Introduction The Gulf Cooperation Council

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprises six countries: Bahrain, Kuwait,

Oman, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The region is rich in natural resources, especially oil and gas. The GCC has become a

center of gravity for international humanitarian organizations because of its history of

humanitarian giving and its proximity to several conflict-stricken countries such as

Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Palestine, and Afghanistan. The wealthiest four GCC

members, KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, emerged as humanitarian donors during the

last few decades. According to a recent foreign aid report published by the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of the UAE (2023a), Emirati foreign aid has reached 140 countries and

benefitted millions of people.

Similarly, KSA's King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (2023a)

reported projects in 90 countries with a total value of more than $6,000,000,000 since its

establishment in 2015. Qatar significantly facilitated international political negotiations in

the Middle East and beyond, including in Afghanistan, Darfur, Lebanon, Eritrea, and

Djibouti (Alarabeed, 2023; Barakat et al., 2020). Kuwait hosted three international

pledging conferences for Syria in 2013, 2014, and 2015, raising more than

$7,000,000,000 for the humanitarian response to the Syria crisis, encouraging the United

Nations (UN) to announce Kuwait as a global humanitarian center and acknowledge the

Amir of Kuwait as a humanitarian leader (Elkahlout, 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

the State of Kuwait, n.d.). GCC generosity led the Organization of Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD) to list KSA and the UAE among the most

generous donors of official development assistance (ODA) in proportion to their gross

national income (GNI).

Despite their marked generosity, humanitarian contributions by GCC countries are

unpredictable (Elkahlout, 2020; Pericoli, 2023). None of the four countries has an annual

aid budget, and their engagement with the international humanitarian system is

inconsistent. There is also a paucity of literature on the performance of GCC governments

against international standards and benchmarks (Bashir, 2022; Ziadah, 2019). Harmáček

et al. (2022) attributed the limited research on GCC donors to the unavailability of

reliable data compared with Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors and even

other emerging actors such as China. In conducting this study, I sought to add to the

limited literature on GCC donors. In addition to addressing the research gap, the study

could contribute to positive social change by improving the understanding of the modus

operandi of GCC donors, potentially leading to better cooperation between DAC and non-

DAC donors. Such cooperation could positively influence the lives of millions of people,

especially in the areas of interest to the GCC, such as Yemen, Sudan, Bangladesh, Libya,

Afghanistan, and Syria. Chapter 1 includes a contextual introduction to the study

explaining its purpose, research question, and problem statement. This chapter also offers

a detailed layout of the nature of the study, the research methodology, and the conceptual

framework. Chapter 1 additionally entails the study’s limitations and significance to

theory, practice, and social change.

Background of the Study

Researchers have critiqued the modus operandi of GCC donors, highlighting

shortcomings related to complementarity, planning, predictability, and motivation.

However, the existing literature does not offer insights into aligning GCC donors’ work

with the mainstream multilateral system (Elkahlout, 2020; Harmáček et al., 2022).

Dandashly and Kourtelis (2023), for example, expressed concerns about current aid

literature that simplifies the work of GCC donors by grouping them under one banner,

ignoring the individual differences between them. Dandashly and Kourtelis argued that

Arab aid programs are less conditional than traditional DAC donors despite their absence

from international standardization initiatives such as the Good Humanitarian Donorship

(GHD) Initiative. The GHD (2018) highlighted complementarity, coordination, and

sustainable impact as essential ethical, humanitarian leadership characteristics for

international humanitarian donors to embrace. Elkahlout (2020) indicated that the

unpredictable modus operandi of GCC countries makes it difficult for GCC governments

to engage meaningfully and systematically with the international community or

contribute to achieving global objectives such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Unlike Western donors, which are usually called "DAC donors" because of their

membership in the DAC of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD],

2023), Arab governments do not announce annual aid budgets. Nevertheless, despite their

inconsistent reporting practices, OECD usually lists GCC countries among the most

generous donors in the world if aid is calculated as a percentage of per capita GNI rather

than in absolute dollar terms (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

[OECD], 2023). Cochrane (2021) argued that although KSA and UAE have exceeded the

global giving target of .7% of GNI, data about their aid allocations remain opaque

(Cochrane, 2021). Exceeding the international giving target has been celebrated by the

governments of the GCC and received scholarly attention, especially from Arab

researchers (Harmáček et al., 2022). In this study, I triangulated the data against the UN

Financial Tracking Service (FTS, 2014) records to address a data unreliability challenge.

Because of the limited data and the unclear institutional structure of government

aid departments combined with inconsistent reporting practices, scholars have questioned

the motivation of GCC donors. Global and regional events, such as the September 11,

2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, the Arab Spring, and the Gulf crisis, added to the global

curiosity about the modus operandi of GCC's donors. For example, after 9/11, GCC

donors were accused of funding terrorism and criticized for not having checks and

balances to regulate and control aid flows (Elkahlout, 2020). The Arab Spring caused

another wave of inquisitiveness concerning GCC donors' giving patterns (Pericoli, 2023).

Cochrane (2021) mentioned that the UAE's aid contributions to Africa increased 10-fold

after 2013. Pericoli (2023) attributed this increase to the UAE's support of newly installed

regimes in Egypt and Tunisia. Finally, the Gulf crisis between Qatar on one side and

KSA, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt on the other added to the uncertainty about the

geopolitical motivation of GCC donors (Barakat et al., 2020). Barakat et al. (2020) argued

that the Gulf crisis changed the aid system in Qatar and the Gulf region. The aid system

in the GCC reacted and adapted in the three cases by changing regulations, increasing

funding, restricting civil society activities, or strengthening relations with multilateral

organizations.

During the last 20 years, political pressure has encouraged Arab countries to

institutionalize their aid business. Examples of such political pressure include accusations

against GCC donors of funding ideological warfare in Afghanistan and Bosnia and

counter-terrorism fiscal policies imposed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001

(Elkahlout, 2020; Volný, 2022). The political repercussions of the Arab Spring and, most

recently, the Gulf crisis between Qatar and its neighbors have added to the growing

institutionalization dynamics in the GCC region (Barakat et al., 2020). Al-Mezaini (2017)

referred to an improvement in the recording of aid by the UAE and commended the

government's efforts in assisting countries from the global south. Likewise, Li (2021)

referred to continuing misperceptions about the motivations of GCC donors, especially

Saudi Arabia. However, despite some progress in the research landscape in the GCC and

increased studies about the region during the last 3 years, the institutionalization of

humanitarian assistance and the management of GCC aid portfolios remain understudied

(Davidson, 2021). In addition, previous researchers who studied the GCC did not

differentiate between aid strategies from a management perspective and the tactics

adopted by GCC governments in response to crises and political developments. For

example, Barakat et al. (2020) referred to a strategy called innocence by association,

whereby Qatari organizations cooperated with the UN to gain international credibility

during the Gulf crisis. These tactics differ from aid strategies donors develop to establish

operational positions and facilitate stakeholder engagement.

Putting the humanitarian aid contributions of the GCC within an international

context could shed light on what GCC governments and the international humanitarian

system could do to maximize the impact of aid programs. For this study, a humanitarian

response refers to situations that require a multilateral response. Examples include the

Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Sudan, and Yemen crises. The principles and best practices

acknowledged by the largest 17 humanitarian donors in the world under the GHD

Initiative provided a backdrop for exploring the understanding of government officials

and humanitarian workers about aligning GCC contributions with international standards

(GHD, 2018). This study comprises four case studies covering: (a) KSA, (b) Kuwait, (c)

Qatar, and (d) the UAE. The study’s conclusions could address part of the gap in research

about GCC governments as humanitarian donors, especially during the last 10 years. The

study could also contribute to positive social change by raising the awareness of aid

programmers (particularly those funded by different international donors) of the need to

be better aligned and synchronized. With better organization, aid programmers may better

meet the needs of the people they serve.

Problem Statement

The social problem addressed in this study was the adverse implications of GCC

donors’ ad hoc modus operandi, which hinders complementarity between humanitarian

donors and impedes the burden-sharing of humanitarian responsibility (Barakat et al.,

2020; Elkahlout, 2020; Li, 2019). There is very little literature on GCC governments as

humanitarian donors, let alone the understanding of government officials and

humanitarian workers of how GCC donors could align their aid programs with

international good donorship practices (Bashir, 2022; Harmáček et al., 2022; Li, 2019).

The specific research problem was that there is a lack of understanding by government

officials and humanitarian workers of how GCC governments could better align their aid

programs with internationally acknowledged GHD practices. Researchers have critiqued

the inefficacy of GCC donors, highlighting shortcomings related to complementarity,

planning, predictability, and motivation (Harmáček et al., 2022). The existing research did

not show pragmatic solutions to understand better what is required to align GCC donors’

work with the mainstream multilateral system.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(UNOCHA, 2022a), 365,000,000 people needed assistance in 2023, representing 1 in

every 23 people in the world. To respond to the growing humanitarian needs in the world,

humanitarian organizations requested $55,900,000,000 to respond to the needs of the

250,000,000 most vulnerable people in the total caseload, according to the agency (see

also Zarocostas, 2023). McDougal and Patterson (2021) expected humanitarian needs to

grow because of conflict and climate change. Given the limited resources and growing

needs, the UN called for better coordination and fair donor burden-sharing (United

Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA], 2022b).

However, burden sharing requires predictability. Therefore, the irregular pattern of

engagement by GCC donors could affect the lives and well-being of millions of people

who need assistance in 69 countries. This study could contribute to positive social change

by providing insight into how government officials and humanitarian workers understand

aid alignment with international best practices. With this knowledge, stakeholders may be

able to provide better aid complementarity and better services to people in need.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative multiple-case study was to explore the

understanding by government officials and humanitarian workers of how GCC

governments could better align their aid programs with internationally acknowledged

GHD practices.

Research Question

What is the understanding by government officials and humanitarian workers on

how GCC governments could better align their aid programs with internationally

acknowledged GHD practices?

Theoretical Foundation

The theories and concepts that grounded this study included the work of Senge

(2006), who investigated the holistic understanding and the total impact of system

dynamics. Senge explained how systems react to their external environment by adapting

their mechanisms in response to triggers, influences, and feedback. Systems theory

provided a theoretical foundation for examining the reaction of GCC donors to external

triggers and exploring the influence of exogenous stimuli on humanitarian contributions

by KSA, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE. Although systems theory represented the main

theoretical backdrop of this study, supporting theories such as system complexity theory

and swarm intelligence theory were used to shed additional light on the adverse

implications of the modus operandi of GCC donors. Senge’s systems theory, Kauffman’s

(1995) systems complexity theory, and Bonabeau and Meyer’s (2001) swarm intelligence

theory grounded this study’s theoretical framework.

The theoretical framework of this study included Kauffman's (1995) system

complexity theory because of its relationship to Senge's systems theory. Gregorian et al.

(2019) stressed that understanding the humanitarian system as a complex adaptive system

might enhance coordination and positive complementarity. From this perspective,

complexity theory may help explain how the GCC countries adapt to and interact with the

more extensive humanitarian system. Figure 1 explains the process of interaction and

feedback between GCC countries and external influences. In this context, a good example

is Kuwait's rise from a small donor to a center of humanitarian action between 2011 and

2015 and the decline of government contributions after this period to an extreme low after

2015 (Elkahlout, 2020). Recent studies by Bashir (2022), Elkahlout and Milton (2023),

Barakat et al. (2020), and Li (2019) did not examine the issue with this theoretical lens.

Systems theory and complexity theory could provide a fresh perspective in this context

(Kauffman, 1995; Senge, 2006). In addition, studying GCC aid dynamics from a systems

theory perspective should highlight current shortcomings and identify areas of

development to synchronize the work of GCC countries with the rest of the humanitarian

architecture. Figure 1 shows how, during major disasters, GCC humanitarian

contributions positively respond to system triggers, such as public sympathy and peer

pressure. GCC countries responded to such triggers by contributing generously to the

Syria crisis between 2011 and 2013 and Yemen between 2018 and 2020 (FTS, 2014).

However, the GCC's generosity usually lasts for a short time. Elkahlout (2020) argued

that when media and international attention to disasters recede, GCC governments, such

as Kuwait, are pressured to prioritize domestic needs, resulting in a decline in

contributions.

Figure 1

Conceptual Framework

Recent studies on the GCC did not examine the modus operandi of government

donors from this theoretical lens (Barakat et al., 2020; Bashir, 2022; Li, 2019). Senge’s

(2006) systems theory provided a fresh perspective in this context. I used Senge’s systems

theory to help identify negative feedback loops in the GCC aid architecture and explore

solutions to turn them into positive feedback loops to improve the interaction between the

GCC region and the larger humanitarian community. Complexity theory provided a

vehicle for studying GCC donors as complex adaptive systems and identifying relevant

system dynamics conducive to mainstreaming donor cooperation.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of this study incorporated three theories: (a) systems

theory, (b) system complexity theory, and (c) swarm intelligence theory. von Bertalanffy

(1976) introduced systems thinking to social research. Senge (2006) further elaborated on

the relationship between systems theory and organizational behavior. Senge explained

how systems react to their external environment by adapting their mechanisms in

response to triggers, influences, and feedback. Systems theory offered a general

theoretical background to understand the modus operandi of GCC donors and how

external factors affect their work. Nevertheless, some aspects required additional theories

to understand the system's total impact on GCC donors' behavior, noting that

complementarity is essential for effective humanitarian action (United Nations Office for

the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA], 2022a). System theory alone

could not offer the required comprehensive framework to achieve the purpose of the

study.

I used swarm intelligence theory and system complexity theory along with

systems theory to analyze the impact of system triggers on the behavior of GCC donors

and shed light on how they could work with counterparts for complementarity. The three

theories provided a holistic framework to answer the study's research question. Swarm

intelligence theory posits that independent entities in a system must cooperate to achieve

a common objective (Bonabeau & Meyer, 2001). Applying this perspective to donors

within the international humanitarian system should facilitate the identification of areas of

improvement to facilitate cooperation and complementarity between GCC donors and

their DAC counterparts. Similarly, system complexity theory is concerned with

understanding how independent system stocks adapt their internal dynamics to fit within

a larger architecture (Meadows, 2008). System complexity theory complemented systems

theory and swarm intelligence theory to form a complete picture of how donors adapt

their work to join the mainstream of GHD practices. The conceptual framework is

elaborated further in Chapter 3.

Nature of the Study

The research approach for this study was based on a multiple-case study design.

The cases were KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE because they are the most significant

donors in the GCC region (Elkahlout & Milton, 2023). I collected data by conducting

semistructured interviews with government officials and humanitarian workers in the four

countries. The multiple-case study approach of this study agreed with the

recommendations of methodology scholars. For example, Pathiranage et al. (2020) argued

that a case study is the most suitable methodology to investigate complex phenomena in

their contextual environment. Lavarda and Bellucci (2022) reiterated Pathiranage et al.’s

view about the suitability of case studies for analyzing reality and contextual dynamics.

For Lavarda and Bellucci, a case study is the most appropriate research method to

investigate aspects related to organizational strategies in complex environments. Using a

case study approach, I could probe the reality of the aid system in each of the four GCC

countries and explore how they relate to good donorship best practices.

Several scholars have advocated for contextualizing the study of aid systems. For

example, Cochrane (2021), Li (2019), and Ziadah (2019) argued that foreign assistance

by GCC governments should be studied within contextual dynamics. Kauffman’s (1995)

system complexity theory and Senge’s (2006) contributions to systems theory and

organizational behavior could help explain how GCC governments make assistance

decisions without announced budgets and standard operating procedures. Investigating

how government officials and aid workers understand the alignment of GCC aid

programs with GHD practices should shed light on the modus operandi of GCC donors

and facilitate interaction among GCC governments and other traditional humanitarian

donors.

To collect data for the case studies, I conducted 20 semistructured interviews with

GCC government officials and humanitarian workers with experience in the region. Five

interviews were conducted in each of the four GCC countries. All interviews were

conducted and transcribed using the improved facilities of New Teams. I reviewed and

analyzed the interview transcripts manually to minimize errors and improve accuracy.

Definitions

The humanitarian terms used in this study include DAC donors, good

humanitarian donorship, gross domestic product, gross national income, the Gulf crisis,

humanitarian action, humanitarian principles, and overseas development assistance.

They are defined to facilitate discussion in the following chapters. Although some terms

might be understood from multiple perspectives, they were contextually defined based on

their usage in this study.

Development Assistance Committee (DAC): An international forum comprising

the 31 largest providers of development assistance in the world (Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2022). No GCC country is a member

of the OECD DAC, though some, such as KSA, Kuwait, and the UAE, report their

contributions to DAC.

Good humanitarian donorship (GHD): The 24 principles adopted by the 37 largest

humanitarian donors in the world represented at the GHD Initiative established by

Sweden in 2003 (GHD, 2018). The 37 members of the GHD initiative agreed on 24

principles to guide their funding modalities, facilitate evidence-based decision-making,

mainstream risk management, and standardize administrative and accountability

procedures. The GHD principles were last updated in June 2018 (Global Humanitarian

Donorship [GHD], 2018).

Gross domestic product (GDP): The value created by all production of goods and

services in a given economy. The calculation of GDP involves the deduction of the cost of

imports and does not include remittances (Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development [OECD], n.d.-a).

Gross national income (GNI): The GDP of a country in addition to remittances

from abroad by the nationals of that country. Both the OECD and the UN use GNI to

calculate governments' fair share of ODA contributions (Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development [OECD], n.d.-b).

Gulf/Qatar crisis: A crisis that started in 2017 when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the

UAE, and Egypt cut their diplomatic ties with Qatar and closed all air, sea, and land

routes to and from Doha. The quartet made 14 demands to Qatar as a precondition for

resuming relations, according to Albasoos et al. (2021). The demands included closing the

Al-Jazeera TV channel and stopping all relations with the Muslim Brotherhood

movement. The crisis affected the foreign policy of the five directly involved countries,

and its impact reached other countries, especially those who took clear sides in this rift

(Al-Eshaq & Rasheed, 2022). The crisis was resolved in 2021 in what became known as

the Al Ula Agreement, signed between the rulers of KSA, Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar

(Kabalan, 2021). Several researchers have discussed the impact of the Gulf crisis on

aidrecipient countries and the behavior of the humanitarian organizations in the five

countries (Al-Eshaq & Rasheed, 2022).

Humanitarian assistance/humanitarian action: Interventions aimed at saving

lives, alleviating suffering, and protecting dignity in the wake of conflicts or natural

disasters (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], n.d.-c).

Humanitarian principles: In the context of humanitarian assistance, the four main

principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, endorsed by UN

General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions 46/182 in 1991 and 58/114 in 2004 (Kindra,

2022). The humanitarian principles are embedded in the Code of Conduct of the

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and

have been adopted by more than 900 organizations (Broussard et al., 2019). The

humanitarian principles have become a benchmark against which the performance of

humanitarian organizations and donors is assessed (Broussard et al., 2019). Although

different initiatives have adopted additional principles, humanitarian principles in this

study refer to the initial three adopted in 1991 and the subsequent principle of

independence adopted in 2004 (United Nations Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA], 2022b). The humanity principle refers to the

imperativeness of humanitarian assistance to all in need. Neutrality means that

humanitarian actors must not take part or sides in hostilities. Impartiality stipulates the

delivery of assistance based on need alone, regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality, or

any other discriminating factor. The principle of independence is meant to protect

humanitarian organizations against the political agendas of governments and donors

(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA],

2022b).

Humanitarian response: A stage in the program cycle approved by the

InterAgency Standing Committee's (IASC) operational framework. Humanitarian

response refers to activities implemented by humanitarian organizations to alleviate

suffering and protect the lives and dignity of people affected by natural or human-made

disasters (IASC, 2017). Other activities in the program cycle include preparedness

planning, needs assessment, resource mobilization, monitoring, and evaluation (Inter-

Agency Standing Committee [IASC], 2017).

Official development assistance (ODA): Financial concessions and assistance

provided by rich countries to poorer countries (Orliange, 2020). ODA could take several

forms but usually targets the economic development of recipient countries (Cassola et al.,

2022). The OECD (2022) defined ODA as government development assistance designed

to achieve economic development in developing countries. The OECD excluded military

assistance from the calculation of ODA. OECD and the UN adopted .7% of GNI as the

target for ODA by rich economies (Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development [OECD], 2022).

Traditional donors: Members of OECD DAC, such as the United States, the

United Kingdom, and the Scandinavian countries. This category of donors is usually

differentiated from non-OECD DAC members such as GCC countries, China, Brazil,

Turkey, and other donor governments often referred to as nontraditional or emerging

(Palagashvili & Williamson, 2021).

Assumptions

The reliability of data published by GCC governments about their humanitarian

contributions was among the assumptions of this study. Scholars have noted the paucity

of research about GCC donors (Bashir, 2022; Cochrane, 2021; Harmáček et al., 2022; Li,

2019). The scarcity of academic research about the GCC necessitates reliance on primary

data from the reports published by GCC governments, which could be, in some cases,

inaccurate or exaggerated (Bashir, 2022). Bashir (2022) argued that the rarity of

trustworthy academic research on GCC donors compelled some researchers to obtain

figures from newspapers and government-affiliated think tanks that tend to exaggerate

government efforts. Similarly, Davidson (2021) highlighted the challenges researchers

face in accessing official government data, noting an improvement in the research

environment in the GCC during the last 3 years. Data published by GCC governments

were triangulated with the FTS and OECD-published records to safeguard the integrity of

this study.

Another important assumption to highlight was the willingness of government

officials to be interviewed. The nature of this study and the focus on best practices and

alignment within the international humanitarian system mitigated the risk of interview

declination and facilitated positive responses from GCC governments. I assumed that

GCC officials would likely accept interview requests when they did not perceive me as

having a premeditated intention to criticize their modus operandi. A possibility remained,

however, that assurances of academic neutrality would not result in positive responses

from government officials.

Scope and Delimitations

This study was limited to multilateral international humanitarian assistance

provided by KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, which are the largest donors in the GCC

region. The study did not cover Bahrain and Oman or focus on bilateral assistance. The

assumption of the inaccuracy of the figures published by GCC governments was

important to highlight in terms of delimitation. Verifying the authenticity of figures

published by GCC governments was beyond the scope of this study. Verifying

government reports about foreign assistance is a lengthy process and difficult to achieve

without access to government records and recipient countries' financial audits (Pericoli,

2023). Therefore, this study included a rough verification exercise to compare the figures

announced by GCC governments with UN and OECD records.

This study was also limited to publicly announced reports about humanitarian

assistance to countries affected by manufactured or natural disasters. Mahembe and

Odhiambo (2021) argued that bilateral loans do not contribute to poverty reduction in

recipient countries. Loans and concessional finance were not included in the scope of this

study to avoid skewing the analysis. The development arms of each of the four countries

provide both grants and loans to poor and least developed countries. Humanitarian

assistance in this study did not include the provision of military assets or non-grant-based

types of aid. This delimitation exercise was meant to facilitate the transferability of the

study approach to other emerging donors such as China, Brazil, India, South Africa, and

Turkey.

Limitations

This study was limited by the cooperation of government officials in the four

countries. The willingness of government officials to share information about their aid

programs could have limited access to information and require alternative plans to

mitigate its impact. The working culture in the GCC region is highly bureaucratic

(Elkahlout & Milton, 2023). To avoid sensitivities or complications, I sought official

approvals to interview government officials by sending letters or emails to the foreign

ministries of the respective countries. If government officials declined the request or did

not respond within a reasonable time, retired officials were approached as an alternative.

The working culture in the GCC may have influenced the way the interviews were

conducted. Bayeck (2021) highlighted the importance of the interview's cultural context

and explained how the setting could affect the participants' responses. There was a

possibility that some of the participants, especially senior government officials, could

influence the setting of the interviews by not agreeing to the audio recording,

necessitating shorthand notetaking instead. No other limitations were anticipated.

Conducting interviews online was not challenging, given the conducive technological

environment in the GCC with enough bandwidth for video conferencing.

Significance of the Study

This study is significant because its findings could affect the well-being of

millions of people in need of humanitarian assistance. The study findings could contribute

to positive social change by encouraging GCC donors to align their giving approaches

with the international aid community to maximize aid effectiveness in the geographic

areas of interest to the region. Li (2019) argued that aligning humanitarian assistance by

GCC donors with international standards and best practices could lead to effective

cooperation and better results for affected communities. This study's main social change

objective revolves around the pragmatic significance of mainstreaming and standardizing

aid practices as a prerequisite of ethical, humanitarian leadership. This study could enable

the international humanitarian system to better understand the modus operandi of GCC

donors and facilitate aid programs' cooperation and complementarity. The study could

also help GCC donors identify ways to manage their aid programs more predictably and

facilitate planning by aid organizations based on solid funding projections.

Significance to Practice

This study was grounded in humanitarian practice. Aligning the modus operandi

of donor countries with international standards and best practices could improve

cooperation and complementarity between donors. Such cooperation should be aimed at

providing better accountability and services to people in need. Examining how GCC

donors could mainstream their work with other large global donors should have practical

implications for foreign aid departments at the perspective governments. Palagashvili and

Williamson (2021) argued that despite their growing influence in the humanitarian sector,

non-traditional donors, including GCC countries, are usually left out of aid effectiveness

discussions. This study involved exploring the understanding by government officials and

humanitarian workers of how GCC governments could better align their aid programs

with internationally acknowledged GHD practices. The findings could lead to identifying

areas of mutual interest whereby GCC donors coordinate their programs with other

donors.

Except for Palagashvili and Williamson (2021), who included KSA with other

emerging donors such as China, Russia, Brazil, and Turkey, no other evaluation of the

performance of GCC donors against international best practices could be found. In

addition, Palagashvili and Williamson did not include Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE in

their analysis, and their study referred to DAC and non-DAC donors as groups rather than

individual donors. I dedicated a separate case study to each of the four GCC donors to

enable individualized analysis that could feed into country-specific policy discussions and

general reforms in the region.

Significance to Theory

During the last 20 years, political pressure encouraged Arab countries to

institutionalize their aid business better. Elkahlout and Milton (2023) argued that such

political pressure included accusations against GCC donors of funding ideological

warfare in Afghanistan and Bosnia and counter-terrorism fiscal policies imposed after the

9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Elkahlout (2020) looked at Kuwait’s reform of

the charity sector as a reaction to such international pressure. In addition, the political

repercussions of the Arab Spring and, most recently, the Gulf crisis between Qatar and its

neighbors added to the growing institutionalization dynamics in the GCC region (Barakat

et al., 2020). Al-Mezaini (2017) referred to an improvement in the recording of aid by the

UAE and commended the government's efforts in assisting countries from the global

south. Li (2019) argued differently by underscoring the continuation of misperceptions

about the work and motivations of GCC donors, especially Saudi Arabia. Davidson

(2021) noted some progress in the research landscape in the GCC and an increase in

studies about the region during the last 3 years. However, the standardization of

humanitarian assistance and the alignment of GCC aid programs with international best

practices remain understudied (Egger & Schopper, 2022; Pericoli, 2023). The scarcity of

academic research about GCC donors indicated a lack of theoretical examination of the

GCC’s donors' modus operandi.

Recent research highlighted the problems caused by how GCC countries engaged

with humanitarian assistance without exploring the solutions. I attempted to bridge a

research gap about the roadmap, the requirements, and the solutions to the problems

identified by previous researchers regarding GCC donors. Most existing literature

critiqued the inefficacy of GCC donors' engagement with the international humanitarian

system, highlighting shortcomings related to complementarity, planning, predictability,

and motivation (Harmáček et al., 2022). Exploring the understanding of government aid

officials and humanitarian workers about the alignment of the GCC’s modus operandi

with internationally acknowledged best practices from a systems theory perspective could

contribute to theory literature. The focus of this study revolved around one aspect of the

theory discussion: how system triggers and complexity affect the modus operandi of GCC

donors. Future researchers could analyze the universality of international norms and

principles and the effectiveness of following standard guidelines, given the argument that

both groups of donors, DAC and non-DAC members, are equally not meeting their best

practices.

Significance to Social Change

This study’s findings could contribute to positive social change by affecting the

lives and well-being of millions of people desperately needing humanitarian assistance.

Aligning humanitarian assistance by GCC donors with international practices could lead

to effective cooperation and better results for affected communities. The main research

perception revolved around the significance of mainstreaming and standardizing aid

practices as a prerequisite of ethical, humanitarian leadership. This study’s results may

enable the international humanitarian system to understand the modus operandi of Arab

donors better and facilitate cooperation and mutual aid programs. The study could also

help GCC donors identify ways to manage their aid programs more predictably and

facilitate planning by aid organizations based on solid funding projections.

Summary and Transition

GCC donors are called non-DAC donors. Scholars refer to GCC donors as

nontraditional or emerging to distinguish them from DAC members such as the United

States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries (Elkahlout, 2020;

Harmáček et al., 2022). DAC members have dedicated coordination platforms, such as

the GHD initiative, which comprises 36 governments plus the European Commission, the

humanitarian arm of the European Union (Al-Mezaini, 2017; Elkahlout, 2020; GHD,

2018). The performance of DAC donors has been studied against the internationally

acknowledged best practices without extending the evaluation to non-DAC donors,

including GCC members (Palagashvili & Williamson, 2021). This study contributes to the

literature by dedicating a separate case study to each of the four large GCC donors: (a)

KSA, (b) Kuwait, (c) Qatar, and (d) the UAE. The purpose of the study was to explore the

understanding by government officials and humanitarian workers of how GCC

governments could better align their aid programs with internationally acknowledged

GHD practices. Chapter 2 focuses on reviewing recent literature about the four GCC

donors.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The social problem of this study was the adverse implications of GCC donors’ ad

hoc modus operandi, which hinders complementarity between humanitarian donors and

impedes the burden-sharing of humanitarian responsibility (Barakat et al., 2020;

Elkahlout, 2020; Li, 2019). There is little literature on the understanding of government

officials and humanitarian workers of how GCC donors could align their aid programs

with international good donorship practices (Bashir, 2022; Harmáček et al., 2022; Li,

2019). Researchers critiqued the inefficacy of GCC donors, highlighting shortcomings

related to complementarity, predictability, planning, and motivation (Harmáček et al.,

2022). The existing research does not show pragmatic solutions to understand better what

is required to align GCC donors’ work with the mainstream multilateral system. This

study could contribute to filling a research gap identified by Bashir (2022), Harmáček et

al. (2022), Li (2019), and Ziadah (2019).

Aligning best practices among donors could improve burden sharing and reduce

the fluctuation of aid contributions, which could reflect positively on the well-being of

people affected by disasters (Harmáček et al., 2022; McDougal & Patterson, 2021). This

study is significant because the findings could help the well-being of millions of people

needing humanitarian assistance. The study findings could promote positive social change

by encouraging GCC donors to align their giving approaches with the international aid

community, maximizing aid effectiveness in the geographic areas of interest to the region,

such as Yemen, Syria, the Horn of Africa, Palestine, and

Bangladesh. This study’s results may also enable the international humanitarian system to

understand the modus operandi of Arab donors better and facilitate cooperation and

complementarity of aid programs. In addition, the study could help GCC donors identify

ways to manage their aid programs more predictably and facilitate planning by aid

organizations based on solid funding projections.

Chapter 2 includes details about the literature review strategy used in this study,

the key concepts informing the inquiry, and the conceptual framework. The three main

topics discussed in the chapter include: (a) the international humanitarian system, (b) the

principles and best practices of GHD, and (c) an overview of the donorship behavior of

KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. Chapter 2 comprises an overview of scholarly

arguments about GCC donors, indicating research gaps and suggestions for future studies.

Literature Search Strategy

The keywords and databases searched included: gulf, GCC, donors, Arab, KSA,

UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, humanitarian, development, assistance, international, ethical,

donorship, institutionalization, global, contributions, and the names of government and

non-governmental institutions in charge of aid assistance in the GCC region. I used

different combinations of keywords on various search engines and databases to generate

maximum results from available sources of information, especially the Walden University

Library, which enabled searching by publication date and sorting the findings by peer

review and other parameters such as full articles and open access. I found the search

engine Google Scholar to be helpful in finding articles unavailable in the Walden

University Library. The advantage of Google Scholar over the Walden University Library

was the possibility of searching for complete sentences, such as the GCC. The main

search databases and database vendors included the Walden University Library (Thoreau),

Sage Journals, ProQuest, and EBSCO. Sage Journals yielded the largest results, with

1,251 articles when searched for good humanitarian donors. The least useful database was

EBSCO, with a few results against all combinations of keywords. Table 1 shows more

details on search queries per combination of keywords.

This literature review relies on primary and secondary sources. The primary

sources used include UN and government websites. The FTS was used to generate reports

on GCC contributions and expand the arguments made by scholars. Additional

information was gathered from the websites of international organizations that aggregate

data from different donor countries, such as the OECD.

Table 1

EBSCO Gulf, humanitarian, assistance 4 Search range from 2018 to 2023

GCC, humanitarian, assistance

Saudi, humanitarian, aid

Very few articles on the region

Similar results to EBSCO

Easiest to search by date range

Saudi, humanitarian, aid 14

UAE, humanitarian, aid 9

Kuwait, humanitarian, aid 3

Qatar, humanitarian, aid 19

Good, humanitarian, donor 44

Ethical, humanitarian, donor 59

ProQuest Gulf, humanitarian assistance 1 Least useful database

GCC, humanitarian, assistance 1

Saudi, humanitarian, aid 2

UAE, humanitarian, aid 0

Emirates, humanitarian, aid 20

Kuwait, humanitarian, aid 8

Qatar, humanitarian, aid 9

Good, humanitarian, donor 20

Ethical, humanitarian, donor 16

Sage Gulf, humanitarian, assistance 57 The largest number of

GCC, humanitarian, assistance

Saudi, humanitarian, aid

UAE, humanitarian, aid

121

results

Some results that were irrelevant

Many duplicates

Emirates, humanitarian, aid 121

Kuwait, humanitarian, aid 128

Qatar, humanitarian, aid 164

Good, humanitarian, donor 1,251

Ethical, humanitarian, donor 693

Search Log

Note. GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council; UAE = United Arab Emirates.

Theoretical Foundation

Systems theory dates back to Aristotle’s argument that the properties of the parts

of a system do not necessarily reflect the properties of the whole system (Vasiliev et al.,

2022). Hassan et al. (2020) defined a system as an entity comprising interrelated parts that

interact to achieve a common purpose. Understanding the dynamic relationship between

the components of a system is considered an essential prerequisite for understanding how

systems behave because system dynamics play a crucial role in shaping the system’s

behavior (Hassan et al., 2020). Besiou and Van Wassenhove (2021) described the

international humanitarian system as complex, with multiple stakeholders and dynamics.

Similarly, Zhang and Ahmed (2020) attributed the development of systems thinking, an

umbrella that covers systems theories in general, to three pioneers: Ludwig von

Bertalanaffy, Peter Senge, and Donella Meadows. In this study, I explored the

understanding by government officials and humanitarian workers of how GCC

governments could better align their aid programs with internationally acknowledged

GHD practices.

Bertanalaffy pioneered systems theory in the 20th century and is referred to by

many scholars as the father of systems theory (Bashan & Kordova, 2021). Bertanalaffy’s

work in the 1970s focused on the interrelationship between living molecules. For

Bertanalaffy (1976), system dynamics caused by the relationship between the parts of a

system were more important than the characteristics of the individual parts. Meadows

Database/database vendor Search term No. of r esults Notes

(2008) was another pioneer of systems theory. Meadows’ work in the 1990s highlighted

system behavior and the factors that influence the behavior of systems, such as feedback

mechanisms, nodes, and system stocks. Part of Meadows' work on system behavior was

posthumously published after she died in 2001. Senge (2006) expanded the traditional

understanding of systems theory, revolving around the relationship between the whole

and the parts, to explore how organizations learn and develop. In this context, an

organization refers to any group of actors who work together to achieve a common

objective. Therefore, the work of government donor departments would lend itself easily

to exploration from an organizational perspective. Senge highlighted five characteristics

of a learning organization or system: (a) team learning, (b) shared vision, (c) mental

models, (d) personal mastery, and (e) systems thinking. While highlighting the

characteristics of a learning system, like Bertanalaffy and Meadows, Senge stressed the

importance of system dynamics and patterns of interaction between the different

components (Zhang & Ahmed, 2020). Systems theory was thus a good choice for

studying GCC aid patterns and the interaction between GCC donors and the international

humanitarian system to achieve common humanitarian objectives.

In addition to systems theory, I used the swarm intelligence theory, as elaborated

by Bonabeau and Meyer (2001), to explore the interaction between GCC and other

donors in the international humanitarian system. Wang and Beni (1989) first introduced

swarm intelligence theory during a conference about smart robotics. Wang and Beni

presented a system model proving that robots smartly interact with each other to achieve

a general task according to independent but collaborative algorithms. Swarm intelligence

theory complemented systems theory by adding the organic independence element to the

behavior of the system units. From a swarm intelligence perspective, the system's units

are independent, like ants in a colony or bees in a hive. However, for the group’s

wellbeing, such independent actors must work together to achieve common goals

(Bonabeau & Meyer, 2001). Swarm intelligence theory enabled a better understanding of

humanitarian donors' behavior, especially GCC donors, as independent actors in a global

ecosystem where they need to cooperate and abide by the same rules for the betterment of

the collective (humanity).

Conceptual Framework

Systems react to their external environment by adapting their mechanisms in

response to triggers, influences, and feedback. I applied Senge’s (2006) systems theory in

the case studies of the KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE to understand how contributions

from the GCC peak in response to influences, interests, and pressures and decline when

external stimuli recede or disappear. The theoretical framework included Kauffman’s

(1995) system complexity theory because of its relationship to systems theory and swarm

intelligence theory. In addition, complexity theory helped explain how GCC countries

adapt to and interact with the wider humanitarian system.

This study could help GCC countries align their aid programs with traditional

humanitarian donors to achieve better complementarity of services provided to people in

need. Figure 1 explains the process of interaction and feedback between GCC countries

and external influences. A good example is the rise of Kuwait from a small donor to a

center of humanitarian action between 2011 and 2014 and the decline of government

contributions after this period to an extreme low after 2014 (Elkahlout, 2020). Systems

and complexity theories provided a fresh perspective in this context. Studying GCC aid

dynamics under a systems theory lens highlighted current pain points and helped identify

areas of development to synchronize the work of GCC countries with the rest of the

humanitarian architecture. Figure 1 shows how GCC humanitarian contributions

positively respond to triggers, such as public sentiments, peer pressure, and geopolitical

concerns. GCC countries responded to such triggers by contributing generously to the

Syria crisis between 2011 and 2013, Iraq in 2014, and Yemen between 2018 and 2020

(FTS, 2014). However, the generosity of GCC donors usually lasts for a short time.

Elkahlout (2020) argued that when media and international attention to disasters recede,

GCC governments, such as Kuwait, face local pressure to prioritize domestic needs,

resulting in a decline in contributions.

This conceptual framework builds on the fact that humanitarian burden sharing is

not optimum (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

[UNOCHA], 2022a). Burden sharing takes different forms depending on the nature of the

humanitarian situation. In peacekeeping operations, for example, burden sharing would

include the provision of troops and covering the deployment costs (Hjorthen, 2020).

Distributive responsibility and burden sharing in the context of this study was limited to

the duty to pay for humanitarian action according to the .7% of GDP threshold identified

by the UN (Sumner et al., 2020). The conceptual framework explains that internal and

external system stimuli influence donors’ decisions to contribute to humanitarian

response. Pressure from public opinion at the peak of a disaster, combined with pressure

from peers and international organizations, results in contributions. When the severity of

the humanitarian situation recedes, public opinion turns to domestic needs, and

governments are under less pressure to pay. Because natural and human-made disasters

seem unavoidable, the conceptual framework was based on the dynamic interrelationship

between humanitarian needs, stimuli, reactions, and new needs. To improve burden

sharing among international donors, Sumner et al. (2020) proposed reconsidering the

voluntary .7% of GDP objective to find a different mechanism to match donor

contributions with the complexity and severity of humanitarian needs.

The logical connections between the framework presented and the nature of this

study included the feedback process between GCC countries and external influences from

the international community and the international humanitarian system. Recent studies on

the GCC region by Barakat et al. (2020), Elkahlout and Milton (2023), Nishimura (2021),

Bashir and Abdelsalam (2021), and Alarabeed (2023) did not cover the modus operandi

of government donors under this theoretical lens. Systems theory provided a fresh

perspective in this context. Senge’s (2006) systems theory and organizational learning

patterns helped identify negative feedback loops in the aid architecture of the GCC and

explore ways to turn them into positive loops to improve the interaction between the GCC

region and the larger humanitarian community. Complexity theory facilitated studying

GCC donors as complex adaptive systems interacting with the international humanitarian

community (Meadows, 2008). A better understanding of the GCC aid system could

positively influence the interaction between GCC donors and the larger humanitarian

community.

Literature Review

There is a paucity of research about GCC countries as donors (Cochrane, 2021;

Elkahlout & Milton, 2023). The erratic reporting practices in the GCC, combined with the

reluctance of the recipient countries to release information about foreign aid, represent an

added challenge for researchers (Nishimura, 2021). The scarcity of peerreviewed

literature about the GCC as humanitarian donors necessitated reliance on primary data

from government sources and international platforms to expand the arguments made by

scholars. The tables and figures in this chapter were generated from FTS to support the

narrative. This literature review is divided into three main sections covering the

international humanitarian system, GHD, and GCC donors.

The International Humanitarian System

Response to major humanitarian problems is complicated. Some humanitarian

situations take decades to resolve, such as those in Somalia and Afghanistan. Besiou and

Van Wassenhove (2021) explained that the international humanitarian system is complex,

with many agents, stocks, influencers, detectors, networks, and feedback loops. Izumi et

al. (2019) concurred about the complexity of the humanitarian system, highlighting the

entangled relationship between the various stakeholders. A proper stakeholder analysis for

the international humanitarian system should go beyond describing roles and

responsibilities into feedback loops and interaction dynamics (Modgil et al., 2020). To

understand the complexity of the international humanitarian system and the relationship

between its stakeholders, including donors, one must go back to the beginning of the

system and trace its origins.

Coordination facilitates complementarity, improves effectiveness, and minimizes

resource wastage. In 1991, the UNGA adopted Resolution 46/182 to improve the

coordination of international response to natural and human-made disasters (United

Nations [UN], n.d.). The resolution recommended the establishment of a department of

humanitarian affairs under the UN secretariat to coordinate humanitarian response

worldwide, given the large number of stakeholders involved in the process. In 1992, the

IASC, comprising the leading humanitarian organizations within and outside the UN

system, was formed and endorsed by UNGA Resolution 48/57 (United Nations [UN],

n.d.). The IASC was created to support the new department and the emergency relief

coordinator who heads it with issues related to coordinating humanitarian assistance,

policy development, advocacy, and system-wide standard operating procedures

(InterAgency Standing Committee [IASC], 2017; United Nations [UN], n.d.). The UN

Department of Humanitarian Affairs developed into a full-fledged organization and

transformed, in 1998, into the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA],

2022b). The UNGA mandated UNOCHA to coordinate humanitarian response to large

disasters, issue consolidated appeals, mobilize resources for humanitarian response, and

advocate for the assistance and protection of people affected by disasters.

UNOCHA was established to coordinate international humanitarian response and

advocate for the accountable delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, the 1990s and

early 2000s witnessed an increase in concerns about the performance of actors in field

operations and the quality of the services provided to people in complex emergencies

(Kennedy, 2019b; Khaled, 2021). Lack of coordination among humanitarian actors

caused duplication of efforts and waste of resources. Besiou and Van Wassenhove (2021)

emphasized the complexity of the humanitarian system from a coordination perspective,

attributing the complexity to the number and different objectives of the stakeholders.

Hilhorst et al. (2021) argued that the absence of minimum standards and misperceptions

about humanitarian accountability generated a movement inside the humanitarian system,

leading to the creation of accountability frameworks and initiatives, such as the Sphere

Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, the Core

Humanitarian Standards, the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red

Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief, to list a

few. Hihorst added that such accountability initiatives led the international humanitarian

system to recognize people affected by disasters as stakeholders in humanitarian response

and investigate donors' performance as enablers and critical actors. The international

humanitarian system has undergone several structural improvements since its

establishment in 1991 (Interagency Standing Committee [IASC], n.d., United Nations

[UN], n.d.). The multiplicity of stakeholders encouraged recent coordination initiatives to

stress the centrality of people affected by disasters and included donors as key actors.

Humanitarian Accountability Initiatives

Different accountability initiatives targeted separate groups of stakeholders.

Kennedy (2019a) noted that since the 1990s, more than 100 self-regulation initiatives

emerged to standardize the work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Some

initiatives, such as the Sphere project, became full-fledged standardization mechanisms

focused on key performance indicators and ethical humanitarianism (Kennedy, 2019b).

However, most existing accountability instruments were tailored for responders such as

NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, and UN agencies. Very few

accountability initiatives target donor governments and provide standards for their

performance. In Hilhorst et al.’s (2021) review of international humanitarian

accountability initiatives, only the Humanitarian Action Partnership (HAP) and the GHD

refer clearly to donor accountability. However, non-DAC donors, including GCC donors,

are not members of HAP or GHD, and there is hardly any literature on their performance

from an accountability perspective. Hence, it is important to explore the understanding of

government officials and aid workers in aligning the modus operandi of the four large

Gulf donors, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, with GHD practices.

The motivation of GCC donors and the impact of their funding behavior in the

Middle East and the Muslim World attracted the attention of scholars. Harmáček et al.

(2022) underscored the increasingly important role of GCC donors, especially in areas of

geopolitical interest to the region, such as Arab and Muslim countries. However, other

scholars, such as Guéraiche (2022), noted that GCC humanitarian contributions,

especially from the UAE, were driven by economic interests and political agendas. Li

(2019) argued similarly about the economic motivation of KSA’s aid programs.

Guéraiche referred to competition over footprint in Africa between UAE and Qatar,

noting a 10-fold increase in UAE’s assistance to African countries during the last 10

years. Several scholars referred to the importance of humanitarian and development

contributions by GCC governments while noting the blurry demarcation line between the

two and the unpredictability of GCC contributions due to the fluctuation of giving levels,

which hampers planning and international cooperation (Bashir, 2022; Elkahlout, 2020;

Guéraiche, 2022; Tok, 2021). However, UNOCHA’s vision states that the ability of the

international humanitarian system to fulfill its mission of assisting and protecting people

in need depends on how the system works together to achieve this goal. OCHA's vision is

for a cooperative aid community that works together to help people needing humanitarian

assistance and international protection.

The performance of the international humanitarian system during disaster

situations determines its functionality and, consequently, raison d’etre. Ruesch et al.

(2022) drew attention to the complexity of humanitarian response operations and

underlined some of the initiatives adopted by the international humanitarian system to

enhance cooperation and complementarity. For example, to facilitate coordination in the

field and promote responsibility sharing among the different stakeholders, UNOCHA

established the cluster system after the Pakistan earthquake in 2005. Currently, 12 clusters

cover different sectors such as protection, shelter, food, and nutrition. A designated

agency leads each cluster to promote accountability and leadership

(Humanitarian Response, 2020). At the end of his tenure, Secretary-General Ban KiMoon

called for an international summit to encourage commitments by different humanitarian

actors, including donor governments and governments hosting refugees, to reduce human

suffering and agree on a roadmap for humanitarian assistance (Agenda for Humanity,

n.d.). The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) revived the narrative about collective

responsibility and burden sharing while accentuating the role of all stakeholders,

including donors. A key outcome of WHS was the agreement between humanitarian

organizations and donors to improve the efficiency of humanitarian funding through an

instrument called the Grand Bargain (Agenda for Humanity, n.d.). The Grand Bargain

stressed accountability by all stakeholders, including donors, to people affected by

disasters and reaffirmed the GHD principles. Therefore, understanding the GHD

principles and best practices is essential for understanding international donors' modus

operandi.

Good Humanitarian Donorship

The GHD Initiative introduced a set of guidelines, principles, and best practices

acknowledged by the largest international donors as benchmarks for ethical, humanitarian

action (Good Humanitarian Donorship [GHD], 2018). The GHD initiative started in 2003

as an informal coordination mechanism among 17 governmental humanitarian donors.

Sweden championed the GHD initiative and hosted the group’s first meeting. The GHD

platform now comprises 42 international donors and is focused on policy development

issues and promoting principled needs-based humanitarian response (Good Humanitarian

Donorship [GHD], 2018). Gibbons et al. (2020) highlighted the link between the

principles of GHD and general ethical frameworks such as the humanitarian principles of

humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Likewise, Kennedy (2019a) drew

attention to the importance of self-accountability initiatives such as the GHD, noting the

scarcity of research about humanitarian accountability. Egger and Schopper (2022) agreed

with Kennedy, explaining that limited data about non-DAC donors forced them to reduce

their final research sample.

The GHD (2018) initiative members adopted a set of 24 principles defining the

conduct of a good donor. The 24 principles include general ethical codes such as

promoting international law, the centrality of the UN’s role, and adopting strategies to

support long-term disaster recovery (Good Humanitarian Donorship [GHD], 2018). Other

principles addressed finance modalities, implementation mechanisms, accountability to

people affected by disasters, and promotion of standards in humanitarian assistance.

Alameldeen (2021) explained how the GHD funding principles encouraged donors to

provide flexible multiyear financial contributions to allow implementing agencies and

communities the opportunity to plan for long-term interventions. Ethical codes like the

GHD principles are meant to alleviate the impact of aid politicization, especially in armed

conflicts and complex, protracted emergencies (Alameldeen, 2021). The principles urge

donors to maintain funding levels for older protracted disasters when new ones occur. For

example, the GHD's good practices stress the role of implementing agencies, funded by

donors, to adhere to ethical codes, efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability to people

affected by disasters. However, Alameldeen argued that humanitarian principles are less

relevant in modern times because of the ethical dilemmas associated with their

implementation when humanitarian organizations fail, under donor pressure, to balance

the principles of neutrality and independence.

Although GHD (2018) principles and good practices are not the only benchmarks

for ethical, humanitarian action, they were used as the primary reference in this study

because of their relevance to the behavior of GCC donors per se. GHD principles

reiterated the centrality of the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality,

impartiality, and independence adopted by the UNGA in 1991 (United Nations [UN],

n.d.). The strong link between the GHD and humanitarian principles adds to the

initiative's credibility as a sideway accountability tool that relies on cross-fertilizing best

practices among peers. Hilhorst et al. (2021) divided accountability into three main

categories: upwards, downwards, and sideways. Upward accountability is usually

between implementing humanitarian agencies and donors or between an implementing

agency and the humanitarian principles or codes of conduct. Downward accountability

involves affected communities and local implementing partners. Sideways accountability

is between peers such as NGOs or humanitarian donors.

Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship

The members of the GHD (2018) initiative agreed on eight principles to guide

their humanitarian work. The GHD principles revolve around needs-based interventions,

non-discrimination, coordination, effectiveness, efficiency, flexibility, transparency, and

accountability (Good Humanitarian Donorship [GHD], 2018). These principles build on

other codes of conduct and humanitarian principles, such as the Sphere Standards, the

humanitarian principles, the Common Humanitarian Principles (CHP), and the Grand

Bargain (Good Humanitarian Donorship [GHD], 2018). Given the overarching nature of

the GHD principles, a brief explanation of their meaning might help understand their

relevance to donor performance and accountability. Analyzing adherence to each of the

eight principles was beyond the scope of this study. Future research could investigate the

performance of GCC donors against each principle and draw comparisons between them

and the members of the GHD initiative.

The first GHD (2018) principle encourages good humanitarian donors to follow a

needs-based approach to humanitarian assistance. Lie (2020) noted that humanitarian

donors should make decisions based on the needs of affected people rather than political

agendas and vested interests. Donors must listen to the needs of affected communities

and local organizations and aid based on a participatory approach where affected

communities play an active role in designing projects and interventions. Supporting Lie's

argument, Gibbons et al. (2020) attributed the decision by large donors to launch the

GHD initiative to claims that foreign assistance was provided based on political

motivations and economic interests. Gibbons et al. elaborated that donors must not

discriminate between communities in need if foreign aid is provided based on needs

alone. The GHD principle of no discrimination reflects the spirit of the humanitarian

principle of impartiality adopted by UNGA Resolution 46/182, obliging humanitarian

actors to avoid all types of discrimination (United Nations [UN], n.d.). Donors should

ensure that assistance is provided based on need only without discriminating against any

affected group based on race, ethnicity, religion, or political affiliation. To achieve this

overarching objective of assisting all those in need without discrimination, donors should

work together to ensure consistency and complementarity.

Donors must work closely with other stakeholders to optimize disaster response,

improve efficiency, and minimize duplication of efforts. The GHD principle of effective

coordination urges donors to cooperate to optimize resource use and serve as many

people in need as possible (Good Humanitarian Donorship [GHD], 2018). Gibbons et al.

(2020) stressed that people affected by disasters are central stakeholders in any

humanitarian process. Other stakeholders include local authorities, local organizations,

international NGOs, local and international media, armed forces, UN agencies, and other

donors, to list a few (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

[UNOCHA], 2022a). Participating in multilateral coordination mechanisms creates a

conducive environment for sharing lessons and maximizing the impact of limited

resources. Hilhorst et al. (2021) viewed coordination as being integral to accountability

and taking responsibility for aid effectiveness. Maru et al. (2022) urged donors to invest

in monitoring and evaluation activities to ensure that humanitarian projects are effectively

designed to meet the needs of people affected by disasters. Allocating sufficient funds for

monitoring and evaluation, including participatory programs by members of affected

communities, helps donors improve the effectiveness of aid programs (Good

Humanitarian Donorship [GHD], 2018). The principles of effectiveness and efficiency

require donors to make funding decisions with a degree of flexibility and innovation.

Flexible funding by donors allows responding organizations to save more lives

and respond quickly to the changing needs of people affected by disasters. Disaster

situations are fluid, and operational decisions on the ground should be left to specialized

responding teams. Al-Mahaidi (2021) criticized existing donor funding models,

explaining that donors prioritize immediate needs over long-term interventions. In Al

Mahaidi’s view, restricted funding obstructs aid operations' efficiency and effectiveness.

Al Mahaidi concluded that current humanitarian funding systems are not fit for purpose.

Tozier De La Poterie et al. (2022) adopted a similar argument highlighting the need for

flexible anticipatory humanitarian financing models to improve transparency and

accountability in humanitarian programs.

The last two GHD principles address issues of transparency and accountability.

The GHD initiative demands that donor governments be transparent about their funding

decisions and share adequate information with the public, other donors, and the media.

Transparency contributes to aid efficiency, improves accountability, and enables better

collaboration among donors and disaster responders. Pusterla and Pusterla (2021) stressed

donors' accountability concerning the use of their funds. For Pusterla and Pusterla, donor

accountability extends to the way their funds are used by implementing organizations.

Donor governments are encouraged to develop accountability frameworks with

implementing organizations to enhance downward and upward accountability, minimize

waste, and eliminate corruption.

Good Humanitarian Donorship Best Practices

The GHD initiative elaborated eight best practices corresponding to the eight

principles to help donors translate their respect for the general principles into actions. The

GHD best practices fall into four categories: (a) funding, (b) implementation standards,

(2021) explained that donors should ensure that funding new disasters does not affect

older ones and provide flexible funding to implementing agencies for better planning and

timely response. In this context, the GHD initiative encourages donors to share the burden

of humanitarian response by contributing responsibly to multilateral appeals and flexible

pooled funding facilities, as elaborated by Al-Mahaidi (2021). The GHD best practices

encourage donors to respect ethical guidelines and advocate for protecting civilians in

armed conflicts. In addition, the best practices highlight the importance of learning

lessons from past humanitarian crises through regular evaluations and transparent, timely

reporting. Finally, the members of the GHD initiative adopted the systematic use of cash

transfers and cash-based interventions in humanitarian response as an assistance modality

that respects the dignity of affected people.

GCC Donors and Good Donorship Practices

GCC countries contribute generously to humanitarian assistance without being

members of the GHD initiative or OECD's DAC Committee. Elkahlout and Milton

(2023) underscored the generosity of GCC countries, noting that all four GCC

governments are non-DAC donors. The reports issued by the foreign ministries of the

four GCC countries highlight the generosity of their respective governments in financing

humanitarian assistance. Recent foreign aid reports issued by the UAE's Ministry of

Foreign Affairs state that the UAE's foreign aid has reached 140 countries and benefitted

millions of people (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, 2023a).

Saudi Arabia's King Salman Center for Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSrelief)

reported humanitarian projects in 90 countries with a total value of more than

$6,000,000,000 since its establishment in 2015 (King Salman Humanitarian Aid and

Relief Center [KSrelief], 2023a). The governments of UAE and KSA place themselves

among the most generous countries in the world if ODA is calculated as a percentage of

GNI. FTS supports the claims of the UAE and KSA by ranking them as the largest donors

to the Yemen crisis, with billions of dollars paid in humanitarian aid and development

assistance (Financial Tracking Service [FTS], 2014).

In addition, the UAE continues to feature in OECD reports among the few

countries whose ODA/GNI contributions exceed the international target of .7%. Similar

to KSA and the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait received similar recognition for their

humanitarian contributions. Barakat et al. (2020) highlighted Qatar's role in facilitating

international political negotiations in the Middle East and beyond, including in

Afghanistan, Darfur, Lebanon, Eritrea, and Djibouti. Alarabeed (2023) built on Barakat et

al.'s argument by underlining Qatar's important role in supporting peacebuilding and

political dialogue. However, Alarabeed criticized Qatar's inconsistent recording practices

and the government's lack of a strategic direction for the development-peace nexus.

While praising Qatar's generous contributions to the humanitarian response in

Darfur and Afghanistan, Alarabeed emphasized the need for more reliable data about

Qatar's role in peacebuilding. Kuwait has active NGOs with operational field presence,

especially in Africa. Kuwait hosted three international pledging conferences for Syria in

2013, 2014, and 2015, raising more than U.S. $7,000,000,000 for the humanitarian

response to the Syria crisis, which led the UN to consider Kuwait a global humanitarian

center and acknowledge the Amir of Kuwait as a humanitarian leader (Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait, n.d.). In addition, Kuwait hosted a pledging

conference for the reconstruction of Iraq in 2017 and pledged U.S. $1,000,000,000.

However, despite their generosity, GCC countries do not have aid strategies or

annual aid budgets (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD],

n.d.-c). Without annual aid budgets, humanitarian contributions by GCC countries are

decided impromptu through royal and presidential decrees. Egger and Schopper (2022)

highlighted an additional challenge related to studying non-DAC donors, such as GCC

countries, because of a research bias towards traditional Western donors. Egger and

Schopper elaborated that new donors, such as Türkiye and the Gulf States, needed more

academic attention to avoid skewing research results favoring DAC donors. This

multiple-case study will contribute to the limited literature about GCC countries by

dedicating a section to each of the four large donors in the region.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The KSA is the largest economy in the Arab world and the only Arab member of

the G20. With a population of 32,000,000 and an annual GDP of more than

$1,000,000,000,000 U.S. dollars, KSA is one of the richest countries in the world

(General Authority for Statistics [GASTAT], 2023). KSA is home to the holiest Muslim

sites: Mecca, where Muslims perform pilgrimage, and Medina, where the prophet

Mohamed is buried. Although still heavily reliant on oil as a source of income, KSA is

diversifying its economy by venturing into new fields such as tourism and entertainment.

The strategic direction to diversify the economy was highlighted in KSA’s Vision 2030

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, n.d.). The wealth

accumulated by KSA from natural resources, religious tourism, and other revenue streams

provided a solid economic base and enabled the Saudi government to contribute to

international humanitarian efforts. The government of Saudi Arabia perceives

international assistance as an obligation and duty mandated by the spirit of fraternity and

solidarity (King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center [KSrelief], 2023a).

However, Li (2019) argued that KSA uses humanitarian assistance as a tool to achieve

economic and political gains rather than purely respond to humanitarian needs.

Regardless of the motivation, which requires extensive investigation, KSA remains one of

the world’s largest donors of humanitarian assistance.

KSA’s history of humanitarian giving dates to the early 1970s. Encouraged by the

newly discovered oil fields, KSA gave generously, especially to poorer Arab and Muslim

countries. Li (2019) explained that KSA saw contributing to humanitarian assistance as a

religious duty and an act of solidarity with neighbors. The data published by KSrelief

indicated that more than 90% of Saudi humanitarian assistance went to Muslim countries

(Mohammed & Jureidini, 2022). The concentration of Saudi funding in the Muslim World

might indicate a strategic direction. However, it could also be attributed to the fact that

the Muslim World accounts for the largest humanitarian caseload, especially if forced

displacement is considered (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR],

2023). This perceived religious motivation for Saudi aid programs and the concentration

of Saudi assistance in the Arab and Muslim worlds made some scholars question the

humanitarian objectives of KSA’s aid programs, especially those led by

NGOs and civil society organizations. Volný (2022), for example, claimed that Saudi

NGOs practiced radicalization in the Balkans using humanitarian aid as a tool of

ideological soft power. Doubting the motivation of GCC donors is not limited to KSA.

Harmáček et al. (2022) divided scholars who studied the GCC region into pro-GCC and

anti-GCC. The pro-GCC group includes government media and compassionate

researchers from the Arab world who sometimes tend to exaggerate the role played by

GCC governments. Conversely, the anti-group includes scholars who accused GCC

humanitarian organizations, especially from KSA, of funding terrorism.

Concerns about the motivation of humanitarian actors from the Muslim world,

especially the GCC, soared during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s.

Krasniqi (2021) believed that GCC donors such as KSA were motivated by religious and

ideological objectives rather than humanitarian obligations. Krasniqi argued that GCC

NGOs, especially those from KSA, played a role in exporting terrorism and radical

ideologies to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the entire Western Balkans. Volný (2022)

expressed similar concerns about GCC charities, especially those from KSA. Another

strong wave of criticism against Saudi charities started after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in

the United States. Li (2021) concluded that anti-Muslim animosity, rather than factual

analyses, could have fueled some generalizations about GCC organizations in Bosnia-

Herzegovina.

Institutionalization of the Saudi Aid Sector

Following 9/11, world governments adopted tight financial regulations to combat

terrorism financing, which directly impacted fundraising by charities on one hand and

international money transfers on another. Some scholars believe that 9/11 changed the aid

scenery in the Muslim world and the GCC (Barakat et al., 2020; Kancherla, 2020).

Qurtuby and Aldamer (2021) noted that in response to global counter-terrorism financing

regulations following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, KSA adopted strict measures to regularize

fundraising by charity organizations and to institutionalize the charity sector. Qurtuby

and Aldamer defended Saudi Arabia against accusations of funding terrorism, explaining

that KSA has suffered from terrorist attacks and detailing the measures adopted by the

government to regulate financial contributions to charity. KSA was one of the first

countries in the GCC to adopt counter-terrorism financial regulations and restrict

fundraising activities by civil society organizations.

The Saudi government's efforts to regulate and institutionalize charity work

culminated with the establishment of the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief

Center (King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center [KSrelief], 2023b) in 2015.

KSrelief was established by a royal decree stressing KSA's vision of assisting people in

need worldwide (King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center [KSrelief], 2023a).

KSrelief has become the official humanitarian interface of the Saudi government and the

primary representative of KSA in the international humanitarian system. To date, KSrelief

has reported humanitarian assistance projects in 92 countries with a total value of

$6,200,000,000 (King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center [KSrelief], 2023b).

Yemen is the largest recipient of KSA funding since the establishment of KSrelief, with a

total project value of $4,200,000,000 (67.7% of total Saudi humanitarian assistance),

followed by Syria with a total funding of $372,000,000 (less than 6% of total

contributions). Since its establishment, KSrelief, despite being a semigovernmental entity,

has become the official source of information about the humanitarian activities of KSA.

The website of KSrelief, more than MoFA, has become the most reliable source of

official information about KSA's aid efforts.

In the context of Saudi assistance to Palestine, Turner (2019) argued that pressure

placed by Western countries on KSA resulted in better institutionalization of aid programs

in KSA. In Turner’s view, Western countries demanded that Saudi Arabia have better

oversight over Muslim faith-based charities operating in Palestine by introducing more

robust controls to prevent the use of aid money for ideological objectives. This pressure

improved the recording of aid contributions by KSA and encouraged the government to

control and monitor the activities of NGOs, especially those operating internationally.

However, in Turner’s view, no improvement has occurred in terms of the predictability of

giving by KSA. Both bilateral and multilateral allocations still happen on an ad-hoc basis

and without specific parameters that could help humanitarian partners anticipate budget

levels and plan programs accordingly. Harmáček et al. (2022) argued that weak aid

structures in the GCC reduced effectiveness, increased volatility, and hampered the

proper planning of humanitarian programs, noting that funding fluctuations by large

donors could expand and prolong conflicts. Clarity of roles and responsibilities among

government institutions in charge of the aid sector could enhance understanding of the

functional setup in the country.

Development assistance by KSA is managed by the Saudi Fund for Development

(SFD, n.d.). Established by a royal decree in 1974, SFD’s mandate aimed at contributing

to international development by providing loans and grants to developing and least

developed countries. Between 1975 and 2020, SFD assisted 84 developing countries with

more than 69,000,000,000 Saudi Riyals ($18,400,000,000). Although most of SFD’s

contributions are soft loans to least-developed countries, SFD managed some grants to

international organizations on behalf of the Saudi government, especially before the

establishment of KSrelief (Saudi Fund for Development [SFD], n.d.). After KSrelief was

established, SFD became more focused on its core mandate of soft lending for

development projects. SFD provided 45.3% of their total contributions between 1975 and

2020 through joint funding programs with other development institutions to encourage

international cooperation and maximize the impact for beneficiary countries.

Apart from KSrelief and SFD, no other Saudi entity is allowed to engage in

international charitable activities. At the local level, the Ministry of Human Resources

and Social Development controls all non-profit activities and tightly monitors fundraising

for charitable causes (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development [MHRSD],

n.d.). Barakat et al. noted that Unlike Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, where some NGOs are

still allowed to fundraise and implement aid programs internationally, either directly or in

collaboration with partners, the non-profit space in KSA has shrunk during the last 2

decades. Local NGOs in KSA are restricted by law from fundraising for international aid,

direct implementation abroad, or allocating funds to international entities, including

multilateral organizations such as the UN (Qurtuby & Aldamer, 2021). The only legal

route for Saudi charities, individuals, and private sector entities to contribute to

international humanitarian causes is now limited to KSrelief since SFD only works with

individuals or local partners.

No KSA government website, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KSrelief,

SFD, and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development, refers to an aid

strategy, policy, or annual budget. Elkahlout and Milton (2023) noted that KSA has been

consistently giving to humanitarian causes since the 1970s, but no government website

explains the modality of aid allocation. Bashir (2022) explained that aid budgets in KSA

and other GCC countries are allocated by royal decrees in an ad hoc manner, causing high

unpredictability and aid volatility. Harmáček et al. (2022) elaborated on Bashir’s point

further by highlighting the negative impact of erratic allocation mechanisms on planning

for humanitarian response, which requires clarity and transparency. Therefore, despite its

acknowledged generosity and regular giving, the lack of a clear aid strategy and annual

budget makes KSA an unreliable partner for humanitarian organizations. The lack of clear

aid strategies was identified as a challenge by several scholars, including Elkahlout and

Milton (2023), Barakat et al. (2020), Bashir (2022), and Li (2019). AlYahia and Fustier

(2011) and Eltarabulsi-McCarthy (2017) referred to unpredictability and dependence on

impromptu allocation by royal and presidential decrees as the aid sector’s characteristics

in the GCC, denoting no significant situation change during the last decade.

KSA’s Humanitarian Aid Motivation

The motivation behind KSA's humanitarian assistance has received some

scholarly attention. Li (2019) argued that KSA's humanitarian assistance was politically

motivated, suggesting that KSA provided aid to developing and least-developed countries

under the banner of south-south cooperation to mask the real objective of expanding an

extreme Wahabi version of Islam. Li's views on the political motivation of KSA's aid

programs agree with Volný’s (2022), Kancherla (2020), and Krzymowski (2022). Li

added an element of economic diplomacy as a strategy by arguing that KSA protects its

economic and political interests abroad by assisting poorer countries in gaining political

standing. Li referred to KSA's assistance to autocratic regimes in Egypt and Pakistan as

an example of how KSA supported military regimes, claiming that KSA tried to

incorporate Islamic law into Pakistan's judicial system between 1970 and 1980.

Kancherla (2020) supported Li's argument about the ideological motivation of KSA's

humanitarian programs, claiming that extremist groups have taken advantage of Saudi

charities the most. However, Li believed that KSA started to place more checks and

balances on their aid programs, coinciding with the establishment of KSrelief and the

reforms introduced by Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman.

Some scholars have studied the motivation of GCC countries to support the

humanitarian response to specific disaster situations. Bashir (2022), for example, studied

the behavior of GCC donors in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Bashir

highlighted the generosity of the four large Arab donors, especially KSA and UAE, whose

assistance reached more than 100 countries globally, transcending regional and

ideological affiliation. While agreeing with the argument about the political motivation of

GCC humanitarian contributions, Bashir thought that GCC programs following

COVID19 were less politicized than their Western counterparts. Dandashly and Kourtelis

(2023) counterargued against the opinion that political interests drove GCC humanitarian

assistance, concluding that DAC and non-DAC donors shared the same motivation for

engagement in humanitarian affairs. Dandashly and Kourtelis found GCC contributions

less conditional than their Western counterparts. Western donors are more transparent

about reporting their contributions. Bashir (2022) praised the generosity of GCC

countries who donated generously to the World Health Organization (WHO) to help curb

the spread of the pandemic. The donations highlighted GCC government-affiliated

media’s lack of transparency and tendency to exaggerate government contributions.

Funding Modalities

To gain a better overview of KSA’s humanitarian contributions during the last 10

years and expand the argument made by scholars about KSA’s giving patterns, I

generated information from the FTS. FTS data offer an opportunity to expand the views

of scholars and explain their arguments based on funding trends. Figure 2 demonstrates

KSA’s humanitarian contributions since 2013. The recorded contributions indicate that

KSA has consistently given humanitarian assistance annually, with a spike from 2018 to

2021 because of additional allocations to Yemen (Financial Tracking Service [FTS],

2014). A closer look at the spikes in KSA’s giving provides some insights into the

strategic direction of aid programs.

Following the expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) attacks

in Iraq, the terrorist group controlled a large part of Iraq’s territories, forcing civilians to

become internally displaced in other parts of the country (United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA], 2022a). To scale up humanitarian

response on the ground, the UN issued a flash appeal asking for an initial $420,000,000 to

meet the urgent needs of the displaced population. This amount later increased to

$1,100,000,000. KSA responded to the UN’s flash appeal by generously contributing

$500,000,000. KSA’s sizable contribution to Iraq in 2014 and the lack of similar

contributions in the following years support the argument made by Harmáček et al.

(2022) and Turner (2019). The Saudi contribution to the Iraq response plan was allocated

per sector and implementing organization to address an immediate problem. However, no

significant investments were made by KSA in Iraq after that to safeguard stability or stop

the humanitarian situation from deteriorating.

Figure 2

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s Recorded Humanitarian Contributions, 2013–2023

Note. Generated from FTS.

Analyzing KSA's contributions during the last 10 years supports the argument

about the relationship between foreign aid and geopolitical interests. Figure 3 indicates

that shelter, food, and health represented the humanitarian priorities for KSA. The

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

AmountinMillionU.S.Dollars

Millions

Year

'AmountinMillionU.S.Dollars'

primary recipients of funds from the Saudi contribution were UN agencies, such as the

World Food Program, UNHCR, and the UN Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). In

addition, the analysis indicates that KSA gives more humanitarian assistance to issues of

geopolitical importance, such as Iraq and Yemen, supporting the argument by Li (2019).

It also demonstrates a clear preference for specific sectors, such as food, and a giving

modality through large UN organizations, as argued by Elkahlout and Milton (2023). In

addition, FTS records highlight the impact of KSA's contributions on the funding level of

a given humanitarian situation. KSA alone contributed more than 62% of all humanitarian

funding for Iraq in 2014. The same applies to Yemen between 2018 and 2021. In 2018,

KSA contributed $551,000,000 to the Yemen humanitarian response plan, representing

21.9% of the plan's total requirements. The trend continued in 2019 when KSA

contributed more than $1,000,000,000 to the Yemen humanitarian response plan (29.2%

of total requirements), in 2020 with a contribution of $329,900,000 (16.6%), and in 2021

with a contribution of $386,000,000 (16.2%). Bordón and Alrefai (2023) described the

impact of such concentrated funding for a single humanitarian situation as a pure

representation of how KSA used humanitarian aid to serve a political agenda and control

sociopolitical dynamics inside Yemen.

Figure 3

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's Funding to Recipient Organizations in 2014

Note. Generated from FTS.

The relationship between KSA’s giving patterns, choices, and strategies was

examined further under the theoretical framework of this study. Palagashvili and

Williamson (2021) noted that discussions of donor performance hardly addressed the

performance of emerging non-DAC donors despite their growing importance, referring to

KSA in this context. However, Palagashvili and Williamson could not find much

difference between the performance of both DAC and non-DAC donors. Dandashly and

Kourtelis (2023) reached a similar conclusion by drawing similarities between DAC and

non-DAC donors regarding motivation and conditionality. Turner (2019), despite their

critical views of the ideological orientation of Saudi aid in Palestine, noted that KSA, as a

non-DAC donor, performed better than Western donors in terms of empowering local

partners and investing in strengthening the capacities of local organizations.

The State of Kuwait

The State of Kuwait is a small Arab country with a rich history of humanitarian

giving. Right after its independence in 1961, Kuwait established the Kuwait Fund for

Arab Economic Development (Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development [KFAED],

n.d.), the same year the United States Agency for International Development was

established. KFAED was initially intended as a fund to support Arab countries, hence the

word "Arab" in its name. However, in 1974, KFAED's mandate was expanded to become

global (Bashir, 2022). Until 2023, KFAED assisted 105 countries with a total soft loan

value of $21,800,000,000 (KFAED, 2023). Although KFAED's name might give the

impression that only Arab countries benefit from its services, the fund has assisted many

countries outside the Arab and Muslim worlds. The establishment of KFAED during the

1st year Kuwait was proclaimed an independent state carries some connotations.

Leichtman (2022b) argued that Kuwait had used international assistance to garner support

from the international community and protect its sovereignty, especially against threats

from neighboring Iraq and Iran. Lowi (2019) argued similarly about Kuwait's use of

foreign aid as a political instrument. Lowi believed that, unlike KSA, Kuwait's foreign aid

programs did not favor certain ethnic groups or support specific ideologies but were used

to serve political objectives related to the country's sovereignty and position in the

international community.

The Humanitarian Landscape in Kuwait

Civil society in Kuwait is active and old compared to other GCC countries. The

websites of Kuwaiti NGOs such as the International Islamic Charity Organization (IICO),

Direct Aid, and the Red Crescent indicate international presence in several parts of the

world. Unlike NGOs in KSA and the UAE, Kuwaiti NGOs are not linked to founders

from the ruling family, hence their generic names. Most Kuwaiti NGOs, however, have

religious affiliations, such as IICO and Direct Aid, or linkages to a social group, such as

the Patients Help Association (Lowi, 2019). Leichtman (2022b) noted that the

government of Kuwait's support for charity work and individual giving contributed to the

overall soft power of Kuwait's aid policy. For example, the collective impact of Kuwait's

governmental and non-governmental aid programs helped Kuwait collect 188 votes for a

non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council between 2018 and 2019 (Leichtman,

2022b). The government's reliance on the role of NGOs in foreign aid may have played a

role in Kuwait's relatively relaxed civil society environment compared to KSA and UAE.

The relationship between governments and civil society organizations in the GCC

is unique, and the demarcation line between governmental and non-governmental

programs across the region is thin. Barakat et al. (2020) mentioned that some government

officials are seconded to NGOs in the UAE and Qatar while still on the government

payroll, denoting the complicated relationship between governments and civil society in

those countries. The relationship between NGOs and the government in Kuwait is less

entangled than in other countries in the region despite the government’s reliance on the

efforts of NGOs to improve its official overall ranking (Leichtman, 2022a). Unlike KSA,

where fundraising funnels through KSrelief, several Kuwaiti NGOs have resource

mobilization permits and organize campaigns for specific causes, especially during the

holy month of Ramadan. To list a few, the websites of IICO, Direct Aid, Sheikh Abdallah

Al Nouri Charity Society, and the Kuwait Red Crescent Society (KRCS, 2023) have a

click-to-donate button for individual donors to contribute. As Leichtman (2022b)

explained, the ability to legally mobilize resources from the public enabled some Kuwait

NGOs to have extensive field presence. For example, Direct Aid, established in 1981 as

the Africa Muslim Committee, operates in over 30 African countries (Direct Aid, 2023).

The organization changed its name to Direct Aid in 1999 to remove geographic

boundaries from its mandate (Direct Aid, 2023; Leichtman, 2022b). However, not all

Kuwaiti civil society organizations maintain the same distance vis-a-vis the government.

The KRCS (2023), established in 1966, defined its mandate as a support entity to official

aid authorities. The KRCS changed its mandate from relief to long-term development to

achieve this support vision to official aid channels (Kuwait Red Crescent Society

[KRCS], 2023). The unique relationship between the government and civil society

organizations in Kuwait is demonstrated by the official designation of the chairpersons of

several NGOs, such as IICO and KRCS, who served as government ministers before

moving to civil society.

Some Kuwaiti NGOs have an Islamic ideological background, such as IICO,

Direct Aid (2023), and Sheikh Abdullah Al Nouri Charity Society (2023). However,

Kuwait's general civil society landscape is a mix of religious and secular (Leichtman,

2022a). Following 9/11, Kuwait was pressured by the international community to regulate

the mobilization and deployment of aid money (Bashir, 2022; Elkahlout & Milton, 2023;

Leichtman, 2022a). In response, the government established stricter financial regulations

to control and monitor public fundraising by charities. Leichtman (2022b) argued that the

humanitarian generosity of Kuwait could partially be attributed to the government's

attempt to whitewash its name and fend off criticism after 9/11. However, both Elkahlout

and Milton (2023) and Leichtman (2022a) agreed that the measures adopted by Kuwait

after 9/11 have contributed to better institutionalization of the aid sector. However, while

noting that additional regulations by the government of Kuwait have contributed to the

transparency of the aid sector, Elkahlout and Milton believed that charity work has

become more politicized and securitized.

Kuwait’s Engagement With the International Humanitarian System

Donors engage with the international humanitarian system in different ways,

mainly as financiers and enablers of humanitarian action. However, there is a research

gap about GCC states as donors and humanitarian actors (Barakat et al., 2020; Bashir,

2022; Elkahlout & Milton, 2023; Leichtman, 2022b). The paucity of reliable research

about Kuwait makes it necessary to rely on raw data to understand Kuwait’s behavior as a

humanitarian actor. Elkahlout and Milton (2023) referred to the shifty reporting practices

of the Kuwaiti government. FTS records support this conclusion. Kuwait’s giving levels

are inconsistent. FTS records indicate a high of $478,000,000 in 2018 and a low of

$41,000,000 in 2021 (Financial Tracking Service [FTS], 2014). Elkahlout and Milton

argued that Kuwait’s recorded contribution in 2021 had reached as low as $3,000,000,

adding that, despite its generosity, Kuwait’s performance is the most unbalanced among

GCC donors. Figure 4 overviews Kuwait’s humanitarian contributions between 2013 and

2023. The fluctuation in Kuwait’s contributions offers an opportunity to study the

government’s interaction with the international humanitarian system. The fluctuation in

Kuwait’s performance extends to general engagement in humanitarian affairs. Kuwait

hosted three international pledging conferences for Syria in 2012, 2013, and 2014

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait, n.d.). Kuwait’s role went beyond

financial generosity to offer a platform for interaction between DAC and nonDAC

donors. Supported by UNOCHA, Kuwait established a coordination platform for the

donors who pledged at least $20,000,000 for the humanitarian response to the Syrian

crisis. In addition to encouraging dialogue and coordination among donors, the Syria Top

Donors Group aimed to follow up on donor commitments and increase funding levels to

the UN response plans.

The return on Kuwait’s humanitarian investment in the wake of the Syria crisis

was evident. Elkahlout (2020) mentioned that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon

announced Kuwait as a humanitarian center and awarded its Amir, Sheikh Sabah AlJaber

Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, the title of humanitarian leader to show appreciation for Kuwait’s

efforts in creating a platform for resource mobilization and dialogue among humanitarian

actors. Leichtman’s (2022a) view that Kuwait used humanitarian assistance as a soft

power tool to enhance its international standing in the international community supports

Elkahlout’s argument. Similarly, Lowi (2019) reiterated the soft power dimension of

Kuwait’s humanitarian role. Figure 4 shows Kuwait’s recorded contributions during the

last 10 years, indicating that Kuwait has contributed regularly but inconsistently to

humanitarian assistance. Figure 4 demonstrates the fluctuation in Kuwait’s contributions

over the years. Kuwait’s sizable contributions to the response to the Syrian crisis are

responsible for the spikes between 2013 and 2016.

The fluctuation in Kuwait’s humanitarian contributions offers an opportunity to

analyze the government’s aid-giving patterns. Elkahlout (2020) attributed the peaks in

Kuwait’s donations to several factors, including strategic interests, solidarity with

countries affected by disasters, and response to acute humanitarian needs. Elkahlout

added that Kuwait’s inconsistent donations could also be linked to changes in oil prices,

given the government’s reliance on oil revenue, but could also be associated with

Kuwait’s interest in non-transactional partnership with the humanitarian system. To

expand this argument, one can look at Kuwait’s role during the beginning of the Syrian

crisis. Kuwait hosted three pledging events for Syria between 2013 and 2016.

Complementing its role as a host, Kuwait made sizable contributions to encourage other

donors to follow suit.

Similarly, in 2018, Kuwait hosted a pledging conference for Iraq, resulting in

$30,000,000,000 in grants and foreign direct investments (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

the State of Kuwait, n.d.). Nevertheless, Kuwait's commitment to humanitarian causes

was not always linked to hosting conferences on its territories. In 2016, after hosting three

consecutive pledging events for Syria, Kuwait joined Germany, the UK, and Norway in a

fourth pledging conference for the same crisis organized in London. In addition, FTS

indicates that Kuwait has contributed more than $40,000,000 to Yemen and $205,000,000

to the countries affected by the Syrian crisis without assuming a convening role.

Figure 4

Kuwait’s Recorded Humanitarian Contributions, 2013–2023

Note. Generated from FTS.

Kuwait’s Aid Motivation

Analyzing Kuwait’s engagement with the international humanitarian system

indicates clear dynamism. Elkahlout (2020) and Lowi (2019) argued that the relationship

between Kuwait and the humanitarian system was interactive and dynamic, referencing

the alignment between Kuwait’s foreign aid and political position. Palagashvili and

Williamson (2021) described Kuwait as one of the most transparent non-DAC donors

who report their overhead costs in full. Harmáček et al. (2022) added that Kuwait and the

UAE were the only GCC donors who provided disaggregated data to OEDC, mentioning

that Kuwait’s overall ODA reached an average of .56% of GNI between 2000 and 2015.

Another dimension in the relationship between Kuwait and the international community

manifests itself in Kuwait’s non-aligned position vis-à-vis political tensions in the region

and beyond. Al-Eshaq and Rasheed (2022) referred to Kuwait’s mediation role during the

Gulf crisis, commending the government for maintaining a difficult balance between

Qatar on one side and KSA, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt on the other. Kuwait’s role

during the Gulf crisis manifested the government’s neutral, independent foreign policy

despite pressure from strong neighbors such as KSA and the UAE (Barakat et al., 2020;

Elkahlout, 2020; Tok, 2021). Elkahlout (2020), for example, described Kuwait as a more

neutral political actor than KSA and the UAE. Barakat et al. (2020) argued similarly,

explaining that Kuwait’s neutrality manifested itself in the government’s soft control over

civil society organizations compared with the UAE, which imposes strict restrictions on

NGOs.

GCC countries have divergent political positions despite being members of the

same council. Tok (2021) divided GCC countries into three categories: (a) prodemocracy,

(b) counter-revolutionary, and (c) neutral. Tok listed Qatar only in the prodemocracy

group based on the government’s position vis-à-vis Arab spring countries, its relationship

with Türkiye, and its reproachment with Iran. The counter-revolutionary group included

KSA, UAE, and Bahrain for reasons similar to the Arab Spring, Türkiye, and Iran. The

third category included Kuwait and Oman because they refrained from taking sides

during the Gulf crisis and the conflict in Yemen (Tok, 2021). Leichtman (2022b)

interpreted Kuwait’s neutral foreign policy approach as an existential strategy to protect

itself against hostile neighbors. This strategy could also explain Kuwait’s preference to

channel financial contributions through multilateral organizations such as the UN. Figure

5 shows that Kuwait has channeled nearly 80% of its foreign aid in 2023 through UN

agencies, with all other funding representing only 22.4% of the total (Financial Tracking

Service [FTS], 2014). Donating to large organizations like the UN supported the opinion

that Kuwait’s foreign aid was neutral, less politicized, and more geared towards

supporting the government’s status in the international community.

Figure 5

Kuwait’s Funding to Recipient Organizations in 2023

Note. Generated from FTS.

The list of countries that received aid from Kuwait offered another perspective on

the dynamic relationship between Kuwait and the international community. More than

92% of Kuwait’s funding in 2023 went to Türkiye and Syria in response to the

devastating earthquake that struck the two countries earlier in the year (Financial

Tracking Service [FTS], 2014). Older disasters such as the Rohingya crisis, Somalia, and

Afghanistan received only 8% of Kuwait’s funding in 2023. Kuwait’s modus operandi is

easily interpreted according to systems theory and swarm intelligence theory. The

geographic distribution of Kuwait's foreign aid indicates a clear preference for supporting

Arab and Muslim countries. Elkahlout (2020) believed that Kuwait's solidarity with Arab

countries was demonstrated during the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1970s when Kuwait

contributed more than 10% of its GNI to assist countries on the front lines, such as Egypt,

Jordan, and Syria. Leichtman (2022a) elaborated that after the first Gulf War and the Iraqi

invasion of Kuwait, Kuwait's aid allocations were further politicized to serve national

security objectives by gaining the support of smaller countries at the UNGA and the UN

Security Council. However, despite the apparent geopolitical distribution of Kuwait's

foreign assistance, Kuwait remains a neutral humanitarian actor compared with other

GCC countries.

The State of Qatar

Solidarity with Arab and Muslim countries is a common denominator among GCC

donors. Qatar was the last of the four GCC countries to establish a development fund. The

Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) was established in 2002, 41 years after Kuwait

started KFAED. QFFD was founded by an Amiri decree to support Arab countries and

other developing nations (Qatar Fund for Development [QFFD], n.d.). Elkahlout and

Milton (2023) mentioned that the QFFD took 10 years to start operations and become

fully functional. Although QFFD's external mandate is similar to SFD and KFAED, it

plays a different role on behalf of the Qatari government at the domestic level. Pericoli

(2023), for example, referred to QFFD's role in mainstreaming foreign assistance

provided by governmental and non-governmental entities. QFFD performs a broader

domestic role than KFAED in Kuwait and SFD in KSA, whose mandates revolve solely

around bilateral development assistance. In Bashir and Abdelsalam's (2021) view, QFFD

functions as an outpost of MoFA, handling bilateral and multilateral transactional

partnerships, justifying the channeling of Qatar's contributions to UN agencies and other

international organizations through the Fund instead of MoFA's International Cooperation

Department. The QFFD website highlights the Fund's international aid mandate on behalf

of the State of Qatar ahead of its role in international development (Qatar Fund for

Development [QFFD], n.d.). QFFD's role and relationship with Qatari civil society

organizations distinguish Qatar from other GCC countries.

The role of the international cooperation department of Qatar's MoFA seems

nontransactional, with a focus on technical cooperation rather than foreign aid. As

summarized on MoFA's website, Qatar's international cooperation vision stresses the

government's active role in national, regional, and international development. Qatar

places particular emphasis on its active membership in regional organizations such as the

GCC and the League of Arab States (LAS) and more global organizations such as the

UN, the G77, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of the State of Qatar, n.d.). Bashir and Abdelsalam (2021) highlighted how

Qatar's Vision 2030 referred to foreign assistance as a pillar of foreign policy.

Role of Civil Society Organizations

Qatar's foreign aid has reportedly reached over 100 countries, focusing on

leastdeveloped countries and fragile communities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

State of

Qatar, n.d.). In addition to the official governmental bodies represented by MoFA and

QFFD, Qatar has a vibrant civil society. Several Qatari NGOs have international

operations. The list includes Qatar Charity, the Qatari Red Crescent Society (QRC),

Sheikh Eid Bin Mohammad Al Thani Charitable Association, Qatar Foundation, and

Education Above All. Qatar Charity is the largest Qatari NGO in terms of international

presence and funding. Since its establishment in 1992, Qatar Charity assisted

220,000,000 people in 60 countries, with a total aid value of more than $2,500,000,000

(Qatar Charity, n.d.). Barakat et al. (2020) highlighted the vital role of Qatari civil society

organizations in their international presence and participation in international

coordination.

Qatari NGOs have diverse mandates. Some specialize in specific sectors, such as

education or health, while others adopt a multisectoral approach. Bashir and Abdelsalam

(2021) divided civil society organizations in Qatar into three categories: (a) public

organizations such as Qatar Charity, (b) technical organizations specializing in specific

sectors such as Education Above All in education and Silatech in livelihood and economic

empowerment, and (c) foundations such as Sheikh Thani Bin Abdallah Foundation for

Humanitarian Services (RAF). Bashir and Abdelsalam's classification places Qatar's civil

society model as a hybrid between KSA and Kuwait. NGOs in Qatar are a mix of

foundations established by members of the royal family, such as Sheikh Eid Bin

Mohammad Al Thani Charitable Association and Sheikh Thani Bin Abdallah Foundation

for Humanitarian Services (RAF), and public organizations in the traditional sense, such

as Qatar Charity and the Qatari Red Crescent Society. Qatari NGOs are allowed to

fundraise with a permit from the government, and some have a click-to-donate button on

their websites, such as Education Above All and Qatar Charity.

Civil society in Qatar is regulated by several laws and Amiri decrees, including

Amiri Decree No. 43 of 2014 and Law No. 15 of 2014 on establishing the Regulatory

Authority for Charitable Activities. Bashir and Abdelsalam (2021) argued that the drive to

institutionalize charity work in Qatar was influenced by accusations against Qatar

following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the Gulf crisis in 2017. Pericoli (2023)

argued similarly, highlighting the need for GCC donors to improve qualitative and

quantitative data in line with best practices by DAC donors. Following 9/11 and the Gulf

crisis, the government of Qatar was accused of funding terrorism through charities and

closing an eye on terrorism financing through philanthropic organizations ((Barakat et al.,

2020; Bashir & Abdelsalam, 2021). As a result, the charity sector in Qatar witnessed two

waves of regulation and institutionalization: one after 9/11 and another after the Gulf

crisis. During the first wave, the Qatar government issued Law No. 12 in 2004 to replace

an older law regulating the work of philanthropic organizations in the country (Bashir &

Abdelsalam, 2021). Later the same year, the government issued Law No. 13, founding the

Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA), which was replaced 10 years later in

2014 with the Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities.

The Gulf crisis had a powerful impact on the humanitarian sector in Qatar and the

region. Barakat et al. (2020) argued that the crisis further securitized and politicized

humanitarian action by GCC donors and changed the civil society map in Qatar in

particular. Several Qatari organizations, including Qatar Charity, Sheikh Eid Bin

Mohammad Al Thani Charitable Association, and Sheikh Thani Bin Abdallah Foundation

for Humanitarian Services, were accused by KSA, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt of funding

terrorism (Bashir & Abdelsalam, 2021). Several senior officials, including some from the

Qatari Red Crescent Association, were also blacklisted. Pericoli (2023) added that in

response to terror accusations, the government of Qatar placed more regulations on the

work of NGOs, restricting international operations to Qatar Charity, The Qatari Red

Crescent Society, and Education Above All. Barakat et al. (2020) detailed the impact of

the Gulf crisis on civil society space in Qatar. In Barakat et al.’s view, the Gulf crisis

shrank the operational space for NGOs in Qatar with the voluntary closure of

organizations such as the Sheikh Thani Bin Abdallah Foundation for Humanitarian

Services, whose founder decided to dissolve the organization and channel its financial

assets through partners.

Another outcome of the Gulf crisis was the rapport between Qatar and the

international humanitarian system. Qatar's preferred modus operandi prior to the Gulf

crisis had been bilateral assistance and concentrated funding to a single operation such as

Gaza or Darfur (Barakat et al., 2020; Bashir, 2022). After 2017, Qatar started to work

more closely with international organizations such as the UN in what Barakat et al.

(2020) described as a reputation improvement endeavor through association with large

international entities. FTS (2014) records support Barakat et al.'s argument, indicating

increased funding to UN organizations from the Qatari government and NGOs since

2017. Elkahlout and Milton (2023) noted that the rapprochement between Qatar and the

UN culminated with the building of a UN house in Doha and a sizeable $500,000,000

donation by the government of Qatar to UN agencies. Qatar is now the largest GCC

contributor to unearmarked funding in the budgets of several UN agencies, including

UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNOCHA. Qatar's Governmental Communications Office

emphasized the government's relationship with the UN and commended its decision to

build a state-of-the-art UN House in Doha (Qatar Fund for Development [QFFD], n.d.).

The UN House in Doha hosts several organizations, such as the UN Development

Program, UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration, UNICEF, and the UN

Office of Counter Terrorism Office.

Funding Modalities

Despite Qatar’s generosity in supporting the core budgets of some UN

organizations, the government does not allocate much foreign assistance through

multilateral channels compared with KSA, Kuwait, and the UAE. Elkahlout and Milton

(2023) estimated Qatar’s average multilateral annual contributions at $83,000,000,

describing Qatar as the smallest but most consistent donor to UN organizations.

Nishimura (2021) referred to Qatar’s preferred modus operandi of channeling funds

bilaterally to friendly regimes, such as in Egypt during the rule of the Muslim

Brotherhood or to the Hamas government in Gaza. Zarras (2021) made a different

argument about small GCC donor countries. Zarras looked at the relationship between

small countries and large organizations as a strategy to gain international standing by

association with regional and international entities such as the League of Arab States and

the UN. Similarly, Mezmir (2020) drew a link between humanitarian assistance and the

desire of small countries, such as Qatar and the UAE, to play a role bigger than their size

within the international community.

Figure 6 shows Qatar’s contributions as reported to FTS. However, FTS and

OECD records might not reflect the actual size of Qatar’s donations because of erratic

reporting practices by the government (Bashir & Abdelsalam, 2021; Harmáček et al.,

2022). Elkahlout and Milton (2023) raised similar concerns about the completeness and

accuracy of the data reported by Qatar. Similarly, Nishimura (2021) highlighted the lack

of accurate data by non-DAC donors as a challenge that was not easy to overcome, given

the parallel reluctance of recipient countries to share information. The challenge posed by

data scarcity is more relevant to Qatar than other GCC countries because the government

started less than 10 years ago to report to FTS and OECD. Establishing QFFD and

Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities might contribute to improved reporting

practices, as in other GCC countries. Researchers should conduct future studies to

investigate the impact of regulation and institutionalization of the aid sector in Qatar on

the quality of reporting by the Qatar government to aggregation platforms such as the

FTS.

Figure 6

Qatar’s Recorded Humanitarian Contributions, 2013–2023

Note. Generated from FTS.

Aggregating Qatar's contributions during the last decade supports the arguments

made by scholars about the government's modus operandi. For instance, Figure 6 does not

indicate any financial contributions by Qatar to peace-building activities despite

Qatar's involvement in several peace efforts in Afghanistan, Sudan, and other places.

Alarabeed (2023) explained that the reluctance of non-DAC donors to share information

represents a challenge to research and forces scholars to rely on crude, incomplete data.

Alarabeed highlighted the unreported Qatari contributions to peace activities in Darfur

and Afghanistan as an example of data ambiguity. Nishimura (2021) offered similar

examples of Qatar's unreported assistance to Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab Spring.

Alarabeed concluded that Qatar needed a strategy to link foreign assistance and peace

efforts together, blaming the collapse of the peace processes sponsored by Qatar on the

government's lack of a long-term vision of engagement. Figure 6 does not show

significant spikes in recorded donations by the Qatari government and charities, except

for a slight peak between 2013 and 2015 because of the response to the Syrian crisis. FTS

and OECD records support the arguments by Alarabeed and Nishimura about Qatar not

quantifying or reporting contributions related to the evacuation of third-country nationals

and vulnerable Afghans from Afghanistan following the Taliban's accession to power in

2021.

The financial reports issued by UN organizations highlight significant

inconsistencies in the figures reported by Qatar to the FTS. For example, FTS records

show that Qatar contributed $888,889 to UNHCR in 20222. In comparison, the financial

report of UNHCR for the same year indicated a total of $33,148,637, comprising

$21,501,968 from government sources and $11,646,669 from the private sector

(Financial Tracking Service [FTS], 2014; United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees [UNHCR], 2023). The vast gap between the recorded figures and actual

contributions skews the analysis of Qatar's humanitarian efforts and gives a wrong

perspective of the country's modus operandi. Translating the figures into percentages

could further explain the implications of such erratic recording practices. Figure 7

indicates that 88.8% of Qatar's humanitarian contributions in 2022 were channeled

through two Qatari entities, namely Qatar Charity (58.8%) and the Qatar Red Crescent

Society (30%). Using these percentages without triangulating the data with the reports of

many other international recipient organizations could lead to a false conclusion that Qatar

allocates most of its official foreign aid through local Qatari organizations. Nishimura

(2021) noted that reaching accurate figures would require triangulating the information

with the data of recipient countries, which is tedious and, in many situations, not possible,

especially if the recipient country is in a state of emergency. In this respect, Qatar could

benefit from the experience of other GCC donors who started recording foreign aid flows

earlier, such as KSA and the UAE.

Figure 7

Qatar’s Funding to Recipient Organizations in 2022

Note. Generated from FTS.

Existing literature on GCC donors indicates a noticeable gap related to Qatar.

Harmáček et al. (2022) attributed the focus by scholars on Kuwait, KSA, and the UAE to

the lack of reliable data on Qatar as a donor. Barakat et al. (2020) believed that the Gulf

crisis might result in better institutionalization of the humanitarian sector in Qatar by

adopting a holistic approach for the government and NGOs to work together on

improving transparency. Alarabeed (2023) suggested the same approach to resolve the

inconsistencies related to Qatar's role in mediation and stabilization initiatives. It is

probably still premature to assess the full impact of the Gulf crisis, which was only

resolved in January 2021. Future studies could evaluate the different repercussions of the

Gulf crisis on the humanitarian sector.

The United Arab Emirates

The UAE is the only federal government in the GCC region. The country

comprises seven independent city-states: (a) Abu Dhabi, (b) Dubai, (c) Sharjah, (d)

Ajman, (e) Fujairah, (f) Ras Al Khaimah, and (g) Umm Al Qaiwain. A ruler heads each

emirate, and the seven ruling Sheikhs form a supreme council that runs the country's

affairs. The federation is presided over by the ruler of Abu Dhabi, the capital of UAE and

the richest of all seven emirates, with the ruler of Dubai as vice president and prime

minister (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, 2023a). The oil-rich

emirate of Abu Dhabi is the largest of the seven city-states, with a total land area of

67,340 square kilometers, representing 84% of the country's total land.

The UAE is the only GCC country that has a humanitarian strategy published on

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Almatrooshi (2019) argued that the UAE’s

foreign aid strategy attaches particular importance to maintaining the country’s status as

one of the most generous donors in the world. The strategy sets out the four priorities of

the UAE as a humanitarian donor and actor with a focus on: (a) peace and security,

especially in the Middle East, (b) relationship building with recipient countries and other

donor governments, (c) supporting the UAE’s position as an active member of the

international community, and (d) catalyzing economic growth in developing countries

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, 2023b). To achieve the

objectives of its aid strategy, the UAE announced a few guiding principles highlighting

cooperation with governments, donors, and communities to address neglected problems

by championing innovation and capitalizing on the UAE’s comparative advantages

(Almatrooshi, 2019). The latest update of UAE’s foreign aid strategy during 2022

introduced two additional guiding principles related to sustainable assistance and

pioneering transparent results-based approaches (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

United Arab Emirates, 2023b). Yet, the strategy does not refer to financial targets or

annual foreign aid budgets as a percentage of GNI. In this respect, the UAE is similar to

other GCC donors who never announce aid budgets or set multiyear humanitarian

contribution targets (Elkahlout & Milton, 2023). A primary difference between the UAE

and other GCC donors in this context is the government’s efforts to record contributions

by UAE entities on international platforms such as FTS and OECD.

The UAE was the first GCC country to recognize the importance of reporting aid

activities and contributions to the international community. Elkahlout and Milton (2023)

referred to the UAE's transparent reporting practices as a result of establishing an Office

for the Coordination of Foreign Assistance (OCFA) in 2008. Krzymowski (2022) detailed

the critical role OCFA played in collecting, collating, and reporting contributions by the

UAE until it evolved into a Ministry of International Cooperation in 2013 and merged

with MoFA as a department in 2017. OCFA started to issue detailed foreign aid reports on

behalf of the UAE government as of 2009. The reports produced by OCFA contained

disaggregated data on all types of contributions by the government of the UAE.

The UAE's foreign aid strategy, updated in 2022, refers to establishing foreign aid

coordination offices at the UAE's missions abroad. Establishing such offices is intended

to bring the UAE closer to DAC donors by enhancing transparent reporting at the point of

delivery (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, 2023b). Almatrooshi

(2019) noted that UAE's foreign aid reports provide a fair view of contributions made by

UAE entities, both governmental and non-governmental. Similarly, Cochrane (2021)

referred to the UAE's accurate distinction between ODA, humanitarian assistance, and

charity contributions. For example, the 2021 report highlighted the difference between

ODA and humanitarian assistance, indicating $3,080,000,000 in humanitarian assistance

and $5,680,000,000 in ODA during the year (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United

Arab Emirates, 2023a). In addition, the report highlighted the share of civil society

organizations from the total contributions and showed an increase in private giving by

individuals and NGOs. In 2021, private giving reached 11.1% of total contributions from

the UAE compared with 6.4% in 2018, showing progress toward a good donorship

practice.

Civil Society and Governmental Aid Institutions

The government of the UAE tightly controls the work of civil society

organizations. Barakat et al. (2020) argued that the UAE government heavily censors civil

society space by enforcing compliance with government-issued lists of countries,

individuals, and organizations that UAE entities should avoid. Large NGOs in the UAE

are closely affiliated with the government, with a blurry demarcation line between

governmental and non-governmental (Barakat et al., 2020). For instance, the Mohammed

Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Global Initiatives (Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum Global

Initiatives [MBRGI], n.d.) was established as a foundation in 2015 by Sheikh Mohamed

Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President of the UAE, Prime Minister, and Ruler of Dubai.

MBRGI comprises 30 entities, including large government organizations, such as the

International Humanitarian City (IHC), which supports the argument about the entangled

relationship between NGOs and the government (Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum

Global Initiatives [MBRGI], n.d.). Another indication of the thin line between the UAE's

government and civil society organizations is the establishment of some NGOs by

presidential decrees. For example, the Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation (n.d.)

was established by Law 20 for the year 2007.

The International Humanitarian City in Dubai was established in 2003. The IHC is

a non-profit independent government authority that offers office space, warehousing, and

a free zone facility to local and international organizations (Elkahlout & Milton, 2023;

IHC, n.d.). Pericoli (2023) described IHC as the largest humanitarian hub in the world,

hosting 79 organizations comprising 17 commercial entities and 62 humanitarian

organizations, including UN agencies. Elkahlout and Milton (2023) highlighted the

importance of the IHC for Dubai's global reputation, noting that the government

complemented this effort by hosting high-level international conferences such as the

annual Dubai International Humanitarian Aid and Development (DIHAD). The location

of IHC near a large seaport in Jabal Ali and the Al Maktoum airport, combined with a

freezone modality, offered a convincing business model to large organizations such as

UNHCR and the World Food Program to open extensive warehousing facilities in Dubai.

Several UN organizations use IHC as a staging hub for shipping relief items into Africa

and Asia (International Humanitarian City [IHC], n.d.). Bashir (2022) explained that the

free-of-charge airlifts offered by the government of Dubai to UN agencies to move relief

items to disaster areas increased the visibility of the UAE as a humanitarian actor and

expedited the delivery of urgently needed assistance during the response to the

COVID19. On the development front, the UAE was the second GCC country to establish

a development assistance fund. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD, 2023)

was founded in 1971, 10 years after Kuwait established KFAED. ADFD started its

operations in 1974 and, to date, has disbursed $32,700,000,000 between soft loans and

grants to 104 countries (ADFD, 2023). The way ADFD operates is slightly different from

KFAED, SFD, and QFFD, which could explain the clear distinction between

humanitarian and development funding by the government of the UAE.

The relationship between foreign aid and foreign policy is controversial in the

case of the UAE. For example, Cochrane (2021) attributed the 600% increase in

development funding by the UAE to political agendas rather than a genuine interest in

assistance, citing the significant spike in development allocations by the UAE to Egypt in

2013. In addition, Cochrane argued that researchers funded by UAE entities exaggerated

the humanitarian motivation of UAE foreign aid programs. Krzymowski (2022), for

instance, argued that the UAE's foreign aid programs were driven by the government's

desire to enable positive global change, blaming some countries for failing to receive

assistance from the UAE. Almatrooshi (2019) explained using foreign aid as a soft power

tool and underlined the UAE's contributions to achieving the Sustainable Development

Goals. Almatrooshi noted that the UAE exceeded the ODA benchmark of .7% of GNI by

allocating more than 1.2% of GNI to foreign aid in 2018. Another benchmark reached and

exceeded by the UAE is the percentage of ODA allocated by donors to least developed

countries from the total contributions. The UAE's average contribution to

LDCs is .36 compared with an international target of .15-.20 (Almatrooshi, 2019).

Cochrane (2021) suggested comparing the UAE's performance as a donor with traditional

DAC donors because of the strides taken by the government to institutionalize aid

structures. Nevertheless, despite the size of UAE's ODA, Cochrane noted a paucity of

research on UAE as a development donor, explaining that their search for relevant

peerreviewed literature yielded only four articles.

Foreign Aid Motivation

Governments assist other governments for different reasons. Mugurtay and

Muftuler-Bac (2023) believed that part of the UAE's motivation as a donor stemmed from

the competition with Türkiye over soft power and political influence in the Middle East

and Africa. Mugurtay and Muftuler-Bac referred to Egypt as an example demonstrating

the competition between the UAE and Türkiye. Similarly, Nishimura (2021) described the

UAE as a strong defender of the political status quo in the Middle East and attributed the

increase of ODA levels in Africa to competition among non-DAC donors over influence

in recipient countries. Almatrooshi (2019) placed foreign assistance at the core of the

UAE's foreign policy and political endeavors. Krzymowski (2022) supported

Almatrooshi's argument by noting that the UAE also used foreign aid to enhance the

government's branding and influence global political affairs, referring to a noticeable shift

in the UAE's modus operandi as a donor since the Arab Spring in the Middle East.

Krzymowski added that the UAE's aid strategy has revolved around stabilization and

political influence since the 1990s when the UAE made sizeable contributions to Albania

and Kosovo and was the largest non-European donor to Macedonia. Guéraiche (2022)

stressed the relationship between aid and foreign trade and attributed the shift in the

UAE's aid strategy after 2013 to security, economic interests, and a new approach to

foreign aid.

FTS financial data supported the argument about the UAE's motivation and modus

operandi as a humanitarian donor. Figure 8 shows the UAE's humanitarian contributions

between 2013 and 2023. The UAE has been described as a top donor despite the

significant fluctuations in government contributions, as Figure 8 indicates (Guéraiche,

2022; Harmáček et al., 2022; Nishimura, 2021; Pericoli, 2023). Figure 8 shows a clear

spike in the UAE's contributions in 2018 caused by a $2,000,000,000 donation to Yemen

allocated mainly through the UAE Red Crescent Society, which received more than 60%

of the total. The fact that the UAE reports on humanitarian and development

contributions to FTS and OECD separately added to the complexity of the analysis.

OECD data referred to a total of $4,900,000,000 in ODA contributions by the UAE in

2013, mainly to Egypt, while FTS records refer to $90,100,000 during the same year

(Guéraiche, 2022; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD],

2023). Comparing the FTS and OECD figures supported the opinion that foreign

assistance by the UAE was driven by political interests and security concerns, with a clear

preference for direct assistance to friendly regimes over humanitarian contributions

through multilateral channels. In addition, the UAE's foreign aid reports during the last 10

years supported the argument about the political motivation of the government's aid

policy. In 2013, government reports stated that total aid disbursements reached

$5,800,000,000, including $90,100,000 only for humanitarian assistance. The UAE's

2013 foreign aid report indicated that most of the UAE's ODA contributions went to

Egypt that year. The percentage of humanitarian contributions from UAE's total foreign

assistance remained under 15% throughout the decade and, in some years, reached a low

of 1.5%.

Figure 8

United Arab Emirates' Recorded Humanitarian Contributions, 2013–2023

Note. Generated from FTS. USD = U.S. dollars.

The UAE was the only GCC country that referred clearly to GHD practices as a

benchmark for evaluating the performance of the government’s humanitarian strategy

(Good Humanitarian Donorship [GHD], 2018). The UAE’s humanitarian strategy,

updated in 2022, acknowledged GHD practices as an objective (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, 2023b). Reference to GHD by the government of

UAE offered a unique opportunity to explore the understanding of aid officials in the

government about the interpretation and application of such practices and principles.

KSA, Kuwait, and Qatar have not announced humanitarian strategies, which could

present a challenge during the interviews with their respective government officials

without a common ground for the discussion.

Gaps in the Literature

This literature review was based on an extensive search using the Walden

University Library, Google Scholar, and other libraries, such as Qatar National Library

and Dubai Municipal Library. The search focused on different combinations of keywords

to identify thematic and methodology-related peer-reviewed articles. The articles

referenced in this literature review were published within the last 5 years and were

deemed relevant and accurate. The literature search and the articles identified indicated a

noticeable gap in the literature about GCC countries as humanitarian donors (Barakat et

al., 2020; Bashir, 2022; Elkahlout & Milton, 2023; Leichtman, 2022b). The gap in the

literature was evident while searching for theory-based studies about the GCC. Cochrane

(2021) highlighted this gap, stating that their search for peer-reviewed articles about the

UAE yielded only four entries.

The methodology literature search focused on case study in combination with

other keywords such as qualitative, Gulf, cooperation, council, theory, open, system,

complexity, swarm, intelligence, government, aid, philanthropy, giving, foreign,

assistance, and international aid. This search generated enough generic methodology

literature, such as the articles by Gregory (2020), Lavarda and Bellucci (2022),

Pathiranage et al. (2020), and Quintão et al. (2020). These four articles discussed case

studies as a methodology offering a perspective on the advantages and disadvantages of

the approach without specific reference to humanitarian assistance or the GCC. This study

would add to the limited literature about GCC countries as humanitarian donors from a

theoretical perspective.

Summary and Conclusions

KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE are large humanitarian donors (Bashir, 2022;

Harmáček et al., 2022; Nishimura, 2021; Pericoli, 2023). The aid system is structured

differently in the four countries, ranging from highly regulated in the UAE and KSA to

loosely structured in Qatar and Kuwait (Elkahlout & Milton, 2023). Exogenous pressure

after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and accusations of terrorism financing against GCC

governments and charities influenced the institutionalization of the aid system in the

region (Barakat et al., 2020; Bashir & Abdelsalam, 2021). The Arab Spring and Gulf

crisis significantly shaped the relationship between governments and civil society

organizations in the four countries. The Arab Spring and Gulf crisis influenced aid

allocations by GCC governments, especially to the Middle East and Africa.

Recording and reporting practices vary significantly between the four GCC

donors. The UAE reports regularly to FTS and OECD, providing disaggregated data on

humanitarian and ODA contributions. Qatar is the least consistent in reporting foreign

assistance, and the government does not account for or quantify peace efforts as part of its

contributions (Alarabeed, 2023). The need for more reliable literature about GCC

countries and the infeasibility of collecting data from recipient countries represent

research challenges (Nishimura, 2021). No previous research explored the modus

operandi of GCC donors against a GHD background (Cochrane, 2021). This study adds to

the limited literature about GCC donors and contributes to filling an identified research

gap.

Chapter 3: Research Method

The purpose of this qualitative multiple-case study was to explore the

understanding by government officials and humanitarian workers of how GCC

governments could better align their aid programs with internationally acknowledged

GHD practices. Chapter 3 includes sections on the research design and rationale, the role

of the researcher, and the methodology. The participant selection logic, instrumentation,

procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection are explained in the

methodology section. Chapter 3 also comprises the issues of trustworthiness, consisting

of subsections on credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, and ethical

procedures. The summary section discussion concludes Chapter 3.

Research Design and Rationale

The research question of this study was: What is the understanding by government

officials and humanitarian workers on how GCC governments could better align their aid

programs with internationally acknowledged GHD practices? This study was based on a

qualitative multiple-case study approach. The study includes four case studies dedicated

to the KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. Data were collected by conducting

semistructured interviews with government officials and humanitarian workers in the four

countries. Pathiranage et al. (2020) argued that a case study was the most suitable

methodology to investigate complex phenomena in their contextual environment. Lavarda

and Bellucci (2022) reiterated Pathiranage et al.’s view about case studies as an adequate

tool for analyzing reality and contextual dynamics. Yin (2018) explained that a case study

was the most suitable qualitative research methodology to explore complex social

phenomena where the dynamics and the details make a difference. The complexity of aid

dynamics in the GCC and the paucity of academic research about the aid sector in the

region supported the choice of the multiple-case study approach.

The context of a given situation affects our understanding of its different

dimensions. From this perspective, foreign assistance by GCC governments should be

studied within its contextual dynamics (Cochrane 2021, Li 2019, Ziadah 2019). Senge’s

(2006) systems theory helped underpin how GCC donors make assistance decisions

without fixed budgets and standard operating procedures. From a methodology

perspective, the multiple-case study research design facilitated exploring the

understanding by government officials and humanitarian workers of how GCC

governments could better align their aid programs with internationally acknowledged

GHD practices. In addition, exploring how government officials and aid workers

understand the alignment of GCC aid programs with GHD practices could facilitate

interaction between GCC governments and their traditional donor counterparts.

The strong connection between humanitarian assistance, foreign policy objectives,

security concerns, and economic interests justified the choice of systems theory as a

theoretical backdrop for this study (Cochrane, 2021). The four case studies added to the

little literature about the motivation for giving by GCC governments, the expectations of

the international aid community, the reality of aid practices by each of the four GCC

governments, how giving relates to the national identity of GCC governments, and how

GCC donors could transition into good donorship practices. A phenomenological

approach could have been considered for this study. However, a phenomenological

methodology would have necessitated focusing on the lived experience of government

officials and aid workers rather than their understanding of how GCC governments could

better align aid programs with internationally acknowledged GHD practices. Besides, a

quantitative approach was excluded because of the difficulty of obtaining reliable data

from both donor and recipient countries (Nishimura, 2021). A quantitative study could be

explored in the future to assess the satisfaction of affected communities with GCC

donorship practices. The researcher’s experience in the humanitarian sector played an

important role in selecting the right approach for this study.

Role of the Researcher

The role of the researcher in a qualitative study depends on the nature of the

research and the reasoning methodology. Rubin and Rubin (2012) pointed out a critical

difference between positivist and naturalist researchers based on the role played by the

researcher in the process. Positivists believe that the researcher should maintain a neutral

position not to influence the participants' opinions or the study's results. Naturalists, on

the other hand, argue that researchers are active participants in the research process, and

the level of their experience and involvement is closely related to the quality of the study.

In qualitative studies, the researcher is the primary collector of data. Researchers can

assume several positions and play different roles in a research project depending on their

level of participation and involvement in the process. Burkholder et al. (2020) identified

three roles for researchers in qualitative research. Researchers can be complete

participants if they play a role in research activities like other participants in the study.

Researchers could also be observers if their role in research activities is limited to giving

instructions and explaining the rules and procedures of an exercise. When the balance of

the researcher's involvement shifts more toward observation, the researcher becomes an

observer-participant. Babbie (2020) summarized the discussion about the role of the

researcher in qualitative research by referring to degrees of involvement ranging from

complete participation to mere observation.

Ravitch and Carl (2021) added that positionality, criticality, and reflexivity are all

characteristics of qualitative research. The researcher's positionality vis-a-vis the topic is

vital to understanding the topic's complexity and providing the readers with a unique

critical perspective. Criticality represents the angle from which the researcher looks at the

research topic. A reflexive approach, conversely, helps the researcher maintain integrity

and focus on the identified niche. The uniqueness of the researchers' role in qualitative

studies and their interaction with the research participants requires attention to the ethical

dimensions of data collection and management to protect the study’s integrity and

reliability (Collins & Stockton, 2022; Pearse, 2021). Ravitch and Carl described the

interaction between the researcher and the participants as complex, adaptive, and

relational. They argued that qualitative researchers need to be flexible and open to

changing the course of the study as they learn across the research journey.

My long experience in the humanitarian sector well-positioned me to study

humanitarian affairs, especially in the context of emerging donors. As a humanitarian

worker with close to 30 years of experience in different international settings, including

war zones and areas of natural disasters, my relevant experience added value to this study.

McSweeney (2021) argued that the researcher’s experience represents a vital part of the

study project, encouraging researchers to make valid inferences based on their

professional background. I have worked with GCC countries for over 12 years and am

currently the most senior UN official in the GCC region. Furthermore, my international

experience in humanitarian affairs and development qualified me for an

observerparticipant role in this study. I participated in responding to several complex

emergencies, such as the Iraq war in 2003, the war in South Lebanon in 2006, and the war

in Libya in 2011. My emergency response experience in natural disasters includes the

Bam earthquake in 2003, the Southeast Asia Tsunami of 2004, and the Pakistan floods in

2010. In addition, I played a key role in establishing coordination networks between Arab

donors and the international humanitarian community. I am known as an expert in GCC

Affairs, and my track record is known to government officials and humanitarian workers.

Before joining the UN, I worked for international donors such as the United States

Agency for International Development and international NGOs such as Islamic Relief.

My experience in the different phases of the humanitarian program cycle and with

different types of organizations enabled me to build an extensive network of contacts.

Therefore, selecting participants for the purposive sample of this study was not

challenging. Finally, I am a native Arabic speaker, which facilitated conducting

interviews in Arabic and enabled me to assist some participants with translating

terminology during the interviews.

The research design of this study relied on selecting a purposive sample of

government officials and humanitarian workers. Three humanitarian workers and two

government officials were recruited in each country. My extensive network of contacts in

the humanitarian sector facilitated the selection of relevant participants for the interviews.

In addition, my knowledge of current humanitarian affairs and the history of giving by

GCC donors enriched the discussion and helped create rapport with the participants

during the interviews. However, my role as an observer-participant in the study raised

concerns about confirmation bias because of my professional proximity to the topic.

McSweeney (2021) argued that confirmation and epistemic biases could occur because of

neglecting potential alternative explanations to the phenomenon of interest, encouraging

researchers to consider competing explanations and avoid making assumptions without

looking for contrary evidence. To minimize the risk of professional confirmation bias, I

supported all inferences with triangulated data from the literature and primary sources

such as UN and OECD records. The selection of participants for the interviews followed

clear relevance criteria. Finally, I did not interview colleagues from my organization to

avoid ethical concerns and conflicts of interest. Informed consent was obtained from each

participant prior to the interview. The methodology section includes additional details on

the data collection strategy, explaining its relevance to the case study approach.

Methodology

Four case studies targeting the four large donors in the GCC region were

conducted to answer the research question of this study. Data collection happened through

in-depth interviews with government officials and humanitarian workers with relevant

experience in the GCC region. Pathiranage et al. (2020) argued that a case study was the

most suitable methodology to investigate complex phenomena in their contextual

environment. Pathiranage et al.’s argument was relevant to the research problem of this

study. Lavarda and Bellucci (2022) reiterated Parthinage et al.'s view that a case study

was the best approach for analyzing reality and contextual dynamics. Lavarda and

Bellucci argued that a case study was an appropriate research method to investigate

aspects of organizational strategies in complex environments. Therefore, foreign

assistance by GCC governments was studied within the context of regional geo-political

dynamics. This same argument justified the choice of systems theory as a backdrop for

analyzing how GCC humanitarian contributions were managed without operational

strategies and standard operating procedures. The four case studies facilitated

understanding the motivation of GCC governments to give and explored the benefits of

their transition into GHD practices.

There is an organic link between data collection approaches and research

methodology. Rubin and Rubin (2012) explained this link by comparing positivist and

naturalist research paradigms, arguing that success for positivists revolves around

matching the findings reached by different researchers. The more the results attained by

different scholars that match, the more reliable the research becomes. On the other hand,

naturalists believe that people construct their understanding of reality; therefore, no data

collection tool is perfect. Rubin and Rubin added that the success of qualitative research

stems from the freshness of ideas rather than generalizability. Qualitative research is,

thus, more concerned with interpreting perceptional reality rather than predicting what

happens in the future.

Participant Selection Logic

In qualitative studies, the research method informs the sample size. Sarfo et al.

(2021) explained that the concern about sampling in qualitative research revolves around

the extensiveness and appropriateness of the sample. Burkholder et al. (2020) argued

similarly, highlighting the direct relationship between the sample size and the purpose of

the study. In a case study, the sample size is usually small (Yin, 2018). Some case studies

necessitate smaller samples if the topic involves hard-to-reach groups such as elite

personalities, senior government officials, or gang members (Guest et al., 2020). In

addition, in a case study, there is a strong connection between the sample size, the

homogeneity of the research community, and the exclusion and inclusion criteria (Guest

et al., 2020). The community of this study was homogeneous but difficult to reach.

Answering the research question required interviewing two categories of respondents:

government officials and humanitarian workers with experience in the GCC region. The

challenge of recruiting relevant government officials was taken into consideration during

the design phase of this study. The study design included alternative plans to compensate

for interview declinations by considering retired officials or advisors working for

government entities. Alternative plans provided enough flexibility, expanded the pool of

potential participants, and facilitated reaching data saturation. Data saturation happens

when new interviews do not yield additional information (Islam & Aldaihani, 2022;

Mweshi & Sakyi, 2020). Sarfo et al. (2021) explained that the sample size in a

multiplecase study approach depends on the research question and the epistemological

nature of the research inquiry. The number of interviews in this study was based on Yin’s

(2018) guidelines for reaching data saturation. The initial purposive sample of the study

included 20 participants with a plan to recruit additional participants until data saturation

was reached.

Relevance was the main criterion for the recruitment and inclusion of the

participants. Only relevant participants were considered and invited for the interviews.

For example, humanitarian workers with no experience in the GCC were not considered.

The same applied to government officials whose work was unrelated to foreign and

humanitarian assistance. The study design depended on interviewing three humanitarian

workers and two government officials in each of the four GCC countries until data

saturation was reached. For Patton (2015), data saturation or redundancy happens when

additional interviews do not produce new information. There is no specific threshold at

which data reaches a redundancy point because saturation depends on the type of research

and the nature of the study (Sarfo et al., 2021). For this reason, Patton cautioned against

false conclusions about data saturation, which could happen when a researcher’s

perspective is skewed or when the design of the interviews is not appropriate.

Given the topic's sensitivity, the ethical framework of this study was of paramount

importance. The working culture of government officials in the Middle East posed a

particular challenge. Most government entities deal with all types of data as restricted and

classified. Other scholars highlighted the challenge of accessing data in the GCC (Bashir,

2022; Li, 2019; Pericoli, 2023). I addressed this challenge by focusing on solutions rather

than shortcomings. I prepared a comprehensive interview protocol (see Appendix A)

based on the case study design guidelines developed by Yin (2018). The protocol

included a general framework for conducting the interviews and highlighted specific

reference points to facilitate the data collection process. Interviewees were thoroughly

briefed about the nature of the study and the angle of exploring best practices rather than

pointing fingers or criticizing current approaches. I expected government officials to be

worried about being identified through the study. Therefore, I reiterated my neutral

position as a researcher and assured all participants of data anonymity, explaining that

nobody should be able to identify the participants, let alone attribute specific opinions to

any of them. Participants were given pseudonyms and code numbers to avoid using any

information that could reveal their true identities.

The interviews with 20 purposefully selected participants (eight government

officials and 12 humanitarian workers) followed a clear protocol and a written script

without excluding the possibility of changing the wording or asking a different question

when necessary. Busetto et al. (2020) referred to document review, participant

observation, interviews, and focus group discussions as the most common qualitative data

collection methods. The semistructured interview approach of this study allowed for

some flexibility without sacrificing the formal nature of the exercise. To reduce the risk of

professional bias, I used a script and allowed the interviewees to speak uninterrupted to

generate meaningful data. The interview script stressed data confidentiality and

anonymity, which might have been more important for government officials than

humanitarian workers not restricted by the same information-sharing regulations.

Instrumentation

Data collection happened through in-depth interviews with eight government

officials and 12 humanitarian workers from KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.

Interviews were electronically transcribed, and data were managed using Microsoft Teams

(MS Teams) and Microsoft Word (MS Word). The interviews were coded to identify

recurring themes and analyzed against the theoretical framework of the study (Deterding

& Waters, 2021). Findings were analyzed and reported verbally on the understanding of

GCC government officials and humanitarian workers of how GCC donors could better

align their aid system with internationally acknowledged aid practices.

Data for this study was collected from primary and secondary sources. Both types

of data were equally important. Primary data were gathered from the relevant government

departments in the four GCC donor countries and through in-depth, semistructured

interviews with purposefully selected participants. Relevant government entities in the

four countries included ministries of foreign affairs, the King Salman Center for Relief

and Humanitarian Work [KSA], 2023), the SFD (KSA), the KFAED (Kuwait), the QFFD

(Qatar), and the ADFD (UAE). Additional information was collected from national

NGOs that receive funding from GCC governments, such as Qatar Charity, Sheikh Eid

Bin Mohammad Al Thani Charitable Association, Education Above All (Qatar), the

International Islamic Charitable Organization (2023), Direct Aid (2023) (Kuwait), Khalifa

Foundation (UAE), and the UAE Red Crescent. In addition, supporting evidence was

gathered from the websites of international organizations that aggregate data from

different donor countries. Such organizations and websites included the FTS of the

UNOCHA and the OECD.

I considered using a software program such as Transcriptor or Cockatoo to

generate initial verbatim transcripts from the audio recordings of the interviews.

However, the accurate transcription facility included with the new version of Microsoft

(MS) Teams made it unnecessary to pay for a stand-alone transcription application. All

electronically generated transcripts were manually reviewed to verify accuracy and

correct transcription errors. Mezmir (2020) indicated that qualitative research tends to

generate large amounts of data that should be reduced to facilitate understanding. Coding

the interview transcripts and dividing the transcripts into themes and categories is a

commonly used data reduction methodology. In this study, interviews were manually

coded using MS Word. Trying the demo versions of NVivo and ATLAS.ti on dummy

interviews showed that manual coding would produce better results because of the

technical complexity of the topic. My experience in the field of study facilitated reading

between the lines to generate good-quality codes, which would not have been possible

had I used electronic coding programs. In addition, Microsoft Word was easier to

incorporate into research documents without changing the format or inserting a different

file. Although some qualitative data analysis programs can perform additional functions,

such as analyzing emotions and sentiments, the current study addressed financial

contributions and government practices rather than the feelings and lived experiences of

the interviewees. Qualitative data analysis programs such as NVivo and ATLAS.ti would

not have added much value in this context.

Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection

Qualitative research tries to make sense of complicated lived experiences or

phenomena. Purposive sampling is the most used technique because the purpose is not

generalizability but seeking the views of participants with unique expertise, knowledge,

or experience (Johnson et al., 2020). To prepare for the interviews, I sent an email from

my Walden University account to potential participants explaining the voluntary nature of

the interview. I explained that the interview had nothing to do with my official capacity to

avoid any conflict of interest. The email sought the consent of the participants after

explaining the interview procedure in full detail. In addition, the email requested the

permission of the participants to audio-record the interview, offering them a copy of the

transcript and the audio recording upon request. Email requests were sent to government

officials either directly to their emails or through generic government portals of the

relevant ministries. Marland and Esselment (2019) highlighted the challenges of

interviewing people with authority, such as politicians and senior government officials.

Such challenges start with reaching the officials through layers of bureaucracy and

protocol. Communication departments sometimes decline interview requests to protect

senior officials' time and shield them from saying the wrong thing in academic interviews

(Marland & Esselment, 2019). Even when an interview is granted, the power imbalance

between the official and the interviewer represents another challenge, especially in

hierarchical cultures such as the Middle East. To overcome such difficulties, Marland and

Esselment suggested creating rapport with the gatekeepers to facilitate referral to officials

through trusted intermediaries. In my situation, this challenge was less severe, given my

seniority and network of contacts in the region.

With almost 30 years of experience in the humanitarian sector, including more

than 12 years in the GCC, I have worked with hundreds of aid workers and developed an

excellent understanding of the global and regional humanitarian architecture. It was not

difficult for me to build a list of potential participants and reach out to them once I

received approval from the Walden University Institutional Review Board. My

professional background facilitated the selection of participants with enough experience

who could add value to the study. Data anonymization was treated with the same scrutiny

for all participants, even if some were fine to be identified. The email request mentioned

the masking of data to protect the identity of the interviewees.

An essential step in ethical research is obtaining the informed consent of the

participants. Ravitch and Carl (2021) stressed the importance of the word informed in this

context. Researchers must explain the project details to the study participants, including

the implications of participating in an interview. In this study, consent was obtained in

writing as much as possible after giving the participants enough information about the

study and explaining the voluntary nature of their engagement. Respecting the

confidentiality of information obtained from interviews and other data collection methods

is an ethical obligation. Nevertheless, in some cases, it is impossible to provide 100%

guarantees of confidentiality because of factors beyond the researcher's control. In focus

group discussions, for example, even if the researcher takes enough precautions to respect

the participants' privacy and protect their information, there is no guarantee that other

group participants will do the same (Ravitch & Carl, 2021). Therefore, it is useful here to

differentiate between anonymity and confidentiality. Researchers might attempt to protect

data confidentiality by changing or concealing the personal details of the participants.

They can also anonymize the data by referring to percentages, demographic designations,

or group descriptions instead of personal details. For example, to anonymize the

information obtained from a focus group discussion, a researcher can say that 5% of

people interviewed said this or reported that. Kamanzi and Romania (2019) argued that

no anonymization measure could guarantee confidentiality in the age of big data.

Kamanzi and Romania explained that in the age of informatics, supercomputers,

algorithmic analytics, and big data, it is impossible to promise confidentiality to research

participants. Algorithms can still reidentify the participants in a study by matching their

information with social media profiles, email accounts, and Google searches.

Data Analysis Plan

One of the objectives of qualitative data analysis is to reduce the data volume to

facilitate understanding and reach meaningful findings (Mezmir, 2020). Lester et al.

(2020) explained that analysis should bring meaning to the scattered qualitative data

gathered during the collection process. Data codification and categorization for this study

included carefully comparing the participants’ views to identify discrepant cases. All

participants agreed on the identified themes with no discrepant cases. The data analysis

plan of this study depended on:

•conducting in-depth interviews with government officials and humanitarian

workers,

•verbatim transcription of the interviews and data management through MS Word,

•coding the interviews and identifying recurring themes,

•analyzing the codes against systems theory, and

•reaching conclusions on how GCC donors could better align their aid system with

internationally acknowledged aid practices.

This plan was consistent with the guidance provided by Patton (2015), Saldaña

(2021), Burkholder et al. (2020), and Rubin and Rubin (2012). Complexity and swarm

intelligence theories were used to complement the data analysis and support the findings.

Participants in the study were asked to verify that the analysis reflected their views

(Busetto et al., 2020). Member checking was observed by sharing a copy of the

transcripts and the summary analysis of the interviews with the participants. Audio

recording of the interviews facilitated member checking and improved the accuracy of

data gathering.

With the participants’ approval, all interviews were audio recorded and

electronically transcribed. I reviewed the transcripts against the voice recording to correct

errors and verify completeness. Verbatim transcripts of the interviews were analyzed to

identify recurring codes. Ravitch and Carl (2021) described coding as a method to

facilitate distilling information out of disorganized data. They recommend keeping

precoding memos to facilitate the interpretation of the codes and help reduce bias. A

tabular modality was used to keep the analysis process organized. The data analysis tables

included columns indicating the exact time of the statements made by the participants,

verbatim input from the interviews, codes, categories, and themes.

The category column grouped codes for an additional data reduction technique.

Ravitch and Carl (2021) suggested using categories as a strategy to connect the codes and

compile them in groups. Categories were generated by identifying commonalities among

the codes. In that sense, every group of similar codes formed a category. Rubin and Rubin

(2012) explained that in addition to data reduction, coding, categorizing, and identifying

themes from interview data could facilitate information retrieval and analysis. Thus,

similar to how categories were generated through the compilation of codes, themes were

produced by compiling categories. Themes represented the final stage in the data

reduction process in preparation for the final analysis against systems, complexity, and

swarm intelligence theories.

Capitalizing on my experience as a humanitarian worker, I produced field

notes/memos to complement the data collected from the semistructured interviews.

Busetto et al. (2020) explained that field notes through observation can happen in two

different ways based on the role of the researcher as a participant or an observer in the

study. My role in the research alternated between observer and participant observer based

on the context and the task. While conducting the interviews, I assumed a

participantobserver role to enrich the discussion and encourage additional input from the

interviewees. I maintained an observer position while taking notes to avoid bias and

enhance the neutrality of observations. Field notes served another objective related to the

rigor and trustworthiness of the findings. Adler (2022) advised researchers to write

observations down as soon as possible, explaining that observation only turns into data

once written. Detailed notes can also serve as a triangulation tool to support statements

made by the participants during the interview (Johnson et al., 2020). The data analysis

tables used in this study included a dedicated column for interview observations.

Issues of Trustworthiness

Despite positivist scholars' views against the trustworthiness of qualitative

research, some techniques and methodologies could improve the quality of naturalist

studies. Strategies supporting the trustworthiness of qualitative research include

transferability, credibility, dependability, confirmability, and triangulation (Adler, 2022;

Johnson et al., 2020). Qualitative researchers should provide enough details to equip the

reader with adequate information about the transferability of outcomes into other

contexts. Singh et al. (2021) explained that dependability should be derived from the

possibility of applying the research outcomes under similar conditions. To meet the

confirmability criteria, the researcher must pay enough attention to different types of bias,

including confirmation and professional bias, and predispositions towards specific

research directions (Ravitch & Carl, 2021). Triangulation is a crucial method to verify the

information obtained from key informants through interviews and focus group

discussions. Qualitative researchers should compare and contrast the information they

receive from different sources through regular debriefs with supervisors and peer

reviewers and by asking iterative questions.

Credibility

Specific measures could improve the credibility of qualitative research, such as

member checking and interview protocols. Busetto et al. (2020) recommended member

checking by validating the analysis with the interviewees. I offered the study participants

the option of reviewing the transcripts to minimize errors and support the credibility of

my data analysis. Similarly, Yin (2018) advised researchers to maintain detailed interview

notes, including transcripts and voice files, when possible. Notes from interview reports

should be as detailed as possible and refer to observations and interpretations.

Observations merely describe something happening during the interview, such as the

interviewee crossing their legs or leaning backward (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). The

researcher can interpret this observation by stating that the interviewee seemed

comfortable and relaxed. Such details add credibility to the process. In addition, the

presentation of research findings is also crucial to its credibility. The research report

should be detailed (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). The required level of detail in this study was

achieved by asking the participants for several examples to support their statements.

Additional details were obtained through follow-up and probing questions. The narrative

presentation of the research should offer enough details to support the credibility of the

information relayed by the researcher (Saldaña, 2021). The report should also be rich in

substance by ensuring the details are triangulated, and conclusions are based on solid

theoretical foundations.

Transferability

Transferability in qualitative research is the equivalent of generalizability and

external validity in quantitative approaches. The main challenge related to the

transferability of qualitative studies is context-specificity because qualitative analyses

focus on describing unique experiences that might be challenging to transfer or replicate

in other contexts (Ravitch & Carl, 2021). To support the transferability of qualitative

studies, scholars encourage providing detailed accounts, including a thorough description

of the studied context (Nassaji, 2020). Burkholder et al. (2020) argued that while the

researcher's responsibility in quantitative studies is to provide rich details of the context,

transferability, and applicability in other contexts is the responsibility of the person

making those decisions. Burkholder implied that this could mean that researchers would

not be expected to ensure the replicability of research findings to other contexts. Instead,

a researcher should provide an elaborate contextual description of the study environment

to facilitate deciding about the applicability of the conclusions in a different context.

Enough details about the research approach, methodology, sampling technique,

interview protocols, and limitations have been provided to facilitate replicating the study

approach in similar contexts. Emerging Non-DAC donors share similarities and common

denominators (Nishimura, 2021). Shedding light on the modus operandi of GCC donors

could contribute to studying other emerging donors, such as Türkiye, China, South Africa,

and Brazil. However, despite the apparent similarities among emerging donors, future

researchers should pay attention to the subtle differences between the group members to

avoid making erroneous assumptions.

Dependability

Dependability in quantitative research refers to the consistency of results from

running the same test or experiment. For a quantitative study to be dependable, the same

result should be obtained every time the test is done. Dependability in qualitative research

is achieved by generating similar coding results from in-depth interviews or focus group

discussions with different constituencies (Babbie, 2020). Burkholder et al. (2020) argued

that statistical reliability or dependability achieved in quantitative research does not apply

to qualitative approaches. Instead, dependability in qualitative research is related to the

consistency of methodologies and techniques used for data collection, presentation,

reporting, interviewing, coding, and analysis. Ravitch and Carl (2021) also stressed the

importance of a well-crafted research design to achieve dependability. For Ravitch and

Carl, dependability in qualitative research relates to data stability, advising consistency,

and transparency about the choice and usage of the data collection methodology. In the

current study, the consistency of the data collection method received the utmost attention.

Collected data were triangulated, to the greatest extent, with published records and the

international platforms of the UN and the OECD. The coding and data analysis plan was

explained thoroughly to enhance transparency and support dependability.

Confirmability

Confirmability of qualitative research refers to the ability of the researcher to

confirm the soundness of the methodology used for data collection and analysis.

Qualitative scholars believe that because life is subjective, researchers cannot separate

themselves from their surroundings (Ravitch & Carl, 2021). Burkholder et al. (2020)

argued that for qualitative research to be confirmable, the researcher must demonstrate

that the study findings could be confirmed or proven correct. From Ravitch and Carl's

(2021) perspective, the main goal of the confirmation process is to acknowledge the

possibility of bias and explain how to minimize its occurrence and mitigate its impact on

the study’s rigor. Professional bias in this study was mitigated through verification of

procedures, peer reviews, and meticulous descriptions of data collection and analysis

mechanisms. Saldaña (2021) suggested an exchange with other scholars to verify the

methodology and reduce professional bias in qualitative research. Regular discussions

with experts about data interpretation allow qualitative researchers to check and balance

confirmation and professional biases. Conducting this study, I had the advantage of

working with scholars and informed experts in humanitarian affairs. I used this privilege

to verify my understanding and interpretation of data through peer discussions and

reviews to improve the study's confirmability.

Ethical Procedures

Adherence to ethical data collection and management approaches is critical in

qualitative research because of the personal interaction between the researcher and the

participants through in-depth interviews or focus group discussions. Ravitch and Carl

(2021) described this interaction as relational, arguing that qualitative researchers need to

be flexible and open to changing the course of the study as they learn across the research

journey. They explained that ethics in qualitative research is multi-dimensional and

specific in context. Likewise, Taquette and Borges da Matta Souza (2022) stressed the

dynamic nature of qualitative research and the essential ethical difference between

working with people and experimenting on human beings.

The ethical framework of this study followed the code of conduct of Walden

University. Data collection did not involve any third party or include any vulnerable

participants. Early communication with the Walden University Institutional Review

Board facilitated my obtaining permission to proceed with data collection under approval

number 02-27-24-1124006. One issue that requires careful ethical consideration in this

relational context is the rapport between the researcher and the participants (Kang &

Hwang, 2021). How close the researcher should get to the participants and the degree of

the researchers’ involvement in a study is controversial. Rubin and Rubin (2012)

suggested a compromise between rigidity and total involvement to maintain boundaries

between the researcher and the participants without affecting trust-building. Nonetheless,

researchers might need to reciprocate favors with their interviewees by paying them an

incentive or helping them with a chore (Ravitch & Carl, 2021). Done within reason, this

does not represent a violation of research ethical frameworks but as a strategy to build

trust and rapport with interviewees.

An important aspect of ethical research is obtaining the informed consent of

participants. Ravitch and Carl (2021) stressed the significance of the word informed in

this context. Researchers must explain all the project details to the study participants,

including the implications of participating in an interview. Consent should be obtained in

writing as much as possible after giving participants enough information about the study

and explaining the voluntary nature of their engagement (Rubin & Rubin, 2012).

Voluntary participation must be clearly highlighted to potential participants who are

incarcerated or when the researcher is an authoritative figure who might have control over

access to some services (Shaw et al., 2020). An example in the humanitarian sector is

refugee camps. Refugees might need to realize they have a choice not to participate in

focus group discussions or individual interviews to avoid declining an invitation, which

could deprive them of certain services. Similarly, special consideration must be given to

the participation of minors in research projects because they might not be fully aware of

the implications of participating in the exercise (Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Shaw et al.,

2020). Consent in the case of minors (less than 18 years old) must be given by an adult

guardian.

Confidentiality and Privacy

In conducting this study, I adhered to rigorous ethical standards. All participants

received an email detailing the scope of the study, the researcher's affiliation, the

confidentiality and anonymity procedures, and any additional factors that could affect

their decision to participate in an interview. No colleagues from the same organization or

subordinates were approached to participate in the study. The purposive sample of the

study included government officials and humanitarian workers. Therefore, power

dynamics were not a concern in this study since the sample comprised two categories of

professional adults with the absolute liberty to decline the interview request. Individuals

in both categories were empowered enough to make a judgment call about participation,

anonymity, and information-sharing issues. In addition, the topic of the study was

unrelated to the personal conduct of the participants, and some of them did not have

issues with confidentiality. However, the study did not require the participants to share

classified information or documents, and I obtained the participants' permission and

approval before audio recording the interviews. Finally, I used my Walden University

email account for all correspondence with the participants to avoid any misperceptions

about my UN function.

Summary

Qualitative research acknowledges the subjective nature of the world. It does not

detach or separate the researcher from the study. Researchers are participants in the

research project, and their level of participation depends on their proximity to the

research activities. Trustworthiness in qualitative research depends on achieving

credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Qualitative researchers must

observe these concepts to make their studies trustworthy and reliable. Following the

advice and guidance provided by scholars and experienced researchers in this context can

make qualitative research more solid and increase the likelihood of its contribution to

positive social change.

In Chapter 3, I described the research design in detail, highlighting the

methodology, the theoretical approach, the data collection tools, the data analysis plan,

and how ethical considerations and issues related to trustworthiness were observed. The

chapter provided details to help future researchers decide about the transferability of the

study to similar contexts, noting the similarities and common denominators among

emerging donors. Chapter 4 will elaborate on the analysis of the data collected from the

interviews with government officials and humanitarian workers in KSA, Kuwait, Qatar,

and the UAE. The analysis explored what the data reveals about the understanding by

government officials and humanitarian workers of how GCC countries could better align

their aid programs with internationally acknowledged GHD practices.

Chapter 4: Results

The purpose of this qualitative multiple-case study was to explore the

understanding by government officials and humanitarian workers of how GCC

governments could better align their aid programs with internationally acknowledged

GHD practices. Literature on this topic indicated a need for more research about GCC

government donors. Data collection to answer the research question occurred through 20

semistructured interviews with eight government officials from the four GCC donor

countries and 12 humanitarian workers with experience in the region. The interviews

indicated that coordination among GCC countries as non-DAC donors and their Western

counterparts could improve with a better mutual understanding between the two groups.

Chapter 4 includes a description of the research setting, the participants' demographics,

the study results, and how trustworthiness issues were addressed.

Member checking with all the participants enhanced the rigor of the data

collection exercise. Interview verbatim transcripts and summaries were shared with each

participant to verify the gleaned information and offer the participants an opportunity to

correct potential misinterpretations of their inputs. Data anonymity was observed

throughout the research process by masking any detail that could lead to identifying the

participants or recognizing their organizations. Code names refer to the participants

throughout Chapters 4 and 5 to protect the participants' identities and respect the

confidentiality agreement signed with them.

Research Setting

Data collection occurred through semistructured interviews with 20 participants

from KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. The interviews were conducted, transcribed, and

analyzed without assistance from a third party. All interviews happened through MS

Teams calls and were recorded and transcribed using the online version of MS Teams.

The improved tools on New Teams facilitated the transcription and made paying for a

transcription program, as anticipated during the proposal phase, unnecessary. Speaking

both English and Arabic made it possible to interview participants who spoke either

language. In addition, being experienced in the humanitarian sector and the GCC region

added to the study's credibility and encouraged participants to be more direct, given my

knowledge of the topic. My network of contacts in the GCC facilitated the recruitment of

senior participants and maximized positive responses to the interview invitation. Apart

from scheduling issues, all approached participants welcomed the opportunity to

contribute to the study and highlighted its timeliness and importance.

The participants were selected through a purposive sample, most of whom were

senior government officials or humanitarian workers at the chief executive officer level.

The seniority of the participants enabled them to provide holistic responses but added to

the complexity of organizing the interviews due to their busy schedules. Two factors

contributed to the complexity of the data collection. Firstly, most interviews happened

during the holy month of Ramadan, a busy period for humanitarians in the Muslim world.

Secondly, data collection happened during a difficult period in the Middle East because of

the war in Gaza, with regular news reports of atrocities committed against innocent

civilians. Some participants were also busy with the humanitarian response to the crisis.

Leshem et al. (2020) explained how prolonged conflicts could affect participants' answers

in social studies using Palestine as an example. Therefore, the emotional impact of the

Arab-Israeli conflict on the participants' responses should not be underestimated.

Demographics

The study’s purposive sample included two government officials and three

humanitarian workers from each of the four GCC donor countries. Relevance was the

primary criterion for selecting the participants. Only relevant government officials with

experience in the respective country’s aid program were considered and approached.

Similarly, only humanitarian workers with relevant experience of at least 6 months in the

region were invited to participate. The sample included seven senior UN officials, five

heads of humanitarian NGOs, and eight senior government officials, some at the

ministerial level. Observing consistency among the four countries enabled comparison,

facilitated cross-referencing, and contributed to the overall rigor of the results.

Experience and operational relevance represented the main reference points in the

selection criteria. Demographic characteristics such as age, gender, or nationality did not

influence the selection of participants. Cash et al. (2022) stressed the impact of a research

sample on a study's outcome and potential impact. Participants were selected based on

representativeness to enhance the study's trustworthiness. Despite the difficulties of

recruiting high-level officials, only senior executives were approached to participate in

the study, assuming a solid relationship between seniority and experience. Recruiting

participants from international organizations, UN agencies, NGOs, and governments

enriched the sample's representativeness by including different perspectives across the

humanitarian spectrum.

Data Collection

Data collection occurred over 8 weeks, slightly longer than anticipated during the

proposal phase. The delay happened because of the busy schedule of the participants

during the holy month of Ramadan and the heavy workload caused by the humanitarian

response to the Gaza crisis. The seniority of the participants added to the complexity of

scheduling the interviews. Immediate positive responses to the interview invitations by

senior officials represented another challenge when their schedules did not allow for

immediate appointments. Protocol issues necessitated waiting for senior officials to fix

appointments instead of approaching alternative participants.

Each interview lasted between 30 and 60 minutes on average. I sent each

prospective participant an email invitation and an informed consent form explaining the

study's purpose, highlighting the voluntary nature of the study, and providing other

information about the research. The email invitations (see Appendix B) mentioned the

requirement to audio record the interviews and offered participants the option of

declining if they wished. Each interview started with repeating important information

such as the title of the study and its purpose, the name of the university, and the need to

audio record the session. All interview sessions stressed anonymity and data masking

even when not required by the participants. MS Teams provided a stable platform for

sending interview invitations, editing the invitations based on the circumstances of the

participants, audio recording the sessions, and verbatim transcription of the discussion.

Audio recordings and transcripts were reviewed immediately after each session to

correct errors and summarize key points while the information was still fresh. Likewise,

member checking occurred right after the interviews by sharing the summaries and

transcripts with the participants and inviting them to correct interpretation mistakes.

Noting that English was the working language for most participants but not their first

tongue, some were surprised at language mistakes in the verbatim transcripts. The

participants were assured that the transcripts would mainly be used for data analysis and

advised to focus on the summarized interpretations instead of the language in the

verbatim transcripts. All participants agreed with the summaries and stressed the study's

importance, relevance, and timeliness. The member-checking exercise resulted in

modifying the summary documents of two interviews based on the participants’ feedback.

English was used for all interviews except for one participant who spoke only Arabic.

The data collection plan developed during the proposal phase of this study proved

to be sound, and no aspects of the plan needed to be changed or modified during the data

collection phase. The purposive sample size was suitable to answer the research question,

although data saturation was achieved mid-way through the process, with additional

participants adding no additional information. The fact that data saturation happened

earlier than expected did not cause a change in the data collection protocol to avoid

skewing inferences among the four countries.

All interview sessions occurred according to standard protocols, and each

participant was asked the same questions. The wording of the questions changed slightly

based on the participants' professional affiliation without deviating from the essence of

the questions. For example, government officials were requested to reflect on their

specific countries' programs, while humanitarian workers were encouraged to respond

based on their work experience in the respective country. Ruslin et al. (2022) argued that

semistructured interviews were more robust than other qualitative data collection tools

because they offer the researcher the flexibility and adaptability to glean the correct

information without losing focus. The semistructured interviews, as a data collection

method, offered me a significant opportunity to ask follow-up questions and expand on

points made by the participants. My role as an observer participant in this study

contributed to the richness of the discussions and encouraged the participants to use

humanitarian jargon without feeling awkward or needing to explain.

Data Analysis

Data analysis happened during and after data collection. The two-stage coding

process followed Saldaña’s (2021) coding manual and the guidance notes elaborated by

Burkholder et al. (2020) and Rubin and Rubin (2012). Pre-coding for this study used

Saldaña’s technique of penciling initial codes during the semistructured interviews to

facilitate the full-fledged coding exercise during the data analysis period. The first cycle

stage was the initial pass at coding. The second cycle stage was to further categorize,

consolidate, and filter that data. In addition to the automatic transcription on MS Teams,

I took handwritten notes to start the preliminary coding process and noted observations

about the interview’s circumstances. Code labels reflected direct inputs by the

participants and implied concepts in their interventions. For example, several

participants mentioned that donors needed to rely on field assessments to provide the

appropriate type of aid. Provision of aid based on the needs of beneficiaries complies

with the needs-based approach in humanitarian assistance. The code for such an

argument by the participants was labeled needs-based. Similarly, when participants

referred to dialogue between donors and other stakeholders, the corresponding code was

labeled coordination. Jotting down initial codes during the interviews facilitated data

analysis afterward. All participants agreed on the same themes, and no cases were

discrepant.

Initial member checking started during the data collection phase by summarizing

the participants’ inputs and asking for confirmation. For instance, when some participants

described scenarios of coordination, complementarity, or the needs-based approach

without referencing those specific concepts, I asked the participants whether they were

referring to such approaches. Rubin and Rubin (2012) considered data coding as a

method to reduce the large amount of data produced by interviews in qualitative research.

The 20 interviews conducted for this study produced hundreds of verbatim transcription

pages. One-page summaries produced for each interview were to reduce the data and

facilitate coding and categorization. Summarizing and distilling the interview substance

was the second cycle stage coding exercise and facilitated overall data analysis. Interview

summaries were shared with the participants to verify the proper interpretation of their

inputs as part of the member-checking process. Table 2 shows the coding mechanisms

used in this study.

Table 2

Coding Example

Participant Interview excerpt Code Category Theme

P5 "The UAE is a go it alone country." Coordination Implementation

modality

Alignment

P1 "The strong link between aid and

trade played a role in shaping our

strategy."

Motivation Vested interest Return on

investment

P11 "No GCC country has a real aid policy."

Strategy Theory and

practice

Reform

P17 "Giving to the less fortunate is in our

genes."

Motivation Giving modality Principled

donorship

Note. UAE = United Arab Emirates. GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council. a

P11's interview response points to a policy and practice discrepancy.

Halfway through the interviews, agreement among the participants on specific

codes and themes became apparent. A few cross-cutting codes were observed in each

interview. For example, all the participants, without exception, stressed the importance of

coordination as a good practice. Coordination was mentioned in different contexts and

sometimes several times during the same interview. Humanitarian workers referred to

field coordination as a modality to minimize duplication of efforts and reach the largest

number of people needing assistance. P4, for example, made a clear link between good

donorship and participation in coordination meetings:

In terms of good donorship, from my experience, I see that engaged participation

is the first good example of good donorship. When donors are present, they are

engaged. They demonstrate 2-way communication. They are present in the

coordination meetings. They are present in donor field visits. They attend

highlevel decision-making platforms and provide feedback. This might sound like

a little bit ideal but having at least one or two of these descriptions would make a

donor a good donor and an engaged donor; at least from my point of view, the

examples of good donors are there. The examples of donors that are less engaged

are there as well, and we can immediately see the impact of more engagement or

less engagement on our ability to perform our work as UN agencies.

Government officials, on the other hand, stressed the importance of coordination

among peers for maximizing the impact of limited resources and ensuring sustainability.

Codes related to the theme of the return on humanitarian investments also stood out as an

area of agreement among the participants. Culture, religious teachings, and sharing of

wealth with the less privileged were highlighted as the primary motivations for GCC

governments to give humanitarian assistance. Some participants also referred to the link

between aid and trade and the relationship between foreign aid and foreign policy. All

participants considered foreign aid imperative because of cultural and practical

considerations related to improving a country’s international standing. For example,

addressing Kuwait’s aid motivation, P19 said:

For me. It's a global responsibility. It's our responsibility towards each other as

human beings; those who are well off contribute to supporting those who are

worse off. But not only that. We realize more and more how humanitarian crises

are linked as the world is growing more and more into a small village.

Humanitarian crises are also linked to national security.

P1 made a similar argument while highlighting the link between foreign aid and

foreign policy in the case of the UAE. P1 explained the return on the investment in

regional peace and security.

We need to save lives. This is, I think, a very critical, important, but also very

important point to make about peace and prosperity in our region. We don't need

to see more conflicts. We hope to resolve all the problems so peace and prosperity

in our region that, I think, will not only our region but also other neighbouring

regions, and that is, with principle, always promote our foreign policy or we said

promoting peace and prosperity.

Commenting on the motivation behind KSA’s aid programs, P6 stressed solidarity

with those in need as a cultural norm and religious teaching. P6 highlighted the

impartiality of KSA’s aid programs that do not discriminate based on religion or political

affiliations:

KSA has been providing humanitarian aid since its establishment, and the main

motive or motives behind this is helping others and supporting them, which is part

of Saudi culture and Islamic teachings. You know, the identity of Saudi Arabia as

a state and a society is mainly based and formed by Islamic teachings, and also, as

Arabs, you know, we have this moral sense of responsibility that we should

support those in need, whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim. Islam encourages

Muslims to give charity to those in need.

Providing humanitarian aid bilaterally rather than through multilateral channels

was highlighted as a characteristic distinguishing GCC donors from their DAC

counterparts. Despite a clear preference for giving bilaterally to "achieve economic gains

and curb the spread of religious extremism," as P5 explained, most participants described

GCC countries as less politicized than their Western counterparts. P18 linked the absence

of aid strategies in the GCC with the region's depoliticized modus operandi, explaining

that Western donors are more strategized because their aid programs are more politically

motivated. Overall, almost all the participants, except for two government officials from

two different countries, needed to familiarize themselves with their respective country's

aid strategies and budget allocation processes. P4 compared between the UAE aid policy

and the ones produced by Western donors:

I've seen three versions of this policy with minor edits put to the public, but it's a

very general document that does not provide a lot of substance or reflect the

ambition properly. So, I would consider it more of a PR tool, not an operational

policy. . . those published by the EU are more of a detailed action plan. It provides

direction. It specifies what's the objective of the policy deadlines, the time frame,

who the actors are, and the thematic areas they want to focus on, so it provides a

roadmap versus the plan or the strategy pronounced by UAE, which more of a PR

tool with no elements, concrete elements inside it. So, one provides direction, and

one is good, but feels like it misses the action plan.

Unsurprisingly, the unpredictability of GCC humanitarian contributions transpired

as a strong theme in all the interviews. Similarly, all participants referred to funding

decisions as reactive to global developments. P11 described humanitarian budget

allocation processes across the region as a top-down approach, typical of "monarchy

clubs." Another area of agreement among all participants was the need for budget clarity

in the GCC to enable better cooperation between governments and humanitarian

organizations based on announced annual budget allocations.

P3, P4, P5, P11, P14, P15, and P19 associated the absence of fixed humanitarian

budgets across the GCC region with less accountability to taxpayers and parliaments. P8

described Western donors as more transparent financially but less so in terms of

motivation and political interests. Accountability as a code transpired in two different

contexts during the interviews. Government officials spoke about accountability to codes

of conduct and affected populations. At the same time, humanitarian workers stressed the

importance of accountability as a tool to improve due diligence, enhance predictability,

and support transparency. The study results section contains additional details about the

content of the interviews and how codification and thematic analysis contributed to the

outcome.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

Establishing trustworthiness in qualitative research requires four dimensions:

credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Because qualitative studies

do not rely on numerical evidence to prove the reliability of results, researchers must pay

additional attention to trustworthiness (Coleman, 2022). Providing sufficient details about

the research methodology, the data collection mechanism, and the analysis protocol can

increase the possibility of replicating the study’s approach and support the dependability

of its outcomes (Makel et al., 2022). This section addresses how the elements of

trustworthiness were observed in this study.

Credibility

Credibility is of paramount importance in qualitative studies. Coleman (2022)

cautioned against the risk of professional bias in research, citing several techniques to

improve the validity and trustworthiness of qualitative studies. Similarly, Busetto et al.

(2020) referred to member checking as a tool to improve the credibility of qualitative

data. The data collection phase of this study included several layers of member-checking.

The first round of validation occurred during the semistructured interviews by

summarizing the points made by the participants and asking for confirmation when

needed. Another layer of informal member-checking happened over the phone. I called

each participant after the interview to verify my understanding and reiterate points related

to confidentiality and anonymity. The last and formal round of verification happened by

email. All participants received copies of the interview verbatim transcripts and

summaries and were asked to review and correct any misinterpretations.

The member-checking process included several exchanges with some participants

to refine the final summaries as a basis for data analysis. Eighteen participants agreed

with the summaries and accepted them as produced. P18 and P20 suggested modifications

and tweaks to the summaries of their interviews. The relevant summaries were updated

based on the feedback from both participants and shared with them again for verification.

The final copies were accepted.

Transferability

The data collection and analysis sections of this study offered enough details

about the interview protocols, the sample's purposive selection, and the study's general

context to inform future transferability decisions. Burkholder et al. (2020) advised

researchers to include sufficient details about the context of the study to enable other

researchers and practitioners to make informed decisions about the transferability of the

results. The approach used in this qualitative study is replicable and transferable only if

the transferability process is intentional and informed (Makel et al., 2022). Despite

apparent similarities between blocks of donors, such as DAC or non-DAC countries,

individual differences must be observed to avoid a one-size-fits-all approach. GCC

donors might share characteristics with non-DAC donors like China or Brazil. However,

the context of engagement between any country and the international community remains

unique and requires dedicated attention. Future researchers interested in studying

nonDAC donors could use this study's research approach and data collection protocols

after tailoring the tools to their specific contexts.

Dependability

In qualitative research, dependability is closely related to systematic data

collection and analysis approaches. Saldaña’s (2021) coding manual represented the

primary reference for coding and analyzing the data gathered from the 20 semistructured

interviews. The data collection and analysis method observed the principle of consistency

recommended by Babbie (2020) and Burkholder et al. (2020). The outcome of the data

analysis process produced stable results supporting the study’s dependability (Ravitch &

Carl, 2021). The researcher’s role as an observer-participant with extensive experience in

the topic and the region enriched the discussions and facilitated verifying information

mentioned during the interviews.

Data triangulation with published reports enhanced the dependability of the results

and added weight to the participants’ statements. For example, to prove the correctness of

the participants ‘statements about the fluctuation of contributions by GCC donors, I

generated tables from OECD and FTS and created graphs to facilitate the visual

representation of the data. The consistency between the participants’ statements, the

recent literature, and the data obtained from OECD and FTS strengthened the

dependability of the interpretation. Further verification of data correctness by reviewing

the records of recipient countries or interviewing members of affected communities in

refugee camps or urban settings was neither possible nor within the scope of this current

study.

Confirmability

Professional bias represented a risk in this study because of my proximity to the

humanitarian sector and my experience in the GCC region. Ravitch and Carl (2021)

considered acknowledging the possibility of professional bias as a positive addition to a

study's rigor. Being aware of the possibility of professional bias from the beginning made

it possible for me to devise techniques to mitigate such risk. Peer reviews and discussions

were among the methods used to confirm the soundness of inferences from the

interviews. Taking enough precautions to protect the participants' identities, I had several

discussions with professional humanitarians and researchers to verify my understanding

and triangulate pieces of information. Participation in several conferences during the data

collection period offered me a platform to sound ideas and conclusions with peers and

professional speakers.

Objectivity is an essential dimension in qualitative research, given the proximity

of the researcher to the topic and the possibility of assuming a participant’s role in the

study. Haq et al. (2023) argued that qualitative researchers must pay extra attention to

conformability by analyzing the data based on the participants’ views rather than personal

perspectives. To minimize the risk of bias in this study, I focused the analysis on the

words of the participants. I also used direct quotes from the verbatim interview transcripts

to support my inferences. The exchange with the participants during the memberchecking

exercise about what they meant during the interviews supported the conformability and

confirmability of the study.

Study Results

This study had one research question: What is the understanding by government

officials and humanitarian workers on how GCC governments could better align their aid

programs with internationally acknowledged GHD practices? This section contains a

detailed account of the study results divided according to the themes and sub-themes

distilled from the data analysis. The participants agreed on all themes with no discrepant

cases. The focus in this section is more on the main themes as overarching banners of the

issues raised by the participants. For example, field coordination and donor coordination

are sub-themes in this study. The main theme is coordination. Both sub-themes were

folded under the main banner to facilitate understanding without diluting the importance

of the main concepts. The key finding indicated a need for GCC donors to adopt

internationally acknowledged best practices related to coordination, accountability,

motivation, strategic planning, and predictability.

Coordination

Coordination is an essential concept in humanitarian affairs. Tosi and Marty

(2024) attributed the centrality of coordination in humanitarian action to the complexity

and dynamism of the system combined with scarce resources and limited information

during disaster response. All 20 participants in this study referred to coordination as a

good practice to maximize the impact of interventions and minimize duplication of

efforts. The participants mentioned coordination as a general theme and sub-theme about

coordinating efforts among donors or between donors and implementing agencies. Some

participants referred to coordination several times during their interview sessions. P11

highlighted the importance of inclusive coordination mechanisms that exclude nobody

based on religious or political affiliations. P9 mentioned coordination 10 times during the

interview as an instrument to meet competing humanitarian needs in the field: “You

know, be it food, water, shelter, health, nutrition, education, or protection, all of those

different sectors will hopefully be covered if we manage to have that kind of coordination

among the humanitarian donors.” Similarly, P15 referred to coordination 12 times as a

tool to align approaches between governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in

Qatar.

During their interview, P6 mentioned coordination 13 times as the “number one

priority” and a “key factor” for the Saudi government. Other participants singled out

coordination as the main priority to align approaches among humanitarian actors. Like

other participants, P5 mentioned coordination 11 times and said: “Be it emergencies or

not, for me, I think the good practice is coordination.” P4 linked being a good donor with

being present in coordination meetings and platforms. A good donor, in P4’s view, should

be “engaged and present in coordination meetings.” Most participants linked coordination

with transparency and predictability as prerequisites to optimizing the delivery of

assistance and meeting the needs of affected populations. In the participants’ view, good

donors should share information, coordinate their contributions, and engage in regular

dialogue with other humanitarian stakeholders, including affected communities,

implementing agencies, and other donors.

Accountability

The participants referred to accountability in different contexts, and most linked it

to transparency. Some participants, such as P3, considered DAC donors "more

accountable to their parliaments and taxpayers," explaining that GCC countries do not

have the same obligation. P11 described the modus operandi in the GCC as a "monarchy

club," attributing the blurry aid policies in the region to weak accountability by

governments to regulatory bodies such as parliaments in the West. P11 highlighted a gap

between published policies and implementation strategies, even in the case of

governments that have published strategy documents, such as the UAE.

Transparency was mentioned in the interviews as a sub-theme to accountability.

Most participants linked the two concepts, stressing that donors must be accountable and

transparent about their contributions. P8 argued that Western and GCC donors need to be

more transparent in different aspects, stating that "Western donors are more transparent in

terms of the processes and the areas of coverage they engage in. The motivation is not

transparent as well from the Western side." P3 made a strong connection between

accountability, transparency, and predictability of engagement, mentioning accountability

11 times, transparency six times, and predictability four times during the same session.

For P3, "accountability stands out, particularly to the OECD donors. This is coming from

the systems that they have in place where the money is taxpayers' money. They also stand

accountable to the bodies that they have, be it the parliament or the public opinions." P4

expressed a similar viewpoint by attributing the accountability of Western donors to the

requirement of reporting to parliaments and legislative bodies.

Government officials did not refer to accountability and transparency from the

same perspective that humanitarian workers addressed such concepts. The angle for

government officials was accountability to affected populations and codes of conduct

rather than financial accountability and transparency about budget allocations. The

concept of accountability to affected populations for P1 was closely related to

coordination among donors and implementing agencies to reduce the burden on recipient

countries, citing an example of a small island state that received 700 international

delegations in 1 year, which burdened the government and lacked coordination among

visiting delegations. Being more accountable for the mandate rather than for the visibility

of the individual donors could have reduced the burden on the recipient country and

saved scarce resources. Participants drew linkages between accountability and the

motivation to contribute humanitarian assistance. The motivation to give was perceived

differently between GCC governments and their Western counterparts.

Motivation

What motivates governments to give humanitarian assistance is a controversial

issue. There are two views about why rich countries should assist poorer nations. While

some believe that affluent countries are morally obliged to assist less privileged ones,

another group believes that wealthy Western countries are more obliged to assist the

countries they previously harmed or colonized (Hupfer, 2022). I asked all the participants

what motivates GCC governments to contribute to humanitarian assistance. All 20

participants cited cultural and religious teachings as the main drivers for GCC

humanitarian assistance. Some participants referred to supporting neighbors as an ethical

norm behind the GCC’s assistance to Arab and Muslim nations.

Several participants highlighted the return on humanitarian investments as a

motivation for humanitarian assistance and foreign aid. P1, for example, said: "We

promote our foreign policy, and we promote peace and prosperity." P1 highlighted the

positive impact of stabilization and peaceful resolution of conflicts on the region's

economy, especially in the Middle East and neighboring regions. Elaborating on the link

between foreign aid and diplomacy, P16 explained that their country has fewer embassies

than development operations worldwide. The government's development arm sometimes

plays a role in international diplomacy by strengthening the country's international

standing through bilateral assistance. Explaining this point in the context of Qatar, P19

said:

Of course, it helps give Qatar more visibility on the political, international, and

global scenes as an active player. Especially in conflict situations and natural

disaster contexts, it has contributed to raising the global visibility of Qatar as a

small state geographically but very influential on the global scene.

P11 argued that all donors, including GCC countries, use foreign aid to support

political positions. P19 adopted a similar viewpoint about the politicized humanitarian

assistance provided by DAC and non-DAC donors. "Western donors are heavier on

process and reporting than GCC donors. They are also very difficult to work with in

conflict situations where non-state actors are involved," explained P19.

To support the argument about the less depoliticized nature of GCC humanitarian

contributions, several participants referred to the unconditionality of assistance by GCC

countries in disaster situations. P13 and P14 described Qatar’s humanitarian assistance as

depoliticized and provided without strings attached. P13 mentioned Qatar’s assistance to

Syria as a good example of how Qatar assisted those in need without considering their

political affiliations. The continuity of assistance was another good practice mentioned by

participants in Qatar and Kuwait. In both countries, participants highlighted the long-term

nature of the government’s engagement with the protracted situation in Syria after more

than 13 years. Correspondingly, P11 cited the consistency and sustainability of assistance

to Syria and Afghanistan as good practices by GCC donors such as Kuwait and Qatar,

comparing the approach with declined Western funding to the same situations. Despite

the argument about continuity, consistency, and the altruistic motivations of GCC donors,

none of the participants connected consistency and strategic planning.

Budgets and Strategies

The UAE is the only GCC country that has a published aid strategy. Despite the

strategy's publication on the Foreign Ministry's website, not all participants knew the

document's details. Some participants described the UAE's aid strategy as fragmented,

referring to discrepancies between the strategy and its implementation and a disconnect

between strategy planning and budget allocation. Unlike KSA and Kuwait, where no

participant had a clear idea about an aid strategy, participants referred to a strategy in the

making in Qatar, expected to be published by the end of the year. Many participants

mixed tactics and impromptu decisions with aid strategies. Several participants referred to

their governments' sectoral interests in health, education, food, and a geographic focus on

specific countries or regions as a strategy. Humanitarian workers were more explicit

about the absence of strategy in the GCC. Most humanitarian workers compared the

haphazard approach in the GCC with Western donors, who usually announce their aid

directions and budgets and share them with other stakeholders.

None of the participants associated the lack of fixed foreign aid budgets with the

absence of aid strategies. Even in the UAE, where an aid strategy exists, allocating funds

to humanitarian assistance was perceived as ad hoc. All participants in all the GCC

countries mentioned that budgets for humanitarian assistance were reactive and

dependent on global developments. P11 mentioned supreme Amiri decrees or pledges in

international conferences as the primary basis of humanitarian funding decisions. Other

participants, such as P4 and P15, described humanitarian budget allocations in the GCC

as unpredictable and differentiated the GCC's approach from DAC donors, who usually

start the year with a fixed amount for ODA and another for humanitarian assistance. P16,

for example, highlighted the lack of flexible funding as a problem that threatens the

sustainability of humanitarian programs:

Sometimes, the donors, when they earmark their donations, restrict the utilization;

they restrict the scope of aid they provide and that can be provided by the

recipients. In some cases, it also restricts the adherence to the principle of leaving

no one behind. Sometimes, it gives the impression of being politically motivated

with some political interests, which, of course, should be avoided. One way of

avoiding this is by not earmarking the aid. In some cases, it also restricts the

adherence to the principle of leaving no one behind. Sometimes, it gives the

impression of being politically motivated with some political interests, which, of

course, should be avoided. One way of avoiding this is by not earmarking the aid.

Some participants cited the lack of accountability to parliaments and taxpayers

and the monarchial rule as reasons behind such erratic budgeting practices in the GCC.

Despite a consensus among the participants about the importance of devising aid

strategies, P20 pointed out that a strategy could be a negative development if it makes a

country's humanitarian approach more stringent and conditional. P20 attributed the

absence of an aid strategy in Kuwait to the unconditional depoliticized modus operandi of

the government. However, regardless of the participant's views on the importance of aid

strategies, most participants agreed on the benefits of having a fixed annual humanitarian

budget that governments could supplement if unexpected events unfold during the year.

Unpredictability

A clear aid strategy and a fixed annual budget for humanitarian assistance could

facilitate complementarity among donors and enable better partnerships between donors

and implementing agencies. Hupfer (2022) listed different views about a country's fair

share of humanitarian contributions based on GDP and GNI. Hupfer explained that the

globally accepted threshold of .7% of GNI is the most common standard, mentioning that

only five DAC members have consistently met this threshold. The other method of

calculating a government's contributions to humanitarian programs is in absolute dollar

terms, regardless of the GNI's percentage. For example, the United States is the most

generous donor in the world if contributions are calculated based on absolute dollar

terms, even though it contributes less than .4% of its GNI to ODA.

Most participants stressed the unpredictability of GCC funding, describing

humanitarian donations from the four GCC donors as unstable. P11 referred to Kuwait's

decline from a major to a small donor as a "case study" about unpredictability and

inconsistency. Similarly, P15 referred to unclarity about the "mechanics of allocating the

annual aid budget." P1 said the annual budget in the UAE was divided into "80%

development assistance and 20% humanitarian efforts," explaining that the humanitarian

sector of the budget is usually not fixed. Overall, the participants described humanitarian

funding as ad hoc and reactive to global developments.

To triangulate the information mentioned by the participants, I generated some

comparative data from OECD and FTS. The extracted information confirmed the

participants' statements indicating significant fluctuations in contributing the

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