Module 4
Primary Prevention
A. The Physical Environment and Crime Prevention
Efforts to alter the physical design of an area or location to impact crime are
generally referred to as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).
Included in this approach are architectural designs that enhance territoriality and
surveillance, target hardening, and the recognition of legitimate users of an area. The
basic ideas of CPTED grew out of Newman’s (1972) concept of “defensible space.”
Defensible space proposes “a model which inhibits crime by creating a physical
expression of a social fabric which defends itself” (Newman, 1972). The idea is that the
physical characteristics of an area can influence the behavior of both residents and
potential offenders. For residents, the appearance and design of the area can engender a
more caring attitude, draw the residents into contact with one another, lead to further
improvements and use of the area, and build a stake in the control and elimination of
crime. For potential offenders, an area’s appearance can suggest that residents use and
care for their surroundings, pay attention to what occurs, and intervene if an offense is
seen.
Territoriality refers to the ability and desire of legitimate users of an area to lay
claim to the area. Areal control is based on the establishment of real or perceived
boundaries, the recognition of strangers and legitimate users of the area, and a general
communal atmosphere among the inhabitants. Territoriality means that an area, building,
or property is owned by someone and others have no claim to it. Most important is that
the residents/owners/legitimate users (non-offenders), as well as the potential offenders,
recognize the “ownership” of the territory and make decisions about actions with that
knowledge. Cozens et al. (2005) point out that territoriality takes two distinct forms.
These are symbolic and real. Symbolic territoriality refers to things such as signs,
landscaping, or other items that signal a change in ownership or area. Real territoriality is
engendered by walls, fences, gates, or other items that place a physical barrier in front of
people.
Surveillance involves any action that increases the chance that offenders will be
observed. Newman (1972) specifically addresses the idea of natural surveillance where
residents and legitimate users have the ability to see and observe what is taking place
around them without taking special measures (this is what Cozens et al. (2005) would
also call informal surveillance). Newman suggests placing windows in such a fashion to
allow residents to see activity on all sides of their homes. Doors should face the street to
allow passersby to view activity taking place inside the entranceways and few families
should use the same common entrance so that legitimate users can identify one another.
Additionally, pathways in and around the community should leave clear, unobstructed
views for residents to see what is awaiting them as they enter and exit their homes
(Newman, 1972). Outdoor activity and pedestrian traffic increase the number of “eyes on
the street.”
Surveillance can be enhanced in a variety of other ways. Formal or organized
surveillance refers to the use of guards or employees specifically tasked with watching
for offending (Cozens et al., 2005). Such formal surveillance may also be done by normal
citizens involving themselves in citizen patrols or other organized surveillance activities.
Yet another type—mechanical surveillance—utilizes cameras or other devices to observe
activities, or lights to simply increase the ability of people to see what is taking place
(Cozens et al., 2005).
Newman’s (1972) concept of image is in some ways an extension of territoriality.
Image is basically the outward appearance of an area or property as cared for by those
who belong in the area. This communicates to potential offenders that there are
concerned citizens watching over the area who will take actions to protect it. If the
residents claim ownership (territoriality) and show that to others, the chances that
offenders will take action will be minimized. Milieu extends these ideas further by
arguing that prevention is enhanced if the surrounding area is also well cared for and
maintained, and that there is little crime in those neighboring areas. Thus, building
homes, businesses, or new communities within an already low-crime area will protect the
new location. Maintaining the image of the area is essential to sending the right message
out to both legitimate users and potential offenders.
Access control seeks to allow only those persons who have legitimate business in
an area to enter. This reduces the opportunity for crime by increasing the effort needed to
enter and exit a building or area for the purpose of committing crime. Access control is
also considered on a larger scale in terms of access to a neighborhood or community.
This can be accomplished through gating communities, closing roads, or other means.
Neighborhood designs that could make offending more difficult include limiting the flow
of traffic through an area by strangers, changes that limit the number of through-streets,
establishing cul-de-sacs and dead-end streets, and enhancing the ability of residents to
recognize legitimate users. In essence, controlling access and egress to an area limits its
permeability to those who wish to commit crime.
The ideas of activity support and motivation reinforcement offered by Kushmuk
and Whittemore (1981) relate to the building of a community atmosphere. They are
roughly the same thing and involve encouraging law-abiding use of the community and
area (Cozens et al., 2005). The ability to recognize neighbors and identify needs of the
community should enhance social cohesion among residents and contribute to a
communal atmosphere that works to eliminate crime and other common problems.
Activity support and motivation reinforcement may occur indirectly through activities
such as street fairs, community days, and other social events. It can also be generated by
directly recruiting residents for anti-crime activities or other societal/community issues.
While the elements of CPTED appear straightforward and have been used and
promoted for roughly 40 years, there are potential contradictions between some elements.
Cozens et al. (2005), Reynald (2011), and others have pointed out that territoriality,
access control, and surveillance have the potential of cancelling out one another. For
example, erecting walls, fences, or other structures may demarcate an area but can
impede natural surveillance (Reynald, 2011). In a similar fashion, access control and
target hardening efforts can lead to the building of fortresses around individuals and
areas. These fortresses can keep people from participating in community and
neighborhood activities, thus reducing activity support (Cozens et al., 2005). It is
important, therefore, to seek a balance between the elements when instituting CPTED.
An important problem for CPTED may be the fact that the key concepts are poorly
defined (Ekblom, 2011b). Territoriality has a wide variety of definitions, which makes it
hard to apply and evaluate. Surveillance runs the gamut from active measures, such as the
use of police and security guards, to passive actions that encourage or enhance citizen
action. Implementing activity support through environmental design with a goal of
increasing citizen usage of an area is equally difficult to achieve when the terms are not
clear (Ekblom, 2011b). Consequently, the implementation and effectiveness of CPTED is
compromised.
B. Implementation of Environmental Design
The implementation of environmental design strategies has not always gone
smoothly or followed a clear plan. Much of the reason for this is the fact that most efforts
have taken place with little or no long-range planning and only intermittent government
organization and support. Many of the initial projects, such as in Hartford, Connecticut,
and Portland, Oregon, were demonstration projects backed by the government or a
private foundation (such as Westinghouse Electric). This does not mean that
environmental design has been ignored or has no organizational support. It is only since
the mid-1990s that we have seen major organized movement toward incorporating
environmental design into communities in an ongoing fashion, and most of that
movement has taken place outside the United States.
In 1989, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in England established
the Secured By Design (SBD) program. This ongoing initiative emphasizes and promotes
the inclusion of safety and security measures in new and existing buildings (ACPO,
2009). The SBD project provides architectural and security assistance to any agency
requesting its input. At the present time, there are 18 Design Guides available to assist in
building safe and secure homes, facilities, and locations (ACPO, 2015). Among these
guides are those for new homes, commercial sites, hospitals, and schools. The SBD
program includes six Core Principles, which closely align with the ideas of defensible
space. These include: (1) an integrated approach, (2) environmental quality and a sense of
ownership, (3) natural surveillance, (4) access and footpaths, (5) open space and
management, and (6) lighting.
In the U.S. the drive for CPTED is primarily a function of private or professional
organizations. Both national and international groups promote environmental design.
Among these are the International CPTED Association, CPTED Security, the National
Crime Prevention Council, the National Institute of Crime Prevention’s CPTED Training
web site, the Designing Out Crime Association (U.K.), and many others. At the state
level, Virginia’s Department of Criminal Justice Services has promulgated Safer By
Design principles for use in designing communities, housing, and businesses. There has
also been a wide range of projects and evaluations that have been attempted to assess the
effectiveness of environmental design changes.
The impact of CPTED and physical design features on crime and fear has long
been a topic for research and evaluation. When Newman (1972) introduced the idea of
defensible space, he illustrated the impact of CPTED features by comparing two public
housing projects. The first, a high-rise, high-crime project, allowed strangers easy access
through unmonitored, multi-user entrances. In addition, the buildings lacked windows
and opportunities to observe indoor common areas and outdoor pathways. The size of the
project mitigated attempts to recognize legitimate users from strangers due to the great
numbers of people in the project. Conversely, the second public housing area consisted of
low-rise buildings that experienced lower crime levels. The project limited the number of
families using the same entrances. This enhanced the ability of residents to identify
strangers. Surveillance was enhanced by entrances that faced public thoroughfares.
Additionally, the low-lying structures made casual observation of outdoor activities
through windows more feasible and effective.
The ideas of access control/target hardening and surveillance include a wide range
of potential interventions for combating crime. Increased street lighting, reduced
concealment, installation of locks, use of unbreakable glass, alarms and cameras, marking
of property for identification, and security guards are only a few of the available means of
prevention. Despite this proliferation of methods, few of these have been subjected to
individual evaluation. Most crime prevention programs rely on a range of activities and
not just a single approach. Almost without exception, most evaluations look at the direct
impact of physical design on crime and/or fear of crime.
Efforts to prevent crime by improving the lighting in areas was a major
undertaking in the 1970s and remains a common approach in both the United States and
the United Kingdom. Pease (1999) suggests that lighting may impact crime through
various mechanisms. For example, lighting may lead to increased outdoor activity and, in
turn, greater surveillance. Lighting may also enhance the ability to detect a crime in
progress or identify an offender. Advocates often point to the deterrent potential of lights,
which may make potential offenders choose less well-lit areas for their crimes. Lighting
should allow potential victims to see their surroundings and may lead them to avoid less
well-lit locations.
Surveillance is also accomplished by means of mechanical devices, particularly
closed-circuit television (CCTV). Research on CCTV has grown tremendously in recent
years. While there are no estimates of the number of public CCTV cameras in use in the
United States, Norris and McCahill (2006) estimate there are 4.2 million public CCTV
cameras in the United Kingdom. The large investment in CCTV has prompted numerous
evaluations of its impact on crime and fear. Brown (1995) and Ditton and Short (1999)
report on evaluations of CCTV in five U.K. cities. Each evaluation included experimental
and control areas as well as outcome measures both pre- and post-installation of CCTV
equipment. Brown (1995) notes that the experimental areas experienced reduced levels of
burglary, but thefts, vandalism, and other offenses only declined in some locations.
Results in Airdrie, Scotland, show reductions in overall recorded crime, although there
are some increases in recorded drug and motor vehicle offenses (Ditton and Short, 1999).
The authors note that the increases may be due to increased detection of offenses through
the use of CCTV. Results in Glasgow also show that CCTV impacts crime in the target
area (Ditton and Short, 1999). Fear also was reduced in areas covered by CCTV (Brown,
1995). Unfortunately, there was also evidence of displacement of crime from areas with
CCTV to nearby/surrounding areas.
Lighting is only one factor that can influence the ability to observe an area.
Surveillability also is determined by a wide range of other factors. Fisher and Nasar
(1992; Nasar and Fisher, 1993) note the physical design impact on prospect, refuge, and
escape. Prospect refers to the ability of individuals to see an area. Locations that offer
greater prospect should engender less fear and victimization than those locations that
limit sight lines. Refuge deals with the presence or absence of concealment, in which
offenders could hide from potential victims. Refuge provides both hiding places and
protection for potential offenders. Finally, escape addresses the ability of both offenders
and victims to escape from an area before and/or after an offense. In essence, physical
design features which impact on surveillability should alter both fear and victimization
levels.
Property identification programs have a long history in crime prevention, often
under the title Operation Identification. The basic idea behind property identification is to
increase the difficulty for offenders to dispose of marked items. Despite the great
proliferation of property identification programs, there is little empirical research on most
projects. One early review of 99 projects from across the United States reported that,
despite public awareness of the programs, few programs are able to entice more than 10
percent of the population to participate (Heller et al., 1975). Likewise, few programs
report significant changes in reported burglary and none find an impact on arrests or
convictions for burglary.
Alarms represent another possible deterrent to offending. Silent alarms in various
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, schools and businesses increased both the numbers of arrests and the
clearance rate in buildings with alarms (Cedar Rapids Police Department, 1975). Break-
ins at buildings with alarms revealed entry through places not hooked up to the alarms
(Cedar Rapids Police Department, 1975). Buck et al. (1993) examined the impact of
alarms and other factors on burglary in three Philadelphia suburbs. Alarms proved to be a
strong deterrent to household burglary. Interviews with offenders also reveal the impact
of alarms. Reppetto (1974) found that one-third of the offenders checked on the presence
or absence of alarms during the planning stages of the offense. Bennett and Wright
(1984) asked burglars to evaluate videotape and photos of potential targets. They found
that the presence or absence of alarms was a prime consideration in the choice of their
targets. Similarly, Hearnden and Magill (2004) find that 84 percent of active and
incarcerated burglars claim that outside alarms are key factors in their decision-making
process. Blevins et al. (2012) report that 60 percent of 422 burglars were deterred by
alarms. Interviews with burglars in New Zealand reveals that the main deterrent to
offending is alarms and security systems.
Access control can be improved through the installation of various devices that
make entry more difficult. These will not eliminate crime. Rather, a motivated offender
will need to work harder and find more effective ways of gaining entrance. The Seattle
Law and Justice Planning Office (1975) evaluated the effect of solid case doors, dead bolt
locks, pins in sliding glass doors, and construction of short walls aimed at making entry
through windows more difficult at four public housing projects. The evaluation found a
significant decline in the level of burglary in three of the four target areas. The mode of
entry after the improvements were made shifted to the use of open and unlocked windows
and doors. This shift was expected due to the increased difficulty posed by the changes.
Efforts to limit access to neighborhoods include the establishment of dead-end
streets, cul-de-sacs, one-way streets, alley gating, and closing streets. Such action can
project a private atmosphere, cut down on the level of use by strangers, and increase the
presence of legitimate users. Often this approach is coupled with broader community
planning activities. In an early study, Newman and Wayne (1974) compared public and
private streets in adjacent areas of St. Louis. A private street is one that is owned and
maintained by the residents living on the street, is often a culde-sac, and is set apart from
the connecting streets by means of landscaping, gates, entranceways, or other similar
features. The authors found less crime on private streets and the fear of crime was lower
among subjects living on those streets (Newman and Wayne, 1974). They also found
more interaction between the residents living on these private streets, which should lead
to reduced crime. Unfortunately, the lack of comparability between the experimental and
control groups, however, suggests that these results should be viewed with some caution.
Studies of public housing are among the early examinations of area-wide physical
design on crime. As noted earlier, Newman (1972) reports that crime varies among public
housing with different design features. Various design problems negate attempts to build
a sense of community, lay claim to an area (territoriality), present a sense of safety
(image), or allow surveillance. Newman and Franck (1980), studying public housing in
Newark, St. Louis, and San Francisco, find that accessibility and building size have direct
effects on burglary and fear of crime. Building size also affects the use of space and
feelings of control over space and indirectly, through control and use of space, on crime
and fear. Poyner (1994), reporting on physical design in an English public housing estate,
demonstrates that limiting access reduces robbery, but not burglary. The removal of
enclosed walkways between buildings effectively limits access, escape and concealment
for potential offenders.
In 1999, the British government began the Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI) by
funding 63 projects across the United Kingdom (Kodz and Pease, 2003). The RBI relies
on local communities to identify the causes of the burglary problems in their area and to
develop appropriate interventions, many of which are physical design changes, such as
target hardening, the installation of alley gates, lighting improvements, fencing, and
property marking (Kodz and Pease, 2003). Interventions also include neighborhood
watch, intensive police crackdowns, and other methods (discussed in later chapters). In
40 out of 55 RBI evaluations, the burglary rates fell relative to the control areas
(evaluations using comparison areas were not conducted in eight locations). An
evaluation of the Fordbridge (West Midlands) RBI project, which implemented target
hardening, alley gates, electronic entry controls for buildings, and improved street
lighting, reports a reduction in burglary of 43 percent for the experimental area (Home
Office, 2003a). Similarly, the RBI project in Stirchley (West Midlands), relying on alley
gates, fences and property marking (along with a crime prevention newsletter), claims a
53 percent drop in burglary, which is twice the reduction seen in the control area (Home
Office, 2003b). These results on the effectiveness of the RBI suggest that physical design
elements are effective at reducing the burglary problem.
While it appears that physical design features can impact crime and fear, there is
no guarantee that proper design will produce the desired results. Merry (1981) conducted
an 18-month participant observation study of a single public housing project that seemed
to conform to good defensible space design. The project was composed of low buildings,
separate courtyards, few families per entranceway, wide pathways, public space in front
of the buildings, and private (fenced) space at the rear of the buildings. Additionally,
many of the residents had installed target-hardening devices such as locks and window
bars. Using a combination of interviews, observation, and official crime figures, Merry
(1981) found that the physical design features failed to have any effect on crime or the
residents’ feelings of safety. Despite the seeming defensibility of the project, Merry
(1981) questioned the design features. First, the stairwells and hallways near doors were
not easily observable by residents or passersby. Second, many of the outdoor features,
such as fences and enclosed trash collectors, actually provided cover for potential
offenders. Finally, the layout of the buildings and outdoor areas, although seemingly
conducive to territoriality, confused residents and visitors and produced discomfort and
disorientation. Clearly, the physical design did not increase interaction between residents
and residents rarely intervened in questionable behavior (Merry, 1981). Residents were
unable to distinguish strangers from legitimate users, feared future retaliation, and held an
uncaring attitude toward those not identified as friends or relatives. Merry attributed these
problems to a lack of social cohesion and community identity among the project’s
residents.
In 2011, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
(UNICRI) published “Improving Urban Security through Green Environmental Design.”
This document proposes a thirdgeneration CPTED that uses green sustainable design to
improve communities and reduce crime (and other social) problems. The key to this is
making residents, visitors, and anyone else feel safe in the community (UNICRI, 2011).
This is essentially territoriality. Third-generation CPTED “insists on practical measures,
physically or cybernetically enhanced, that foster the perception of urban space as safe”
(UNICRI, 2011, p. 11). This is done using technologies that transform public space to
interactive communal space, which fosters a sense of belonging, ownership, and
surveillability.
A final topic to address is the issue of disorder and incivility. While “crime and
disorder” have been addressed throughout this chapter, it is always in terms of action to
eliminate these problems. Much of the discussion about physical features deals with the
correct design to allow surveillance and feelings of goodwill among legitimate users. It is
also important to question the degree to which signs of disorder may actively promote
criminal activity. This may occur when both signs of physical and social disorder signal
that an area or location is not protected and is open to criminal behavior. Various authors
(Hunter, 1978; Skogan, 1990; Taylor and Gottfredson, 1986; Wilson and Kelling, 1982)
have presented indicators of physical disorder, including broken windows, abandoned
buildings, vacant lots, deteriorating buildings, litter, vandalism, and graffiti. Similarly,
they offer social indicators, such as loitering juveniles, public drunkenness, gangs, drug
sales and use, harassment (such as begging and panhandling), prostitution, and a lack of
interaction among people on the street. Perkins and Taylor (1996), Taylor et al. (1995),
and Spelman (1993) suggest that physical disorder can contribute to the growth of social
disorder. Examples of such instances would be non-residential property or abandoned
structures interrupting a housing block.
C. Neighborhood Crime Prevention
The failure of physical, environmental design changes to always impact crime and
fear may be directly attributable to the ability of such activities to live up to the
assumptions of the basic theory. Few authors claim that changes in physical design alone
will have a major impact on crime. By themselves, locks, lights, windows, and the other
physical characteristics can only make offending more difficult and lead to alternative
means of committing the crimes. The key element that will reduce and prevent crime is
the ability of the physical features to enhance active surveillance, engender community
cohesion, and promote citizen action against crime. Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design has faltered because of the inability to motivate residents and
legitimate users to become active guardians against crime.
Second-generation CPTED seeks to directly build social cohesion, citizen
participation, and resident action. The most recognized manifestation of the second-
generation goals is neighborhood crime prevention. While predating second-generation
CPTED, neighborhood crime prevention seeks to directly influence intervening
constructs in the CPTED model and, in turn, build active guardianship and impact levels
of crime and fear. Neighborhood crime prevention can take a variety of forms that are
broader in scope than just those discussed in connection with physical design. Possible
techniques include neighborhood watch, neighborhood advocacy, citizen patrols, physical
design, and any actions to engender guardianship.
D. Types of Neighborhood Crime Prevention Approaches
A wide variety of neighborhood crime prevention strategies have been proposed
and implemented over the years. Since the 1970s, there has been a great proliferation of
programs in the United States, United Kingdom, and other countries. While many
programs have been instigated and aided by various government agencies or policies,
other programs have emerged from the simple realization by citizens that the formal
criminal justice system is incapable of solving the crime problem on its own. Regardless
of the source of stimulation, neighborhood crime prevention has become a major aspect
of crime prevention.
Neighborhood watch directly seeks to bring neighbors and residents of an area
together as a means of enhancing knowledge of one another and their ability to recognize
who belongs and who does not in the area. Key activities of neighborhood watch groups
include discussions of mutual problems in the neighborhood, actions to increase feelings
of community, and the promotion of interventions to address common problems.
Neighborhood watch, ideally, is proactive in design. That is, it sets out to identify
problems before they occur or, at the very least, as they occur. This requires interaction
between citizens and law enforcement, education about crime and prevention efforts, and
the implementation of various preventive actions.
One way that neighborhood watch contributes to social control is through the
heavy use of surveillance. Successful surveillance requires the ability to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate users of an area. The absence of such recognition leaves
residents unable to identify someone or something that is out of place. Members of
neighborhood organizations become eyes and ears for the police. It is impossible for the
legal authorities to be everywhere at the same time. It is the responsibility of ordinary
citizens, therefore, to assist in the surveillance function of law enforcement.
The exact number of neighborhood or block watches is not known. Many
neighborhood watch groups are true grassroots organizations and do not belong to any
larger national organization that keeps records on such groups. In the United States, the
National Sheriffs’ Association sponsors the National Neighborhood Watch (NNW)
organization. According to NNW (2015), there were more than 25,000 neighborhood
watch groups in the United States in 2012, with more than one million volunteers. It is
unknown how many other non-affiliated neighborhood watch groups or participants exist.
The National Association of Town Watch (2015) claims more than 16,000 communities
with 38 million neighbors involved. O’Keefe et al. (1996) note that 31 percent of national
survey respondents claimed membership in a neighborhood crime prevention
organization. In England and Wales, the Neighborhood and Home Watch Network
(2015) claims there are 170,000 neighborhood watch schemes with 3.8 million
participating households. According to the 2009–2010 British Crime Survey, roughly 13
percent of the households in England and Wales participate in neighborhood watch
schemes. Internationally, neighborhood watch is more common in New World countries
(the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and Asian
countries than other areas.
One notable movement in the area of neighborhood anti-crime programs in the
1990s involved the proliferation of community anti-drug (CAD) programs. In response to
the surge in drug use, particularly cocaine and crack in inner cities during the early
1990s, residents banded together with each other, the police, and various agencies and
organizations to attack drug use, drug sales, and related problems (Davis et al., 1993).
Many of the neighborhood efforts mirrored neighborhood watch programs in their use of
surveillance tactics, reporting to the police, working with agencies to clean up the area,
providing information to residents, instituting anti-drug programs, and participating in
citizen patrols.
Citizen patrols are often a key element of neighborhood watch and represent an
active role in surveillance efforts. The sole purpose of patrols is to put more eyes on the
street in order to increase the chances of detecting strangers in the area and discovering
crimes in progress. Residents are discouraged from physically intervening in any
suspicious activity they may find. While most citizen patrols are on foot, mobile patrols
can be found in some communities. Participants can be either volunteers or paid
individuals. As with block watches, no clear number of citizen patrols is available. The
Guardian Angels is perhaps the most well-known citizen patrol group. Started in 1971,
the group is made up primarily of teenagers and young adults, and boasts having over 130
chapters in the United States and 17 other countries. It also provides educational
materials on safety, an online, Internet safety component, and works with at-risk youths.
Variations on the citizen patrol theme include Whistle Stop, Radio Watch, and
similar projects. These surveillance methods use the simple presence of people on the
street. Participants in these programs generally do not serve in any formal capacity or
follow any set schedules. Instead, they watch for suspicious persons and activity while
partaking in normal daily activity. For example, people in Whistle Stop blow a whistle if
they see something happening out of the ordinary as they are shopping, working, or
simply walking out of doors. Radio Watch relies on individuals with two-way radios
(such as cab drivers and truckers) or cell phones to report questionable behavior when
they see it occurring. Once again, the key is to observe, call the authorities, and not take
any further action.
Throughout all of the different forms of neighborhood crime prevention, the key
component is building guardianship. The primary guardians are typically meant to be
residents and legitimate users of the areas. Indeed, as discussed in the last chapter,
physical design is expected to engender citizen action (guardianship) to stop crime. The
failure of CPTED to bring this about led to overt efforts to engender citizen action (as in
second-generation CPTED) and neighborhood crime prevention. The importance of
guardianship is demonstrated most effectively in routine activities theory. Cohen and
Felson (1979) argue that three things must coincide for crime to occur. These are (1) a
suitable target, (2) a motivated offender, and (3) an absence of guardians. When these
three factors converge in time and place, the opportunity for crime is enhanced. It is
important to note that routine activities theory does not posit that crime will occur. That
is, it is not a cause of criminal activity. Rather, it presents the opportunity for crime and
greatly enhances the chances that crime will take place. Addressing crime, therefore, is
accomplished by reducing the opportunity.
Evaluation of neighborhood crime prevention efforts typically involves two
distinct measures of effectiveness. The most logical measure is the impact these activities
have on crime and the fear of crime. A second measure of effectiveness is the impact of
neighborhood organizing on intervening factors such as social cohesion, a sense of
territoriality, and neighborliness. Crime rates and fear of crime change to the extent that
these intervening factors are enhanced. The following evaluation of neighborhood crime
prevention looks at changes in both the intermediate factors as well as crime and fear of
crime.
Studies of neighborhood crime prevention often include an evaluation of the
effectiveness of the organization effort. The outcome measures range from simple
documentation of existing groups and numbers of participants to some statements about
the quality of individual involvement. A few studies rely exclusively upon these process
evaluation measures and fail to consider the actual impact on crime and fear. The
assumption in these later studies is that changes in intermediary factors inevitably lead to
crime prevention. Several analyses of community crime prevention note the extent of
citizen participation in terms of number of neighborhood groups and the number of
participants in those groups. Garofalo and McLeod (1988) and O’Keefe et al. (1996)
demonstrate widespread participation in various crime prevention activities. Bennett
(1990) reports that 64 percent of the residents in one London neighborhood and 44
percent in another claim to participate in neighborhood watch. Crawford (1998) notes
that more than six million people participate in neighborhood watch organizations in
England and Wales.
The primary interest in neighborhood crime prevention is reduced levels of crime
and fear of crime. Community crime prevention techniques are aimed primarily at the
property offenses of burglary, larceny, and robbery. Little, if any, impact should be found
on crimes of interpersonal violence. The reason for this is that many personal crimes
occur between individuals who know one another and within the home. Increased
surveillance will not alleviate crimes when the offender and victim are co-residents or
legitimate users of the area. Neither would appear out of place nor draw attention to
themselves. Only crimes that occur between strangers should experience any great
reduction from neighborhood watch activities. The following discussion of effects on
crime is divided into three primary areas—studies using official data, analysis of victim
survey data, and a discussion of two specific prevention initiatives from Great Britain.
The use of victim survey data avoids the confounding influence of changes in
reporting crimes to the police. Studies utilizing victim surveys typically report strong
support for neighborhood watch. For example, the Seattle Community Crime Prevention
Program noted that community crime prevention areas displayed lower burglary rates
after program initiation than did corresponding control areas of Seattle (Cirel et al.,
1977). At the same time, reporting to the police increased, thus supporting the view that
there was a real reduction in crime. Unfortunately, the lower burglary levels persisted for
only 12 to 14 months and then increased to the preprogram levels (Cirel et al., 1977).
This finding of time-bounded effects suggests that programs need to be periodically
reviewed and promoted in order to prolong their effectiveness. Cook and Roehl’s (1983)
analysis of Chicago’s Northwest Neighborhood Federation also uncovered a 12 percent
reduction in the level of criminal victimization. The authors also reported a 26 percent
increase in the feeling that residents could do something about crime in their
neighborhood. The meta-analysis conducted by Holloway et al. (2008) reveals similar
positive results for neighborhood watch in studies using self-report data.
Two projects offer a good deal of insight into the effectiveness of community and
neighborhood interventions. These are the Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project and the
Safer Cities program. Kirkholt is a clearly defined residential area comprised of more
than 2,200 dwellings near Manchester, England, and owned by the local governmental
authority. According to the 1984 British Crime Survey, Kirkholt had a burglary rate more
than twice that of other high-risk areas in England (Forrester et al., 1988). The burglary
prevention activities included the establishment of “cocoon neighborhood watch” (very
small groups of homes banded together for surveillance and support), as well as the
removal of pre-payment heating fuel meters in homes, improvements in physical security
devices, and the use of community teams to conduct security surveys. While overall
security was an issue, the program specifically targeted repeat burglary victims.
Community anti-drug (CAD) programs represent a recent incarnation of
community crime prevention initiatives. These programs utilize many of the same forms
of intervention, including physical design changes, surveillance, group meetings, phone
hotlines for anonymous reporting to the police, and citizen patrols, but also add activities
directly targeted at drug problems, such as demanding enforcement of zoning and
housing codes in order to eliminate drug houses. Many of these programs grew in the late
1980s and early 1990s in response to the growing drug problem in many cities.
The success of CAD programs should be enhanced by increased levels of social
cohesion. While there is some evidence that anti-drug programs have a positive impact on
social cohesion, the research results are mixed. Lurigio and Davis (1992), reporting on
initiatives in Miami, Seattle, Philadelphia and Baltimore, argue that the programs have
significantly increased the social cohesion in three of the four sites. Conversely, Roehl et
al. (1995) and Davis et al. (1991) note that actual participation by residents is low (often
less than 10 percent) and many programs operate with only a small core group of
dedicated individuals. Results from an analysis of anti-drug initiatives in Chicago’s
public housing suggests that change may be hard if the residents actively contribute to the
problems and the interventions are being driven by outsiders.
Citizen patrols present the most straightforward attempt by neighborhood
residents to increase surveillance. Relatively few studies of citizen patrols exist. One
examination of citizen patrol studies shows reduced burglary rates on the order of 20 to
50 percent in patrol areas (Titus, 1984). Latessa and Allen (1980), evaluating paid, citizen
foot patrol in Columbus, Ohio, report a great drop in crime in the target areas compared
to pre-program figures and control areas. In addition, citizens favor the patrols and their
activity (Latessa and Allen, 1980). Similarly, Troyer and Wright (1985), assessing the
impact of citizen patrols in a middle-class neighborhood and on a university campus,
report that residents strongly favored the patrol and report feeling safer since its initiation.
Citizen involvement in patrols undertaken on mass transit facilities in The Netherlands
appears to have caused a 33 percent increase in feelings of safety and a clear drop in
violence (van Andel, 1989). In general, the research suggests that citizen patrols can be
effective at reducing both crime and fear.
Besides attempting to eliminate or reduce crime, neighborhood crime prevention
programs have the potential to impact fear of crime. Many evaluations investigate
changes in fear, often through victim surveys that ask residents about their feelings of
safety in the community and their perceived risk of future victimization. Research also
tests other dimensions discussed by Ferraro (1995), such as impressions of overall crime
in the community, feelings about whether citizens can have an effect on crime and
neighborhood problems, and general feelings toward components of the criminal justice
system.
Not all studies, however, exhibit lower levels of fear nor are the evaluations of
fear without problems. Brodie and Sheppard (1977), evaluating crime prevention
programs in Denver, uncovered conflicting evidence on fear of crime. While fear of
burglary decreased, fear of walking outdoors and feelings of helplessness toward crime
increased. Rosenbaum et al. (1986) report increased fear of personal crime, no effect on
fear of property crime, and increased perceptions of neighborhood crime. In addition, the
programs failed to engender positive attitudes toward the area, had little influence on area
deterioration, and did not alter crime prevention efforts of individuals (Rosenbaum et al.,
1986). Similarly, the Community Responses to Drug Abuse evaluation reveals no
changes in residents’ perceptions of crime or fear of crime (Davis and Lurigio, 1996).
Other studies also report no change in levels of fear of crime.
The failure to find reduced fear in some studies may be due to a variety of
problems in the research. First, participation in crime prevention programs and attempts
to heighten awareness of crime may engender more, not less, fear and worry. Second, the
varying definitions of “fear” makes assessments of program impact difficult. Third, the
use of diverse subjects in follow-up surveys (e.g., only those who participate in the crime
prevention program, random samples of neighborhoods, or subgroups of the population)
makes summarizing the results problematic. Fourth, many programs focus on high crime,
high fear areas and prevention efforts face a major challenge for changing attitudes in
these locations. Finally, short follow-up times may not be enough to elicit any changes in
high crime areas. In general, neighborhood crime prevention appears to successfully
reduce fear of crime, particularly where the interventions are appropriately implemented.
Beyond the various problems noted so far in this chapter, there are other issues
that hamper the effectiveness and evaluation of neighborhood crime prevention
programs. A major concern in any evaluation or discussion of neighborhood watch
entails the definition of “neighborhood” and “community.” Unfortunately, neighborhood
and community are rarely explicitly defined (Tilley, 2009). At one extreme is the use of
entire cities, villages, or towns. Research often utilizes census tracts or block groups.
Some analyses use mapping techniques to identify high-crime locations and use those as
the target “neighborhood.” Many studies assume that everyone knows what a
neighborhood is and there is no reason to define it. What this means for research and
program planning, however, is that everyone involved in the project may be envisioning a
(slightly) different area when “neighborhood” is being considered. For example, many
cities have areas that can be identified by a name. These names may come from a feature
of the area (such as “uptown” or “the park district”) or a subdivision name (such as
“Shady Acres”) or some other identifier. Unfortunately, the simple existence of a name
does not mean that the area has set boundaries or that everyone knows the boundaries.
Even being able to establish boundaries would not mean that the area is homogeneous.
The consequence of organizing and evaluating a heterogeneous community is that the
differences can impede success.
Crime prevention research is particularly susceptible to variations in the definition
of neighborhood. Surveys of crime and fear that reference the respondent’s neighborhood
will invariably be tapping a range of definitions. Crime prevention programs often
operate on very different views of the neighborhood. As noted in Chapter 4, large
housing complexes (such as Cabrini-Green), the mixed use Union Avenue Corridor in
Portland (which was 3.5 miles long), and North Asylum Hill in Hartford have all been
considered as neighborhoods. On the opposite extreme, various studies (e.g., Taylor,
1988, 1997; Weisburd et al., 2012) have considered streetblocks or street segments as the
focus. A streetblock consists of the homes on either side of a single block (that is,
between two cross-streets). Taylor (1988) chooses this bounding based on a belief that it
is within this area that social contacts, relationships and interaction are strong. The
streetblock may hold more relevance to residents than does the idea of neighborhood. The
important point is that “neighborhood” may have many different meanings to different
individuals in varied settings.
E. Displacement and Diffusion
Crime displacement represents change in crime due to the preventive actions of
the individual or society. Most discussions of displacement focus on the shift of crime
from one place to another (often called crime spillover). The assumption is that many
crime prevention actions simply move the crime around instead of eliminating the overall
amount of crime. For example, an increase in police presence in one neighborhood may
reduce crime in that area but cause an increase in crime in a contiguous neighborhood.
Displacement, however, can take forms other than just the geographical movement of
crime.
Reppetto (1976) offers five forms of displacement—territorial, temporal, tactical,
target, and functional (see Table 6.1). Territorial (spatial) displacement is the most
frequently discussed and represents movement of crime from one location to another.
Temporal displacement, the movement of offending to another period while remaining in
the same area, may manifest itself through a shift in larcenies from the late evening to the
early morning. Under tactical displacement, the offender utilizes new means to commit
the same offense. A shift in burglary from entering through unlocked doors to breaking
windows for entry represents a tactical change in the offense. Targetdisplacement
involves a choice of different victims within the same area. For example, an increase in
the use of weapons by store owners may force robbers to choose elderly pedestrians as
victims. Reppetto’s final form of displacement, functional displacement, suggests that
offenders change to a new type of offense, such as shifting from larceny to burglary or
burglary to robbery. Each of these forms of displacement represents a change in offense
behavior on the part of the offender. Barr and Pease (1990) offer a sixth form of
displacement—perpetrator. Perpetrator displacement occurs when one offender ceases his
deviant behavior, only to be replaced by another offender. Crime prevention techniques
are a logical cause of any of these types of displacement.
Displacement assumes that crime is inelastic. That is, offenders are driven to
commit a certain number of offenses over a given period of time (Reppetto, 1976). If
crime is inelastic, it is not eliminated by crime prevention activities. Rather, it is simply
moved along one of the displacement dimensions. Offenders are motivated to commit
crime and will seek out opportunities to offend. One key to displacement, therefore, is
available opportunities. Felson and Clarke (1998) argue that opportunities are (or can be)
limited, thus having an impact on the possibility of displacement.
Displacement assumes mobility on the part of the offender (Reppetto, 1976). The
mobility can be across time, place, tactic, or any displacement dimension. Not all
potential offenders, however, have the same level of mobility (Brantingham and
Brantingham, 1984). For example, youthful offenders may not have access to
transportation (limiting territorial displacement) or they may be tied to school and
curfews (limiting temporal displacement). Race may inhibit individuals from entering
areas populated by other racial or ethnic groups. Some offenders may not be
psychologically able to shift from one type of crime to another (functional displacement).
While such factors may limit displacement, they will not eliminate it for all potential
offenders.
A very important third assumption involves the level of volition held by potential
offenders. Rational choice theory has become a central focus in the study of crime
(Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Cornish and Clarke, 1986a). This theory assumes that
potential offenders make choices based on various factors in the physical and social
environment. Offenders respond to payoff, effort, peer support, risks, and similar factors
in making decisions to commit a crime (Cornish and Clarke, 1986b). Displacement views
the offender as being a rational individual who is capable of making informed, free-
willed choices. He is able to evaluate the costs and benefits inherent in his choice and
circumstances, and can make decisions based on those factors.
The tenor of most discussions of displacement is clearly one of disappointment or
dismay at the thought that crime is simply being moved across one of the displacement
dimensions. Displacement, however, can be positive. Barr and Pease (1990) divide
displacement into two types—“malign” and “benign.” Malign displacement leads to
undesirable outcomes. Efforts aimed at reducing burglary may prompt an increase in
robberies and accompanying levels of assault. Another case of malign displacement
would be an offender’s need to increase the number of crimes in order to offset the
reduced payoff garnered from each offense (Gabor, 1990). A third possibility is shifting
crime to another area that is unprepared to respond. Such malign displacement may not
be tolerable to society. Benign displacement suggests that changes from displacement
may benefit society. For example, the new crime or tactics that are utilized by the
offenders may be less serious and offer less danger to the potential victims. Robbery
becomes burglary, assault with a deadly weapon becomes simple assault, burglary
becomes petty theft, and so on. Displacement may also bring about reduced fear of crime
which offsets the problem of actual crime.
Rather than shifting the crime, diffusion assumes that prevention efforts will
benefit people and places other than those targeted. Diffusion is discussed under a variety
of names, including “halo effect” (Scherdin, 1986) and “free bonus effect” (Sherman,
1990). What accounts for diffusion? Clarke and Weisburd (1994) offer two potential
sources for diffusion— deterrence and discouragement. Deterrence can have an impact in
various ways. While many prevention efforts are short-lived, the impact on crime often
outlasts the period of intervention. Similarly, targeting one location or certain
merchandise may result in protecting other targets. In each case, there is an assumption
that the chances of being apprehended are heightened and potential offenders are deterred
by the risk of being caught. Discouragement works by reducing the payoff and increasing
the effort needed to commit a crime.
F. Offender Choice and Mobility
Offenders do not commit offenses totally at random. They do not simply walk
down the street and attack people, commit robberies, break into homes, or act in other
criminal ways with no reason. If offenders acted completely at random, committing
crimes with no thought and at any moment, all of our streets would be rife with crimes at
any time and nothing anyone could do would have an impact on crime. Thankfully, we
know that many places and times are free from crime, and many things can be done to
prevent crime. This means that offenders, at least to some degree, make decisions on
what to do, when, where, and how. The key for prevention, therefore, is to understand the
factors that go into those decisions.
The routine activities theory argues that the normal movement and activities of
both potential offenders and victims plays a role in the occurrence of crime. Cohen and
Felson (1979) outline three criteria that must exist for crime to occur. There must be (1) a
suitable target, (2) a motivated offender, and (3) an absence of guardians. The authors
believe that much crime is due to opportunity. That does not mean that offenders do not
seek out opportunities. Rather, it implies that the actual choice and commission of an
offense is determined by the mutual occurrence of the three conditions. The routine
activities of people have greatly changed over the years. Since World War II many
households have moved to two-earner incomes, which leaves many homes unoccupied
during the day and, therefore, unguarded (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Increased mobility of
the population has led to the establishment of “bedroom communities” which are
removed from the watchful eyes of workers and pedestrians. Time spent away from
home, either at work or in recreation, opens up opportunities for crime.
An implicit assumption in routine activities is that offenders make rational
choices about when and where to offend. In order for crime prevention activities to have
an impact, offenders must be making (somewhat) rational decisions based on their
perceptions of needs, risks, payoffs, and other factors. Whether offenders make choices in
their offenses can be answered both intuitively and through the literature. On an intuitive
level, most people believe that human beings are free-willed. At the same time, however,
people recognize that the available choices are limited by time, place, or circumstance.
This implies a sort of soft determinism. That is, individuals make choices but only within
the realm of available opportunities. This is true in all behavior and not just criminal
activity. For example, every individual may wish to be comfortable in his daily existence.
One person may be independently wealthy while another must work. Further, the choice
of work relies upon the physical and mental abilities of the individual, the state of the
economy in the area, the competition for jobs, and a host of other factors. The fact that
everyone makes choices in life leads to the belief that criminals make similar choices.
Additionally, offenders spend the majority of their time participating in normal, socially
accepted activities within which they make choices. It would be naive to think that this
ability to make choices is removed when criminal behavior is contemplated.
Two keys to understanding patterns is to understand the environmental backcloth
and the social/crime template of the offender. The environmental backcloth refers to the
social, economic, cultural, and physical conditions within which people operate. While
these dimensions are constantly changing, it is possible to discern patterns from them.
The social/crime template is the idea that people have templates that outline expectations
of what will happen at certain times and places given certain behavior by the individual.
In essence, the template tells an offender what should occur in a certain place, time, or
situation. Understanding how people learn about the environment and how they construct
these templates is an important endeavor for understanding the occurrence of crime.
Another consideration in how individuals learn about the environment involves
cognitive maps. Smith and Patterson (1980) argue that individuals create cognitive maps
(mental images) of the environment that are used in making behavioral choices. There are
four aspects to cognitive mapping: recognition, prediction, evaluation, and action.
Recognition refers to being able to identify your location and various features in the area.
Recognition leads to prediction, which involves making connections between the
identifiable objects in the area and possible lines of behavior. During evaluation, the
individual uses the information gathered in the earlier stages and determines which
options are acceptable modes of behavior. It is based on the information gained in the
first three steps that an individual decides on an appropriate action. In essence, cognitive
mapping entails changing nodes and paths into awareness space. To the extent to which it
removes fear and uncertainty about locations, cognitive mapping helps the individual
make informed choices and turn the location into an activity space.
Beyond providing a framework for developing cognitive maps/awareness
space/activity space, nodes can serve to promote crime in other ways (Brantingham and
Brantingham, 1996). Some nodes may act as crime generators by drawing potential
victims to the area. They also may be crime attractors. These are areas to which potential
offenders and victims are drawn, such as drug markets, sites of street prostitution, and/or
adult clubs and bars. Finally, a node may serve as a hunting ground for offenders. That is,
offenders recognize that potential victims frequent an area, there is a lack of guardians at
that location, and, consequently, the offender follows the victims to that place. An
emerging possibility for development of cognitive maps and information on potential
targets has been the advent of the Internet and its widespread accessibility. Today, a
wealth of information, including visual depictions, can be found online. Programs such as
Google Maps, Google Streetview, and government property web sites provide varying
levels of detail about different addresses and areas. Google Streetview, for example,
allows the user to look at an address from the main street, take a 360-degree look into the
area, move up and down the street, and zoom in to look at property details. While this
information reflects only a single point in time, it provides a basis of information on the
area. Publicly accessible government documents also provide details of homes and
businesses, including room layouts and sizes. All of this information can be used by
potential offenders to build mental maps of a target, the surrounding area, and other
useful planning information without ever leaving home and visiting the area. As such, the
potential to plan crimes outside the assumptions of routine activities and crime pattern
theories is greatly enhanced.
Assessments of displacement need to consider a number of factors. First, all of the
forms of displacement should be open to examination. Most analyses only consider
territorial displacement and totally ignore the other forms. Second, each crime/problem
being targeted by the prevention initiative should be examined in detail to answer a
number of questions: Who are the likely offenders? When are the offenses taking place?
How are the crimes being committed? Where are they occurring? What purpose does the
crime serve (i.e., why does it happen)? and similar concerns. The answers to these
questions are crucial for both the selection of the crime prevention measures and the
potential for displacement. Interestingly, while most crime prevention programs answer
these questions when developing the intervention, they are typically ignored when
discussions of displacement occur. This is unfortunate because answers to these questions
would inform expectations about the type and extent of possible displacement.
G. The Mass Media and Crime Prevention
In many respects, one can say that the mass media has an affinity for crime and
crime-related activity. This is true whether one looks at the coverage of crime in the news
or the content of fictional programming on television. Crime accounts for a major portion
of the written and broadcast media. A variety of studies have examined the extent of
crime in newspapers and on television. One method for analyzing the reporting of crime
is to undertake content analyses of newspapers. In one early study, Deutschmann (1959)
finds that between 10 percent and 15 percent of the stories in selected New York and
Ohio newspapers focus on crime. Graber (1980) reports greater attention to crime (22 to
28 percent of the stories) in daily newspapers. A wide range of other studies report that
crime stories comprise between roughly 5 percent and 30 percent of newspaper space
(Cohen, 1975; Deutschmann, 1959; Otto, 1962; Stempl, 1962; Stott, 1967). Chiricos et al.
(1997) claim that newspaper coverage of crime has increased more than 400 percent in
recent years. Similar results appear in analysis of U.K. newspapers, where the percentage
of crime stories has increased from roughly 9 percent from 1945 to 1951, to 21 percent
from 1985 to 1991.
One potential problem of media presentations of crime is that viewers receive
inaccurate images of crime and the criminal justice system. Several studies note that the
public image of crime is influenced by media presentations. Gerbner et al. (1977, 1978,
1979) and Barrile (1980) compare the perception of crime and the criminal justice system
held by individuals with differing levels of television exposure. The authors consistently
find that respondents answer closer to the “television answer” (the answer that is
commonly depicted on television) than to the real world information. The images,
therefore, are influenced by media presentations. Perhaps of more interest for us is the
ability of the media to cause crime or fear.
Besides causing deviant behavior, media presentations may also increase people’s
fear. Several authors note that crime news increases fear (Ditton and Duffy, 1983;
Gunter, 1987; Robinson, 2011; Sherizan, 1978; van Dijk, 1978). Heath (1984) and Liska
and Baccaglini (1990) report that local crime stories, particularly those dealing with
sensational events, tend to raise the level of fear among readers. Examining 10 British
daily newspapers and their relationship to fear, Williams and Dickinson (1993) find that
fear varies with the saliency of the crime reports. That is, stories that place the offense in
a framework familiar to the reader have a greater impact than those more removed from
the reader’s experiences. High levels of television viewing also have been found to raise
fear (Callanan, 2012; Doob and Macdonald, 1979; Gerbner et al., 1979). Chiricos et al.
(1996) report that television and radio news is related to fear, while written news has no
relationship with fear levels. Boda and Szabó (2011) note that there is a strong, consistent
impact of television violence on increased fear. Callanan (2012) points out that television
has a greater impact on levels of fear compared to other media sources.
A two-pronged evaluation of this campaign was conducted from 1979 to 1981
(O’Keefe and Mendelsohn, 1984). The first part of the evaluation consisted of surveying
1,200 adults from across the country. The second phase involved a panel survey of adults
in Buffalo, Detroit, and Milwaukee. The panel survey took measurements three months
prior to the introduction of the campaign and again after more than a year and a half of
campaign exposure. Among the issues investigated were the level of exposure to the
public service announcements and the impact of the campaign on subsequent attitudes
and crime prevention behaviors. The evaluation did not include any measures of actual
crime. Self-reported victimization and attitudes served as the dependent variables.
A second evaluation was conducted in 1992 and involved interviewing a national
sample of adults, as well as law enforcement and media representatives. Compared to the
earlier evaluation, 80 percent of the citizen respondents reported having seen the
announcements, an increase of 30 percent (O’Keefe et al., 1996). Exposure was greatest
among younger respondents, males (by 6 percent over females), those with at least a high
school education, and victims. The impact of the announcements was uniformly in the
expected direction. Respondents reported feeling more competent about crime prevention
participation, taking more action, and becoming more concerned about crime (O’Keefe et
al., 1996). Interestingly, the evaluation did not uncover demographic differences between
those learning from the announcements and those reporting no impact.
Throughout this chapter we have discussed the potential of the media for
enhancing crime prevention activity. Lavrakas (1997) suggests that the media must
assume some of the blame for the continued failure of policies to deal with crime. He
argues that the media fails to critically assess claims regarding the efficacy of crime
control policies. In particular, politicians are able to promote interventions and crime
policy without being held accountable for their rhetorical arguments. The author argues
that the media has a responsibility to do more than simply report what legislators say.
Instead, the media should be critically questioning those positions and challenging
politicians to provide proof for their arguments.
H. Developmental Crime Prevention
Any attempt to address crime through developmental factors is faced with a very
broad spectrum of variables and issues that could be addressed. Virtually everything that
occurs to individuals and around individuals as they grow and mature has a potential
impact on later decision making and behavior. It is not feasible to try and address every
possible factor. Indeed, attempts to do so would mean that an individual and his
environment are subject to total control and regimen. The more reasonable approach is to
identify and intervene in those factors that are most likely to influence an individual’s
choices and behaviors. In essence, this means identifying risk factors and implementing
programs to mitigate their effect.
It is important to note that not all variables or factors that are related to criminality
should be considered risk factors. First, many factors are strongly correlated with crime,
such as age, sex, and race. Age, for example, is perhaps the most highly correlated with
deviant behavior, with most crime being committed by persons in their late teens and
early twenties. The problem is that these factors cannot be changed by a prevention
program. Therefore, they are of no practical value for developmental prevention. Second,
it is important to recognize the distinction between a simple correlate and a causal factor
(Farrington, 2007). Just because something occurs at the same time as crime does not
mean it is the cause of the crime. Farrington (2007) uses the example that just because a
delinquent has delinquent friends does not mean that the friends cause the delinquency.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the identification of risk factors is often based on
finding a difference between two groups on some dimension. That dimension is then
considered a risk factor. What is more important is to find out if a change in the
dimension for an individual is related to a change in the key behavior (Farrington, 2007).
For example, if most offending is committed by those earning low income, income is
considered a risk factor. What is more important to know is whether the commission of
crime (or level of crime) is changed at the individual level when the individual’s income
goes up or down. It is this change that indicates a causal connection between the risk
factor and the behavior.
There are many different prevention programs that entail developmental
interventions. It is impossible to cover all of the diverse approaches in this chapter.
Instead, the following discussion will target some of the most promising and intriguing
developmental prevention programs. The interventions chosen for inclusion are those that
tend to have the following features: (1) they are aimed at young children (even infants)
and their families, and (2) the youths are not those who have necessarily already
exhibited anti-social behavior. This later criterion does not mean that delinquent youths
are not handled in the program, only that the program addresses youths regardless of their
current behavioral status. Included here are programs that address skills training, parental
education, preschool preparation, and multi-component programs that work at a broad
community level.
The Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS) program has been
recognized as model program. PATHS is taught in regular classrooms and, ideally, is a
five-year-long curriculum offered in elementary schools (Greenberg and Kusche, 1998).
The curriculum is intended to reduce both behavioral and emotional problems, while
building self-control and problem-solving abilities. PATHS has undergone several
evaluations utilizing experimental and control groups of regular students, as well as
special needs students. The results reveal improved problem-solving ability, reduced
hyperactivity, increased planning activity, reduced self-reported conduct problems, less
peer aggression, and reduced teacher reports of conduct problems (Greenberg and
Kusche, 1996, 1997; Greenberg et al., 1995). Greenberg and Kusche (1998) suggest that
PATHS can be adopted for use with different populations and for implementation outside
the school setting.
The Elmira Prenatal/Early Infancy Project targets the earliest stage of a child’s
development, specifically when the child is still in the womb. The center piece of the
program is home visitation by nurses beginning during pregnancy and lasting through the
child’s second birthday (Olds et al., 1997, 1998). The target subjects are young, poor,
first-time, and often unmarried mothers. Mothers were visited an average of nine times
during pregnancy and 23 times after birth (Olds et al., 1998). The visiting nurses focus on
three areas: health and health-related activities of the mother and child; learning how to
provide appropriate care to the child; and social and personal skills development for the
mothers. In addition, the nurses provide referrals and access to other assistance and the
project provides transportation for the mothers to access assistance (Olds et al., 1997).
Evaluation of the program revealed a number of positive outcomes. First, maternal abuse
and neglect were significantly reduced. Second, in a 15-year follow-up, the children
reported significantly less running away, arrests, and substance abuse. Third, there were
also fewer arrests of the program mothers (Olds et al., 1997, 1998). The success of the
project has led to its replication in other sites.
One suggestion for addressing anti-social behavior involves early preparation of
children for school. Preschool programs are viewed as a means of establishing a level of
competence that avoids early placement into differential ability tracts, building a positive
attitude toward school, and providing basic social skills to youths who are not prepared to
enter school. The advent of preschool as a technique in fighting school problems and
delinquency can be found in the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
the Administration of Justice. The expectation is that success in school will translate later
to greater social success out of school and lower delinquency and criminality.
The idea of assisting in the development of youths is the cornerstone of mentoring
initiatives. Mentoring involves pairing adult volunteers with youths in need of friendship,
emotional support, guidance, and advice. Youths are typically aged 10 to 16 and from
single-parent homes. Matching adults and youths is perhaps the most important part of
the programs. The mentors and mentees are expected to meet two to four times per month
for three to four hours each time. Both the adult volunteers and the youths undergo initial
training that outlines expectations and requirements for the programs (Grossman and
Tierney, 1998). Many programs also involve regular contact with the parents. Mentoring
programs specifically target academic failure, dropping out of school, truancy, and
delinquency, among other things.
The final group of programs to be considered can be generally listed as multi-
component programs. These interventions often begin by targeting youths who have
already displayed anti-social behavior and/or delinquency. In that sense it is possible to
classify the programs as tertiary prevention since the targets have already exhibited the
negative behavior and there is a goal of stemming further offending. At the core of the
programs there is a recognition of a need to address the causal factors leading to the
deviant behavior and keep the youths from developing more problematic activities. The
programs also target youths as early as possible, thus stemming the problems in early
adolescence. Multi-component programs also share the common feature of utilizing a
range of interventions rather than only one or two approaches. While it is possible to find
multiple inputs in the parent training programs discussed earlier, the programs below tend
to be even more inclusive of different techniques.
The positive developmental prevention results do not mean there is universal
acceptance of the developmental crime prevention approach. Indeed, several concerns
can be noted with developmental prevention. Perhaps the first set of concerns revolves
around the ability to adequately identify early risk factors that can be subjected to change.
Despite the long list of risk factors that have been uncovered in past research, there
remain issues with whether much can be done with them. As noted earlier, many of the
risk factors, such as sex and race, are really not amenable to change. Others, like
criminality of parents or community deprivation, require interventions where change may
not be feasible, especially in any reasonable period of time.
I. General Deterrence
Deterrence can be broken down into two distinct types—general and specific.
General deterrence aims to have an impact on more than the single offender. The
apprehension and punishment of one person hopefully serves as an example to other
offenders and potential law violators. In this instance, the incarceration of a single burglar
should deter other individuals from committing burglary. General deterrence fits primary
prevention because of its focus on preventing an act before it occurs. It looks at the effect
of punishing one individual on the future behavior of other persons. This means changing
the behavior of societal members prior to their commission of criminal acts. General
deterrence clearly fits the criteria of prevention before initial criminal action.
Specific deterrence refers to efforts that keep the individual offender from
violating the law again in the future. The hope is that the experience of punishment will
deter the individual who has been punished from future illegal activity. The offender who
is incarcerated for burglary is expected to be deterred by the experience from committing
any further acts of burglary once he is released from the institution. The punishment is
not expected to affect anyone other than the targeted individual. Specific deterrence fits
into tertiary prevention due to its focus on the activity of an individual who has already
violated the law and seeking to prevent the individual from recidivating and committing
future criminal acts.
Studies on deterrence take a variety of different forms. Cross-sectional studies
compare differences between different individuals, groups, states, or other aggregate.
Longitudinal analyses look for changes over time, primarily due to shifts in law or
criminal justice system activity. Panel designs follow separate units (such as states or
counties) over time. In many respects they are a combination of longitudinal and
crosssectional approaches. Finally, meta-analysis examines existing research by
reanalyzing the data from numerous studies using a common measure to uncover results.
Most cross-sectional studies of sentence severity focus on the death penalty.
These studies examine the differences in homicide between states that have and those that
do not have the death penalty. Homicide is typically the focus. The assumption is that, if
the death penalty has a deterrent effect, the state with the penalty will have lower
homicide rates. In an early influential study, Ehrlich (1977), an economist, claimed a
strong connection between the penalty and lower homicide rates. Comparing death
penalty to non-death penalty states, Ehrlich reported that more than 20 homicides are
deterred for every execution. The author noted that, not only does the death penalty deter,
the length of imprisonment also lowers the homicide rate.
A common approach in deterrence research entails longitudinal analysis, which
looks for a change in the outcome variable as a result of introducing a change in some
condition. One example of this is the examination of homicide rates prior to and after the
imposition of the death penalty. The advantages of the longitudinal approach are many.
First, the same jurisdiction is being considered at both points in time, thereby negating
the problem faced in cross-sectional studies of biased results due to differences between
the areas under study. Second, with a single jurisdiction the researcher is able to isolate
both the point in time that the intervention occurs and when changes in the dependent
variable occur. A third advantage of longitudinal analysis is that the observer can see
when the changes occur, evaluate the time lag between the intervention and the change,
and examine whether the effect is short or long term. That is, do the changes in the
dependent variable diminish over time and return to the pre-intervention level? These
advantages, among others, make longitudinal analysis the preferred technique.
Several recent analyses have relied on panel data as a means of avoiding problems
with both cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches. A panel design follows a number
of separate units (such as states, counties, or individuals) over a period of time. In many
respects it is a combination of cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches in a single
study. Shepherd (2005) notes that both cross-sectional and longitudinal designs suffer
from serious problems. Simple longitudinal designs result in aggregating disparate
observations into a single group. The results from one state, for example, may be offset
by those from another state, thus masking the results from each individual state. Cross-
sectional designs cannot account for changes over time and often miss key differences
between study units within the same cross-section. Typical longitudinal and cross-
sectional studies also have few observations, both across time and in terms of units (e.g.,
states).
The conflicting evidence on the deterrent effect of executions and other sanctions
has led some researchers to analyze published results in an attempt to provide some
meaning to the state of knowledge. Pratt et al. (2006) applied meta-analysis to 40
deterrent studies looking at certainty, severity, and other factors. The authors arrive at
several conclusions. First, deterrence measures have only a modest impact, at best, on
crime. Perhaps more important is that other factors, especially non-legal factors, are more
important. The impact of deterrence also varies across samples, with certainty having a
greater impact than severity (Pratt et al., 2006). Donohue (2009) reviews six studies of
the impact of imprisonment on crime. He reports a statistically significant negative
relationship between the level of imprisonment and area crime rates. Unfortunately, this
result could be attributable to incapacitation, rather than deterrence.
The ability of punishment to deter offenders rests upon various assumptions about
the knowledge held by potential violators regarding the law and the criminal justice
system. The existence of a law or the actual imposition of a sanction will only affect
individuals who perceive risks to themselves. Individuals ignorant of the law cannot be
expected to refrain from the proscribed behavior simply due to the law’s existence. The
lack of knowledge about the chances for arrest and the penalty incurred for breaking the
law also may result in a lack of deterrence. As noted earlier, deterrence also assumes that
offenders consider the consequences of possible actions and make rational choices. While
there is evidence that offenders make rational choices, there is also evidence that in
interpersonal offenses and many violent crimes, the offenders do not undertake the cost–
benefit analysis required for deterrence.
The deterrence literature provides conflicting evidence that increased perception
of risk is related to reduced deviant behavior. Erickson et al. (1977), surveying 1,700 high
school students, find that the level of perceived certainty of arrest or incarceration is
inversely related to the level of self-reported delinquency. That is, juveniles who envision
higher chances of being arrested or incarcerated for a given offense are less likely to
engage in that form of deviant behavior. Nagin (1998), reviewing the deterrence
literature, claims that the research shows a clear impact of perceived risk on reduced
chances for committing crime.
The perception of severity of punishment has not received as much attention as
certainty of apprehension. In one study, Meier and Johnson (1977) look at self-reports of
deviant behavior and reasons given for not offending. Focusing on adult marijuana use,
they examine a variety of independent measures including legal variables (e.g., statutory
knowledge, perceived severity), social support (i.e., friends’ use), attitudes toward drug
use, and various demographic factors. They find that as the perceived severity of the
sanction increases the level of marijuana use decreases. Severity, along with the
combined legal factors hold minimal influence compared to the contribution of social
background characteristics and social support factors (Meier and Johnson, 1977). A
replication of this study (Williams, 1983) reports the same basic findings, further
questioning the importance of severity in deterrence.
A few studies attempt to gauge perceptions of certainty, severity, and/or celerity
within the same analysis. Hollinger and Clark (1983) find that perceived severity and
certainty have a deterrent influence. The level of employee theft diminishes as
perceptions of risk increase and the individual sees harsher sanctions as a possible
outcome. Pestello (1984) surveyed high school students about their school misbehavior
and the perceptions of each of the deterrent elements as they relate to school discipline.
The results show that perceived severity and celerity of punishment increase the fear of
consequences for behavior that, in turn, reduces the possibility of misbehavior. This is
one of the few studies that reports a significant effect of severity on behavior.
Unfortunately, each of these studies suffers from the problem of time order in its
analyses. The measures of perception are taken at the same time as the measures of
behavior, which raises the possibility of the experiential effect.
