Battle of Kursk: Germany’s Lost Victory in World War II
Introduction
Seventy-seven years ago, in the Kursk region situated in the western part of the Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the largest tank engagement in recorded history
commenced, drawing over two million participants into a conflict that would decisively
influence the course of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk was not merely a turning
point due to its scale and immediate outcome, but because it represented a critical juncture in
military strategy and technology, ultimately altering the balance of power in the international
arena and signaling the irreversible decline of the Third Reich. The Soviet forces, emboldened by
their staunch defense and innovative tactics, coupled with the strategic acumen of their generals,
effectively sealed the fate of Hitler's campaign in the East. Following the Battle of Stalingrad,
which concluded in early February 1943 and inflicted substantial losses on the Germans, the
Wehrmacht's capabilities were notably diminished. Though the Nazi war machine remained
formidable due to its resilient infrastructure and strategic reserves, its operational efficacy waned
with the depletion of equipment and the necessary redeployment of auxiliary units to bolster the
front lines. Consequently, the Battle of Kursk, emerging as a pivotal clash in the annals of the
Second World War, not only precipitated the downfall of the Nazi regime but also set a precedent
for armored warfare in modern military history. This essay will delve into the complexities of the
Battle of Kursk, examining its significant role in the eventual defeat of the Nazis and its lasting
impact on global military strategy.
Historical Background of the Battle of Kursk
The War imposed on the whole world by German fascism was the largest military clash
of the 20th century. It began under extremely favorable conditions for Germany. Its army was
completely mobilized, had two years of experience in waging War in Europe on a large scale,
and its economy was long ago converted to a war footing.
Germany was given a serious military advantage by the surprise attack. The German command
had an emphasis on powerful strike groups, significantly outnumbering the troops of the Red
Army. In addition, the gaps in assessing the possible time of the attack on the USSR by Hitlerite
Germany and the associated omissions in preparing to repel the first strikes played a role. The
extremely heavy blows that fell on the Soviet armed forces in the early days of the War did not
crush or disperse them, which the fascist German command hoped for. Soviet soldiers fought
with genuine self-sacrifice. The whole country was turned into a single military camp.
Heavy bloody battles took place in three main directions: northwest, west, and southwest. The
victory over the Nazi troops near Moscow was a decisive military event during the first year of
the Second World War. An important turn of world-historical significance took place near
Moscow. The plan blitzkrieg was finally eliminated, and the myth that the Germans could not be
defeated was abandoned as well. The plans of the Nazis to seize Moscow, Leningrad, and the
Caucasus were thwarted (Hickman).
Given such a substantial defeat, Germany decided to change its strategy and tactics. The German
army started an attack in the southwest to nab the Caucasian oil areas, industrial regions of
Stalingrad, as well as the richest agricultural regions of the Don and Kuban. From mid-July
1942, the historic Battle of Stalingrad took place, which had a decisive part in the Great Patriotic
War (History.com Editors). The triumph associated with the defeat of the Germans on the Volga
marked the turning point in the entire Second World War. The Red Army snatched the initiative
of military action from the Nazis, consolidated it in subsequent operations, and after the Battle of
Kursk, apparently dominated until Germany was completely defeated.
Having suffered a heavy defeat in the winter campaign of 1942-1943, the Germans attempted to
take revenge in 1943, assuming, in the presence of a favorable situation, to expand the actions of
its troops to eliminate the Kursk salient, and then attack Moscow (Kasdorf 6). At the launching
stages of the summer battles, the German forces had about 230 divisions within the scope of the
Soviet-German front. Germany continuously tried to break through the defenses of the USSR
forces in the Belgorod region; however, such actions did not contribute to significant results.
Instead, the Nazis faced a plethora of losses, as well as we’re forced to consolidate their position
on the achieved line. Both sides were preparing for the decisive battle.
After the end of the operations of the winter campaign of 1942-1943, there was a strategic pause
on the Soviet-German front (Kasdorf 7). Both sides ceased active hostilities and began
comprehensive preparations for the summer battles. In the center of the Soviet-German front, the
so-called Kursk balcony was formed – the initial bridgehead for inflicting flank attacks on the
Orel and Belgorod-Kharkiv Nazis’ groupings. Subsequently, favorable conditions were created
for the deployment of following offensive operations on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, and
Crimea.
The forces of a number of fronts that were on the Kursk salient were a threat to the flanks and
rears of the German’s army groups “Center” and “South” (History.com Editors). These Nazi’s
groupings that occupied the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkiv bridgeheads were provided with
favorable circumstances for the delivery of an advanced flank attack against the USSR’s forces
that defended the area (“Battle of Kursk”).
Predispositions to the Battle
By the start of summer-autumn military actions of 1943, the front line ran from the Barents Sea
to Lake Ladoga, then along the Svir River to Leningrad and further to the south; at Velikiye
Lugs, it turned to the southeast, and in the Kursk region, it formed a huge ledge, which went
deep into the location of the enemy troops (Trust 1). In general, by the summer of 1943, before
the Battle, the Red Army was superior to the German fascist forces both quantitatively and
qualitatively (“Battle of Kursk”). The USSR now had all the required possibilities to crush the
Nazi’s troops, as well as to resolutely and firmly preserve strategic initiatives in all crucial
regions and dictate its will to the Germans. The Hitlerite military-political leadership, realizing
that its armed forces had lost their former superiority over the Red Army, took total measures to
send the best troops to the Soviet-German front.
The Nazis took advantage of the absent second front in Europe and transferred the most combat-
ready troops from France and Germany in significant numbers (Schaufler 224). The military
industry, working constantly, was in a rush to provide new tanks “Tiger” and “Panzer” and heavy
self-propelled guns “Ferdinand”. The Air Force received new aircraft Focke-Wulf-190A and
Heinkel-129. German troops received significant replenishment of personnel and materiel
(“Battle of Kursk”). To carry out the planned operation at Kursk, the Germans concentrated their
best forces. More than 900 thousand people were ready for hostilities. The Nazis were confident
of success; fascist propaganda devoted a lot of effort to raise the spirits of the troops, promising
an absolute triumph in the upcoming battles.
The crucial point here is the reasons why Germany decided to conduct its general offensive in
the Kursk region. The fact is that the operational disposition of USSR troops on the Kursk Bulge
promised great prospects for the Germans (Schranck 477). Here, two large fronts, Central and
Voronezh, could be surrounded at once, as a result of which a serious gap would have formed,
allowing the Nazis to carry out major military actions in the southern and northeastern directions.
The fascists also took into account the exceptional strategic significance of the bulge for the
Soviet troops (Schaufler 229). By occupying it, USSR could strike at the rear and flanks of both
the Orel and Belgorod-Kharkiv enemy groupings. In their assessments of the situation and
possible options for the Germans’ actions, the Soviet authorities proceeded precisely from this
premise, which was later confirmed. The USSR’s operational-strategic command was unanimous
in its assessment of the further enemy actions. In this unity of opinions that was founded on a
profound evaluation of all factors, the increased skill of the Soviet staff was best reflected.
Taking into account the created situation, an operation plan was developed, which provided for
the repulsion of the enemy offensive with the subsequent transition to a decisive counter-
offensive on Orel, Belgorod, and Kharkiv.
The Soviet governance figured out the Nazis’ plans in time and carefully prepared the forces to
repulse, creating a mighty defense and pulling up reserves that were superior to the Germans’
ones. This could no longer be claimed about the Nazis who did not demonstrate an appropriate
and deep evaluation of the situation and comprehensiveness of the plan (Trueman). Given the
fact that the Nazis lost strategic initiatives, they could not overcome the increased difficulties,
which was aggravated by a sharp decline in the military spirit among the soldiers.
The most dangerous defense lines in the Belgorod area were occupied by the 6th Guards Army.
By the time of the defensive battle, Soviet troops, both quantitatively and especially qualitatively,
were superior to their enemy. The increased power of aviation, armored forces and made them
capable of creating shock groupings in a short time, rapidly breaking all resistance of the German
troops (“Battle of Kursk”). This provided the USSR’s military-strategic command with the
opportunity to be prepared and confidently carry out the defeat of the German forces in the area,
to thwart Hitler’s widely conceived offensive plan.
In the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet troops possessed better manpower and plenty of military
resources than the Germans. However, relying heavily on tanks and motorized troops, the Nazis
grouped them in narrow areas, which contributed to their tactical advance at the launching stages
of the battle (Grossman 228). Nevertheless, when the Soviet forces, located in the operational
depth, entered into action, the superiority was gained by the troops of the USSR.
The Battle of Kursk
On the morning of 5 July 1943, the Battle of Kursk began. The German troops moved forward
their main forces. In total, seventeen tank, three motorized, and eighteen enemy infantry
divisions participated in the action. Carrying out the meticulously but stereotyped Citadel plan,
the Nazis aimed to concentrate the mentioned forces on narrow areas of the frontline (Schaufler
228). The idea was extremely simple: to break through the defensive lines of the Red Army
simultaneously from two opposite sides of the Kursk Bulge. As they said then, concentric strikes
in the general direction to Kursk had to cut off and then eliminate the USSR’s forces stationed
there.
To comprehend these possibilities, the Nazis’ military command started preparing for the primary
summer offensive. It hoped to defeat the USSR’s forces by inflicting strong counterstrikes,
regaining strategic initiatives, and changing the conditions in its favor. The operation, code-
named Citadel, envisaged the delivery of two powerful concentric oncoming strikes against the
Soviet troops in the area to encircle and defeat them (Grossman 239).
In the following strategy, the German forces, given the completed encirclement of the USSR
troops in the Kursk region, intended to inflict a swift blow to the rear of the Southwestern Front,
to conduct the second stage of Operation Citadel (Kasdorf 16). For this, after the completion of
this encirclement of the USSR armies, it was supposed to use all the free mobile German
formations. Meanwhile, the German forces did not rule out the possibility, after the
implementation of the Citadel operation plan, to develop success in another direction – to the
northeast, bypassing Moscow, to reach the rear of the entire central troops of the USSR forces.
This operation was supposed to be a general battle on the Eastern Front and demonstrate the
superiority of German military strategy, the increased power, combat capability, and
irrepressibility of Nazi Germany.
The USSR governance was capable of accurately determining the time of the start of the Nazis
offensive. All units were put on alert. Counter-artillery training of the Soviet artillery outstripped
the German. On 5 July, at 6 o’clock in the morning, the Nazis struck at the Soviet troops;
however, they failed to break through the defenses of the guards’ division (“The Battle of
Kursk”). The fascist forces suffered a blow at the junction of the 78th and 72nd Guards Rifle
Divisions in the area of Maslovoy Pristan. The Nazis managed to force the Seversky Donets in
several places and wedged into the main line of defense.
The guardsmen showed considerable resistance to the Germans. On 5 July, the Nazis lost plenty
of tanks, hundreds of soldiers, and officers there. On the second day, the Nazis left about 60
tanks and 500 killed and wounded on the battlefield. From 7 to 8 July, the guards destroyed 80
tanks and assault guns. In four days of bloody battles, the Germans managed to advance 8-10
kilometers and reach the second army line of defense, but could not break through it. The
Germans were feeling exhausted and could not handle the situation at all (Schaufler 228). In
contrast, according to Grossman, the Soviet troops started to feel capable of overcoming any
German trick (237).
A huge role in disrupting the Nazis’ offensive plans belongs to the triumph of the Red Army
forces in the tank struggle in the Prokhorovka area, which is to be considered as the largest one –
there were 1200 units from both sides. It should be noted that a substantial part of the Soviet
forces here belongs to the unbreakable spirit of soldiers. For instance, there is a sound story of
Lyuba the Tank Killer, who, in extremely short terms, converted herself from a military nurse to
a full-scale warrior and destroyed a great number of the enemy’s tanks (Loza 4). It should also be
noted that the Soviet soldiers were significantly prepared to eliminate the German tanks with the
antitank rifle (Voenizdat of the NKO USSR, 4), which contributed to the strategic advantage of
the USSR during the Battle to a great extent (Schranck 486). Heavy steel cars turned into heaps
of scrap metal. Towers and cannon barrels flew from the tanks, and caterpillars were torn to
pieces. Both sides had to face big losses.
On 12 July, the fascist German troops were stopped in the Orel-Kursk direction, where they
managed to advance 9-15 km, and on 16 July, they were stopped near Belgorod, where they
advanced 15-35 km. By 24 July, as a result of a counterattack by the USSR forces, the Germans
were thrown back to their original positions (Trueman). The enemy’s summer offensive was a
complete failure.
Following this, the Red Army turned to offensive tactics on the Orel and Belgorod-Kharkiv
bridgeheads – the enemy’s most powerful strategic bridgeheads, from which it intended to leap
Moscow. The aims of the USSR troops in the counter-offensive were very complex and difficult.
Both on the Oryol and the Belgorod-Kharkiv bridgehead, the enemy created a strong defense
(Trueman). The first of them was fortified by the Nazis for almost two years and considered it as
a starting area for attacking Moscow, and they considered the second a bastion of the German
defense in the east, a gateway that blocked the paths for the Russian armies to Ukraine.
At dawn on 3 August, significant artillery began a counter-offensive by the USSR forces in the
Belgorod-Kharkiv direction under the code name “Commander Rumyantsev” (Trut 1); the Nazis’
defense was interrupted. On 4 August, the Soviet troops, breaking the enemy’s resistance,
advanced. The Nazis resisted especially stubbornly north of Belgorod in the related offensive
zones. The Germans tried with all their might to hold these areas that were near the breakthrough
of the Red Army and to hamper the maneuver of the tank divisions that broke through, and,
under favorable circumstances, to strike at their rear.
Soviet aviation was active, firmly holding air supremacy in its hands. The assault formations of
the 2-1 air army suppressed the enemy’s artillery, struck at his reserves and communications. It
should be stated that the aviation conducted about thirty air battles, in which about 40 Nazis
aircraft were shot down. During the stubborn struggles on 4 August, the formations approached
the Tomar knot, wedged into its defenses in several places, and covered the knot in a half-ring
from the north, east and south. east. The Germans’ attempt to stop the troops advancing north of
Belgorod was also unsuccessful. The second and third defensive lines of the Nazis broke
through, and the infantry and tanks were quite close to the city.
A difficult situation for the German troops took place on the eastern and southeastern approaches
to Belgorod. There, the USSR forces eliminated the enemy’s bridgehead on the right bank of the
Seversky Donets, as well as crossed the river in several areas. Then, the Red Army reached the
northern outskirts of Belgorod. But a more dangerous situation for the enemy developed on the
western approaches to Belgorod. On 5 August, Belgorod was completely cleared of the Germans.
The Nazis hastily retreated to the south, leaving over 3 thousand people killed in the streets of
the city. The offensive impulses of the Red Army were increasing day by day. On August 7-8, the
1st and 5th tank armies captured the towns of Bohodukhiv, Zolochev, and the village of Cossack
Lopan. With the arriving tank formations in the area of Bogodukhov, the Germans’ defense was
interrupted to the entire operational depth. The Battle ended on 23 August – with the liberation of
Kharkiv (Kasdorf 17). However, according to Grossman, several following small battles in the
area went on (242).
Impact of the Battle
The Battle of Kursk might be characterized as one that had a substantial influence in both the
military-political and international frameworks. It substantially increased the importance and
global authority of the USSR (Grossman 231). It became apparent that given the mightiness of
the Soviet troops and forces, the Nazis were forced to face an inevitable lesion. The sympathy of
the global community towards the USSR increased as well. Plenty of the occupied countries and
citizens were considering the Soviet Union as the ray of hope that would set them free from the
fascists’ oppression. There were numerous national fronts inspired by the Battle – starting from
France and ending with Norway. The anti-Nazi struggles were intensified throughout the whole
world, which was an important mental advantage over Hitler and his allies.
Then, the victory at Kursk had a notable impact on the German people, undermining their state
of mind and belief that they are a superior nation that cannot be defeated. The Nazis were losing
control over their allies, and there were many splits within the fascists’ blocs – all these resulted
in continuous political and military crises (Balck 303). The launching steps of this collapse were
evident from the end of Mussolini’s regime when Italy decided to stop its relationships with
Germany.
The triumph in the Battle of Kursk that was discussed above forced Germany to turn to a
defensive strategy at all the fronts of World War II (Zapotoczny 2). It had a significant influence
over the whole theatre of military actions. The transfer of the major part of the German troops
from the West to the Soviet-German frontlines, as well as their losses from the battles there,
considerably alleviated the disembarkation of Anglo-American forces in Italy and predefined the
success of the latter ones (Grossman 231).
Finally, given the effects of the triumph of the Soviet forces, interactions between the world-
leading governments of the anti-Hitler coalition were enhanced (History.com Editors). Soon after
the Battle of Kursk, the Teheran conference was conducted. There, the heads of the Soviet
Union, the US, and Great Britain were present and formally established the allies’ relationships
between the three mentioned countries. During the meetings, it was decided to open a second
front in Europe.
The Battle of Kursk failed the strategy of the offense of the Nazis; their attempts to seize
strategic advantages and overcome all the resistance had no positive results in the aftermath. The
USSR leaders completely defended their strategic initiatives and did not lose them until the War
ended. After this great battle, the balances of forces substantially changed in favor of the Red
Army. In contrast, the troops of the Germans had to launch a defensive strategy to survive and
take the lead where possible, which – unsurprisingly – did not happen.
Conclusion
The Battle lasted for fifty days, which puts it in line with the longes battles of the War. More than
four million people took part in it from both sides, and a plethora of military means was utilized
as well. The Nazis faced such a drastic struggle from which they could not simply recover during
the further flow of the War. Soviet forces considerably advanced in the southern and
southwestern directions, eliminating the Orel and Belgorod-Kharkiv troops of the Germans, as
well as creating favorable circumstances for the free of left-bank Ukraine and access to the
Dnieper.
Then, it should be emphasized that the won of the Soviet forces in the Battle had a significant
political and military impact. Given the results of this Battle, the Nazis’ offensive aspirations
could last no longer. The triumph demonstrated several radical changes within the vector of the
War. The Germans were forced to turn to merely defensive actions, and their allies were
abandoning them one by one. Under the impact of the Battle explored, resistance movements
throughout the whole world started to be more active, which undermined the fascist positions to
a great extent as well. Then, the military art of the USSR became even more advanced, and the
airspace nearby Kursk was fully occupied by the Red Army air forces after the Battle.
More than a hundred thousand Soviet soldiers who took part in the Battle gained their rewards –
orders, medals, and recognition. The battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk might be
considered three crucial stages within the scope of the struggle against the Germans during the
War – three critical milestones that led to the won over the Nazis. The initiatives for actions on
the Soviet-German front were completely seized by the Red Army forces, which contributed to
the absolute dominance of the USSR in this frontline. Subsequent operations were conducted
under the conditions of our undivided possession of this initiative, which was an important factor
in achieving new major military victories over the Nazis.
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