Police Accountability: Evidence from United Kingdom
1.0 INTRODUCTION
In order to understand the complex nature of police accountability in the United
Kingdom, it is necessary to map out the terrain of policing across three separate
jurisdictions and to highlight a number of themes. From the outset, it is
necessary to be clear about what we are referring to when talking about the
police of the United Kingdom. The UK police are not a unitary body similar to
the national police forces that exist in many parts of the world. In England and
Wales, 43 forces undertake territorial policing on a geographical basis. In
Scotland there are eight regional police forces. In Northern Ireland, The Police
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) came into being in November 2001
following the recommendations of the Patten Commission on policing in the
province. It replaced the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which itself had been in
operation since the disbandment of the Royal Irish Constabulary in 1922.
In addition to the these forces, there are a number of non-Home Office police
forces that have a specialised remit and exercise their jurisdiction throughout
the UK. These include the British Transport police (BTP); the Ministry of
Defence Police (MOD); and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
Constabulary (UKAEA). The Jersey, Guernsey and Isle of Man Police are
separate organisations that carry out policing in those islands. Recognising the
need to adapt to transnational and cross-border issues, the government and the
police service have also developed national policing agencies. In 1998, the
amalgamation of six regional crime squads established the National Crime
Squad (NCS). The overall remit of NCS is to target criminal organisations
committing serious and organised crime. Also operating nationally is the
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), which was established in 1992
drawing on staff from the Home Office, HM Customs and Excise, the police
service and local authorities. In November 2004, the government introduced
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill. This is intended to bring together
the work of NCS, NCIS and other agencies through the creation in 2006 of the
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). Therefore, although on some
occasions we might refer to .the police service as if it were a single entity, it
continues to consist of a number of police forces. Accordingly the
arrangements for police accountability are necessarily complex. In the United
Kingdom, accountability has been a consistent and, at times, fiercely debated
policing issue. In Northern Ireland the legitimacy of the police has been
questioned in a divided society. In England and Wales police accountability
during the 1980s became a national political issue concerning who controlled
the police, who should control them and whether they were beyond democratic
control. These issues have lost some of their controversy in recent years as
discussion surrounding accountability has shifted to focus on police
performance and effectiveness. As commentators have noted, accountability
remains significant. This is for the following reasons, the first two of which are
especially pertinent in the human rights context:
1. The paradox of police governance: There is a need to balance the
unwarranted exercise of coercive power by the police with enabling their
effective operation.
2. Policing is political: Policing is about the exercise of power and there are
competing options for policing priorities and style.
3. Financial stewardship: The police need to be held accountable for their use
of public resources. (The total expenditure on the police in the UK exceeded
£12 billion in 2004/5).
4. Police legitimacy: Police in democratic states strive for legitimacy to achieve
the active cooperation and trust of the policed. Accountability contributes to the
legitimacy of the police. In the chapters that follow, although the policing of the
UK comprises three separate systems based on geographic and legal divisions, the
primary focus will be on England and Wales, which contains 90% of the UK.s
population. Where significant differences exist in the policing systems operating
in Scotland and Northern Ireland, these are highlighted.
2.0 Objectives
At the end of this unit, students should be able to:
a. Understand the complex nature of police accountability.
b. Examine International Standards and practices on Policing a nation.
3.0 Main Body
3.1 International Standards on Policing and Accountability
A number of international instruments have considerable relevance to police
accountability in the UK. The UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights
1948 is a fundamental source for legislative and judicial practice. As such, it
provides human rights principles and standards that underpin the accountability
of the police. In 1951, the UK ratified the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which endorsed the
principles of the UN declaration. The articles of the Convention reaffirm the
fundamental freedoms in democratic systems of government. UK law gave
effect to the Convention in the Human Rights Act 1998. As public authorities
under the Act, the police have a responsibility to abide by the Convention. The
Human Rights Act 1998 provides for adjudication by UK domestic courts and
for the award of compensation in cases where public authorities have breached
Convention rights. Complainants can take cases that the UK domestic courts
cannot resolve to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. These
arrangements provide a powerful legal framework making the police
accountable for their actions. The Independent Police Complains Commission,
and in Northern Ireland the Police Ombudsman, take account of the Human
Rights Act 1998, in investigating complaints about police misconduct. Two
other measures provide guidance for police as to their conduct. The UN Code
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979) sets out basic standards for
policing agencies across the world and relates to all law enforcement officers
who exercise powers of arrest and detention. It requires them to recognise the
rights set out in the UN Universal Declaration and other international
conventions. In particular, police should only use force when it is necessary.
The amount of force should be proportionate to the circumstances. The Council
of Europe Declaration on the Police (1979) defined the rules of conduct
expected of police in the member states of the Council of Europe, which
includes the UK. The rules were designed both to help protect human rights
and to improve the status of police officers. In 2001, The Council of Europe
supplemented the Declaration by the Code of Police Ethics. The UN Code of
Conduct, the European Declaration on the Police and Code of Police Ethics
provide basic standards for the operation of legitimate law enforcement.
However, they are not directly judicable in law. They should, however, be
regarded as guidance which indirectly informs the practice of policing and
accountability in the UK.
Statutes and Structures for Police Accountability in the United Kingdom
(the way things are supposed to be)
The police are subject to the rule of law and to legislation, which is the
product of Parliament.
Although judicial processes and case law may affect the interpretation of
legislation, and guidelines on procedure may be issued by the executive, the
legislature is the origin from which the powers of police are derived. In this
sense, they are subordinated to the law and to the law alone. In relation to
policy, however, the major public powers of government are vested in
ministers who are servants of the Crown. Police also have allegiance to the
rown, which serves instead of the state as a central organising principle of
government. The arrangements for accountability of the police, therefore, are
not simply those of subordination to government. A more complex system of
accountability is in operation.
The tripartite system of police accountability
The current system of holding the 43 forces of England and Wales accountable
has been characterised as .the tripartite structure of police accountability.
Established under the 1964
Police Act, following the deliberations of the 1962 Royal Commission on the
Police, this remains the fundamental basis of police governance. The tripartite
system distributes responsibilities between the Home Office, the local police
authority, and the chief constable of the force. Legislation since the 1964 Police
Act, including the 1994 Police and Magistrates. Courts Act (PMCA), the Police
Act 1996, and the Police Reform Act 2002, has endorsed the tripartite
arrangements, though not always uncontroversial. This tripartite system
provides accountability to Parliament through the Home Secretary (who has
responsibility for policing policy including centrally set .key priorities. that are
formalised within a National Policing Plan). It also provides accountability to
local populations through the local police authorities, which comprise of
elected local councillors, magistrates and business representatives nominated
by a central panel. In practice chief constables also respond to policies and
circulars set by the executive (the Home Office and Her Majesty’s Chief
Inspector of Constabulary). The autonomy of chief constables is arguably
limited by the current arrangements, although case-law has made it clear that
the police are the servants of the law in terms of their operational discretion,
and are not subject to administrative or political direction in this respect. Figure
1 below provides an overview of the tripartite system and where it is situated
constitutionally.
One intention of the 1994 PMCA was to strengthen the role of local police
authorities by giving them additional powers, including involvement in
developing local policing plans. However, the 2002 Police Reform Act moved
greater power towards the centre through, inter alia, the introduction of the
Home Secretary’s rolling three year National Policing Plan. Table 1 shows the
current balance of powers and the respective responsibilities of the tripartite
structure. Scotland, unlike England and Wales prior to the 1964 Police Act,
already had a tripartite system of police governance, in which the local
authority itself was the local police authority. Nevertheless reforms in England
and Wales have followed a similar pattern in Scotland, the primary legislation
being the Police (Scotland) Act 1967. Scottish Ministers retain overall
responsibility for policing policy. Police Authorities and Joint Police Boards
are responsible for setting police budgets and ensuring that best value is
attained for the public purse. Chief Constables are responsible for the
operational aspects of policing within their force areas. In Northern Ireland, the
role of the police authority is taken by the Policing Board, which not only has a
responsibility for delivering an efficient police force but is also responsible for
helping the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) fulfil its statutory
obligation to meet the standards of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Board also
has the power to launch its own inquiry into any aspect of the PSNI.s work,
with or without the agreement of the chief constable. This gives it a more
active role in the management of the police than is the case with local police
authorities.
Table 1:
The tripartite system under the Police and Magistrates. Courts Act
1994 and the
Police Reform Act 2002
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)
In addition to the tripartite structure of police accountability and its associated
legislation, the police are subject to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
(PACE). The criminal justice system ensures that suspects apprehended by the
police have the right to trial by a jury in serious cases and are given an
opportunity to have legal representation. The court system also ensures that the
police have followed the correct procedures, for example, those established by
PACE 1984. Failure to follow these rules can and does result in failures to
secure convictions because the courts increasingly use exclusionary rules to
render inadmissible any evidence which has not been fairly obtained. The
application of the principle of the fruits of the poisoned tree means that entire
cases can fail when the rules have not been followed, with important
repercussions for police effectiveness. The statutory powers of police on
matters of stop and search; entry, search and seizure; arrest, detention and the
questioning of suspects are provided by PACE 1984. Codes of Practice created
under the Act govern cautioning procedures, identification parades and a range
of other responsibilities. Strictly speaking, the codes are not statutory but any
breach of their requirements amounts to a disciplinary offence. Also, any
breach of the codes is admissible in evidence in criminal or civil proceedings
against the police. Overlaying the tripartite structure of accountability and the
existing legislation on policing is an oversight regime that includes:
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)
The first Inspectors of Constabulary were appointed under the provisions of the
1856 County and Borough Police Act (and in Scotland under the Police
(Scotland) Act 1857). The Inspectors have independent status, being servants
of the Crown and not Home Office employees. Section 38 of the 1964 Police
Act (and section 33 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967) specified the inspector’s
role and gave them the power to inspect and report to the Home Secretary on
the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces. The role of HMIC has since
been laid out in the Police Acts (1994 and 1996) and, relating to Best Value,
the Local Government Act 1999. The inspectorate’s role, according to its
statement of purpose, is: To promote the efficiency and effectiveness of
policing in England, Wales and Northern Ireland through inspection of police
organisations and functions to ensure:
·Agreed standards are achieved and maintained;
·Good practice is spread; and
·Performance is improved.
Also to provide advice and support to the tripartite partners (Home Secretary,
police authorities and forces) and play an important role in the development of
future leaders.8 There are currently six Inspectors (four are former chief
constables, two are from non-police backgrounds) with regional responsibilities
and three Assistant Inspectors (two seconded deputy chief constables and one
from a non-police background (who specialises in race and diversity issues)
who provide policy and inspection support. The inspectors conduct their work
assisted by staff officers and support staff. The Chief Inspector of Constabulary
(HMCIC) coordinates their work and advises the Home Secretary on policing
matters. Seconded police officers and Home Office civil servants provide
support to the Chief Inspector. In terms of the inspections themselves, HMIC
conducts inspections of forces and of the geographic Basic Command Units
(BCUs) within force areas. It also conducts thematic inspections that focus on a
specific area of policing, such as corruption (Police Integrity), visibility and
reassurance (Open All Hours) and diversity (Diversity Matters). With the Audit
Commission; it also conducts Best Value inspections.
The Audit Commission (England and Wales)
Since 1988 the police have been scrutinised by the Audit Commission. This
independent body was established in 1982 by the Local Government Finance
Act to monitor and promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the
management of local government. The Audit Commission first focussed on the
police in 1988 and early reports scrutinised the financing of police funding and
budget allocation. However, later reports focused on operational matters,
including crime management and patrol work. Although the Commission’s
recommendations are not prescriptive, they are commonly implemented, which
is no small task. As one retired chief constable has noted, between 1997 and
1999 there were .no less than 27 Audit Commission and Police Inspectorate
thematic reports published, incorporating over 300 different recommendations.
In Scotland, The Accounts Commission and Audit Scotland are linked
independent statutory bodies that ensure the Scottish Executive and public
sector bodies are held to account for the proper, effective and efficient use of
public money. Audit Scotland publishes an annual report Police and Fire
Performance Indicators that compares the performance of Scottish Councils.
Best Value
From April 2000, the Best Value programme placed a statutory duty on local
authorities to deliver services to clear standards by the most effective,
economic and efficient means. Local police authorities are included as .best
value authorities and as such police forces are required to demonstrate .best
value. Accordingly, police forces must report against a series of Best Value
Performance Indicators.
The Police Standards Unit
The Police Standards Unit began work within the Home Office in July 2001,
but was formally established by the Police Reform Act 2002. It has become
increasingly influential. Its role is to identify good policing practice and the
means of spreading it. It also has an intervention role. If a force is identified as
requiring .remedial actions, it will intervene to improve performance. In this
role, the PSU works closely with HMIC.
The Police Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF)
The PPAF was introduced in April 2004. It has been developed by the Home
Office, in consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
and Association of Police Authorities (APA). It introduced PPAF performance
measures and aims to .provide an effective, fair framework for comparing
police performance and provide a firm basis for effective performance
management. It is therefore intended to be both a means of holding individual
police forces accountable for their performance and a means of comparing
forces. Performance against each other. According to the Home Office, in
addition to focussing on operational effectiveness, the Policing Performance
Assessment Framework provides measures of satisfaction plus overall trust and
confidence in the police, as well as measures that put performance into context
in terms of efficiency and organisational capability. In line with the
Government’s desire to enhance policing accountability at a local level,
performance against national and local priorities, are reflected in the
framework. HMIC published its first .baseline assessments. of each force in
England and Wales in Summer 2004, which led to much debate (media, public
and political) concerning the comparative performance of forces and press
speculation over whether chief constables of forces rated as poor would be
dismissed. Parties on both sides of the political spectrum see this kind of public
information as a key mechanism for encouraging public scrutiny of the police.
3.2 Financial and Organisational Accountability
In the 1980s, the government applied its public sector Financial Management
Initiative (FMI) to the police service. This was concerned with business
management strategies and audit techniques and related to financial
accountability in the stewardship of public money. The National Audit Office
has produced reports on value for money in policing and District Auditors are
empowered to undertake audits of the finances of public sector organisations,
including the police. The enactment of the Police and Magistrates Courts Act
1994 changed the system of police funding in a way that theoretically provided
greater control to the local police authority and greater devolution of budgeting
within police forces. Since the 1994 Act each local police authority receives a
cash-limited grant from the Home Office, which is supplemented by funding
from the local authority raised through the revenue support grant, non-domestic
rates and council tax. Forces are also permitted to seek out a relatively small
proportion of funding through sponsorship arrangements. The Local Police
Authority and the chief constable, rather than the Home Secretary, then decide
on the allocation of funds between police officers and civilian staff, equipment,
buildings and vehicles. Thus whilst the Home Secretary retains control of the
total amount of the grant, police authorities and chiefs have greater freedom
within the budget. Devolution of budgeting is therefore being encouraged but
not with any over-arching national strategy. It is occurring at a speed and
implementation that suits individual forces. These arrangements, through codes
of practice, encourage a greater amount of local managerial freedom and
delegation of financial responsibilities within the police organisation.
Potentially this can support the objective of meeting local priorities, thereby
increasing local accountability.
At an organisational level, accountability is provided through a hierarchical
rank structure a quasi-military structure aimed to produce a disciplined and
answerable service. In addition police officers are subject to a disciplinary code
that punishes offences including discreditable conduct, failure to obey orders,
racially discriminatory behaviour and falsehood. Offences are investigated
internally and judged at disciplinary hearings. Punishments range from
reprimand to fine to dismissal. A breach of the code may also constitute a
criminal or civil offence. Officers taken through the courts can still face
disciplinary boards.
Self Assessment Exercise;
1. Generally police accountability is said to be necessarily complex.
Explain
2. Explain the tripartite system of police accountability as obtainable in
England.
4.0 Conclusion
As expected and should be practiced, Policing in the UK has been subject to
extensive pressure since the enactment of the Police Act 1964. Failures in
policing have served to keep it in the spotlight over the years. As a result, the
government has instituted a number of measures in response to the need for
change and more are likely to be necessary. The development of other agencies
for investigation and enforcement also means that the public police, who have
been in existence since the early 19th century, are not the only agency now
responsible for .policing.. Although much attention will continue to be
focussed on the public police in the UK, the accountability of these other
.policing agencies also needs constantly to be reviewed. The most effective
approach that all police agencies can adopt at times when they are under
pressure is to remain open to constructive criticism; to welcome scrutiny and to
remain highly accessible to ideas from the public. Although this may be a
painful process, ultimately it will result in a stronger community-based
policing, which will be able to retain the respect and to secure the help of the
public.
5.0 Summary
In this unit, our focus has on The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
(PACE) police accountability, International Standards on Policing and
Accountability, the tripartite system of police accountability financial and
organisation accountability from the British perspective a model Nigeria Police
is structured after.
6.0 Tutor Marked Assignment
Explain the need of police accountability in security of a nation
7.0 References/ Further Reading
Jones, T. (2003) .The governance and accountability of policing in
Newburn, T. (ed.) The
Handbook of Policing, pp. 603-627, Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
Leigh, A., Mundy, G. and Tuffin, R. (1999) Best Value Policing: Making
Preparations, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit Police Research Series Paper
116, London: Home Office.
Loveday, B. and Reid, A. (2003) Going Local: Who should run Britain.s
police? London: Policy Exchange.
Mawby, R.C. (1999) .Visibility, Transparency and Police Media Relations. in
Policing and Society, vol. 9, pp. 263-286.
Mawby, R.C. and Wright, A. (2003) .The police organisation. in Newburn, T.
(ed.) The Handbook of Policing, pp. 169-195, Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
Morgan, R. (1992) .Talking About Policing., in Downes, D. (ed.) Unravelling
Criminal Justice, London: Macmillan
Newburn, T. and Jones, T. (1996) .Police Accountability. in Saulsbury,
W., Mott J., and Newburn, T (eds.) Themes in Contemporary Policing
London: PSI.
Neyroud, P. (2003) .Policing and ethics. in Newburn, T. (ed.) The Handbook of
Policing, pp. 578- 602, Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
Neyroud, P. and Beckley, A. (2001) Policing, Ethics and Human Rights,
Cullompton: Willan
Publishing.
Oliver, I. (1997, 2nd ed.) Police, Government and Accountability, London:
Macmillan.
Pollard, C. (1999) .Unnecessary Intervention., Policing Today, vol.5, no.4, pp.
26-28.
Turpin, C. (1995) British Government and the Constitution: Texts, Cases and
Materials, London: Butterworths.
Walker, N. (2000) Policing in a Changing Constitutional Order, London:
Sweet and Maxwell.
