1 / 5100%
Within the intelligence cycle there are five steps: Planning and Direction, Collection,
Processing, Analysis, and Dissemination. It is crucial for all five steps to be properly completed
to develop the highest quality intelligence. Albeit, even if all five steps are completed properly, it
does not necessarily mean the intelligence will be accurate enough to forestall an unseen event. It
must be accepted that intelligence may be wrong due to the impossibility of foreseeing the
future. The process of analysis is an intellectual process that is prone to many challenges
(Lowenthal & Marks, 2015).
Johnson (2011) discusses major attributes that are measureable and can be used when
assessing intelligence reporting. This is similar to a checklist an analyst can use to measure the
quality of their intelligence reporting. These eight major attributes are: accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, comprehensiveness, readability, probability, objectivity, and actionability. Again, it
must be stated even when the analyst(s) develops high quality intelligence, it does not mean the
consumer is always receptive nor does it mean the intelligence is precise enough to forestall a
specific unseen event. However, incorporating these attributes within the intelligence process
will produce finer work than if the attributes were not properly used or used at all.
There are many things that can go wrong during the five steps of the intelligence cycle;
things can begin to go wrong right from the start. The Planning and Direction phase is the first
step within the cycle. Johnson (2011) states in the beginning, the problem is generally the lack of
guidance from the policymaker about their intelligence requirements. This type of guidance is
the foundation the analyst’s work. He or she must have a clear understanding of the consumer’s
needs to properly conduct the intelligence cycle. This could be the foundational start to an
analysis setback. One thing that can go wrong, perhaps the most important is the intelligence is
off-target and irrelevant (lack of utility) which can lead to a snowball effect for all other stages.
Once the consumer’s requirements are established, next is the collection phase. One thing that
can go wrong in the collection phase is the inability of using a wide range of sources. This can
result into a lack of flexibility that is needed to meet changing circumstances (McDowell, 2009).
The collection phase is vital to achieving success in the whole intelligence task; thus a well-
executed plan and collection activity must be achieved (McDowell, 2009).
Johnson (2011) affirms speed and accuracy are the watchwords for the Processing phase.
If the analyst is unable to face the time constraints of the processing phase without accurately
filtering through the ‘noise’, then it can lead to misinterpretations along with the lack of the
timeliness aspect needed in reporting. The Analysis phase is critical to the outcome of
intelligence. This is the phase where formulas and recipes are put to use when analyzing the
collected and processed data. As stated earlier, intelligence analysis is an intellectual activity
first, therefore the data mechanics of this phase is secondary. “Mere data management will not
solve problems and where even the synergistic result that comes from adding data items together
just will not provide an answer without careful and talented analysis” (McDowell, 2009, p. 213).
This talent and critical thinking will allow for the appropriate analytical methodology to be
chosen. However, one thing that can go wrong is choosing just one methodology, especially in
strategic intelligence. McDowell (2009) states it is unlikely choosing just one single
methodology will produce the answer to any strategic intelligence problem.
Lastly, the Dissemination phase is where the analysis product is handed over to the
consumer in a timely manner. Many things can go wrong in this phase. One crucial element that
can go wrong is the analysis was misinterpreted by the consumer and the intelligence managers
failed to clear up the misinterpretation(s). Misinterpretations can occur for various reasons: the
lack of readability, objectivity was placed within the report, policy maker conducts cherry
picking, etc. Even though some of the responsibility lies within the policy maker for the
misinterpretations, it still falls on the intelligence manager to clear up these misinterpretations
regardless of the possible backlash received. Their goal is to produce analysis that is not
politicized and clear of biases, and to not fear objecting the policy makers. “Sanctify them in the
truth; your word is truth” (John 17:17, ESV).
References:
Johnson, L. H. (2011). National security intelligence in the United States: A performance
checklist. Intelligence and National Security, 26(5), 607-615.
doi: 10.1080/02684527.2011.604198
Lowenthal, M.M. & Marks, R.A. (2015). Intelligence analysis: Is it as good as it gets?
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,28(4), 662-665.
doi: 10.1080/08850607.2015.1051410
McDowell, D. (2009). Strategic intelligence: A handbook for practitioners, managers, and
users.
Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press.
Thank you for your post Jordan. Within your last paragraph, you mentioned the
legislation process and the connection it has with the intelligence community. As you
mentioned, Lowenthal (2015) discusses the specificity of this by mentioning the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), it may be satisfying but will have no effect on
the analysts. Lowenthal also discusses the need for a profound political shift in managing and
overseeing intelligence. One major benefit it would provide is depoliticizing intelligence and
ending them being the political punching bag of convenience when unforeseen events happen
(Lowenthal, 2011). Lowenthal also talks about the need for policy makers to be more informed
and educated on what intelligence truly provides. There is a saying "the educated consumer is the
best consumer", unfortunately as much as the intelligence community would love for this to be
true, but it is not always the case. Many presidents and cabinet members have little knowledge or
experience with intelligence when they come into the job, and that chance of gaining knowledge
and experience is decreased due to the lack of time once they are in power (Jervis, 2010). There
needs to be a better connection for improving receptiveness to intelligence.
References:
Jervis, R. (2010). Why intelligence and policymakers clash. Political Science Quarterly,
125(2), 185-204. Retrieved from
http
s
:
//
www
.
j
s
tor
.
o
r
g
/
s
tab
l
e
/
25698994
Lowenthal, M.M. & Marks, R.A. (2015). Intelligence analysis: Is it as good as it gets?
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,28(4), 662-665.
doi: 10.1080/08850607.2015.1051410
Thank you for your post Josh. You present a valid argument in stating cognitive biases are
the most catastrophic to analysis. These cognitive biases can contribute to uncertainty in
intelligence. Psychological evidence shows the real decision-making and information processing
abilities are not optimal due to the complexity of information in the world, which overwhelms
the human cognitive abilities and this is how cognitive bias is developed (Kebbell, Muller, and
Martin, 2010). Adding to the complexity of information, is the contextual pressures such as time
constraints (Kebbell, Muller, and Martin, 2010). While the analysis phase can certainly prove as
the phase for things to go wrong, the collection phase is just as important. McDowell (2009)
states while traditionally, more attention is paid to the analysis phase, the collection phase is
fundamental to the success of the entire intelligence task. He states it is imperative for a well-
planned and executed collection plan is crucial to the success of relevant collection, which in
turn provides more solid foundation for the analysis phase.
Reference:
Kebbell, M., Muller, D., & Martin, K. (2010). Understanding and managing bias. In Bammer G.
(Ed.), Dealing with Uncertainties in Policing Serious Crime (pp.87-98). ANU Press.
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hbrf.10
McDowell, D. (2009). Strategic intelligence: A handbook for practitioners, managers, and
users.
Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press.
Students also viewed