LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 1
CASE REVIEW ASSIGNMENT
Linda Marie Williams
School of Education, Liberty University
EDAS 747
Author Note
Linda Marie Williams. I have no known conflict of interest to disclose. Correspondence
concerning this article should be addressed to Linda Marie Williams. Email:
lmwilliams31@liberty.edu.
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 2
Introduction
The following cases have a direct impact on education. Cyberbullying can be more
damaging, if not more than the traditional forms of bullying (Fisher, 2021). Although (Kimmel
2017) found bullying needs to be treated as a severe problem and not a rite of passage to be left
alone and endured. Nonetheless, it is the duty of the school board, superintendent, administrators,
and teachers to protect the safety of our children in the educational setting. Moreover, it is their
direct responsibility to recognize the signs of abuse and bullying, both inside and outside of
school. Subsequently, administrators should train their staff to recognize signs of such abuse and
what actions, if any, they should take. However, a diverse culture should be in place to make
children feel safe and secure when speaking about issues or concerns of their safety and or the
safety of others. These cases have set a precedent on education today, involving both the rights of
students and teachers as they are not given up just because they entered the school doors.
In this case law review, the following four cases related to my topic on bullying and
cyberbullying are being reviewed with court decision and as evidence statements supporting the
spokesperson. Four cases are as follows: Zeno v. Pine Plains Central School District, J. S. v. Blue
Mountain School District, Nicole B. v. School District of Philadelphia, and
Zeno v. Pine Plains Central School District
Analyzes Case Law
In January 2005, Anthony Zeno transferred to Stissing Mountain High School ("SMHS")
in Pine Plains from Long Island, New York during his first year of high school. He was harassed
for the next three and a half years. In February 2005, shortly after a few weeks of attending this
school, a student unknown to Anthony, came charging toward him and screaming that he would
“rip” Anthony's face off, kick his ass, and said we do not want your kind at our school.”
However, as other students held the aggressor back unidentified students called him a “nigger”
and told him to go back to where he came from. It was after this that Anthony’s mother, Cathleen
Zeno spoke with SMHS principal Mr. John Francis Howe. Mr. Howe informed her that in a small
town such as this you do not want to start trouble.
Anthony was subjected to racial comments and harassment at the school for the rest of
the school year. A student would strip him of his necklace breaking it and claim it to be a joke.
However, Anthony continued to report the incidents to school officials. Subsequently, Mrs. Zeno
wrote a letter to the school board and to the District Superintendent, Dr. Linda Kaumeyer, with
concerns about students' “verbal racial attacks and physical abuse” on Anthony and his younger
sister, who was also a student in the district. Although, Dr. Kaumeyer neither offered to meet
with Mrs. Zeno nor let Mr. Howe know of the letter that she received. During the semester,
students either received a warning or a suspension for their conduct towards Anthony. There
were no remedial actions taken in response to Anthony’s student harassment.
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 3
Student harassment continued throughout Anthony’s second year at SMHS. Escalating
harassment was reported by Anthony revealing racial tensions in the hallway. The following
semester, the harassment continued. But in January 2006, a faculty member reported racial
comments during Anthony's art class. Then, in February 2006, another student tampered with
Anthony's locker, along with the student who had broken Anthony's necklace by stuffing garbage
into the locker. And when Anthony opened his locker, the metal door fell off hitting him on the
head and garbage spilled onto him and onto the floor. Furthermore, on two separate occasions,
students taunted Anthony with references to lynching, displaying a noose, or threatening to take a
rope to the nearest tree. However, the district suspended the students involved for five days and
Anthony was subjected to file for orders of protection, twice. One student was moved to another
school by the district.
During Anthony’s sophomore year, more reports of harassment continued to face
Anthony, which he repeatedly reported to school officials. About halfway through the year, he
told faculty and staff that he was tired of this and cannot take any more of it, and it has to stop
because it has been going on too long. Mrs. Zeno wrote a letter to the Superintendent on
September 19, 2005, recounting the verbal attacks, racial slurs, and threats on their lives, not to
mention the physical attacks which SMHS had to call police. The superintendent did not reach
out to Mrs. Zeno but responded to her in writing. As added reports of harassment take place, the
principal did ask staff and teachers to keep a watchful eye on Anthony. The Zenos' lawyer and
other members of the community notified the district about the harassment. Marilynn A. Vetrano
of the Dutchess County Human Rights Commission (HRC) wrote the superintendent, referring to
“a complaint of alleged racism related incidents.” During which time, Anthony's lawyer, Michael
H. Sussman, also contacted the district. Mr. Sussman asked SMHS to do two things: (1) provide
Anthony with a shadow, who would go with him to school, and (2) implement racial sensitivity
programs to underscore the district's bias for zero tolerance of racism.
In November 2005, the Dutchess County N.A.A.C.P. met with the superintendent and
principal. During these meetings, they restated the Zenos' requests for a shadow to Anthony and
implemented racial sensitivity programs. In addition, they offered to provide these options at no
cost. The district declined to assign Anthony a shadow and chose not to implement the training
program.
The district prepared an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for Anthony at the end
of the school year. The IEP notes that “Anthony has been struggling with acceptance in the
school environment. There have been many incidents between Anthony and others with prejudice
or racial slurs.” After the IEP was completed, school officials discussed the IEP with Mrs. Zeno.
At this meeting, Mrs. Zeno also raised more concerns about the bias Anthony continued to
endure at school. More district action was taken, and Ms. Stoorvogel, who was aware of the
many incidents with prejudice or racial slurs concerning Anthony, never investigated the
harassment. As the District's Title IX compliance officer, Ms. Stoorvogel, was charged with
investigating alleged violations of both Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 Title IX
and Title VI. Nonetheless, she did not follow up or respond to these complaints. Consequently,
the administrators never discussed Anthony’s racial harassment.
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 4
The district coordinated a mediation between Mrs. Zeno and Anthony's accused harassers
and their respective parents, in February 2006. However, the district neglected to let Mrs. Zeno
know of the time and date of the mediation, therefore, she did not attend. Moreover, the
prospective mediator had not been trained in bias awareness or diversity issues which were at the
core of the harassment.
The district later implemented a separate one-day program for faculty and staff, students,
and parents, run by McGrath Training Systems. The course, called Altering the Culture of
Cruelty: A Legally Based Bullying and Harassment Prevention Program discussed bullying and
sexual harassment, but despite being customized for the district, its treatment of race and
discrimination was hardly touching the matter. SMHS never implemented discrimination-, bias-,
diversity-, or race-specific programs during the 2005–2006 academic year.
Anthony was subjected to more hallway harassment in school, in the fall of 2006. He
reported it less often to the district, however, because nothing was being done, and it has already
been three years. Mrs. Zeno contacted Kaumeyer again on October 24, 2006, to discuss solutions
for Anthony’s continued harassment. Although Kaumeyer did not call Mrs. Zeno, or meet with
her, she did respond a few days later in writing.
In January 2007, a student threatened to do bodily harm to Anthony and threatened to
rape his younger sister, in addition to the hallway harassment. Anthony decides to throw a punch
and the district punished Anthony, and not the instigator. Anthony began spending part of his
junior year with the Boards of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) program. Students on
the BOCES bus repeatedly called him a “nigger” as he travelled to the off-campus program.
Anthony informed the district about these incidents, but the harassment continued.
The district hired James Childs of JaRa Consulting, who conducted student focus groups,
administer surveys, and met with staff, parents, and community members to create diversity
awareness culture. Childs was also supposed to train faculty and staff on the importance of
acknowledging racial diversity, recognizing racial stereotypes, and students on diversity issues.
However, Childs held no training sessions, during the entire school year, and only did
preliminary work (US 2nd Circuit Opinions and Cases). The district organized a student
extracurricular activity defunded STOP (Students and Teachers Opposed to Prejudice).
Furthermore, Anthony began this action against the district alleging discrimination in
violation of Title VI, on July 18, 2007. The district moved for summary judgment, after
discovery. The motion was denied by the district court on May 20, 2009.
Trial started on March 8, 2010. The district orally moved for judgment as a matter of law,
after Anthony rested. Ruling from the bench, the court denied the motion. On March 12, 2010,
the jury returned its verdict, finding that the district had violated Anthony's civil rights under
Title VI, and awarding him $1.25 million in damages.
The district renewed its earlier motion for judgment as a matter of law, on April 13, 2010,
and moved for a new trial. Thus, a new trial limited to damages, or a remittitur of the jury award.
On August 5, 2010, by memorandum and order, the district court granted the district's motion for
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 5
a new trial, subject to Anthony's accepting a reduced $1 million award. On August 9, 2010,
Anthony agreed to accept the reduced award, and the district court directed the Clerk of the
Court to enter judgment in the sum of $1 million, in addition to costs and fees, in favor of
Anthony. On September 3, 2010, the district filed its notice of appeal. However, on September 9,
2010, the district court entered an amended final judgment.
Analyzes Self as Spokesperson
I am shocked and appalled that the administrator and other school officials did not handle
this at once. This is clearly a case of bullying! They did not offer any safety precautions for
Anthony and allowed him to suffer at the hands of his peers. Nearly 70 years have gone by and
yet there are public schools who continue to allow racial discrimination and harassment of
students. The district failed this student on so many violations creating a hostile environment for
Anthony to endure. Subsequently, created legal entanglements. A school district shall be subject
to liability for third-party conduct if it exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the
context of the known harassment. The educators have a duty to do everything in them to ensure
the bullying stops (Hinduja, et al. 2015). The Supreme Court has noted that school districts
should exercise substantial control over the circumstances of harassment when it occurs at the
school during school hours. A school district's authority to take remedial action lies in its
longstanding disciplinary oversight over its students. The principal eventually disciplined
students, but the bullying did not stop and ensured the target person felt safe.
The harassment was so offensive and severe which lead to him taking control of the
situation by hitting back because they were not doing anything about the reports he continued to
file against his peers. His mother reached out to the principal, superintendent, and the school
board. But for over three and a half years, Anthony Zeno was endlessly humiliated, attacked in
the hallway, in his classes, and no one said or did anything about it. According to the education
national geographic, on May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed racial segregation in
public schools.
J. S. v. Blue Mountain School District
Analyzes Case Law
A minor student identified as J.S, was suspended for creating, on a weekend and on her
home computer, an internet creating a MySpace fake profile making fun of her principal, James
McGonigle, with adult language and sexually explicit content. However, no substantial
disruption was created in school and could not reasonably have led school officials to predict
substantial disruption. J.S. had limited access for her and to her friends. The MySpace profile did
have the principal's picture; however, it did not identify him by name, school, or location. It was
never viewable at school. J.S. was suspended due to this MySpace profile page. Subsequently,
J.S. and her parents, Terry and Steven Snyder, sued the school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and state law, alleging that the suspension violated J.S.'s First Amendment free speech rights, that
the school district's policies were unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, that the school district
violated the Snyders' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights to raise their child,
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 6
and that the school district acted outside of its authority in punishing J.S. for out-of-school
speech.
Furthermore, McGonigle decided that the profile created was a Level Four Infraction
under the Disciplinary Code of Blue Mountain Middle School, Student-Parent Handbook,
Appendix 65-66, as a false accusation about a staff member of the school and a copyright
violation of the computer use policy, for using McGonigle’s photograph.
The principal contacted MySpace by providing the URL for the profile requesting its
removal, which was eventually done. However, the superintendent was contacted to inform
her of the decision regarding J.S. and K.L.’s punishment. Although the superintendent could
have denied McGonigle’s decision she ultimately agreed with the punishment. On Friday,
March 23, 2007, McGonigle sent J.S.’s and K.L.’s parents a disciplinary notice, saying that
they were given a ten-day suspension. However, Mrs. Snyder’s attempt to overrule the
suspension the following week was declined by the superintendent.
The First Amendment free speech rights were violated when J.S. was suspended for an
indisputable off-campus speech that did not cause a substantial disruption at school. Therefore,
the school officials could not reasonably have led administrators to predict substantial disruption
at school (LexisNexis). Furthermore, another issue raised was that the school district violated the
Snyders' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights to raise their child (LexisNexis).
Moreover, schools have not been able to punish students for off-campus speech that is not
school-sponsored or at a school-sponsored event and that caused no substantial disruption at
school by neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
ever been allowed (LexisNexis).
Because the district court did not acknowledge that Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), does not govern this case and no
substantial and material disruption occurred, the School District’s punishment was
permissible constitutionally because the profile was both vulgar and offensive; therefore,
because both Fraser and J.S.’s off-campus conduct did have an effect at the school (Justia U.
S. Law, 2011).
Furthermore, nothing forced J.S.’s parents from reaching their own disciplinary decision,
and they were not forced to approve or disapprove of the conduct. The Fourteenth Amendment
claim was denied. Because the student handbook was explicitly limited to in-school speech, the
policies were not unconstitutional. However, the policies clearly defined when and where they
were applied, with specific examples, and a comprehensible normative standard was articulated.
Therefore, they were not found unconstitutional for being vague (Justia U. S. Law, 2011).
Analyzes Self as Spokesperson
I have mixed feelings about this case. Seems as though the main issue was infringing on
the First Amendment rights of J.S. However, she did illegally use a picture of the principal that
was downloaded from the school districts web site, violating copyright laws even though she
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 7
used her own personal computer in her home. She did not make it private until the next day when
other students began approaching her saying they thought it was funny. I think the principal put
the student who initially told him about the profile under duress as Mr. McGonigle asked the
student to find out who created the profile. Although, he was not able to find the profile on
MySpace, he called them to ask to have the profile taken down. Later that student reported to
him at the end of the day that it was J.S. who created the profile. Then the principal asked the
student who initially told him about the profile to bring him a printed copy of the profile to
school on the next day, and she did as he asked.
He showed the printed copy of the MySpace profile to the school superintendent and
other school officials and technology staff. Later he decides that creating the profile was a Level
Four infraction from the school code of conduct and student-parent handbook, which referred to
false accusation about a staff member and a copyright violation of the computer use policy,
which I disagree with because she used her parent’s computer at her home did violate a copyright
violation for using that photograph from the school districts website. I think this is where legal
entanglement is complicated by the principal (Justia U. S. Law, 2011). J.S. should have been
suspended for copyright violation and not for the statements in the profile; thus, which infringed
on her First Amendment rights. I do concur with the decision about not infringing on the parents'
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Moreover, the principal testifies that there is a decline in student discipline because of
this lawsuit. He believes this encourages other students to misbehave because they think they
can get away with it by filing a lawsuit to mitigate disciplinary actions (Justia U. S. Law,
2011). He just needs to know how to apply the laws to disciplinary actions and to contact his
superintendent, if in doubt. Because, in my opinion, the superintendent should have asked
more questions about this entanglement before agreeing with the principal in this case.
Regarding the vulgar and offensive wording, the principal should have referred to that same
school code of conduct book and student-parent handbook to see how that policy is
implemented.
Nicole B. v. School District of Philadelphia
Analyzes Case Law
N.B. began attending Bryant on or around September 14, 2011, as a fourth grader.
N.B. had not previously attended public school and Plaintiff expressed concern about her
son's integration into the student population. The principal assured her that the child would
be safe, therefore his mother decided to keep N.B. enrolled at Bryant. His peers began
harassing N. B. daily calling him names related to race and sex.
On October 25, 2001, three of N.B.’s classmates assaulted him sexually in the
bathroom at his public elementary school in the City of Philadelphia and N.B. did not tell
anyone about the incident until November 4, 2011. According to Appellant, N.B. had
endured two months of pervasive physical and verbal harassment at school leading up to the
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 8
sexual assault. However, when N.B.’s mother learned of the assault, she called the
authorities, the school principal, and his teacher. Subsequently, she withdrew N.B. from his
school, claiming the administrator and teacher were both aware of the risk to N.B. but did not
protect him from the harm of the abuse he suffered.
These peers physically assaulted N.B. on several occasions and they forced him to
commit humiliating and violent acts under threats of violence. Mother spoke with one of
N.B.’s teachers about the harassment, and Mr. Johnson assured the mother that N.B. would
be safe. Mom accused the School District and Pearson of trying to cover up the sexual
assault and tried to persuade a police officer to lie about what happened. Subsequently, N.B
suffered significant psychological problems from the abuse and needed intensive
psychological therapy after the incident.
Furthermore, the Appellant filed an administrative complaint with the Human
Relations Commission against the Philadelphia School District in her individual capacity and
on N.B.’s behalf, asserting claims of discrimination based on gender and race under the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), over two years later, in 2014. Subsequently, the
Human Relations Commission rejected the Appellant’s complaint because it was filed
beyond the 180-day time limit. Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered if
principles of equitable tolling found in PHRA, or Pennsylvania’s Minority Tolling Statute
(Minority Tolling Statute), appeal to an otherwise mistimed complaint. Moreover, the
Supreme Court found the PHRA’s impartial tolling provision applied to a minor whose
parent did not satisfy the statute of limitations for filing an administrative complaint prior to
the minor reaching the age of majority. Although the Court reversed the order of the
Commonwealth Court, by this finding.
On April 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas,
Philadelphia County, Philadelphia, PA. A third and final Amended Complaint was filed on
February 17, 2016, bringing claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (Counts I, II),
Pennsylvania tort law (Counts III, IV), and Pennsylvania contract law (Count V). On March 7,
2016, Plaintiff served three expert reports on defendants. One, the report of Felicia Hurewitz,
Ph.D. (Hurewitz Report) (Doc. No. 1-4), invokes the Individuals with Disabilities in Education
Act (IDEA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504) Doc. No. 1-4 at 2. The
Hurewitz Report shows that she intends to testify about the requirements outlined under these
statutes for schools to find and provide accommodations for students with disabilities, that the
school did not follow these requirements about the student attackers of N. B., and that this led to
the harm N. B. suffered. Moreover, Malcolm Smith, Ph.D. (Smith Report) (Doc. No. 1-5), filed a
report which looked to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), as providing
the relevant standard that Bryant should have followed to prevent N.B.'s abuse (Doc. No. 1-5).
A three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed in an unpublished
memorandum. Nicole B. v School District of Philadelphia, 868 C.D. 2018 (Pennsylvania
Commonwealth filed Dec. 17, 2018). Preliminarily, the court explained that an individual
alleging discrimination may bring an action in the courts of common pleas for legal or fair relief,
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 9
must first exhaust his or her administrative remedies under the Act. Relying upon Vincent v.
Fuller Co., 616 A.2d 969, 974 (Pa. 1992) (By necessary implication, one who files a complaint
with the [Human Relations Commission] that is later found to be untimely cannot be considered
to have used the administrative procedures provided in the [PHRA]), the court reasoned that
Appellant was precluded from pursuing relief in court because she filed her administrative
complaint more than two years after N.B. was sexually assaulted, well beyond the PHRA’s 180
days (about 6 months) time limit. Thus, the court agreed that the trial court lacked authority to
entertain Appellant’s lawsuit.
Additionally, the court rejected Appellant’s contention that Section 962(e) of the PHRA
which effectively tolls the time requirement for complaints filed by minors, and by explaining
that administrative complaints filed beyond the 180-day window have been permitted in the past
based on the doctrine of equitable tolling only in instances where the defendant actively misleads
the plaintiff regarding the cause of action, where extraordinary circumstances prevent the
plaintiff from asserting his rights, and where a plaintiff has asserted his rights in a timely fashion,
but in the wrong forum. Nicole B., 868 C.D. 2018. However, the court noted that Appellant did
not advance any of those justifications, and later found that her supposition of N.B.’s status as a
minor should trigger equitable tolling was without authority and blended the concepts of
equitable tolling and minority tolling, of which the court found “does not toll the statute of
limitations unless the legislature has expressly provided for minority tolling.”
Although, through no fault of his own, the court explained that the doctrine of equitable
tolling typically applies where a plaintiff was unaware of or unable to promptly discover his tort
claim. Consequently, the court saw that the Appellant learned of the harassment and of her son’s
injury as early as November 4, 2011, and needed to file her administrative complaint by May 2,
2012. The court found that Appellant’s untimely administrative complaint could not be brought
back via fair tolling. The General Assembly’s use of the broad phrase, fair tolling, is an intent
that this principle is to be employed in a manner consistent with the statute. Indeed, we note
that the PHRA has a short limitations period for further supporting the view that the phrase
“equitable tolling” should be broadly interpreted. Finally, denying minors, the right to be
heard by the Human Relations Commission, and to recover for wrongful discriminatory
conduct, through an overly restrictive interpretation of the phrase, fair tolling, would defeat
the very purpose and policies upon which the PHRA is based, and severely undercut the
protections of this humanitarian statute. Thus, a finding that equitable tolling does not
encompass minority tolling would forever bar many minors’ claims of discrimination. Yet,
our Commonwealth is at the forefront of protecting the rights of children. Barring minor’s
claims before they have the legal ability to bring them conflicts with such protection. This
conflict is partially resolved by allowing minors to bring claims through an adult
representative. However, minors with a parent or guardian to stand for them do not have to
wait until reaching the age of majority to seek a remedy in court. However, while a parent or
guardian may bring an action on behalf of the minor, such representation alone may be
inadequate to protect a minor’s rights because an adult may not continue within the
limitations period.
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 10
Thus, where a parent or guardian does not promptly file a complaint before the Human
Relations Commission on the minor’s behalf, absent equitable tolling, the injured child would be
forever deprived of the ability to seek civil relief. Simply said, children should not be subject to
the whim or mercy of parents or guardians with respect to the assertion of their legal rights.
Furthermore, resort to equitable tolling for minors is particularly critical for certain populations
of children, such as the homeless, youth whose parents are themselves minors, and children with
disabilities or in foster care, who have special needs and who routinely do not have anyone
serving as a parent to advocate on their behalf. Thus, an interpretation excluding minors from the
doctrine of equitable tolling would be fatal to the rights of many children subjected to
discrimination. However, the General Assembly has instructed that the PHRA shall be
construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof, and any law inconsistent
with any provisions hereof shall not apply. Although consistent with the legislature’s
mandate, we have done so here. Finally, we are unpersuaded by the district’s argument that
the Minority Tolling Statute was enacted prior to the PHRA’s, fair tolling provision, the
legislature would have expressly included minority tolling in the PHRA if it had intended age
to toll the limitations period. However, as found by the Commonwealth Court and asserted by the
District, the Minority Tolling Statute applies only to, civil actions, which do not include
administrative proceedings then it is eminently reasonable that the General Assembly intended to
include minority tolling as part of the umbrella concept of fair tolling. As we are confident that
construing fair tolling to include tolling based on minority status gives effect to the legislature’s
intent to protect all Pennsylvania citizens against unlawful discrimination, while an express
articulation would have been preferred. Thus, we acknowledge that the limitations period
contained in Title VII, another civil rights statute, has been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court to be subject to equitable considerations of waiver, estoppel, and equitable
tolling, Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393, and that federal decisional law has generally held that the
limitations period is not subject to tolling on the basis of minority. Simply noted that while we
may consider federal decisions made under Title VII as instructive, such interpretation of a
federal statute is to determine that the PHRA’s equitable tolling provision is ambiguous, and,
after consideration of the occasion and necessity for the PHRA, its goals and objects, and the
consequences of including minority tolling as part of equitable tolling, we hold that, under its
equitable tolling provision, the PHRA’s limitation periods may be tolled during a child’s period
of minority. Like the Supreme Court of New Jersey in addressing its wrongful death statute in
Lafarge, supra, we do not believe that our legislature intended minority status to bar children
who have suffered discrimination from seeking the protections and benefits of the PHRA.
Analyzes Self as Spokesperson
I cannot even begin to express how the administration, staff, and peers of this student did
not help him. This student was continuously bullied because of his race and gender stereotype.
However, this school administration, teachers, and onlookers failed this kid by not intervening
early in the situation and by allowing the bullying to escalate from verbal, to physical, and
eventually to rape. There should have been protection for him under the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act (PRHA), which is Pennsylvania’s anti-discrimination law, when schools do not
stop ongoing bullying. His case was transferred to a Commonwealth court which denied merits
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 11
of the case because he was 9 years old at the time he was assaulted sexually and did not file a
claim within the 180 days (about 6 months) of the incident. First, he did not tell anyone for
almost two weeks of the sexual assault. And when he does tell, he is continued to be assaulted for
a couple of more weeks. What I am still coming to grips with is that he was sexually assaulted in
the bathroom. Where was the teacher at the time of the rape? How could he not know what
happened and then ignore what happened. What punishment did the boys receive for the sexual
assault, which is a crime.
Nonetheless, until a child turns 18, the legal document for minority tolling means that the
time for bringing a child’s claim does not begin prior to the age limit; but the court ruled that
minority tolling does not apply to PHRA claims. However, minority tolling is a vital protection
for Pennsylvania’s children, as it is unfair to hold children like N.B. to the same statute of
limitations as adults (Education Law Center).
In September 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in favor holding that bullying
victims have until six months after their 18th birthday to bring discriminatory complaints under
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Education Law Center staff attorney, Kristina Moon,
commented, “By recognizing that minor children should not be subjected to a short, 180-day
statute of limitations in filing claims with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the
court has affirmed the right of students and former students to challenge wrongful racial
discrimination, sexual harassment, and other discriminatory conduct in schools” (Education Law
Center).
State v. Bishop June 10, 2016
Analyze the Case
The underlying circumstances involved in this case include Bishop, a student, at Southern
Alamance High School and Price who sent out a sexually explicit text message. Another student
posted a screenshot of Price’s message on Facebook (FB). Students began to comment on the
post alleging Price was homosexual, homoerotic, and the defendant's comment “never got to slap
Price down before the Christmas break. When Price’s mother discovered him in his room
punching his pillow and banging on his bed, she went to console him. Subsequently, once she
was told about the incident and she at once telephoned Alamance County Police Department.
Later, Bishop was arrested and charged with one count of Cyberbullying in violation of N.C.G.S.
§ 14-458.1. The warrant reported that the defendant unlawfully, intentionally, and willfully used
a computer network to intimidate and torment Price.
Furthermore, the defendant was convicted in a jury trial. Nonetheless, the North Carolina
Circuit of Appeals upheld the conviction. However, on June 10, 2016, the court in a unanimous
decision reversed their decision, finding that cyberbullying was unconstitutionally restricting the
First Amendment freedoms of speech. The court rejected the states’ position of prescribed
conduct and not speech. Thus, it noted that the cyberbullying statute did make it a crime to post
or encourage others to post certain information on the internet. Consequently, the speech was
punished based on viewpoints and subject to such strict investigation. Therefore, the state did,
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 12
however, did not define torment and personal which meant the cyberbullying could not survive
such scandalous language.
Analyzes Self as Spokesperson
As some of the other students involved in conversations online, they were also arrested
and charged in connection with this crime of cyberbullying. The Supreme Court N.C.G.S. § 14–
458.1(a)(1)(d) found that the conduct and not speech, specifically punishes posting or
encouraging others to post comments with the intent to intimate or torment a minor via the
internet. The provision challenged made it unlawful for anyone to use a computer network or
computer to post private, personal, or sexual information about a minor with intent to harm them
mentally or physically.
The cyberbullying statute if clearly proven by the state, then the courts can uphold this
part of cyberbullying when states can show that it satisfies harsh examination. Therefore,
protecting children from the effects of line bullying as a government interest and is uncontested.
However, as states must normally show a problem that needs solving, it reveals its interests
substantially and constitutionally lawful. Consequently, captivating attentiveness is simply
protecting minors from both physical and psychological harm. Nonetheless, banning burdens in
protecting children from serious criminal penalization for crimes committed before they turn 18
years old.
Conclusion
One commonality these four cases have is the First Amendment, freedom of speech. Because of
the challenges schools are faced with in these cases, states need to revisit and amend their
bullying and anti-bullying campaigns to include cyberbullying. Consequently, administrators
and school officials are punishing students for off campus related speech about others on
campus. Hudson (2009) relays substantial disruption standards in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District (1969) even in off campus online speech as long as
there is a rationale relation to school activities. Hudson (2009) recognizes that one part of Tinker
often out of mind is when school officials punish students if their speech invades the rights of
other students.
LEGAL ENTANGLEMENT PROJECT: PART 3 13
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