Introduction Urban Development in Conflict Cities Planning Challenges and Policy
Innovations
In this paper I will present a policy for reducing violence in Baltimore City,
Maryland. The proposal seeks to do this by reforming Baltimore’s institutional
violence machine, the criminal justice system. This system has become a mass
incarceration system and has served to deprive individuals of the needed capacity
for reentry into Baltimore’s communities. This deprivation fosters conditions that
make it possible that a significant number of homicide perpetrators and homicide
victims are believed to have had previous, multiple interactions with the criminal
justice system (Kennedy, 2010).
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
Figure 2: Baltimore City FY2016 Funding Breakdown
Courtesy of Open Budget - City of Baltimore. License CC BY.
Defining Success
The policy proposal details specific indicators to measure policy success, but the
overall desired outcomes are:
1. Reduction in violence
2. Reduction in incarcerated population
3. Socioeconomic improvement in Baltimore’s most underserved
neighborhoods
Known Challenges to Implementation
There are a number of potential barriers to implementation of the policy. Below
I’ve outlined the major barriers along with strategies to overcome them.
Potential Barriers Strategies for Success
Community resistance to locating reentry
service centers in their largely residential
neighborhoods
- Create a meaningful platform for resident
participation in the planning process
- Host community information sessions about
the negative effects of incarceration
Community and policymaker perception of
rewarding ex-offenders with services
- Make information on the benefits for families and
neighborhood economic development widely available
Lack of funding and/or bureaucratic “red tape” - Gain commitment from mayor’s office to
carry out exhaustive funding search from City
budget and external sources
- Establish partnerships with community
organization and support of residents to push
for accountability on behalf of
City administration
- Ensure that reentry service centers are part
of the ongoing Baltimore rezoning proposal
such that services can be offered in the
identified neighborhoods
- Hold City to its commitments to “Safer
Streets” and its 2013 interest in improving
reentry
Policy perceived by ex-offenders as an extension
of the Institution and associated mistrust and/or
lack of use of services
- Establish resource information sessions as
part of the jail and prison intake process
- Establish services within the jail and prison
system that will motivate individuals to
continue upon reentry (e.g., education
attainment, professional certification)
- Low barriers to access services, including transportation
from jails and prisons and accessibility via public
transportation
Despite these challenges, this ambitious policy is much needed and has the
potential to disrupt the violent cycle of the criminal justice system.
Broader Relevance
Moreover, there is no doubt that the improved approach to reentry services
proposed in the following policy memo are relevant outside of Baltimore. Across
the United States there are over 2.2 million people in prisons and jails. That
number has grown over 500 percent in the last 30 years. (The Sentencing Project,
2015). As Michelle Alexander (2010) argues, the U.S. system of mass incarceration
has resulted in relegating ex-offenders to second-class citizens, and it has
disproportionally affected black men as the Baltimore case illustrates.
An extraordinary percentage of black men in the United States are legally
barred from voting today, just as they have been throughout most of
American history. They are also subject to legalized discrimination in
employment, housing, education, public benefits, and jury service, just as
their parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents once were.
(Alexander, 2010)
A successful model in Baltimore will hold promise for cities across the country.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
This paper is a continuation of research presented earlier this semester titled
“Understanding Baltimore’s Violent Spaces.” In that paper I outlined the history of
structural, institutional, economic, and social violence taking place in Baltimore.
Through researching the urban segregation, declining population,
underdevelopment, active gang networks, flourishing drug market, and racial
inequity, it is clear that Baltimore represents a complex case. There is no single
policy that will reduce the level of gun violence and homicides in the City. Rather,
Baltimore needs a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence and improving the
socioeconomic conditions of its underdeveloped neighborhoods. These two
objectives must go hand-in-hand. The policy proposed in the attached
memorandum targets violence through improving the socioeconomic standing of
formerly incarcerated individuals and their neighborhoods.
Current Context
Just four years ago, there was hope that Baltimore was going to divert from its
decades-long history of high violent crime. On January 1, 2012 Baltimore Sun
reporter Justin Fenton wrote, “The annual number of killings in Baltimore has
fallen below 200 for the first time in more than three decades, a symbolic
threshold that seemed elusive for a crime-weary city just four years ago.”
That hopefulness faded, however, as the City was unable to keep the homicide rate
below that threshold. In stark contrast, only four years later the city is witnessing a
record-high per capita rate of homicides. As of December 8, the total number of
homicides in 2015 stands at 322, a rate of approximately 51 homicides per
100,000 people. Compared to 2014 rates nationally, Baltimore would have been
the most deadly city in the United States. (Figure 1)
The City’s primary response in 2015 has been to project a tough stance on
violence, through the creation of the War Room. The War Room is a cross-agency
coordinated effort to target violent offenders. The Baltimore City Police
Department is leading War Room operations with assistance from the mayor's
office, city and federal prosecutors, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and the U.S. Marshals Service (Campbell and Anderson, 2015). This
tough stance on crime echoes Baltimore’s aggressive approach to crime that
characterized the 2000s.
Legacy of Aggressive Policing and the Mass Incarceration Effect
During the years of Martin O’Malley’s mayorship, Baltimore adopted an
aggressive, zero-tolerance approach to crime based on the Broken Windows
theory. As a result, in 2008, Baltimore City was ranked as the top-jailer in the
United States based on the incarceration rate per capita in the City jail (Justice
Policy Institute, 2010). Moreover, Baltimore residents disproportionately make up
the state prison population. In 2015 one-third of Maryland state prison inmates
are Baltimore City residents; Baltimore City only makes up 1/10 of the state
population (Justice Policy Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 2015).
Despite the high rates of incarceration, Baltimore’s homicide rate remains
relatively unchanged. The longer-historical trend since 1975 is a definitive increase
and the last 15 years show only a small decline. The underlying logic of my
proposed policy is that supporting reentry services for individuals returning to
Baltimore neighborhoods from jail or prison will have positive impacts on their
well-being, the community’s well-being, and the City at large. The 2010 Justice
Policy Institute report found that, “Reported conditions in [the Baltimore City] jail
do not lend themselves to rehabilitation and may actually worsen a person’s
chances of succeeding on the outside.” (48) A jail reentries strategies report
commissioned by the Office of the Mayor in 2013 emphasizes the correlated need
for reentry services:
“The number of individuals processed through the jail on an annual basis, and the
collateral consequences of continued engagement in the criminal justice system
on these individuals, their families, and the community emphasize why
implementing a jail reentry strategy is critical,” (James, 2013, ix).
Stakeholders
The policy proposed tackles an institutional problem. Therefore, the main
stakeholders must include departments within those institutions. At the forefront
of the implementation will be the Office of the Mayor, the Mayor’s Offices of
Human Services and Criminal Justice, and Baltimore City and Maryland jails and
prisons. The policy is written to this institutional audience. However, it is
imperative that the policy have the endorsement and support of community
organizations that are already engaged in work to provide reentry services,
improve socioeconomic conditions within Baltimore neighborhoods, especially
those identified in the policy, and to mediate violence. The responsibility of
garnering this support is with the Office of the Mayor. Without community
partnerships the policy risks being perceived as a top-down institutional approach
and risks lacking the legitimacy of local neighborhood voices and knowledge.
Funding
Baltimore City has set “Safer Streets” as its top priority in fiscal year 2016 budget.
Safer Streets receives nearly 32 percent of the overall budget, however that
money is primarily allocated to police services (18 percent). Reentry services are
not an explicit funding area in the budget. I identified one line item aimed at
reentry, an ex-offenders workforce program, which has an allocation of only $2.4
million for 2016. Other reentry programing is likely receiving funding, but it is not
identified as a major or priority sector in the budget.
