Emerging Agricultural Policy Formulation Processes
The emergent phases in the political and economic policy environment in Kenya as presented
by (Smith and Karuga 2004) can be seen as a reflection of the changing roles for various
actors, institutions and processes in agricultural policy initiation, formulation and
implementation. On that basis, five plausible forms of policy initiation and formulation
process can be distinguished. They include bureaucratic initiatives both requiring and those
not requiring cabinet approval; executive directives; budget policy decisions; other domestic
policy initiatives; and external policy initiatives.
At the bureaucratic level, like at the directorate or permanent secretary level, a number of
policies are initiated, formulated and approved by the minister. Before 1985, it is claimed;
most policy formulations were bureaucratic at this level. Inter-ministerial co-ordination at the
permanent secretary (PS) level with adequate consolations with the Treasury for the
allocation of funds for their implementation predominated. Over the years, however, this
approach to policy initiation and implementation has been continuously abandoned. There
are also some important policy decisions initiated by the bureaucrats but which need them to
write a cabinet paper for their approval. Policy initiatives that need new legislation or major
changes in existing legislation before they are implemented would require that they be
approved by parliament, accompanied by the release of a Sessional Paper.
Some policy decisions are executive presidential directives with the role of the technocrats
being to accommodate them within the resource envelope and methodology of
implementation. Commonly, such decrees are based on vested interests or are reactions by
the president or executive to either previous or perceived crises. The bureaucracy thus simply
rubber stamps the directives.
Policy decisions directly linked to resources are embodied in the government annual budget.
The budget represents a summary of presentations made by ministries as to the programs and
projects for funding in the evolving fiscal year. It will thus entail policy decisions of every
ministry. They are usually likely to be implemented because they have resource allocations
attached for their implementation. Any policy, therefore, requiring government resources and
approval to be implemented, must be accorded due recognition in the budget.
Policy decisions affecting agriculture are also made during the budget preparation
process. The medium term budgetary expenditure framework (MTEF) budgetary process that
the country adopted in 2001 has an elaborate process through which concerned ministries lay
out their policy framework to their budget and plan. The ministry of agriculture (MOA) has
to make policy decisions it perceives can best enable it achieve its objectives, not only
annually but also in the medium term that captures two outer fiscal years. This should make
annual policy proposals for which resources should be allocated be in line with the broader
policy objectives captured in the outer two fiscal years. The budget making process also
provides for sector hearings giving an opportunity to the other sectors whose decisions may
have some impact on agriculture to also contribute to its decision-making within it.
Nevertheless, in the budgetary process it is those with the final say on resource allocations
that determine which policy decision will be implemented because most policy decisions
require resources to implement. The Ministry of Finance is therefore crucial in the realisation
and implementation of policies.
Domestic policy initiatives emerge also from outside the arena discussed so far and are at one
stage incorporated into the budgetary process. Such is the case of the development planning
process. Although thought of as a normal policy process, many are the policies proposed in
the development plan that are never implemented because resources are not mobilised or
allocated for their implementation in the budget. This is also the case with the sessional
papers or documents arising from task forces. Other sources of domestic policy initiatives
include motions by MPs in Parliament, which get the acceptance and approval by key
decision makers in the budgetary process.
The long history of foreign aid to Kenya has meant that there are policy initiatives that are
typically donor driven. They are formulated and initially implemented through donor
financed efforts like the project implementation units (PIUs) or non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and are funded outside the national budget. Significantly, there are
some that are taken over by government and resources deployed for maintenance.
The roles of the bureaucrats, donors and other players have, however, changed over the
years. The bureaucrat’s role has diminished increasingly after 1985 with policy decisions
being shaped more by the executive’s views instead. The executive policy directives
represent “road side,’’ ad-hoc and “spur of the moment” approach to policy making, which
has been represented difficulties for policy formulation since they lead to confusion and
contradictory policies and at times completely derail budgets. These executive declarations
have persisted and traversed the three post independence political regimes.
The role of technocrats who are involved in formulating agricultural policy have been
marginalised. The circle formulating policy has been limited in size, concentrated in the
ministry of finance (MOF) and the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). Even within the MOF and
CBK the policy formulation clique has been quite small. The MOA technocrats consider their
inputs ignored by MOF since their budget submissions detailing priorities for the ministry get
reordered without consulting with them. Instead they resorted to lobbying MOF decision
makers for policies they would wish to implement accepted. O’brien and Ryan (2001)
however note that economic policy formulation group, within the policy formulation circle of
the CBK and the Finance ministry has been small with controlled internal discussions. One
of the reasons given for this closed approach has been the passive approach to earlier
consultations from other ministries. Another reason given is the desire by the core policy
makers to prevent potential losers from the policy from mobilising opposition.
The policy formulation process has also been influenced by technical assistance (TA). TA
has enabled the training of key policy advisers in the core ministries, especially public sector
economists in policy analysis. Nevertheless, their impact in policy formulation has been
impaired by the inability of the government to retain them in public service. They have
moved out of public service due to low pay, poor leadership and inadequate resources with
which to operate, leading to low morale, and productivity. Technical assistance has however
been associated with a number of factors affecting development policy. These include
coordination of resources related to technical assistance due to multiplicity of donor
objectives, preferences and strategies. Donor centred development process also weakens
domestic ownership and therefore integration into the national policy objectives (UNDP
2003).
Also emerging in the recent past are policy decisions that receive inputs from enhanced
voices of parliamentarians, the private sector, civil society and smallholders as the process
becomes more systematic, transparent and inclusive. In the PRSP there was wider
stakeholder policy considerations discussed right to the village level in some districts. And
when the NARC government came to power in December 2002, the preparation of its blue
print for economic revival, the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment
Creation (ERSWEC) which addressed policy issues in the agricultural sector as well,
received widespread stakeholder consultations with parliamentarians, donors, trade unions,
professionals, financial institutions, industrialists, ASAL representatives amongst others. The
policy process has also benefited from the 1993 reconstitution of parliamentary committees
under the umbrella Liaison Committee chaired by the Speaker of the national assembly. The
Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources Committee is tasked to process and/or vet proposed
legislation from all the six ministries3 involved in the sector. Parliamentary caucuses
established from 1999 to seek opportunities for commodity producer groups and stakeholders
are also concerned with policy formulation. For instance, caucuses have been created
comprising MPs from areas growing three commodities, namely, the Coffee and Tea
Parliamentary Group (COTEPA) and the Sugar Parliamentary Group (SUPA). They
influence policy on these commodities, especially when put under pressure by their
constituents to change or improve policy guiding the production of the affected commodity.
Along the same vein have emerged various civil society interest groups, which are comprised
of more farmers. Those already created include SUCAM (Sugar Campaign for Change in
Western Kenya), NGOMA (“Ng’ombe na Mahindi” to cover maize and milk in the North
Rift, SAWA (“Sauti ya Wafugaji” – North Eastern pastoralists, MAMBO (“Matunda na
Mboga” for horticulture in Eastern province. Currently efforts are underway to unite the sub-
sectors into a national umbrella body with representation from all the groups to enable them
deal with issues that are cross-cutting that include policies and a common voice in the policy
process.
The main actors in the policy making process can therefore be identified as the government,
parliamentary caucuses, donors, and the civil society organisations. Prior to the era of
reforms, the government dominated the allocation and management of resources in the
country. The government established public or quasi-public institutions operating like
monopolies or regulatory bodies in agricultural markets. This meant limited participation by
other stakeholders especially the private sector, the civil society as well as the general
population in the development process. Economic policy making in the country in the early
post-independence years was therefore highly centralised and was for a long time limited to
government ministries and parastatals both at sectoral and national levels, with limited
dialogue and interaction with other stakeholders. It has further been argued that even within
these government institutions, the policy formulation group remained narrow4.
During the first decade of independence, the focus of agricultural policy was on land
ownership and resettlements, emphasising the controls on marketing and pricing of
agricultural commodities as well as government support for agricultural services like
research, extension, and livestock production inputs. These largely contributed to the success
in the performance of the sector witnessed during this period. By late 1970s, serious
problems had emerged especially with payment and marketing of most commodities, with
official involvement in the marketing and pricing viewed as possible sources of operational
inefficiencies.
Government authority over the economy was also increased through the regulatory
framework and steady expansion of controls on macro economic variables like domestic
prices, interest rates, foreign exchange, and external trade. Policy making during this period
was therefore largely concentrated around the government. In the wake of reforms however,
there has been increased focus on the role of other actors, with sustained advocacy for
participation in resource mobilisation allocation and management. Since the commencement
of the implementation of the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) strategy, the
government has continued to emphasise the use of participatory methodologies in
programmes and project implementation (Republic of Kenya 2002).
Donors played an important role in policy reforms in the agricultural sector, especially in the
implementation of reforms in agricultural marketing and prices, whose implementation were
sometimes linked to donor conditionalities. Policy dialogue between the government and
both multilateral and bilateral lenders played an important role in indicating approaches to
some of the problems identified in the reform process. The growing importance of
programme and structural lending has therefore had implications for the role of donors in
policy formulation.
Through technical assistance, a cadre of economic advisors have been provided to the core
ministries including agriculture who have been involved and influence the direction of policy
thinking in the country. It is argued that some technical assistance advisors have had positive
impact on the economic policy making process in the country (O’Brien and Ryan 2001).
Lack of cleat guidelines the utilisation of externalresources through technical cooperation has
at times led to lack of effective implementation of development policies.
The civil society organisations through empowering of grassroots organisations mobilise
resources and advocate for issues affecting their members to be included in policy
formulation.
In general, when analysing policy processes in the country, it is important to note that one of
the problems with effectiveness of policy has been the lack of implementation of policy
pronouncements. As a result, the policies that have been initiated are not reflected in the
actions in terms of resource allocations and commitments. While policies in the 1960s and
early 1970s were mostly implemented, this has not been the case over time.
Government policies with respect to agriculture and rural development in particular, have
suffered from lack of common objectives and coordination among the implementing
ministries. Some policies have also tended to respond more to short term interventions, rather
than focus on long term sustainable development. In addition, institutional failure due to lack
of capacity by the private sector to take over functions by the state after liberalisation, has
also been a problem.
The conduct of the policy process in agriculture, therefore, is not a straight forward
formalised step by step exercise involving defined and recognised institutions. It attracts
various actors defined by politics, geographical settings, interests, gender and donors among
others. The process involves the central government, ministry of agriculture, the executive,
parliament and its caucuses, civil society (NGOs, FBOs, CBOs, trade unions, etc), the budget
process, development partners, interest groups, the farming community, ethnicity and even
the political system. The decisions that influence and/or affect agricultural policy formulation
and implementation are made by these actors interactively or singularly.
Emerging Agricultural Policy Formulation Processes
Since the commencement of the implementation of the District Focus for Rural Development
(DFRD) strategy, the government has continued to emphasise the use of participatory
methodologies in programmes and project implementation. Through the DFRD, central
government departments are all represented at the district level, leading to decentralisation of
power and management of responsibilities. However, in certain cases, the decentralisation of
decision making to the district did not take place (UNDP 2003). But still, it remained largely
broad and was also relatively more participatory than was the practice in previous years.
Much more recently there are indications that the policy formulation process is becoming
more systematic, transparent and inclusive. There has emerged a relatively greater role for
various stakeholders and a voice for parliamentarians, the private sector, civil society and the
poor. A number of policy frameworks have evolved that are the result of largely consultative
processes. The government subscribed to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)
in 2000, and started to prepare the Poverty Reduction Strategy paper (PRSP 2001-04). This,
however, was never completed due to the change of government in 2002. In a deviation from
the past, however, there were widespread stakeholder consultations nationally going down to
the grass roots. The PRSP provided an opportunity for pro-poor growth through the
participatory nature and direct budgetary allocation to priority sectors. The Economic
Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERSWEC) was produced in 2003
to revive the economy. Again there were widespread stakeholder consultations with
parliamentarians, donors, trade unions, professionals, financial institutions, industrialists,
ASAL representatives amongst others but also considered widely ideas contained in the
PRSP, NARC manifesto and post-election action plan.
The Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (SRA 2004) was started to complement the ERS in
agriculture and emphasises public-private sector partnerships to facilitate competition,
enhance markets, raise efficiency in the usage of resources and improve private profitability.
It recognises only two roles for government: to provide a limited range of goods and services
and to carry out a reduced range of regulatory functions that cannot be enforced by private
self-regulation and industry code of conduct. However, unlike the other policy framework
documents before it that were participatory, the SRA embodied no stakeholder consultations.
However, this was due to speed with which it was formulated. It now nevertheless faces the
challenge of developing stakeholder ownership. In spite of this, the SRA has the advantage of
a well-defined medium- to long-term framework for policy formulation and implementation
in the agricultural sector.
The adoption of the PRGF by the government required it to formulate and implement its
budgetary process through the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which seeks
to link policy, planning and budgeting in order to improve budgetary outcomes. Its main
objective is to link strongly the annual budget to national development policies and align
expenditure allocations to national priorities, outputs and outcomes. Because the SRA
outlines the agricultural sector priority areas set out in the ERS, the MTEF process ought to
allocate resources to these priority areas in agriculture for their realisation. However, for this
to be achieved it would require the technical inputs of staff at the ministry together with the
sectors’ advocacy groups who are both well trained to analyse budgetary issues and
formulate budget proposals for the sector.
Policy making in general and within the ministry in particular, is tending towards evidence-
based findings from research undertakings of local consultants, universities and policy
research institutes (PRIs), which policy formulation had made very limited use of in the past.
The importance of policy based on evidence has grown with the establishment of PRIs,
namely, the Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR), the Kenya Institute for Public
Policy Analysis and Research (KIPPRA), the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) of the
University of Nairobi and the Egerton University based Tegemeo Institute of Agricultural
Policy and Development. Although Smith and Karuga (2004) argue that a general perception
tends to persist of low demand for evidence-based policy analysis and formulation due to the
fear of loss of power, influence, current employment and even economic rent through
informed policy reforms, there is some shift towards this direction given that some ministries
and other private organisations make use of the PRIs as much as they can to inform their
policies.
he emerging policy formulation process in Agriculture, therefore, attracts various players
who will have to arrive at various policy positions consultatively and in a participatory
manner. The MTEF budgetary process will be required to allocate resources as per the agreed
priorities amongst the various stakeholders. In addition, policy formulation will benefit more
from evidence generated from research thus PRIs are going to play an increased role in the
policy formulation process in agriculture than before.
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http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKENYA/Resources/donor_statement_agricultu re
Joint Statement of Development Partners for the Kenya
