ADJUDICATORY HEARING
A. Burden of Proof :
The State must prove allegations of abuse, neglect, or dependence by a
preponderance of the evidence and should the State fail to do so; the Court must dismiss
the petition. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 343, 730 N.E.2d 1086 (2000); In re Urbasek, 38
Ill.2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967); In re A.D.W., 278 Ill. App. 3d 476, 663 N.E.2d 58
(4th Dist. 1996) (dependency); 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1) The burden of proof lies with the
State or moving party. In re Nitz, 76 Ill. App. 3d 15, 394 N.E.2d 887 (3rd Dist. 1979); In
re Simmons, 127 Ill. App. 3d 943, 469 N.E.2d 215 (5th Dist. 1984) The State must
demonstrate that an allegation of neglect is probably more true than not. In re L.M., 319
Ill. App. 3d 865, 747 N.E.2d 440 (2001) "By a preponderance of the evidence is meant
the greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily in numbers of witnesses, but in merit
and worth that which has more evidence for it than against it is said to be proven by a
preponderance. The standard of proof and rules of evidence in the nature of civil
proceedings are applicable at an adjudicatory hearing. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1)
Preponderance of the evidence is sufficient if it inclines an impartial and reasonable mind
to one side rather than the other. Compare New York Life Insurance Co. v.
Jennings/Williams v. City of Atlanta, 61 Ga. App. 577, 6 S.E.2d 915(1940)** (Moss-
American, Inc. v. Fair Employment Practices Com., 22 Ill. App. 3d 248, 259, 317 N.E.2d
343(5th Dist. 1974)) A proposition proved by a preponderance of the evidence is one that
has been found to be more probably true than not. See generally Estate of Ragen, 79 Ill.
App. 3d 8, 13, 398 N.E.2d 198 (1st Dist. 1979)
The ICWA provides that a court may order an involuntary foster care placement
only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence, including the testimony of
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian
custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 25 USC
§1912(e) It provides as follows:
“No foster care placement may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a
determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified
expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” 25 USC §1912(e)
B. Rule(s) of Evidence :
The first step is the adjudicatory hearing on a petition for adjudication of
wardship at which "the court shall first consider only the question whether the minor is
abused, neglected, or dependent." 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) The civil rules of evidence
apply to adjudicatory hearings in child abuse, neglect, and dependency cases. 705 ILCS
405/2-18(1) Dependency, neglect and abuse proceedings are "appropriately labeled as
'civil' proceedings in both the legal and lay sense of the word." In re Darnell Jr., 196 Ill.
App. 3d 510, 554 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist. 1990) citing In re Urbasek, 38 Ill.2d 535, 543,
232 N.E.2d 716 (1967) see In re Christenberry, 69 Ill. App. 3d 565, 567, 387 N.E.2d 923
(1st Dist. 1979) (civil rules apply to post-trial motions); In re Harpman, 134 Ill. App. 3d
393, 396, 480 N.E.2d 873 (4th Dist. 1985) (civil rules apply to pleading standards);
People v. Davis, 11 Ill. App. 3d 775, 778-79, 298 N.E.2d 350 (1st Dist.1973) (civil rules
apply to testimony of adverse witnesses) In making that determination of abuse, neglect
or dependency, the rules of evidence in the nature of civil proceedings apply. In re A.W.,
Jr., 231 Ill. 2d 241, 256, 897 N.E.2d at 741(2008); In re J.B., 346 Ill. App. 3d 77, 803
N.E.2d 997 (1st Dist. 2004); In re R.V., 288 Ill. App. 3d 860, 681 N.E.2d 660 (1st Dist.
1997); People v. Davis, 11 Ill. App. 3d 775, 298 N.E.2d 350 (1st Dist. 1973); 705 ILCS
405/2-18(1) Under the Illinois Rules of Evidence, hearsay is inadmissible unless
otherwise allowed by other rule or statute. Ill. R. Evid. 802 Of course, testimony about an
out-of-court statement which is used for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement is not hearsay. People v. Williams, 181 Ill.2d 297, 313,
692 N.E.2d 1109 (1998) Sections 2-18 of the JCA modifies the general rules of evidence
of admissibility of evidence at the adjudicatory hearing. 705 ILCS 405/2-18
Part of section 2-18 allows for the admission of certain business or medical
records. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) Section 2-18(4) provides that where it is established
that the medical record is that of a hospital, public agency or private agency, the JCA
dispenses with the requirement that a custodian or person familiar with the “business”
provide in-court testimony establishing the foundational requirements of a business
record. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) Instead, the Juvenile Court Act merely requires a
certification by the head or responsible employee or certified designee thereof of the
hospital or agency that the writing or record is the full and complete record of the
condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event and that it satisfies the conditions that the
document(s) was (were) made in the regular course of the business of the hospital or
agency and that it was in the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the
act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter. 705 ILCS
405/2-18(4)(a) When certification of a record under §2-18(4)(a) of the JCA is incorrect or
incomplete, the attorney should object and be prepared to challenge that the records are
not authentic, are incomplete or altered. See In re Charles W., 2014 IL App. (1st) 131281,
6 N.E.3d 399 (1st Dist. 2014) An “agency” under the JCA means a public or private child
care facility legally authorized or licensed by the State for both placement or institutional
care. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(3)
It remains unsettled whether or not §2-18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act applies
strictly to abuse or neglect proceedings. In re Charles W., 2014 IL App. (1st) 131281, 6
N.E.3d 399 (1st Dist. 2014) (Section 2-18(4)(c) applies to abuse, neglect and dependency
proceedings); In re I.H., 238 Ill.2d 430, 939 N.E.2d 375 (2010)(Because the court is not
making a finding of abuse or neglect at a temporary custody hearing, §2-18(4)(c) of the
JCA does not apply to a minor’s out-of-court statement in the temporary custody hearing)
Until In re J.Y., 2011 Ill. App. 3d 100727, 962 N.E.2d 1 (3rd Dist. 2011), the
admissibility of Pediatric Resource Center (“PRC”) letters/reports had not been directly
addressed. In re J.Y. did reject the wholesale admission of PRC medical opinion
letters/records absent proper foundation. It was subsequently determined that such PRC
records were not business records and, therefore, not admissible under §2-18(4) of the
JCA. In re A.P. & J.P., 2012 Ill. App. 3d 110191, 965 N.E.2d 441 (3rd Dist. 2012) aff’d
In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, 981 N.E.2d 336 (2012)
Because this is a civil proceeding, the State or moving party may call the
respondent parent(s) or guardian(s) as adverse witnesses. Compare People v. Davis , 11
Ill. App. 3d 775, 298 N.E.2d 350 (1st Dist. 1973); In re Wheeler, 86 Ill. App. 3d 564, 408
N.E.2d 424 (3rd Dist. 1980) A finding as to what is in the best interest of the child at the
adjudicatory stage is premature. In re N.B., 191 Ill.2d 338, 343, 730 N.E.2d 1086 (2000)
The test to be applied in determining if a matter is collateral is whether the matter
could be introduced for any purpose other than to contradict. In re Julie Q. v. DCFS, 2011
IL App (2d) 100643, 963 N.E.2d 401 (2nd Dist. 2011) ¶50 citing People v. Santos, 211
Ill.2d 395, 404, 813 N.E.2d 159 (2004)
Stipulation to the wardship petition can support a finding of neglect. In re R.B.,
336 Ill. App. 3d 606, 714 N.E.2d 400 (4th Dist. 2003) Similarly, an admission by a parent
or guardian is admissible evidence. In re Walter B., 227 Ill. App. 3d 746, 592 N.E.2d
274 (1st Dist. 1992); In re Jackson, 81 Ill. App. 3d 136, 400 N.E.2d 1087 (4th Dist. 1980);
In re Johnson, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 429 N.E.2d 1364 (1st Dist. 1981) but see 705 ILCS
405/2-10(2)(“Acceptance of services shall not be considered an admission of any
allegation in a petition made pursuant to this Act, nor may a referral for services be
considered as evidence in any proceeding pursuant to this Act. . .”) A stipulation by the
child’s parent, Indian custodian, or tribe, or a failure to object, may waive the
requirement of producing evidence of the likelihood of serious damage only if the court is
satisfied that the party has been fully advised of the requirements of the ICWA and has
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them.
C. Admissible Evidence :
Generally:
All evidence must be relevant to be admissible. In re Kenneth J., 352 Ill. App. 3d
967, 980, 817 N.E.2d 940, 950 (1st Dist. 2004) Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove a
fact in controversy or render a matter at issue more or less probable. In re Kenneth J., 352
Ill. App. 3d 967, 980, 817 N.E.2d 940, 950 (2004) “Admissible evidence” under the JCA
is not synonymous with “prima facie evidence.” In re S.R., 349 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 811
N.E.2d 1285 (4th Dist. 2004) "[A]dmissible evidence" means some evidence, but not
necessarily sufficient evidence to prove the allegation. In re S.R., 349 Ill. App. 3d 1017,
811 N.E.2d 1285 (4th Dist. 2004) Evidence of any words spoken must be presented in
context. In re E.M., 328 Ill. App. 3d 633, 641, 766 N.E.2d 1149 (4th Dist. 2002) Evidence
of good character would be admissible in favor of a parent. In re Morris, 331 Ill. App.
417, 73 N.E.2d 337 (1947); In re B.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 193, 735 N.E.2d 1058 (4th Dist.
2000) Also, grounds for finding of unfitness under Adoption Act may be admissible. 705
ILCS 405/2-18(1)
Section 2-3 of the Act describes what constitutes neglect and abuse. 705 ILCS
405/2-3 In so doing, §2-3 describes what may be admissible to prove abuse or neglect.
For example, §2-3 provides that “any newborn infant whose blood, urine, or meconium
contains any amount of a controlled substance as defined in subsection (f) of Section 102
of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, as now or hereafter amended, or a metabolite of
a controlled substance, with the exception of controlled substances or metabolites of such
substances, the presence of which in the newborn infant is the result of medical treatment
administered to the mother or the newborn infant. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(c) Additionally,
§2-3 indicates what evidence may be considered in assessing whether a minor was
improperly left without proper supervision. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(e) Similarly, general
factors that may be considered to establish abuse of a minor is set forth in §2-3 of the
Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)
Anticipatory Neglect:
Section 2-18(3) of JCA provides that proof of neglect as to one minor is admissible
on the issue of neglect of any other minor for whom the parent is responsible. 705 ILCS
405/2-18(3) It is this section that has given rise to the theory of “anticipatory neglect.” Under
the theory of “anticipatory neglect,” the State seeks to protect not only children who are the
direct victims of neglect or abuse, but also those who have a probability to be subject to
neglect or abuse because they reside, or in the future may reside, with an individual who has
been found to have neglected or abused another child. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3); In re Arthur H.,
212 Ill.2d 441, 819 N.E.2d 734 (2004) Thus proof of neglect or abuse or dependency of one
minor may be admitted as evidence of another minor in the household. However, the mere
admissibility of evidence does not constitute conclusive proof of neglect of another minor. In
re Arthur H., 212 Ill.2d 441, 468, 819 N.E.2d 734, 750 (2004) Anticipatory neglect should
take into account not only the circumstances surrounding the previously neglected sibling,
but also the care and condition of the child named in the petition. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill.2d
441, 468, 819 N.E.2d 734, 750 (2004) There is no per se rule that the neglect of one child
conclusively establishes the neglect of another child in the same household. In re Arthur H.,
212 Ill.2d 441, 468, 819 N.E.2d 734, 750 (2004); In re J.C., 396 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1056-57,
920 N.E.2d 1285, 1290-91 (3rd Dist. 2009) Also, just as a prior neglect finding is not
evidence of per se neglect of another child (Arthur H., 212 Ill.2d at 468, 819 N.E.2d at 749),
prior finding of unfitness does not prove per se neglect. (See In re A.W., 231 Ill.2d at
105, 896 N.E.2d at 324 (2008) (affirming finding of unfitness where respondent had been
previously found unfit and failed to produce evidence that he had taken steps to correct
the conditions that led to the previous unfitness determination); compare also In re D.C.,
209 Ill.2d 287, 807 N.E.2d 472, 478-80 (2004) (rejecting State's argument that "unfitness
as to one child is unfitness as to all" and holding that when deciding whether a parent is
unfit under section 1(D)(m)(iii) of the Adoption Act courts must find "clear and
convincing evidence of a lack of reasonable progress during the applicable time period
with respect to each child")
When the treatment of the minor’s siblings is employed as a basis for finding
neglect, the trial court should consider the current care and condition of the child in
question and not merely the circumstances that existed at the time of the incident
involving the child’s sibling. In re S.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d 121, 728 N.E.2d 1165 (2nd Dist.
2000) citing Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d 18, 657 N.E.2d 78 (1st Dist. 1995)
Change in Minor’s Condition/Failure to Thrive/Medical Neglect :
Proof that a minor’s condition improved or impairment lessened when the minor
was no longer in the care, custody or supervision of the respondent parent or guardian but
in someone else’s care could be introduced as evidence that the respondent parent or
guardian failed to exercise a minimum degree of care toward the minor. 705 ILCS 405/2-
18(4) see also In re Prough, 61 Ill. App. 3d 227, 376 N.E.2d 1078 (4th Dist. 1978); In re
Dalton, 98 Ill. App. 3d 902, 424 N.E.2d 1226 (2nd Dist. 1981) However, the mere fact
that a child had medical diagnosis of failure to thrive syndrome constituting prima facie
evidence of neglect was rebutted by showing that the mother had adequate and
appropriate food in the home and there were independent observations of minor’s
propensity to reject food and other potential causes for weight loss were possible for
which parent sought medical treatment. In re Barion S., 2012 Ill. App. (1st) 113026, 983
N.E.2d 57 (1st Dist. 2012) There is no statutory requirement that requires a finding of
medical neglect to be supported by expert medical testimony. In re Erin A., 2012 IL App
(1st) 120050 (1st Dist. 2012) Evidence of missed medical appointments and failure to
comply with treatment suggestions may be admitted to evidence of medical neglect. See
In re Stephen K., 373 Ill. App. 3d at 20-21 (1st Dist. 2007); In re N., 309 Ill. App. 3d 996,
1006-1009, 723 N.E.2d 678 (2nd Dist. 1999) It is noteworthy that proof of the failure to
thrive of one child may not always provide sufficient grounds for finding neglect as to
other children where there has been sufficient evidence presented to show that the other
children were not neglected. Compare In re Edaward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 799
N.E.2d 304 (1st Dist. 2003)
Rebuttable Presumptions/ prima facie Evidence :
Prima facie evidence means "[e]vidence that will establish a fact or sustain a
judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced.” In re S.R., 349 Ill. App. 3d 1017,
811 N.E.2d 1285 (4th Dist. 2004) citing Black's Law Dictionary 579 (7th ed.1999)
Presumptions of neglect or abuse created by prima facie evidence only creates a
rebuttable presumption that may be overcome by other evidence. In re K.G., 288 Ill. App.
3d 728, 682 N.E.2d 95 (1st Dist. 1997); In re Edrika C., 276 Ill. App. 3d 18, 657 N.E.2d 78
(1st Dist. 1995) A presumption is a legal device that either permits or requires the fact finder
to assume the existence of an ultimate fact, after basic or predicate facts have been
established. People v. Pomykala, 203 Ill.2d 198, 203, 784 N.E.2d 784, 787 (2003) The phrase
“rebuttable presumption” is defined as “an inference drawn from certain facts that establishes
a prima facie case, which may be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence. People
v. Jordan, 354 Ill. App. 3d 294, 820 N.E.2d 1083 (1st Dist. 2004) citing Black’s Law
Dictionary 1205 (7th Ed. 1999) It appears that a rebuttable presumption must be overcome by
whatever burden of proof is required of the case and chief. See example In re C.M.J., 278 Ill.
App. 3d 885, 663 N.E.2d 498 (5th Dist. 1996) (Upon showing that Respondent was convicted
of first degree murder of the mother of his children, the burden shifted to respondent to show
by clear and convincing evidence that he was not unfit) see also In re Alyssa Jo B., 354 Ill.
App. 3d 1173, 883 N.E.2d 1155 (3rd Dist. 2005) (rebuttable presumption may only be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence)
The United States Supreme Court has held that mandatory conclusive
presumptions do not pass constitutional muster because such presumptions directly
conflict with the presumption of innocence. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523,
99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979) Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has held that mandatory
rebuttable presumptions that shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant are per se
unconstitutional as they alleviate the State’s burden to prove every element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523, 99 S.Ct. 2450
(1979) Therefore, in Illinois all mandatory rebuttable presumptions are considered to be
per se unconstitutional. People v. Watts, 181 Ill.2d 133, 692 N.E.2d 315 (1998); People
v. Pomykala, 203 Ill.2d 198, 203, 784 N.E.2d 784, 787 (2003); People v. Jordan, 354 Ill.
App. 3d 294, 820 N.E.2d 1083 (1st Dist. 2004) An impermissible mandatory presumption
may be created notwithstanding that the language of the statute does not contain the word
“shall but provides that there is a “rebuttable presumption.” People v. Jordan, 354 Ill.
App. 3d 294, 820 N.E.2d 1083 (1st Dist. 2004)
Evidence that a minor subject to compulsory school attendance is a chronic truant
raises a rebuttable presumption of neglect. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(5) Section 2-18(2) of the
JCA sets forth various medical conditions/diagnosis and drug related situations that if
proven by a preponderance of the evidence constitutes prima facie evidence of abuse or
neglect. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(2) Additionally, section 2-18(2)(e) addresses unexplained
injuries or conditions of a minor on what might be commonly equated to a res ipsa
loquitur type of situation (e.g., child with sexually transmitted disease and no blood
transfusion, etc.). 705 ILCS 405/2-18(2)(e)
In the “extremely few” Illinois cases in which a summary determination of unfitness
has been upheld, almost all of those cases involved a judgment of unfitness based on the fact
that the parent had committed a crime that serves as a per se factor establishing parental
unfitness. In re J.B., 328 Ill. App. 3d 175, 765 N.E.2d 1093 (1st Dist. 2002) citing In re T.J.,
319 Ill. App. 3d 661, 745 N.E.2d 608 (2001); In re Ray, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 411 N.E.2d 88
(1980) (murder of one of parent’s children); In re J.H., 292
Ill. App. 3d at 1103, 687 N.E.2d 105 (1997) (murder of any child); In re A.M.F., 311 Ill.
App. 3d 1049, 726 N.E.2d 661 (2000) (aggravated battery to a child) The First District Court
of Appeals has determined that there can be per se factors for finding of unfitness as a matter
of law under the Adoption Act. In re J.B., 328 Ill. App. 3d 175, 765 N.E.2d 1093 (1st Dist.
2002) citing In re T.J., 319 Ill. App. 3d 661, 745 N.E.2d 608 (2001) However, the question of
whether the per se factor is narrowly tailored to express the State’s interest in protecting
children from abuse and whether it is the minor’s best interest to terminate parental rights
remains open for consideration. In re J.B., 328 Ill. App. 3d 175, 765 N.E.2d 1093 (1st Dist.
2002) citing In re T.J., 319 Ill. App. 3d 661, 745 N.E.2d 608 (2001)
Judicial Notice:
Courts may take judicial notice of matters of record in its own proceedings. In re
J.R.Y., 157 Ill. App. 3d 396, 510 N.E.2d 541 (4th Dist. 1987) citing People v. Knight, 75
Ill. 2d 291, 296, 388 N.E.2d 414, 417 (1979); People v. Davis, 65 Ill. 2d 157, 161, 357
N.E.2d 792, 794 (1976) The Juvenile Court may take judicial notice of sworn testimony
from any hearing under the JCA involving the same minor where the parties were
represented by counsel or waived counsel and it would not result in the admission of
prohibited hearsay. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(6) compare In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227, 719
N.E.2d 348 (2nd Dist. 1999) (termination/ adoption); In re H.C., 305 Ill. App. 3d 869, 713
N.E.2d 784 (4th Dist. 1999) Trial court can take judicial notice of matters sua sponte. In
re C.M.J., 278 Ill. App. 3d 885, 663 N.E.2d 498 (5th Dist. 1996) (court took judicial
notice of murder conviction and earlier evidence in juvenile proceeding identifying
victim as mother of children) It is incumbent upon the party opposing the taking of
judicial notice to make an objection. In re A.T., 197 Ill. App. 3d 821, 555 N.E.2d 402 (4th
Dist. 1990) citing In re Johnson, 134 Ill. App. 3d 365, 480 N.E.2d 520 (4th Dist. 1985)
Although the juvenile court has a duty to consider a child’s best interest in
proceedings under the JCA, the JCA does not impose any obligation on the court to do its
own factual investigation. In re S.R., 349 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 811 N.E.2d 1285 (4th Dist.
2004) citing In re D.S., 198 Ill.2d 309, 324, 763 N.E.2d 251, 259 (2001); In re Ashley F.,
265 Ill. App. 3d 419, 424, 638 N.E.2d 368, 371 (1st Dist. 1994); 705 ILCS 405/1-1
through 7-1.
Post-Petition Evidence:
Neither the Juvenile Court Act nor any case law mandates that evidence from
after a petition for adjudication is filed is irrelevant at the adjudicatory hearing. The
Juvenile Court Act states that in all proceedings, "the court may direct the course thereof
so as promptly to ascertain the jurisdictional facts and fully to gather information bearing
upon the current condition and future welfare of the minors involved.” 705 ILCS 405/1-
2(2) The Act also states that at an adjudicatory hearing, the court shall "first consider
only the question whether the minor is abused, neglected or dependent.” 705 ILCS 405/2-
18(1) A case proceeding on a theory of anticipatory neglect by its very nature [276 Ill.
App. 3d 32] seems to require considering the present and the future care of the child at
the adjudicatory phase. For example, in In re Brooks, several witnesses testified at the
adjudicatory hearing about how the minors were relating to their parents for months after
the original petitions in the case were filed. In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, 379 N.E.2d
872 (1st Dist. 1978) see also In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d 18, 657 N.E.2d 78 (1st
Dist. 1995)(“ Respondent persuasively argues that the court below conducted the trial
with a bright-line rule that any post-petition evidence was irrelevant. The petitions were
filed on December 2, 1992, and the court repeatedly made comments like: "I certainly
don't see what the relevance would be of anything that happened after the day of the
petition." The court also sustained several objections made solely on the basis that the
testimony concerned "information after the petitions in this case were filed.") The test of
admissibility of post-petition evidence will depend on whether it is relevant to the
allegations of the petition. In re Kenneth D., 364 Ill. App. 3d 797, 847 N.E.2d 544 (1st
Dist. 2006) citing In re S.W., 342 Ill. App. 3d at 451, 794 N.E.2d at 1042 (2003); In re
Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 799 N.E.2d 304 (2003) (Expert evidence on improving
health of child in inorganic failure to thrive)
Sui Generis :
Cases involving an adjudication of wardship are sui generis, and each case must
ultimately be decided on the basis of its own particular facts. In re M.Z., 294 Ill. App. 3d
581, 691 N.E.2d 35 (1998)
D. Directed Finding :
When a motion for a directed finding is made, the trial court must determine
whether the plaintiff (State) has made out a prima facie case and then weigh the evidence,
including the evidence that favors the defendant (respondent). If this weighing process
negates some of the evidence necessary to the petitioner’s prima facie case, the court
should grant respondent’s motion and enter judgment for the respondent. Compare
Orbeta v. Gomez, 315 Ill. App. 3d 687, 690, 733 N.E.2d 1287 (2000) see also Dwyer v.
Love, 346 Ill. App. 3d 734, 805 N.E.2d 719 (2nd Dist. 2004) (trial court does not view the
evidence most favorably to the petitioner); 735 ILCS 5/2-1110.
