without

strong opposition or spending in opposition. Negative information and spending generated by

organized opposition about a ballot initiative initially supported because of generalized

environmental support, decreased support for the environmental initiative (Guber 2001a: 124,

128-129).

Lake (1983), studying California environmental bond issues and ballot initiatives, found

electoral success for environmental bond issues but less electoral support for environmental

initiatives. Lake identified 13 statewide California environmental bond issues between 1970 and

1980. California voters were asked to approve bonds to pay for specific environmental proposals,

including spending for parks and water pollution control. Non-environmental statewide bond

referenda during the same time period were also studied as a control. Approximately 70% of the

environmental bond issues passed, about the same passage rate as for non-environmental bond

issues. Statewide environmental bond issues passed in 1978 on the same ballot as Proposition 13

(the tax roll-back proposition) and passed in the Reagan 1980 general election notwithstanding

Reagan carrying California in a campaign with marked anti-environmental positions. Lake

concluded that the success of environmental bond issues at the same rate of non-environmental

bond issues demonstrated the willingness of voters to pay for the costs of environmental matters.

In contrast to bond issues with an identifiable and limited funding source, voter initiatives in

California on environmental issues during the 1970-1980 period did not pass at the same rate as

environmental bond issues, or non-environmental initiatives. While environmental activists were

able to obtain the signatures necessary to place an initiative on the ballot, such initiatives passed

at about a 25% rate, a significantly lower passage rate than for non-environmental initiatives.

The environmental initiatives attracted organized opposition, which outspent the initiative

proponents. Unlike bond issues with a determinable cost (the amount of the bonds, plus interest),

environmental initiatives were attacked because of the alleged high and unknown costs to

businesses and voters to implement the initiatives. Lake concluded that the environmental

movement was strong enough to garner the grassroots support necessary to place a citizens’

initiative on the ballot, but not powerful enough to pass such measures in the face of organized

opposition and concern regarding the cost of such initiatives (Lake 1983). Kotchen and Powers

(2006: 384-305) concurred that bond funding mechanisms and the funding rate determined the

likelihood of success for environmental ballot initiatives. Coan and Holman studied 29

environmental initiatives in 13 states from 1994 to 2005, including six in Florida (2008: 1124,

Table 1). Democratic partisanship explains most of the variance in levels of support, with income

and education also significant (Coan and Holman 2008: 1125, 1128).

The partisan split discussed above also appeared in environmental referenda voting. Bell,

et al. (2009) created an experiment to measure the willingness of respondents to pay a set amount

each year in return for a specified improvement in water quality. Starting with a base line

question of the respondent’s willingness to pay $200.00 per year for a 20% improvement of

water quality, subsequent questions were designed to determine mean values of the amount

respondents willing to pay for increased environmental quality (demonstrating the respondent’s

willingness to pay for a public good) (Bell, et al., 2009: 659-661). Voters were willing to pay

more than non-voters, perhaps from a willingness to promote public goods through voting; or

from a willingness to vote when the respondent is interested in public goods. Mean responses

were higher for Democrats compared to Republicans; and for Gore voters compared to Bush

voters (Bell, et al., 2009: 667-669, Table 4 and Table 5). Education, income, membership in an

environmental group, living in the Northeast United States, and visits to a lake or river were

significant in increasing the amount a respondent was willing to pay for environmental benefit

preferences; but race, gender, and living in locations not in the Northeast United States were not

significant (Bell, et al., 2009: 663 Table 1). The means were higher than median values (skewed

in favor of the environment, as those who strongly support the environment were willing to pay

more than others less favorable to the environment). Therefore, to attract the median voter, which

will assure a majority of votes, Bell, et al., posited that environmental activists should craft

environmental referenda and policies priced below the mean cost per voter (2009: 667).

Environmental ballot initiatives may be strategically employed by political parties to

increase party voter turnout. Smith and Tolbert theorized that political parties endorsed or

opposed ballot initiatives, and provided financial resources to ballot initiative organizations,

seeking to (1) increase turn out of party supporters; (2) drive wedge issues against the other

party; and (3) for ideological reasons (2001: 741, 753). Using aggregate county data, Smith &

Tolbert found that party identification levels in a county were associated with that county’s vote

on 77% of ballot initiatives in the 1998 primary and general election (2001: 746-747). Examining

individual voter data from the Voter News Service Exit Polls for 1994 and 1996, partisan

identification was the most salient factor to explain California vote choice for two ballot

initiatives (one considered liberal and one considered conservative) in 1994, two ballot initiatives

(one considered liberal and one considered conservative) in 1996, the 1994 California

Gubernatorial election and the 1996 presidential election (Smith & Tolbert 2001: 749, 751 Table

3). Party identification drove both the partisan election candidate choice and the seemingly

nonpartisan referenda election decision. These results bolstered Dolan’s (2005) research finding

that Democratic candidates utilized environmental positions on websites, while Republican

candidates did not. To test the theorized effectiveness of political party activity and cuing on

individual voting decisions, future research could include survey questions on whether the

respondent was aware of party endorsement or opposition to environmental referenda, was aware

of party activities in support or opposition of the initiative, and used such information in position

taking regarding the environmental initiative.

Use of the county as the unit of study for referendum voting has been criticized for

aggregation bias (Wu & Cutter 2011). Using census track data (median 4600 persons) and block

level data (median 1300 persons) (smaller geographic units of study compared to countywide

data), Wu & Cutter found that the more high income people residing in the census track, the

lower level of support for environmental referenda (2011: 555, 557). Respondents with higher

incomes may have more tax liability and therefore be adverse to the costs of such referenda, or

may be able to purchase private goods to replace the public goods promoted by the

environmental referenda (Wu & Cutter 2011: 560-561). The block level data, however, revealed

a curvilinear effect for income. As the number of high-income persons increased in the block

data, environmental support decreased, until a certain number of high-income persons were

reached and then environmental support increased. Similar curvilinear results in the block level

data occurred for the number of older persons, conservatives, and those engaged in agriculture or

mining (Wu & Cutter 2011: 558 table 2, 559). Higher levels of education, youth, minority,

population density, and high levels of urbanization were positively associated with higher levels

of environmental support; while employment in agriculture or mining was negatively associated

with higher levels of environmental support (Wu & Cutter 2011: 555).

The difference in results obtained by utilizing smaller population groups as compared to

the results from countywide aggregate data suggests that individual beliefs and voting decisions

may be an important level of analysis regarding environmental ballot initiatives. Branton (2003)

studied individualized voting behavior in 50 ballot initiatives [not limited to environmental ballot

initiatives] in 24 states over three election cycles (1992, 1994 and 1996). Using Voter News

Service General Election state exit polls, Branton divided ballot initiatives into three broad

categories “economic/financial” (which included several environmental initiatives), “term

limits,” and “moral/social issues” (2003: 369). The independent variable tested was whether the

respondent took the conservative (coded 1) or liberal (coded 0) position for a particular ballot

initiative. The conservative position was determined by analysis of various news sources as

coded by 15 students, with the coding determined to be intra- and inter-coder reliable. The study

measured partisan affiliation (the dependent variable) by two dummy variables: one coded 1

Democrat, 0 non-Democrat; and the other coded 1 Independent, 0 non-Independent.

Demographic control variables were age, income, education, gender, and ideology (Branton

2003: 370). Partisanship was a significant predictor of individual voting behavior. Democrats

voted statistically less conservatively than Republicans in 12 of the 13 economic/financial

initiatives, in 12 of 14 of the term limit initiatives, and in 21 of 23 of the moral/social issue

initiatives. Independents were less conservative than Republicans for economic/financial and

moral/social initiatives (Branton 2003: 370-376). The age of respondents increased conservative

voting in economic/financial referenda, was inconclusive regarding term limit initiatives, and

increased conservative voting in moral/social issues (Branton 2003: 370, 372). Higher education

levels affected conservative support (mixed on economic/financial, and less conservative on term

limits and moral/social issues); and a liberal ideology decreased conservative support in all three

types of initiatives (Branton 2003: 370, 372). Gender and income did not seem to be related to

individual voting behavior in all three categories of initiatives (Branton 2003: 376). Branton

studied three 1996 environmental ballot initiatives, included the Florida Sugar Tax initiative,

discussed in the section regarding Florida initiatives, below. The other two environmental issues

studied were (1) a Montana water initiative, in which Democrats and Independents were

significantly less likely to support the conservative position, and age increased conservative

support; and (2) a Idaho initiative regarding radioactive waste (considered to be a moral/social

initiative, not an economic/financial initiative) in which partisanship was significant, but no other

demographic variable reached statistical significance (Branton 2003: 371, Table 1; 375, Table 3).

In summary, partisan identification, even in elections without overt partisan labels or cues,

affected individual voting behavior in a variety of initiatives in multiple states over time in the

1990s. Other demographic variables explained less variance in initiative voting behavior, or were

not significant.

Environmental Referenda Support in Florida

Americans historically have supported “the environment” generally and voted in support

of environmental referenda, especially with clear and limited funding such as exist in bond

issues. Floridians share that generalized environmental support (MacManus, et al., 2011:

414415). Various groups supported environmental proposals in Florida for a variety of reasons,

leading deHaven-Smith to characterize Florida environmentalism as a coalition of different

groups with a particular concerns, rather than a generalized movement (1998: 294). Florida

attitudes overall on environmental questions were consistent with national averages. Floridians

were within 2% +/- of national average of people who believed global warming is happening,

believed global warming was mainly human caused, believed that most scientists believed global

warming was happening, and somewhat to strongly supported the regulation of CO2 emissions

(Howe, et al., 2015: 596 Figure 1). In Florida, factors such as income and education increased

environmental support; but Republican partisanship and being under age 35 decreased

environmental support (Salka 2003: 266, Table 4). In Florida, the expected increased support for

environmental measures for younger respondents did not materialize. Salka (2003: 270)

theorized that the “Green Migration Theory” may explain the unexpected increased

environmental support by older respondents compared to younger residents in Florida. The Green

Migration Theory developed by Jones, et al., (2003), posited people moved to Florida for the

warm climate and other environmentally related reasons. These older migrants, choosing to live

in Florida, were more likely to support environmental measures to protect the reasons for the

choice of retirement location.

Citizen initiated ballot measures in Florida are limited to constitutional amendments.

Florida does not have a citizen initiative provision to implement legislation or policy preferences.

When the legislature failed to act in concert with general public opinion, as in the failure to fund

the conservation and retirement land trust over multiple legislative sessions, Floridians could

only change the state constitution to achieve the desired legislative and public policy. Advocates

for a proposed constitutional change must obtain over 600,000 signatures of registered voters.

The title, summary, and content of the constitutional amendment must be approved by the

Supreme Court of Florida as being in conformity with constitutional requirements for such ballot

measures. To pass, a supermajority of 60% of the voters must approve the constitutional

amendment (Outler 2008). Historically, environmental constitutional initiatives in Florida have

proven non-controversial, and passed by wide margins. Florida voters added to their state

constitution limits regarding use of fishing nets (1994 71.7% approval); approved requirements

for Everglade polluters to pay for cleanup costs (1996 68.1% approval); created an Everglade

Trust fund as part of Forever Florida (1996 58.3% approval); created the Fish and Wildlife

Commission (1998 72.3% approval); approved property tax exempt status for land encumbered

by perpetual conservation easement and property tax breaks for lands reserved for conservation

purposes not permanently encumbered (2008 68.5% approval); and limited property assessment

increases caused by adding renewable energy devices (2008 60.5% approval).

Certain specifically Floridian characteristics affected environmental support and voting

for environment issues. Coastal counties attracted retiring Northerners, so coastal counties may

be more supportive of environmental referenda than non-coastal Florida counties (Salka 2003).

Panhandle respondents and non-panhandle respondents showed different levels of environmental

support. On a county level, non-panhandle Florida counties had higher levels of support

compared to panhandle counties for the proposition that global warming will cause moderate to a

great deal of harm to humans. Non-panhandle counties also evidenced higher levels of belief that

global warming is occurring (Howe, et al., 2015: 596, Figure 1). The urban/rural split in levels of

environmental support was seen in other ballot measures such as support for anti-Gay Marriage

ballot initiatives in Florida and California (Salka & Burnett 2012).

Branton’s study (2003), discussed above in the section about referenda support generally,

included one Florida environmental ballot initiative, the 1996 proposal for a sugar tax to pay for

cleanup expenses in the Florida Everglades. Democratic partisans (and Independents) were

significantly less likely than Republicans to support the conservative position (a no vote). Having

a higher income and having less than a high school education were also significant in explaining

variance in support. The coefficient estimate for age was negative, as would be expected by the

Green Migration theory, but only -.07, and not significant (Branton 2003: 371, Table 1).

Some Concluding Thoughts about American Environmentalism

Environmental concerns and pro-environmental attitudes and issue positions initially cut

across cleavages in American politics and society. The period effects of terrorism and economic

crisis of the 2000’s, and the increasing mobilization of an anti-environmental countermovement

during the same period, seemed to lessen this consensus support on the environment.

Proenvironmentalism increasingly was associated with specific groups, with anti-environmental

attitudes expressed by other groups. At the same time, referenda remained a viable mechanism

for environmental issues to be enacted, especially as the federal system seemed deadlocked, and

states varied in environmental responsiveness. In this increasingly polarized environmental

milieu, Floridians seeking to pass environmental initiatives have to encourage multiple group

support for the environmental referenda, especially because of the super majority requirement for

referenda passage in this closely contested swing state. Current data should help first describe

current environmental attitudes nationally and in Florida, and then give guidance to the factors

that will help build support for passage of environmental initiatives in Florida.

HYPOTHESES

The Florida legislature seems unwilling to provide environmental funding, despite high

levels of public approval for conservation and recreational land acquisitions. Effects of climate

change, such as Sea Level Rise, are an increasing threat nationally and to Florida (Weiss, et al.,

2011). Multiple possibilities for environmental action by government exist; but political and

systemic barriers may lessen the effectiveness of certain political arenas to resolve environmental

policy disputes. Federal action in the courts and in the Congress seems constrained by judicial

decisions regarding proof of environmental impacts and by legislative intraparty gridlock (Jones

& Jacques 2014). The current Democratic President and the federal agencies under his direction

are receptive to environmental concerns. A change in party after the 2016 presidential election

may foreclose this avenue of federal action. Non-profit environmental activists focus efforts in

states to advance environmental policy at the state level, and to bring pressure for action at the

federal level (Hall & Taplin 2010: 65, 68).

Florida government is not currently responsive to environmental concerns. Executive

action in Florida on the environment seems unlikely under the current Republican administration

in which ranching interests control supposed environmental boards, developers control the water

management boards, and the mere mention of “climate change” is allegedly prohibited in

executive agency reports. Florida has passed a fair district constitutional amendment, but absent

court action, no redistricting will occur until after the 2020 census, making changes in the

makeup of the current anti-environmental legislature unlikely. Environmental activists in Florida

seemingly have no alternative but to turn to ballot initiatives to amend the Constitution of the

State of Florida to enact environmental policies.

The initial part of this study, using 2012 survey data, will attempt to demonstrate the

characteristics of individual respondents that shape environmental attitudes in Florida. Each of

the three environmental questions in the CCES 2012 data will be considered separately, as

different questions explore different aspects of environmental attitudes (Daniels et al., 2012:

469). Based upon previous research, Floridians are anticipated to have similar variances in

environmental views as respondents nationally, with divisions based upon partisan identification,

opinions regarding the Tea Party, educational and income levels, and to some degree by race and

gender. Age effects of environmental support in Florida, however, may different than results

nationally. Older Floridians, who moved to Florida for the favorable environment, may be more

supportive environmental issues than older respondents generally. This study then attempts to

analyze the factors leading to overwhelming support for Amendment One in 2014. Amendment

One passed with 75% of voters supporting. Because of this widespread support, pro-Amendment

One support should be expected in both parties and in all demographic groups. However 25% of

Floridians voted against Amendment One.

In an attempt to understand environmental opinions in Florida generally and the elements

of support for Amendment One, this study will test the following hypotheses:

H1 Consistent with the Florida history of bipartisan environmental support, Floridians

will demonstrate lower levels of difference in opinions across a range of

environmental issues based upon various demographic, partisan, and opinion

variables than the differences expressed by Americans nationally.

H2 Both nationally and in Florida, those respondents who highly approve of the Tea Party

will express lower levels of environmental support across a spectrum of

environmental issues than respondents who highly disapprove of the Tea Party.

H3 In Florida, the age of respondents will increase levels of support for environmental

issues for both younger respondents and older respondents, as compared to the levels

of support for environmental issues for respondents aged 40-59; while nationally

environmental support will decrease as the age of the respondents increase.

H4 Although Amendment One ultimately passed with overwhelming voter support,

certain characteristics will be associated with opposition to Amendment One:

H4A Republican identifiers will be more likely to oppose Amendment One

compared with Democratic identifiers.

H4B The Republican opposition to Amendment One will be driven by the aspects

of Tea Party support measurable in the data regarding support for

Amendment One, specifically opposition to President Obama and support of

Governor Scott.

H4C Respondents aged 40-59 will oppose Amendment One at higher levels than

respondents aged 39 and under and aged 60 and older.

H4D Male respondents are more likely to oppose Amendment One than Female

respondents.

H4E Panhandle residents are less likely to support Amendment One than

respondents who reside in non-panhandle areas of Florida.

Supporters and opponents to environmental policy positions need information regarding

the groups most likely to favor the respective policy positions. Environmental activists must be

strategic in determining the most effective forum to achieve the desired environmental policy.

Understanding both the characteristics driving the support for Amendment One and the general

analysis of national and Florida environmental attitudes should add to the knowledge of how

environmental concern, attitudes, and policy positions drive environmental beliefs; and the effect

of environmental beliefs on political action, both nationally and in Florida. This analysis of

Florida environmental attitudes in general, and specifically with regard to Amendment One

support and opposition, should provide guidance to environmental activists and opponents in

future constitutional ballot measures on environmental subjects; and in designing effective

appeals for the support or opposition to environmental issues generally.

DATA AND VARIABLES

Utilizing two data sources, this thesis will examine environmental attitudes in Florida in

2012, and analyze more specifically the factors leading to support or opposition to Amendment

One in 2014. The 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) comprised 54,535

Internet interviews conducted by YouGov/Polimetrix in October 2012 and November 2012,

weighted to reflect population demographics. The CCES included 3850 respondents from the

State of Florida. The CCES contained approximately 120 questions to identify respondents by

location, demographic attributes, questions on various issues and elections, and election-specific

questions. This research utilizes the demographic information; party and ideological

identifications; attitudes regarding environmental issues; approval of the Tea Party; approval of

President Obama; approval of Governor Scott; and religious attitudes.

The Florida Chamber of Commerce engaged Cherry Communications to poll likely

Florida voters in 2014, including a question to gauge pre-election support for Amendment One.

The Chamber has made available the data for some of the questions asked in its poll taken in

September 2014, less than two months before the election. The poll of 813 likely voters

(identified by voting records confirmed by 100% responding that they were extremely or very

likely to vote) conducted by telephone interviews September 16-21, 2014, asked respondents for

their position on Amendment One. The poll found that 75.5% definitely or probably would vote

in favor of Amendment One, 13.25% probably or definitely against the amendment, and the

remainder unsure or refused to answer (4 respondents. 0.49% of all respondents refused to

answer). The margin of error was 3.5%. The poll accurately reported the ultimate election result

in which 75% of voters supported Amendment One. The poll surveyed respondents’ opinions

regarding approval of Governor Scott’s job performance and approval of President Obama’s job

performance. Demographic questions included age, occupation, party identification, race, gender,

and media market of respondent.

From these two data sets, a rich amount of analysis is possible. All analysis will be

performed utilizing the “r” computer program. From the CCES data, demographic and attitudinal

variables will assist in the creation of a profile of those persons more likely to express a

proenvironmental attitude regarding three environmental issues. Models will show the national

characteristics and the State of Florida characteristics. Two of the three environmental questions

permit five responses: a highly favorable environmental position, a somewhat favorable

environmental position, a neutral position with regard to the environmental issue, a somewhat

unfavorable environmental position, and a strongly unfavorable environmental position. The

third question is a yes or no question regarding support for the Keystone Pipeline Authorization

legislation, in which the “no” response is the environmentally favorable position. Crosstab

analysis (verified by Chi Square and p test) will identify characteristics leading to support and

opposition in environmental matters. To test the initial characterizations of environmental

support, nationally and in Florida these three questions will be the dependent variables in two

models for each question, one for National respondents, and one for Florida respondents. As the

dependent variable has multiple possible responses, OLS regression analysis will be employed to

determine the variables significantly associated with environmental attitudes. The independent

variable will be a three level party identification variable, considered as two dummy variables,

with Democrats compared to Independents, and Democrats compared to Republicans. Control

variables include gender; race; ideology; whether the respondent is “born again” (an

evangelical); the importance of religion to the respondent; levels of approval of the Tea Party;

being retired; residence in the Panhandle (for the Florida models); approval levels of President

Obama; approval levels of the Governor which for Florida would be then two-year incumbent

Rick Scott; age (divided into two dummy variables, comparing respondents 18-39 and

respondents over 60 with respondents aged 40-59, a variable necessarily created to be compatible

with the age information available in the data regarding Amendment One); whether the

respondent has children under the age of 18; homeowners compared to renters and others;

education levels; and family income. The CCES data will also permit a side excursion into the

debate between Guber (2001) and Davis & Wurth (2003) regarding the impact of environmental

attitudes on presidential candidate selection in the 2012 election. CCES data regarding 2012

presidential election choice was transformed into a two option variable scored 0 for Romney and

1 for Obama (all other responses omitted). As this variable is a yes/no variable, logistic

regression models were created for the effect of the three environmental questions on presidential

vote choice, controlled for the same demographic, attitudinal and identification variables used for

the OLS regressions on environmental attitudes. This analysis will help answer

H1 through H3.

Similar analysis will explore demographic variables and attitudes characteristic of support

or opposition to Amendment One in 2014. Crosstab analysis with appropriate Chi Square and p

test verification will identify the characteristics potentially able to explain the variance in support

and opposition to Amendment One. The Amendment One question permitted a four level

response (likely to support, probably support, probably not support, definitely not supporting –

all other responses omitted). OLS regression will determine if any of the observable differences

in the crosstab analysis of all respondents reach statistic significance. If as anticipated, the

opposition to Amendment One comes largely from Republican voters, the subset of Republican

voters will be analyzed again by OLS regression. Gender will also be studied separately, to

ascertain any identifiable characteristics explaining any observed variance between the genders.

In all OLS regressions regarding Amendment One, the dependent variable will be the four

option variable regarding levels of support or opposition to Amendment One. In Model One,

party identification will be the independent variable, with the demographic and attitudinal

variables as a series of independent/control variables to determine which variable or variables

(party identification, age, gender, retired, race, panhandle, support of Governor Scott, opposition

to President Obama, and a combined additive index of highly favorable to Governor Scott/very

unfavorable to President Obama as potentially the most conservative respondents) are

statistically significant in causing all respondents in Model One to oppose Amendment One. In

Model Two, testing Republican respondents attitudes to Amendment One, gender will be the

independent variable and the same demographic and attitudinal variables will serve as controls.

Model Three, the subset of female respondents, will use party identification as the independent

variable, and the same demographic (except obviously gender) and attitudinal variables will

serve as controls. This information will help answer H4, and its subparts; and give added

information regarding the issues raised in H1 through H3.

Certain variables require further explanation for their use in this study. Age will be of

particular interest in both data sets to determine if there is any support for the Green Migration

Theory demonstrated by older voters expressing more environmentally favorable positions.

Taking information regarding occupation, to create a dummy variable of retired or not retired will

also test whether retired respondents express different environmental attitudes than others. By

utilizing the Congressional District variable in the CCES data and the “Media Market” variable

in the Amendment One data, a dummy variable for panhandle residence will test whether the

more conservative Florida panhandle demonstrates different environmental attitudes than the

remainder of the State of Florida. Neither data set contained enough respondents in Florida to

make meaningful analysis of attitudes of those in agriculture or extractive industries.

There was also no ability to create an urban/rural variable.

Tea Party approval is tested directly in the CCES data regarding the three environmental

questions. The Amendment One poll did not ask directly regarding respondents’ opinions

regarding the Tea Party, which would have permitted a direct analysis of the Tea Party/non-Tea

Party national attitude split within the Republican Party found by Hamilton & Saito (2015) on

environmental issues. Rick Scott was initially favored in the 2010 Republican Party primary

election more favorably by Tea Party supporters than his primary opponent. As the faction of the

Republican Party most likely to support Rick Scott early, it is reasonable to conclude that Tea

Party members would continue to view Scott the most positively. Tea Party identifiers were also

among the most intense critics of President Obama; and continued to hold that position. Strong

anti-Obama sentiment was a strong predictor of Tea Party Support (Maxwell & Parent 2012;

Maxwell & Parent 2013). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Republicans who most

strongly oppose President Obama are more likely to be Tea Party sympathizers. In the

Amendment One data, unfavorable opinions of President Obama’s job performance and highly

favorable approval of Governor Scott’s job performance, and an additive index of those

respondents most favorable to Governor Scott and least favorable to President Obama, will be

utilized to measure at least some characteristics of Tea Party supporters on attitudes regarding

Amendment One. If high levels of approval of Scott and/or high levels of disapproval of

President Obama, or additive results of both variables, become a statistically significant

explanatory factor for why Republicans supported Amendment One (Model Two), there will be

at least inferential support for the findings of Hamilton & Saito (2015) demonstrating a split

within the Republican Party.

The CCES data and the Amendment One data are different surveys taken two years apart

using different methodology and therefore not directly comparable. However, certain variables

are common to both data sets. A final OLS regression for Florida respondents on the CCES

environmental questions and the respondents regarding Amendment One, utilizing the variables

available in both surveys, will compare the characteristics of all four environmental issues to

ascertain if any commonality materializes.

FINDINGS

Both the CCES 2012 data set and the Amendment One data set provide multiple

independent control variables. To assure that each variable utilized in this study measured

distinct characteristics, the association between the independent variable and all control variables

was calculated. Nationally, the Pearson’s r measure of association between party identification

and opinions regarding President Obama was .68. (Florida .69). Because of the extreme

divergence of opinions regarding President Obama by partisans, this moderately strong

association is not surprising. However, as the association is well below .80, each variable appears

to be measuring a different characteristic. The association between importance of religion and

being born again measured .50 nationally and in Florida. The correlation measure for

ideology/party identification, party identification/Tea Party opinions, and ideology/Obama

opinions were approximately .45 each. In Florida, those associations, and the association

between Tea Party support and opinions regarding Governor Scott, were .42 to .46. No

association between any other two variables exceeded .25. (Florida .35). In the Amendment One

data, the correlation between party identification and opinions of Governor Scott was .62; again,

a not surprising result. No association between any other two variables exceeded .33. Neither

data set seems to have any significant multicollinearity concerns. [Full results not reported, but

available for review.]

The 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) included three questions

relevant to develop the characteristics of respondents leading to environmental attitudes

nationally and in the State of Florida. The questions tested three different aspects of

environmental attitudes: (a) respondents’ beliefs regarding climate change; (b) whether

respondents considered protecting the environment or protecting the economy as more important;

and (c) respondents’ support or opposition to a particular piece of federal legislation

(to authorize the Keystone Pipeline). As these questions involve different aspects of

environmental attitudes, each question is considered separately (Daniels, et al. 2012). The most

pro-environmental position for each question is:

A. Climate change is “a serious problem and needs immediate action” (supported by

27% of Respondents nationally and 26% of Respondents in Florida).

B. We should “protect the environment even if we lose jobs or decrease the standard of

living” (supported by 12% nationally and 11% in Florida).

C. Opposition to the Keystone Pipeline Authorization legislation (27% nationally; 24%

Florida).

Table 1 sets forth the percentage of respondents in various groups who take the most

proenvironmental position regarding the three questions. For all variables, the Chi-Square was

generally robust and the p score was an exponentially low decimal fraction. [Results not shown,

but available for review.] Only gender in Florida for attitudes on the environment/jobs trade off

question (Chi-square 17.56, p score 0.002), gender in Florida for attitudes regarding the

Keystone Pipeline legislation (Chi-square 9.94, p score 0.002), and those with children and those

without children regarding the Keystone Pipeline (Nationally: 2.55, 0.1; Florida: 4.29, 0.04),

show less robust results. At least initially, the observed difference within groups on

environmental attitudes did not seem to be the result of random chance or measurement error.

OLS regression analysis of the five level response (unsure and no responses omitted) questions

regarding climate change and the environment/jobs tradeoff are set forth in Table 2. Even though

the Keystone Pipeline question has only a yes/no response, the OLS regression results are set

forth in Table 2, to permit direct comparisons among the three questions. [A logistic regression,

not reported, of the Keystone Pipeline question found identical magnitude, direction, and

significance in the results for each variable.] Possible responses to each of the three questions

moved from the most pro-environmental position to the least pro-environmental position. A

positive coefficient therefore shows lower levels of environmental support caused by a variable;

and a negative coefficient shows higher levels of environmental support.

The extensive variables and number of respondents in the 2012 CCES permitted

exploration of two areas regarding environmental attitudes that cannot be addressed in the

Amendment One survey data discussed below. The CCES data of year of birth variable permitted

the creation of an interval level age variable to examine the apparent increased environmental

support for respondents aged 40-59 observed in the three part age cohort variable in both the

CCES data and the Amendment One data. The CCES data also permitted the creation of a birth

year cohort variable. Figure 1 sets forth the levels of support for the most proenvironmental

position by age cohort for each of the three questions, nationally and in Florida.

The CCES data, complied in the 2012 election year, permitted the testing of the influence

of various environmental positions on presidential candidate choice. The CCES included both the

environment/jobs trade off question Guber (2001b) found not significant in presidential choice

and a climate change opinion question. (Unfortunately there was no question regarding spending

levels.) Further, as the OLS regressions show the powerful effect of Tea Party views and Obama

opinion on environmental positions, 2012 would be the first presidential election after the 2010

emergence of the Tea Party and would reflect four years of opinion regarding the Obama

Administration; both factors not relevant for either Guber (2001) or Davis & Wurth

(2003). Voting for President Obama in 2012, the variable tested, was a no/yes question, so five

models of logistic regression measuring the predicted likelihood of voting for President Obama

are set forth in Table 3. For all models, a negative co-efficient predicted less likelihood of voting

for Obama and a positive coefficient predicted increased likelihood of voting for Obama.

Pre-election polling in September 2014 showed generalized support for Amendment One.

In the overall population, 85% of respondents expressing an opinion on Amendment One

supported Amendment One. Overall, 32.8% of respondents expressing an opinion, indicated that

they would “definitely support” Amendment One. Different subgroups, however, appear to

express different levels of support for Amendment One (Table 4). The chi-square and p score

tests for all variables except race and occupation are initially significant. Table 5 sets forth the

OLS regression for eight models measuring the impact of various variables on levels of support

and opposition for Amendment One. A positive coefficient indicates more opposition to

Amendment One. With regard to Republicans, only Republican women are statistically different

in levels of support or opposition for Amendment One. Considering only gender and Obama

attitudes, both were significant for Republicans. In the model of Republican respondents with all

aspects considered, only gender was statistically associated with levels of Amendment One

support (Table 6, Part A). The differences in levels of support of women for Amendment One are

more complex. Party identification is associated with higher levels of opposition by women,

except when considering only Obama low approval, which becomes the driver of Republican

women opposition to Amendment One. In the full model of women respondents, age and race

were significant, in addition to party identification and Obama support (Table 6, Part 4). Table 7

reports the similarities in Florida environmental attitudes reported in the CCES and the factors

associated with support or opposition to Amendment One in OLS regressions utilizing the

variables comparable in both data sets. Using the information set out in the Tables and Figure,

the Hypotheses in this thesis are addressed in the following analysis.

Environmental Attitudes Nationally and in Florida

H1 Consistent with the Florida history of bipartisan environmental support, Floridians

will demonstrate lower levels of difference in opinions across a range of

environmental issues based upon various demographic, partisan, and opinion

variables than the differences expressed by Americans nationally.

Similar percentages of respondents in Florida and nationally expressed support for the

most pro-environmental position in all three CCES environmental questions (Table 1).

Democrats, liberals, those for whom religion is not important, those with a very negative opinion

of the Tea Party, and who strongly approve of President Obama supported the most

proenvironmental position at higher levels than the overall population. Republicans,

evangelicals, conservatives, those with highly unfavorable opinions of President Obama, and

strong Tea Party supporters expressed far lower levels of support for environmentalism than the

entire population (Table 2). The trends hold consistent for the Florida respondents. However, the

percentage gap between extremes (liberal versus conservative, Tea Party supporters and non-

supporters, strongly approve and strongly disapprove of President Obama) was smaller among

Florida respondents compared to national respondents (Table 1). This is perhaps an initial

indication that the partisan and ideological split on environmental attitudes was not as strong in

Florida, reflecting a vestige of the previous strong bipartisan consensus on environmental

attitudes even during Florida gubernatorial administrations generally conservative on other

issues.

Certain groups do not appear to demonstrate much difference regarding environmental

attitudes. Men and women supported the most pro-environmental attitudes at about the same

percentage as the general population. Other groups show splits in attitudes depending on the

question asked. Only Hispanics showed higher levels of environmental support. Blacks in Florida

showed a split in environmental attitudes with lower than average support for climate change

action, but higher than average support for protecting the environment over jobs and the

economy. Retired persons nationally and in Florida expressed pro-environmental positions

regarding climate change consistent with responses overall; but expressed lower than average

support for protecting the environment over jobs/economy. Even though retired persons no

longer work, concerns regarding fixed incomes and increased costs from protecting the

environment may influence this result. Attitudes regarding the governor do not make much

observable difference in environmental attitudes nationally, perhaps as a result of different states

with different governors of various partisan and ideological beliefs. In Florida, the opinion

regarding Governor Scott created a demonstrable difference in levels of environment support.

Those respondents with a strongly favorable opinion of Governor Scott expressed lower levels of

environmental support, while those with a strongly unfavorable opinion of Governor Scott

expressed higher levels of environmental support. Persons with children under 18, who might be

expected to be more pro-environmental from concern for preserving the environment for their

children, expressed similar levels of support as those without children under 18.

The results for party and ideology were different nationally and in Florida. Compared to

Democrats, Republicans nationally were significantly more likely to express anti-environmental

views. In Florida, the party differences were not significant. Conservative ideology was also

significantly associated with anti-environmental views nationally, with no significance in Florida.

Views regarding the Tea Party and President Obama, however, have a consistent impact

nationally and in Florida. As the favorability of the Tea Party decreased, environmental support

increased; and as the favorability of President Obama decreased, environmental support

decreased. Attitudes regarding Governor Scott influenced environmental support in Florida.

Nationally, differing levels in environmentalism displayed a partisan, ideological, Tea Party, and

Obama split. In Florida, there was no party or ideological divides. The observable differences in

environmental attitudes in Florida resulted from opinions regarding President Obama, Governor

Scott, and the Tea Party.

Other variables were significant nationally, but not in Florida. Women nationally had

significantly different views than men regarding environment issues. For two of the three

environmental questions, women were more pro-environment than men. For the

environment/jobs tradeoff question, however, women favored protecting jobs and economy over

the environment. Non-evangelicals and those to whom religion was not important were more

environmentally supportive nationally. Religious beliefs were not significant in Florida.

Increasing levels of education made respondents nationally more environmental; but education

was significant (at the 0.05 level) in Florida only in the environment/jobs trade off question.

Race was significant in the environmental/jobs tradeoff nationally decreasing environmental

support, and increasing environmental support (significance 0.1) in Florida; but otherwise was

not associated with environmental positions. Florida panhandle residents, a generally

conservative area, interestingly were more environmentally supportive regarding the

environment/jobs tradeoff and regarding the Keystone Pipeline. (No similar variable could be

created nationally, and therefore is omitted from the national regressions.) Being retired, having

children under 18, being a homeowner versus a renter, and family income generally were not

significant in explaining variance in environmental opinions.

Intertwined with the question of the significance regarding differences in environmental

opinions between different groups, is the question of whether differences in environmental

opinions influenced political action. Studies regarding the effect of environmental opinions in the

1996 presidential election were mixed, with Guber (2001b) finding no significance and Davis &

Wurth (2003) finding significance for environmental opinions in determining candidate choice.

In 2012, however, attitudes regarding climate change, the environmental/jobs tradeoffs, and

attitudes regarding the Keystone Pipeline, individually and collectively, were strongly associated

with presidential vote choice nationally (Table 3). In Florida, climate change positions were

strongly associated with presidential vote choice and environment/jobs tradeoff positions were

weakly associated with presidential vote choice. All three environmental questions measured

together had no statistical association with presidential vote choice in Florida. However,

considering only climate change and environment/job trade off in Florida [not reported], climate

change achieved significance (0.05) while the environment/jobs tradeoff remained associated

with presidential vote choice at the 0.1 level of significance. Therefore, the lack of significance

when considering all three environmental positions in Florida in Model Five (Table 3) seemed to

be explained by the lack of significance in variation of opinion regarding the Keystone Pipeline

in Model Four (Table 3). Two strong determinates of environmental positions - opinions of the

Tea Party and opinions of President Obama – were not present in either the Guber (2001b) or the

Davis & Wurth (2003) study, but were present by the 2012 election.

In 2012, differences in levels of support in a variety of environmental issues added to the

ability to predict a presidential vote. Holding all other variables at their mean, for national

respondents, the predicted probability [not reported but results available for review] of voting for

President Obama for persons holding the most pro-environmental position regarding climate

change was .84. The predicted probability for of voting for President Obama for persons holding

the least pro-environmental position regarding climate change was .43. For Florida respondents

the respective probabilities were .81 and .29. Therefore measured across the full range of five

possible positions climate change, negative climate change positions decreased the probability of

voting for Obama by .41 nationally and by .51 in Florida.5 For the environment/jobs tradeoffs,

measured across the full range of five possible positions of environment versus jobs question,

changing positions less favorable to the environment decreased the probability of voting for

Obama by .25 nationally and .38 in Florida. Measured across the range of two possible positions

regarding the Keystone Pipeline Authorization legislation, supporting authorization of the

pipeline decreased the probability of voting for Obama by .10 nationally. Therefore, knowing

environmental positions helped predict the probability of voting for President Obama both

nationally and in Florida. Interestingly, in a state with a history of bipartisan environmental

support, anti-environmentalism had a larger decrease in the predictive value than demonstrated

nationally. Overall, while Republican and Democratic differences were not significant in Florida,

Tea Party opinions were significant. The difference in predictability of environmental attitudes in

presidential vote choice was more pronounced in Florida. While there was some evidence of less

divide between opposing groups in Florida compared with national results, at least in some

respects, and contrary to H1, environmental divides are emerging in Florida equal to or stronger

than the divides on environmental issues nationally.

H2 Both nationally and in Florida, those respondents who highly approve of the Tea Party

will express lower levels of environmental support across a spectrum of

environmental issues than respondents who highly disapprove of the Tea Party.

In Florida, controlling for Tea Party opinions, any observed difference in levels of

Republican and Democratic environmental support did not achieve statistical significance. For

Florida at least, the Tea Party/non-Tea Party split within the Republican Party explained the

different levels in expressed environmental support between Republicans and Democrats.

Nationally, however, both party identification and opinions regarding the Tea Party were strongly

associated with levels of environmental support. Perhaps the long bipartisan environmental

support and the importance of the environment to the tourism economy in Florida had lessened

the general anti-environmentalism expressed by Republicans nationally. Further study of the

CCES data, by state, would determine if respondents in other states are similar to Florida; or if in

other states there are both interparty and intraparty environmental divides.

H3 In Florida, the age of respondents will increase levels of support for environmental

issues for both younger respondents and older respondents, as compared to the levels

of support for environmental issues for respondents aged 40-59; while nationally

environmental support will decrease as the age of the respondents increase.

Nationally, environmental support decreased for all three questions as the respondents

aged. In Florida, however, the middle cohort (ages 40-59) expresses the highest levels of

proenvironmental support for climate change and for the environment as more important than

jobs/economy. Only regarding the Keystone Pipeline Authorization did the national pattern of

decreasing support by age emerge in Florida. Age cohorts were insignificant in explaining

climate change opinions; and mixed but significant regarding the environment/jobs tradeoff and

positions regarding the Keystone Pipeline (Table 2). The results for all three questions

demonstrated that environmental support initially increased from the oldest cohorts, but

beginning in approximately birth year 1970, declined so that fewer members of the younger

cohorts expressed the most pro-environmental position than members of the immediately

preceding cohorts (Figure 1). There is strong support for a “green migration” explanation of

environmental support in Florida. Nationally and in Florida, generalized support for the

environment among younger cohorts seems to be lessening in the most recent age cohorts,

possibility resulting from increasing anti-environmentalism socialization mitigating any effects

of environmental awareness or postmaterial attitudes within certain groups and beliefs.

Amendment One Support

H4A Republican identifiers will be more likely to oppose Amendment One compared with

Democratic identifiers.

Republicans expressed lower levels of likely support for Amendment One and higher levels of

oppositions than Democrats or Independents (Table 4). Republican identification was moderately

associated with opposition to Amendment One, when controlling only for opinions regarding

President Obama. Otherwise, Republican identification was uniformly strongly associated with

decreased levels of support for Amendment One, regardless of other demographic or attitudinal

attributes. (Table 5). Hypothesis H4A is supported by the data.

H4B The Republican opposition to Amendment One will be driven by the aspects of Tea

Party support measurable in the data regarding support for Amendment One,

specifically opposition to President Obama and support of Governor Scott.

Respondents expressing low level of support Obama, those expressing high approval of

Governor Scott, and those who expressed the lowest level of support for President Obama and

highest level of approval for Governor Scott (expected to be the most conservative voters), all

appeared to express more intention to vote against Amendment One (Table 4). As there is not a

direct measure of Tea Party support in the Amendment One data, and because Republican

identification remains significant (Table 5 and Table 6) in the Amendment One data (but not in

the CCES data) in explaining opposition to Amendment One even controlling for opinions

regarding President Obama and Governor Scott, some other aspect of Tea Party support – not

measurable in this data – explained Republican opposition. Including variables to measure racial

resentment and high levels of opposition to government, two other aspects of Tea Party support,

may explain why Republican identification remains significant in the Amendment One data, and

not in the CCES data. There is, at best, only partial support for the hypothesis that aspects of Tea

Party support explain any Republican opposition to Amendment One.

H4C Respondents aged 40-59 will oppose Amendment One at higher levels than

respondents aged 39 and under and aged 60 and older.

For age, both the youngest and the oldest cohort expressed more support for Amendment One

than respondents aged 40-59 (Table 4); but the differences in support were significant only for

the oldest cohort (Table 5). There was partial support for Hypothesis H4C regarding Amendment

One support; and further evidence in support of older retirees “green migration” explanation for

environmental support in Florida.

H4D Male respondents are more likely to oppose Amendment One than Female

respondents.

As shown in Table 4, men and woman expressed similar levels of definite support, but woman

expressed lower levels of opposition (female 9.9%, male 19.9%). Females were strongly

associated in explaining Republican support for Amendment One (Table 6). Analyzing the

reasons for support or opposition to Amendment One by female respondents was more complex.

Party identification was associated with higher levels of opposition by women, except when

considering only Obama low approval, which becomes the driver of Republican women

opposition to Amendment One. Differences among females in support or opposition to

Amendment One had more causes. In the full model of women respondents, age and race were

significant, in addition to party identification and Obama support (Table 6, Part B). The

significance of the female support for environmental issues in Florida was confirmed in the

comparison of Amendment One results with the environmental attitudes in the CCES 2012 study

(Table 7). Therefore, there is evidence in support of Hypothesis H4D: male respondents were

more likely to oppose Amendment One than female respondents.

H4E Panhandle residents are less likely to support Amendment One than respondents who

reside in non-panhandle areas of Florida.

Although panhandle residents express less support for environmental matters than residents

elsewhere in the State of Florida (Table 4; confirmed on other environmental issues in Table 1),

such expressed differences do not reach statistical significance (Table 5; with similar results on

other environmental issues in Table 2 and Table 7). Therefore, area of residence in the State of

Florida does not seem to be an explanatory factor of different levels of support for Amendment

One.

Amendment One Opposition in the Context of CCES Florida Environmental Attitudes

The CCES data predated the Amendment One vote by two years. CCES contained more

variables to explain variation in environmental attitudes than are present in the Amendment One

data. Direct comparisons of factors influencing Amendment One positions and environmental

positions generally are constrained. Important potential explanatory variables such as ideology,

education, and income are not available in the Amendment One data. However, party

identification, gender, and Obama opinion responses are associated with all four environmental

questions. Floridians reacted to Amendment One based upon the same characteristics that

affected other environmental attitudes (Table 7).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The time of consensus environmentalism has passed. A concerted countermovement,

challenging the science and values underlying environmentalism, has moved the discussion from

competing ideas of the role of government and the costs to individuals and businesses

notwithstanding an overall favorable opinion of environmentalism, to a world in which

antienvironmentalism is a political asset. What Guber (2003) thought could never happen is the

new reality: candidates now intentionally take anti-environmental campaign and policy stances,

especially among candidates seeking Tea Party approval. Candidates are asserting specific

environmental positions designed to mobilize voters; voters understand the differences in

environmental positions; and voters are making candidate choices in part based upon

environmental position taking. Any question in 1996 about the effect of environmental attitudes

on presidential vote choice has been answered by 2012: knowing environmental positions of a

voter does increase the ability to predict that voter’s presidential vote choice. Environmentalism

no longer cuts across ideological, partisan, and demographic cleavages in political society. The

intensity of these differences regarding environmental support or opposition within groups may

not be as pronounced in Florida, but still are evident. Environmentalism has become yet another

cleavage in American politics and for politics in Florida.

Nationally, variations in levels of support for environmental issues are explained by

partisan identification, support for the Tea Party, religious beliefs, and certain demographic

variables including gender, race, and education levels. In Florida, however, environmental

attitudes are not determined by partisan identification when other explanatory variables are

available. Florida environmental opinion differences are strongly associated with ideology, and

opinions regarding the Tea Party and elected officials. Gender and race are weakly associated

with Florida environmental attitudes. When considering environmental policy questions utilizing

only the more limited variables available in the Amendment One data, partisan identification

becomes statistically significant regarding environmental matters. These findings support the

idea that environmental issues in Florida remain somewhat bipartisan; and that the differences in

environmental support are more correctly identified as a split between Tea Party supporters and

non-Tea Party supporters, rather than a split between Florida Democrats and Florida

Republicans. Nationally, there appears to be a split both between Republicans and Democrats

and between Tea Party Republicans and non-Tea Party Republicans.

The results of this thesis have implications for further research, for political activists and

candidates, and for environmental activists. Environmental support is increasing identified with

particular groups or attitudes. The period effects of terrorism and economic decline, the

emergence of the Tea Party, and the demonstrable effects of environmental attitudes upon

political action since Guber’s book-length study (2003) call for a new comprehensive analysis of

environmentalism in America and in Florida. The finding that multiple environmental issues

separately or together explain candidate choice indicates that there is an environmental vote. This

aspect should be studied in future presidential elections, and expanded into statewide and local

elections. The CCES 2012 data offers the opportunity to study multiple states with large numbers

of respondents to see if the same cleavages exist in states without the same economy so based on

the environment, as does Florida. Environmentalism seems to have become part of the “Big

Sort” of American (Bishop & Cushing 2008) and Florida politics.

The proponents of the theory that environmentalism is a postmaterial value may well

argue that effect of environmental opinions on presidential vote choice as found in this study

actually is a proxy measure of postmaterialism. Neither the CCES data set nor the Amendment

One data include any of Inglehart’s Materialist/Postmaterialist question sets, leaving the impact

of postmaterialistic socialization and worldview on Florida environmental attitudes unresolved in

this study. The cohort data in the CCES data, and the findings in both the CCES and Amendment

One data that younger and older respondents both express higher levels of environmental support

across multiple issues, hint at potential shortcomings in the Postmaterialist theory to explain

environmental attitudes. As anticipated by the Postmaterialist analysts, levels of

proenvironmental support increase in new cohorts, up to a certain point, after which the percent

of highest levels of pro-environmental support decline. The even younger cohorts would be

expected to show more impact of the socialization in a secure and affluent America. The

declining levels of the highest levels of environmental support among the most recent cohorts

indicates that other socialization forces, such as a concerned anti-environmental

countermovement, reduce or even outweigh any Postmaterial worldview. A data set including the

Materialist/Postmaterialist questions, as well as the extensive attitudinal and demographic

variables in the CCES data would be beneficial to help answer whether there is a Postmaterialist

explanation for variance in environmental attitudes nationally and in Florida.

Political activists from the two major political parties will be expected to draw clear lines

on environmental issues. Environmentalism and anti-environmentalism may become increasingly

a wedge issue, a base mobilization issue, and a voting cue. It will be increasingly risky for

moderate and establishment candidates in Republican primaries to accept the science of climatic

change or take pro-environmental positions for fear of a well-funded Tea Party- backed primary

opponent.

Environmental activists should craft environmental constitutional proposals in Florida

likely to pass without attracting a well-funded opposition; and generally mobilize environmental

support more effectively at the federal, state, and local levels by appeals to those groups most

likely to support environmental issues. Because of the limited number of control questions in the

Amendment One data, this research, at best, describes only some “elements” (in honor of Strunk

& White’s The Elements of Style) but not all aspects of the coalition necessary to reach 60%

voter support for future environmental constitutional amendments in Florida. In addition to the

Democratic voters, largely expected to support a pro-environmental constitutional amendment,

activists should target female and non-Tea Party Republicans, as those Republicans most likely

to vote Republican on the partisan ballot but environmentally on the amendment ballot. Activists

in Florida seem to continue to have initial support among all groups for environmental measures.

A notable feature of the support in each subgroup for Amendment One is that approximately

50% of every group expressed “probable” support for Amendment One (Table 4). If any shadow

of generalized environmental support remains in Florida politics, the uniformity in probable

support (even in groups with lower levels of definite support and higher levels of opposition to

Amendment One) demonstrates that the starting point for assessment of Amendment One was a

desire to “support” the environment. Even with the political “Big Sort” and increasing divides

nationally and in Florida on environmentalism, future limited Florida constitutional ballot

amendments on generally popular and non-controversial environmental matters should expect

voter approval. A constitutional ballot amendment mandating a 20% reduction in carbon

emissions in Florida, on the other hand, would be expected to garner intense ideological

opposition, and raise serious questions regarding the ability of proponents to obtain enough

Republican support – Tea Party or not – to reach the 60% approval vote necessary to be adopted.

Nothing about Amendment One triggered any organized opposition willing to fund an

extensive anti-Amendment One campaign. Amendment One did not create a new program;

funding was not from general tax revenues but from a specific revenue source, paid only by

persons purchasing real property. Opponents to Amendment One raised only esoteric arguments

of keeping the Florida Constitution free of funding mandates and concerns that other groups

would tie up future funding by constitutional mandate. Neither argument seemed likely to trigger

the role of government or cost of program concerns that could have increased opposition and

made achieving supermajority voter support more problematic. Opponents may well have

overlooked a possible argument that would have reduced that generalized support for certain

groups: that much of Florida land is already owned by the federal and state governments; and

that Amendment One should be opposed for concerns of limiting private property rights and to

avoid ‘big government.’ Currently for the 2016 ballot, there is a solar power constitutional

amendment, proposed by business interests to oppose government regulation of solar energy.

Another group is promoting another solar power related constitutional amendment with on-going

governmental regulation. While neither proposal has yet achieved the required number of petition

signatures to be placed on the ballot, both propositions on the ballot would make competing

arguments and would be attempting to mobilize different segments of the Florida voting

population.

Environmental attitudes and beliefs cannot be dismissed as simply personal behaviors,

inconsequential for political action. Environmentalism has become one of many organizing and

sorting influencing in American (and Floridian) civic and political society; and an important

force in motivating and explaining political behavior.

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