Discussion 5
Response
A. Definitions and Activities of Response
It is very likely that when you hear or think about emergency management, you
immediately think about the response phase of disaster. You might envision yourself
working in an ultramodern, high-tech emergency operations center (EOC),
simultaneously monitoring network news coverage on multiple flat-panel televisions,
keeping a close eye on your computer screen as response activities are logged and
updated at near real-time speed into an advanced decision support software program, and
handling nonstop telephone calls from colleagues out in the field and media seeking a
good quote. Indeed, the image of a strong leader asserting command and control over a
chaotic situation is one that many people have of the emergency manager. We will refer
to this as the “command post” image of the emergency manager. Despite the
pervasiveness, and the appeal even, of this imagery, it is not entirely accurate. In fact, if
your idea of an emergency manager is a person whose days are action-packed and spent
in the EOC making split-second, life and death decisions, then you will likely be
disappointed by the profession. There will be some of that, to be sure, but most of your
time will not be spent in the trenches. Rather, you will spend time working to make the
trench time effective, efficient, and smooth.
As we have discussed throughout this book, the life cycle of disasters includes
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. Because you will spread your time
across all four phases, because actual disaster events are relatively rare, and because
emergency managers have numerous job responsibilities, it is simply inaccurate to
assume that most of your time will be spent managing response efforts. However, it is
accurate to assume that you will spend a great deal of time thinking about response
activities. The time you spend on preparedness-related activities, for example, including
educating the public about the hazards and risks in your community, talking with
organizations such as schools and businesses, and conducting drills and exercises, will
pay tremendous dividends when it comes to responding to an actual disaster. Similarly, if
your community takes effective, proactive steps to mitigate possible threats, it is likely
that disaster impacts will be less severe and enable more manageable responses. While
response is the most prevalent phase in the common view of the emergency manager’s
work, the concept of comprehensive EM assumes that the other phases are equally
important.
Another reason the command post view of the emergency manager comes to mind
so readily is the common notion that disasters create chaos and social disorganization. In
all that confusion, it is assumed by many that we need a calm, level-headed leader to
make the right decisions and keep everyone else in line. The concept that disasters create
chaos and massive social breakdown, however, is a myth. Instead, as we will see,
individuals, organizations, and communities typically show remarkable resilience in the
face of disasters. As Dynes (2003) points out, we continually find “order in disorder” in
the immediate aftermaths of large-scale disasters like the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. Similarly, Drabek (2013) characterizes the post-disaster environment as
“organized-disorganization.” However, for reasons we will discuss in this chapter, many
people, including some EM professionals, continue to believe that chaos prevails in
disasters. As a result, the command post image of the emergency manager persists in the
minds of many.
Because it envisions a chaotic scene after a disaster, the command post image also
assumes that the best way to effectively manage a disaster is to assert strong command
and control over the situation. According to Dynes (1994), this command-and-control
model of EM is based on numerous false assumptions and inappropriate analogies.
Generally, it assumes that civil society is fragile, and the post-disaster environment is like
a wartime scenario. In the absence of a strong and assertive leadership, the expectation is
that lawlessness and anarchy will spread. From this perspective, based largely on a
military model of leadership, the emergency manager is essentially a commander,
establishing firm control over a situation and unilaterally issuing orders to others. As we
will see in this chapter, however, emergency managers are much more effective when
they emphasize coordination and communication instead of command and control. The
post-disaster environment is fluid, dynamic, and constantly changing. Decisions must be
made quickly, often based on very limited information. In those circumstances, a rigid,
hierarchical, and centralized approach is likely to fail. Instead, a decentralized, flexible,
problem-solving approach is much better suited to the complexities of the response phase
of a disaster (Dynes 1994; Neal and Phillips 1995). Therefore, in sharp contrast to the
command post image, it is much more accurate to view EM professionals as managers
and coordinators, not as commanders.
Disaster-induced demands arise from the needs to care for victims and deal with
physical damage and social disruption caused by the event. Response-induced demands
are far less obvious but equally important and challenging for emergency managers. They
include the need to coordinate the activities of the multitude of individuals and
organizations involved in the response. As we will see later in this chapter, response-
induced demands are plentiful in the wake of a disaster because so many different types
of actors and organizations – some without clearly delineated disaster responsibilities –
become involved in response efforts.
Given the involvement of so many different individuals, groups, and agencies and
the pressing needs brought on by disasters, the response period is typically packed with
activity. Common components of the response effort include activating the EOC, warning
the public, notifying appropriate authorities, mobilizing personnel and resources,
initiating evacuation, opening shelters, providing medical services, search-and-rescue
operations, and many others. To more accurately describe response activities, Drabek
(1986) separates them into pre-impact mobilization and postimpact emergency action
subphases. Pre-impact mobilization involves warning the public, initiating evacuation,
and establishing shelters. Postimpact emergency actions include searching for survivors
and providing medical care to the injured.
Emergency assessment includes monitoring hazards (natural, technological, and
human-induced) in your community and assessing damages and other impacts when a
disaster occurs. One of the main tasks of an emergency manager after a disaster is to
conduct an emergency assessment, which in the U.S. initiates the process of applying for
a presidential disaster declaration that releases federal disaster funding. To conduct a
preliminary damage assessment (PDA), capable investigators enter the field to determine
how bad things are after a tornado, flood, or earthquake has struck. The initial PDA,
which will be followed by a more thorough investigation once the area is accessible,
typically involves a “windshield survey” in which the EM team drives through the area
and identifies quickly the number of houses, businesses, and infrastructure components
compromised. To do so, they generally designate three levels: destroyed, major damage,
and minor damage and tally a straightforward account of the apparent damage. Aerial
reconnaissance and satellite imagery can also be used to assess damage, but, as with the
windshield survey, the visual images just cannot reach inside a building. Therefore, the
PDA is followed by more careful assessments made by qualified engineers to determine
if buildings are safe to reenter or need to be torn down. The PDA thus serves to safeguard
the public, determine the amount of damage to qualify for outside aid, and set up
parameters by which voluntary organizations will determine the extent of their assistance.
The PDA is, in short, the key step that bridges response into recovery.
Expedient hazard mitigation refers to activities undertaken just prior to or shortly
after the onset of a disaster – sandbagging in a flood and boarding windows in a hurricane
– aimed at protecting lives and containing damage. Protective response involves all the
activities we typically think about in relation to disasters, including search and rescue,
emergency medical services, sheltering, and others. Incident management requires
establishing an EOC, interagency and intergovernmental coordination, media
communications and public information activities, documentation, and administrative and
logistic support. As an emergency manager, it is highly unlikely that you would ever be
directly involved in all these response activities. However, it is important that you
understand what happens and will happen in your community after a disaster. It is even
more important that you understand how best to facilitate coordination of all those
activities, foster communication among all the responding entities, and recognize the
value of flexibility in maximizing the effectiveness of your community’s response to a
disaster.
B. Disaster Warnings
Warning the public of an impending threat is a critical first step in responding to
disasters. Of course, disasters vary significantly in predictability and length of
forewarning. At one extreme, for example, hurricanes can be spotted and tracked well in
advance, giving emergency managers and other public officials hours or possibly even
days to establish an EOC, mobilize necessary resources, and urge the public to take
appropriate protective actions. At the other extreme, an earthquake or chemical plant
explosion offers virtually no advance warning. Between these extremes, tornadoes can be
located and tracked fairly accurately, giving local officials some time, even if only
minutes, to alert the public. Because of the great variability in forewarnings of disasters,
it is critical in the preparedness phase for emergency managers to educate the public
about the hazards in their communities, test their disaster warning systems, and provide
clear guidelines for people and organizations to follow in the event of a disaster when
every second counts.
In some sense, therefore, warnings can be considered both a preparedness and
response activity. In the interests of simplicity and clarity of presentation, we will focus
in this chapter only on actual disaster warnings and treat them accordingly as response
activities. You should recognize however that while disaster warnings fall under response
activities, other types of risk communication cut across the phases of disaster and focus
on preparedness, recovery, and mitigation. Public education campaigns that seek to
inform the public about common causes of wildfires and house fires or about the value of
flood insurance are intended to prevent disasters from occurring in the first place or
persuading people to take preventive measures that will assist them to respond to or
recover from a disaster. In weather forecasting, a distinction is made between watches
and warnings. Watches indicate that conditions are favorable for the emergence of a
tornado, blizzard, hurricane, or ice storm. A warning indicates that a storm has been
spotted. If these efforts are effective, people will pay attention to emergency warnings
and respond appropriately, lessening the burdens on EM agencies and first responders. In
this section, our primary objective is to gain a better understanding of the disaster
warning process and the factors that enhance the effectiveness of warnings. An effective
disaster warning persuades people and organizations to take appropriate protective
actions. Disaster warnings have been studied extensively for more than 40 years and we
have learned a great deal (Sorensen 2000; Sorensen and Vogt-Sorensen 2006).
Nevertheless, public officials continue to stumble, as evidenced in Hawaii in 2018 when
authorities mistakenly issued a false warning to the public about an impending ballistic
missile attack.
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, some observers were surprised that so many
people did not evacuate New Orleans at the urging of the city’s mayor. Many observers
attributed much of the suffering and human tragedy that ensued to the failures of some
individuals to make the right decisions and leave the area. Inherent in that view, however,
are the assumptions that everyone in the impacted area received warning messages; that
the messages were clear and interpreted in the same way by all who received them; and
that the residents had a level playing field in terms of ability to evacuate. In reality,
people do not always receive and interpret warning messages in the same manner;
messages are not always effectively worded and delivered; and social factors such as
socioeconomic status, disability, and others impact the ability of people to heed warnings
and take protective actions. At first glance, the warning process seems simple and
straightforward: public officials issue a warning and people comply with the instructions
in the warning. Research, however, suggests that warnings are far more complex. As
depicted in Figure 7.1, warning is a social process that involves several steps (Mileti
1999, p. 191; Sorensen and Vogt-Sorensen 2006, p. 191; National Research Council
2010, p. 8). As shown, there is a long way to go from public officials issuing a warning to
the point where people and organizations take protective action. Every step presents
uncertainties and intervening factors that can negatively impact the process.
By issuing disaster warnings, emergency managers and other public officials hope
to enhance life safety by urging citizens and organizations within their communities to
take appropriate protective actions. Of course, the nature of a hazard determines what
protective actions are appropriate. In the case of a tornado, for example, people are
typically urged to get below ground or go to the center of their houses so that the walls
protect against outside threats. However, in the days before a hurricane makes landfall,
people may be asked to leave the area. At times, the primary purpose of a message is
simply to urge people to stay tuned for more information and direct them to appropriate
sources for additional information. During the winter months when inclement weather is
expected, for example, public schools and universities often issue press releases and post
announcements on their websites telling people to tune in to certain radio and television
stations for important information about opening delays or cancellations. For community-
wide disasters, the primary protective actions are temporary sheltering and evacuation.
Over the years, researchers have learned a tremendous amount about these measures and
the insights they gained are extremely relevant to the practice of EM. If you are involved
in setting up temporary shelters during a disaster, you may be surprised when very few
people use them. Similarly, if you are involved in issuing an evacuation warning in your
community, you may feel frustrated when many people stay put and ignore the warning.
Researchers have consistently uncovered these patterns of behavior in their studies of
numerous disasters, so we should not be surprised when people do not evacuate or utilize
public shelters. In fact, by familiarizing themselves with research findings on sheltering
and evacuation, public officials may dramatically improve their ability to persuade the
public to take protective actions.
Sheltering and housing activities cut across the phases of disasters, beginning in
the response phase and sometimes continuing through much of the recovery. In this
section, we primarily consider temporary or emergency sheltering that falls into two
broad types: public shelters and sheltering in place. Sheltering in place is a very common
response to some hazards such as tornadoes. It involves urging people to stay where they
are and giving them specific instructions on how best to protect themselves. For example,
advice in a tornado is to seek shelter in a basement, storm cellar, or interior room of a
house or building. A chemical or hazardous materials release may require that people
remain indoors with windows closed and air conditioning systems turned off. Public
sheltering, on the other hand, involves urging people to evacuate their homes and go to
designated locations for safety. These locations often include school gymnasiums,
common areas in churches, and large arenas, stadiums, or convention centers. In the U.S.
we are starting to see communities, in areas of high risk, building congregate shelters to
host hundreds of people at risk in a hardened facility.
In reviewing the major research findings on sheltering, we will limit discussion to
public sheltering, which follows an official recommendation for people to evacuate a
hazardous area. As mentioned previously, emergency managers may be puzzled when so
few people actually show up at community shelters during and immediately after a
disaster. Researchers have known about this pattern for a very long time. For example, in
his comprehensive review of several decades of research on the topics of evacuation and
sheltering, Drabek (1986) conclusively determined that most people in disaster-impacted
communities do not go to public shelters. Where do people go after a disaster, if not to
public shelters? In every disaster, of course, a number of people will simply stay put.
During the 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens in the state of Washington, a local resident
named Harry Truman stubbornly refused to evacuate despite several warnings, and he is
presumed to have died and been buried under several feet of ash from the volcano.
According to Drabek (1986, 2010), most people who evacuate during a disaster will go to
the homes of friends or relatives. While it is impossible for you to know ahead of time
exactly how many people in your community will refuse to evacuate, how many will seek
refuge with friends or family, and how many will use public shelters, you do not want, as
many emergency managers do, to overestimate the amount of shelter use.
Researchers have also identified numerous individual- and householdlevel factors
affecting warning responses and protective actions (Mileti 1999). These factors include
gender, race, socioeconomic status, education level, knowledge and risk perception, and
presence of children. While some of these factors positively impact the warning process,
others decrease the likelihood that people will take protective action. Based on past
research, it appears that protective actions are more likely to be engaged in by women,
households with children, and those with higher socioeconomic status. Additionally,
warning messages have more positive impacts on people with higher levels of education,
greater knowledge about and heightened perception of risk, and those with more
community involvement. On the other hand, racial and ethnic minorities, people of lower
socioeconomic status, and those with less education are less positively impacted by
official warnings and less likely to take protective actions. Social class significantly
shapes exposure to hazards and the ability to escape them, as was dramatically revealed
in Hurricane Katrina when many people simply did not have the necessary resources,
including cars, to get out of the city. Another factor stems from credibility of the person
issuing the warning. A person issuing a warning should be as similar as possible to the
population the warning should reach. Imagine, for example, someone with a New Jersey
accent trying to convince someone in the Deep South to evacuate. A familiar voice will
appear credible and thus motivate higher compliance.
Another impediment to public sheltering emerges when people believe that a
shelter may not be ready for them. People with disabilities, for example, fear that shelters
may not be able to accommodate their needs or perhaps a previous experience was
unpleasant (van Willigen et al. 2002). We may also erroneously assume that everyone is
warned. National Weather Service meteorologists noted a “hole” in the weather warning
system: many systems bypass people with hearing disabilities (Wood and Weisman
2003). Senior citizens may prefer to remain in the comfort of their homes where they
have medications, assistive devices, neighbors or family to help them, and pets to comfort
them. Both groups experience lower incomes than the general public and have difficulties
affording travel to, at, and from a shelter.
Other factors you may not have considered are far less intuitive. After Hurricane
Katrina and other events, we learned that one major impediment to people seeking safety
in public shelters was care of pets and service animals (Heath et al. 2001). Public shelters
typically do not allow pets, even though owners, particularly the elderly, consider pets
essential members of their families and are reluctant to leave them behind. Moreover,
service animals provide necessary assistance to the vision impaired. Although public
shelters are mandated to accept service animals (U.S. Department of Justice n.d.), not
every shelter provider understands this (National Organization on Disability 2005).
Another less obvious impediment to evacuating and seeking refuge in public shelters is
the fear of looting (Drabek 2010). As we will see later in this chapter, the idea that
looting and stealing are rampant after a disaster is a major myth to which many people
subscribe. Although these crimes are rare, people nevertheless make decisions about what
protective actions they take on the basis of the looting myth. They fear that looters will
target their property and steal their belongings if they leave their homes.
Finally, we would be remiss if we did not also consider disaster warnings
themselves as potential impediments to protective actions. Public officials sometimes
wait too long to issue a warning; issue a warning that is too vague about who will be
impacted by the impending threat and what actions should be taken; or convey
contradictory messages to the public as events unfold. Because it is important for you to
understand how to craft warning messages that are timely and accurate and effectively
persuade as many people as possible to get out of harm’s way, the next section discusses
the researchbased characteristics of effective warning systems.
Effective warning messages persuade those who receive them to take appropriate
protective actions. Several established warning systems have been in operation for many
years and new technologies promise to expand the reach and enhance the effectiveness of
disaster warnings. Established warning systems include outdoor sirens used to warn of
tornadoes and other weather events, the Emergency Alert System that scrolls messages
across television screens, weather radio, and others. Newer technologies include cell
phones, short message service (SMS) and text alerts, and social media websites including
Facebook and Twitter (NRC 2010; Sutton et al. 2015; Canales, Pope, and Maestas 2019;
Wehde, Pudlo, and Robinson 2019). In the wake of the tragic shootings at Virginia Tech
University in 2007 many universities across the U.S. implemented text alert systems for
informing students, faculty, and staff about emergencies on campus and providing brief
instructions on what to do. While researchers and EM professionals are hopeful that the
new technologies can fill crucial gaps left by the older warning systems, we also must be
mindful of the limitations of technology. Social media, for example, which has emerged
as such an important tool for communicating risk and disaster information, can also be a
major source of misinformation. To address that issue, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has launched a rumor control page to share trusted sources
of information and discourage others from sharing information from unverified sources.
Although research is fairly clear on what constitutes an effective disaster warning,
warning systems that largely ignore the guidelines continue to be devised. For example,
consider Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Homeland Security Advisory
System (HSAS) put into place by Homeland Security Presidential Directive #3 and
unveiled by the newly created DHS in the months following the attacks of September 11,
2001. Its purpose was to educate the public about the threat of terrorism, inform them
about changes in risk levels, and encourage them to take precautionary measures. To
achieve those objectives, a color-coded scheme was implemented in which green
indicated a low risk of terrorist attacks, blue indicated a general risk, yellow indicated a
significant risk, orange indicated a high risk, and red indicated a severe risk. However,
based on the characteristics of effective disaster warnings described in this section, the
HSAS had major shortcomings. As Aguirre (2004) aptly demonstrated, the terrorism alert
system offered only a vague description of the hazard, was nonspecific in terms of to
whom or even what region it applied, and failed to provide explicit instructions as to what
people should do to protect themselves.
To better understand what constitutes an effective disaster warning system,
consider news network coverage of severe weather in “tornado alley.” If you live in or
visit Texas, Oklahoma, or Kansas in the spring, you will undoubtedly experience severe
weather and television coverage of it. During a typical broadcast, after a tornado has been
spotted, meteorologists and weather forecasters inform viewers of its precise path,
including its future trajectory and time estimates. Importantly, they tell viewers exactly
what to do when the storm reaches their area. For example, viewers are typically told to
go to a basement, storm cellar, or the center of the house away from windows. If you find
yourself responsible for writing a disaster warning message in the future, think about the
contrast between a detailed, highly specific tornado warning and the vague, ambiguous
terrorism warning. To maximize the effectiveness of your warning message, model it
more after the tornado warning than the terrorism alert.
C. Myths and Realities
Despite what we have learned over the years about effective disaster warnings,
some emergency managers and other public officials are still sometimes hesitant or
reluctant to issue warnings to the public. Like the individual who refuses to go to a
shelter out of fear of his or her home being looted, some officials fear that a premature
warning will spark widespread panic in their communities. Indeed, fears about looting
and panic in the aftermaths of disasters are fairly widespread among the public, and
alarmingly, even among emergency managers. Looting and other antisocial behaviors are
exceedingly rare in disasters and commonly called myths by researchers (Fischer 2008).
In this section, we will explore these and other response myths in much greater detail,
identify some of the sources of these myths, and contrast them with a more realistic,
research-based view of the response phase.
At the most basic level, the myth- and the research-based views differ in terms of
what they assume about social order in disasters. The myth-based view assumes that
society is fragile and disasters cause a breakdown in social order, which leads to
lawlessness, conflict, and chaos. However, the research-based view recognizes that
society is resilient and disasters typically result in increased helping behavior, consensus,
and enhanced social solidarity during the response phase. In fact, since the early 1950s,
researchers have continually attempted to debunk the myths of disaster and instead
document the recuperative and resilient capacities of societies (Quarantelli 1960; Fritz
1961; Quarantelli and Dynes 1977; Fischer 2008). In this section, the myth- and research-
based views are contrasted in terms of how they characterize disaster response at the
individual, organizational, and community levels. The myth-based view assumes that
individuals will suffer from reduced coping capacity, organizations will lack personnel,
and communities will be torn apart. Conversely, the research-based view recognizes that
individuals will actively contribute to the response effort, organizations will adapt and
change to meet heightened demands, and communities will exhibit significant resilience.
When most people think of disasters, the myth-based view often comes
immediately to mind. They envision massive piles of rubble, burning fires, blaring sirens,
and traumatized victims milling around a devastated town. Under these tragic
circumstances, it is difficult for many people to imagine anything but chaos and disorder.
Associated with this imagery is the notion that the best way of dealing with the aftermath
of a disaster is for authorities to swoop in and establish strong command and control over
the highly disorganized scene. At the individual level, the myth-based view assumes that
panic and psychological breakdown will impede the ability of people to respond in an
orderly, rational, and productive manner. In the simplest sense of the term, panic refers to
highly individualistic or selfish, nonrational flight behavior accompanied by a complete
disregard for social rules and attachments (Quarantelli 1954). Thus, the epitome of a
panic-stricken person would be a person who abandons their own child to escape an
impending threat or one who pushes, shoves, and tramples others to escape a burning
building. The myth-based view assumes that because panic is a common response to
disaster, emergency officials should postpone warning the public of a hazard until
absolutely necessary. It also assumes that a major part of the official response will
involve controlling and containing all the panicked people in the community.
At the organizational level, the myth-based view assumes that organizations will
suffer personnel shortages and be largely ineffective. This assumption has two major
components. First, it is often assumed that the only organizations that will respond will be
those with clearly delineated disaster responsibilities such as police and fire departments
and hospitals. Second, in light of the centrality of these organizations to the response
effort, there is concern about the problem of role abandonment. Role abandonment is the
failure of emergency workers to report to work and instead tend to their own personal or
family needs. Because the myth-based view assumes that emergency-relevant
organizations will not receive much help from other agencies and individuals in the
community, the fear is that the effects of a disaster will be exacerbated if emergency
workers do not report to work. Disaster myths also assume that organizations must assert
strong command and control to counter the panicked and selfish responses of individuals,
and that it is best to conform to rigid bureaucratic policies and procedures.
If panic, looting, and social breakdown are myths, why do so many people,
including the public, government officials, and even some emergency managers, believe
them? As discussed in the next section, these myths persist despite several decades of
debunking research. We can identify at least three primary reasons for the persistence of
disaster myths. First, the mass media certainly plays a role in perpetuating disaster myths
(Fischer 2008). In an effort to capture the attention of readers, listeners, and viewers (and
thus satisfy advertisers), media outlets typically sensationalize disasters, focusing
primarily on rare and isolated cases of antisocial behavior and presenting them as the
norms rather than the exceptions. Second, as Tierney (2003) points out, various
institutional interests benefit from depicting disasters as chaotic and lawless, including
private security firms, advanced technology companies, and those seeking to establish an
increased role for the military in civilian disaster response operations. Finally, Quarantelli
(2002) suggests that the myth of panic and social breakdown may serve a useful function
for society at large. Drawing insights from a classical sociologist named Emile Durkheim
who argued that images of crime and criminals are functional for society because they
reaffirm the importance of social rules, Quarantelli similarly suggests that perhaps images
of panic, chaos, and social breakdown remind us all of the need to conform to cultural
norms, maintain social relationships, and preserve social order, even during disasters.
The research-based view of disaster response contrasts sharply with the myth-
based view. Its central premise is that individuals, organizations, and communities exhibit
resilience in the face of disaster. In this context, resilience refers to the ability of
individuals and social units to absorb and rebound from the impacts of a disaster. As will
be discussed in more detail later in this section, certain vulnerable populations are at
greater risk and some individuals, organizations, and communities rebound more easily
and quickly than others, but the overall pattern of resilience is well established in the
research literature (Dynes 2003). At the individual level, the research-based view
recognizes that disaster survivors will participate actively in the response effort (Yang
2021). Indeed, individuals possess important coping skills, and in times of disaster they
typically exhibit remarkable self-efficacy and respond in an altruistic and caring manner.
In virtually every disaster, survivors are typically the first responders on a scene,
initiating search-and-rescue activities and providing preliminary care to the injured. This
pattern was on vivid display during Hurricane Harvey in Houston in 2017 when dozens
of citizen responders used their personal watercraft to conduct successful water rescues
throughout the flooded city.
Rather than having to control panic-stricken people as they flee en masse,
emergency managers instead find themselves struggling to manage and coordinate all the
people and donations that quickly arrive at disaster scenes and in some instances, remain
or return for long periods of time (Nelan, Penta, and Wachtendorf 2019; Nelan, Zavar,
and Ray 2020; Penta, Wachtendorf, and Nelan 2020). This mass influx of people and
supplies at the scene of a disaster is known as convergence behavior. In the first
systematic study of the issue, Fritz and Mathewson (1957) identified several types of
people who converge on a disaster site: returning survivors, curious spectators,
volunteers, and those who seek to exploit the situation for economic gain. In addition to
this kind of personal convergence, these researchers also discussed informational
convergence, which in today’s world would certainly include the mass media and its
round-the-clock coverage of disasters, and material convergence – heavy equipment,
other relief supplies, and donated items. In a much later study of convergence behavior,
Neal (1994, 1995) documented the problems emergency managers faced in South Florida
following Hurricane Andrew in 1992 when they were bombarded with unrequested
donations, including winter coats and mismatched shoes. A similar pattern of excessive
donations followed the explosion of a fertilizer plant in West Texas in 2013 and a tragic
mass shooting at an elementary school in Newtown, Connecticut, in 2012. As Box 7.2
illustrates, the continuing problem of convergence and unrequested donations remains
one of the most prominent unlearned lessons related to disaster response.
As far as the panic myth is concerned, extensive research suggests that it is rare or
nonexistent (Quarantelli 1954, 1957; Johnson 1987, 1988; Clarke and Chess 2008).
Norris Johnson (1987), a leading authority, studied victim behavior in a major nightclub
fire in which 160 people perished and a crowd surge at a rock concert where 11 people
died. On the basis of extensive research, he concluded that in both instances social norms
and attachments continued to regulate behavior. For example, in the crowd surge, he
found that people upheld norms of civility as evidenced by the fact that helping behavior
became widespread. Moreover, helping behavior appeared to have been guided by
prevailing gender role expectations. Specifically, he found that most women reported
receiving help, while men were twice as likely to report giving than receiving help. In
terms of social attachments, he found in the nightclub fire that the overwhelming
tendency was for patrons to attempt to evacuate in the same social groupings – friends
and family members – with whom they arrived, a very common phenomenon in building
fires.
The issue of psychological stress and impairment has also been the subject of
extensive research (for an excellent summary, see Edwards 1998). The basic conclusion
is that disasters are capable of producing both negative and positive mental health effects.
While the myth-based view focuses only on the negative effects and the debilitating
impacts on individuals, the researchbased view also calls attention to the possible positive
effects. As Fritz (1961, p. 657) states, “The traditional emphasis on pathological
‘problems’ has focused only on the destructive and disintegrative effects of disaster; it
has wholly neglected the observable reconstructive and regenerative human responses.”
Thus, although we should certainly be sensitive to the mental health needs of disaster
survivors, we also need to recognize that survivors often experience heightened feelings
of solidarity with others around them and a sense of empowerment as they contribute
actively to a response effort. This is not to say that there is no need for psychological
services after disasters, but just as they do with public sheltering decisions, emergency
managers and other public officials sometimes dramatically overestimate demands for
mental health services.
At the organizational level, the research-based view suggests that organizations
are adaptive and resilient in the face of disasters. Rather than having to deal with
personnel shortages from role abandonment, as assumed by the myth-based view,
research suggests that organizations, especially those with disaster-related
responsibilities, will instead be confronted with a massive onslaught of workers and
volunteers. Consider the search-and-rescue and clean-up efforts at Ground Zero
following the attacks on the World Trade Center. Firefighters, police officers,
construction workers, and volunteers from all parts of the country toiled in the rubble for
months, working exceedingly long hours and stopping only periodically to recuperate or
attend funerals. Far from abandoning their roles, these workers overextended themselves,
even placing their own health and safety at risk. Many of the first responders later
suffered serious health problems as a result of the toxic exposures they faced at the site of
the disaster, and as a result, the U.S. government passed legislation to address their
medical needs.
At the community level, the research-based view emphasizes resilience and social
order rather than lawlessness and social breakdown. Instead of stealing from and fighting
with each other, disaster survivors are much more likely to assist family members,
friends, and neighbors. This increase in helping behavior after disasters led early
researchers in the field to characterize the post-disaster environment as therapeutic in
some respects for disasterstricken communities. For example, Fritz (1961, p. 694) argued,
“Contrary to the traditional pictures of man and society in the process of disintegration,
disaster studies show that human societies have enormous resilience and recuperative
power.”
Researchers have identified various sources of community resilience in the face of
disasters. First, although they are certainly tragic when they occur and disruptive to those
they impact, many disasters are relatively low-impact events in relation to remaining
community and societal resources, which allows societies to largely absorb the effects
(Wright et al. 1979). Second, disasters are collectively shared experiences that often
produce a unifying effect, whereby people feel heightened attachment to and
responsibility for others and social distinctions and inequalities are temporarily
suspended (Fritz 1961). Third, during a disaster, an emergency consensus typically arises,
whereby community priorities that ordinarily are subject to competition and debate are
simplified and oriented toward life safety activities (Dynes 1970). Finally, social capital,
including cultural values, social norms and obligations, social relationships, and cultural
traditions, ensures community survival and provides guidance and resources for
responding to disasters.
Researchers also recognize however that disasters can and do produce negative
effects and that societies can do much more to prevent them (Tierney 2014). Indeed,
Tierney (2007) cautions researchers against overstating or exaggerating what she refers to
as the “good news” paradigm in disaster research. Researchers have begun to identify
various limitations of community resilience. First, for example, catastrophic events may
severely limit the ability of a community or society to effectively rebound. The scope and
magnitude of impact of a catastrophe, such as Hurricane Maria that caused massive
damage in Puerto Rico in 2017, are so wide and devastating that even the capacity of
surrounding communities to offer assistance is diminished. It is important to note
however that even in catastrophes, people remain capable of and typically do exhibit pro-
social, helping behavior, as demonstrated in Hurricane Katrina.
Second, as discussed throughout the text, vulnerable populations, including the
elderly, racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, and others, often suffer much greater
impacts from disasters and steeper challenges responding to and recovering from them.
Third, problematic pre-disaster conditions such as high crime rates and widespread
political corruption may also limit the ability of a community to respond in a productive,
pro-social manner, as these same dynamics will likely play out during the disaster
(Fischer 2008). Fourth, a growing body of research in the field of environmental
sociology suggests that technological disasters such as oil spills, rather than producing
the therapeutic effects commonly observed in natural disasters, may instead create
corrosive communities characterized by heightened psychological stress, intensified
conflict over whom is to blame, and in some cases prolonged litigation.
Finally, some types of disasters, such as riots, can involve intense conflict
between first responders and community members, and in some cases, the response effort
is actually thwarted by crowd members throwing rocks, bottles, and other objects at
responders and otherwise attempting to undermine the response effort. These kinds of
confrontations have occurred in several U.S. cities in recent years, including Baltimore,
Maryland (2014), Ferguson, Missouri (2015), and Minneapolis, Minnesota (2020), where
controversial police killings of civilians sparked widespread protests. In light of the
conflict that accompanies these kinds of events, researchers have historically made a
distinction between natural disasters, which typically evoke consensus and solidarity and
conflict-type events, such as riots, which involve intentional acts of property damage and
disruption.
D. Disaster Response in an International Context
The myths and realities of human response to disaster discussed in this chapter are
based largely on research conducted on events in the U.S. In light of that fact, it is
reasonable to question whether the same kinds of response patterns would be present in
another country. Do people in other countries respond to natural disasters in the same
pro-social manner described above? Do they rely as heavily on informal social networks,
including family and friends? Does the outpouring of support occur in response to
international disasters? The simplest answer to these questions is that there are some
basic similarities in disaster responses across countries but there are also important
differences. At the most basic level, international research suggests that societies across
the globe exhibit varying degrees of resilience in responding to disasters. In the
wealthiest, most developed countries of the world such as the U.S., Canada, Australia,
Japan, E.U. nations, and others, disaster impacts are typically absorbed relatively
effectively, and the general response pattern resembles the research-based view of
response described in this chapter. While the financial impacts of disasters in those
nations can be very high, loss of human life is typically relatively low. Indeed, on
virtually any indicator, including financial loss, damage to the built environment, and
death toll, the ratio of disaster impacts to remaining societal resources is usually
relatively low in the most developed nations.
However, disaster impacts on all these dimensions are typically very high in
developing nations and in the least developed countries of the world (Kulstad-González
2019; Rayamajhee and Bohara 2019; Kroll et al. 2021). But the initial social response to
disaster in those countries is often very similar to the pattern observed in developed
nations, including survivors actively engaging in search and rescue and other activities;
friends, family members, and neighbors helping each other; and volunteers, supplies, and
resources converging on the scene. In other words, social capital such as interpersonal
relationships, community ties, cultural traditions, and other factors serves as a source of
survival and resilience in all societies, from the most impoverished and least powerful to
the wealthiest and most powerful (Ritchie 2012). Disasters in the developing world,
however, typically produce much greater devastation and much more complex and
difficult response challenges than those in developed nations. Developing nations include
Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Haiti, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, India,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and many others. There are many
reasons for the heightened disaster vulnerability of these countries.
First, substantial portions of their populations live in extreme poverty. As a result,
in daily life and certainly when disaster strikes, people have far fewer resources to draw
upon than those living in wealthier nations. Second, these societies typically have
vulnerable physical infrastructures. Because of that vulnerability, the physical impacts of
disasters on their built environments are often far more extensive than what we see in the
U.S. and other developed countries. Third, stemming from the vulnerable built
environment, disasters in developing countries often produce sizable death tolls. The
January 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the 2004 Asian tsunami, for example, each resulted
in approximately 300,000 deaths, and a devastating earthquake in Nepal in 2015 killed
thousands more. With such widespread loss of human life, disasters in the developing
world cause much greater losses in social capital – a primary source of resilience – than
they typically do in developed countries.
Fourth, developing countries often have weak or inef ective political institutions.
Countries like Turkey, for example, are known to have reasonable building codes
governing development but lack enforcement mechanisms, leading to questionable
building practices and massive damage and loss of life when earthquakes occur. In 1999,
for example, approximately 20,000 people died in an earthquake in Turkey, largely from
building collapses. Fifth, in many cases developing countries are more vulnerable to
disasters due to a lack of ef ective warning systems. The death toll in the Asian tsunami
in 2004, for example, was so high in large part because the Indian Ocean, unlike the
Pacific, was not protected by an advanced tsunami warning system. Finally, developing
nations face increased technological hazards. As the wealthiest and most developed
countries shift their manufacturing operations to the developing world in search of
cheaper labor power and weaker environmental regulations, they are exposing people in
those nations to new technological risks. In 1984, for example, thousands of residents of
Bhopal, India, died from a toxic release at a chemical plant owned by Union Carbide, a
U.S. company.
E. Principles of Ef ective Emergency Management
Based on the topics covered in this chapter, it should be clear that disasters, even
in an international context, generally do not produce the kind of chaos and social
breakdown envisioned by the myth-based view. Problems arise, to be sure, particularly in
developing nations, but they typically do not center on the need to control hordes of
unruly people. Instead, the greatest challenge in effectively responding to disasters is
organizing and focusing the activities of the numerous individuals, informal groups,
voluntary organizations, and public agencies that invariably arrive at the scene of a
disaster. Indeed, probably the two most common problems identified in after-action
reports about disasters are the lack of coordination among responding organizations and
breakdowns in communication. Throughout your career, you can do your part in
overcoming those challenges by remembering the principles of effective EM introduced
in this book. In particular, the most effective strategies to embrace during the response
phase are comprehensive EM, integrated EM, and flexibility.
As social events, then, disasters of all types create some common social responses
that have been described in this chapter and produce common management problems.
Convergence behavior or rushing to the scene of a disaster is very likely to occur,
regardless of the hazardous agent. Additionally, as predicted by the DRC Typology,
numerous organizations, both formal and informal and official and unofficial, will
invariably become involv.ed in responding to disasters of all types. As a result, regardless
of the type of disaster involved, emergency managers will always have to organize and
focus the activities of multiple response organizations. By embracing the all-hazards
view, emergency managers maximize their ability to respond effectively to the broadest
range of threats.
Integrated EM recognizes that all kinds of organizations are involved in
responding to disasters. From this perspective, a major challenge for the emergency
manager is coordinating, organizing, and focusing the activities of so many different
response agencies. Coordination is a vital and far-reaching task. Emergency managers
must facilitate coordination of multiple levels of government, coordination of
government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), coordination within single
organizations and across multiple organizations, and interactions among official and
unofficial response groups and organizations. They must also manage the flow of
information throughout the community and through the media and direct the movement
of equipment, supplies, and donations.
Based on such a tall order and complex and important tasks, it may be helpful to
consider some strategies for improving coordination. Keep in mind that none of these
strategies is guaranteed and each has limitations. First, for example, emergency managers
can improve coordination through enhanced EOC design, setting a center up in a way that
maximizes communication among responding organizations (Neal 2003, 2005). An EOC
is best viewed as a communication hub, not as a command post, where EM professionals
and representatives from all the responding organizations can come together to identify
and address emergency response needs. Whether the EOC is set up as a stand-alone
facility in a city-owned building or as a mobile operation in a motor home or trailer, its
purpose is to monitor, manage, and share information so that officials can make proper
decisions. To facilitate communication and assist in the decision-making process, EOCs
today are equipped with numerous advanced technologies, including web-based software
programs, such as WebEOC, which allow stakeholders to communicate and share
information remotely. Unfortunately, many modern EOCs are so oriented toward
advanced technology that they actually impede communication because representatives
from agencies sit staring at computer screens rather than interacting with others. Thus,
EOCs should always be set up and designed in a manner that maximizes communication
and facilitates collaboration and coordination among the multitude of responding
organizations.
Second, incident management frameworks, such as the National Incident
Management System (NIMS), predicated largely on the Incident Command System (ICS)
developed by the fire services, can be useful for improving coordination. These systems
are aimed at providing common terminology and organizing response activities into
standard, recognizable areas (finance, logistics, operations, and planning). In the U.S. it is
expected that all levels of government will use NIMS in a consistent manner, but as with
all federal policies, actual implementation varies significantly. In their study of the use of
NIMS in responding to Hurricane Katrina, for example, Neal and Webb (2006) visited
the EOC in New Orleans and the Joint Field Office in Baton Rouge and found wide
variation in organizational training in and use of NIMS.
Finally, numerous advanced technologies can assist emergency managers in
coordinating response activities. Geographic information systems (GISs) and global
positioning systems (GPSs) can be used to locate and track response teams or map areas
of heavy damage. Remote sensing technologies can produce aerial images for damage
assessment, and decision support software can be used to log, track, and prioritize
response activities. Advanced technologies, however, should be approached with some
caution. One reason for caution is that not all jurisdictions have access to the most
advanced technologies, creating somewhat of a technological divide in community
readiness for disasters. Further, satellites cannot see inside a building to assess damage
and may require ground truthing (Eguchi et al. 2003). Another reason is that
technological glitches invariably arise, including data compatibility problems and lack of
system interoperability. Finally, technology should be viewed with caution to the extent
that it may foster overdependence and constrain the flexibility and creativity of users.
In addition to embracing comprehensive and integrated EM, emergency managers
can enhance their ability to overcome response challenges by recognizing the value of
flexibility. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, preparedness and planning are critical
aspects of EM. If done successfully, these activities can greatly reduce the amount of
damage and disruption caused by a disaster, lessen the number of physical injuries and
deaths, and dramatically improve a community’s ability to respond. During the response
phase, however, emergency managers and other public officials will invariably encounter
new problems and unforeseen challenges for which they may not have been trained or to
which they may not have been given much consideration. When that happens, responders
need to think creatively and be flexible about possible solutions. There are two broad
categories of flexibility in responding to disasters. Individual-level flexibility refers to
improvisations enacted by individual responders and can take various forms (Mendonca
et al. 2014). For example, a responder may have to perform a task without his or her
usual equipment and rely instead on makeshift provisions. In the aftermath of the
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, for example, first
responders used blown-out doors in the fallen debris as stretchers for carrying victims of
the blast.
Organizational-level flexibility involves adaptations on the part of the
organizations. Similar to individual improvising, organizational adaptations can take
several forms and usually result from resource shortages, unforeseen contingencies, or
unmet needs and demands. For example, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001,
attacks, New York City’s EOC had to be relocated when the building housing it was
destroyed (Kendra and Wachtendorf 2003). Also in that event, thousands of people were
evacuated from lower Manhattan in an unplanned water rescue operation (Kendra,
Wachtendorf, and Quarantelli 2003; Kendra and Wachtendorf 2016). At both the
individual and organizational levels, flexibility is often necessary to fill gaps left by the
planning process and meet heightened demands of a disaster.
Some organizations, however, develop important limitations on flexibility. As
Webb and Chevreau (2006) suggest, several internal organizational characteristics limit
flexibility. For example, many organizations actually stifle flexibility and creativity due
to their strict adherence to written rules and procedures, extensive specialization of tasks
with accompanying diffusion of responsibility, and overreliance on technology to solve
basic problems. Rather than producing innovators and problem solvers, these
organizations instead create conformists and ritualists who define their jobs in very
narrow terms and rely exclusively on protocol and standard operating procedures to
perform tasks. There are also important external constraints on organizational and
individual flexibility. Drabek (2010) calls attention to the climate of litigation so
prevalent in modern society and the possibility that individuals and organizations may be
legally liable for damages possibly resulting from failures to follow proper protocol.
Additionally, we could consider the broader bureaucratic context under which EM falls
as a possible external constraint on flexibility.
The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) marked a
significant restructuring of the U.S. federal government's approach to national security
and emergency management. However, the integration of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) into the DHS framework sparked apprehension among
many observers, who feared that FEMA's autonomy and agility in responding to natural
disasters would be compromised within the broader homeland security apparatus. These
concerns were exacerbated by the federal government's widely criticized response to
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which laid bare systemic shortcomings and bureaucratic
obstacles within the emergency management infrastructure. The initial slow and
ineffective response to Hurricane Katrina underscored the need for a paradigm shift in
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, prompting a reevaluation of
FEMA's role and capabilities within the DHS framework.
Critics argued that FEMA's absorption into DHS diluted its focus on natural
disaster preparedness and response, diverting attention and resources towards
counterterrorism and homeland security priorities. This perceived shift in priorities,
coupled with bureaucratic red tape and interagency coordination challenges, hindered
FEMA's ability to mount a timely and coordinated response to the unfolding
humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Furthermore, the hierarchical
nature of the DHS structure, characterized by layers of bureaucracy and centralized
decision-making, contributed to delays in mobilizing critical resources and coordinating
multi-agency response efforts. The disjointed communication channels and conflicting
chains of command further exacerbated the confusion and inefficiencies plaguing the
federal response to Hurricane Katrina, leading to widespread criticism and calls for
reform. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, there was a growing consensus regarding
the need to reevaluate FEMA's organizational structure, authorities, and operational
capabilities to enhance its effectiveness in addressing both natural and man-made
disasters. Efforts were made to streamline communication channels, clarify roles and
responsibilities, and bolster FEMA's capacity to coordinate with state, local, tribal, and
territorial partners in disaster response and recovery efforts.
Subsequent legislative reforms, such as the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006, aimed to strengthen FEMA's autonomy, elevate its status within the
federal government, and enhance its focus on disaster preparedness, mitigation, and
response. These reforms sought to strike a balance between integrating FEMA into the
broader homeland security enterprise while preserving its core mission of safeguarding
communities from the impacts of natural disasters. In conclusion, the integration of
FEMA into the DHS framework raised concerns about its autonomy and effectiveness in
responding to natural disasters, as evidenced by the federal government's initial
shortcomings in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. However, subsequent reforms and
efforts to enhance FEMA's capabilities have sought to address these challenges and
reinforce its role as a cornerstone of the nation's emergency management infrastructure.
F. The Future of Response
Unlike conventional disasters, which are generally rapid onset events with a
relatively short duration, creeping crises, such as climate change and the COVID-19
pandemic, develop slowly over time and are capable of producing disruptive impacts for
months or even years (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2020). Compounding disasters occur
when two or more events happen simultaneously or in rapid succession of each other.
During COVID-19, for example, FEMA provided guidance to local communities on how
to respond to hurricanes during the pandemic (U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2020a). Future disasters will also be capable of producing cascading impacts in which
failures in one system cause ripple effects across multiple systems. In early 2021, for
example, significant parts of Texas were impacted by a severe ice storm that resulted in
widespread power outages. While residents may have been somewhat prepared to deal
with the consequences of not having electricity, many were caught off guard when they
lost water because the power outages shut down many water treatment facilities. To make
matters worse, this all occurred in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis. With multiple
disasters occurring at once and failures spreading across multiple systems, future
disasters are clearly going to be more complex and difficult to manage.
The evolving landscape of disaster risk presents a formidable challenge,
characterized by the interplay of creeping, compounding, cascading, and complex factors.
These future disasters are poised to transcend traditional boundaries, both geographic and
political, exerting their impact across vast regions and inducing profound societal
disruption on a scale previously unseen. The term "creeping" encapsulates the gradual
onset and protracted nature of certain hazards, such as slow-onset climate events like sea-
level rise, desertification, and glacial melting. Unlike sudden-onset disasters, creeping
hazards unfold over extended periods, often eluding immediate detection and
necessitating sustained adaptive responses to mitigate their long-term impacts. As these
hazards intensify, they pose existential threats to vulnerable ecosystems, livelihoods, and
infrastructure, amplifying the imperative for anticipatory and proactive risk management
strategies.
Compounding disasters arise from the convergence of multiple hazards,
exacerbating their individual effects and magnifying the overall impact on affected
communities. For instance, the intersection of a natural hazard, such as a hurricane, with
socio-economic vulnerabilities, inadequate infrastructure, and systemic inequalities can
precipitate a compounding disaster scenario characterized by heightened levels of
devastation and protracted recovery timelines. By recognizing and addressing the
interconnected nature of risk factors, stakeholders can adopt a holistic approach to
disaster preparedness and resilience-building efforts. Cascading disasters unfold in a
domino-like fashion, wherein the initial event triggers a chain reaction of secondary
hazards, compounding the complexity and severity of the overall crisis. For instance, a
seismic event may precipitate landslides, tsunamis, and infrastructure failures, each
amplifying the cascading effects and posing formidable challenges to emergency
response and recovery operations. By anticipating and mitigating the ripple effects of
cascading disasters, responders can enhance their capacity to mitigate harm and restore
essential services in a timely manner.
The inherent complexity of future disasters stems from the intricate interplay of
social, environmental, economic, and technological factors, rendering them inherently
unpredictable and challenging to manage. Rapid urbanization, population growth,
technological dependencies, and globalization further exacerbate this complexity,
amplifying the potential for systemic risks and unforeseen consequences. By embracing a
multidisciplinary and systems-oriented approach to disaster risk reduction, stakeholders
can enhance their adaptive capacity and resilience in the face of evolving threats. In
summary, future disasters are characterized by their creeping onset, compounding effects,
cascading impacts, and inherent complexity, transcending conventional boundaries and
posing profound challenges to societies worldwide. By fostering interdisciplinary
collaboration, embracing anticipatory risk management strategies, and prioritizing equity
and inclusion, stakeholders can enhance their collective resilience and mitigate the
catastrophic impacts of future disasters.
To deal with these challenges, the EM profession is going to need to change in
significant ways. As a first step, FEMA, in its 2018–2022 Strategic Plan, established
readying the nation for catastrophic disasters as one of its top strategic goals in
recognition of the fact that disasters are growing in scope, severity, and complexity (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security 2018). More recently, in its 2020 National
Preparedness Report, FEMA recognized that in order to enhance our ability to respond to
future disasters, emergency managers will need to develop a better understanding of
catastrophic risks, systemic risks, and emerging risks, which are defined in Figure 7.4
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2020b). Finally, to better equip future
emergency managers to deal with challenging disasters in the future, the FEMA Higher
Education Program emphasized both systems literacy and scientific literacy, in its report
on The Next Generation Core Competencies for Emergency Management Professionals.
As described in this chapter, considerable differences exist between first
responders and emergency managers. Working in the response phase is only one of the
activities of the emergency manager and is a role that involves coordination,
communication, and collaboration across multiple agencies. In a small town, the
emergency manager will likely play the role of EOC facilitator. In larger areas, EM
professionals play more specific roles during the response period such as specializing in
mass care (food and shelter), coordinating debris removal, handling massive unsolicited
donations, assessing infrastructure damage and repair needs, reestablishing
communications, and working with the media. To be effective, an emergency manager
must pursue education, training, and experience. Anyone who works in an EOC during a
response period must be a highly trained professional capable of managing significant
amounts of stress, working across agencies, and moving the community through crisis
stage by stage.
As you embark on the journey of transitioning towards working in the response
period, leveraging resources such as the FEMA Independent Study (IS) courses can serve
as a foundational step in expanding your knowledge base and honing your skill set. These
freely available online courses offer a comprehensive array of modules covering various
aspects of emergency management, incident command systems, the National Incident
Management System (NIMS), voluntary organizations, and beyond. One of the primary
benefits of engaging with FEMA IS courses lies in their ability to provide a structured
and standardized framework for understanding the complexities of emergency response
and disaster management. Through self-paced learning modules, supplemented by
interactive quizzes, case studies, and real-world scenarios, participants gain a nuanced
understanding of the principles, protocols, and best practices underpinning effective
emergency response operations.
Central to the curriculum is the Incident Command System (ICS), a proven
management system designed to facilitate seamless coordination, communication, and
collaboration among diverse stakeholders during incidents of all scales and complexities.
By delving into ICS concepts such as unified command, chain of command, and span of
control, learners acquire the foundational competencies necessary for assuming key roles
within the incident management hierarchy. Furthermore, the NIMS framework serves as
a linchpin in fostering interoperability and standardization across the emergency
management landscape. Through FEMA IS courses, individuals gain insights into the
core components of NIMS, including its organizational structure, resource management
principles, and multi-agency coordination mechanisms. Armed with this knowledge,
responders are better equipped to navigate the intricacies of interagency collaboration and
resource allocation in the midst of crisis scenarios.
Beyond the realm of governmental agencies, FEMA IS courses also shed light on
the pivotal role played by voluntary organizations in bolstering community resilience and
facilitating disaster recovery efforts. Participants learn about the diverse array of
voluntary organizations active in disaster response, ranging from faith-based groups and
non-profit organizations to community-based initiatives and spontaneous volunteer
networks. By understanding the capabilities, limitations, and coordination mechanisms
inherent to these entities, responders can forge effective partnerships and leverage
community assets to enhance overall response capacity.
In addition to the core modules, FEMA IS courses offer specialized tracks tailored
to specific roles and responsibilities within the emergency management continuum.
Whether you aspire to serve as an emergency manager, public information officer,
logistics coordinator, or volunteer coordinator, there are tailored courses designed to
equip you with the requisite knowledge and skills to excel in your chosen field. As you
embark on your FEMA IS learning journey, it's essential to approach each module with a
spirit of curiosity, humility, and a readiness to apply newfound knowledge in real-world
scenarios. By synthesizing theoretical insights with practical experiences, you'll be better
prepared to navigate the complexities of emergency response with confidence,
competence, and compassion.
Perhaps you have other kinds of interests. The Medical Reserve Corps integrates
medical professionals into volunteer service. When coastal hurricanes threaten nursing
home populations, for example, many residents are evacuated inland or to other host
states. The Medical Reserve Corps receives, assesses, and cares for arriving evacuees. A
fairly new program, called Map Your Neighborhood in the state of Washington, involves
neighbors in identifying people who may need assistance and where neighborhood
resources can be located for rescue purposes. If you volunteer for response, do not just
show up and hope to help. Known as spontaneous unaffiliated volunteers (SUVs), such
convergences of people create more problems than help. Enter a damaged area through an
established organization for your own safety as well as that of those you seek to help.
