Running head: FLINT WATER CRISIS
Flint Water Crisis
Liberty University
Elizabeth J. Davis
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FLINT WATER CRISIS
Event Overview
In April 2014, the event known as the Flint water crisis began, and is still ongoing to this
day. Flint city is located in Michigan, approximately 60 miles outside of Detroit. Prior to April
2014, Flint received their main water supply from Detroit. Due to budget constraints from the
city’s rampant poverty level, officials decided to make a change to lessen the budget demands.
This change involved changing Flint’s water source supply from Lake Huron to Flint River. This
allowed the city to no longer pay for the treated water coming from Detroit Water and Sewage
Department and instead use Flint’s own treatment facility.
The most concerning factor in this change was the pipeline system. The new pipeline
system to access water from Lake Huron would not be attainable for approximately three years,
and the city needed immediate change. The decision to meet the immediate needs was made, to
change the water source to Flint River. The change of the water source was meant to only serve
as a temporary solution until the new pipeline to Lake Huron was made accessible. However, this
temporary solution led to an ongoing water disaster. Those ramifications of the decision led to a
man-made disaster that impacted the city’s economy and created psychological, medical, and
educational implications for Flint residents (Shen, 2017).
Flint River is highly corrosive. In fact, it is over sixteen times more corrosive than Flint’s
regular water supply source (Shen, 2017). The corrosive water and the city’s aging pipeline
infrastructure were the main factors in the disaster. “The higher corrosiveness and inadequate
treatment of the water resulted in elevated levels of contaminants including disinfection
byproducts, bacteria, and lead” (Kruger et al., 2017, p. 958). The effects appeared shortly after
the change. Just within weeks after the switch, Flint residents began to complain of noticeable
changes in the water’s color, taste, and odor (Masten, Davies, & McElmurry, 2016). The
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following month, in May 2014, local residents informed officials of physical effects possibly
caused from the drinking water. These effects were mainly the result of rashes, especially in
children. Adults experienced rashes as well, along with hair loss.
It was not just the local residents who noticed the consequences. A few months later,
there were more noticeable changes; discoloration and red colored water appeared within the
distribution system along with an unusual increase in water main breaks (Masten, et al., 2016).
General Motors Corporation also complained the new source of water was causing corrosion on
their engine parts, causing them to change their water from Flint to Flint Township (Masten, et
al., 2016).
These complaints and physical changes persisted. In response, Flint officials persisted the
water was safe to drink and there was no relationship between the rising health issues and the
drinking water. In September 2015, a research team from Virginia Tech reported a high level of
lead was contaminating the residents’ drinking water, approximately 40% of Flint homes were
impacted (Burke, 2016). After this was reported, a local pediatrician affirmed the high lead levels
by revealing the dramatic elevation in children’s bloodwork (Gostin, 2016). After this report was
released, was when government officials began to act on the residents’ complaints. By this time,
the water crisis brought national and international media attention. This attention led to
declarations of a state of emergency by both Flint’s mayor and Michigan’s governor in December
2015 and January 2016 (Kruger, et al., 2017).
Prevention & Mitigation
Prevention is the action taken to prevent an incident from happening, whereas mitigation
is the efforts and actions taken to decrease the damage to lives and property caused by the
disaster. The Flint water crisis serves as an example of what happens when prevention is not
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taken. The act of prevention was clearly not a priority for Flint officials. Prior to switching the
water source from Lake Huron to Flint River, officials were warned about the likelihood of a
potential disaster. A study was conducted prior to the switch showing the need to take preventive
measures to counteract the river’s highly corrosive water. To prevent lead from seeping into the
water supply, the pipes could be treated with federally approved anti-corrosives for about $100 a
day (Gostin, 2016). Officials declined this preventable suggestion. Now the estimated costs for
repair are estimated at $1.5 billion (Gostin, 2016). With man-made disasters, the old adage, an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, holds true when focusing on mitigation over
response (Kilroy, 2008). This crisis was completely preventable.
Flint officials failed to prevent, and also failed to correctly mitigate the crisis in proper
time. It was not until eighteen months after the complaints started that officials began to act. By
this time the pipeline system and public health had already undergone irreversible damage (Shen,
2017). Due to the public outcry and it being highly publicized, on October 16th, 2015, the water
source was switched from Flint River back to Detroit Water and Sewage Department (Masten, et
al., 2016). This was a structural way to mitigate the crisis for the aging infrastructure and public
health, however it was long overdue. Another structural mitigation strategy was used for the
infrastructure, treating the pipelines with phosphates. Treating the pipelines with phosphates
allowed scale layer to be formed that inhibited further damage (Shen, 2017). However, this only
served as a short-term mitigation strategy.
Considering the damage to public health was already done, especially in children, there
was a need to mitigate the impacts of the lead elevation in children. High levels of lead can have
damaging, long lasting effects on children. This includes impeding their learning capabilities. In
regards to a pediatric epidemic, lead is a known salient (Keating, 2017). Within the Flint school
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district, mitigation actions have been taken to lessen the effects of the lead exposure. An increase
in calcium, iron, and Vitamin C has been initiated in the school lunches to alleviate the after-
effects of lead poisoning (Shen, 2017). There has also been a push for early childhood education
program for children between the ages of three and five, to aid in mitigating the negative effects
of lead poisoning on brain growth (Shen, 2017).
Preparedness
Preparedness is the active state of readiness to respond. This phase was clearly lacking in
the Flint water crisis. The officials of Flint city failed to act on the complaints for over a year
after the crisis began, this is not the definition of an active state of readiness. The city was not
prepared for such a disaster. Considering the city was in such a state of poverty, the city was not
at all financially prepared for such a crisis. In fact, the lack of financial preparedness is what put
the city in the situation to begin with when the water source was change due to financial
shortfalls. There was no noted emergency preparedness for man-made disasters such as this.
Unfortunately, it was evident the city failed to prepare for such a disaster as it was completely
preventable.
Response
The Flint water crisis had a delayed response, there was nothing immediate about the
response. Technically response means the immediate response to save lives and conserve the
environment. Although Flint did not take immediate action into this disaster, there were some
response actions taken. Unfortunately, this delayed response caused even further ramifications.
Two different advisories were announced months after the switch, to boil water. However, those
advisories were not long-lasting and were lifted only in a matter of days.
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Once officials started to take true action, bottled waters were delivered to all Flint
residents by the state police (Wakes, 2018). Other means of transportation was set up as well to
enable residents to receive bottle water. Genesee Intermediate School District provided bus
services to those who do not have means of transportation to receive bottled water (Shen, 2017).
Soldiers and Airmen from the Michigan National Guard were deployed to Flint to aid in
distributed water supplies to residents. The need for this extra resource served as a needed
response, as the city resources did not have the capacity to meet the demand.
The city did switch its water source back to Detroit’s water supply, which provided a
properly treated source of water, and test results started to show signs of normalcy in the water
(Sanburn, 2017). Although the switch was long overdue, it provided positive effects of the
response action. Flint city declared a state of emergency in response to the crisis in 2015 which
aided in the beginning of the recovery process.
Recovery
The recovery phase is the process of returning back to the new normal. Recovery is the
costliest and most long-lasting phase out of all the phases. To aid in the financial recovery, Flint
declared a state of emergency. Michigan’s Governor Snyder, sought a major disaster declaration
through the federal government, asking for almost $96 million to aid in recovery, however Flint
does not qualify for the same federal assistance disaster relief as natural disasters would (Gostin,
2016). President Obama declared a state of emergency, authorizing FEMA to coordinate disaster
relief efforts and provide up to $5 million in federal aid to go towards water, filters, and other
items for up to 90 days (Southall, 2016).
There were three main things damaged due to the disaster; pipeline infrastructure, public
health, and public confidence in their government. To aid in the recovery for the damaging
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effects to the public health, the state of Michigan has spent approximately $67 million, and
started to enroll up to fifteen thousand residents in Medicaid to aid in those suffering from lead
poisoning (Gostin, 2016). The city’s pipeline is in need of replacing. Out of Flint’s 30,000 lead
service pipelines, only 700 have been replaced (Sanburn, 2017). Replacing them all will require
far more than the $27 million the state has provided for the infrastructure replacement (Sanburn,
2017). Perhaps the true challenge within the recovery phase will be restoring the public
confidence and trust in the government. The city of Flint has shown resiliency within its
community members, but unfortunately the ones they are protesting against is their own
government.
Conclusion
The Flint water crisis differs significantly from natural disasters, as it was completely
preventable. This disaster has proven to be an example for other governments and emergency
managers of what not to do, and it can be learned from. There were many things lacking in this
crisis, namely integrity within the government officials. There should have been a stronger
system of checks and balances to provide transparency and accountability. “Whoever walks in
integrity walks securely, but whoever takes crooked paths will be found out” (Proverbs 10:9
NIV). Officials should have reacted sooner to the crisis, due to the delay in response, residents
were continuing to drink contaminated water that led to a Legionnaires’ disease outbreak which
claimed twelve lives, decrease in fertility, lead poisoning, and irreversible damage to the
pipelines (Shen, 2017).
This student recommends an improvement in risk management. Most water system
failures could have been prevented with better risk management (Baum, Bartram, & Hrudey,
2016). Water safety plans (WSPs), which serves as a risk management approach, promotes the
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individual utility risks so that appropriate measures can be taken and plans can be implemented.
“This process-based, know-your-own system approach changes the culture from one of reacting
to hazardous events as they occur to preventing their occurrence altogether” (Baum, et al., 2016,
p. 5436). If Flint took the proper precautions, used the knowledge of the river’s corrosive state,
and were more aware of the city’s treatment facility and pipeline status, the crisis could have
been completely prevented.
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References:
Baum, R., Bartram, J., & Hrudey, S. (2016). The Flint water crisis confirms that U.S. drinking
water needs improved risk management. Environmental Science & Technology, 50,
5436-5437. doi: 10.1021/acs.est.6b02238
Burke, K. L. (2016). Moving forward after Flint. American Scientist, 104, 137-139.
Gostin, L. O. (2016). Politics and public health: The Flint drinking water crisis. Hastings Center
Report, 46(4), 5-6. doi: 10.1002/hast.598
Keating, C. (2017). Fighting for the children of Flint. People, 88(1), 97-98.
Kilroy, R. J. (2008). Threats to homeland security: An all hazards perspective. Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley.
Kruger, D. J., Cupal, S., Franzen, S. P., Kodjebacheva, G., Bailey, E. S., Key, K. D., &
Kaufman, M. M. (2017). Toxic trauma: Household water quality experiences predict
posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms during the Flint, Michigan, water crisis. Journal
of Community Psychology, 45(7), 957-962. doi:10.1002/jcop.21898
Masten, S. J., Davies, S. H., & McElmurry, S. P. (2016). Flint water crisis: What happened and
why? Journal of American Water Works Association, 108(12), 22-34.
Sanburn, J. (2017). A year later, Flint still can't drink the water. Time, 189(4), 12.
Shen, J. (2017). Rising scholar: Flint water crisis: Impacts on human-environmental interactions
and reflections for future solutions. International Social Science Review, 9392), 1-14.
Southall, A. (2016, January 17). State of emergency declared over man-made water disaster in
Michigan city. The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/18/us/obama-flint-michigan-water-fema-emergency-
disaster.html
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Wakes, N. (2018). The Flint water crisis. Anglican Theological Review, 100(1), 143-145.
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