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McDowell writes in Strategic Intelligence
A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers, and Users that there are some subtle,
albeit major differences between the subjects of strategic intelligence and tactical
intelligence as well as related fields. These differences include tasking and focus, in
which he notes that strategic intelligence is more concerned with examining
problems in a way that provides understanding of the structure, purpose, and nature
of the topic so that organizations can develop comprehensive plans to deal with it,
and not merely react to the issue. Listed here are the seven processes outlined by
McDowell as being essential to the understanding of the application of strategic
intelligence. These include:
Planning of the strategic research project, where the emphasis on the timing
and resources of the plan will change and adapt as the planner realizes the
complexity involved in covering the strategic intelligence plan; Information collection,
in which strategic intelligence looks towards gaining a deeper understanding of all
aspects of a particular crime phenomenon and its impact, near and far, and in which
case data collection is aimed at gathering all sorts of information from a variety of
sources within and outside of government circles; Collating and evaluating the data,
in which McDonald reports follows much the same set of principles and practice as
other forms of intelligence; Analysis of information, where an analyst may need to
spend some considerable time working out the qualitative information in a way that
allows the analyst to see meaning, even where no substantive proof or statistical
reliability can be found; Developing of workable concepts and hypotheses, in which
the data and hypotheses involved may have much less positive and conclusive
information than may be the case in tactical intelligence; And finally reporting of the
results of strategic research, where in strategic intelligence projects, the outcomes
are most often written reports that provide a wealth of detail and comment, unlike
tactical intelligence reports that are often delivered in verbal briefings (McDowell,
2008).
John G. Heidenrich, a renowned expert in strategic intelligence matters, who
has long advocated an analytical approach that is comprehensive, and assesses the
interactions of political, military/security, socio-cultural, economic, technological, and
environmental variables, wrote a paper in 2007 titled The State of Strategic
Intelligence, in which he was critical of the field of strategic intelligence in which he
writes that certain concepts and processes that are vitals to the strategic intelligence
framework are lacking. Notably, he reports that many individuals do not even
understand the definition of strategic intelligence, often confusing or correlating it
with other forms of intelligence frameworks. He also goes on to write that current
analysts are often young and experienced, and lack the creativity and experience to
collect information from open sources, often choosing to focus on resource gathering
from familiar sources. Heidenrich also reports that the modern intelligence
environment and state of global affairs has pushed the fields of intelligence into
providing information that is only relevant in the urgent and short term, something in
which strategic intelligence is ill suited to do, given it’s complex and contextual
nature. He also goes on to report that “to craft language which is literal, concise, and
not misleading requires editing, editing, and more editing.” (Heidenrich, 2007 p 11).
Communication skills, Heidenrich writes, are severely lacking, rendering many
analysts unable to convey important and complex information in a manner that is
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digestible and actionable to the policymaker. These deficiencies of the strategic
intelligence field are likely to have been contributing factors in some of the United
States’ past intelligence failures, such as the 9/11 attacks, the assertion about
WMD’s in Iraq, and even instances such as the Yom Kippur War and the Iranian
Revolution of 1979.
References
Heidenrich, J. G. (2007). The Intelligence Communities Neglect of Strategic
Intelligence. Studies in Intelligence, 51(2).
McDowell, D. (2008). Strategic Intelligence. Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group.
https://libertyonline.vitalsource.com/books/9780810862852
