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INTRODUCTION At The Outset
At the outset, many expected the United States of America to be able to contain
the novel coronavirus like it had handled previous pandemics. Other comparable
countries like New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, Brunei, China, Taiwan and Thailand were
able to successfully manage its spread largely through strict lockdowns, mask ordinances,
clear risk communication strategies, and a national unity to accept momentary
inconveniences for the common good (Bremmer, Jun. 12, 2020). As of September 2020,
the U.S. is still the global leader of both coronavirus cases and deaths and in late July,
White House coronavirus advisor Dr. Anthony Fauci testified that it is unlikely Covid-19
will ever be eradicated (Lovelace, Jul. 22, 2020). How did it get this bad? As the
American Federal Government failed to muster a sufficient national response to contain
the coronavirus, and would later shift responsibility away from the federal level, local
governments took steps to implement new laws to contain the spread of the coronavirus.
What some might not have expected would be the significant resistance from their own
citizens from measures that would keep them safe in the long run. On June 23rd,
Florida’s Palm Beach County council heard testimony from agitated activists who
believed that their own government was conspiring against them.
“You literally cannot mandate somebody to wear a mask, knowing that that
mask is killing people. It literally is killing people. We, the people, are
waking up… and every single one of you [lawmakers] who are obeying the
Devil’s laws [by mandating mask ordinances in public spaces] are going to
be arrested. You, doctor, are going to be arrested for crimes against
humanity… Every single one of you are going to be punished by God. You
cannot escape God not even with the mask [ordinance] or the six feet [social
distancing recommendation] ... All of you are practicing the Devil’s laws.
What happened to Bill Gates? Why isn’t he in jail? Why is Hillary Clinton
not in jail? Why are all these pedophiles that are demanding you to listen
to their rules, why are they not in jail? Is it because you’re a part of them?
Are you a part of the deep state?”
While her testimony was subsequently mocked online, her misunderstanding of
the public health crisis was emblematic of something more: The American public is not
only reckoning with a media landscape rife with misinformation (Orlowski, 2020), but
are so politically motivated that many reject information that is counter to their
preconceived worldview (Uscinski et al., 2020; Kahan, 2017).
According to a March GallupPoll, people's opinions about whether it is easier or
harder to be informed are strongly related to their attitudes about the media. Seventy
percent of those who have a positive opinion of the media say it is easier to be informed,
while 64 percent of those with a negative opinion of the news media say it is harder
(Ritter, Apr. 9, 2020). These numbers would fall even harder along partisan lines a month
later. In April, 85 percent of Democrats said the Trump administration was a main source
of misinformation about the virus, but only 4 percent of Republicans agreed. For 75
percent of Republicans, mainstream national news was the main source of virus
misinformation, but only 2 percent of Democrats agreed.
We have yet to know the final global impact of the novel coronavirus pandemic
but the delays, denials, and misinformation about COVID-19 have exacerbated its spread
and slowed pandemic response across the world, particularly in the U.S. (e.g., Abutaleb
et al., 2020). Americans are divided about many political issues, but how did the severity
of the coronavirus become a partisan fight? An August YouGov poll found that nearly
three-fourths of Republicans approved of how the U.S. was responding to coronavirus,
while 75 percent of self-identifying liberals said the U.S. response was very bad. Ten
percent of registered Democrats and 33 percent of registered independents believe that
the 185,000 coronavirus deaths were acceptable. Among registered Republicans, 57
percent believed those deaths were an acceptable amount (Salavanto et al., Aug 23,
2020).
While the role that misinformation played in slowing the American’s federal
government’s response to COVID-19 is better understood, less is known about what role
the media played in spreading that misinformation.
Americans’ attention to the news has increased from early December 2019 to
March 2020 (Ritter, Apr. 9, 2020) but where they would go to get accurate information
about the coronavirus depended on a number of factors. According to the April
Gallup/Knight Foundation poll, younger people (18-34) were more likely to consult
health professionals or official health organization websites directly while older people
(55+) were more likely to get information from the one or two news sources they trust
most (Jones, May 11, 2020).
Polling from the early stages of the pandemic suggests that many Americans were
misinformed about COVID-19 from the beginning. In early March 2020, a poll
conducted by YouGov and The Economist found that 13 percent of Americans believed
the coronavirus was a hoax, 49 percent believed the coronavirus was man made, and 44
percent believed the threat of coronavirus was being exaggerated for political reasons
(Economist, 2020). A mid April Gallup/Knight Foundation poll found that 58 percent of
US adults say they are well-informed about the virus while 36 percent say they’re
overwhelmed by all of the information going around (Jones, May 11, 2020).
This divide seems to be consequential - as the decisions that Americans made to
learn about the virus informed their beliefs about the virus and their behavior. A March
1st Civiqs poll found 68 percent of Democrats were moderately or extremely concerned
about COVID-19, but only 21 percent of Republicans expressed moderate or extreme
concern (Badger and Quealy, 2020). Another Quinnipiac University poll released early in
March found that roughly 6 in 10 Republican voters were not especially concerned that
the coronavirus would disrupt their lives (Quinnipiac University/Poll, 2020; Russonello,
2020a). Further, there have been considerable partisan gaps with respect to how citizens
were responding to the crisis, such as washing their hands, working from home, or
changing their travel plans (Stecula, 2020).
The variation in media coverage of the pandemic in its early stages may help
explain these partisan differences. Some American media, particularly popular
rightleaning outlets and pundits, spouted hoaxes and conspiracy theories behind the
pandemic:
Sean Hannity said the virus was a fraud by the “deep state” trying to spread panic,
manipulate the economy, and suppress dissent; Rush Limbaugh suggested the virus was a
plot hatched by the Chinese to harm the U.S. economy; and Fox Business anchor Trish
Regan told viewers that the worry over coronavirus “is yet another attempt to impeach
the president” (Peters and Grynbaum, 2020). As denial and disinformation exploded on
right-leaning media outlets, many conservative elites correspondingly downplayed
concern about the virus (Abutaleb et al., 2020; Badger and Quealy, 2020; Peters and
Grynbaum, 2020; Russonello, 2020b; Warzel, 2020).
Previous academic research has demonstrated that people accept factually
incorrect information as true if it originates from trusted sources or affirms their political
and social worldviews (Kahan, 2017). Considerable evidence also suggests that political
identity leads people to engage in motivated conspiracy endorsements that damage their
political rivals (Flynn et al., 2017; Miller et al., 2016). These motivations may be
amplified in an environment where the pandemic is highly politicized and trusted opinion
leaders also endorse dubious COVID claims (Stecula, 2020). As a result, even seemingly
innocuous denials or false claims from relied-upon media sources may lead individuals
either into a false sense of security or lead others to ignore government
recommendations.
The spread of misinformation about COVID-19 could be particularly problematic
if misinformed people are subsequently less likely to trust advice from experts or medical
professionals. Previous research has found that misinformation about vaccine safety is
associated with increased skepticism about the role medical professionals play in the
policy-making process (Motta et al. 2018) and also with noncompliance with
expertbacked health behaviors (such as wearing sunscreen or vaccinating children)
(Oliver and Wood, 2014). The highly partisan nature of early media coverage of the
coronavirus pandemic had important public health consequences. The relative
prominence of COVID misinformation shared by right-leaning media may have
contributed to the spread of misinformation about COVID and subsequently undermined
support for information from public health experts.
Across multiple media channels, conservative media (Fox News, Breitbart, Daily
Wire, Lowder with Crowder, and PragerU) regularly discussed misinformation about
COVID-19 during the early stages of the pandemic. Further, nationally representative
survey data suggest that people who consumed right-leaning media during that time were
more likely to endorse COVID-19 misinformation (Uscinski et al., 2020). Misinformed
people were more likely to believe that the CDC exaggerated COVID’s health risks,
suggesting that media coverage of the virus in the early stages of the pandemic may have
had important public health consequences. While previous studies (Brigman et al., 2020;
Uscinski et al., 2020) have examined the relationship between conservative media
coverage and misinformation, this article will take a closer look at how conservative
media audiences responded to conservative media coverage of the coronavirus.
The author decided to focus the attention on media effects from YouTube because
it is tremendously influential as a popular social media platform, but its moderation of
politically motivated conspiracy theories has been lax in recent years (Lewis, 2018). In
fact, according to the Pew Research Center, more than a quarter of Americans get their
news from YouTube (Stocking et al., Sept. 28, 2020). However, researchers have pointed
out problems with YouTube’s algorithm (Lewis, 2018; Orolowski, 2020), that promote
controversial and shocking content because it is engaging rather than factual and
explanatory content that can be trusted. Because of YouTube’s low standards of content
moderation, misinformation garners a wide audience and spreads quickly - embroiling
the video hosting platform in a number of scandals. For example, the platform was
responsible for promoting conspiracy videos about the mass shooting in Las Vegas
(Levin, Oct. 4, 2017), facilitated disinformation on such a scale that may have swayed the
2019 election in Brazil (Fisher and Taub, Aug. 11, 2019), and being the platform used
most by fascist groups in the US to indoctrinate others into their far-right world view
(Evans, 2018). While previous studies (Brigman et al., 2020; Uscinski et al., 2020) have
examined the relationship between conservative media coverage and coronavirus
misinformation on television and on Twitter, this article will focus specifically of
conservative news coverage on YouTube.
In this article, the author will be examining how the conservative coverage of the
coronavirus on YouTube affected its audience by examining user comments across three
channels: a total of more than 1,500 user comments (the top 30 comments from over 50
videos). This study will be examining the subject of these comments: how much of the
audiences’ ire was focused on external threats, how their internal processes were
influenced by social biases, and how the comment section became a virtual space to
engage with a like-minded community.
This article exists at the nexus of several disparate fields of study in mass
communication. Particularly, it relies on previous studies of conservative media
(DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Hopkins and Ladd, 2014) and explores the history of
conservative media as it adapts to new technologies. As it relates to social media and
participatory culture, this article relies on recent studies on the kinds of influence that
YouTube has on its audience (Orlowski, 2020; Lewis, 2018 & 2019). Finally, this article
seeks to expand on coronavirus misinformation studies (Brigman et al., 2020; Uscinski et
al., 2020) that seeks to understand why lawmakers and their citizens would not adopt
simple public health measures to slow the spread of coronavirus. Media practitioners
should use this study to reflect on the impact that political influencers, particularly on
YouTube, can have on spreading misinformation about the politicized pandemics. This
article will expand on the existing study of social media’s facilitation of the spread of
misinformation and examine the kinds of relationships consumers have with conservative
news media.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 HOW SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS IS POLITICALLY UNDERMINED IN
THE MEDIA
In the wake of the World Health Organization declaring that the coronavirus
pandemic would be a world catastrophe, they launched a platform designed to combat the
spread of misinformation (Zarocostas, 2020). This platform, EPI-WIN, was supposed to
combat the spread of misinformation around the virus and prevent the ensuing
‘infodemic,’ a portmanteau of the word ‘information’ and ‘pandemic’ used to describe the
wealth of misinformation and conspiracy theories that would be widely available on the
internet. While many world leaders would describe the virus as a common enemy that
divided factions must unite to combat (Oprysko and Luthi, Mar. 18 2020), that did not
insulate the response effort from being highly politicized to suit certain American
political goals. In fact, the scientific consensus around taking governmental action and
acting in the favor of public health, has a long history of being undermined politically in
American media (Oreskes and Conway, 2010).
This history of undue skepticism about scientific consensus has an impact on the
public trust in scientific experts and public health officials (Motta et al. 2018; Oliver and
Wood, 2014). Despite the severity of the coronavirus and the need for immediate,
decisive action to contain its spread, the necessary public health measures were not
immediately followed because of certain political interests and entrenched media
dynamics suited to cater to those interests.
Skepticism around scientific consensus has been a main feature of American
conservative ideology since 1965. This kind of undue skepticism about scientific
consensus has been a major factor in a number of public health problems: smoking,
asbestos, the hole in the ozone layer, fracking, second hand smoke, GMOs, acid rain,
CFC’s, climate change, and now around the government response to coronavirus.
In their 2010 book Merchants of Doubt, authors Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway
documented the use of sowing doubt around scientific consensus as a political tactic they
call the Tobacco Strategy. Historically, this process of preventing scientific consensus
from becoming regulatory policy begins not with finding facts, but fighting them
(Oreskes & Conway, 2010).
A crucial first step in this process involves finding highly visible scientists who
can produce a public study that does not accord with the scientific consensus. For
example, in February 1988, Philip Morris International hired scientists deliberately
outside of the smoking industry to “be able to produce research or stimulate controversy"
around the scientific consensus and create the illusion of a continued scientific debate,
when in actuality there was none (Schwartz, May 9, 1997). This parallel can be seen 23
years later when Fox News host Sean Hannity read a letter on March 23 from an
unidentified doctor “in the New York area” about the effectiveness of treating
coronavirus with hydroxychloroquine (Media Matters, Mar. 23 2020). It can also be seen
over a month later when Dr. Daniel Erickson and Dr. Artin Massihi went viral for
publishing a study comparing the virus’ severity to the flu, garnering over 4 million
views, and a lengthy interview with Fox News’ Laura Ingram on April, 28, 2020 (Times
of San Diego, Apr. 28, 2020). In both cases, those scientists’ credentials were leveraged
by public affairs people, including those on social media and in the news.
The Tobacco Strategy relies on scientists, public relations experts, partisan media,
and lawyers to “maintain the controversy” and “keep the debate alive” in the court of
public opinion in order to avoid governmental action (Losovitz, Feb. 25, 2017). A second
important step in the Tobacco Strategy is the desire for a continuous public debate
between the two sets of scientists (Oreskes and Conway, 2010). In fact, the presence of
the two sets of scientists are designed to conflate the posturing that happens in political
discourse with robust scientific debate. In the context of a debate, the scientists’
credentials are used as a way of concealing possible political motivations and thus the
disagreement is interpreted as a scientific debate rather than a political one. Because of
this, the scientific consensus of one side can appear to be in dispute if the opposing
argument comes from another scientist. As long as the opposing side can engage in a
vociferous debate in the public eye, the ‘consensus’ is perceived to be still up for
consideration and not yet worthy of immediate action.
In the context of coronavirus, as conservative media and right wing politicians in
America resisted immediate and strict public health measures, largely by following the
Tobacco Strategy. It is important to note that these lawmakers and media figures
delineated slightly from the Tobacco Strategy as they did the majority of the debating on
behalf of the doctors, rather than having the doctors do it themselves. Media Matters for
America, an organization that monitors right-wing disinformation across multiple
channels, published almost over 850 stories about coronavirus misinformation from
conservative media as of September. In a brief overview of their published stories, few of
the stories’ headlines contain scientists or medical professionals - with a majority of the
misinformation coming from reactionary figures of rightwing media channels.
Regardless, the Tobacco Strategy appears to mirror the coronavirus response.
Despite having politically motivated and often unscientific research, the opposing side
can appear to be equal to the best scientific opinion as a public disagreement gives the
impression of a serious debate, whose merits are worthy of discussion. Because
scientists’ credentials are so heavily used in this public discussion, artificially inflated
doubt can be conflated with healthy scientific skepticism. It creates the impression that
everything is unresolved and thus nothing can be done yet: “Doubt is our product” ran
the infamous memo written by one tobacco industry executive in 1969, “since it is the
best means of competing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the minds of the general
public” (Oreskes and Conway, 2010 pg. 34; Smoking and Health Proposal, 1969).
Regardless of their credibility or credentials, when each ‘side’ is given equal time,
their arguments are perceived to be of equal importance, and thus the matter is ongoing
and undetermined. The presence of this debate can be further complicated when there are
multiple, possibly politically motivated sources who can repeat the unscientific claim and
appear to give it corroboration. In our modern media ecosystem, of media bubbles and
echo chambers, news media networks and prominent social media profiles can reach
thousands of people and can even unintentionally give oxygen to misinformation and
conspiracy theories by making the two narratives appear to be equally worthy of
consideration (Orlowski, 2020). Even though public health measures have the backing of
scientific rigor and scholarship, and the other doesn’t, something patently false like anti-
vaccination conspiracies can appear to be true if it has enough public salience (Jang et al.,
2017; Maza, May 9, 2019).
Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) developed a measure to
understand how humans perceive truth and developed the Coherence Test to determine
whether a fact-claim can be accepted as true (Christian, 1998). According to the
Coherence Test, a claim can only be accepted as true if it coheres with facts that have
already been accepted as true. For example, consider the following fact claim: There are
no sharks in Lake Murray. Under the Coherence Test, one can compare this claim to other
accepted facts like 1) Lake Murray is freshwater, 2) most sharks live in saltwater, 3) the
Saluda Dam closes the lake off to the ocean, 4) Freshwater sharks cannot swim past the
dam, and 5) no one has ever reported being bitten by a shark at Lake Murray.
However the Coherence Test has a serious flaw as it relies on a previous set of
assumptions that are believed to be true, whose veracity also largely depends on public
salience. In fact, Ciuk and Yost (2016) found that people’s willingness to adopt
policyrelevant information instead of partisan cues depends on the salience of a particular
issue. While this body of research is expanding, Yeyati et al. (2020) found that partisan
elites can have degrees of influence on public opinion. According to their research, the
endorsement of ideas from party elites can polarize public opinions when no prior
polarization exists. Using partisan and leader cues prove of little use in bridging opinion
gaps and building policy support in political climates that are not already polarized.
2.2 HOW CONSERVATIVE MEDIA BEGAN AND HOW IT OPERATES
The emergence of partisan news - as well as political media that presents itself as
news - broadly emerged after the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987. The policy,
aimed at mandating newscasters to give equal time to two sides of a controversial issue,
was broadly aimed at making sure that Americans were uniformly informed about ‘both
sides’ of an issue to prevent individual media groups from having an outsized influence
on American political discourse. At the time, explicitly conservative media was relegated
to William F. Buckley’s The National Review and the monthly American Spectator
(Anderson, Sep. 2017). When the Fairness Doctrine was repealed in 1987, Rush
Limbaugh launched his national right-wing radio show a year later and inspired others
across the country. In the 90’s Rupert Murdoch conceived of a conservative alternative to
CNN and, with the help of Nixon aide Roger Ailes, launched the Fox News Channel
which joined the airwaves in 1996 (Groseclose and Milyo, 2005).
In June 2011, the Nixon presidential library resurfaced a 318 page memo from
Ailes outlining his plans in 1970 to be “Putting the GOP on TV News” (Cook, Jun. 30,
2011). Ailes’ plan was “to provide pro-administraiton, videotape hard news actualities to
the major cities of the United States” in order to circumvent the gatekeeping of
conventional news media. Ultimately, Ailes’ strategy was to undermine conventional
journalistic reporting and set a new media agenda, one that was always favorable to
Nixon and the Republican party. In the memo, he envisioned having a media organization
designed to disseminate interviews with pro-Nixon Republicans directly to their
constituency so that they could directly influence public opinion without “the censorship,
the priorities, and prejudices of network news selectors and disseminators.”
With a fawning media organization, Republicans and the Nixon White House
would be able to control the agenda setting power of the news media to its advantage.
This plan to create a pro-Republican media organization specifically relied on television
because “television news is watched more often than people read newspapers, than
people listen to the radio, than people read or gather any other form of communication.
The reason: People are lazy. With television you just sit—watch—listen. The thinking is
done for you.” Thus when Ailes later launched Fox News, it differentiated itself from
other major television news networks as being “balanced” and “fair,” and painted
conventional news networks as deceitful and illegitimate.
Because technology at the time was slowly advancing and the vast
communications infrastructure that exists today was still being built, the Fox News
Channel was not broadcasted across the country at the same time. Initially, the company
had to negotiate with individual cable companies and would take until the mid 2000s to
be accessible to the entire country. Due to the incremental layout, researchers were able
to determine that the individual media markets that aired the Fox News Channel
increased turnout among Republican voters and induced independents to vote for George
W. Bush in 2000 (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Hopkins and Ladd, 2014). Additionally,
Clinton and Emamordo (2014) found evidence that the congressional representatives of
the areas where Fox News aired marginally reduced their support for President Bill
Clinton.
A significant aspect of how partisan media works is what Kahan (2017) refers to
as identity-protective cognition, which describes a tendency of culturally diverse
individuals to selectively credit and dismiss evidence in patterns that reflect their
preconceived worldview. He found that people can accept factually incorrect information
as true if it originates from trusted sources or affirms their political and social
worldviews. Broadly, the existence of partisan media allows audiences to choose the
narrative about an event that they agree with, rather than subjecting themselves to
mainstream coverage that could contain narratives that disagree with their preconceived
notions and expose the audiences to the possible identity-threatening feelings that may
arise from reconciling the two (Kahan, 2020).
Considerable evidence also suggests that political identity leads people to engage
in motivated conspiracy endorsement impugning their political rivals (Flynn et al., 2017;
Miller et al., 2016). These motivations may be amplified in an environment where the
pandemic is highly politicized and trusted opinion leaders also endorse dubious COVID
claims (Stecula, 2020). As a result, even seemingly innocuous denials or false claims
from relied-upon media sources may lead individuals either into a false sense of security
or lead others to ignore public health recommendations.
The success of conservative media cannot be overstated. Fox News is the most
watched cable news network in the country and has been for a while. In both June 2020
and July 2020, Fox News was the highest-rated television channel in the prime-time
hours of 8 to 11 p.m. The average live Fox News viewership in those hours outstripped
cable rivals like CNN, MSNBC and ESPN, as well as the broadcast networks ABC, CBS
and NBC, according to Nielsen (Grynbaum, Aug. 9, 2020). In short, there was nothing
more popular on television than Tucker Carlson Tonight, Hannity, and The Laura
Ingraham Show - for better or worse, Fox News Programming is primetime television
(Grynbaum, Aug. 9, 2020).
As a whole, the channel generates an estimated $2.7 billion for its parent
company 21st Century Fox (Mayer, Mar. 11, 2019), and its influence on American
politics is unparalleled. President Donald Trump is not only a frequent guest for
interviews, he also regularly consults with its programmers, and employs many former
Fox News staffers in his administration (Mayer, Mar. 11, 2019). The President spends
much of his time in office watching television (Haberman et al., Dec. 9, 2017; Gertz, Jan.
05, 2018). His tweets regularly follow the Fox News programming that he consumes so
closely that experts claim he “prefers to rely on conservative cable news hosts to
understand current events” rather than the federally funded information gathering
apparatus designed to help the American executive branch (Gertz, Jan. 5, 2018).
In fact, Fox News has catered to the political right for so long, that they now
basically operate as a media arm for the Republican party, according to its own
employees. In the wake of numerous layoffs in Fox News’ fact-checking team, an
anonymous current Fox News employee told the Daily Beast “It looks like Fox is more
like an extension of [the Trump] administration, insead of a news network” (Falzone and
Grove, Sept. 28, 2020). Even under oath, lawyers for Tucker Carlson Tonight, one of the
most watched shows on television at the moment, referred to its own news program as
“hyperbolic opinion commentary,” and explicitly not “sober factual reporting.” Fox News
attorney Erin Murphy even questioned that “would a reasonable viewer be coming here
[to Tucker Carlson Tonight] and thinking, ‘this is where I’m going to be hearing the news
of the day?’ raising doubt that one of the most watched shows on the Fox News Network
has audiences that do not believe that Tucker Carlson would tell the truth about the news
(Pierce, Jun 21, 2020).
In addition to the words from Fox News’ own employees, the actions of both
media figures and Republican politicians raise questions about the right-wing news
media. Numerous Fox News hosts have broken traditional norms of journalistic
objectivity as they often campaign with the president and for the Republican party
(Mayer, Mar. 11, 2019; Maza, Nov. 26 2018). Numerous politicians have gone on Fox
News multiple times and received political benefit from campaign donations or
governmental contracts because of it (Derysh, May 20, 2020; Merchant, Aug. 3, 2020;
Caputo, Aug. 29, 2018).
As an example of conservative media’s influence, Fox News is the most watched
cable news program and its impact on electoral politics in America is unlike any other.
Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) found that if the channel had never existed, the Republican
presidential candidate’s share of the two-party vote would have been 3.59 points lower in
2004 and 6.34 points lower in 2008. That means that John Kerry would have been the
2004 popular vote winner, and in an alternative 2008, Barack Obama’s victory would
have turned into a 60% landslide victory. Arceneaux et al. (2016) found that Fox News
was so powerful at influencing congressional lawmakers, even Democrats increased
support for Republican party positions on divisive votes in the months before an election.
Fox News and conservative media also affects individuals in subtler ways. Ash
and Poyker (2019) found that “exposure to conservative news causes judges to impose
harsher criminal sentences... Fox News viewership increases incarceration length, and the
effect is stronger for black defendants and for drug-related crimes.” Vargo et al., (2017)
also found that partisan media is incredibly susceptible to consume and disseminate
misinformation and fake news.
The success of conservative media coincided with the emerging technological
platforms as well. The huge success of Limbaugh inspired a wide variety of conservative
radio shows and without any substantial media regulation, created a vast network of
conservative media airing misrepresentations, misinformation, and sometimes outright
conspiracy theories (Williamson and Steel, Sept. 7, 2018). More media channels,
including on television, the radio, and eventually on the internet, led to media a
‘narrowcast’ (Hamilton, 2005), resulting in media channels catering to different segments
of the population. Partisan news networks emerged from this fragmented media
environment (Webster, 2005), giving rise to individualized ‘media bubbles’ as opposed to
the uniform broadcasting of the past (Stroud, 2011).
This narrowcast becomes even more challenging in the era of social media.
According to a 2020 study conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 1 in 5
Americans get their news primarily from social media, less likely to closely follow major
news stories, and less informed about the events themselves (Pew Research, Jul. 30
2020). The ability to curate one’s source of information based on their appetite for news,
political affiliation, or interest in newsworthy topics directly impacts their real-world
response to their political reality (Orolowski, 2020). Bridgman et al. (2020) found that
exposure to social media is associated with misperceptions about basic facts about
COVID-19 while the inverse is true for news media.
Orolowski’s (2020) The Social Dilemma outlines the effect that social media has
on Americans’ perception of their political reality. Because social media giants like
Facebook are so adept at collecting their users’ data, they determine which users are more
likely to endorse conspiracy theories and feed them conspiratorial content. In fact, they
can find users who are susceptible to being radicalized by sensational political content
and market that content directly to those users. Content producers can essentially target
their audience with content they are sure to enjoy. Producers of political content on social
media especially have perverse incentives as they will make more money based on how
much attention they garner. There are financial incentives for these political social media
influencers to make bold statements and calamitous predictions. Lewis (2018) found that
these dynamics happen especially on conservative YouTube channels, whose coverage
pushes their audience to political extremes on YouTube’s platform.
2.3 CONSERVATIVE MEDIA IN THE ERA OF SOCIAL MEDIA
YouTube is among the most popular video-streaming platforms in the world and,
because of its popularity, it has elevated certain content creators to celebrity and financial
success. These content creators are able to amass huge platforms as its most popular
creators can rival the celebrity of superstar athletes and traditional media figures
(MorningConsult, 2019). Numerous media scholars have looked into how influential
YouTubers are on their viewers (O’Calagahan el al., 2015; Lee and Watkins, 2016;
Ferchaud et al., 2017; Lewis, 2018).
An important element of the research on YouTube has focused on the illusory
social interactions (Horton and Wohl, 1956) that exists between the YouTube creator and
their audience. These interactions, called parasocial relationships (PSR), can mimic the
two-way relationships people have offline: through features on the platform, viewers can
communicate to creators and other viewers through comments or upload videos
responding to other videos. Jung, Youn, and McClung (2007) found that these
communicative features allow users to become active gratification seekers in similar
ways as they would on other social networking platforms .
All of this is to suggest that a key factor in studying PSR is the perception of
authenticity. Rubin and Rubin (1985) found that the perceived realism of a soap opera
positively related to the audience’s parasocial interaction of its characters. Levy (1979)
found that one of the most common parasocial indicators of newscasters is that they “are
almost like friends you see every day” (p.180). These PSRs are powerful as viewers find
YouTube content creators to be credible and trustworthy (Rasmussen, 2018; Johnson,
2017; Ault, 2014). Several quantitative analyses have found similar results (Chapple and
Cownie, 2017; Morris and Anderson, 2015), with some investigating the perceived
intimacy between YouTube creators and their audiences (Berryman and Kavka, 2017).
This perceived authenticity is a key aspect of the popularity of YouTube
influencers, conservative political influencers use that both as a marketing tool and
rhetorical technique (Lewis, 2019). In this way, by using subtle techniques and
emphasizing “relatability, authenticity, and accountability” viewers feel like they can
have a closer, less polished connection to the conservative YouTuber that doesn’t exist on
television. Lewis (2018) outlines how YouTubers and their audience have a feedback
loop relationship where they are both shaped by the coverage and the source of its
demand - elevating influencers not based on their adherence to journalistic norms but on
who can best cater to their expectations.
When YouTube was created in 2005, it was conceived as a video library that
contained trivial videos that wouldn’t have significant effects on American political
discourse, but as the platform grew and its users became more savvy, it became
tremendously influential on political discourse. In the past three years alone, the now
Google owned company has faced a number of high profile public relations scandals:
including promoting conspiracy videos about the mass shooting in Las Vegas (Levin,
Oct. 4, 2017), facilitating disinformation on such a scale that may have swayed the 2019
election in Brazil (Fisher and Taub, Aug. 11, 2019), and being the platform used most by
fascist groups in the US to indoctrinate others into their far-right world view (Evans,
2018; Lewis, 2018).
In 2011, former conservative radio host Dennis Prager wanted to harness new
technologies and create a conservative media channel on YouTube. This new channel
would be made in opposition to a “Liberal Media” conspiracy (which we’ll examine
later) that he sees as dominated by liberal political activists who have infiltrated every
level of knowledge production, namely in the news media and universities. The channel’s
concept is giving the viewer a short, digestible conservative perspective about
conventional political topics that are designed to be in place of a semester long college
course on the subject:
“Our kids aren’t learning that America is a land of opportunity, a defender
of freedom around the world, a source of pride. They’re learning that
America is land of inequality and racism and imperialist power, something
to be ashamed of. Is there a way to undo this damage? There is: it’s called
PragerU, a totally new concept in education ” (“The Mission of PragerU,”
Aug. 24, 2015).
The channel has grown since 2011 and is now a 501(c)(3) that accepts online
donations through its website. Although portraying itself as a university, as well as Prager
admitting to Mother Jones that it was created as a virtual university (Oppenheimer, Mar.
2018), the channel’s website says it is not an accredited university and does not claim to
be [anymore]. In fact, PragerU is largely funded by fracking billionaires Dan and Farris
Wilks, who were supportive of Prager’s attempt to mass-produce conservative narratives
in the trappings of an academic work (Shea, Apr. 30, 2015; Oppenheimer, Mar. 2018;
Johnston, May 7, 2018).
In a similar way, former Canadian voice actor and Fox News guest Steven
Crowder wanted to make a conservative alternative to political comedy shows. In 2009,
he began uploading comedy bits on YouTube and attracted the attention of PJ Media who
molded his burgeoning comedy career with his future as a political commentator. After
YouTube, he was hired by Fox News and then transitioned into his own show on
YouTube hosted by Glen Beck’s BlazeTV (Dickinson, Jul. 11, 2017). Crowder has more
of a diversified revenue stream as he has one of the top political YouTube channels
(second to the liberal The Young Turks’ 4.9 million subscribers), and regularly gets more
than 100,000 views per video. In addition to his affiliation with BlazeTV and ad revenue
from YouTube, he sells merchandise, and has an exclusive subscription service called his
“MugClub.”
Crowder's videos present themselves to be the conservative version of political
comedy shows, but are filmed like sports radio shows as the host often bounces
conversation off of his co-hosts behind the audio controls. Crowder sometimes does
segments that interact with the public. Some of his segments involve man on the street
interviews, character sketches that involve the public, or debate requests with the public
to “change his mind” about political subjects. His channel is influential as he has more
than 4.5 million subscribers on YouTube, nearly twice as big as PragerU’s 2.7 million
subscribers or The Daily Wire’s 2.2 million.
The Daily Wire, like the other conservative flavors of pop culture, is a news and
opinion site that does not do any original reporting and its articles are often less than 500
words (Legum and Zekeria, Jun. 25 2020). It was founded in 2015 by Jeremy Boreing
and Ben Shapiro, former editor of Brietbart.com. Shapiro, who initially wanted a writing
job in Hollywood, transitioned into conservative commentary after graduating from
Harvard Law School. Shapiro, like Crowder, prides himself on his skills in debate but
sticks more towards a straightforward conservative media format.
Despite having a small news site that does not do original reporting, The Daily
Wire is incredibly popular on social media, vastly overperforming traditional news media
like The New York Times, CNN, The Washington Post, and HuffPost on Facebook
(Legum and Zekeria, Jun 25. 2020). An investigation by the Popular Information
newsletter found that a vast network of popular conservative pages on Facebook exist to
promote Daily Wire content (Legum, Oct. 28, 2019). Leaks from Facebook employees to
NBC News revealed that the site regularly shields conservative media sites like PragerU
and The Daily Wire from persistent misinformation infractions (Solon, Aug. 7, 2020).
Despite having cozy relationships with Facebook, The Daily Wire does not appear
to have a financial relationship with the social media giant. The Daily Wire appears to
have a diverse revenue stream, taking an initial investment from the Wilks fracking
billionaires, an exclusive subscription service, in addition to Shaprio accepting regular
speaking fees with various Koch Foundation groups (Nguyen, Dec. 9, 2018; Johnston,
Jun. 25 2019).
The three channels operate in similar ways and exist in the same media ecosystem
as they often host the creator of another channel onto their show (Lewis, 2018). The
YouTube algorithm also pushes viewers of one channel to watch videos from another
channel; thus while the three channels post different levels of views and engagement, it is
conceivable that they share many of the same audience (Lewis, 2018). PragerU brands
itself as being educational and being able to explain complex situations from a
conservative perspective into short digestible videos. While the channel features longer
discussion videos, they often cover a wide range of unrelated topics. Unlike PragerU’s
shorter explanatory videos, Lowder with Crowder is centered around host Stephen
Crowder who claims to be a conservative comedian and discusses various news items
with his cohosts. He often does skits that involve mocking the public in some way and
likes to engage with the public in debates. Finally, the Daily Wire can be seen as more of
a traditional news network, or at least wraps itself in the trappings of a news broadcast.
The show is usually hosted by one person who gives a conservative slant on the news and
appears more to inform about subjects in the news rather than explain complex issues or
make jokes. It is important to acknowledge that while these channels present themselves
as authoritative, they do not produce original reporting.
In fact, it is the effect that these channels have on their audience that motivates
this inquiry. By examining audience comments, this article seeks to explore how the
coronavirus was understood by the audiences of the largest conservative YouTube
channels. Particularly, this article seeks to explore the perspectives of the conservative
YouTube audience about the coronavirus by asking three questions.
Q1: Who were conservative YouTube audiences wanting to blame?
By examining the external objects that commenters were concerned about, the
author intends to gain a greater perspective on the entities or groups that they paid
attention to during the pandemic. As previously mentioned, conservative groups were
less likely to be concerned with the virus itself and this paper seeks to explore what they
and the media they consumed paid attention to instead. In addition to focusing on the
external objects, this article seeks to explore the socio-political ideologies that may
inspire their worldview or their fascination with conservaitve YouTube. It is the author’s
hope that by examining these socio-political processes, researchers can better understand
why conservative media audiences were less likely to adopt simple public health
measures to control the spread of the virus.
Q2: What were the socio-political influences that commenters resonated with in
conservative YouTube’s coverage of the coronavirus pandemic?
Finally, this article seeks to do a more focused analysis on the YouTube medium
itself. By investigating what the commenters reveal about themselves and how they speak
to others, the author intends to explore the context of how the comment section connects
its users.
Q3: What message does the medium of the comment section provide for its users?
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This author selected the three most subscribed conservative media channels on
YouTube. They include “The Daily Wire” which has 2.13 million subscribers, “PragerU”
which has 2.7 million subscribers, and “Lowder with Crowder” which has 4.6 million
subscribers. In addition to their popularity on the platform, the channels represent a range
of overlapping conservative viewpoints that reject progressivism and wider social justice
movements, brand themselves in opposition to the “Liberal Media,” and an adoration for
Republican politicians and conservative thinkers. The three channels also appear in
Lewis’ (2018) ‘Alternative Influence Network,’ defined by mutual appearances in the
content of related conservative influencers. Finally, they fit similar conservative flavors
of popular media, as the Daily Wire mimics a conservative newscast, Lowder with
Crowder mimics a conservative political comedy show, and PragerU mimics a
conservative educational video.
Then the author went through all of their video archives on June 29th, 2020 and
looked at the title of the videos that contained the word ‘virus,’ ‘coronavirus,’ or
‘COVID-19.’ The author then only considered videos with 100,000 views or more
bringing the total from 104 to 54. Each video was ordered chronologically so that it
would be easier to understand the progression of their coverage. Then the author relied on
YouTube’s top comment feature, which relies on YouTube’s engagement metrics, copied
and pasted the top 30 comments into a separate file, and were examined in that order.
While each video was not watched in their entirety, all the 1,620 unique comments were
examined critically.
This article looked at the comments from over 50 videos across a time period
from February to the end of June. During this five month period, most Americans were
learning about the novel coronavirus for the first time and how it would impact their
lives. Further, the author believed this time was an important reference point as it would
not be drowned out by more important news stories. During this time, the national
attention would be mostly on COVID-19 as the 2020 Presidential election in early
November was still four months away.
The subject of selected videos’ coverage of COVID-19 mimicked the
conventional legacy media coverage, often discussing major developments such as the
implementation of public health measures or controversies in the conservative media
echo-chamber. The timeframe for considered videos started in mid-February and ended
before August. As one can imagine, the subjects of the comments were usually tied to the
content of the video. For example, top comments were talking about New York
Congressperson Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in the videos where she was prominently
featured (“AOC Says Coronavirus Causing Racism…,” “Greta & AOC use COVID19 to
Push Climate Change…,”). While the majority of comments appeared to be supporting
many conservative talking points about the virus, it is not accurate to say all of them
agreed with the creator. Creators got pushback especially on coverage that downplayed
the severity of COVID-19 and comparisons to the seasonal flu. While these comments
were interesting, they won’t be considered for further examination in this analysis as they
were not numerous enough and should be considered for further scholarship.
This analysis used a grounded approach to assign various themes to the comments
under each video. After copying and pasting all of the comments in a separate file, they
were then reviewed in chronological order. As the subject of the videos changed from
video to video, the author looked for any connections between the comments from one
video to the next. The author settled on the themes of external enemies, internal
processes, and social processes as a way of categorizing the comments as it relates to the
individual commenter. In addition, the author consulted similar studies that examined
right-wing coronavirus coverage and compared the comments to existing trends in the
relevant literature.
While the researcher did not watch all 54 videos, he did examine the top 30
comments from each of them. Videos were viewed when the subject of the comments
deviated wildly from the previous video or when the author wanted to know what the
commenters were referring to in their messages. The commenters' profiles remained
anonymous in this article but can be seen in the appendix section. While the author
struggled with anonymizing them in the appendix, the comments are publicly available
on the original YouTube video.
CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
In investigating this article’s research questions, the author wanted to provide the
reader with a brief overview of the findings. The external section will examine the
external groups that were almost uniformly criticized by the commenters. The internal
section will seek to understand the context of the comments and examine the processes
involved in understanding the commenters’ worldview. Finally, the social sections will
examine how the commenters relate to others and identify themselves. Table 1 outlines
the various themes and subsections of this article.
Table 4.1 Outline of Subsequent Analysis
I. External
II. Internal
III. Social
A. China
A. Overriding
Suspicion
A. Talking to Host
B. The “Liberal
Media”
B. Contempt for the Weak
B. Talking about “me”
C. Democrats
C. Change as unmasculine
C. Talking about “us”
4.1 CONTEMPT FOR EXTERNAL ENEMIES
This section will be discussing the top external entities that were almost
uniformly criticized by both the commenters and the video hosts themselves.
The first subtheme will focus on the contempt for China, the roots of ‘yellow
peril’ discourse, and how that manifested in the coronavirus comments. The
second subtheme will discuss the “Liberal Media” conspiracy, the origins
of the conspiracy, and how their criticisms echo old antisemitic
conspiracies. Finally, the last subtheme will discuss the commenters’
contempt for Democrats, how negative partisanship has shaped
conservative media coverage, and its implications on how citizens perceive
their political reality.
4.1 CHINA
The Covid 19 pandemic began in late 2019 as the virus was zoonotic in form and
jumped from bats to humans in the city of Wuhan, China. Although it was unknown at
the time, the virus was contracted by humans and spread asymptomatically in an open-air
market, eventually becoming a super spreading event. It would take researchers another
two months before realizing that the virus could be from people spread without obvious
symptoms. From there, infected travelers went around the world spreading the virus to
other parts of China as well as Europe in late December 2019.
In early January, the World Health Organization announced a mysterious
coronavirus related pneumonia, but they would take until the end of the month to declare
a global health emergency. From there, skeptics and political opportunists, including
tabloid news sites The Daily Mail and The Washington Examiner, spread conspiracy
theories falsely claiming that the virus could be a man-made biological weapon from
China. Research suggests that during times of national crisis, but especially during
pandemics, minority groups are historically scapegoated (Keil and Ali, 2006; Rohleder,
2007; Monson, 2017; White, 2020).
For years, the United States has had an adversarial relationship with East Asian
countries, but specifically China. While economic ties have improved diplomatic
relations over the years, Americans’ cultural attitudes about East Asian countries and their
people have remained tragically regressive. Scholars referred to these biases and attitudes
about East Asian groups as “Yellow Peril” and are characterized by the use of tropes as
“dishonesty, disease, invasion, as well as cultural and political inferiority (Del
Visco, 2017). These tropes are a major feature of Americans’ perspective on the global
east and have had a lasting impact on conservative attitudes of nationalism,
anticommunism, and anti-immigration (Del Visco, 2017).
Yellow peril, much like other forms of racialization of ethnic groups in America,
is not static. Instead, “Yellow Peril is a fluid designation that has been used alternatively
to label various East Asian people as the ‘enemy’ of Western civilization and to signify
‘invasion and infection of civility by an inferior culture’” (Lyman 2000, 684). While
these tropes can be traced back centuries ago, these ‘yellow peril’ tropes largely still exist
in conservative spaces today. As China has increased its influence over the global
economy, President Donald Trump has exacerbated existing ‘yellow peril’ ideologies by
worsening economic relations between the two countries and using them as a scapegoat
to shirk responsibility for allowing the coronavirus to spread. Thus, it comes as no
surprise that yellow peril fears appear in many of the comments of conservative media’s
coverage of coronavirus.
As outlined in Del Visco (2017), many comments castigate perceived dishonesty
by the Chinese: “China lying is nothing new,” “It’s from China it’s their fault… China
messed up,” “China is lying about the coronavirus,” [the virus] “was man made in
China,” “why do you trust the Chinese numbers? They have never given any reason to
believe them,” “China is lying about the death rate. It’s much higher than what they are
pointing out, “You can NEVER trust the media OR the CCP!” The perceived dishonesty
of China is a main feature of the yellow peril attitudes in the coronavirus comments.
Stemming from the condemnation of Chinese dishonesty is a major feature of yellow
peril: invasion.
As Del Visco outlines, the fears of Chinese invasion can be through expansion
and ideology. The expansion fear appears very prominently in the coronavirus comments
in a number of ways. The first echoes fears of America having a reduced impact on the
global economy as China has gained a greater position in recent years. The second can be
seen in many of the commenters’ desire to punish China for the coronavirus
economically. For example, “Something should be done to China. Sanctions?,” “Why do
we continue to buy products from them. Bring our work home!!!! Trump 2020,” “China
should be sued,” “China makes all our masks and medications. Brilliant Globalists.,”
“China released this virus as a biological weapon, with the intent to tank the world and
the US economies, thus leading to Trump losing the election.”
While many non-partisan public health experts tried to avoid the racial
stereotyping that follows global pandemics, that did not prevent political elites and
conservative media from using the coronavirus to exploit white racial resentment politics
through yellow peril tropes. Although yellow peril tropes have existed in culturally
conservative spaces in America long before COVID-19, they absolutely show up in a
prominent way in the comments. These fears of Chinese dishonesty, disease, and invasion
are a main feature of commenters’ concern. While many of their fears of China appeared
to be related to economics, commenters were also worried of an ideological invasion.
They fear that the ideological infiltration has already reached American shores,
particularly through their perception of the “liberal media.”
4.2 THE “LIBERAL MEDIA”
A common feature of conservative media is the contention of a vast “Liberal
Media”' that exists outside of the conservative media echo-chamber. The allegation,
which has become a common talking point in much of contemporary conservative media,
characterizes a vast and interconnected conspiracy by political activists to deceive the
public by infiltrating and populating almost all of American knowledge production. This
“Liberal Media” is purported to exist as a monolith, united in their opposition to
conservatives and Republican politicians, and is often conceived as a single entity and
not numerous organizations that exist independently from each other.
The allegation of a “Liberal Media” has its origins in the late 1950’s and early
60’s (Greenberg, 2008). At the time, national journalists covered the Civil Rights
Movement, portraying black activists as fighting for their right to vote against brutalism
from the police. Segregationists saw their coverage as evidence of losing the battle for
public opinion, which inspired the white supremacist Alabama Governor George Wallace
to adopt the populistic idiom of the existence of vast conspiracy of an elite, left-leaning
Northeastern media were distorting the news to fit their politics - an idea that soon, under
President Nixon, became conservative dogma (Greenberg, 2008).
The term’s usage in contemporary discourse can be best outlined by Rush
Limbaugh who described the “Liberal Media” conspiracy as upheld by four corners of
deceit:
“We really live, folks, in two worlds. There are two worlds. We live in two
universes. One universe is a lie. One universe is an entire lie.
Everything run, dominated, and controlled by the left here and around the
world is a lie. The other universe is where we are, and that’s where reality
reigns supreme and we deal with it. And seldom do these two universes
ever overlap. … The Four Corners of Deceit: Government, academia,
science, and media. Those institutions are now corrupt and exist by virtue
of deceit. That’s how they promulgate themselves; it is how they
prosper.”
The allegation of a vast “Liberal Media” is very powerful as it allows for the
conservative audience to anticipate a discrepancy between mainstream and conservative
media coverage. The term, especially when conflated with the allegation of ‘fake news,’
primes conservative media consumers to be sensitive to criticisms of conservative
political figures and inspires a lowered ability to identify credible news (Van Duyn and
Collier, 2018). While mainstream journalism relies on legitimized sources of knowledge
production in its coverage, the term allows the conservative media audience to re-
imagine these legitimized sources as ‘deceitful.’
Additionally, the term acts as a way to insulate conservatives from bad press.
Credible claims of sexual misconduct (Givas, Sep. 17, 2019), abuse of power (Gainor,
Jan. 25, 2020), or a slow federal response to the coronavirus outbreak (Graham, Jul. 18,
2020) are re-imagined as public attacks by political operatives and thus must be
disregarded as partisan and illegitimate. The conspiracy is ‘self-sealing’ as the believers
don’t have to critically examine why conservative politicians are receiving bad press or
why conservative media coverage is different, because any evidence that points out those
problems is re-imagined as further evidence supporting the conspiracy (Lewandowsky
and Cook, 2020).
Rhetorically, the term can be used both defensively and offensively to explain
why the conservative coverage of a news story varies from the most of the other media’s
coverage.
Even though the “Liberal Media” conspiracy supposedly taints so much of the
knowledge production in American life, conservative media cannot do their job without
relying on it. While conservative media often feel that they are not treated fairly outside
of their specific media ecosystem (Nadler et al., 2020), they still rely on the use of
mainstream journalism to guide their coverage. For example, PragerU, Lowder with
Crowder, and the Daily Wire all do not do original reporting, they incorporate
mainstream media coverage of an event as an important feature of their coverage (Legum
and Zekeria, Jun. 25, 2020).
However because of the salience of the “Liberal Media” conspiracy, the
conservative YouTube audience is rarely encouraged to consume the specific coverage
themselves and thus creates an uneven knowledge gap between the conservative news
producers and their audience. This can lead to a game of telephone where the YouTuber
is not only politically motivated but twists valuable information about the coronavirus
into an opportunity to make a certain political point. In much of the early coronavirus
coverage, mainstream news sources were cited and then discredited in the same video
(The Coronavirus Crisis is Worse Than We Thought…).
This knowledge gap becomes a problem where the conservative YouTube
audience relies on the show host to accurately explain what the original reporting means
rather than outlining what it says. This could explain why mainstream print media
consumption led to more accurate beliefs and closer adherence to CDC guidelines
(Jamieson and Albarracin, 2020) and why exposure to social media is associated with
misperceptions about the coronavirus (Bridgman et al., 2020).
Before examining the various themes about the media seen in the comments, they
appear to echo longstanding antisemitic conspiracies about Jewish people seeking to
destroy the Western world with liberal policies and their purported control of the news
media. Jewish heritage and history scholars have found origins of this antisemitic
conspiracy theories in the 1903 Russian story The Protocols of the Elders of Zion
(Zipperstein, Aug. 25, 2020; Klug, 2003). Levine and Newman (2018) outlines how the
conspiracy has evolved to fit different narratives and different political contexts, but
especially in anti-communist, religious, and conservative spaces in America.
As we can see in the comments about coronavirus, the users feel persecuted by
the news media which they believe to be deceitful, left-wing political activists seeking to
harm the country. To the commenters, they believe the media is maliciously conspiring
against them, the president, and the country: “the ‘journalists’... are attacking our
president,” they don’t inform the public in order to make “their president look bad,”
“We’re in a panic because that’s exactly what the [mainstream media wants] ... to happen.
The stock market is crashing and that’s exactly what they want!!!! They believe this will
help them in November,” “Now they tell people to freak out and panic all the while
trying to blame it all on the President.”
In addition to being nefarious and malicious, the commenters believe the news
media is deceitful: “And they wonder why everyone calls them fake news and doesn’t
trust them,” “The [mainstream media] need to find something else to complain about,”
“these smug reporters are never asking constructive questions for the benefit of the
general public,” “Today’s reporters are merely actors playing to their respective
audience,” “We have a press that cries wolf all day,” “The media sells you a crisis.”
Finally, the comments echo the last part of the antisemitic conspiracy that the
news media is comprised of left-wing political activists. Rhetorically, we can see this in
the ways that the news media, Democrats, and all left-wing ideologies are lumped
together as working together in the same plot. “You can NEVER trust the media or the
[Chinese Communist Party]!,” “the [mainstream media] are worried about offending the
Chinese Government,” “political activists disguised as reporters,” “today’s reporters are
merely actors playing to their respective audience,” “The media is complaining about
retractions??!! That’s rich. Such hypocrisy. I can’t stand the left,” “the press and
democrats are not helping… the left does what it wants… we have a press that cries wolf
all day,” “the media told people not to panic, now they tell people to freak out… Liberals
‘never let a crisis go to waste,’” “the media sells you a crisis, politicians sell you a
solution,” “the fact is left wing media panics instantly and spreads like wildfire,” “This is
what happens when ‘Truth-in-Journalism’ is substituted for rabid ideology,” “I’d add that
it’s not just the schools but the media pushes a leftist agenda.”
As we can see, nearly all of the commenter’s criticisms of the media fall onto
antisemitic tropes of being malicious, deceitful, political activists who want to see the
demise of the Christian world in America. In the commenter’s characterization of how
the media operate outside of their conservative media bubble, they rhetorically combine
the news media institution, Democrats, and all the different ideologies on the left as
working together on the same plot against them. It is curious how conservative media
networks (Fox News, Breitbart, or the channels on YouTube) are never included in their
criticisms - perhaps because they tacitly acknowledge that conservative media will never
tell them something that will contradict their worldview or ask them to reconsider their
political alliances. “Yep. Mainstream media is imploding on itself. It’s up to YouTube
journalists to give us the real facts and truth,” one commenter wrote.
4.3 DEMOCRATS
One of the most common enemies of both the commenters and the conservative
YouTube hosts are Democrats or anyone on the left. While their contempt for their
political rivals can be understood merely in opposition to their political goals, it does not
explain the degree of their difference in opinion. According to Pew Research Center
(2014), Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines than they
have been in over 20 years. A key factor in that study asked participants not just if they
disagreed with their enemies, but whether the opposition party is a threat to the nation's
well-being. In 2014, 27 percent of Democrats believed Republicans threatened America -
over a 10 point increase from 1994. Among Republicans, over a third of participants
believed Democrats were a threat to America - more than doubling what it was in 1994.
This polarization is no-doubt in part due to the prevalence of partisan media and
the ability for social media feeds to curate echo-chambers (Pew Research, 2014), but,
more critically, the competition between the two parties puts each other at odds. Since
most elections in American are determined by a winner take all system, many voters can
be motivated to cast their ballots in opposition to a candidate rather than for one they
like. This phenomenon, of voting for a party not because of your support for their
platform, but because of your opposition to its opponent, is called negative partisanship.
Through negative partisanship, voters can be mobilized not through their support of a
certain policy, but in opposition to their rival’s agenda (Abramowitz and Webster, 2015;
See also: Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; Greenberg, 2004; Jacobson, 2007; Iyengar et al.,
2012; Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2013, 2015; Abramowitz, 2015; Huddy et al., 2015).
Abramowitz and Webster (2015) found that negative partisanship was responsible
for an increase in straight-ticket voting, a steep decline in the advantage for incumbents,
and a closer alignment between the results of presidential elections and the results of
House, Senate and even state legislative elections. Pew Research (2020) found that 83
percent of Amercians believe it ‘really matters’ who wins the presidency, a more than 30
point increase since 2000. This hatred for the other side doesn’t just impact how voters
vote, but how politicians govern themselves. In Congress, the ideological divide between
Democrats and Republicans in both the House and Senate is now larger than at any time
in the past century (Ansolabehere et al., 2001; Theriault, 2008; Bafumi and Herron, 2010;
Mann and Ornstein, 2013; Kraushaar, 2014). Party unity on roll call votes has increased
dramatically in both chambers in recent years (Izadi, 2014; McCarty et al., 2008;
Theriault, 2008; Sinclair, 2006). Moreover, the party divide in Washington is not limited
to the elected branches of government. On the Supreme Court, the justices now divide
along party lines on major cases with greater frequency than at any time in recent history
(Clark, 2009; Bartels, 2015; Stone, 2014).
Because there are enormous incentives to motivate your voters’ support by
demonizing your enemy, this could explain why conservative media describes both
moderate and progressive Democrats with the same extreme language. In 2017, YouTube
channel PragerU host Dennis Prager said “defeating the left is as great of a moral urgency
as defeating islamism” (Rubin Report, Jan. 18, 2017). Ahead of the 2018 midterm
elections, Sean Hannity joined President Trump at a political rally and attacked
Demcratic candidates in critical races across the country, calling former Missouri Senator
Claire McCaskill a “Liberal, radical, leftist,” Arizona Senate challenger Kyrsten Sinema
as “radical, leftist,” and Florida governor challenger Bill Nelson as “Democratic,
donothing, Shumer Democrat” (Maza, Nov. 26, 2018).
While using negative partisanship in conservative media coverage is not new, its
influence on their conservative media audience is real and powerful (Martin and
Yurukoglu, 2017; Arceneaux et al., 2016). Because conservative media describes
Democrats in this way, it inspires their audience to describe them as “vipers,” “leftists,”
“miserable people,” “spreading disinformation about the coronavirus,” “[praying] for
World War III, Virus Epidemic, & Recession,” “demon rats,” wanting something to
destroy civilization, “don’t even understand basic reality,” and “inanimate objects [who]
don’t have personalities.”
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
SOCIAL INFLUENCES DETERMINING PERCEPTION OF RISK
The second section will examine the social influences that motivate how
conservative media consumers perceive the new political reality dealing
with the coronavirus pandemic. The first subtheme of this section will
discuss the overriding suspicion that motivates conspiratorial thinking
and the perception of the coronavirus pandemic. The second subtheme will
discuss the contempt for the weak, a hallmark of contemporary
conservatism. Finally, the third subtheme will discuss how the gendered
resistance to change was a major factor in the global response to
coronavirus, but also how it impacted citizens and world leaders in largely
the same ways.
5.1 OVERRIDING SUSPICION THAT SOMETHING IS WRONG
A consequence of branding your news show in opposition to a vast “Liberal
Media” conspiracy that infiltrates almost all of American knowledge production, is what
Lewandowsky and Cook (2020) refer to as an ‘overriding suspicion’ about the official
record or account of a major news event. They outline this ‘overriding suspicion’ as a
nihilistic degree of skepticism towards the official account: “this extreme degree of
suspicion prevents belief in anything that doesn’t fit into the conspiracy theory.”
In the conservative coronavirus coverage on YouTube, this overriding suspicion
resulted in creators raising a number of specific conspiracy theories about the origins or
official narrative surrounding the virus. Daily Wire host Andrew Klavan suggested that
the virus could be a Chinese bioweapon in mid-February (The Coronavirus Crisis is
Worse Than We Thought…). In late February, another Daily Wire host Michael Knowles
suggested that the virus was no more a threat to global health than the seasonal flu and that
media reports about the severity of the virus in other countries are evidence of coordinated
effort by political activists in the media to harm the economy before the 2020 election
(Coronavirus Kills The Economy…). In early April, Lowder with Crowder host Steven
Crowder suggested that the official death rates in America were overinflated because
people die from complications like respiratory failure, pneumonia, or ARDS and not the
virus itself (The REAL COVID-19 Numbers...).
In their 2017 report, the Council of Europe outlined frameworks to understand
false information and how it spreads online. Particularly they describe how often true
information can be said in such a way to imply something false. In their videos, the
conservative content creators can raise the idea of a conspiracy theory (like coronavirus
being a manmade bioweapon or that the government is overinflating death rates) without
using the exact words to explicitly spell it out. Alternatively, creators can still endorse
conspiracy theories despite equivocating or rhetorically distancing themselves by
claiming ignorance or drawing connections by ‘just asking questions.’ These rhetorical
strategies insulate the creators from legal consequences while inferring connections in the
minds of their audience. These unfounded conspiracy theories become even more
problematic when the shows present themselves in the trappings of conventional news
shows, with authoritative speakers with various credentials, talking about topics in the
news in an accessible way that is easy to understand. These factors contribute to
worldview around an overriding suspicion that appears to trickle down into the audience.
Keeley (1999) finds that the overriding suspicion involved in both the conspiracy
theories raised by the content creators and the same ones that appear in the comments,
depends on a desire to hold onto notions of an ordered universe. “By supposing that
current events are under the control of nefarious agents, conspiracy theorists entail that
such events are capable of being controlled… On this view, there is some hope that
humans can understand, predict, and conceivably control the course of human events.
This the conspiracy theorists believe, only they further believe that the wrong folks are at
the helm” (p.123-124).
The author reveals that this ‘overriding suspicion’ perfectly exemplified in late
March, April, and early May with the often repeated talking point in the conservative
coronavirus coverage that the ‘media refuses to talk about the positives’ of the
government’s response. The allegation goes that the mainstream media has been
deliberately focusing negative aspects of the coronavirus outbreak instead of framing
their coverage that paints the Trump administration in a more positive light. Daily Wire
host and Founder Ben Shapiro outlines that particular talking point in “Ben Shapiro
Provides Positive Updates on Coronavirus; SLAMS Mainstream Media”
“Listen to the questions there. It’s terrible. The members of the media who are
spending all their time asking ‘is [the federal response] enough?’,
‘is it enough?’ They’re looking for bad news at this point. How about this,
when a Democratic governor of a state says that the Feds are doing their
best in providing help, you say ‘oh that’s good news!’ instead of ‘is it
enough?’ [or] ‘what more can you get out of them?’
The attempt to castigate the media for ‘not focusing on the positives’ is a veiled
attempt to reconcile the severity of the coronavirus without assigning blame to the Trump
Administration’s slow federal response. Under this framing, there is a clear villain behind
why the virus is perceived to be as bad as it is and further suggests that there is reason to
be suspicious of the official narrative as the media could be exaggerating.
5.2 CONTEMPT FOR THE WEAK
In the wake of the controversial election of 2016, media figures and scholars have
attempted to explain the basis of support for Trump. Some in the media saw his support
as a result of ‘economic anxiety’ from white people of all economic backgrounds
(Semuels, Dec. 27 2016). Others laid the blame on the growing right-wing populism of
the Republican Party, racism, sexism, and a desire for fascism (e.g., MacWilliams, 2016;
Rahn and Oliver, 2016; Schaffner et al., 2017; Sides and Farrell, 2016; Wayne et al.,
2016).
Perhaps most importantly, analysts have focused on Trump’s appeal to white
Americans who harbor animosity toward “undeserving” racial minorities. Trump’s lack
of support among people of color and his popularity among nearly every white subgroup
suggest that support for his candidacy was rooted in racial hostility (Luttig et al. 2017).
Moreover, Trump’s call for law and order in the context of discussing urban unrest is
reminiscent of previous racial appeals in American politics, including George HW Bush’s
Willie Horton ad (Mendelberg, 2001) and Richard Nixon’s “Southern strategy” (Hillygus
and Shields, 2008). More diagnostic still are studies showing that variables measuring
white in-group favoritism and those measuring bias against racial and ethnic out-groups
strongly correlate with support for Trump (e.g., Cohen et al., 2016; Gest, 2016; Nteta and
Schaffner, 2016; Schaffner et al., 2017; Tesler, 2015, 2016a; Wood, 2017; Luttig et al.
2017).
One of the most provocative essays about the energy behind President Donald
Trump is written by Adam Serwer of The Atlantic, titled “The Cruelty is the Point”
(Serwer, Oct. 3 2018). In his essay, he describes how Trump does not lose support for the
harsh and nativist actions he takes as president of the United States, but in fact is because
he inflicts suffering onto those marginalized groups, who are deemed to be enemies: “It is
that cruelty, and the delight it brings them, that binds his most ardent supporters to him,
in shared scorn for those they hate and fear: immigrants, black voters, feminists, and
treasonous white men who empathize with any of those who would steal their birthright.”
These elements could explain not only the sexism and racism found in some of
the comments, but also the irreverence and enjoyment of those same remarks. However
these comments don’t come out of nowhere: the YouTubers play a critical role as well. In
addition to spreading racist ideologies, the content creators play an important role in
shifting the definition of racism from a system of advantage based on race (Wellman,
1977) to a much narrower one that includes intentionality and a desire for easily
identifiable universal signals of discriminatory language and action. In these ways,
creators can incentivize racist behavior while commenters can believe that they are
actually not being racist as their actions do not meet this narrower definition.
Trump’s support, especially around his desire to punish demographics of people
determined to be enemies, has been named many things (Sheparrd and Jones, Oct. 5,
2017) and often reflect key identifiers of fascism (Paxton, 2004; Harris et al., 2017;
Robinson, 2019). As Historian Umberto Eco outlined in Ur-Fascism (1995) a key
element of fascism is a ‘Fear of Difference’ that often results in a popular sentiment of
‘us vs. them.’ This popular sentiment is rooted in a chauvinistic, ultra-nationalism that
favors the country over all else and the perceived inferiority of outsiders (Johnston, Jul.
19, 2018). Eco outlines that these beliefs often translate into a form of ‘popular elitism,’
where citizens believe they are the best citizens of the world and contrast those beliefs
with a strong contempt for the weak (Eco, 1995).
This contempt for classes of people deemed to be foreign and weak often appears
in sexism and misogyny. Even in covering coronavirus, the YouTubers made several
videos talking about the ‘irrationality’ and ‘stupidity’ of female Democratic lawmakers as
well as climate activist Greta Thunberg. In the context of Coronavirus, the YouTubers
relentlessly mocked these women for claiming that coronavirus exacerbates existing
inequalities. However, the YouTubers and the commenters’ misogyny did not translate
into a uniform hatred of all women: Former Governor of South Carolina Nikki Haley and
Dr. Deborah Birx were interviewed by Daily Wire Host Ben Shaprio in late March and
early April - and were largely praised by the commenters.
Philosopher Kate Manne describes this reaction of criticizing dissenters and
praising advocates in her book Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (2017) as being
wholly consistent with the logic of misogyny. She theorizes that because of the nature of
patriarchies, women are born into an “unofficial service industry” that requires “a masked
quality about it: it is supposed to look amicable and seamless, rather than coerced.
Service with a smile, not a grimace, is the watchword” (Manne, Jul. 11, 2016). Because
of this ‘service position,’ misogyny acts as a form of enforcement: to punish the
disobedient and to praise the obedient whose actions uphold the patriarchal order. Under
her framework, misogyny isn't purely a hateful reaction. While hateful and hostile
reactions are directed at women who challenge men’s power and authority, misogyny can
also take the form of paternalism and high praise.
“Misogyny can afford to be selective because its fundamental goal is
enforcement. Women who know their place do not need to be put in it…
Trump also has high praise for some of the women who love and revere
him, such as his daughter Ivanka… By saying that her father supported her
career ambitions, as well as those of his women executives, Ivanka missed
the point that she and they represent no threat to her father and are thus
unlikely to come under fire. It is primarily women who challenge Trump’s
power and preeminence who suffer his comebacks” (Manne, Jul. 11, 2016).
For example, Manne’s framework for misogyny is evident in how the commenters
perceive Haley as “awesome” and someone who “just says it how it is.” To them, she is
someone who would get enthusiastic support from nearly everyone in the comment
section if she were to run for president. Haley is praised as she is supportive of their
ideological interests and does not threaten patriarchy. On the other hand, Democratic
Congresswoman from New York Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Massachusetts Senator
Elizabeth Warren, are the victims of intense hatred and scorn from the comment section.
They are labeled as ignorant, childlike, and weak: “She is ignorant to almost everything,
speaks rambling sentences, and when she does convey an idea, it has little to no
relevance. Yet she expects people to take her seriously.” “When is someone with some
cred going to tell Warren that she is truly insane and needs help… to her face?,” “She is a
child in an old woman’s body.” Through the logic of misogyny, the disobedient women
are not just child-like figures to be ignored, but insolent children in need of discipline and
punishment. “We are essentially living through the societal equivalent of ‘spare the rod,
spoil the child,’” one comment reads.
However, it also must be acknowledged that even positive praise for a person is
not without its racial underpinnings. Bill Richmond is a recurring character on Lowder
with Crowder, which he and the commenters lovingly refer to as “half-Asian lawyer Bill
Richmond.” While some ethnic minorities are racialized in a negative sense, some are
racialized in a positive sense. As the result of postwar American government propaganda
efforts, east-Asian people are perceived to be extraordinarily smart, hardworking, polite,
and particularly adept at math (Burns and Yu, May 29, 2018.) In this context, Richmond
is a ‘model-minority,’ who recognizes his place as subordinate and is unthreatening to the
white supremacist hegemony and thus deserving of praise: “Crowder’s bringing out the
heavy artillery. Half-Asian Lawyer, FULL Asian Doctor,” “I’m starting to think you only
hire Asian professionals. That’s either racist, or very, very smart.”
Rhetorically, the constant labeling of Richmond as ‘half-Asian lawyer Bill’ serves
as a constant reminder to Richmond and the audience that he is from a different racial
category than Crowder’s other white guests. The constant reminders not only reinforce
his racial otherness, but also becomes one of the most prominent features of his identity
and his reputation. The audience mimics Crower’s persistent labeling of being ‘half-
Asian lawyer Bill,’ but likely interprets the Crowder’s persistent labeling as a compliment
because of the model-minority myth.
Perhaps it is because of the commenters’ contempt for the weak that dampened
the willingness for conservatives to adopt communitarian public health measures. From
their perspective, it would be an unacceptable reality to disrupt their daily lives to protect
the marginalized groups whom they despise.
5.3 TOXIC MASCULINITY AND CHANGE AS VULNERABILITY
While the coronavirus was affecting large parts of the world, most authoritarian
leaders resisted implementing the public health measures necessary to prevent its spread
(Rachman, Apr. 20, 2020). In May, as many countries in Europe and New Zealand were
seeing a slow spread and steady decline in coronavirus cases, many commenters in the
media saw comparisons between the high number of cases in countries with strongman,
authoritarian world leaders (America, Britain, Brazil, Russia, Iran, Italy, Hungary, and
Belarus) and the low number of cases in countries with female world leaders (Germany,
New Zealand, Finland, Norway, Iceland, and Taiwan) (Taub, May 15, 2020; Cox Apr. 13,
2020). While the comparisons are interesting, and presents a significant opportunity to
increase female representation of leaders on the world stage (Piazza and Diaz, 2020), the
evidence suggests that gender had an influence on not just political decision making, but
also willingness for citizens to adopt public health measures.
British Journalist Gideon Rachman interpreted the reluctance for the countries
with strongman, authoritarian leaders to quickly adopt public health measures as
evidence of their “refusal to be intimidated by a mere disease.” Brazilian President Jair
Bolsonaro, who would later contract the virus multiple times, said on March 29th that the
country would “tackle the virus but tackle it like fucking men – not like kids” (Phillips,
Mar. 30, 2020). Belarusian Dictator Alexander Lukashenko, who would later contract the
coronavirus, continued to hold public appearances without a mask, continued to play
hockey, and was interviewed in late March in full hockey gear and said, “It’s better to die
standing, than live on your knees” (Evans, Aug. 20, 2020). British Prime Minister Boris
Johnson, who would also later contract the virus, minimized the severity of the virus by
saying that he “wouldn’t need to worry” about the virus because of his “history as an
athlete” (Cottle, Mar. 27, 2020). After four months of refusing to wear a mask, repeatedly
undermining his own public health agency’s guidelines, and mocking his political
opponent for wearing one, American president Donald Trump told aides that wearing a
mask would “send the wrong message,” according to one administration and two
campaign officials not authorized to publicly discuss private conversations (Associated
Press, May 7, 2020). It would take until July for Trump to wear a mask for the first time
publicly, who was flanked by military generals at the time and was praised by aides on
Twitter for being ‘patriotic.’ He would later test positive for the coronavirus.
The desire to promote strength and dominance by resisting public health
measures, reflects what Johnathan Metzel describes in his book, Dying of Whiteness:
How the Politics of Racial Resentment Is Killing America’s Heartland, as “an assumption
of a kind of invincibility that is tied to this idea of white masculinity” (North, May 12,
2020). Glick et al. (2018) outlines how showing weakness contradicts a core element of
contemporary masculinity. He later found that “Leaders who are more concerned with
preserving a macho public image put our lives at risk as they prove their manhood by
showing resistance to experts’ opinions, hypersensitivity to criticism and constant
feuding with anyone who seems to disagree with them” (Glick, Apr. 30, 2020).
The stereotype of contemporary masculinity as an invincibility and reluctance to
show vulnerability plays out in other adherence to public health measures. Global Health
50/50 suspected that an explanation for why men were dying from coronavirus at higher
levels were because of a higher likelihood to smoke, consume alcohol at higher rates, and
lower likelihood to wash their hands than women (Global Health 50/50, 2020; American
Cleaning Institute, 2010). Men were also more likely to spread the virus as Capraro and
Barcelo (2020) found that they were less likely to wear a mask as well.
The reluctance to accept simple public health measures from both political leaders
and from their citizens directly played into a slow response to coronavirus. This
reluctance played out in both conservative media coverage as well as in the comments.
While many YouTubers were downplaying the severity of the virus, many commenters
found that their lives did not have to change significantly. This reaction appeared to take
many forms as some claimed that there was no reason to worry “zero concern,” that
public health measures can be easily accommodated in their lives “you mean I shouldn’t
bug out to the Rockies, I do that every summer,” and that Trump’s comparisons to the flu
over the recommendations from the YouTuber assuaged them from taking action “sorry
ben, but trump stating the average flu stats calms my fears.”
Finally, because people can live in can construct media bubbles where through the
severity of the coronavirus is portrayed only in one way, even best efforts to
communicate risk were never taken seriously as their audience was primed to ignore
reports from the “Liberal Media,” health experts or others.
CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
COMMUNITY OF THE LIKEMINDED
The last section of this analysis will discuss how consumers of conservative
YouTube use the medium to interact with the host, themselves, and each
other. The first subtheme will discuss how users talk to the host as if they
were friends, giving both praise and criticism. The second subtheme will
examine how commenters used the medium to talk about themselves,
especially using ethnic identity labels as a way to denounce something
mentioned in the media coverage. Finally, the last subtheme will examine
how the users talk to each other through in-jokes and a community of shared
ideologies.
6.1 NAVIGATING PARASOCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HOST
Lewis (2019) outlines the various ways that conservative YouTube creators inspire
connections with their audience. She relies on a definition of these creators as
‘microcelebrities,’ who have developed highly engaged niche audiences by constructing a
public person to be consumed by others and “use strategic intimacy to appeal to
followers, and regard their audience as fans” (Marwick, 2015). Lewis (2019) found that
the conservative YouTubers can inspire powerful parasocial relationships with their
viewers by using micro-celebrity strategies not only as a business strategy but also a
political stance that positions them as more credible than mainstream media.
Specifically, she looked at conservative YouTubers Tim Pool, Dave Rubin, and
Blaire White and examined how they weaponized “relatability, authenticity, and
accountability” to establish credibility with their audience. Worse, she outlines that these
relationships can inspire an “authoritarian potential” that destabilizes their audiences’
worldviews by using anti-progressive viewpoints to castigate mainstream media and
“serve as an entryway into other alternative information sources” (Lewis, 2019).
Thus the dynamics of the parasocial relationship between the creator and audience
are even more slanted. The content is not only entertainment but one of the sole sources
of ‘true’ information in opposition to a vast and interconnected “Liberal Media”
conspiracy. Perhaps this media effect, coupled with existing parasocial relationships,
could explain the positive comments between the commenters and host.
Some of the positive comments involved being proud of the guests that were
interviewed by Ben Shapiro. Over the 4 month period that this study looked at, The Daily
Wire’s guests have included Former Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, top
public health official Dr. Deborah Brix, and Vice President Mike Pence. These guests
were universally praised as a success, as many of the comments seemed to be praising
Shapiro and the Daily Wire for having such high profile guests, rather than engaging with
what they said or the implications of their warnings of the coronavirus. Negative
comments did not appear in the top comments under these videos.
While many envision the conservative media audience to be uniform, who exist
largely in an echo chamber who believe the same things, the number of negative
comments prove otherwise. On Steven Crowder’s “Leftist Coronavirus Lies
DEBUNKED” on March 9, seven of the top 30 comments pointed out how this video
coverage would not age well. On several occasions, commenters posted lengthy rebuttals
about the severity of the coronavirus. Others wrote longer essay style responses to the
hosts, castigating them for politicizing the virus response or criticizing the president’s
slow federal response.
Others criticized the programming decisions of Steven Crowder. In his March
17th video, “PRANK CALL: Nike's Racist Coronavirus Policies!,” Crowder calls Nike to
complain to one of their customer service employees about a number of Nike official
policies in an offensively exaggerated asian accent. In the video, Crowder badgers the
customer service employee about Nike’s decision to close stores in America, whether
stores are open in Asia, and differing prices between certain shoes. Despite the customer
service employee being very composed in his responses, Crowder aggressively tries to
put him into a corner, asking him about his personal opinion about shoe prices and then
conflating that with the official position from Nike. Nearly half of the top 30 comments
disapproved of the segment or praised the customer service employee for having to deal
with Crowder’s harassment.
The comments appear to be a way for the audience to give their feedback to the
show, both the good and the bad. Many of the comments were directed at the host as a
singular person, rather than the entire program staff. This could be evidence of a
parasocial relationship and an imagined personal connection with the host.
Finally as evidence of a personal connection, some comments were made as an
attempt to a joke at the hosts’ expense. A common joke against Daily Wire host Ben
Shaprio refers to his constant mention that his wife is a doctor. While most of the
conservative YouTube channels appear to be non scripted - as the show hosts don’t
appear to be reading anything and occasionally use verbal crutches like ‘um’ - the joke
can be evidence of the audience’s awareness of common talking points and the repetitive
nature of conservative media.
6.2 USE OF IDENTIFYING LABELS WHEN TALKING ABOUT “ME”
An interesting series of comments were involving several self disclosures. These
types of comments tended to be longer and revealed a number of facets into their lives.
While it is impossible to determine the veracity of the personal information, much of this
information was intended to give anecdotal accounts. It is important to acknowledge that
these comments are giving a first person account in a media environment dedicated to
skepticism about the official narrative of the coronavirus.
During the months of February to June, public knowledge of the coronavirus has
developed and sometimes shifted. The virus can be spread by people who do not exhibit
obvious symptoms, a fact that was first disputed by the WHO in February and later
clarified in June. Masks are an important and cost effective way to reduce the spread of
coronavirus through droplets in the air. People who leave the safety of their own homes
should wear them in public to prevent the spread of the virus. While the production of
personal protective equipment like masks was overwhelmed and medical practitioners
were running on short supply, some officials told Americans to not buy them to allow
doctors and nurses to have them. As mask wearing became an important aspect of the
public health response, the issue became politicized and fodder for conspiracy theories.
As consumers of conservative media, who are often told not to believe official
reporting, government authorities, or academic studies, these first person accounts give a
brief window into the lives of these individuals. Many of them involve identifying
themselves with a label: “as a Christian” “I’m Chinese” “As a Mexican American” “I am
an immigrant” “As a Latino man” “As we say in Texas.” While profiles on YouTube have
less identifiable information than most social media platforms, the preference for
identifying labels in their comments is curious and echoes previous scholarship on ethnic
identity (Brittian et al., 2014; Morrison and Chung, 2011).
Most of the comments that feature ethnic identity labels appear to be forms of
denouncement. For example, “As a Latino man… I can’t help but wonder why anyone
would vote for AOC. She is ignorant to almost everything,” “I am an immigrant…
luckily didn’t do school here,” “As a Mexican American… It makes me sick how other
citizens of Mexican descent complain about supposed injustices,” “I’m Chinese and i’m
sorry for the tragedy my country brings you… I sincerely apologize to you all.” While it
is impossible to determine the veracity of their ethnic identity labels, it is curious that
these labels appear in the context of conservative media, whose audience is
conventionally perceived to be uniformly white. Future studies of the conservative media
audience should look at how these self-disclosed labels of ethnic identity are used to
denounce various objects of contempt in conservative media.
Another feature of these self-disclosure comments do not reflect lives of
privilege. In fact, many self disclosures included descriptions of difficult upbringings and
precarious economic situations. “I’m VERY poor (becoming homeless is a very
possibility in my life)” , “My childhood was nothing but pain and suffering, from the
hands of my own father, and as a ward of the State of Connecticut… I had my share of
other problems, including 18 months in jail” , “I’m making deliveries all over town for
people” , “I work in customer service” , “life can be [pain]” , “As someone who works in
a pizza place.”
While some of these kinds of comments were denouncing something, (“I pity the
‘trophy generation’”), many of them were telling others to resist large changes in their
lives because of coronavirus: “it’s not the virus itself that’s scaring them,” “[Coronavirus
is] letting me appreciate what I already have,” “this chat was comforting and reassuring,”
“I’ve been ‘self-quarantining’ for the past 39 years, this is great news.”
This is to say, the many communicative features that YouTube facilitates, through
its comment section and PSRs, found that these communicative features allow users to
become active gratification seekers in similar ways as they would on other social
networking platforms (Papacharissi and Rubin, 2000; Jung et al., 2007). In addition to the
audio and visual simulation of the company that videos provide, YouTube users can
provide avenues for communication among other conservative media consumers. These
features allow users to explore both personal and social identities with other people they
see as like them.
6.3 TALKING TO OTHERS
Taken together, the comments reflect a range of reactions to conservative media’s
coverage of coronavirus. The comment section appears to be a way for audience
members to communicate directly with the host. From the audience’s perspective, it can
also be used to communicate with other audience members who are likely likeminded
individuals. One of the primary ways that users talked to others in the comment sections
were through a series of repetitive jokes. These jokes provided a social role, in order to
build a connection with other audience members through their shared perspective on a
topic. These jokes ranged in creativity and appeared to closely follow the subject of the
video.
Several jokes were insensitive and often repeated. While the nature of humor
sometimes involves taboo subjects, the jokes’ repetitiveness grew the simple joke into
more of an internet meme. While the memes involve different subjects, like the apparent
suicide of celebrity sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein or comparing coronavirus to cheap
Chinese manufactured goods, they had similar effects. Their repetitive nature signaled a
shared set of values that the jokes reflect - in the case of Epstein, that we should be
skeptical of the official narratives, and in the case of Chinese goods, that foreign goods
are lesser in quality than American products.
Many of the comments also reflect a shared community around many of the same
fears: of a Chinese conspiracy, a “Liberal Media” conspiracy, or of Democrats gaining
political power. This feature of conspiratorial thinking in both the conservative
coronavirus coverage on YouTube, as well as in the comments, echo a threatened way of
life - and conservative media appears to offer audience members a safe haven to express
shared in-jokes, fears, and sometimes personal anecdotes.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Previous studies looked at the correlation between conservative media coverage
and their audience’s likelihood to follow public health guidelines or have misinformed
beliefs about coronavirus. This study looked at the audience of conservative media and
their actual responses to content. While a few commenters pushed back on the
misinformation and misrepresentation in the coronavirus coverage, most did not. Many
echoed the conspiracy theories raised by the hosts and many shared similar sentiments
about the virus.
While these YouTube channels were likely not to be the only form of news this
audience was consuming, the channels were incredibly popular and shaped how hundreds
of thousands of Americans saw the pandemic. With their unique attachment to their
audience, influencers were able to circumvent traditional norms of journalism and
sometimes elevate conspiracy theories about the virus. Yet viewers saw these YouTube
influencers in opposition to the media organizations that exist outside of the conservative
media ecosystem, the few beacons of truth among a vast ocean of lairs. This paper argues
that the way conservative YouTubers covered the coronavirus had lasting effects on their
audience and undermined critical health communications by using their agenda setting
capabilities to shift their audience’s attention toward external enemies, fueled by division
and contempt.
The first section of this discussion examined how much of the content creators
and the commenters’ ire was focused on external enemies. These enemies were not
unfamiliar characters in conservative media as there is a long history of demonizing
China, the “Liberal Media,” and the Democrats. Many of the China comments fell into
familiar ‘yellow peril’ tropes, blaming them for disease and afraid of an invasion. Many
of these fears resulted in a desire to primarily punish China economically as a way to
prevent further prominence in the world economy. The second subtheme examined the
contempt for the “Liberal Media” that commenters felt were conspiring against
conservatives. The “Liberal Media” trope was not only powerful but the subject of
intense scrutiny from commenters. Finally, the last subtheme examined contempt for
Democrats and how negative partisanship influenced their perception of the new political
reality under coronavirus.
The second section of this discussion looked at the social influences that shaped
how conservatives perceived the coronavirus pandemic. The first subtheme of this
section looked at the overriding suspicion that guided conspiratorial thinking and why
commenters were willing to raise doubts over the origins of the virus or simple public
health measures to prevent its spread. The second subtheme examined how a contempt
for the weak was not only a feature of contemporary conservatism but a common
reoccurrence in the coronavirus comments. Finally, the last subtheme examined how the
gendered resistance to adopt public health measures was a factor in the global response to
coronavirus, but also a part of the comments.
Finally, the last section of this discussion looked at the social aspect of the
comment section. The first sub theme examined how the parasocial relationship between
the audience and the producer influenced how commenters spoke to the host in a familiar
tone. The second subtheme addressed how users spoke about themselves, notably using
ethnic identity labels to denounce things in the coverage. Finally, the last subtheme
looked at how the commenters spoke to other commenters, demonstrating a familiarity
between commenters based on shared values and interests.
This work expands on the literature of Oreskes and Conway (2010) and their book
Merchants of Doubt especially in terms of understanding how interconnected right wing
media is, especially with regards to being a part of an ‘Alternative Influence Network’ as
described in Lewis (2018). Specifically, this article contributes to the existing body of
research that has looked into the origins of conservative media and how it has adapted to
various technologies and in numerous political contexts. Finally, it understands how this
type of political content functions and the kind of effects it has on its audience,
particularly with regards to the spread of COVID-19 misinformation on social media.
This work expands on the existing communications research into conservative
media, online misinformation, and coronavirus health communication. While previous
studies like Brigman et al. (2020) and others at the Harvard Kennedy School
Misinformation Review looked at broader COVID-19 misinformation across social
media platforms, this study focused more specifically at how users responded to slanted
and politically motivated coverage of the coronavirus on YouTube. This work also
expands on Lewis (2018) who pioneered how theorists understand the influence of
conservative media on YouTube consumers. Further research in this field should examine
the correlation between the consumption on conservative media on YouTube and voting
behavior or willingness to adopt public health measures to prevent the spread of
coronavirus. Media practitioners should use this study to reflect on the impact that
political influencers, particularly on YouTube, can have on spreading misinformation
about the politicized pandemics. This article will expand on the existing study of social
media’s facilitation of the spread of misinformation and examine the kinds of
relationships consumers have with conservative news media.
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