DISCUSSION FORUM 3
Introduction
Most times disaster management requires collaboration between two separate entities to
come together and work to assist in an emergency. According to Sylves (2019, p 218),
Emergency management is by its true nature intergovernmental and intercommunity- it demands
government agencies and officials to coordinate and cooperate on the same level to prepare and
respond to a disaster. There are many events to choose from when it comes to significant events
that have occurred in the US, but I choose Hurricane Katrina due to its impact on disaster policy
and how it devastated New Orleans and the United States.
Hurricane Katrina, a category 3 which developed into a category 5 slammed the Gulf Coast
where three states, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are in August 2005, but Louisiana (New
Orleans) had the most severe impact with the lives of over 1800 individuals’ majority being
senior citizens lost and 125 billion in damages. It affected about 1.7 million people in the state of
Louisiana which required a pre-fall evacuation. The state of Louisiana evacuated about 1.5
million people before hurricane Katrina hit (Tyrell et al., 2022) however, despite all measures
that were in place, the disaster is still regarded as a failed government attempt to respond to an
emergency.
Pre-Planning or protocols that were in place
There were measures in place between the local, state, and the federal government before
Hurricane Katrina hit. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is expected to establish
and maintain an emergency management partnership with federal agencies, states, and local
governments, volunteer organizations, and the private sector for pre- and post-emergency
management to better serve their mission (Sylves, 2019,226). Over its history, FEMA has
worked out a memorandum of understanding (MOUS) with respective state emergency
management agencies…it is a way to ensure coordination and cooperation in intergovernmental
activities (Sylves, 2019, p.238). There was a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between
FEMA and Louisiana Emergency Management under the Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act as laid out in the National Response Framework (NRF) formerly
National Response Program (NRP) that explains how the Federal government would mobilize
federal resources and conduct activities to assist states and local governments in responding to
disasters (Sylves, 2019, 242). To access the FEMA resources under the Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act, the state governors must formally request by letter to the
president which goes to FEMA. In the letter, the resources required and the assistance that the
state and the local agencies will be providing are also laid out (PBS, 2005). The state of
Louisiana’s Governor Kathleen Blanco declared a state of emergency for Louisiana on the 26th
of August 2006 and contacted President Bush to initiate the federal response plan that enabled
FEMA to organize and mobilize resources to assist (Chaudhuri, 2010). FEMA coordinated with
other agencies like the National Guard, the Red Cross, and the Police. There was a coordinated
evacuation agreement (a memorandum of agreement (MOA); between the government and
Louisiana Transportation Department in April 2005 to mobilize transportation to support
emergency evacuation for at-risk population” meaning the frail, elderly, disabled and others who
will not be able to get out of the city on their own (Lipton 2006). New Orleans also had in place
levees along the coastline, but they were designed to withstand a category 3 hurricane.
Training exercises that took place.
In June 2004, FEMA conducted the "Hurricane Pam "drill which was a simulation of the storm
to hit New Orleans. Following the drill was an emergency planning session in July 2005,
sponsored by FEMA state and local officials to discuss evacuation planning for a possible
hurricane in the region (Lipton, 2006). At the meeting, they came to a consensus that the local,
state, and FEMA were only 10 percent ready for evacuation means for only about a hundred
thousand people with no means of transportation (Lipton, 2006) meanwhile the federal
government had been preparing for a large disaster scale in New Orleans since 2002 (Chaudhuri,
2010)
What went wrong in terms of planning and response
Louisiana especially New Orleans had the most devastating effects of the hurricane. The
Governor of New Orleans after asking the President to issue a disaster declaration on the 26th of
August which will initiate the release of federal assistance (FEMA) did not issue an emergency
evacuation till the 28th of August, a day before the hurricane was to hit and many residents could
not leave the city, so the Superdome was used as a site for residents to shelter from the storm
(Chaudhuri, 2010). Moreover, FEMA delayed in its response to the disaster due to bureaucratic
factors and as a result, deployed responders were not present till days later. The state of
Louisiana’s pre-planning for the hurricane on the other hand was not enough and it also played a
major part in the reason why New Orleans was severely damaged. For instance, Mississippi also
had an impact from the hurricane but its effects on the state were different due to its preparation,
unlike Louisiana. The Florida-Mississippi mutual aid agreement (MAA) was created under the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) system. This is different from the
National Response Framework between the federal government and state local government etc.
The Florida – Mississippi agreement supported a unified command structure to support
responders and logistics, which later evaluations identified as crucial to Mississippi's response
and a deficit in Louisiana. The absence of a hurricane relief program in Louisiana shows how ill-
prepared the state was compared to Mississippi (Thomas, 2020). In addition, the mutual
agreement between the government (FEMA) and the Louisiana Transportation Department was
honored initially before the hurricane hit but failed later because those without access to
transportation found themselves stranded and the majority were the elderly, disabled, and
disadvantaged residents (Lipton, 2006).
Did it appear National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command
System (ICS) were used as needed?
State and local governments are not “preemptively" compelled to adopt and use the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) but are encouraged to work with its concept of operation
(Sylves 2019, p. 244). NIMS is a product of the Department of Homeland Security with state and
local officials to work together with nongovernmental organizations and private sectors to work
to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from incidents (FEMA.GOV). The
Incident Command System (ISC) which is part of the NIMS was utilized during Hurricane
Katrina but not as needed. The ICS promotes command and control in emergency management
that promotes the unity of local, state, and federal authorities, however, there was a failure in
command and control within the three levels of government. Many communications systems
crucial to support effective command and control procedures were destroyed which degrade
efforts among many government agencies. Officials from the local levels complained of a lack of
leadership from the federal governments particularly FEMA Director Michael Brown and FEMA
turning down support offered by the police and local emergency crews (PBS, 2005). FEMA also
asked that no firefighters or ambulance crew respond to areas hit by Hurricane Katrina without
being first mobilized by local and state authorities, a declaration that undoubtedly slowed
response to the disaster (Chaudhuri, 2010). FEMA was unwilling to accept help from non-
government organizations.
Conclusion
The federal government not responding early, and improper use of the NIMS were a major cause
for the delay in response to Hurricane Katrina even though the city of New Orleans was also ill
prepared. As a result, many things changed after Hurricane Katrina. The Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) was signed into law on Oct 2006 which enabled the
reconstitution of FEMA which ignited the return of several parts of it lost jurisdiction and the
authority to dispense its own program grants without having to work through a DHS grants
clearinghouse unit outside of FEMA as it did from 2002 to 2006 (Sylves, 2019). PKERMA the
solutions to gaps that became evident in Hurricane Katrina response efforts. It is very imperative
government agencies work together in time of emergency because they are all serving under one
body (government).
1 Corrinthians 12:12-13 says “just as a body, though one, has many parts, but all its many parts
form one body, so it is with Christ. For we were all baptized by one spirit to form one body-
whether Jews or Gentiles, slave or free- and we were all given the one spirit to drink.
References
Chaudhuri, D. (2010). Government- Response to Katrina. Mit.Edu.
http://web.mit.edu/12.000/www/m2010/finalwebsite/katrina/government/government-
response.html
Lipton, E. (2006). Key Documents Regarding the Hurricane Katrina Response. The New York
Times. https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/national/nationalspecial/10katrina-
docs.html?
PBS NewsHour. (2005, September 9). FEMA Faces Intense Scrutiny.
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec05-fema_09-09
Thomas, K. K. (2020, August 28). Florida, FEMA, and Fugate. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health. https://publichealth.jhu.edu/2020/florida-fema-and-fugate#:
%7E:text=The%20Florida%2DMississippi%20agreement%20supported,and%20a%20deficit
%20in%20Louisiana’s
Tyrrell, K., Hildreth, K., & Oren, S. (2022, May 14). The Storm That Changed Disaster Policy
Forever. NCSL. https://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/the-storm-
that-changed-disaster-policy-forever-magazine2022.aspx
Sylves, R. T. (2019). Disaster Policy and Politics: Emergency Management and Homeland
Security (3rd ed.). CQ Press.
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