Austin Jessee
GEORGIA v. RANDOLPH 04–1067
Statement of the Case: Three decades ago, this Court defined what constitutes
“valid consent” for warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment. The
Court also decided who can consent, recognizing that valid consent may be
obtained from the person whose property is being searched or from third-
parties who have common authority over or a sufficient connection to the
premises. This case presents the important question of whether police can
obtain valid consent to search a shared premise where both occupants are
present and one occupant consents while the other occupant objects.
Procedure Below: Whether such an evidentiary seizure is likewise lawful with the
permission of one occupant when the other, who later seeks to suppress the evidence,
is present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent.
Facts: On July 6, 2001, police arrived at the Randolph residence after Mrs. Randolph reported
a domestic dispute with her estranged husband, Defendant Scott Randolph. Randolph v State,
590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Georgia, 2003). The couple had separated two months earlier, and Mrs.
Randolph left the home at that time with their son to Canada. Id. She then returned with him to
the house on July 4, 2001 to collect her belongings. Id. On the morning of July 6, Mrs. Randolph
told police that Mr. Randolph had taken their son away and accused him of using cocaine. Id. He
denied such use and contended that Mrs. Randolph was highly inebriated. Id. The police then
requested Mr. Randolph's consent to search the house. Id. After he explicitly refused, the police
requested and received consent from Mrs. Randolph to search the house. Id. She took the
police to an upstairs bedroom, where the police found a "piece of cut straw," which contained
white residue. Id. The police believed it was cocaine and immediately contacted the district
attorney, who instructed them to obtain a warrant before continuing with the search. Id. at 397.
Mrs. Randolph then withdrew her consent to the search, but the police obtained a search
warrant and seized various drug-related items. Id. Mr. Randolph was indicted for possession of
cocaine. Id. He moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that it was obtained in violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights because he expressly objected to the search. Id. The trial court
denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed. Id. That court first
acknowledged that in US v Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court defined
"valid consent" for a police search as "the consent of a person who possesses common
authority over a premise . . . as against the absent non-consenting person with whom that
authority is shared." Id. (emphasis added). The appellate court, however, distinguished the
present case from Matlock because Mr. Randolph was not absent, but rather unequivocally
objected to the search at the house. Id. at 836-37. The court found it "reasonable" for Mr.
Randolph to believe that his "stated desire for privacy would be honored, even if there is
another occupant who could consent to the search." Id. at 836. Accordingly, the court held that
the search was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. After the appellate court's
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d
835 (2004), the State sought review by the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted
writ of certiorari on April 18, 2005.
Issue(s): Whether such an evidentiary seizure is likewise lawful with the permission of
one occupant when the other, who later seeks to suppress the evidence, is present at
the scene and expressly refuses to consent.
Rule of law: The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of a
premises when the police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is
reasonably believed to share, common authority over the property, and no present co-tenant
objects.
Holding: A physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails
Concurrence: Justice Stevens’ concurrence coming from ‘the living constitution’ school
of jurisprudential thought attack the "originalists" view of the Fourth Amendment.
Stevens wryly noted that the search would still have been prohibited if the Court
attempted to apply the law based on the meaning intended by the founding fathers,
pointing out that when the Fourth Amendment was written, the law of the time would
have made the man the "master of his house":
Concurrence: Justice Breyer's concurrence stressed that the majority opinion was
rather specific, writing "the circumstances here include the following”: The search at
issue was a search solely for evidence. The objecting party was present and made his
objection known clearly and directly to the officers seeking to enter the house. The
officers did not justify their search on grounds of possible evidence destruction. Cf.
Thornton v Untied States, 541 U. S, 615, 620-622 (2004); Skinner v Railway labor
Executives’’ Assn., 489 U. S. 602, 623 (1989); Schmerber v California, 384 U.S. 757,
770-771 (1966), and, as far as the record reveals, the officers might easily have
secured the premises and sought a warrant permitting them to enter. See Illinois v.
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). Thus, the “totality of the circumstances” present here do
not suffice to justify abandoning the Fourth Amendments traditional hostility to police
entry into a home without a warrant. I stress the totality of the circumstances, however,
because, were the circumstances to changes significantly, so should the result.
Critical Summary: This case essentially comes down to a determination of what is
reasonable, which is very difficult to determine clearly. The Matlock case attempted to exploit
the phrase "assumes the risk" in order to create a principle, but that may have merely confused
the issue. The respondent can distinguish Matlock from the present case because respondent
was present and objected to the search. However, the only legitimate law enforcement interests
that could have justified the decision in Matlock would seem to justify a decision in the State's
favor here. The only question, then, is whether the Court will continue to diminish the right to
be free from warrantless search in favor of law enforcement interests, or whether it will retreat
from its decision in Matlock.
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