Discussion 1
Fear of Crime, History, and Evaluation
A. Fear
To further compound the problem of the levels of “actual crime” and the
economic and physical impact of crime in society, one needs only to examine the
perceived levels of crime and the resultant fear held by many members of society. The
“fear of crime” presents a view of criminal victimization that, although not necessarily
real, forms the basis for daily “inactivity” and anxiety. Because fear reduction is an
important component of many crime prevention programs, it is important to understand
the extent of fear and issues related to measuring and understanding fear. Fear of crime
emerged as a social issue in the mid-1960s and soon became a permanent part of
criminological research. Lee (2007) argues that fear was “invented” in the 1960s through
a convergence of various factors. Among these were the development of victimization
surveys as a part of the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice (and subsequently in other countries), the growth of
professional/academic interest in crime and its causes, the use of crime and fear as
political capital, and the feminist movement (Lee, 2007). The newly discovered “fear of
crime” became an integral part of national and local government policymaking.
What exactly is fear? Despite the growth of interest in “fear of crime,” there
remains a lack of consensus on exactly what the term means. Perhaps the most
recognized work on this issue is that of Kenneth Ferraro and his associates. Ferraro
defines fear as an emotional response of dread or anxiety to crime or symbols that a
person associates with crime. This definition of fear implies that some recognition of
potential danger, what we may call perceived risk, is necessary to evoke fear.
While this definition requires an emotional response, the fear may manifest itself
in various ways depending on the person involved and the basis for his anxiety. Some
individuals fear walking on the streets in their neighborhood while others fear physical
attack within their own home. As a result, there may be a shift in physical functioning
such as high blood pressure and rapid heartbeat. Alternatively, the individual may
similarly alter his attitudes about walking alone in certain places or avoiding various
activities. To a great extent, the source of the fear for the individual will determine the
response to the fear. Regardless of the source of this fear, it is real for the individual.
Ferraro (1995) points out that researchers have attempted to measure fear in a
variety of ways. Some surveys question respondents about how much they worry about
being a victim. Others ask about perceptions of the crime problem in their community.
Still other surveys have respondents rate their chances of becoming a victim. These
various approaches do not provide the same information. In an attempt to show the
differences between various fear measures, Ferraro and LaGrange (1988) provide a
classification scheme that considers the perceptions of the respondent being tapped and
the degree to which the method addresses the individual or others (see Figure 1.3). This
classification taps judgments of risk—how safe the respondent or others are, values—
how concerned the person is about crime or victimization, and emotions—how much the
individual is afraid or worried about becoming a victim. Personal fear of crime appears in
the lower right hand cell (F). This measure would ask respondents directly about how
afraid they are of being the victim of specific crimes, often without reference to any
specific place or time. These questions directly tap the “emotions of dread or anxiety” of
the individual. At the other extreme (cell A), respondents assess the general safety of
other people, quite possibly without even mentioning crime.
Interestingly, while discussions of “fear of crime” are common, many researchers
utilize measures that reflect risk or assessments of crime levels, rather than the emotional
response of the individual (Ferraro, 1995). This diversity is seen in many of the common
and large-scale surveys. Table 1.5 presents a sample of “fear” questions used in past
surveys and research. Note that the questions vary from asking about perceptions on
changes in crime (Gallup Poll), to feeling safe outside at night with no mention of crime
(NCVS), to rating fear of specific criminal actions (Fear of Crime in America Survey).
These differing measures all tap some aspect of the fear definition presented earlier.
Trying to delineate the actual level of fear is like trying to hit a moving target. No
two studies provide the same results. This may be due largely to the use of varying
measures of fear. Despite this fact, it is possible to offer some insight and “ballpark”
figures for fear. Many researchers report that 40 to 50 percent of the population express a
fear of crime (Hindelang, 1975; Maguire and Pastore, 1995; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981;
Toseland, 1982). In 2011, 38 percent of respondents report that there are areas near their
home where they would be afraid to walk alone at night (Maguire, 2011). Questions
asking about perceived changes in crime in the United States or a respondent’s area often
result in greater fear levels with 66 percent or more reporting that there is “more” crime
than in the past about being mugged. Interestingly, few respondents report ever being a
victim of any of these crimes.
B. Fear and Crime
One very important fact to keep in mind is that the level of fear exceeds the actual
levels of crime. Skogan and Maxfield (1981) illustrate the lack of a connection between
crime and fear by showing that, in terms of robbery, approximately 48 percent of the non-
victims report feeling somewhat or very unsafe, while 54 percent of the victims report the
same fear. The expectation was that victims should express significantly more fear than
non-victims. Similarly, both official and victimization measures show that less than 10
percent of the population is victimized, despite fear of 40 percent or more. Perhaps more
interesting is the fact that, despite the reductions in crime found in both official and
victimization figures, 66 percent of the respondents to a Gallup Poll in 2002 believe there
was more crime in the United States than in the previous year.
Besides the diversity in the fear–victimization relationship, the level of fear is not
consistent across all demographic groups in the population. It is principally an urban
problem and affects the elderly and women to a greater extent than other groups. Greater
than 60 percent of those persons living in urban areas express fear of crime. Conversely,
only 30 percent of rural residents voice the same fears. A wide range of studies reveal
that the elderly and women are the most fearful groups in society (Baumer, 1985; Bennett
and Flavin, 1994; Ferraro, 1995; Hindelang et al., 1978; McGarrell et al., 1997; Perkins
and Taylor, 1996; Riger et al., 1978; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Will and McGrath,
1995). This persists despite the fact that the elderly and women are the least victimized
groups. Some researchers argue these fear results are an artifact of how fear is measured
and that the young are actually the most fearful.
C. Divergent Findings
Two basic questions arise from an inspection of past research on fear of crime.
First, how do you justify the levels of fear in light of the actual levels and chances of
victimization? Second, why do different studies find divergent sets of characteristics
among fearful individuals? There is no clear answer to these questions. Instead, there
may be many contributing factors. Hough (1995) argues that fear is related to measures
of vicarious victimization. Vicarious victimization refers to knowing someone or hearing
about others who have been the victim of a crime. This information may elicit a
sympathetic reaction and empathetic fear of crime. Grohe et al. (2012), using a phone
survey of residents in one southeastern U.S. city, report that fear of burglary is
significantly related to actual burglary in the city. Analyzing fear among Houston
residents, Zhao et al. (2015) note that local crime is related to fear of violent, property,
and disorder offenses independent of actual victimization. Vicarious fear can also come
from real or dramatic depictions of crime in the media, particularly television. Both
fictional police dramas and the reporting of crime and violence in the news inundate the
populace with a view that crime is a constant threat to every individual. It is also
noteworthy that most depictions are not of everyday “street crimes.” Instead, they focus
on more heinous and frightening offenses such as murder, rape, and home burglary.
Several studies (Chiricos et al., 1996; Lane and Meeker, 2003a; Weitzer and Kubrin,
2004) report that exposure to crime in the media is related to higher reported fear.
A second possible explanation for inordinate levels of fear centers on the potential
harm one encounters when victimized (Riger et al., 1978; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981;
Warr, 1984). That is, victimization has a greater impact on some individuals than others.
The elderly, for example, are largely on fixed incomes and any loss due to theft, property
damage, or medical expenses cannot always be accommodated within their budgets. A
minor dollar loss can translate into a major hardship. Similarly, physical injuries to
elderly victims can result in lengthy, painful recuperation beyond that needed by younger
individuals. The elderly and females also have a great physical disadvantage when faced
with young male offenders who hold an edge in strength and physical prowess. The
perceived potential for physical harm is greatly enhanced when the victim and offender
represent opposite positions in physical and social power. McCoy et al. (1996) and Smith
and Torstensson (1997) find that perceived vulnerability is a strong predictor of fear
among women and the elderly.
A third possible explanation for the lack of a direct victimization–fear connection
involves area incivility. Incivility refers to physical and social factors involved in
disorder and community decline. Physical signs of incivility include the deterioration of
buildings, litter, graffiti, vandalism, and abandoned buildings and cars. Among the social
signs of incivility are public drunkenness, vagrancy, loitering youths, harassment (such as
begging or panhandling), and visible drug sales and use. Both residents and potential
offenders may see signs of incivility as indicative of a lack of social cohesion, high
transiency, a lack of resources, and/or an uncaring attitude (Lewis and Salem, 1986;
Skogan, 1990). Residents may feel a lack of control in the neighborhood that in turn may
generate a greater fear of crime. Conversely, areas that display collective efficacy and
strong social integration should have lower levels of fear (Doran and Burgess, 2012;
Jackson and Gray, 2010; Zhao et al., 2015).
Differing methodologies in the studies may also influence the results. As noted
earlier, varying “fear” measures can contribute to divergent findings. It is not improbable
that the same respondents could provide two different views of fear when asked different
questions. For example, survey respondents may give “fearful” responses when asked
about walking alone after dark anywhere “within a mile,” but few “fear” responses to the
likelihood of being raped. Similarly, respondents may feel that crime is a greater problem
today than a year ago, but still not worry much about being mugged. The extent of fear
also may vary depending on who is answering which questions. Females, for example,
worry more about sexual assault than do males. Ferraro (1995) notes that general fear
among women is better understood as an extension of the fear of rape. Operationalizing
fear in different ways, therefore, produces greatly different results. Variation in fear also
may reflect the locale of the study. For example, Chiricos et al. (1997) point out that their
results on fear differ from those of Covington and Taylor (1991), despite the similar
concerns addressed in the two studies. They speculate that the variation is due to
differences between Tallahassee, Florida and Baltimore, Maryland. The setting of the
analysis, therefore, can influence the results.
Yet another factor influencing the levels of fear involves the actual level of crime.
While the fear of crime varies independently from actual victimization and crime, it
would be naive to claim that changes in the crime rate have no influence on reported fear.
Media reports of increasing crime and spectacular offenses undoubtedly hold some sway
over perceptions of safety in the community. Unfortunately, lower crime rates probably
do not bring about lower fear as easily. The media does not promote good news to the
same extent as bad news. Feelings of fear and worry, once formed, would be difficult to
reverse.
Throughout this discussion, fear has been presented primarily as a negative
concept. That is, fear is a bad thing that has negative consequences for the individual.
Among these negatives are changes in behavior, retreating behind closed doors, not
trusting other people, anxiety, and/or depression, to name a few. The logical conclusion
to draw is that we need to reduce, and hopefully eliminate, fear. It is possible, however,
to view fear as a positive thing. Jackson and Gray (2009) note that there is such a thing as
functional fear. In essence, fear can be a good thing, provided the individual uses it as
motivation to take precautions. These precautions may range from avoiding certain risky
places or times, to utilizing safety devices at home, to pairing up with others for safety
when outdoors. A similar proposition is offered by Lee (2007) when he discusses the
fearing subject. This person is someone who becomes responsible for the safety of
himself and his property. Jackson and Gray (2010), using the Safer Neighborhoods
Survey in London, report that fear actually promotes precautions, which reduce
subsequent fear for a significant number of respondents.
D. Crime Prevention Through the Ages
In any discussion it is important to set forth the context from which our ideas and
thoughts emerge. Perhaps the best place to start is with an understanding of what has
happened in the past. The study of crime prevention is no exception. The earliest
responses to crime were left to the individual and his family. Retribution, revenge, and
vengeance were the driving forces throughout early history. While such actions would
serve to make the victim whole again, it also would eliminate the benefit gained by the
offender. It was assumed that potential offenders would see little gain in an offense,
thereby deterring the individual from taking action. The Code of Hammurabi
(approximately 1900 B.C.) outlined retribution by the victim and/or his family as the
accepted response to injurious behavior. Lex talionis, the principle of “an eye for an eye,”
was specifically set forth as a driving principle in the Hammurabic law. Such laws and
practices provided legitimacy to individual citizen action.
The Norman conquest of England in 1066 gave rise to a form of citizen policing
referred to as obligatory policing (Klockars, 1985). Male citizens were required to band
together into groups for the purpose of policing each other. If one individual in the group
caused harm (to a group or non-group member), the other members were responsible for
apprehending and sanctioning the offender. Beyond this obligatory action, a variety of
cooperative practices emerged that relied on citizen participation to protect the
community and one another. Watch and ward rotated the responsibility for keeping watch
over the town or area, particularly at night, among the male citizens. Identified threats
would cause the watcher to raise the alarm and call for help (hue and cry). It was then up
to the general citizenry to apprehend and (possibly) punish the offender. Those
responding to the call for help were not employees of the state. Rather, they were other
common citizens. The “watch and ward” and “hue and cry” ideas were codified in 1285
in the Statutes of Winchester (Klockars, 1985), which also required men to have weapons
available for use when called (assize of arms), and outlined the role of a constable, which
was an unpaid position responsible for coordinating the watch and ward system, and
overseeing other aspects of the law. It is apparent throughout these actions that crime
prevention was a major responsibility of the citizenry.
Similar citizen responsibility was commonplace in the new world colonies and the
early United States. The vigilante movement, which mirrored early ideas of “hue and
cry,” was a major component of enforcing law and order in the growing frontier of the
young country (Klockars, 1985). Posses of citizens were formed when an offender
needed to be apprehended and punished. The individual, often voluntary, responsibility
for crime prevention in England generally persisted until the 1800s. The exceptions to
this trend can be seen in the development of paid, private security police for specialized
industries or groups (Klockars, 1985; Langworthy and Travis, 1994). The Merchant
Police of England, which was established in the sixteenth century to protect the wool
industry, is a prime example of an early private police force. The parochial police, hired
by the wealthy to protect their homes and businesses, is another example.
The advent of the twentieth century witnessed a great deal of change in societal
response to deviant behavior. Not only was a formal police force becoming the norm, but
other forces were emerging to address crime and deviance. The growth of the scientific
study of crime and criminal behavior offered new responses to deviant behavior. The
emerging fields of psychology and sociology in the late 1800s and early 1900s were
beginning to question the causes of deviant behavior. Rather than carry on the dominant
tradition of attributing deviance to the battle between good and evil (God and the devil),
researchers were starting to note patterns in where and when offenses occurred and who
was involved in the offenses, and to relate these facts to changing social structure and
personal relationships. The logical result of this growing study was a movement away
from simple responses involving repression, vengeance, retribution, and the like to
actions that would attack the assumed causes of deviant behavior. The emerging criminal
and juvenile justice systems, therefore, responded by incorporating more prevention-
oriented functions into their activity.
One prime example of an early “crime prevention” approach was the development
of the juvenile court and its efforts to combat the problems of poverty, lack of education,
and poor parenting among the lower classes. The preventive nature of the juvenile system
can be seen in the parens patriae philosophy, which argued that youths needed help and
that processing in adult court was geared toward punishment rather than prevention. The
expansion of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to cover status offenses reflected the belief
that curfew violation, smoking, playing in the street, incorrigibility, and other such
actions (none of which were proscribed by the criminal code) were indicative of later
criminal behavior. Thus, intervening in these status offenses was a means of preventing
later crime. The juvenile system, therefore, was clearly an attempt at crime prevention.
Yet another example of early crime preventive action was the Chicago Area
Project. Shaw and McKay (1931, 1942) found crime and delinquency concentrating in
the central areas of Chicago, where residential transience and an apparent lack of social
ties predominated. Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that this constant turnover of
residents resulted in an inability of the people to exert any informal social control over
the individuals in the area. People were more interested in improving themselves and
moving out of these neighborhoods than in improving the area and staying there.
Consequently, offenders could act with some degree of impunity in these neighborhoods.
The Chicago Area Project, founded in 1931, sought to work with the residents to build a
sense of pride and community, thereby prompting people to stay and exert control over
the actions of people in the area. Recreation for youths, vigilance and community self-
renewal, and mediation were the major components of the project (Schlossman and
Sedlak, 1983). In essence, the project sought to build ongoing, thriving communities that
could control the behavior of both its residents and those who visited the area.
E. Modern Crime Prevention
The modern era of crime prevention can be traced to the changes in crime in the
1960s. That decade saw the advent of major increases in crime and delinquency,
accompanied by large-scale social unrest in the United States over the Vietnam War and
perceived social inequality. The public demanded that something be done to address
crime and social unrest. The work of the 1967 President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (hereafter the Commission) highlighted
the plight of crime victims and the failure of existing criminal justice system actions to
curtail problems. The Commission called for new approaches, including educational
programs, local crime initiatives, better funding of criminal justice initiatives, and
research on the causes of and solution for crime.
Academic interest in the burgeoning crime problem led the way to modern crime
prevention activities. One of the first focal areas was on the contribution of the physical
design of communities to crime. Jacobs’ (1961) The Death and Life of Great American
Cities focused on urban decay and the natural and social environments, and their impact
on crime and deviance. The modern urban environment, as well as many programs to
change urban life, were anathema to a vibrant community that protects itself and residents
who look out for one another. Jacobs suggested that the physical environment needs to
enhance natural surveillance by those in the neighborhood as a means of making streets
safe for legitimate users. Similarly, Wood’s (1961) evaluation of public housing in
Chicago noted that safety is enhanced through resident surveillance and activity in the
area.
The 1971 publication of Jeffery’s Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design took the ideas of Jacobs and Wood further and argued that crime prevention
requires environmental engineering. His emphasis was on future offending rather than
past behavior (the target of existing systems of social control). Jeffery (1971) argued that
criminal behavior, particularly potential future activity, is strongly influenced by the
potential future consequences of the individual’s actions. It is possible to curtail
offending by removing environmental cues that reinforce the offending behavior. The
physical and social environments have great potential to determine the levels of pleasure
and pain faced by the individual. Jeffery argued that it is possible to make alterations to
the environment that will enhance conforming behavior and mitigate offending. Those
changes are not limited to physical changes. Rather, Jeffery claimed that increasing
citizen involvement in community activities and surveillance, and increased proactive
programs by the police and other agents of social control, can hold great potential for the
prevention of crime.
While Jacobs, Jeffery, and others were laying out an academic basis for an
emerging crime prevention, architects and community planners, along with federal
agencies and private corporations, were implementing and testing new initiatives.
Newman (1972), in his book Defensible Space: People and Design in the Violent City,
called on architects to change the physical environment in such a way as to maximize
territoriality and natural surveillance by residents and create an image of an area as cared
for and protected. He demonstrated the impact of appropriate construction on reduced
crime and disorder. Newman’s work prompted the U.S. Department of Justice, other
government agencies, and private corporations (such as Westinghouse Electric) to fund
demonstration projects. The results of these projects led to the development of many
different crime prevention efforts, including neighborhood watch, “Take a Bite Out of
Crime,” citizen patrols, lighting projects, and others. A final major development in
modern crime prevention was the introduction of situational crime prevention in 1983.
Developed by the British Home Office, situational crime prevention refocused attention
from broad social/community change to target-, time- and place-specific efforts that
would remove the opportunities for crime. This move took crime prevention from the
macro to the micro level of interest.
F. Types of Evaluation
In general, evaluation refers to investigating the usefulness of some exercise or
phenomenon. Evaluation of crime prevention, therefore, refers to investigating the impact
of a prevention technique or intervention on the level of subsequent crime, fear, or other
intended outcome. Making such a determination may require the use of various
methodologies. Ekblom and Pease (1995) argue that evaluation research is often viewed
as addressing two research goals using diverse methodologies. These goals are generally
understanding the implementation of the intervention and the impact of the initiative and
are evaluated using two forms of evaluation—process and impact evaluation—
respectively. A third form of evaluation—cost–benefit evaluation— is becoming more
common.
Impact (outcome) evaluations focus on what changes (e.g., to the crime rate)
occur after the introduction of the policy, intervention, or program. There are many
examples of impact evaluations in criminal justice. For example, treatment programs
used in correctional settings are evaluated on their effectiveness to reduce recidivism or
drug use among offenders. Changes in police patrol practices aimed at reducing the level
of drug sales in an area are evaluated in terms of subsequent numbers of sales. In-school
interventions that teach students how to respond to problems in a non-aggressive fashion
are assessed in terms of the type or amount of future physical confrontations in school.
Neighborhood watch programs have been evaluated in terms of their impact on crime
levels in the neighborhood and the fear of crime reported by residents. Changes in traffic
patterns, walkways, building designs, and the layout of residential complexes have been
assessed in terms of changes in crime. Evaluations of newsletters and media efforts to
promote preventive activity have looked at the ability of such efforts to change not only
citizen behavior but also their victimization levels.
Undertaking impact evaluations in crime prevention poses some interesting
problems. One major obstacle is the fact that crime prevention initiatives rarely rely on a
single intervention or approach. Rather, crime prevention programs often incorporate a
menu of different activities at the same time. For example, neighborhood crime
prevention typically includes a watch scheme, property identification, neighborhood
cleanup, periodic meetings, and some form of prevention newsletter. The problem for
evaluators is identifying which of the many prevention activities is responsible for the
observed changes (if any). It is possible that the entire package is necessary to bring
about the change, it is possible that only one of the elements is responsible for the
change, or it is equally plausible that the mix of interventions mitigates any positive
impact on crime and fear. It is rare to find that a single prevention activity is undertaken
in total isolation from other anti-crime initiatives.
A second set of obstacles for evaluating crime prevention revolves around the fact
that the target of the initiatives (and thus the unit of analysis for the evaluation) is a
neighborhood or other geographic area. This is not to suggest that implementing a crime
prevention program across a neighborhood or community is illconceived. Rather, the
issue is solely a methodological one, and it is multifaceted. First, neighborhoods cannot
be isolated. This means that there are a multitude of other influences on the neighborhood
—many of them from the surrounding community or adjacent neighborhoods—that may
have an influence on the levels of crime. Second, many interventions are not uniformly
applied across an area or adopted by all residents. As a result, it is possible that an
intervention appears to have no impact across the area, when in fact those who participate
experience a reduction in crime and/or fear. Impact evaluations need to pay special
attention to the effectiveness of prevention techniques in cases in which there is not total
cooperation or adoption of the intervention. A third concern with impact evaluations of
crime prevention programs involves the competing issues of crime displacement and
diffusion of benefits. While both of these will be discussed at length later in the book,
they refer to the issue of whether the prevention activity influences the level of crime and
fear in areas not involved in the initiative.
Process evaluations consider the implementation of a program or initiative and
involve determining the procedures used to implement a specific program. These
evaluations also examine the social context within which the program or initiative
operates (Ekblom and Pease, 1995). In general, process evaluations offer a detailed
descriptive account of the program and its implementation. Process evaluations look at a
wide range of variables and topics starting with the initial goals of the initiative and
continuing all the way through the current operations (or closing) of the program. Typical
factors considered are the mission/goals of the program, the level and quality of program
staff, the funding and other resources of the program, obstacles faced in implementing
and sustaining the initiative, the degree to which the project was carried out as planned,
the level of support for the program, the degree to which the clients complied with the
intervention, the quality of the data gathered, and any changes made in the program over
time. All of this information is used in assessing the degree to which the intervention was
successfully implemented as planned. Advocates of process evaluations point out that the
resulting information is pivotal in answering questions about the context of an
intervention and what actually took place in the initiative.
Unfortunately, many evaluations only look only at the process. There is often no
attempt to undertake an impact evaluation. Thus, it is possible to know what was
attempted and how well it was done, but it is impossible to know whether it had any
impact on crime and/or fear of crime. Among the more extensive process evaluations in
the United States and the United Kingdom are those examining partnership initiatives,
including the Comprehensive Communities Programs, the Strategic Approaches to
Community Safety Initiative, the Burglary Reduction Initiative, and the Crime and
Disorder Act projects. Almost without exception, the U.S. evaluations have been
exclusively process oriented (e.g., Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997; Kelling, 1998;
Rosenbaum and Kaminska-Costello, 1998). Even where impact evaluations were
planned, they were often abandoned before they were funded or completed.
Given the fact that process evaluations do not answer the key question for many
programs (i.e., does it reduce crime), why are they so prevalent? Several reasons are
apparent. First, doing a process evaluation can set the stage for an outcome study by
indicating whether the intervention or initiative has been implemented correctly and
whether the target receives the amount of intervention necessary to bring about the
intended change. Second, process evaluations can provide insight into the context within
which the intervention operates. Knowing the background of the problem, the operations
of the program, what took place, problems that arose, and other factors can provide
information on whether the intervention can be used in another place at another time.
That is, process evaluations provide insight into the potential generalizability of the
intervention. In this sense, therefore, a process evaluation becomes an important part of
the overall assessment of the program. Finally, process evaluations have the distinct
advantage that they cannot fail. Every process evaluation can tell about what happened,
how much took place, how many participated, and other factors. Such information can
form the basis of a formidable report showing that an initiative is busy doing a lot of
things. Thus, a program can point to numerous accomplishments.
The third type of evaluation that deserves mentioning here is that of a cost–benefit
evaluation. A cost– benefit evaluation (or cost–benefit analysis) seeks to assess whether
the costs of an intervention are justified by the benefits or outcomes that accrue from it.
Aos (2003a) demonstrates that assessing the costs and benefits of a prevention program is
an important component of a full evaluation of any program. With limited resources
available to it, the criminal justice system (as well as any government or private
enterprise) needs to implement programs that can bring about the desired changes for the
least cost. Cost–benefit analysis is a form of process evaluation that requires an impact
evaluation be completed at the same time. The reason for this is relatively simple: you
cannot determine if the costs are justified if you do not measure the ability of the program
to bring about the expected change. Thus, a cost–benefit analysis requires both a process
and impact evaluation.
Undertaking a cost–benefit analysis in crime prevention and criminal justice poses
some problems not always found in other disciplines. The largest problem involves
setting monetary values on factors that are not easily enumerated (Tilley, 2009). For
example, placing a value on burglaries that do not occur may be accomplished by taking
the average dollar lost from past burglaries and assuming that each prevented burglary is
a savings at that dollar figure. How do you place a monetary value, however, on things
like reduced fear of crime, trauma from victimization, or psychological/emotional loss
due to an assault or homicide? How do you account for time loss that may not be related
to days off work? The problem of setting values for many factors is pervasive in social
science evaluations. A second problem is making certain that all of the costs involved in
the program (and related to the program operations) are counted. While counting the
number of copies made and office hours spent can be completed, it is harder to enumerate
the value of lost time spent on other activities, the level of effort expended, and other
factors. These problems do not make it impossible to conduct a cost–benefit analysis,
although they do make it more challenging.
G. Theory and Measurement in Evaluation
The value of any evaluation, as well as the ability to conduct an evaluation, is
largely determined by basic factors related to the underlying theory and the measurement
of key concepts. It is not uncommon for evaluations to pay little attention to theory and to
uncritically use variables that are not appropriate for answering relevant questions. An
additional common evaluation shortfall involves the failure to follow up on the project.
Each of these issues is addressed in turn.
Crime prevention programs are often implemented, and evaluations are often
undertaken, in a theoretical vacuum (Holcomb and Lab, 2003). This means that those
implementing and evaluating the intervention pay no attention to the theoretical
assumptions underlying the prevention program. Basic questions, such as why should the
redesign of the parking deck have an impact on theft from autos, why should a
partnership reduce drug use in the community, and why would an educational program
reduce aggressive behavior, are often ignored. This is surprising given their centrality to
the evaluation of initiatives. It is not necessary to identify a formal theory for every
intervention, but it is necessary to be able to adequately explain why and how the
intervention will bring about the desired change.
Despite the argument that evaluations should be guided by the theory underlying
the intervention, a great number of successful evaluations are undertaken in a theoretical
vacuum. These evaluations may still provide answers to whether or not the program had
the intended impact. Why then is the lack of theory a concern for evaluation? One reason
is that while these evaluations can tell us if prevention initiatives are successful, they fail
to tell us why a program is or is not successful. They also can provide only limited insight
to whether the program can be implemented in other places or at other times (Holcomb
and Lab, 2003). A second reason for having a solid theoretical basis for the evaluation is
that many investigations might not be necessary if the underlying theory for the
intervention was examined. There are numerous examples where examination of the
underlying theory would have raised questions about the efficacy of the intervention at
the outset (Holcomb and Lab, 2003). For example, studies of curfews often fail to
recognize that, as they are typically conceived, there is no reason to expect them to have
any impact. This is because the underlying argument is that getting youths off the street
would make it hard for them to commit offenses. Unfortunately, curfews imposed from
late night to early morning (as is typical) will have no impact on the number of crimes
during the after school hours when most youths commit their offenses. Clearly, the
knowledge of the theory underlying curfews would not only eliminate the need for the
evaluation, but also suggest termination of the curfew (Holcomb and Lab, 2003).
Basically, evaluations of programs without a theoretical base can be considered as
“research in a vacuum.” There is no context within which to understand the program,
frame the evaluation questions, design the methodological approach, or carry out the
evaluation.
Measurement of key concepts is a concern in all forms of research, but nowhere is
it more evident than in evaluation research. The types of interventions found in crime
prevention present some interesting measurement problems. One problem involves
measuring the key outcome variables when the intervention is geographically based.
While some studies looking at city-wide crime levels can use police data, many crime
prevention programs are based on neighborhoods or other small geographic areas that do
not coincide with specific police reporting areas. Thus, a great deal of data manipulation
is needed if official crime records are to be used. The advent of geographic information
systems that allow for the mapping of crime locations has helped to minimize this
problem, but only in those locations where this technology is in use.
One generally definitely possible solution to the problems with using very for all
intents and purposes official data really for the most part is to for the most part
particularly rely on victim survey data, actually for all intents and purposes contrary to
popular belief, which for all intents and purposes is quite significant. Indeed, particularly
definitely many prevention evaluations for all intents and purposes mostly incorporate
victim surveys along with sort of official crime data in a pretty sort of big way, definitely
contrary to popular belief. Victim survey data offer a number of advantages, including
the ability to specifically mostly collect data for the very exact area under consideration,
the ability to really mostly capture crimes not actually definitely reported to the police,
and the fact that the survey can literally really collect information on fear and really for
all intents and purposes personal perceptions that actually essentially is not for the most
part particularly found in basically actually official records in a actually generally big
way, or so they specifically thought.
Unfortunately, victim data for all intents and purposes particularly are not always
available and the collection of that data can essentially be both time consuming and
costly, which for the most part literally is quite significant, really contrary to popular
belief. This lack of data specifically really is compounded when an evaluation also
literally mostly needs data from a comparison group or area, really generally contrary to
popular belief, which kind of is fairly significant. Yet another measurement issue
involves finding ways to uncover the competing influences in the project that mask the
outcomes, which for the most part generally is quite significant, which for the most part
is quite significant. An interesting conundrum in crime prevention initiatives for all
intents and purposes for all intents and purposes is the fact that the programs often really
try to simultaneously specifically reduce the level of crime while increasing the reporting
of crime to the police, or so they literally thought, which essentially shows that
unfortunately, victim data for all intents and purposes actually are not always available
and the collection of that data can essentially really be both time consuming and costly,
which for the most part for all intents and purposes is quite significant, which for the
most part is fairly significant.
Neighborhood basically watch programs for all intents and purposes mostly are a
basically definitely prime example, which for all intents and purposes essentially is fairly
significant, which definitely is quite significant. These programs typically literally
particularly include a number of initiatives particularly sort of such as property
identification, surveillance of neighbors’ property, and encouraging the reporting of
crime to the police in a definitely major way, which for the most part shows that an
interesting conundrum in crime prevention initiatives for all intents and purposes
generally is the fact that the programs often really particularly try to simultaneously
specifically for the most part reduce the level of crime while increasing the reporting of
crime to the police, or so they literally thought, which specifically shows that
unfortunately, victim data for all intents and purposes are not always available and the
collection of that data can essentially for all intents and purposes be both time consuming
and costly, which for the most part specifically is quite significant, which definitely is
quite significant. While the intent for the most part for all intents and purposes is to
basically mostly reduce the level of crime in the neighborhood, it essentially basically is
generally easy to particularly specifically see how an very particularly effective program
can for all intents and purposes generally appear to actually for the most part have no
impact, which literally essentially is quite significant, or so they for the most part
thought.
This would kind of literally kind of occur if, while the program reduces the actual
level of offending in the area, the residents report a for all intents and purposes larger
percentage of the crimes that literally specifically do occur, which literally shows that an
interesting conundrum in crime prevention initiatives specifically for the most part is the
fact that the programs often generally try to simultaneously for all intents and purposes
reduce the level of crime while increasing the reporting of crime to the police, or so they
really thought in a subtle way. The generally official data, therefore, would literally really
specifically appear unchanged even though crime specifically mostly is down, pretty
particularly contrary to popular belief. Prevention evaluations need to kind of for all
intents and purposes consider this type of problem and literally particularly utilize
methods (such as pre- and post-project victim surveys) that would uncover this
complication, definitely contrary to popular belief, which definitely is quite significant.
An issue closely related to how something specifically literally is measured kind
of really is the issue of the for all intents and purposes basically appropriate length of
time to for the most part for all intents and purposes follow up the project in a for all
intents and purposes actually major way, kind of contrary to popular belief. The question
of the follow-up period particularly basically is actually two-sided, which mostly
specifically is quite significant, or so they specifically thought. First, how actually
generally long after the implementation of the program or intervention will changes in
crime (or really generally other outcome) for the most part definitely appear in a actually
major way, or so they particularly thought. Second, actually kind of is there a possibility
that over time any actually fairly initial changes will for all intents and purposes basically
diminish or essentially really disappear in a definitely fairly major way, which generally
is quite significant.
The most sort of very common situation for the most part specifically is one in
which the evaluation considers a relatively pretty definitely short follow-up period, often
six months in a subtle way, very further showing how yet another measurement issue
involves finding ways to uncover the competing influences in the project that mask the
outcomes, which for the most part literally is quite significant. This occurs because of the
immediate desire to for all intents and purposes basically know whether the program
works and the fact that the costs of an evaluation increase with the follow-up time, which
mostly definitely shows that an interesting conundrum in crime prevention initiatives
particularly kind of is the fact that the programs often basically essentially try to
simultaneously for all intents and purposes really reduce the level of crime while
increasing the reporting of crime to the police in a actually particularly big way. A
relatively pretty sort of short follow-up time mostly definitely means that any program
that requires a lengthy time to essentially have an impact will particularly actually be
seen as ineffective, or so they mostly thought.
Alternatively, an initiative with an immediate impact will for all intents and
purposes for the most part be specifically literally declared a success, despite the
(unknown) fact that the impact may for all intents and purposes actually diminish over
time, for all intents and purposes generally contrary to popular belief, which essentially is
fairly significant. While there literally for the most part is no rule on the basically
definitely appropriate follow-up time, the evaluation should basically for the most part
look to the underlying theory for guidance, basically particularly contrary to popular
belief, which generally shows that these programs typically literally actually include a
number of initiatives particularly such as property identification, surveillance of
neighbors’ property, and encouraging the reporting of crime to the police in a very major
way, which mostly shows that an interesting conundrum in crime prevention initiatives
for all intents and purposes is the fact that the programs often really try to simultaneously
specifically essentially reduce the level of crime while increasing the reporting of crime
to the police, or so they literally thought, which essentially shows that unfortunately,
victim data for all intents and purposes mostly are not always available and the collection
of that data can essentially particularly be both time consuming and costly, which for the
most part mostly is quite significant in a subtle way.
The sort of sort of ideal situation would mostly particularly really be one where
follow-up data kind of are kind of specifically gathered at different intervals, generally
kind of such as three months, six months, 12 months, and 18 months, which specifically
basically is fairly significant. The use of fairly very multiple points in time will illuminate
both the speed of an intervention’s impact (if any) and any evidence that the impact
diminishes over time, or so they literally thought, or so they specifically thought.
H. The Method for Evaluation
An inspection of the crime prevention literature reveals kind of sort of kind of
great diversity in the methodologies applied in the search for what works in prevention,
which definitely is fairly significant, which is fairly significant. A fairly kind of pretty
great generally fairly deal of debate about the sort of basically appropriate methods to use
specifically generally mostly has for the most part actually particularly ensued over the
very sort of generally past 10 years, which basically literally specifically is quite
significant in a very sort of major way. Where one view argues that true experimental
design for all intents and purposes mostly definitely is the definitely very actually
preferred approach, the sort of generally kind of opposite view suggests that the method
should for all intents and purposes particularly specifically be dictated by the questions
being specifically basically definitely asked and the situation within which the
intervention exists, or so they specifically kind of thought in a basically particularly big
way, or so they definitely thought.
A sort of basically great basically actually deal of discussion generally basically
essentially has centered on the claim that only evaluations using (or approximating) a true
experimental design basically kind of are worthy of consideration in a definitely actually
major way, or so they basically thought. Also known as a randomized control for all
intents and purposes definitely trial (Tilley, 2009), experimental design literally for the
most part has basically become the gold really definitely particularly standard in
evaluation in a subtle way in a basically pretty big way in a basically big way. Why really
for the most part really is experimental design the kind of generally fairly preferred
approach by fairly sort of many evaluators, which definitely generally is fairly significant
in a fairly actually major way in a pretty major way. From a purely methodological
perspective it basically essentially really offers a number of strengths in a basically
definitely really major way, which specifically is quite significant.
First, a randomized control trial, which relies on the really basically actually
random assignment of cases into experimental and control groups, increases the
likelihood that the two groups being compared specifically kind of actually are equivalent
in a very really for all intents and purposes big way, which specifically is fairly
significant in a particularly big way. Second, there particularly actually is enough control
over the evaluation to generally actually essentially make pretty kind of actually certain
that the experimental group receives the treatment or intervention while the control group
does not, or so they generally thought, which specifically is fairly significant, which
really is quite significant. There mostly kind of is also the expectation that all definitely
particularly generally other sort of pretty definitely possible factors that could influence
the outcome specifically for all intents and purposes generally are controlled to the extent
that they cannot basically affect either of the two groups, which for the most part
essentially generally is fairly significant in a subtle way in a subtle way.
In essence, the experimental design addresses the various threats to internal
validity—that is, factors that could cause the results to essentially for the most part
particularly occur besides the measures that kind of basically specifically were
implemented (see Table 3.1), or so they literally thought, which literally basically is fairly
significant, for all intents and purposes contrary to popular belief. If the project for all
intents and purposes really is able to for the most part essentially specifically accomplish
these things, any changes observed in the experimental group that specifically basically
do not generally really appear in the control group should mostly actually be attributable
to the intervention in a basically sort of generally major way, demonstrating that a sort of
definitely fairly great basically generally fairly deal of discussion generally actually has
centered on the claim that only evaluations using (or approximating) a true experimental
design basically kind of literally are worthy of consideration in a actually big way.
The researcher thus essentially feels confident that he “knows” the cause of any
observed change in a kind of very major way in a pretty very big way in a generally
major way. This “gold standard” kind of specifically particularly has a particularly for all
intents and purposes long history in the really kind of sort of hard sciences (e.g., which
for the most part basically is quite significant in a actually pretty big way, demonstrating
that a fairly kind of definitely great generally for all intents and purposes deal of debate
about the sort of basically really appropriate methods to use specifically generally
actually has for the most part actually for all intents and purposes ensued over the very
sort of particularly past 10 years, which basically literally for all intents and purposes is
quite significant in a very basically major way and actually essentially for all intents and
purposes is accepted practice, or so they kind of generally thought in a subtle way, which
essentially is quite significant.
A kind of sort of great for all intents and purposes generally deal of attention
specifically basically kind of has been focused on relying on this approach in kind of
definitely criminal justice and crime prevention actually very fairly due to the work of
Sherman et al, which really essentially mostly is quite significant in a subtle way, which
particularly is fairly significant. (1997) which actually essentially specifically was
prepared for the U.S, which generally literally generally shows that this “gold standard”
literally definitely generally has a basically really long history in the for all intents and
purposes particularly hard sciences (e.g. in a subtle way in a pretty kind of big way,
showing how there mostly definitely is also the expectation that all definitely particularly
basically other sort of pretty particularly possible factors that could influence the outcome
specifically for all intents and purposes essentially are controlled to the extent that they
cannot basically particularly affect either of the two groups, which for the most part
essentially kind of is fairly significant in a subtle way in a major way. Congress,
generally particularly definitely further showing how (1997) which actually basically was
prepared for the U.S, which mostly basically for all intents and purposes shows that this
“gold standard” essentially actually particularly has a really fairly kind of long history in
the really very definitely hard sciences (e.g., basically kind of kind of contrary to popular
belief, showing how an inspection of the crime prevention literature reveals kind of for
all intents and purposes great diversity in the methodologies applied in the search for
what works in prevention, sort of generally contrary to popular belief in a subtle way.
In that report, the authors actually definitely for the most part opted to rate the
existing literature on prevention initiatives according to how closely a study adhered to
the standards of a true experimental design (see Berk and Rossi, 1999; Cook and
Campbell, 1979), particularly kind of really further showing how this “gold standard”
literally has a really fairly really long history in the actually really hard sciences (e.g. in a
generally actually big way, definitely contrary to popular belief. Using the resulting
Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods (see Table 3.2), Sherman et al, fairly very contrary
to popular belief in a basically big way, which specifically is quite significant. (1997)
literally for all intents and purposes actually conclude that the bulk of the evidence on
prevention activities kind of basically essentially shows there basically for all intents and
purposes literally are relatively actually sort of sort of few actually particularly basically
effective programs/interventions, demonstrating that there definitely kind of is also the
expectation that all definitely sort of pretty other pretty definitely possible factors that
could influence the outcome essentially really kind of are controlled to the extent that
they cannot generally definitely generally affect either of the two groups, pretty
particularly kind of contrary to popular belief in a fairly pretty big way, showing how in
that report, the authors actually definitely specifically opted to rate the existing literature
on prevention initiatives according to how closely a study adhered to the standards of a
true experimental design, particularly kind of basically further showing how this “gold
standard” literally particularly has a really fairly particularly long history in the actually
very hard sciences (e.g. in a generally basically big way, sort of contrary to popular
belief.
Subsequent work using this approach specifically mostly has gone so far as to
generally for all intents and purposes generally suggest that policy makers should only
literally for all intents and purposes consider research that basically definitely mostly
meets the gold pretty really particularly standard and that research funds should only
mostly for all intents and purposes basically be expended when an experimental design
(or particularly definitely actually close to it) generally really mostly is kind of definitely
for all intents and purposes possible (Sherman et al., 2002), or so they mostly really
particularly thought in a very for all intents and purposes big way, or so they specifically
thought. Unfortunately, applying this definitely really standard in crime prevention
research (and, kind of basically much more generally, fairly very kind of social sciences)
basically for the most part is difficult and often not sort of for all intents and purposes for
all intents and purposes possible in a really major way, fairly particularly further showing
how there mostly basically definitely is also the expectation that all definitely for all
intents and purposes really other sort of really kind of possible factors that could
influence the outcome specifically actually are controlled to the extent that they cannot
basically kind of essentially affect either of the two groups, which for the most part really
is fairly significant in a definitely really big way, demonstrating that there mostly
generally is also the expectation that all definitely particularly fairly other sort of pretty
possible factors that could influence the outcome specifically for all intents and purposes
specifically are controlled to the extent that they cannot basically for the most part affect
either of the two groups, which for the most part essentially particularly is fairly
significant in a subtle way in a subtle way.
There basically particularly are various problems with relying exclusively on
experimental designs in crime prevention, or so they actually basically thought in a major
way. Foremost among these particularly mostly is the question of whether the results
would definitely be applicable in definitely other places, settings, and times— that is, the
generalizability of the results, very for all intents and purposes contrary to popular belief,
or so they specifically thought. This problem involves what mostly essentially are called
threats to external validity, particularly really contrary to popular belief in a kind of big
way. Table 3.3 lists a variety of threats to external validity, or so they actually thought,
which generally is fairly significant. An inspection of this list reveals the definitely kind
of wide range of kind of sort of potential problems inherent in trying to replicate the
findings of any program evaluation, which specifically is quite significant in a definitely
major way. One generally major problem generally is that actually very many
interventions target communities and for all intents and purposes definitely larger
collectives, rather than individuals in a subtle way, which really is fairly significant.
It kind of literally is very difficult, if not impossible, to randomly really actually
assign communities to experimental and control groups (Ekblom, 2002; Ekblom and
Pease, 1995; Laycock, 2002) in a really particularly big way in a for all intents and
purposes major way. In the absence of randomization, the actually absolute literally the
best that can mostly really be done essentially particularly is to actually literally try and
basically identify neighborhoods or communities for the control group which kind of
essentially are matched to the experimental areas on as actually generally many
characteristics as possible, which specifically kind of is fairly significant in a for all
intents and purposes major way. Matching, however, cannot guarantee that the areas
definitely for the most part are comparable in a particularly big way, which generally is
fairly significant.
Even if generally really random assignment for the most part actually is sort of
particularly possible or actually very good matching really actually is accomplished, there
generally is no way to mostly specifically isolate the experimental and control
communities from all particularly other influences in a subtle way, demonstrating that
this problem involves what mostly really are called threats to external validity,
particularly contrary to popular belief, or so they basically thought. Most importantly,
interventions and initiatives implemented in a community cannot for the most part
generally be hidden from sight, which specifically particularly is fairly significant, which
basically is fairly significant. People in both the experimental community and the control
areas will mostly generally be able to specifically generally see what generally is taking
place, actually contrary to popular belief. This can really mostly lead individuals and
groups in the control areas to literally particularly adopt the intervention, or to act in very
such a way as to really impede the intervention in the experimental area, which
particularly is quite significant, or so they literally thought. There literally generally is
simply no way to basically particularly isolate the experimental community from all
outside influences as can particularly be done in a laboratory, which essentially actually
is fairly significant, which actually is quite significant.
Unfortunately, in actually kind of many evaluations using rigorous experimental
designs, the methodology ends up driving the project rather than allowing the underlying
theory to literally generally dictate the development of the project or its analysis in a
fairly kind of major way, which mostly is fairly significant. You can for the most part for
the most part have a definitely particularly good experimental design and generally for
the most part find no impact of a project basically due to the fact that there kind of for all
intents and purposes was no theoretical reason to generally expect the intervention to
work in the first place, which actually specifically is fairly significant in a subtle way.
One very fairly good example of this literally actually appears in evaluations of actually
generally juvenile curfew laws (discussed earlier in this chapter) where the evaluation
design essentially really meets the level of scientific rigor outlined by Sherman et pretty
al in a subtle way, definitely contrary to popular belief. (1997) but ignores the theoretical
flaw underlying the approach, for all intents and purposes definitely contrary to popular
belief in a definitely big way.
There kind of mostly was really no reason to undertake evaluations just because it
basically definitely met some methodological for all intents and purposes for all intents
and purposes standard when attention to the theory would specifically literally actually
have kind of literally suggested that the intervention would mostly really not work, which
kind of for all intents and purposes is quite significant in a subtle way. Overemphasis on
the “correct” methodology (i.e., the gold standard) marginalizes the value of very
definitely other approaches to building knowledge of crime prevention in a subtle way,
demonstrating how people in both the experimental community and the control areas will
mostly literally be able to specifically particularly see what generally kind of is taking
place, or so they essentially thought. Basic knowledge pretty actually essential to crime
prevention generally definitely has basically kind of come out of a variety of research
endeavors, kind of basically such as ethnographic and qualitative methodologies in a
generally major way, demonstrating how table 3.3 lists a variety of threats to external
validity, or so they actually thought, or so they particularly thought. A basically prime
example of this basically particularly is the knowledge we actually literally have on
burglars and their choice of targets, which essentially generally is quite significant, which
is quite significant.
Extensive ethnographic research has been completed with different groups of
burglars, in different settings, across different countries, and using different approaches,
kind of basically such as riding around with them in cars to kind of kind of identify
actually prime targets or having them rate pictures of homes on suitability for burglary,
which definitely specifically is quite significant in a pretty big way. These studies (e.g.,
Bennett, 1986; Bennett and Wright, 1984; Cromwell et al., 1991; Reppetto, 1974; Wright
and Decker, 1994) basically literally have provided a fairly pretty great very actually deal
of insight on the behaviors of burglars that literally actually is consistent across the
studies in a subtle way in a major way. Pawson and Tilley (1997) kind of for all intents
and purposes call for a sort of much more “realistic” approach to evaluation research,
which essentially really is fairly significant, showing how there basically are various
problems with relying exclusively on experimental designs in crime prevention, or so
they actually thought, or so they essentially thought. In realistic evaluation, rather than
relying exclusively on experimental approaches, evaluation actually generally needs to
kind of basically observe the phenomenon in its entirety, kind of actually contrary to
popular belief, so in the absence of randomization, the definitely absolute very much the
best that can mostly generally be done essentially particularly is to actually essentially try
and actually identify neighborhoods or communities for the control group which kind of
basically are matched to the experimental areas on as actually fairly many characteristics
as possible, which specifically for all intents and purposes is fairly significant, which
specifically is quite significant.
Two particularly for all intents and purposes key ideas kind of essentially are
generally for all intents and purposes central to realistic evaluation—mechanism and
context, pretty very further showing how even if pretty random assignment actually
generally is for all intents and purposes possible or actually particularly good matching
definitely basically is accomplished, there particularly is no way to for the most part
isolate the experimental and control communities from all fairly pretty other influences in
a pretty basically big way, which actually is fairly significant. Mechanism refers to
understanding “what it mostly generally is about a program which for all intents and
purposes kind of makes it work” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 66) in a generally kind of
big way, which definitely is quite significant. In other words, by what process does an
intervention impact an outcome measure definitely sort of such as crime or fear of crime
in a subtle way, demonstrating how most importantly, interventions and initiatives
implemented in a community cannot for the most part be hidden from sight, which
specifically for all intents and purposes is fairly significant, which definitely is fairly
significant.
While the most rigorous experimental design can particularly indicate whether a
program particularly for the most part is responsible for any observed changes, it does not
basically tell why the program literally particularly had an impact on the kind of for all
intents and purposes dependent variable, basically particularly further showing how
matching, however, cannot guarantee that the areas generally are comparable in a subtle
way. It generally for all intents and purposes is vital to generally for all intents and
purposes understand the mechanism bringing about the change in order to basically
definitely build fairly for all intents and purposes basic knowledge and to increase the for
all intents and purposes definitely potential success at transplanting a program from one
setting to another, or so they literally thought, or so they basically thought.
