HIUS 520 Week 4 “Black Troops” Transcript and Study Guide
Around us is the battlefield of Petersburg, and this is the Crater. Here on July 30, 1864, an event
took place which Ulysses S. Grant called “the saddest affair I have witnessed in the war.” With
the Union and Confederate armies confronting each other from virtually impregnable lines of
entrenchments and fortifications, Union troops had tunneled under the Confederate fortifications.
Beneath this Confederate fort, they placed several tons of gunpowder.
On July 30, they detonated this enormous mine, blasting a crater which, when new, was 170 feet
long, about 100 feet wide, and at least 30 feet deep. Union commanders had hoped that the blast
would blow a hole in the Confederate lines, and it did — for a time. But poor management by
Union 9th Corps commander Ambrose Burnside led to the failure of the assault. As always,
Burnside was effective until something unexpected occurred. In this case, high command
changed its plans for which division was to lead the assault at nearly the last minute, and
Burnside handled the change poorly.
The result was that the initial Union troops, instead of going around the crater to exploit the
breach in Confederate lines, flocked into the crater itself, where they were useless and
completely vulnerable. Delays allowed the Confederates to recover and bring up reinforcements.
Additional Union divisions sent in to support the first also tended to enter the crater, or were
driven into it by Confederate counterattacks.
Soon, Confederate troops reached the rim of the crater. Thousands of Union soldiers were
trapped inside — practically helpless, unable to use their weapons effectively in the confined
space.
Many of the Union soldiers in the crater belonged to one of the supporting divisions of the
United States Colored Troops (USCT), a branch of the Union Army formed from Black enlisted
men commanded by white officers. Confederates were enraged by the presence of Black soldiers
in enemy ranks and did not stop killing once the fighting stopped. In short, there was a massacre.
A large number of Black soldiers — we do not know exactly how many — were shot or
bayoneted while attempting to surrender or after having surrendered.
This was not the only racial massacre involving Black troops during the war. Similar events
occurred at Poison Spring, Arkansas; Saltville, Virginia; and Fort Pillow, Tennessee.
The use of Black troops — arming African Americans and deploying them as soldiers — was
one of the most controversial issues of the Civil War. Few things provoked as intense a reaction.
It directly challenged entrenched racist assumptions in both the North and the South about what
African Americans were capable of and what they should be allowed to do.
Initially, the Union did not plan to enlist Black troops, precisely because it was such a
controversial issue. President Lincoln hesitated, and even restrained efforts by abolitionists who
wanted to recruit Black soldiers earlier. However, in the Emancipation Proclamation, issued on
January 1, 1863, Lincoln announced that the Union would begin enlisting Black troops.
At first, these troops were enlisted into state regiments (e.g., the 54th Massachusetts), led by
white officers. Later, Black soldiers were organized into a separate federal branch known as the
United States Colored Troops (USCT).
Black troops fought in numerous engagements, including Milliken’s Bend, Louisiana, and
Battery Wagner (also known as Fort Wagner) on the South Carolina coast — the latter
famously depicted in the film Glory. They proved themselves to be just as effective as white
soldiers of equal experience.
For many years, historians largely ignored the contributions of Black troops. The first modern
scholarly study was written by Dudley Taylor Cornish and published in 1957, although it had
been written earlier. Titled The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865, it gave
a detailed account of the political evolution that led to the enlistment of Black troops and
chronicled their performance during the war. Cornish noted:
•Black soldiers enlisted despite threats of massacre.
•They performed as well as white soldiers with comparable experience.
•They were somewhat more dependent on the quality of their white officers.
•Their regiments often had less experienced officers, since those officers were transferred
from existing white units or promoted from the enlisted ranks.
To help with officer training, the Union established a school in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
which served as a precursor to modern officer candidate schools. On the whole, officers in Black
regiments were reasonably well prepared.
Cornish’s book remained the standard work for decades. In the late 1980s, the University Press
of Kansas reprinted it, attesting to its lasting value.
In 1990, another scholar, Joseph Glatthaar, published Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance
of Black Soldiers and White Officers. Glatthaar, the Stephenson Distinguished Professor of
History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, covered much of the same ground
as Cornish but placed greater emphasis on the relationships between white officers and Black
soldiers. He concluded that these relationships were generally strong and that their cooperation
represented a meaningful step toward racial equality. However, Glatthaar noted that the alliance
between Black soldiers and white officers deteriorated after the war.
Altogether, about 180,000 to 200,000 Black troops served in the Union Army.
Did Black troops serve in the Confederate Army? The answer is both yes and no.
We can dismiss myths about thousands of Black soldiers in the Confederate Army. These stories
are exaggerated. While some enslaved people were used as laborers or teamsters, slaveholders
were reluctant to let their enslaved workers serve in military capacities. Some officers brought
personal enslaved servants to care for their gear, but these individuals were not enrolled
combatants.
It is possible that a few enslaved men may have picked up a weapon in isolated moments, but
generally, Black men were not enlisted or armed as Confederate soldiers. This is unsurprising,
given that the Confederacy was founded to perpetuate slavery.
However, as Confederate fortunes declined, ideas began to shift. In January 1864, General
Patrick Cleburne (an Irish-born Confederate officer) proposed to the Army of Tennessee that
enslaved men be enlisted as soldiers. His suggestion met with resistance.
By early 1865, even Robert E. Lee and President Jefferson Davis supported the idea. Davis,
citing Lee’s support, urged the Confederate Congress to act. Eventually, the Confederate
Congress passed a law allowing the enlistment of enslaved men — but only if they were freed
and voluntarily donated by their masters.
Only two companies (about 200 men, perhaps fewer) were enrolled. They were not armed by
the time the war ended.
Many Confederates were never reconciled to the idea. Howell Cobb, a Georgia politician,
expressed the sentiment of many when he said, “If slaves will make good soldiers, our whole
theory of slavery is wrong.”
Historians have addressed this issue in several important works:
•Robert F. Durden, in The Gray and the Black: The Confederate Debate on
Emancipation (1972), argued that the Confederacy delayed too long in considering the
enlistment of Black soldiers, and that their eventual desperation move was too little, too
late.
•Bruce Levine, in Confederate Emancipation (2005), explored similar themes, focusing
on internal debates over whether to free and enlist enslaved men. Levine concluded that
the Confederacy's final decision was driven by desperation and came too late to have any
real effect.
Ultimately, the Confederate government’s refusal to consider Black enlistment until its final
collapse highlights the centrality of slavery to its identity — and its unwillingness to abandon
that institution until forced by absolute necessity.
Study Outline: Week 4 – Black Troops
I. Petersburg and the Crater: July 30, 1864
•Union troops tunneled beneath Confederate lines and detonated several tons of
gunpowder.
•Created a crater 170 feet long, 100 feet wide, 30 feet deep.
•Poor Union execution by Ambrose Burnside led to disaster.
•Troops entered the crater instead of flanking it; became trapped.
•Confederate counterattack resulted in a massacre, particularly of Black Union troops
(USCT).
II. Racial Massacres in the Civil War
•The Crater was one of several massacres of Black Union soldiers.
•Other examples:
oPoison Spring, Arkansas
oSaltville, Virginia
oFort Pillow, Tennessee
III. Controversy Over Using Black Troops
•Widely opposed in both North (racism) and South (ideology).
•Lincoln delayed use due to political concerns.
•Officially announced in the Emancipation Proclamation (January 1, 1863).
•Initial enlistments were into state regiments (e.g., 54th Massachusetts).
•Later organized under a federal branch: United States Colored Troops (USCT).
IV. Combat Effectiveness of Black Troops
•Fought valiantly at:
oMilliken’s Bend, Louisiana
oBattery Wagner (Fort Wagner), South Carolina
•Portrayed in the film Glory.
•Black troops proved equal to white troops of the same experience.
•Dependent on white officer quality.
V. Training and Officer Corps
•White officers often promoted from other regiments.
•Officer training school established in Philadelphia.
•On average, Black regiments had fewer high-quality officers but still performed well.
VI. Key Historians and Works on Black Union Soldiers
1. Dudley Taylor Cornish
oThe Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865 (Published 1957).
oFirst scholarly modern study.
oEmphasized:
§Black enlistment amid risk.
§Comparable performance to white troops.
§Officer dependency.
2. Joseph Glatthaar
oForged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers
(1990).
oStudied relationships between white officers and Black soldiers.
oConcluded alliance was strong during the war but collapsed afterward.
VII. Did Black Soldiers Fight for the Confederacy?
Short answer: No — with desperate exceptions.
•Myths debunked: No thousands of Black Confederate combatants.
•Some enslaved men served as:
oTeamsters
oLaborers
oBody servants
•Not enrolled or armed.
VIII. Turning Point: Confederate Desperation
1. General Patrick Cleburne (January 1864)
oProposed arming slaves (Army of Tennessee).
oIrish-born, perhaps less ideologically rigid.
2. Support from Lee and Davis (Early 1865)
oJefferson Davis lobbied Congress, citing Robert E. Lee’s support.
oConfederacy agreed to enlist freed slaves — if voluntarily donated by owners.
oOnly two companies (~200 men) formed.
oNot armed by the end of the war.
3. Howell Cobb, Georgia politician:
o“If slaves will make good soldiers, our whole theory of slavery is wrong.”
IX. Key Historians and Works on Black Confederates
1. Robert F. Durden
oThe Gray and the Black: The Confederate Debate on Emancipation (1972).
oEnlistment effort came too late.
oDriven by recognition that slavery would be lost anyway.
2. Bruce Levine
oConfederate Emancipation (2005).
oTraced ideological resistance to arming slaves.
oDesperation forced change, but too late to affect the outcome.
X. Concluding Themes
•USCT played a vital role in Union victory.
•Use of Black troops challenged racial assumptions.
•Confederacy’s delay and resistance confirmed that preservation of slavery was its core
purpose.
•Historians emphasize the too-late and half-hearted Confederate effort to use Black
soldiers.
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