INTRODUCTION Coptic laity held
On 6 March 1911, the Coptic laity held the so-called ‘Coptic Congress’ in Asyut (Southern
Egypt) whose main goal was to shed light on the complaints and demands of the Christian
community at the time. The organizers ended up with a list of grievances which included
the following. 1) Religious discrimination against Copts since they were not given a day
off in Sunday whereas Friday was a day of rest for Muslims. 2) The bias against Christians
in employment, particularly in high-rank positions. 3) The underrepresentation of Copts in
provincial councils. 4) The inequity in distributing educational privileges among Muslims
and Copts. This was manifested in prohibiting Coptic children from studying in the Kuttābs
(elementary religious schools) and public schools, whereas Muslim children were allowed.
This was based on the premises that these places were deemed Islamic establishments.
Ironically, Coptic grievances have not entirely been resolved yet despite the fact
that more than hundred years have passed since the Coptic Congress (see chapter 2). What
is worse, the position of Copts has deteriorated due to several waves of sectarian violence
they have encountered since the 1970s onwards, which culminated after the Arab Spring.
In fact, the rise of Islamists to power in the wake of the 2011 uprisings has enhanced fears
and worries among Copts. Furthermore, several legitimate questions concerning the roles
and duties of religious minorities ruled by an Islamist government were raised. The
following are just a few instances. What are consequences associated with the application
of the sharī‘a state, which has been advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) even
before assuming office, on Copts? Would Copts be granted equal political rights as those
of Muslims? Socially speaking, would Christians be considered ahl-dhimma (i.e., protected
religious minority) as mainstream Islamist tradition has confirmed (see chapter 2)? How
would Copts proceed, socially as well as politically, within such a religiously-hostile public
sphere? Would Copts revolve around Church and religious identity acting as “Christians”,
or would they organize around the wider national identity behaving as “Egyptians”? What
are implications of the religiopolitical polarization which dominated Egypt back then on
the prospects of democracy in the post-2011 era?
The current thesis intends to address these questions by examining first Islamists’
conceptualizations of state and role of the sharī‘a in the modern state. Then it investigates
Coptic fears and concerns stemming from the ascendance of Islamists to power,
emphasizing the association between these fears and subsequent collective actions seen
later in the June 30th mass protests. Relatedly, this work explores the underlying factors
constructing communal actions of Copts during the MB’s reign in particular, focusing on
the potential roles played by religious collective identification and growing religious
threats.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
This thesis tries to answer the following two main research questions:
RQ 1: What are the underlying causes that shaped Copts’ collective action in the political
realm during the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule (2012-2013)?
Taking other sociopolitical factors into consideration, this study argues that Copts’ political
communal actions were primarily constructed due to growing feelings of religious threats
perceived at the time. In other words, it argues that Christians’ religious identity became
more salient under the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamist rule.
RQ 2: What are the mechanisms that transformed perceived religious threats into actual
collective action?
This work contends that perceived religious threats were transformed into actual collective
action through mechanisms occurring at both individual and communal levels. While the
former included perceptions of unequal citizenship and personal insecurity, the latter
involved processes of group identification and group consciousness.
Taken together, this thesis suggests a casual mechanisms model (see chapter 4) that
helps explain the proposed association between perceived religious threats (i.e., the
independent variable) and the collective action of Copts (i.e. the dependent variable),
highlighting certain mechanisms that were transforming these perceived threats into real
action. More specifically, perceived religious threats that dominated the Coptic community
during MB rule generated growing feelings of personal insecurity and unequal citizenship
among individual Copts. These individual-level mechanisms were transformed at the
communal level yielding increasing incidents of group identification and group
consciousness, which eventually incited Copts’ collective action seen in the June 30 revolt.
In essence, Christian collective action aimed at eliminating the main source motivating the
perceived threats in the first place, namely the Brotherhood’s
Islamist regime.
Literature Review
Transitions have figured prominently in contemporary politics. Considerable intellectual
capital has been devoted thus far to addressing the causes, processes, and consequences
associated with times of political transformation, utilizing diverse theoretical and
methodological approaches. A robust theory explaining when and why exactly political
changes occur has not been generated yet. Nevertheless, scholars have agreed that all
societies undergoing transitions experience a “condition of uncertainty” while departing
from authoritarianism towards political democracy.2
According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, transition can be described as a movement
from “certain authoritarian regimes toward an uncertain something else.”3 Much scholarly
attention has been devoted to exploring the roles played either by agents4 and/or
structures5 in shaping mechanisms and outcomes of transitions. Agreeing
2 See for example, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986);
Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations,”
Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 6/7 (2000): 703-734; Todd Eisenstadt, “Eddies in the
Third Wave: Protracted Transitions and Theories of Democratization,” Democratization 7,
no. 3 (2000): 3-24; Stephen King, The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North
Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); Alfred
Stepan and Juan Linz, “Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’,” Journal of
Democracy 24, no. 2 (2013): 15-30.
3 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions, 3.
4 See for instance, Barbara Geddes, “What do we Know about
Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999):
115-144; Bunce,
2000; O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions.
5 Seymour Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1
(1959): 69–105; Seymour Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993
Presidential Address,” American Sociological Review 59, no.1 (1994): 1-22; Jason
with Charles Tilly, the structure-agency dichotomy should be abandoned while approaching
the complexities associated with political transformations, leaving space for analyzing the
dynamic interactions occurring among competing groups within a given
society in transition.6
Reviewing the literature on transition reveals that while the influence of elite
factions has been given much attention, less is known about “ordinary” citizens and how
they handle the growing fears accompanied with times of political change. More
importantly, the social and political behavior of religious minorities has received scant
attention. Furthermore, whereas much emphasis has been placed on sociopolitical contexts
as being key factors determining outcomes of political transformation, religiously-driven
variables have frequently been overlooked in existing literature on transition and social
mobilization.7 The current thesis is dedicated to filling this gap by analyzing collective
action taken by ordinary Coptic citizens (i.e., non-elite and nonactivists) during the
Brotherhood’s transition, investigating potential influences of religiously-motivated factors
driving these actions.
Understanding Christians’ sociopolitical behavior during the Brotherhood’s
transition is incomplete unless the broader Muslim-Coptic relationship is explored. To
Brownlee, Tarek Masoud and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression
and Reform (UK: Oxford University Press, 2015).
6 Charles Tilly, “Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization,”
Sociological Theory 18, no. 2 (2001): 18.
7 See for example, Michael Hoffman and Amaney Jamal, “Religion in the
Arab
Spring: Between Two Competing Narratives,” The Journal of Politics 76, no. 3 (2014):
593-606; Ceren Belge and Ekrem Karakoç, “Minorities in the Middle East: Ethnicity,
Religion, and Support for Authoritarianism,” Political Research Quarterly 86, no. 2 (2015):
280-292.
begin with, Christian-Muslim relations are a multifaceted and complex issue as the
literature has clearly shown. On the one hand, it can be addressed utilizing different levels
of analysis: the state-church level; the societal level reflected in the daily interactions
between Coptic and Muslim communities; the international level through which Coptic
diaspora and international human organizations along with global powers intervene in local
affairs for political ends. On the other hand, a wide array of historical, socio-political,
economic, religious and cultural factors has together led to the construction of Christian-
Muslim relationships over centuries.
Broadly, it can be argued that the relation between the Coptic minority, the largest
Christian minority community in the Middle East, and the Muslim majority in Egypt has
gone through different ebbs and flows over the past century. For instance, the 1919
revolution signified an unprecedented moment of national unity, when both Muslims and
Copts fought shoulder-to-shoulder against British rule which eventually led to Egypt’s
independence. This harmony was seen once again in the drafting process of the 1923
constitution. For instance, the Committee of Thirty that had been formed to write Egypt’s
first constitution included 6 members representing non-Muslim minorities (twenty per cent
of the committee). Furthermore, despite the negative implications associated with Article
194 of the constitution on the identity of Copts, which states that “Islam is the religion of
the state and Arabic is its official language”, this Article was approved unanimously by the
committee. Contrary to what had been known as the “golden age” for Copts, extending
throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the status of the Coptic laity was weakened in the
aftermath of the 1952 revolution due to the socioeconomic policies adopted by Nasser.
These policies, however, enhanced the church’s power since it became the Copts’ sole
representative before the state in return for Pope Kyrollos’ unlimited support to Nasser.
The informal Nasser-Kyrollos “entente” was undermined under Sadat’s reign,
during which political Islam was dominating Egypt’s public sphere. According to Saba
Mahmood, “if Nasser’s policies are held responsible for the confessionalization of Coptic
identity, then Anwar Sadat’s regime (1970-1981) is regarded as having opened the door for
the polarization of Muslim identity along confessional lines.” Muslim-Coptic interactions
during Sadat were negatively shaped by several variables, such as the ostensible tensions
between Sadat and Pope Shenuda III, the escalation of Islamism, and the religiously-
inspired violent incidents targeting Copts and their assets.
As for Mubarak’s era (1981-2011), the church’s social and political power was
further consolidated and incidents of sectarian violence targeting assets and places of
worship of Copts continued. The ascendance of Islamists to power following Mubarak’s
overthrow in 2011 has ushered in a new and fiercer wave of sectarian assaults against Copts
and their assets, however. For example, Jason Brownlee contends that under president
Mursī the “anti-Christian violence brought chilling validation to the concerns Copts
harbored. Kidnappings in Upper Egypt continued, and anti-Christian attacks rocked the
heart of the country as well.” In fact, these attacks have greatly escalated after the ousting
of Islamists in 2013. On 21 August 2013, a week after the clearing of the
Raba‘a and al-Nahda sit-ins, Human Rights Watch released a report entitled “Egypt: Mass
attacks on Churches”. The report states that:
Immediately following the violent dispersal of the Brotherhood’s sit-ins in Cairo on
August 14, crowds of men attacked at least 42 churches, burning or damaging 37,
as well as dozens of other Christian religious institutions in the governorates of
Minya, Asyut, Fayum, Giza, Suez, Sohag, Bani Suef, and North Sinai.
As was shown above, Copts have encountered several phases of tolerance and persecution
alike across different times and regimes. The challenging question posed now, however, is
why does Copts’ identity become more salient as noticed under the Brotherhood’s rule
yielding such communal religious fears and insecurity (as will be elaborated later)? The
literature on collective mobilization has traditionally focused on economic and political
grievances as key factors determining why and when citizens mobilize.16 Nevertheless, a
growing body of scholarship has recently called for shifting attention away from
sociopolitical variables towards cultural and psychological ones while addressing causes
triggering collective behavior. Within this tradition, some commentators have focused on
religion as one of the main catalyst motivating political participation.17 Other analysts have
highlighted the roles played by social identification and group categorization processes.18
16 See for example, Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1970); Robert Dhal, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale: Yale University
Press, 1971); Ricca Edmondson, ed., The Political Context of Collective Action: Power,
Argumentation and Democracy (London: Routledge, 1997); Louise Tilly and Charles Tilly,
ed., Class Conflict and Collective Action (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981);
Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, The Arab Spring, Pathways of Repression and Reform
(UK: Oxford University Press, 2015).
17 See for example, Dennis Patterson, Gamal Gasim, and Jangsup Choi,
“Identity,
Issue, and Religious Commitment and Participation: Explaining Turnout among
MosqueAttending Muslim Americans,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11, no.3
(2011):
343-357; Kenneth Wald, Dennis Owen and Samuel Hill, “Churches as Political
Communities,” American Political Science Review 82, no. 2 (1988): 531-548; Fredrick
Harris, “Something within: Religion as a Mobilizer of African-American Political
Activism,” The Journal of Politics 56, no. 1 (1994): 42-68; Calhoun Brown, “African
American Churches and Political Mobilization: The Psychological Impact of
Organizational Resources,” The Journal of Politics 58, no. 4 (1996): 935-953; Fiona
McCallum, “Christian Political Participation in the Arab World,” Islam and Christian
Muslim Relations 23, no. 1 (2012): 3-18; Saba Mahmood, “Religious Freedom, the
Minority Question, and Geopolitics in the Middle East,” Comparative Studies in Society
and History 54, no. 20 (2012): 418-446; Eva Pföstl and Will Kymlicka, “Minority Politics
in the Middle East and North Africa: The Prospects for Transformative Change,” Ethnic
and Racial Studies 14, no. 38 (2015): 2489-2498.
18 See for instance, Steven Greene, “Social Identity Theory and Party
Identification,” Social Science Quarterly 85, no. 1 (2004): 136-153: Beth Uhler, “The The
current study belongs to the latter school of thought in that it explores the relationship
between perceived religious identity threats and Copts’ political behavior.
Despite the fact that “religious affiliation became the Copts’ main marker, not their
citizenship” since Nasser’s era as Mariz Tadros has indicated,19 Copts have never been
exposed to such real threats as they were under the Islamist’s rule (see chapter 2). In fact,
it was the first time in Copts’ modern history to be ruled by an Islamist actor, i.e. the Muslim
Brotherhood.
According to Jason Brownlee, the Coptic minority perceived Muslim Brotherhood
rule as aiming at transforming the national narrative from “Egyptianness” to an “Islamic”
identity.20 Agreeing, Andrea Rugh indicates that “[d]uring the year of President Morsy’s
tenure, Christians saw their position eroding as he moved quickly to institute measures
more in line with the establishment of an Islamic state.”21 Moreover, Christian
Escalation of Commitment in Political Decision-Making Groups: A Social Identity
Approach,” European Journal of Social Psychology 26 (1996): 611-629; Oral Muldoon,
Karen Trew, Jennifer Todd, Nathalie Rougier and Katrina McLaughlin, “Religious and
National Identity after the Belfast Good Friday Agreement,” Political Psychology 28, no.1
(2007): 89-103; Stephan Stürmer and Bernd Simon, “The Role of Collective Identification
in Social Movement Participation: A Panel Study in the Context of the German Gay
Movement,” Personality and Social Psychology 30, no.3 (2004): 263-277; Caroline Kelly
and Sara Breinlinger, The Social Psychology of Collective Action: Identity, Injustice, and
Gender (London: Taylor& Francis, 1996).
19 Tadros, “Vicissitudes,” 271.
20 Brownlee, “Violence against Copt,” 5.
21 Andrea Rugh, Christians in Egypt: Strategies and Survival (UK:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 191.
communities have developed a common sense of social isolation during the rise of
Islamists, which can be attributed to the growing feelings of lack of citizenship.
In sum, it can be contended that any analysis seeking to understand political actions
adopted by Copts during the MB’s rule is incomplete unless the cultural as well as
psychological variables which helped construct these actions are taken into consideration.
Therefore, the current work finds itself located at the intersection of three main traditions.
The first is politics, where Copts’ political behaviors are analyzed. The second field relates
to social phycology, in which the influences of social identity-related threats in addition to
social categorization processes on shaping social action are explored. The final discipline
revolves around religion, where prolonged religious cleavages existing between the Coptic
minority and the Muslim majority, furthered during Mursī’s transition, are addressed.
Theoretical Framework Social Identity Theory
Understanding a multifaceted issue such as the one at hand, namely Copts’ sociopolitical
responses to the rise of Islamists, requires a broader gaze outside politics analyzing the
psychological, cultural, and religious context. This is due to the fact that the sociopolitical
behavior adopted by religious minorities (i.e., Egypt’s Christians) in times of political
transformation cannot be explained based solely on political factors. Growing communal
fears and uncertainties featuring in periods of political change are, hence, expected to play
pivotal roles in shaping behavior. That is to say, socio-psychological variables such as
identity salience, collective identification, and self-esteem are deemed equally important as
other relevant political variables while approaching the positioning of religious minorities
in times of social unrest. Based on this reasoning, the current study employs the social
identity approach, which is considered the most relevant theoretical framework allowing
for a deeper understanding of the research puzzle under scrutiny.
Broadly, social identity theory is a social psychological tradition explaining mutual
relations between individual persons and social groups in a given society. It contends that
the way in which one perceives the self and the group to which one belongs are significant
for the construction of social actions and attitudes.23 The theory was formulated by Henri
Tajfel in the 1970s, and has received considerable scholarly attention since then. According
to Tajfel, social identity is defined as “that part [Italic in
original] of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional
significance attached to that membership.”24 Clearly, this conceptualization emphasizes
23 See for example, James Cameron, Deborah Terry and Richard Lalonde,
“Perceptions of Self and Group in the Context of a Threatened National Identity: A Field
Study,” Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 8, no.1 (2005): 73-88; Jolanda Jetten,
Nyla Branscombe, Michael Schmitt and Russell spears, “Rebels with a Cause: Group
Identification as a Response to Perceived Discrimination from the Mainstream,”
Personality and Social Psychological Bulletin 27 no. 9 (2001): 1204-1213; Julie Smurda,
Michele Witting and Gokce Gokalp, “Effects of Threat to a Valued Social Identity on
Implicit Self- Esteem and Discrimination,” Group Processes Intergroup Relations 9, no.
2 (2006): 181-197; Steven Greene, “Social Identity Theory and Party Identification,”
Social Science Quarterly 85, no. 1 (2004): 136-153.
24 Henri Tajfel, Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social
Psychology of Intergroup Relations (London: Academic Press, 1978), 63.
the crucial roles played by social groups (e.g., religion, gender, party, and ethnicity) in
constructing not only cognitive and attitudinal perceptions of individuals, but more
importantly social identities. That is, group membership becomes an integral part of one’s
conception of the self and other social groups. As Beth Uhler pointed out, “people gain a
sense of who they are, and derive much of their self-esteem, from memberships in social
groups…[and therefore] positive social identity produces strong relations when that
identity is endangered.”
While deconstructing the social-psychological meanings attached to group
membership, Tajfel has provided three main dimensions. The first is cognitive, which refers
to an individual’s awareness that he/she belongs to a certain social group. The second is
evaluative, where positive as well as negative meanings come into one’s mind when his/her
in-group is compared to other groups (i.e. out-groups). The final aspect is emotional, which
signifies the extent to which individuals are emotionally committed (e.g., like or dislike) to
their group based on the cognitive and evaluative aspects previously mentioned.
Accordingly, developing positive or negative social identities is strongly associated
with diverse degrees of belonging to certain social groups as Hogg and Abrams have
demonstrated. These authors have emphasized the psychological and functional roles
played by social categories. As for the former, identification with a certain social category
is deemed “phenomenologically real and has important self-
evaluative consequences.” With regard to the latter, social groups “fulfil individual and
societal needs for order, structure, simplification, predictability according to the authors.”
Bearing these psychological and functional aspects in mind, the social identity
perspective is deemed a sociological tradition as well since it primarily addresses reciprocal
interactions among social groups on one side, and explores dialectical relations between
individuals and society on the other. In other words, it explores how personal identities are
being connected with social identities. Taking these main principles together, the social
identity framework contributes substantially to the understanding of mutual interactions
occurring within groups (intra-group level) and between groups (inter-group level). More
importantly, it assists in predicting patterns of reactions that might be adopted by
disadvantaged or threatened social categories particularly during times of social
transformations.
Specifically, one of the theory’s core assumptions is organized around the idea that
individuals are in crucial need to have and maintain a positive social identity. Henri Tajfel
and John Turner provided three main social-psychological processes enabling individuals
to sustain a satisfactory image either about themselves or their respective groups: social
categorization, social identity, and social comparison.
To start with, social categorization is a cognitive mechanism which helps
individuals to organize and deal with the surrounding social environment on one side, and
guide them towards more appropriate social actions on the other. According to Tajfel,
categorizations are crucial mechanics because they assist individuals to draw social
distinctions between the “us” and the “them,” or between the in-group and relevant
opposing out-groups. As for social identification processes, the theory emphasizes that
individuals’ self-perception is mainly derived from one’s awareness that his/her group is
socially valued. Literature on social identification has frequently highlighted the affective
-
scape
2
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as well as behavioral consequences resulting from commitment to a certain social group.
With regard to social comparison, theorists of social identity argue that
persons tend to conduct continuous social comparisons between the group to which they
belong and out-groups, making sure that their own group is socially respected.
Since developing a satisfactory social identity is crucial for constructing a positive
self-image according to the theory, people belonging to less favorable social groups utilize
different alternatives by which perceived low self-esteem is addressed. Two main
mechanisms are provided by the theory in this regard: social mobility and social change.
To begin with, Social mobility occurs primarily on the individual level, when individual
persons choose voluntarily to leave perceived disadvantaged groups, moving towards more
favorable ones in an attempt to improve their social positioning. When it is difficult or
impossible for an individual to “pass” freely from one social group to another, people utilize
the “social change” strategy. This could be seen when people act
collectively in order to change general conditions of life threatening the position of the
entire group.
The Relevance of the Social Identity Theory to the Research Puzzle Several
reasons can be provided elucidating why social identity is deemed the most relevant
framework to the study’s main question. First, the theory basically addresses intergroup
relations giving a special attention to minority groups whose social positions are
disadvantaged and/or insecure. This type of understanding fits neatly with the main focus
in this work, which is mainly directed to understanding how the Coptic minority responded
to perceived threats during the MB’s rule. In other words, it assists in explaining social
behavior taken by a threatened minority group (i.e., Copts) living among a majoritarian
community (i.e., Muslims) in times of transition.
Second, the rationale of this work is to identify mechanisms linking perceptions of
identity threats (i.e., cognitive aspect) adopted on the individual level with real actions (i.e.,
behavioral dimension) adhered collectively by a certain social group. In fact, the social
identity perspective helps accomplish this goal, since it primarily highlights dialectical
relations between the self and the other (i.e., the in-group and out-group) occurring through
specific processes such as social categorizations and comparisons illustrated earlier. In
other words, it moves from person to social group (i.e., from individual to society) which
matches precisely with the current project’s primary goal.
Third, the theory provides two main mechanisms enabling individuals to deal with
perceived identity threats (i.e, social mobility and social change). These mechanisms are to
be exploited in this study in order to track changes in the attitudes and behaviors taken by
Copts, either on the individual or communal level, across times and regimes (i.e., SCAF’s
transition versus Mursī’s transition).
Finally, the literature on democratization and regime change focused on political
and economic factors, overlooking other social and psychological aspects. Since the main
goal of this work is to reconsider these ignored yet important factors, it would greatly
benefit from the social identity approach which is mainly considered a social
psychological-based theoretical framework.
Methodology
This thesis adopts Lieberman’s Nested Analysis Approach, in which a complementary
strategy of both quantitative and qualitative methods is employed. This strategy helps
bridge “great holes in the relations between independent and dependent variables” as
McAdam et al have illustrated. Furthermore, it assists in an understanding of the potential
variations that might exist in the participants’ responses. Since the main aim of this study
is to analyze collective actions taken by Copts under “Islamist” rule (namely, Mursī’s
regime), it is important to explore whether or not these actions varied under different
regimes (i.e, SCAF’s transition and Mursī’s period). To trace these variations, the study
further adopts Lijphart’s “Diachronic Comparative Analysis,” which aims at “maximizing
comparability” of results as the author elaborated. In other words, this approach would
allow for comparing collective actions taken by the same unit of analysis (i.e., Copts)
experiencing different types of regime (i.e., the SCAF and the MB), which ultimately helps
to examine the main argument of study from its two sides.
Quantitatively, the Arab Barometer dataset (AB) will be utilized to empirically
examine the study’s main premises. Specifically, while the AB Wave II contains data
addressing SCAF’s period (the fieldwork was conducted from 16 to July 3, 2011), the AB
Wave III provides data covering events during Mursī’s era (the interviews were conducted
from March 31 to April 7, 2013). The uniqueness of the two waves lies in the fact that both
include a wide variety of questions relevant to the research puzzle at hand. Some of the
questions covered, for example, the following topics: diverse levels of trust in key political
forces at the time, such as the MB, the SCAF, and the cabinet; perceived personal security
threats; evaluations of equal citizenship status; levels of interest in politics; attitudes
towards democracy and democratic systems; and attitudes towards the implementation of
sharī‘a. In fact, these questions allow for conducting several comparisons between Copts
and Muslims across the two political transitions under investigation.
While the AB material help meet quantitative-related issues under scrutiny, indepth
interviews are employed as a primary qualitative strategy aimed at identifying possible
mechanisms through which Copts’ perceived religious threats were translated into
collective action. Narratives of a selected group representing ordinary Coptic citizens are
collected and analyzed. It is worth mentioning that the diversity of the interviewees was
ensured so as to represent diverse socioeconomic backgrounds of Copts (e.g., social class,
gender, age, education, etc.).
The dependent variable in this thesis is collective action of Copts (i.e., political
engagement in protests, marches, sit-ins, meetings discussing political concerns, etc.)
during the Brotherhood’s regime, whereas the independent variable is perceived religious
threats experienced by Copts at that time. Influences of other relevant mechanisms (e.g.,
perceptions of unequal citizenship, feelings of personal insecurity, in-group identification)
will also be examined. As for the variables and scales of measurement, they will be further
elaborated once each one of them is used (see chapters 3 and 4).
Objectives
Generally, this thesis mainly addresses the relationship between religion and politics. More
specifically, its main objective is to understand the extent to which religiouslydriven fears
helped construct Copts’ communal political actions during the MB’s reign (2012-2013).
According to the literature, minorities are extremely concerned with how to preserve their
religious identity especially in the midst of political transformations. Therefore, this study
aims to measure perceptions of religious fears adopted by Copts and then compare them
across two different regimes. In addition, it suggests some plausible dynamics through
which these perceived fears were transformed into actual behavior. To accomplish these
goals, the current work relies on a complementary strategy in which both quantitative and
qualitative methods are utilized. Relatedly, it uses both primary and secondary materials.
As for the former, narratives provided by a small-N representing diverse Coptic
backgrounds were gathered and then analyzed qualitatively. With regard to the latter, the
Arab Barometer (waves II and III) was employed as secondary material generating several
statistical indicators examining the study’s main arguments
quantitatively.
Adopting such a mixed - methodology consisting of both quantitative and qualitative
indicators helps handle the shortcomings and limitations of surveys, such as social
desirability bias. This strategy is crucially important in the current work, where respondents
belong to a religious minority (i.e., Copts) are asked to participate in public opinion surveys
during times of uncertainties on both social as well as political levels.
While existing literature on social mobilization has frequently explored the roles
played by sociopolitical factors in determining why and when people get involved in
collective mobilization, this work explores the influences of religion and identity.
Specifically, it examines connections between religious threats perceived by Copts and the
likelihood of engagement in politics. To achieve these goals, the social identity perspective
is employed as the most relevant theoretical framework to the research statement under
investigation.
Contribution
Given the research puzzle at hand, this work is more interested in political decisions taken
by individual citizens than those adopted by elite factions or the “men with guns” during
times of transition. While mainstream studies of transition follow the dominant
“transition without citizens” approach, where the main focus is placed on the elites’
political agenda, this study emphasizes what can be described a “transition with citizens”
model. In fact, the latter mainly focuses on choices of ordinary people in times of political
unrest. Hence, the significance of this study lies on three levels: 1) the targeted unit of
analysis (i.e., ordinary Coptic citizens); 2) the timeframe of analysis (i.e., collective action
of Copts encountering an “Islamist” regime); and 3) the causal explanatory factors under
investigation (i.e., religious and identity-driven variables).
CHAPTER II The Rise of the Brothers to Power and its Sociopolitical
Implications for Copts Setting the Stage: Coptic-Muslim Relations
Over the last eighty years, the Muslim Brotherhood has been pursuing political power in
Egypt through a slow and incremental process of Islamizing Egyptian society “from
below”. Once they assumed power in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the Islamization
process occurred “from above” as an Islamist President and his cabinet, along with the
parliament, were speaking the same language. The Coptic minority communities were
aware at the time that their collective religious identity was at stake. This is due to the fact
that Copts have never been ruled by Islamists at least throughout their modern history. As
the narratives expressed by the interviewees will elaborate (chapter 4), ordinary Christians
felt that they were given a second-class placement due to religious rationalizations while
the Islamists were in office. This has enhanced the already worsening perceptions of
unequal citizenship they had developed since the Islamization wave they encountered
during Sadat’s era.
Understanding the threats Christians perceived due to the Muslim Brotherhood’s
rise to power is incomplete without addressing first the religious foundations upon which
the Brothers’ political project is established. Two main principles are to be provided in this
regard: the Brotherhood’s conception of the state and their perceptions of the role of sharī‘a
in society. While the first section of this chapter explores how the Muslim Brotherhood
perceives both of the state and of the role of sharī‘a in society, the second part addresses
the sociopolitical implications resulting from adopting such as conceptualizations on the
Coptic community in particular.
Main Tenets of the Brotherhood’s Project
Recreation the Islamic Caliphate
The Muslim Brotherhood makes no separation between religion and state. For them, Islam
should cover every single aspect of a Muslim’s life. Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), the
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, made this point clear when he argued that “Islam is
worship and leadership, religion and state, spirituality and work, prayer and jihad,
obedience and rule, Mushaf [the Qur’an] and sword.” While explaining the foundations of
the Brotherhood’s da‘wa (call), al-Banna indicated that “Islam is a comprehensive system,
which touches upon all dimensions of Muslims’ life. It is a state and a nation; a government
and umma.”
In his turn, Sayyid Quṭub (1906-1966), the most influential theorist not only for the
Brotherhood but for all radical Islamist movements, argued that Islam provides a
comprehensive methodology that should be followed by the Muslim community on both
the individual and the communal levels. According to the Brotherhood’s reasoning,
everything on earth, including the state, is owned by God and nothing is left for Caesar.
As al-Banna has put it:
It is not our choice that politics is deemed an integral part of religion, and Islam
governs rulers and ruled. Giving back to Caesar what is Caser’s and to God what is
God’s does not exist in Islam. Rather, Caesar and all he possesses are owned by
Allah, the one, the prevailing.
For the Brothers, it is not only the citizens who should abide by the Islamic doctrine but
also the state itself. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī (1926-), the Muslim Brotherhood’s main theorist
and spiritual leader, contended that the Islamic state is deemed one of the divinely revealed
rites, and hence establishing an Islamic state is a precondition for creating a purely Islamic
community. Al-Qaraḍāwī provided the following five reasons explaining why the Islamic
state is of great importance to Islam itself. For him, the state protects the Islamic creed,
maintains religious rites and acts of devotion, educates Muslims in the basic ethics of Islam,
implements Islamic laws and regulations, and prepares the umma for jihad once needed.
The state in the Brotherhood’s collective mind is an Islamic caliphate-type of rule,
which had been established in 622 when the Prophet Muhammad created what they thought
the first “Islamic state” in Medina until it was demolished by Mustafa
ّKemal Atatürk in
1924. Historically, the Brotherhood as an entity was established in 1928 meaning that its
inception came only four years after the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate. Arguably, it can
be contended that the movement came as a direct response to the breakdown of the caliphate
system, and hence its ultimate goal has been the
restoration of the caliphate since then.
The Islamic caliphate in al-Banna’s thought is not only a symbol of Islamic unity but more
importantly it is an Islamic rite, and hence Muslims in general and the Brothers in particular
should pursue all possible means to regain it. Abul ‘Alā Maudūdī (19031979), a Pakistani
Islamic philosopher whose writings have hugely influenced al-Banna’s and Quṭub’s
thinking, claimed that the first Islamic state established in al-Medina was in its essence an
Islamic caliphate. By the same token, Muhammad ‘Imāra (1931-), a conservative Islamic
writer attached to the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed that regaining the caliphate is a
religious duty that should be undertaken by the Islamic awakening’s affiliates.
Conceiving the Islamic state in such a broader sense requires demolishing existing
geographical borders which separate Islamic countries. Thus, the Brothers tend to favor
non-nation state entities, such as the Islamic community or umma, over the current nation-
state model. This is due to the fact that the former is deemed the most effective bond
unifying Muslims around the world. In other words, the Brotherhood’s thinkers pay more
attention to religious faith, rather than political borders while thinking of the state.
Several decades ago, al-Banna has made this point clear stating that “[c]ontrary to others
who believe in the geographical boundaries while thinking of nationalism, nationalism in
our perception is bounded by faith. Hence, each spot where there is a Muslim who says
‘there is no God but Allah’ is considered our homeland.”
As a result, it should come as no surprise that Muhammad Mahdī ‘Ākif (1928-), the
Muslim Brotherhood’s 7th Supreme Guide, announced publicly that he did not recognize
the geographical borders existing among the Islamic countries. In a wellremembered
journalistic interview held in 2005, ‘Ākif pointed out that “Muslims are one umma, where
there is no difference between Malaysians, Egyptians and Saudis … the
Islamic caliphate ruled the entire Arabic and Islamic world … This tells us that Islam is the
citizenship.”
Accordingly, ‘Ākif did not consider Egypt under Ottoman rule an occupied country,
nor did he care if a Malaysian caliph would come and rule Egypt simply because Muslims
around the world are perceived as one community. Evidently, ‘Ākif was not the first
Brotherhood leader who envisaged the Islamic faith as the sole social marker of citizenship.
Several decades ago, Sayyid Quṭub stated that the “Islamic faith is the only citizenship
marker recognized in Islam, under which Arabs, Romans, Persians and all other
nationalities are deemed equal figures living under Allah’s flag.” Similarly, alQaraḍāwī
confirmed that the Islamic linkage is superior to all other associations be it social, ethnic or
blood-related bonds.” He went on arguing that “any Muslim is closer to his fellow Muslim
than to any other infidel, even if the latter was his father, mother, or brother.”
Since its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has embarked on such universal - type
of da‘wa, benefiting from the distinctive nature of Islam as a universal religion.
Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood’s eventual goal exceeds the construction of both a
Muslim society and an Islamic country heading towards establishing an entire Islamic
world for the common good of the whole globe.
In order to achieve this task, the Muslim Brotherhood adopts a fully-fledged
strategy by which the caliphate system can be restored on the global level. According to a
written manuscript found in a villa owned by a Brotherhood member in Switzerland, this
strategy includes 12-incremental steps towards regaining the caliphate. The proposed plan,
written in 1982, calls for employing all possible means starting from peaceful da‘wa to
violent jihad if necessary to impose Islamic sharī‘a laws in local communities on one hand,
recreating the Islamic caliphate on the other.
The Application of Sharī‘a
The underlying causes which motivated Egyptian revolutionary youth to occupy Egypt’s
main streets and squares on January 25 were to bring about social equality and freedom for
all Egyptians. The main slogans raised at the time were ‘Aish, Hurriyya, ‘Adāla Ijtimaiyya
(Breed, Freedom, and Social Justice). However, these human dignity-related slogans were
replaced by “Islāmiyya, Islāmiyya” only after six months in the sharī‘a Friday millioniyya
on July 29, 2011.
While implementing sharī‘a was never thought of or raised throughout the 18days
of the revolution, the Sharī‘a Friday’s main demands were the assertion of Egypt’s Islamic
identity and the implementation of sharī‘a. Despite that the Islamization of the 2011
uprising had begun several months earlier when al-Qaraḍāwī led the Friday ceremony on
20 February, it can be contended that the “spirit of Tahrir Square” was substantially
undermined due to the Sharī‘a Friday.
The call for the implementation of sharī‘a was not noticed only in the massive rallies which
were primarily led by the Brothers and Salafis, but also in Islamist political party platforms.
For instance, the Freedom and Justice Party (the MB’s political party) asserted in the very
beginning of its platform that “the Islamic sharī‘a, which the majority of Egyptians believe
in, is deemed the fundamental marj‘iyya (reference) upon which the Party is established.”
In addition, Islamic sharī‘a law was given a top priority in the MB’s Party platform, in that
the first Principle in the platform’s first Chapter, entitled “Foundations and Starting Points”,
which states that “the principles of Islamic sharī‘a are the main sources of legislation.”
The pressing question is why sharī‘a was given such as advanced priority in the
Brotherhood’s agenda where the other sociopolitical issues inciting the revolution had not
yet been resolved at that time? A profound gaze at the Islamist’s tradition reveals that
establishing a sharī‘a state is considered a top priority not only for the Brothers but for all
other Islamist movements. Creating an Islamic state is not, however, an end for its own
sake in the Brothers’ thought. Rather, it is only a vehicle which helps applying the sharī‘at
Allah on earth, the Brothers’ ultimate mission.
The key point of departure in the Brothers’ scholarship is the idea that Allah is the
sole source of legislation for mankind. Transforming this broad idea into a more robust
conceptualization, Maudūdī coined the concept of al-hākimiyya (sovereignty), which
literally means that Allah is the only one who has the right to legislate for the people.
Drawing on Maudūdī‘s writings, Quṭub has extensively elaborated on al-hākimiyya and al-
jāhiliyya (period of ignorance). In fact, the legacy of Quṭub has frequently been utilized by
all radical Islamist groups to legitimize their violence against the regime or society.
According to Quṭub, al-hākimiyya and al-jāhiliyya are two sides of the same coin. More
specifically, al-jāhiliyya occurs when hākimiyyat Allah is violated by transferring rights of
legislation to His mankind. According to this understanding,
Quṭub concluded that “the entire modern world lives in Gāhiliyya.”
Although the main goal in this part is to explain how the Muslim Brotherhood
perceives sharī‘a and its roles in society rather than arguing against these perceptions, it is
worth elaborating a bit more on the gap exists between the MB and other Islamist traditions
in conceptualizing sharī‘a and the role it plays in society.
Despite the fact that sharī‘a as a primary source for legislation has been emphasized
in the Brotherhood’s thought, one would be astonished to discover that the word sharī‘a
and its derivations have been mentioned four times only throughout the Qur’an. More
importantly, sharī‘a in the four instances referred to a totally different meaning than
legislation. Specifically, neither sharī‘a/shir‘a as a noun nor shara‘a as a verb was
employed in the Qur’an to refer to legislation or law enforcement. This conclusion is based
on the actual usage of the word either in the Arabic language or in the
Qur’anic text as Muhammad Sa‘īd al-‘Ashmāwī has stated. According to al-‘Ashmāwī
(1932-2013), a former Egyptian Supreme Court judge, the word sharī‘a/shir‘a in the noun
form is employed in Arabic and in Qur’an to mean the approach or the road leading to
something, whereas shara‘a as a verb means to make something clear.
Based on this type of understanding to the real meaning of sharī‘a, liberal Islamists
diminish the essence of the Islamic sharī‘a state as claimed by the Brotherhood.
thee upon an open way of the Command; therefore follow it, and follow not the caprices of
those who do not know” (45:18). Furthermore, it was utilized as a verb in two times as
follows: “He has laid down for you as religion that He charged Noah with, and that We
have revealed to thee, and that We charged Abraham with, Moses and Jesus: 'Perform the
religion, and scatter not regarding it (42:13); “Or have they associates who have laid down
for them as religion that for which God gave not leave?”(42:21). Moreover, a final
derivation of shir’a was used only once as it follows: “To every one of you We have
appointed a right way and an open road” (5:48).
Thus, reformist Islamists distinguish between religious faith and teachings that are purely
sent by Allah and other historical inventions introduced by man; between religion as a
sacred text and Muslims’ religiosity. Broadly, Islam in the reformist Islamist’s views is a
mere religious faith, and hence it is not a din wa dawla (religion and state) as the
Brotherhood’s thinkers have always assumed. For Bassam Tibi, “Islam is a faith and a
cultural system that determines a way of life for ordinary Muslims. Islam is not a
framework for a political state order.” Thus, Abdullahi An-Na‘im confirmed that
establishing an Islamic state, whose main function is to coercively applying sharī‘a, would
definitely undermine the essence of Islam as a merely leverage assists maintaining social
capital among Muslim communities.
fī al-Tafsīr (Beirut: al-Markaz al-Thaqafī al-‘Arabī, 1996); ‘Abd al-Jawwād Yassīn, AlSulṭa
fī al-Islām (Beirut: al-Mrkaz al-Thaqāfī al-‘Arabī, 2000); ‘Abd al-Jawwād Yassīn, Al-Dīn
wa al-Tadayun (Beirut: al-Tanwīr, 2012).
Taken the liberal Islamic tradition into consideration, it becomes clear that Hassan alBanna
was talking about politics not about religion while sending his infamous letters to the kings
and prime ministers of the entire Islamic world in 1936. These letters contain fifty main
demands by which the Islamic umma can regain its glorious history as al-
Banna claimed. The second of these demands calls for “restructuring laws so as to matching
with the Islamic legislations, especially concerning the crimes and hudud
[punishments].”
Similarly, the al-hākimiyya and al-jāhiliyya tradition introduced by al-Mudūdi and
Quṭub should be dealt with as being “religionized-politics” advancements not sacred
discourses revealed by Allah. Moreover, the wide variety of slogans that have been
generated since the emergence of the Brothers, such as “Islam is the solution,” “Qur’an is
our constitution,” and “Islam is din wa dawla,” are all set to expressing political concerns
rather than divinely religious issues.
Sociopolitical Implications for Copts
Having defined the two main tenets characterizing the Brotherhood’s political project (the
restoration of caliphate and the enforcement of sharī‘a law), it is appropriate to move on to
exploring how the Brotherhood’s rise to power influenced the positioning of nonMuslims
in general and Copts in particular. In order to understand the threats nonMuslims perceived
while Islamists were in office, it is crucial to explain first how the Muslim Brothers perceive
Islam especially when it is compared to other religions. To begin with, the Brothers’
thinkers believe in the supremacy of Islam over all other religions, since they think Islam
is the only true religion revealed by Allah while all other Abrahamic religions have been
distorted.
Sayyid Quṭub, for instance, contends that Islam is the superior religion among all
other religions, pagan creeds, philosophies, and distorted scriptures. For him, Islam
provides the perfect type of knowledge about the nature of Allah, and hence Muslim
believers are superior to all their counterparts following other religious creeds.
Furthermore, al-Qaraḍāwī assumes that faith in Allah has never been known rightfully in
the West. This is due to that the Western Christianity, as for him, is not the authentic version
revealed by God but rather a distorted form that had been advanced by the Roman Emperor
Constantine and the Council of Nicaea. The nature of Christ in this fabricated version, al-
Qaraḍāwī continues, was substantially changed from being one of God’s servants to be
worshiped like God. In “Islam is the solution”, Muhammad ‘Imāra confirms that “the
Islamic umma has the sole authentic revelation among other existing divinely books, since
Allah Almighty Himself had pledged to preserve it.”
The perceived superiority of Islam/Muslims over other religions/believers dominates the
Brotherhood’s traditional literature. This type of reasoning is definitely undermining the
social and cultural positioning of non-Muslims, especially those living among a
majoritarian Muslim community like Copts. Unfortunately, the Islamic supremacy
narrative is not to be found only in the writings of the Brothers but in the mainstream media
and more dangerously in peoples’ daily interactions. The following section addresses the
sociopolitical implications resulting from adopting such exclusionary traditions on non-
Muslims in general and on Copts in particular.
The Dhimma Status and the Jizya Payment
In the sharī‘a state envisioned by the Brotherhood’s theorists, non-Muslims, including
Copts, are not eligible to receive equal rights to that of Muslims. This is due to the fact that
non-Muslims living in an Islamic state, according to the sharī‘a state’s advocates, are given
a dhimma status which transforms them into ahl dhimma rather than being ordinary citizens
like Muslim citizens. This is how the Qur’anic word dhimma has mistakenly been
interpreted by the Muslim Brotherhood’s scholars. To be sure, the word dhimma has been
utilized in two instances only in the Qur’an in the noun form (dhimma), meaning a treaty
or an agreement. Thus, while the word dhimma was never used in Qur’an to identify a
certain group of people, it was later employed in the
Islamist’s tradition to exclusively describe the People of the Book, namely Jews and
Christians.
Another controversial concept associated with the dhimma status is the jizya.
According to the Brotherhood’s reasoning, non-Muslims are deemed a group of people
protected by the Islamic state due to the dhimma contract they are granted. Therefore, they
are expected to pay the jizya (poll-tax) in exchange for this protection. Al-Qaraḍāwī, for
example, asserted that non-Muslims are not religiously required to pay the Zakāh (an
obligatory tax every Muslim must pay) or to get involved in the actions of jihad, and
therefore they are expected to pay the jizya. “If some of our fellow Christians dislike the
word jizya,” al-Qaraḍāwī elaborated, “they can call it whatever they want… ahl al- dhimma
can be changed as well in case it intimidates Copts.”
In fact, the real issue here is not whether using the word ahl al-dhimma antagonizes
Copts or not as al-Qaraḍāwī has simplistically put it. Rather, it is about depriving
nonMuslims in general and Copts in particular of one of their political rights as being equal
citizens using religious claims. In addition, non-Muslims living in Islamic states are
straightforwardly granted a second-class placement once such religiously justified
conceptualizations are put in effect. Ironically, while the dhimma status and the jizya
payment completely undermine equal citizenship rights of non-Muslims and are seen by
them as a sociopolitical stigma, the Brothers consider both as privileges. Al-Qaraḍāwī, for
instance, argues that the notion of ahl al-dhimma is not perceived in the Islamic sharī‘a as
a sign of non-Muslims’ defamation or offence, rather it is a symbol of custody and
fulfillment towards non-Muslims.
Distribution of State Positions
Aside from the absence of full citizenship due to the dhimma status and the required jizya,
Copts are not allowed to occupy certain types of posts in the proposed sharī‘a state. While
they can have access to, for instance, low-profile positions they can never get access to the
so-called al-wilaya al-‘amma (central authority).
Posts of al-wilaya al-‘amma are not well specified by Islamic thinkers, and hence vary from
an Islamic school to another. For some, al-wilaya al-amma’s positions are limited to both
the presidency and the military’s top leadership.92 For others, such as al-Qaraḍāwī, they
however are expanded to include all judicial posts, different types of religiouslybased
positions such as those that are involved in managing the Muslims’ zakat, and key executive
posts influencing a state’s decision-making processes.93 Taking the term to the extreme, al-
Qaraḍāwī argued that non-Muslims should not serve in the military in the first place.
Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s former Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashūr contended in
an interview that Copts are not trusted to serve in the military and to defend the nation, and
hence they should pay the jizya in return.94 Although al-Qaraḍāwī himself grants Copts the
right to become members of parliament, this right is however enjoyed only so long as the
vast majority of the parliament’s seats are held by Muslims.95
hardliners Brothers so as to depriving non-Muslims of the same rights of Muslims, other
scholars tend to interpret these verses significantly differently. Muhammad al-Ghazālī
(1917-1996), a renowned Egyptian Islamic preacher and scholar, emphasized the historical
circumstances surrounding the time of its revelation. He contended that these verses were
sent in the midst of the then ongoing war status existed between Muslims and their enemies,
and therefore the kāfirīn (infidels) in these verses refer only to the Muslim’s warriors of the
time. For further elaboration, see: Muhammad al-Ghazālī, AlTa‘asub wa al-Tasāmuh bayn
al-Masīhiyya wa al-Islām (Cairo: Nahdat Misr, 2005), 38.
92 Zīdān, Ahkām Dhimmiyn,78.
93 Al-Qaraḍāwī: Ghayr al-Muslimīn, 17-18; Maudūdī, Huqūk Ahl al-
dhimma, 35.
94 The international Crisis Group, “Egypt Muslims Brothers:
Confrontation or integration?”,2008: 5, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-
north-africa/northafrica/egypt/egypt-s-muslim-brothers-confrontation-or-
integration; Mariz Tadros, The Muslim Brotherhood, 89.
95 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Min Fiqh al-Dawla,194-195.
If this is the case regarding posts of al-wilaya al-‘amma, it can be argued that there is a
consensus among all Islamist movements including the MB that non-Muslims are not
eligible to hold al-wilaya al-‘udhma (the presidency) in an Islamic state based on religious
foundations. Al-Qaraḍāwī, for example, asserts that the Islamic state is an
“ideological state”, and hence the president of an Islamic state is the “Prophet’s deputy
whose main job is to guarding religion and governing people with religion.”
Rights of Non-Muslims to Building Places of Worship
In the Islamic sharī‘a state envisioned by the Brothers, attitudes towards building and
renovating places of worship belonging to non-Muslims provide another manifestation of
religious discrimination. Theoretically, there is a consensus not only among the
Brotherhood’s thinkers but among almost all Islamists that freedom of religion and worship
of non-Muslims must be maintained on religious grounds. The Qur’anic verse stating that
“No compulsion is there in religion,” has always been utilized advocating Islam’s tolerance
towards non-Muslims. Transforming this virtual right into reality by allowing for the
construction of places of worship for non-Muslims is a problematic issue, however.
Al-Qaraḍāwī, for instance, argues that non-Muslims living in an Islamic country should
respect common feelings of Muslims not performing their rites in public nor building new
churches in cities which had no previous churches. Generally, traditional Islamic scholars
distinguish between two different types of non-Muslims’ places of worship. The first
includes houses of worship that had been established on territories that were not considered
a part of dār al-Islam (house of Islam). The second type contains new holy places non-
Muslims want to construct in one of newly established cities of dār al-Islam.
The general rule put forward by the Brotherhood’s classical preachers has been that
while the former places of worship (i.e., old houses of worship) are allowed to be
maintained and refurbished if destroyed, the latter holy houses (i.e., new places of worship)
is religiously prohibited. Muhammad Abdullah al-Khatīb (1929-2015), a former Mufti of
the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic preacher, issued an infamous fatwa (Islamic legal
statement) during the 1980s prohibiting church construction in newly established Egyptian
cities. According to al-Khatīb, Copts are not allowed to build new churches in the then
emergent cities, such as Ma‘adi and the 10th of Ramadan, since these new cities were
originally built by Muslims, meaning that they are integral parts of dar
al-Islam.
Relatedly, the Brotherhood’s thinkers agreed that having a permission to building
nonMuslims’ places of worship from walī al-’amr should be given in advance. Historically,
since the al-khat al-Hamayuni (Hamayuni Edict) advanced in 1856, the “walī al-’amr” has
been deemed the sultan or who became later the president. That is, building or renovating
a church in Egypt, for example, needed a presidential signature which has been the case
over the last fifteen decades. However, this policy has recently been changed in August
2016 when the Egyptian parliament approved a new church building law, by which these
permissions are to be given by local governors rather than the president.
Despite the importance of adopting such a relatively more advanced legal step
towards regulating non-Muslims’ religious affairs, the underlying concern lies more in the
hostile religious discourse that has been advanced against Copts over the decades. This
discourse has eventually made it difficult for local Muslim communities to accept the idea
of having churches inside their neighborhoods. Thus, it is not surprising to discover that
the vast majority of sectarian conflict in Egypt over the past several decades is mainly
attributed to church construction/renovation-related issues.
Given the previously mentioned sociopolitical implications, it has become clear that
Copts are given second-class citizenship due to religiously-based theories advanced mostly
by the Brothers and Salafis. Moreover, bearing in mind the underlying foundations shaping
the Brotherhood’s political project helps understand several actions and decisions adhered
by the Brotherhood’s leaders since the 2011 uprising. Retrospectively, it is understandable
now why President Musri missed what Jason Brownlee described as a “golden opportunity
for interfaith accord” with Copts by not appearing in the enthronement ceremony of Pope
Tawadros II. As Paul Rowe has argued, Mursī’s absence “raised complaints from Copts
who feared that it indicated an increasingly disdainful attitude for Christians within the
regime.” Furthermore, it is obvious now why the entire Coptic community living across
Egypt’s governorates were given only presidential permission to construct an “apartment-
sized” church during the
Brotherhood’s one - year tenure.
Relatedly, yet on the societal level, the discriminatory religious discourse towards
nonMuslims has cultivated patterns of sectarian beliefs and attitudes adopted by ordinary
Muslim citizens. Sectarian tensions erupted in Qena once a Coptic figure was announced
its governor in April 2011, for instance. This appointment has led to a wave of fierce riots
and mass protests, led primarily by local Islamist leaders, sweeping across the entire
governorate. As Mariz Tadros concluded, “it was the religion of the governor that served to
unify all the different parties into one alliance, not the demand for a civil, democratically-
elected governor.”
It is crucial to note that non-Muslims throughout the Brothers’ religious discourse
refer exclusively to the Abrahamic religions’ followers, namely Jews and Christians.
Utilizing such as narrow conceptualizations, non-Muslims are deprived of their basic
human rights on religious accounts as it was illustrated throughout this chapter. However,
religious rights and freedoms of non- Muslims on the broader sense, i.e., followers of the
non-Abrahamic religions or others following no religion, are not recognized in the
Brotherhood’s thinking in the first place. To mention only one example, Mahmūd Ghozlān,
a prominent member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Office, confirmed that non-Muslims
other than the People of the Book do not have the right to worship in an Islamic state.
The Coptic Response
Copts were aware of the potentially devastating consequences resulting from the
establishment of the Brotherhood’s proposed Islamic sharī‘a state. For them, the
ascendancy of Islamists to power would not only endanger their sociopolitical position but
also Egypt’s identity and its civilian nature. This explains why religious minorities in the
broader Middle East tend to support authoritarian regimes, sustaining the status quo and
hence preserving their positioning. Based on a comparative field work conducted in several
Middle East countries, Ceren Belge and Ekrem Karakoç concluded that religious minorities
in the Middle East (i.e., Egypt and Jordan) are more likely to support autocratic regimes
compared to the majority populations.
This is attributed to three main reasons according to the authors. First, nonMuslims have
enjoyed greater autonomy over their socioeconomic affairs since the
Ottoman era, which considered them as distinct communities deserving state protection.
Second, the Ottoman policies have eventually helped increase non-Muslims’ economic
powers particularly in the post-independence era. Third, Arab nation-states have been
deemed the main guarantor of secularism, and consequently religious minorities have been
hesitant to undermine states’ authoritarian institutions which have assisted
preserving their sociopolitical status over years.
These results were visible on the ground in Egypt when pope Shenouda publicly supported
the Mubarak regime during the 2011 uprisings, calling on Copts not to participate in
protests and to stay at home instead, praying for Egypt. However, the rise of Islamists
following the revolution has ushered in a new relationship pattern between the Coptic
community as a whole on one hand and the state on the other. The following section
explores these new patterns of interactions, analyzing the Coptic responses on both church-
state level and ordinary individual level.
Reactions on Church Level
As for the relations between the church and the newly emergent Islamist regime, it was the
first time in Egyptian Christianity’s long history that leaders of the five largest
Christian denominations got together forming an Egyptian Council of Churches. The
Christian coalition, which was established on February 18, 2013, aimed at defending the
interests and concerns of Egypt’s Christian communities. Furthermore, it tried to generate
a sense of belonging among all Egyptian Christians during times of uncertainty and fears
sweeping Egypt’s sphere at the time. More importantly, it sought to establish a counter
coalition before the then Islamist ruling front led by the Brothers and Salafis.
Another manifestation of growing tensions in church-state interactions could be noticed in
the revolutionary stances taken by the newly elected Patriarch at the time: pope Tawadros.
Broadly, it can be assumed that unspoken pacts have been established between the
leadership of the Coptic Orthodox Church and successive Egyptian presidents since Nasser
(see the literature review section). According to these informal pacts, the general rule has
been that issues and concerns of the Copts are to be handled between top officials from
both sides (i.e., state and church) behind closed doors. It seems, however, that the rise of
Islamists to power put an end to these long-established pacts.
Specifically, Tawadros publicly blamed Mursī and the state apparatus, holding them
responsible for the April 7, 2013 assault on the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in Abbassiyya.
In fact, it was the first time through its long history that the Coptic Cathedral was attacked.
While commenting on the unprecedented assault on the Cathedral in a televised interview,
Tawadros stated that “attacking the Cathedral exceeded all red lines and limits anyone can
imagine … The Cathedral, which is deemed Egypt’s national symbol, has never been
attacked through its 2000-year-old history, even during worst historical junctures.”
Furthermore, he publicly accused Mursī of not keeping his promises indicating that
“president Mursī had promised me to do everything he could to protect the Cathedral, but
none of his promises was maintained in reality.”
During the drafting of the 2012 constitution, it was clear that the Brothers and Salafis were
drafting a purely Islamic constitution. It is worth mentioning that Islamists were dominating
the Constituent Assembly, where 66 out of its 100 members were Islamists. Hence, it was
not surprising that the committee refused any changes to Article 2 of the suspended
constitution, for instance, stating that “Islam is the religion of the state, Arabic is its formal
language, and the principles of Islamic sharī‘a are the main source of legislation.” While
Article 2 was deemed problematic for Copts since its introduction by Sadat in the 1980s in
an effort to placate the Islamists, Article 219 further enhanced the already growing fears
shared by the Coptic community. According to this controversial Article, the principles of
sharī‘a were to be derived exclusively from the mazahib ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama‘a (the
Sunni schools of thought). For Copts, this Article would jeopardize their position since
“Wahhabi sources could be applied or that anyone could be given the power to criminalize
a certain act.” Agreeing with Clark Lombardi and Nathan Brown, the Islamic technical
language used in writing this Article “provides firm evidence, if any was needed, that there
were many Islamists in the room when this document was drafted.”
Islamizing the constitution could also be recognized in Article 4, which granted al-Azhar
a significant role in that al-Azhar’s Council of Senior Scholars should be consulted in all
Islamic law-related matters. As Lombardi and Brown pointed out, “alAzhar as an institution
may feel authorized by Article 4 to institutionalize itself as the Islamic conscience of the
country.” Taken the 2012 constitution-related concerns together, it was evident that “the
Muslim Brotherhood appeared to be going from electoral dominance to institutional
hegemony” as Jason Brownlee has indicated. Responding to the Islamists’ hegemony over
the constitution-writing process on
one hand and their insistence on Islamizing society and state on the other, representatives
of the Coptic Church withdrew from the Constituent Assembly in objection before the final
draft was put to a public referendum. After it was passed, pope Tawadros strongly criticized
the new constitution in a journalistic interview with the Associated Press, in which he
demonstrated that:
The only common bond between all Egyptians is that they are all citizens ... the
constitution, the base for all laws, must be under the umbrella of citizenship and not a
religious one … Subsequently, some clauses were distorted by a religious slant and
that in itself is discrimination because the constitution is supposed to unite and not
divide.
Responses Adopted on the Individual Level
Generally, political transformation bears risks as well as threats to religious and ethnic
minority communities especially in autocratic regimes.130 As Samuel Tadros has clearly put
it, “it was the wisdom of centuries of persecution that taught minorities the eternal lesson
of survival: that the persecuting dictator was always preferable to the mob.”131 Drawing on
Coptic religious fears, Talal Asad rightly argued that “the Mubarak regime always
maintained that it was the only force capable of keeping ‘religious peace’ precisely because
it suppressed Islamic extremism.”132
However, ordinary Copts were not afraid of the speculations that had frequently been
advocated in the very beginning of the revolution, predicting that Islamists would dominate
Egypt’s sphere once Mubarak was ousted. Thus, they actively participated in the 18-days
of the uprisings beside their fellow Muslim citizens, opposing the church’s repeated calls
to stay at home. At that time, Copts thought that toppling Mubarak’s longstanding
authoritarianism would create a new more religiously tolerant Egypt they had been
dreaming of. As time passed, they eventually had to encounter what was deemed a more
problematic concern: “the increase in random mob violence by non-politicized
Egyptian citizens against them.”133
In response to the then growing Islamization of state and society following the uprising,
many ordinary Copts chose to migrate even before the Brothers officially seized
130 See, Belge and Karokoc, “Minorities in the Middle East”; Kanchan Chandra
“Making causal claims about the effect of ethnicity,” in Mark Lichbach and Alan
Zuckerman, ed., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2007); James Fearon and David Laitin, “Violence and the
social construction of ethnic identity”, International Organization 54, no. 4, (2000):
845877.
131 Samuel Tadros, Motherland Lost: The Egyptian and Coptic Quest for
Modernity, (California: Hoover Institution Press, 2013), 209.
132 Talal Asad, “Fear and the Raptured State: Reflections on Egypt after
Mubarak,” Social Research 79, no. 2 (2012): 281.
133 Samuel Tadros, Motherland Lost, 205.
office. The Vatican suggested that up to 100,000 Christians fled the country during the first
6 months following the revolution.134 Many other Copts, however, chose to engage in
politics defending their political as well as religious interests. Furthermore, a wide array of
Coptic movements was established to address Coptic grievances,135 such as the
Maspero Youth Union, the Christian Brotherhood, and the Mina Daniel Movement.
Throughout the pre-revolution era, ordinary Copts used to raise their demands “within the
confines of church walls”, using Jayson Casper’s words; however, the new Coptic
movements which emerged after the rise of Islamists have altered this equation. In other
words, the ascendance of Islamists to power has motivated ordinary Copts to go beyond
church fences raising certain religious concerns at public sites and streets, which was
considered a turning point back then.136
It was not only the case that Copts got involved in “street politics” due to the rise of
Islamists, but they also engaged in “real politics”. Despite a lack of robust evidence, it was
widely speculated that the majority of Copts gave their votes either to Ahmad Shafiq or to
Hamdin Sabbahi in the first round of the presidential election.137 Also, they were said to
favor Ahmad Shafiq, the ex-prime minister and the old regime’s representative,
134 Ross Douthat, “Democracy’s Collateral Damage,” NewYorkTimes.com,
October 15, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/opinion/sunday/douthat-
democracyscollateral-damage.html(accessed August 22, 2016).
135 For further elaboration on Coptic social movements established in the
aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, see: Jayson Casper, “Mapping the Coptic Movements:
Coptic Activism in a Revolutionary Setting,” Arab-West Report Papers 44 (2013).
www.arabwestreport.info.
136 Mariz Tadros, “Copts under Mursi,” 26; Jayson Casper, “Mapping the
Coptic Movements,” 3.
137 Mariz Tadros, “Copts under Mursi,” 22.
over Mursī in the run-off. Expectedly, ordinary Copts rejected the 2012 “Islamic”
constitution advanced by the Islamists when put to referendum. A year before, they had
been encouraged to say a previous “no” to the 19 March 2011 constitutional amendments
since “yes” would have accelerated the transmission of power to the Brotherhood.
Still within Coptic individual reactions, Assistant President Samir Murqus resigned his
position the day after Mursī issued his constitutional declaration in November 22 in
condemnation. A few days later in December 6, the prominent Coptic scholar and a close
friend of the Brothers, Rafiq Habib, resigned his post as a deputy chairman of the Freedom
and Justice Party. Habib’s decision came one day after violent clashes had ensued between
the protestors gathered outside the presidential palace demonstrating against Mursī’s
declaration and the Brotherhood’s supporters.
Taken the Christians’ reaction adopted on both church and individual levels
together, it can be assumed that the rise of the Brotherhood following the Arab Spring led
eventually to the unification of the Coptic community against a common threat: the
Islamization of state and society. Evidently, Copts actively participated in the revolution
from its very beginning “not as Copts but as Egyptians.” However, subsequent political
developments instigated “Copticness” among the Coptic society, driving them towards
politics not as being Egyptians anymore but as Christians. This transformation has
undermined the iconic scenes of national unity witnessed in Tahrir Square, where Copts
were protecting Muslims with their bodies during prayers and vice versa. “To Copts,”
Marlyn Tadros points out, “the image of the revolution was that which enabled the creation
of an almost Utopian state of freedoms and liberties, not least of which religious freedom.”
Nonetheless, the Brotherhood’s exclusivity and the subsequent Coptic responses have
destroyed what was seen at the time as another symbolic moment of national unity,
resembling Egypt’s national unification of the 1920s.
CHAPTER III
The Road to Constructing a Threatened Coptic Identity
While millions of Muslims and Copts alike were taking to the streets in the 2011 uprising,
a more religiously tolerant and politically democratic Egypt was being visualized in the
demonstrators’ hearts and minds. “In the tent city of Tahrir Square,” Jason Brownlee writes,
“Egyptians communed across the state’s ethnic and political borders.” It can be argued that
Muslims and Copts were acting as a unified community against Mubarak’s regime. The
national unity between Muslims and Christians seen throughout the 18-day revolt recalled
the corresponding national solidarity that had previously been experienced during the
campaign against British rule in the 1920s. However, the political developments that
followed along with the decisions taken by political forces at the time, especially the
Muslim Brotherhood (MB), have weakened this short-lived unification. This, eventually,
gave way to the establishment of two conflicting identities/communities; the Coptic
minority community versus the Muslim majority society, each of which started to pursue
different goals employing varying strategies.
The current chapter is divided into two main sections. The first addresses the period
of unity between Muslims and Copts, arguing that at first ordinary Copts trusted the MB as
their fellow Muslim citizens did. Back then, Christians hoped that the Brotherhood would
establish a more democratic country guaranteeing the rights of religious minorities, which
had frequently been violated by the successive regimes. The second section traces changes
in the Coptic community’s trust in particular towards the
Brotherhood after the latter seized power. The main premise is that declining trust in the
Brothers has increased levels of political disillusionment among the Christian community,
which in turn increased the readiness to defect from the whole democratic process among
Copts, pushing them towards supporting the military.
Changes of Copts’ Trust in the Muslim Brotherhood over Time
In his seminal work Trust and rule, Charles Tilly has emphasized the crucial influence of
trust between ruled and ruler on the quality of democracy on one hand and the stability of
rule on the other. Tilly has defined trust in terms of risk, arguing that “[t]rust consists of
placing valued outcomes at risk to others’ malfeasance, mistakes, or failures.” This type of
reasoning is proven right when applied to the political context following the 2011 revolt,
in the sense that ordinary Copts took the risk of trusting the MB.
In order to examine changes of trust in the MB among Copts and Muslims over
time, exploring how these changes influenced Copts’ sociopolitical behavior in particular,
the Arab Barometer (AB) dataset was utilized. Before heading to discussing the results, it
is important to elaborate first on the type of data as well as the questions employed, showing
their relevance to the arguments at hand. To begin with, since the first part of this chapter
seeks to compare levels of trust in the MB among different religious groups across different
regimes, namely the SCAF-led regime and the MB regime, the AB waves II and III were
used. Specifically, while wave II contains data addressing instances going back to SCAF’s
rule (the field work was conducted from June 16-July 3, 2011), wave III reflects events
which occurred during Mursī’s tenure (data were gathered from March 3- April 7, 2013).
The AB datasets, therefore, give an invaluable chance to investigate the arguments at hand
since they help monitoring changes in attitudes and positions of both Copts and Muslims
across different transitions under investigation.
As for the questions employed, trust in the MB was measured using a relevant item
in which participants were asked to what extend they trusted the MB with a scale ranging
from 1 (I trust it to a great extent) to 4 (I absolutely do not trust it). Since the main purpose
here is to distinguish between those who trusted the MB regardless of degrees of trust and
those who did not trust it at all, a dummy variable measuring general trust in the MB was
created. That is, citizens who did not trust the MB at all were coded 2, whereas people who
trust it either to a great or a medium or a limited extent were coded 1. In order to investigate
the relationship between religion and trust in the MB, a
Chi-Square Test was performed.
Table 1. Crosstabs between religion and trust in the MB during SCAF’s transition
Muslims Copts
Yes 790
69
43
60.6
Trust the
MB
Frequency
%
Frequency %
The results displayed in Table 1 support the assumption suggested: Copts took the risk of
trusting the MB during SCAF’s tenure as their fellow Muslim citizens did. Specifically, no
significant relationship was found between religion and trust the MB during SCAF’s
transition as hypothesized (p> 0.05). Looking at the percentages displayed above reveals
that large numbers of Copts (60.6%) and Muslims (69%) granted the MB relatively equal
levels of trust during SCAF’s rule. That is to say, ordinary Copts followed Muslim citizens
giving the Brothers a full chance to rule Egypt after the SCAF would hand over power to a
civilian government as had been pledged.
These results can be attributed to the fact that Egyptians, including the Coptic
minority, might have believed frequent promises by the MB’s leadership at the time who
were assuring the group’s good intentions to participate in, instead of dominating Egypt’s
politics. For instance, while addressing a crowd in Damanhur (lower Egypt), the MB’s
Supreme Guide Mohammad Badie stated that the movement would “demonstrate that it is
a moderate and tolerant group promoting equality for all regardless of religion, colour and
creed.” He went on emphasizing the “participation not domination” slogan, reminding his
audiences that “the MB group was from the people, with the people and for the people.”
Moreover, in May 2011 Mohamad Mursī, the then head of the MB’s newly formed Freedom
and Justice Party (FJP), announced that the new party would not force Islamic sharī‘a laws
on Egyptians. He demonstrated that “[w]e only use Islam as the basis of our party ... which
No 354
31
28
39.4
X2(1) = 2.237, p> 0.05 (0.1) 1144
100
71
100
means that our general framework is Islamic sharia ... We don't issue religious rules in
individual cases.” In an attempt to resolve growing fears that swept across the Coptic
community, especially regarding parliamentary representation, Mursī pointed out that “we
want to see our Christian brothers elected in parliament ... We don't want one group to
control the parliament, neither the Brotherhood nor anyone else.” Furthermore, the MB’s
former Supreme Guide Mahdī ‘Ākif declared
publicly in May 2011 that the organization would not field a presidential candidate.
As time passed, political developments have clearly shown that “the MB was driven
by hunger for power fueled by the immense vacuum left after the fall of Mubarak and the
NDP” as Khalil al-Anani argued. In addition, events on the ground proved that
“the group’s actions were overshadowing its rhetoric” as Jason Brownlee has rightfully
stated.To mention just a few examples, the Brothers contested the parliamentary elections
in full capacity after they had pledged a few months earlier that they would contest only 35
percent of the parliamentary seats as the MB’s media spokesman Essam al-Arian had said.
After the MB-led Democratic Alliance won 46% of the parliamentary seats, the Brothers
headed towards seizing the presidency as well. In another reversal yet on the presidential
level, the movement fielded its deputy and strongman Khairat al-Shater for the presidency.
In an attempt to justify this regression, the FJP’s chairman Muhammad Mursī claimed that
"[w]e have chosen the path of the presidency not because we are greedy for power but
because we have a majority in parliament which is unable to fulfill its duties.”
A week before assuming office, Mursī had made several promises before a large
number of Egypt’s political leaders who mostly belonged to the non-Islamist camp and who
had gathered in the Fairmont Hotel. The main goal of what came to be known as the
Fairmont Accord was a discussion of the new political developments that were threatening
the revolution, especially given that Ahmad Shafiq, a representative of the ousted Mubarak
regime and of the “deep state”, had become Mursī’s sole competitor in the runoff. These
promises varied to include the following: launching a “national unity project”; forming a
“national salvation government” in which all political forces and orientations would be
represented; appointing a presidential team representing Egypt’s varied political trends; and
forming an inclusive constituent assembly in order to draft a constitution for all Egyptians.
Eventually, Mursī won the election by a tiny margin of one percent over his rival Shafiq
and became Egypt’s first democratically elected president in June 30, 2012.
Broadly, none of these promises were fulfilled throughout Mursī’s one-year tenure,
however. More specifically, appointing the politically unknown figure Hisham Qandil as
prime minister and allocating significant ministries such as higher education, housing,
manpower, and information were deemed signs undermining “the power-sharing spirit of
the so-called Fairmont Accord.” With regard to the Coptic quest, sectarian attacks against
Copts and Copts’ holy places “increased in both frequency and intensity,” reaching a climax
in the unprecedented assault on the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in April 7, 2013 (see
Chapter 1). Moving to the constitution, Islamists dominated the constituent assembly and
hence “an overtly religious constitution” was advanced. According to Muqtadar Khan, “the
Egyptian constitution, passed by the Islamists, fudged on the equality of all citizens by
privileging one religion, Islam, over others (articles 1 and 2), and subverting the equal status
of women and minorities.”
On the institutional level, the Brotherhood-ization of the state was further
consolidated through consecutive cabinet reshuffles, in which the number of Brotherhood
members appointed increased. Throughout his tenure, Mursī “focused more on
consolidating his party’s power over government institutions than providing good
governance.” Assuming both executive and legislative powers, Mursī took a farreaching
decision issuing the shocking constitutional declaration of November 22, 2012.
The declaration, which was deemed by Jason Brownlee as an “auto-golpe,” placed the
presidential office above all state establishments particularly the judiciary system.
Agreeing with Khan, “the Muslim Brothers did much in a very short time to squander their
credibility in Egypt.”
Table 2. Crosstabs between religion and trust in the MB during Mursī’s transition
Muslims
Copts
Trust the MB
Frequency
%
Frequency
%
Yes
353
31.3
19
27.5
No
774
68.7
50
72.5
X2(1) = 0.435, p> 0.05(0.5) 1127 100 69 100
The previously illustrated bad decisions and policies taken by the Brotherhood, especially
those that were adopted during Mursī rule, are hence expected to have enhanced worries
among Copts in particular about the real intentions of the MB compared to Muslims. The
results in Table 2 partially support this argument. Specifically, no significant associations
were found between religion and trust in the MB during Mursī’s period contrary to
expectation (p> 0.05). However, percentages of distrust among Copts (72.5%) were a bit
higher than that among Muslims (68.7%), meaning that Copts became a bit more skeptical
of the MB’s real intentions during Mursī’s transition than Muslims. Collectively, it can be
argued that while levels of distrust in the MB have increased among Muslims and Copts
during Mursī’s tenure, percentages of distrust among Copts
were a bit higher, yet not significantly, than that of Muslims.
Table 3. Paired Samples Tests identifying changes of trust in the MB within each community over time
Note: Higher scores meaning greater levels of distrust
After exploring patterns of change in levels of trust/distrust in the MB among both religious
communities across different regimes (i.e., the SCAF and the MB), it is important to
examine whether these patterns were changing over time within each individual community
or not. For the Coptic society, Paired Samples’ results (Table 3) sustain the premise at hand:
levels of distrust towards the MB during Mursī’s transition were significantly higher
(M=3.7) than during SCAF’s period (M=2.9) [Paired Samples Test (54)= - 4.709, P=0.000].
With regard to the Muslim community, the results did not support the other half of the
argument presented. The findings (Table 3) reveal that levels of distrust in the MB among
Muslims have also increased during Mursī’s presidency
Levels of Trust
N Mean t df sig (2tailed)
Copts
During SCAF’s transition
55 2.9 - 4.709 54 0.000
During Mursī’s transition
Muslims
55 3.7
During SCAF’s transition
1012 2.6 -16.998 1011 0.000
During Mursī’s transition
1012 3.4
(M=3.4) compared to their counterparts during SCAF’s transition (M=2.6) [Paired Samples
Test (1011)= -16.998, P=0.000]. These results indicate that general distrust in the MB has
increased among religious groups over time. Looking at the means of distrust above shows
that Copts tended to distrust the MB (M=3.7) more than Muslims (M=3.4). Generally, the
results presented in the previous three tables are partially supportive of the main theoretical
argument suggested. More specifically, Copts were inspired by the
“spirit of Tahrir Square” giving equal trust to the MB as those of Muslim citizens during
SCAF’s transition. What occurred afterwards was that general trust in the MB has
statistically deteriorated among both Copts and Muslims. However, degrees of distrust in
the MB among Copts remained a bit higher than their counterparts shared by Muslims over
the two transitions.
Satisfaction with Government’s Performance between Religious Groups over Time
Another manifestation indicating how the MB’s ascendance to power was posing a real
threat to Copts compared to Muslims could be noticed in the contradictory positions each
group held towards the government’s performance. Satisfaction with the government’s
performance was tested utilizing relevant question asking respondents whether they were
satisfied/dissatisfied with the government’s performance. Answers provided ranged from 0
(absolutely unsatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied).
Satisfaction Levels
N Mean t df sig (2-tailed)
Muslims
Satisfaction with SCAF’s government
1111 5.7 -2.110 1110
0.03
Table 4. Paired Samples Tests identifying differences in satisfaction with governments among Muslims and
Copts over time
Note: Higher means meaning greater levels of satisfaction
The results presented in Table 4 enhance the argument presented. Specifically, the Paired
Samples Tests demonstrate that general satisfaction with the performance of Mursī’s
government among Muslims (M=7) was comparatively higher than their satisfaction with
SCAF’s government (M=5.7) [Paired Samples Test (1110)= -2.110, P=0.03]. By contrast,
levels of satisfaction with Mursī’s government among Copts were statistically lower
(M=2.4) than their satisfaction with SCAF’s government (M=6) [Paired Samples Test (60)=
9.102, P=0.000]. Generally, these results are in congruence with the main hypothesis
proposed in that each community was evaluating the same government’s performance
significantly differently. Initially, evaluations hence were based on beforehand suppositions
rather than relying on substantive factors.
Implications on Minority-Related Politics
Distrust in the incumbent has its own consequences on citizens in general and on minority-
related politics in particular. This section explores how these implications are linked with
a certain array of concerns challenging minorities in transitions in general.
Three main worries are provided in this regard: the potentiality of establishing a new
dictatorship, the rise of communal apathy, and the willingness to defect from the democratic
Satisfaction with Mursī’s government
Copts
1111 7
Satisfaction with SCAF’s government
61 6 9.102 60
0.000
Satisfaction with Mursī’s government
61 2.4
process as a whole. The remainder of this chapter discusses each one of these concerns in
a separate part.
Musrī’s Rule: A New Islamist Dictatorship
Charles Tilly has introduced a political process-oriented definition highlighting the main
features distinguishing democratic regimes from other types of rule. Tilly argues that:
a regime is democratic insofar as it maintains broad citizenship, equal citizenship,
binding consultation of citizens at large with respect to governmental activities
and personnel, as well as protection of citizens from arbitrary actions by
governmental agents.
By this standard, it can be hypothesized that Mubarak’s long dictatorship was replaced by
a newly established one, yet with an “Islamist” face seen during Mursī’s tenure.
Methodologically, three relevant questions were selected to evaluate the general assessment
of Mursī’s regime as perceived by Copts. Arguably, these three questions address the four
main principles featuring democratic regimes as suggested in Tilly’s definition.
Specifically, tapping on both broad citizenship and consultation, the first question asked
interviewees to evaluate the general status of democracy andaf human rights on a scale of
1 (very good) to 5 (very bad). The second question taps into the issue of equality, in which
participants were asked whether they were receiving equal treatment compared to other
citizens under different regimes. Responses given ranged from 1 (to a great extent) to 4 (not
at all). The final question signifies the protection principle, in which respondents were
asked whether they were able to criticize the government without fear or not. Answers given
to this question were either 1 (yes) or 2 (no). A final composite scale aggregating scores of
the three questions together was created, measuring whether the MB was establishing
democracy or autocracy in the perception of Copts. Scores of the final scale ranged from 3
to 11, where greater points mean that the regime was perceived as more autocratic.
Table 5. Paired Samples Tests measuring differences in assessment of status of democracy over time
Status of democracy N Mean t df sig (2-tailed)
Under SCAF’s rule 56 6 -5.545 55 0.000
Under Mursī’s rule 56 7.8
Note: Higher scores meaning that the regime is authoritative
According to the results presented in Table 5, the status of democracy significantly
deteriorated during Mursī’s transition (M=7.8) compared to its counterpart during
SCAF’s period (M=6) as perceived by Christians [Paired Samples Test (55)= -5.545, P=0.000]
. In other words, while the Brothers thought they were driving Egypt towards democracy,
embarking on a limited conceptualization of democracy defined by electoral victories,
opposing factions including Copts thought that the movement was establishing religious
autocracy. According to Nathan Brown, successive elections held at that time
“seemed only to deepen rather than ease or resolve differences” between the majoritarian
ruling camp and the minority camp, be it political or religious. Relatedly,
Mursī’s dictatorship was evident for example in that “the Brotherhood ran afoul of Egyptian
moderate sensibilities by trying to establish an Islamic state” as Tarek Masoud has pointed
out. In other words, despite the “civil state” discourse which was frequently advocated by
the MB back then, the MB’s underlying cause was to
establishing an Islamic state.
Rise of Communal Cynicism among Copts
After assuming power, it was evident that Mursī “refused to compromise and argued that
his electoral legitimacy gave him the right to ignore opposition demands.” This eventually
created a new Islamist dictatorship as previously illustrated. Thus, a growing wave of
communal cynicism dominated the Coptic community in particular and wider Egyptian
society in general, especially liberals and leftists. Since the main focus of this part is
allocated to Copts, three indicators signifying collective skepticism shared by Copts in
particular are provided. These indicators are as follows: increasing political apathy;
growing worries about economic situation; and rising willingness to emigrate.
Increasing Political Apathy
The political apathy which dominated the Coptic community could be seen in three main
manifestations: perceptions of how transitions were managed; evaluations of basic
freedoms; and interest in following political news. To start with, the management of
transition was evaluated using a relevant question investigating attitudes towards the way
in which political transition was handled. Responses given to answer this question varied
from 1 (very good) to 4 (very bad). As for evaluating status of primary freedoms across
regimes, the following question was selected: “To what extent do you think that ‘freedom
to express opinions’ is guaranteed in your country?” Seven items covering different
dimensions related to positioning of freedoms were directed to interviewees, with a scale
rated from 1 (guaranteed to a great extent) to 4 (not guaranteed). These items are as follows:
1) Freedom to express opinions; 2) Freedom of the press; 3) Freedom to join political
parties; 4) Freedom to participate in peaceful protests and demonstrations; 5) Freedom to
join civil associations and organizations; 6) Freedom to sue the government and its
agencies; and 7) Freedom to vote. After excluding item 7 since it was asked in wave II only,
a separate aggregated scale (for each individual wave) adding up scores of the 6 items was
created with a total points of 6 to 24. The newly created scales were highly reliable:
Cronbach’s Alpha for the 6 items evaluating status of freedoms during SCAF’s transition
is 0.912, whereas the Cronbach’s Alfa for the other 6 items measuring positioning of
freedoms during Mursī’s period is 0.924. These high scores suggest that items of each scale
have high internal consistency. The third variable addressing interests in following political
news was measured using the following question: “To what extent do you follow political
news in your country?” Responses given to this item varied from
1 (to a great extent) to 4 (I don’t follow political news at all).
Table 6. Paired Samples Tests identifying differences in political apathy among Copts over time
Political apathy indicators
N Mean t
df sig (2-tailed)
Management of transition
Under SCAF’s rule
61 2.6 -6.567
60 0.000
Under Mursī’s rule
61 3.4
Respect of basic freedoms
Under SCAF’s rule
50 10.5 - 3.518
49
0.001
Under Mursī’s rule
50 14
Following political news
Under SCAF’s rule
69 2.2 -2.226
68
0.02
Under Mursī’s rule
69 2.5
Note: Higher means refer to deterioration of the indicator at hand
During times of political transformation newly elected regimes are expected to build
broader coalitions and provide several compromises, which are deemed preconditions for
a consolidated democracy to occur in the first place. As it has been indicated earlier, Mursī’s
regime failed to establish either of these requirements. This conclusion was empirically
proven right as the results in Table 6 point out. To start, the management of transition during
Mursī was perceived by ordinary Copts to be statistically worse (M=3.4) than that of the
SCAF (M=2.6) [Paired Samples Test (60)= -6.567, P=0.000]. As for respecting freedoms,
the results demonstrate that essential freedoms deteriorated significantly during Mursī’s
transition (M=14) compared to their counterparts during SCAF’s tenure (M=10.5) [Paired
Samples Test (49)= -3.518, P=0.001] according to
Christians’ evaluation. The final indicator reflecting increasing political apathy among
Copts during Mursī’s tenure was observed in declining interests in following political news.
The findings indicate that interest in following political news has significantly declined
among ordinary Christians while the MB were in office (M=2.5) compared to their
counterparts during SCAF’s period (M=2.2) [Paired Samples Test (68)= -2.226, P=0.02].
It should be noted here that rising political skepticism among Copts does not mean that
they abandoned politics entirely. Rather it means that while they might quit formal political
process, they embarked on “street politics” to further their interests as it would be discussed
thoroughly in the next chapter.
Growing Pessimism Concerning Economic Position
Increasing political apathy shared by Copts during Mursī’s presidency was coupled with
growing pessimism concerning economic-related matters. To evaluate participants’
assessments of the economic situation, two related questions were selected. The first asked
the participants how they would evaluate the economic situation in Egypt, with a scale that
varied from 1 (very good) to 4 (very bad). The second question explored prospects for the
economic situation in the foreseeable future as perceived by Copts, with responses ranging
from 1 (much better) to 5 (much worse).
Table 7. Paired Samples Tests indicating increasing pessimism regarding economic situation among Copts
over time
Note: Higher means refer to deterioration of the economic indicator under investigation
According to the results presented above, Egypt’s economic situation during Mursī’s
government was statistically worse (M=3.5) than its counterpart under SCAF’s transition
(M=3.1) [Paired Samples Test (68)= -3.506, P=0.001] as evaluated by Copts. Relatedly,
Christians were skeptical of the MB’s capacity to fix the then worsening economic position.
Specifically, during SCAF’s transition Copts were more optimistic about the future of
Evaluating economic situation
Current economic situation
N Mean t df sig (2-tailed)
Under SCAF’s rule
69 3.1 -3.506 68 0.001
Under Mursī’s rule
Foreseeable economic situation
69 3.5
Under SCAF’s rule
66 1.8 - 9.225 65 0.000
Under Mursī’s rule
66 3.6
Egypt’s economic situation (M=1.8) than during Mursī’s period, where levels of pessimism
have statistically increased (M=3.6) [Paired Samples Test (65)= -9.225, P=0.000]. These
results provide empirical evidence for what has frequently been emphasized in the literature
concerning the MB’s incompetence, and its failure to provide good governance.179
Economic inefficiency of the MB could be attributed to the fact that
179 For more information on the economic factor and how it helped toppling
Mursi’s regime, see for example, Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, The Arab Spring;
Hafez Ghanem, “Egypt’s Difficult Transition”; ”Hafez Ghanem, “The Role of Micro and
Small Enterprises in Egypt’s Economic Transition,” Global Working Paper 53,
(Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-role-of-micro-and-small-enterprises-in-
egyptseconomic-transition/.
the Brothers have primarily been trained to become religious preachers not statesmen as
Khalil al-Anani has rightly indicated. In his analysis of Egypt’s economic situation under
Mursī, Hafez Ghanem pointed out that the MB lacked a “serious macroeconomic
stabilization program.” The author went on identifying economic difficulties experienced
under Mursī’s regime stating that, “the economy deteriorated gradually with low growth
and increasing unemployment and inflation…The Egyptian people were also feeling the
pinch in terms of higher prices and shortages of some imported necessities.”
Increasing Willingness to Emigrate
A final indicator reflecting communal resentments dominating the Coptic community
during Mursī’s tenure could be seen in growing readiness to emigrate. This variable was
evaluated employing the following question: “Do you think about emigrating from your
country?” The participants were to choose from a list including a wide array of
sociopolitical, religious, and economic reasons. Since the main aim here is to differentiate
between Copts who thought about emigration regardless of the reason from those who
never thought about it, a dummy variable was created. Specifically, those who answered
yes irrespective of the reason were given 2, whereas those who reported no were given 1.
Table 8. Willingness to emigrate among Copts over time
During SCAF’s rule
During Mursī’s rule
Thinking about emigration
Frequency %
Frequency %
Yes
14
19.7
29 42
No
57
80.3
40 58
Total 71 100 69 100
The results in Table 8 clearly indicate that willingness rates to emigrate have dramatically
increased among the Coptic community during Mursī’s transition compared to their
counterparts during the SCAF. Specifically, while only 19.7% thought about emigration for
diverse socioeconomic and political reasons during SCAF’s transition, this percentage was
doubled during Mursī’s presidency reaching 42%. These results provide additional
empirical evidence signifying the general deterioration of Copts’ socioeconomic position
during the MB’s rule. Using another statistical model, a Paired Samples Test shows that
levels of willingness to leave the country among Copts (M=1.4) were significantly higher
during Mursī’s era than its counterparts under SCAF’s transition (M=1.2) [Paired Samples
Test (70)= - 3.381, P=0.001]. Evidently, these significant differences are deemed crucial in
understanding the real threats Copts had to encounter under the MB’s
rule.
Defection from Democracy and its Impacts on Changing Balance of Power
One of the most dangerous moment threatening newly democratic transitions occurs when
civilians decide to defect from the democratic system, lining up with the military or relying
on street politics to resolve differences. In fact, this opens wide doors for military
intervention in politics. Two main dimensions addressing the willingness to defect from
democracy among Copts are provided. The first dimension addresses the likelihood of
siding with the military, defined by changing levels of trust in the military across time. This
variable was evaluated using a relevant question asking participants to what extent they
trusted the military in the two transitions, with a scale ranging from 1 (I trust it to a great
extent) to 4 (I absolutely do not trust it). It is worth mentioning that the main issue here is
to make a clear distinction between those who trusted the military during those difficult
moments irrespective of degrees of trust, and those who did not trust at all. Thus, a dummy
variable measuring varying trust levels in military was constructed. Copts who did not trust
military at all were coded 2, whereas Copts granting whatever degrees of trust to military
were coded 1. The second explores the extent to which participants believe in democracy
as a way of governing as opposed to other systems. This was evaluated utilizing the
following phrase: “A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other
systems.” Answers provided ranged from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree).
Statistically, a Chi-Square test was utilized to investigate the first dimension (i.e., the
association between religion and trust in the military), while an Independent-Samples T-
Test was performed to measure the second element (i.e., diverse levels of believe in
democracy as a way of governing).
Religious Background and Trust in the Military
Before heading to discuss the association between religion and trust in the military across
different regimes, it is worth remembering that Copts and Muslims alike trusted the MB
during the SCAF’s transition. As illustrated earlier, both whished for a brighter political
future for all Egyptians after the military would hand over power to civilians.
Table 9. Crosstabs between religion and trust in the military during SCAF’s transition
Muslims
Copts
Trust in the military
Frequency
%
Frequency
%
During SCAF’s transition
Yes
1134`
99.1
68
95.8
No
10
0.9
3
4.2
X2(1) = 7.093 , p=008 1144 100 71 100
The data presented in Table 9 point out that Copts were more skeptical of the military’s
intentions during the SCAF’s transitional period than Muslims. That is, religious
background was positively correlated with levels of trust in the military during SCAF’s
period. Comparatively, Muslims tended to trust the military (99.1%) more than Copts
(95.8%), whereas levels of distrust in the military among Copts (4.2%) were higher than
that of Muslims (0.9%) [p=0.008].
These results can be better understood by revisiting the events that occurred on the
ground. For example, it was clear during SCAF’s transition that an informal pact had been
established between the MB and SCAF by which a quick transfer of power to a civilian
government had been reached. This was definitely against non-Islamists and liberals in
general on one side, and it was in favor of the MB’s interests on the other given that they
were the only organized political group at the time. Relatedly, the road map which was
announced by SCAF foresaw elections before the writing of a new constitution. This
trajectory, again, was favoring Islamists over other political and religious minorities.
Moreover, the committee formed by the SCAF to amend the 1971 constitution antagonized
non-Islamists including the Christian community. According to Brownlee et al, this was
due to the fact that the committee was headed by an Islamist thinker, Ṭāriq al-Bishrī. More
importantly, the MB was the sole political group to have been represented in the committee
by one of its members, Ṣubhī Ṣalīh.
Another discriminatory policy adopted by the SCAF was evident in that sectarian
violence against Copts was being handled by local Islamist leaders through informal
committees rather than by enforcement of law through the state apparatus. In her extensive
analysis of religiously-inspired violence between February 2011 and June 2012, Mariz
Tadros has emphasized the devastating consequences of this strategy on social cohesion.
“One of the most dramatic changes occurring after the revolution,”
Tadros writes, “is in the shift in the management of sectarian incidents on a local level from
the SSI [State Security Investigations] apparatus to that of the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Salafis.” If we add the “Maspero Massacre” to the aforementioned instances, we can better
understand why levels of trust in the military differed between Copts and
Muslims during SCAF’s transition. The atrocity of Maspero, in which 27 citizens many of
which were Christians were killed by army soldiers, substantially undermined Coptic-
SCAF relations. Agreeing with Tarek Masoud, during SCAF’s transition “both the Muslim
Brotherhood and the army that unseated it brooked no argument and viewed losers in the
electoral game not as minorities to be protected but as enemies to be silenced.”
Table 10. Crosstabs between religion and trust in the military during Mursī’s transition
Muslims
Copts
Trust in the military
Frequency
%
Frequency
%
During Mursī’s transition
Yes
1151`
93.3
68
98.6
No
76
6.7
1
1.4
X2(1) = 3.026, p= 0.08 1127 100 69 100
Despite previous grievances shared among Copts, which resulted basically from the
“sectarian approaches” followed by the SCAF, policies adopted later by Mursī have
radically changed the balance of power between influential groups at the time.
Specifically, the results in Table 10 indicate that religion and trust in the military were
positively associated during Mursī’s transition. Although Muslims and Copts granted the
military high levels of trust during Mursi’s tenure as indicated in Table 10, Copts tend to
trust the military (98.6%) more than Muslims (93.3%). Relatedly, levels of distrust in the
army among Copts were significantly lower (1.4%) than among Muslims (6.7%)
[p=0.08].
Taken the results in Tables 9 and 10 together, it becomes clear that the MB’s ascendance
to power has changed the balance of power between competing factions. In other words,
the rise of the MB led to a reconstruction of Coptic-Muslims relations on one side, and
more importantly to the reshaping of civil-military relations on the other. This eventually
has sustained religious cleavages in society, leading to the construction of a more threatened
Coptic community as it has been illustrated throughout the current chapter.
Disbelieve in Democracy
In addition to an increasing willingness to side with the military rather than with the elected
civilian government, growing disbelieve in democracy provides another manifestation
reflecting high levels of willingness to defect from democracy among Christians.
Table 11. T-Test showing differences in believe in democracy between Copts and Muslims across time
Democratic system is better than other systems N Mean t df sig (2-tailed)
During SCAF’s transition
Muslims
1144 1.9 0.010
1213
0.9
Copts
71 1.9
During Mursī’s transition
Muslims
949 1.8 - 5.126
1003
0.000
Copts
56 2.4
Note: Higher means refer to greater amounts of disbelieve in democratic system
The findings in Table 11 point out that Muslims and Copts alike believed at first in a
democratic system being the most appropriate pattern of governing, despite the potential
problems attached. Specifically, the Independent Samples T-Test showed that means of
believe in democratic system among Copts (M=1.9) where equal to those of Muslims
(M=1.9) during SCAF’s transition [P> 0.05]. By time, it seemed that the MB left no room
for either religious or political minorities except for losing faith in the democratic system
as the results in Table 11 demonstrate. To elaborate, levels of disbelieve in democratic
system shared among Copts during Mursī’s tenure were significantly higher
(M=2.4) than their counterparts adopted by Muslims (M=1.8) [T-Test (1003)= -5.126, P=
0.000].
Collectively, the three main concerns Copts encountered during Mursī’s transition
(the construction of a new Islamist dictatorship as perceived by ordinary Copts at the time,
growing communal apathy, and oscillation between defection from or commitment to
democracy) have ultimately given way to the “men with guns” to intervene in Egypt’s
politics once again. Furthermore, the policies and tactics adopted by the MB have
significantly threatened interests of Copts, motivating them towards leaning more towards
military after they lost hope in the newly elected democratic regime. This was clearly
evident when Copts actively participated in the massive protests of June 30th, calling for
Egypt’s first democratically elected president to leave office. For Copts being ruled by an
Islamist regime, democracy was no longer “the only game in town”, using the phrase of
Linz and Stepan. Frequent shifts in attitudes and positions taken by Copts across times and
regimes explain how they could handle growing religious fears dominating their
community in the post-2011 era. Exploring the mechanisms by which perceived religious
fears were translated into actual actions during Mursī’s transition in particular is the next
chapter’s main focus.
CHAPTER IV
Mechanisms Linking Perceived Religious Threats with Christians’ Collective Action
In chapter 3 I argue that while Copts and Muslim were full of hope that Mubarak’s
overthrow would usher in a more religiously tolerant Egypt, the MB’s rise to power and the
subsequent hegemony of the Islamists have been perceived by Copts as a threat to their
religious identity. Relatedly, it was also assumed that actions and policies adopted by the
MB helped enhance levels of political apathy among Copts. On the other hand, the MB’s
choices increased the likelihood of defection from Egypt’s new born democracy among
ordinary Copts, calling on the military to intervene in politics in the June 30th revolt.
This chapter traces the mechanisms by which perceived religious threats,
dominating the Coptic community during MB rule, were translated into collective action
noticed in their active involvement in the June 30th uprisings. That is, it explores how self-
perceptions adopted on the individual level are linked with communal behavior
emphasizing the roles played by religiously driven factors in provoking a certain political
action. Broadly, this chapter hypothesizes that a “return of the sacred” was shaping Coptic
sociopolitical behavior during Mursī’s tenure. In other words, Christians were mainly
motivated by religious factors, such as growing religious identity-related fears and
identification more with the in-group to which they belong, while being ruled by Mursī’s
“Islamist” rule.
Methodologically, the results included in this chapter are primarily based on an
analysis of narratives from in-depth interviews with 11 ordinary Christian citizens, aged
between 21 and 48 year in Cairo. Agreeing with Reuel Rogers “interviews are an
indispensable source of data on minority populations, especially in light of the fact that
these groups are still quite underrepresented in national surveys.” Quantitatively, relevant
indicators drawn from the AB dataset (waves II and III) will be utilized as well. Diversity
of interviewees was ensured in that varying socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds of
Egypt’s Christians were represented as much as possible. With regard to the interview
process, an open-ended interview guide was designed and utilized to elicit narratives about
the topics under investigation. The interviews, which averaged between 45 minutes to one
hour, were conducted in Arabic.
Identity Politics and Dynamics of Collective Action
In his attempt to introduce a “fourth generation of revolutionary theory”, Jack Goldstone
has drawn attention away from conventional structural factors towards the crucial roles
played by “revolutionary ideologies, ethnic and religious bases for revolutionary
mobilization, intra-elite conflicts, and the possibility of multiclass coalitions.” In his work,
Goldstone has emphasized the roles of “micro processes of revolutionary mobilization and
leadership” which had been overlooked in “Third-Generation” traditions of collective
mobilization. Building on these insights, this chapter pays more explicit attention to the
pivotal role played by religious factors in motivating collective action of Christians during
the MB’s transition, culminating in the June 30th
demonstrations. Growing religious fears were translated into communal political behavior
through an array of mechanisms as illustrated in Figure 1. The rest of this chapter will
thoroughly discuss the association between the independent variable (i.e., threatened
identity) and the dependent variable (i.e., collective action), elaborating on each of the
proposed mediating mechanisms.
Figure 1: A suggested “causal-mechanisms” model linking religious threats with collective action of Copts
Perceptions of Religious Threats
The qualitative analysis has revealed that Christians perceived their religious identity as
substantially threatened during Mursī’s tenure. As indicated in chapter 3, Islamists’
electoral hegemony and the MB-SCAF informal pact in addition to growing sectarian
violence against Copts have altogether maintained fears among Copts. Increasing worries
among Copts were evident once Mursī was officially announced Egypt’s president,
according to interviewees’ narratives. For instance, while describing her feelings after
knowing about Mursī’s victory, Samya (an Orthodox female, 48-year-old) indicated that
“we Copts were extremely terrified once we heard about Mursī’s victory…I remember the
first Friday’s religious ceremony I attended at the church after Mursī was elected
president…I would claim that almost all of attendees were crying, and the priest kept
repeating that this is God’s will and that all we have is to seek His help in such difficult
times… it was a difficult day and I felt that God left us at sea.”
Several reasons were put forward by the participants explaining these religious
identity-related concerns. For example, Salwa (a Protestant female, 28-year-old)
Threatened
Religious
Identity
Group Level
Personal
Insecurity
Unequal
Citizenship
Group
Consciousness
Group
Identification
Collective
Action
Individual
Level
emphasized the Muslim Brotherhood’s terrifying history with non-Muslims in general
stating that “my religious identity was under genuine threat during the Islamist rule… this
was due to the fact that the MB does have a black history when it comes to politics
…more importantly, they have been intolerant towards non-Muslims in general…my
religious fears were doubled since I was deemed a minority within a minority being
Protestant…generally speaking, anyone who disagrees with the MB is considered an
enemy, let alone Copts who have been deemed by their top officials as infidels.”
Adding another reason, Ramy (an Orthodox male, 48-year-old) pointed out that “the
MB’s ascendance to power meant that religious discrimination against Copts would
definitely be increasing…this is simply due to the fact that the MB has always considered
us as merely guests staying in an Islamic country, not as genuine citizens sharing equal
rights and duties like Muslim citizens.” In her turn, Heba (a Protestant female, 23-yearold)
explained how the MB’s enduring grievances have been translated into negative positions
adopted towards Christians and their interests. She said that “it was clear that the Muslim
Brothers were hungry for power … as if they were trying to compensate the long history of
oppression they have experienced by suppressing others, especially marginalized groups
like us.” For more elaboration, Heba gave the following revealing example: “I still
remember a TV talk show in which an intellectual Copt was asking one of the MB politicians
‘do you love us?’… the latter kept answering ‘I just respect you’… this was the case before
they seized actual power… we were expecting the worst once
they would officially rule Egypt.”
These frightened narratives can be understood in terms of the Islamization wave
dominating Egypt’s public sphere since the eruption of the Arab Spring, culminating during
the Islamist rule that followed. Drawing on the AB (waves III), several quantitative
indicators signifying this Islamization of society can be introduced.
Table 12. Muslims’ attitudes toward enacting country’s laws in accordance with Islamic law during
Mursi’s transition
The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law
To begin with,
the results
(Table 12)
indicate that the vast majority of Egypt’s Muslim citizens (77.5%) agreed during Mursī’s
presidency (to a great and a medium extent, combined) that the country’s laws should be
enacted in accordance with Islamic law
Table13. Muslims’ attitudes toward applying sharī‘a more strictly during Mursī’s transition
Frequency %
I strongly support
335
33.3
I somewhat
support
474
44.4
I do not support
196
18.4
I strongly do not
support
42
3.9
Total
1067
100
It was not only the case that Muslim citizens favored enactment of local laws so that it
matches with Islamic sharī‘a laws, but it was also clear that a considerable amount of them
called for applying sharī‘a more strictly. Table 13 indicates that 77.7% of Muslims
supported (to a great and a medium extent, combined) a more strict application of sharī‘a
during Mursī’s reign in particular, compared to 22.3% who rejected this idea (combining
both who do not support and strongly do not support together).
Frequency %
I strongly agree
305 28.5
I somewhat agree
525 49
I disagree
171 16
I strongly disagree
70 6.5
Total
1071 100
Table14. Preferring a religious political party over a non-religious political party among Muslims during
Mursī’s tenure
The first sentence: prefer a religious political party over a non-religious political party
The second sentence: prefer a non-religious political party over a religious political party
Frequency
%
I strongly agree with the 1st sentence
230
22.1
I agree with the 1st sentence
190
18.2
I agree with the 2nd sentence
290
27.8
I strongly agree with the 2nd sentence
124
11.9
I don’t agree with either sentence
208
20
Total 1042 100
Another facet reflecting the extent to which Egypt’s political sphere was Islamized could
also be found in the positions adopted by the participants towards religious political parties,
and the role they were expected to play in post-2011 era. Empirically, during the MB
transition, 40.3% of Muslims supported (to a great and a medium extent, combined)
religious political parties over non-religious ones, compared to 39.7% who preferred (to a
great or a medium extent, combined) political parties over religious ones. These results
interpret why Islamists captured almost 70% of the parliamentary seats in Egypt’s founding
election that took place right after the 2011 revolution. Seemingly, benefiting from the
Islamization process that swept across Egypt at the time, the Freedom and
Justice Party won 41.9% of the seats. Relatedly, the Salafist bloc which was led by al-Nur
Party seized 24.2% of the vote and al-Wasat Party captured 2% of the seats.
Shockingly, the liberal-oriented Wafd Party, which had been a key player in Egypt’s
political scene even before the 1952 revolution, was defeated by newly formed Islamist
parties. Arguably, this defeat can also be deemed another manifestation reflecting the
Islamization of society.
Mechanisms Connecting Identity with Collective Action: The Individual Level
The qualitative analysis indicated that two main “micro processes” helped mobilize
individual Copts against Mursī and the Brothers: growing perceptions of personal
insecurity and increasing feelings of unequal citizenship.
Personal Insecurity
The thematic analysis has clearly showed that Copts were substantially lacking personal as
well as family safety during the MB rule. Feelings of insecurity were evident across
denomination, age, and gender. For instance, Lydia (an Orthodox female, 24-year-old)
pointed out that “one of the main reasons which made me so scared, personally speaking,
was that ordinary citizens were encouraged to attack assets and holy places of Copts
empowered by the fact that Egypt was ruled by an Islamist president…I was shocked to find
some of my colleagues in university, whom I later discovered that they belong to the
MB, starting to treat their opponents very badly.” In her turn, Salwa showed how sectarian
violence against Copts was informally resolved through reconciliation meetings rather than
by implementing laws. “You cannot imagine,” Salwa elaborates, “how scared I was when
knowing about these reconciliation committees in which Copts, whose social and religious
fundamental rights were significantly violated, were forced to make certain concessions
with culprits or otherwise their personal safety would be further jeopardized.”
Furthermore, Ramy focused on how the discourse of hatred advocated by the MB
and Salafis against Copts was threating his personal security. He pointed out that “the
Muslim Brothers used to ignore our existence to begin with… look for example at the
Islamic discourse they were disseminating and you will find that demands such as the
enforcement of jizya on Copts and the exclusive slogan of Islamiyya Islamiyya were
prevalent…I felt that my personal as well as family safety were under real threat out of such
scary thoughts.”
Table 15. Perceived personal and family’s insecurity among Copts across transitions
Do you currently feel that your own personal as well as your family’s safety and security are ensured or not
These fearful narratives were empirically supported as Table 15 illustrates. Specifically,
while 41% of Copts felt that their personal and family’s security were ensured (to a great
or a medium extent, combined) during SCAF’s transition, this percentage has dramatically
declined under Mursī’s regime in that only 16.6% whose personal security was ensured
(after adding “Fully ensured” and “Ensured” together). Relatedly, Christians who
developed a common sense of insecurity (to a great and a medium extent, combined)
jumped from 59% under the SCAF to 83.3% under Mursī’s regime. To make sure, a Paired
Sample Test demonstrated that Copts’ feelings of unsafety during Mursī’s reign
(M=3.08) were significantly higher than under SCAF’s transition a year earlier (M=2.67)
[Paired Samples Test (65)= -2.628, P= 0.01].
Table16. Comparing personal and family’s insecurity status across different regimes
Compared to this time last year, do you feel that your own personal and your family’s safety and security are
now? Frequency %
Better than
last year
4
6
Same as last year
25
37.3
Worse than
last year
38
56.7
During SCAF
During Mursī
Frequency %
Frequency %
Fully ensured
9 12.7
3 4.5
Ensured
20 28.2
8 12.2
Not ensured
28 39.4
36 54.5
Absolutely not ensured
14 19.7
19 28.8
Total
71 100
66 100
Total
67
100
The findings outlined in Table 16 further confirm the growing insecurity feelings
previously mentioned, where 56.7% of the participants stated that their personal and
family’s security during Mursī’s tenure were worse than during SCAF’s period. Relatedly,
only 6% who indicated that their personal safety was in a better situation during Mursī’s
tenure than that had been experienced under the SCAF.
Unequal Citizenship
While explaining the deep-root causes triggering sectarian violence in Egypt, Saif ‘Abd al-
Fattāh emphasized the issue of equal citizenship as being a main catalyst in this regard. The
author conceived equal citizenship as being an ideological, institutional, and practical
framework, which can enhance or undermine sectarian tensions between Muslims and
Copts. In other words, he shed light on the theoretical and practical dimensions constituting
the real meaning of equal citizenship. Empirically, neither of the two aspects was
maintained during Mursī’s presidency in particular according to the qualitative results.
For example, Peter (an Orthodox male, 32-year-old) showed how the essence of
equality was demolished due to the phenomenon of bearded policemen which grew steadily
after Islamists came to power. Commenting on these unprecedented scenes, Peter said that:
“we Copts have always been dealt with as second-rank citizens regardless of the regime…
yet, I really was so terrified watching Egyptian police officers with a beard… this matter
was further threatening equality… simply because I was completely sure that any problem
between me and Muslim would become a supreme state security case, meaning that my
rights, if any, would be undermined since a ‘bearded’ policeman would never treat an
‘infidel Copt’ like me equally as he would do with his Muslim brethren.”
Inequality between Muslims and Copts can be seen on both societal and institutional levels
as the interviewees indicated. As for the former, Salwa focused on discriminatory policies
seen in private businesses stating that “I would argue that Copts are not treated equally
with Muslim citizens…this is clearly evident in the private sector for instance …where it is
so common to find advertisements placed on the clothing stores’ door or even in streets
looking for veiled girls only to hire…this phenomenon increased dramatically after the
Islamists’ rise to power.” Providing another manifestation showing society-based
inequality, Salwa moved on adding that “regarding the MB period in particular, take
Friday’s ceremonies as another example of social inequality…believe me or not, almost
every Friday I used to listen to hateful Islamic discourse describing Copts and Jews as
being the descendants of monkeys and pigs, infidels, and apostates and so forth…I cannot
imagine what would happen to Copts if any preacher had used such words in describing
Muslims?!...how could anyone claim then that Muslims and Copts are equal?…it is just
nonsense.
Concerning institutional inequality, Samya emphasized how Copts have usually
been prohibited from occupying high-rank posts in government especially in the military
and police establishments. She made this point clear saying that “inequality can be easily
seen in the military and the police where you will never find Copts in higher positions… it
would be great if you find one among 1000 accepted students in the police academy, for
instance, who is a Copt…while this discriminatory policy has been evident across different
regimes, it was further maintained during Mursī’s presidency for sure.”
Table 17. Perceptions of unequal citizenship among Copts across transitions
To what extent do you fell that you are being treated equally compared to other citizens in your country?
Table 17 provides empirical evidence for the unequal citizenship themes previously
outlined. In detail, whereas 59% of Christians reported that they were treated equally (to a
great or a medium extent, combined) with other citizens during SCAF’s period, this
percentage deteriorated considerably during Mursī’s tenure reaching 36% (after adding “to
a great extent” and “to a medium extent” together). As for perceived unequal treatment, the
results revealed that while 41% of Copts think that they were not receiving equal treatment
(to a limited extent and not at all, together) like other citizens during
SCAF’s time, the proportion of perceived unequal treatment rose during Mursī’s reign to
64% (to a limited extent and not at all, combined). To make sure whether the change in
these figures is statistically significant or not, Paired Sample Tests were performed. The
results indicated that Coptic perceptions of lacking social equality during Mursī’s
presidency (M=2.8) were significantly higher than their equivalents which had been
practiced during SCAF’s transition (M=2.3) [Paired Samples Test (63)= -2.894,
During SCAF
During Mursī
Frequency %
Frequency %
To a great extent
16 22.5
4 6.3
To a medium extent
26 36.6
19 29.7
To a limited extent
15 21.2
26 40.6
Not at all
14 19.7
15 23.4
Total
71 100
64 100
P=0.005].
Mechanisms Connecting Identity with Collective Action: The Community Level
Collective Identification
Agreeing with David Zeidan, “Copts are committed to preserving their identity against the
assimilative majority… history has taught them to stick together and compete for survival.”
While this has been the rule during normal times, Copts’ commitment to survive reached a
peak during the wave of Islamization following the Arab Spring. As will be elaborated in
this section, collective identification tendencies among Christians have significantly
increased during Mursī’s tenure. In other words, individual’s grievances indicated above
(i.e., lack of both personal insecurity and inequality) were transformed into collective action
through a group identification mechanism. Collective identification with the Coptic
community, in turn, could be noticed primarily in two main manifestations as the qualitative
analysis has revealed: increase of social bonds among
Christians and rise of church going.
Growing Social Ties
As for social bonds, interviewees pointed out that mutual interactions and ties among
Christians have increased during Mursī’s transition in particular. For instance, Heba
highlighted the issue of Copts’ social solidarity stating that: “I remember that we Christians
got closer to each other since the rise of Islamists to power, especially during these days in
which Islamists were organizing and leading the demonstrations… at that time, we used to
invite our friends and relatives whose homes are located near these protests to come and
stay with us in our home until these demonstrations are over … this was also happening
the other way around… something made us more secure.”
Another facet reflecting this pattern of social cohesion was seen in the growing
reliance on Christian media outlets for collecting news and information about Copts.
Elaborating more on this point, Peter stated that “I tend to rely on public TV channels in
gaining news more than on Coptic media platforms…however, during the MB rule I was
heavily relying on Coptic religious media such as SAT 7, al-Haq wa al-Ḍalāl [the Right
and Wrong] and al-Tariq [the Road] since these platforms were providing more profound
details about sectarian violence targeting Copts and churches.”
An additional manifestation signifying growing collective identification processes
was witnessed in collective prayers Christians used to conduct, irrespective of their
religious diversity. Highlighting these aggregated religious services, Maha (a Protestant
girl, 21-year-old) pointed out that “in general, whenever we face any sort of crises we ask
God’s help…what was new after Islamists took power was that diverse Christian
denominations used to gather together in the nearest church regardless of religious
affiliation for congregational prayers…these unified prayers were for Egypt to overcome
that hard time.”
Increasing Communal Religious Piety
Another agreement was found among participants that religious piety among Christians
rose substantially during the Islamists’ reign. Mona (a Protestant girl, 23-year-old), for
instance, noted that “during the MB rule it was unprecedented that prayers were conducted
in rotating shifts…I would argue that the only benefit we gained out of the
Islamists’ ascendance to power was that we Copts became more attached to our God.”
Relatedly, church going increased fundamentally at that time as the participants have
indicated. “Before the 25 revolution,” Peter stated, “I used to go to church monthly,
however, I started to go on a weekly basis during the MB ruls…being in church during
those hard times made me feel secure.”
Quantitatively, the results presented in Table 18 support the narrative outlined above
in that the overwhelming majority of Christians used to attend Sunday’s services since the
Islamization wave following Mubarak’s overthrow. It should be noted, however, that
Egyptians have always been known to be religiously committed persons whether they are
Muslims or Copts. As Mohammed Nossier has put it, “[a]helicopter view of our society
would certainly show that Egyptians are apparently strongly attached to their religions.”
“Over the last few decades,” the author elaborates, “both Muslims and Christians tend to
pray considerably more often and attend religion classes more frequently.”
Table 18. Patterns of church going across regimes Do
you attend Sunday services?
Nevertheless, it was expected that increasing hostile sectarian attacks targeting Christians
and their holy places, which rose drastically since the 2011 uprising (see chapter 2), would
help decline levels of church going. The findings in Table 18 challenge this expectation,
since that 91.5% and 91% of Christians kept attending Sunday’s ceremonies (with varying
During SCAF
During Mursī
Frequency %
Frequency %
Always
42 59.1
34 51.5
Most of the time
15 21.1
18 27.3
Sometimes
8 11.3
8 12.2
Rarely
6 8.5
6 9
Total
71 100
66 100
degrees) either during SCAF’s or Mursī’s tenure (respectively) despite the high degrees of
personal risks associated.
These results can be understood in terms of the recent body of literature which has
emphasized the relationship between religion and/or religious establishments and collective
action of minority groups. Two main premises were introduced in this regard. First, religion
can enhance political activism through “institutional effects”, in which religious leaders
directly encourage attendees to get involved in political events. Based on this type of
understanding, religious institutions are deemed key “catalyst for mobilization” since they
provide essential organizational resources advancing collective mobilization such as social
interactions and communication connections. The second argument centers around the idea
that religion can sustain political engagement through attitudinal/psychological impacts.
Such emotional effects touch, for example, on the role played by religious institutions in
preserving a common sense of belonging among the believers. Also, they can enhance
interests in politics among attendees on one hand, and empower them with crucial
knowledge about political issues on the other.
The qualitative analysis revealed that both organizational and attitudinal effects
attached to religion have enhanced collective identification processes among Christians,
which eventually were translated to communal action seen in the June 30th revolt. Tapping
on the organizational resources provided by the church, Mona clarified that “we used to go
to church in groups…communal prayers made us stronger and more secure… and in case
we die, for any reasons, we would die together inside our church.” Agreeing, Salwa said
that “being in church gave me an unprecedented chance to socialize with other fellow
Christians…I used to go to church even during Mondays…being there helped me alleviate
increasing fears and tensions of the time.”
As for the emotional dimension, almost all interviewees confirmed that priests and
other religious clergy were strongly motivating them to get involved in the political events
and not to miss any opportunity to participate in public affairs. For example, Samya stated
that “while it never happened that we were guided by church leaders to elect a certain
presidential or parliamentary candidate, we were often urged to participate actively in all
election contests.” Furthermore, Ramy pointed out that “church going at that time helped
maintain Copts’ religious spirituality which in turn assisted in overcoming growing
anxieties dominating the Coptic community back then.” Along the same lines, Lydia
indicated that “the church was strongly urging us to fast and pray more than normal not
only for the sake of Copts but also for Egyptian society as a whole… this helped me a lot
to manage my feelings of insecurity.”
Group Consciousness
Despites the key role it plays in sustaining a sense of belonging among the members of
marginalized groups, collective identification cannot incite social mobilization on its own.
According to Allison Calhoun-Brown, “group membership or mere group
identification, however, is not enough to affect political participation. It is group
consciousness that affects political participation.” Thus, a distinction is made between
group membership (i.e., collective identification process) and group consciousness as
Arthur Miller and his colleagues have pointed out. The authors elaborated that while the
former “connotes a perceived self-location within a particular social stratum”, the latter
“involves identification with a group and [Italics in original] a political awareness or
ideology regarding the group’s relative position in society.” Another differential element
lies in the fact that group consciousness is conceived as a more politicized concept than
group identification. This is because group awareness involves a perception of deprivation,
which a certain subordinate group might experience when it is compared with dominant
groups. Accordingly, the main hypothesis provided here is that “group identification will
translate into group consciousness … and [then] political action will result.” In other words,
group consciousness is considered an inevitable mechanism which helps transform
collective identification into communal political activism.
This type of reasoning was proven correct in the current work. The quantitative
findings revealed that interviewees did conceive of the religious group to which they belong
(i.e., the Christian community) as being fundamentally deprived of basic religious rights
compared to the rights enjoyed by the dominant out-group (i.e., the Muslim community).
To be sure, the victimized consciousness adopted by Copts has been evident across times
and regimes, yet it increased drastically under the MB’s Islamist rule. For instance, Samy
emphasized collective grievances shared by the Coptic community during
Mursī’s tenure. He stated that, “I wanted to get rid of Mursī and the Islamist group backing
him even if the military would return to politics…believe me, the main goal of the Muslim
Brothers was to humiliate the entire Coptic society, placing them underneath their shoes.”
In her turn, Heba reported that her religious identity was more salient during the Islamist’s
reign than her national identity. She went on pointing out that, “during the Islamist period
I felt that my religious identity was more present than my nationality… this could be
attributed to that the MB wanted us to leave the country… thus, it was not the case that my
national identity which was threatened, rather it was my religious affiliation.” Following,
Gamal (an Orthodox male, 31-year-old) indicated that “several Copts did not dare even to
go out of their home while the MB was in office…we Copts will never forget the horrible
scenes in which several churches were being exploded and burnt down in front of our eyes
on TV channels.”
It is worth mentioning that Copts’ group consciousness was not occurring in a
vacuum. Rather, certain leverages were employed in this regard among which was
historical memory. In other words, a present and vibrant memorization of previous sectarian
attacks targeting Copts helped Christians’ religious identity to be maintained. According to
Baljinder Sahdra and Michael Ross, recalling hostile and tragic incidents committed against
in-group members enhances the social identity of the in-group. Analyzing the main themes
expressed by interviewees has demonstrated that almost all participants had a strong
memorization of previous hostile incidents in which members of the in-group and/or holy
places of worshiping were targeted. Yasser (an Orthodox male, 32-year-old), for instance,
provided a detailed list of several sectarian assaults targeting
Copts. This list varied to include sectarian instances starting from al-Zawyia al-Hamra in
1981, then recalling al-Kush’h incident of 1999, ending with recent accelerated church
burnings witnessed after Mursī’s overthrow in 2013. Other participants (e.g., Samya and
Salwa) provided exact numbers and locations of churches that have been attacked during
the Islamist’s period. Other interviewees (e.g., Ramy and Peter) gave specific names of the
Brothers and Salafis who were advocating hatred discourse against Christians at that time.
Taken together, collective identification and group consciousness have helped transform
Coptic grievances into real communal action observed in June 30th massive
protests.
Collective Action
As thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, the Muslim Brotherhood came to power prepared
with a fully developed strategy that would help “transform Egypt into a kind of missionary
state”, using Shadi Hamid’s expression. In response, a counter strategy of
“return of the sacred” was primarily constructing attitudes and behavior of Christians
throughout the “Islamist” rule. In other words, growing collective political activism
observed in June 30 demonstrations (i.e., the main dependent variable in this work) can be
explained mainly by the increasing identity threats perceived by Copts (i.e., the main
independent variable in study) at the time. This argument has strongly been supported
throughout this chapter, utilizing several quantitative as well as qualitative indicators.
The literature on causes and dynamics of protest participation has emphasized the
role played by relative deprivation in inciting collective action, especially among minority
groups. A distinction was made in this respect between two different types of deprivation:
individual deprivation and group deprivation. While the former occurs when individuals
compare their social situations with other individuals’ respective positions, the latter
happens when comparisons are made among social groups. Empirically, the two types of
deprivation were evident in this work as the qualitative analysis has revealed.
To be sure, participants felt that Copts at both the individual and communal levels were
deprived of a secure religious identity and of religious freedom during the Islamists’ reign.
These growing feelings of deprivation have resulted in politicizing Copts’ religious identity,
inciting a wave of collective “street politics” seen in June 30 protests.
To start with, it can be argued that while ordinary Copts have held certain attitudes
towards sociopolitical concerns facing Egyptian society in general, they used not to engage
in massive demonstrations advancing these issues. This paradoxical behavior, which can
be attributed to a wide array of sociopolitical and religious considerations (see chapter 2)
was typically evident throughout the period preceded the 2011 era. This conclusion was
supported qualitatively and quantitatively. As for the former, while almost all interviewees
(nine out of eleven) expressed hostile narratives about Mubarak and his long established
rule, only a few of them (four out of eleven) participated in the 18-day of the 2011
revolution.
Table 19. Copts’ engagement in politics during the 2011revolution
Frequency %
During the 2011 revolution was your position closer to (N=58)
Supporters of Mubarak
15
26
Opposition against Mubarak
43
74
Actual participation in the 2011 revolution (N=71)
Yes
4
5.6
No
67
94.4
Quantitatively, the findings represented in Table 19 show that while 74% of Copts adopted
negative positions towards Mubarak, only 5.6% of them who translated these verbal stances
into reality by engaging in the 18-day protests against him. Broadly, these patterns of
political inactiveness had been shaping behavior of Copts since at least Nasser’s era.
However, these patterns were changed drastically after the Islamists took power in that
ordinary Christian citizens got involved enthusiastically in the protests of June 30. This
conclusion was strongly supported through the thematic analysis as well. Empirically, the
majority of interviewees reported that they had taken to the streets and public squares of
Egypt protesting against both Mursī and the Brothers. When asked about key factors that
were driving them towards collective participation in the massive demonstrations back
then, the interviewees introduced a diverse array of reasons. While some participants (e.g.,
Gamal and Salwa) tapped in the deteriorating socioeconomic situation in Egypt at the time,
others (e.g., Samy and Peter) focused on the fact that neither Mursī nor the MB as a whole
was deemed politically competent to proceed in office.
In addition to the economic and political factors, the most emphasized reason that
was motivating the interviewees towards collective mobilization revolved around
insecure religious identity, however. To elaborate, Peter for instance pointed out that “I
participated in the June 30 protests from the first hour…since we Copts in particular had
nothing to lose…it was evident that the MB was heading towards recreation of the
Islamic caliphate…if this happened we Copts would’ve witnessed a new Era of Martyrs
…and we would’ve been forced to choose among the following three options: converting to
Islam; paying Jizya; being dismissed out of country.” In her turn, Mona indicated that “I
participated in June 30 demonstration from the first moment…this is due to the fact that
throughout Mursī’s year in office Copts’ general position was deteriorating…in addition,
the Muslim Brothers do not recognize that we Copts exist in the first place.” By the same
token, Ramy commented that: “I participated in the June 30 uprisings because
I did not want the MB gang to continue to rule the country… really I felt at the time that it
was not only the case that Coptic identity was under existential threat but also the wider
Egyptian identity…it was so clear that the MB’s prime goal was to reestablish the Islamic
caliphate at the expense of Egypt’s interests…let alone the interests of marginalized group
such as Copts.”
Taken together, the qualitative and quantitative indicators outlined throughout this
chapter have strongly supported the main premise provided. Specifically, perceived identity
threat was deemed the key explanatory factor by which Christians’ collective mobilization
witnessed in the June 30 protests can be understood. That is, the results emphasized the
crucial role played by identity politics in motivating collective action of
Copts. As Bert Klandermans has put it, “identity politics makes collective identities salient,
contributes to their politicization and radicalization, and triggers political protest.” As for
the current work, it has been evident that “identity politics” has helped politicize Christians’
communal identities. This was mainly due to the fact they were being ruled for the first
time in their modern history by a purely “Islamist” rule (i.e., the
Muslim Brotherhood). The association between religious identity and collective action of
Copts was mediated by certain mechanisms. While some of these dynamics were
occurring at the individual level (i.e., lack of both personal security and social equality),
others were happening at the group level (i.e., collective identification and group
consciousness) as the current chapter has indicated.
CONCLUSION
Religious Identity and Dynamics of Resistance in Times of Transition
Identity as a Form of Resistance
According to Bert Klandermans, “politics is about distribution of goods and bads in
society.” A profound examination of the socio-political and religious grievances (i.e.,
“the bads”) perceived by Egyptians due to the 2011 revolution and the subsequent
Muslim Brotherhood’s ascendance to power reveals that they were not distributed equally
among Muslims and Copts. To elaborate, it has been evident throughout this thesis that
Egypt’s Christian citizens considered the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule as a genuine threat to
their collective identity compared to Muslim citizens. Furthermore, Copts felt at that time
that that they were being “relatively deprived” of fundamental religious as well as
sociopolitical rights. Moreover, feelings of insecurity experienced by the Coptic
community either at personal or collective level reached a climax due to the rise of sectarian
violence targeting Copts and their religious buildings during the Islamist reign.
While processes of social exclusion/inclusion in Egypt are primarily established on
religious identities during normal times as Elizabeth Iskander has argued, patterns of
exclusion/inclusion were further accelerated since the 2011 revolution culminating during
the Brotherhood’s rule. As illustrated earlier in this work (chapter 2), the Muslim Brothers
came to Egypt’s power with a full-blown conceptualization regarding the state and the role
of the sharī‘a in society. Regarding the former, Muslim Brotherhood theorists have
advocated for non-nation state models, such as the Islamic Caliphate/Umma, rather than
nation-state entities distinguishing the modern era. In other words, Islamists have revolved
around religious faith rather than political borders and geographical boundaries in
theorizing the state as a political body. Concerning the sharī‘a, it has been elaborated that
the establishment of an Islamic state and society based entirely on sharī‘at Allah has been
the primary goal not only for the Brothers but for all fellow Islamist movements.
The Islamists’ entrenchment with such type of thinking, through which the whole society
would be Islamized, has sustained fears and uncertainties among members of the Christian
community in particular. This is simply due to the fact that calling for the restoration of the
Islamic caliphate on the one side, and the enforcement of sharī‘a on the other, means
nothing but worsening the already deteriorated sociopolitical positions of Copts. Thus, the
rise of Islamists to power yielded corresponding patterns of religious attachments among
ordinary Copts as previously outlined (chapter 2). Understandably, identity politics was
hence deemed the main leverage utilized by ordinary Christians in resisting what was
perceived a “hostile” political regime (i.e., the MB rule) back then.
While examining the influence of identity on motivating collective activism, Bert
Klandermans emphasized two main aspects constructing identity: a “we” and a “they.” The
author moved on pointing out that “we” is “a definition of the group or collective treated
unjustly,” whereas “they” is “a definition of some institution or authority that is responsible
for the injustice.” The findings in this work have supported this type of reasoning. More
specifically, conservative theorizations that had been advocated by the Brothers against
Christians in addition to the increasing sectarian actions targeting Copts once they assumed
power have produced a “we” versus a “they” feeling among Copts (see chapter 4). These
“affective” social categorizations generated certain “behavioral” consequences reflected in
growing involvements in June 30 uprisings among Christians, which in turn supports the
social identity tradition (review Theoretical Framework, chapter 1).
In fact, feelings of injustice was not the sole factor that helped sustain a “we” versus
“they” thinking as suggested by Klandermans, when it comes to analyzing general positions
of Copts under the MB rule. In other words, perceived injustice and considering the MB
rule as being incompetent were complementing each other, accelerating social
classification processes among the Coptic community. Jack Goldstone was crucial in
pointing out that “[t]he joint need to manage state tasks and cultural standing can be
summed up in two words: effectiveness and justice.” Goldstone moved on elaborating that
rulers may be forgiven if perceived by citizens as unjust but efficient or as incompetent but
just, whereas they will not be tolerated if deemed both unjust and incompetent. To be sure,
the relationship between Copts and the Brothers provides a clear example in support of
Goldstone’s hypothesis. Broadly, ordinary Copts considered the MB rule as being both
incompetent and unjust. Specifically, the quantitative and qualitative findings have
indicated that Copts lacked feelings of equal citizenship and personal security due to these
types of policies as well as strategies adopted by the MB.
In addition, they perceived Mursī’s government as inefficient economically as well as
politically (see chapters 3 and 4). As a result, ordinary Copts reorganized themselves
around the church’s leadership and the religious group to which they belonged in pursuit
of justice and efficiency they lacked under the MB reign.
Revolving around one’s own group assists in the construction of what Goldstone
labeled “protest identities” among the entire group’s members, which is basically
reinforced through three main resources according to the author:
First, the group helps to justify and validate the individual’s grievances and anger
against the status quo. Second, the group…gives a sense of empowerment,
autonomy and efficacy to its members…Third, the state itself may create or
reinforce a sense of oppositional identity by labeling a group as its enemies or by
acting against the group, thus demonstrating that the group is now outside the
protection and justice of the state.
Applying this type of reasoning was proven correct in the current project. Specifically, the
first resource was manifested in that church going empowered Copts with essential
institutional context needed to share perceived or real grievances and worries with the
ingroup members (organizational effects). As for the second resource, the interviewees
pointed out that while in church they were strongly encouraged to participate in politics
either by church leaderships or other fellow Copts (attitudinal resources). Concerning the
roles played by Mursī’s regime itself in sustaining protest identities among Christians, the
interviewees emphasized that Islamists in general have always considered Christians as
being infidels and/or enemies. Thus, they felt that they were not given equal rights to that
of Muslim citizens based on religious claims advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood’s
theorists even before they seized actual power. Relatedly, the participants felt that they were
outside the protection of the Islamist state. This was manifested, for example, in the
informal committees in which religious grievances of Copts were resolved by local agents
rather than by the enforcement of state laws. This phenomenon was established during the
SCAF transition and furthered during the MB rule as the thematic analysis revealed
(chapter 4).
Identity and Strategies for Survival
The previous discussion supports the social identity and collective mobilization traditions,
which have emphasized the fact that identities are social constructions. That is, they are
constructed and reconstructed by several forces, including cultural discourses, social
conflicts, and shifts in power relations of key social forces and groups in society.
Accordingly, it should not come as a surprise that a “threatened Coptic identity” was
produced because of the growing fears resulting from the rise of Islamists to power as this
work has elaborated. In addition, these frightened identities were ultimately
reconstructed yielding “protest identities” among Copts as outlined above. Drawing on the
process-based nature of identity, this section emphasizes two main identity-related survival
strategies which were utilized by Copts during the Islamist’s reign: social mobility and
social change.
Social Mobility
According to the social identity tradition, individuals whose own groups are socially
deemed in a lower status tend to leave or detach themselves from perceived disadvantage
groups, moving upward towards more valued groups. Understandably, this psychological
mechanism, which occurs mainly on the individual level, is expected to accelerate during
times of social unrest. Based on the results of the current work, Egypt’s Christian citizens
have historically considered themselves as belonging to a less desirable social group due
to their religious affiliation. Relatedly, deep-rooted feelings of inferiority shared among
Copts have flourished during the rule of Islamists as the thematic analysis has revealed
(chapter 4). Two main plausible dimensions measuring whether or not ordinary Copts
embarked on an individual mobility strategy during the MB rule were examined: converting
to Islam and migration.
Qualitatively, the findings have shown that converting to Islam was never thought of
among interviewees as being an instrument for managing growing religious fears and
subordination perceived during the MB rule. However, the results pointed out that most of
them thought about fleeing the country back then. As for conversion, Mona for example
stated that “I can accept the idea that someone chooses to convert to Islam as long as he/she
is totally convinced…but I can never agree with those who change their religion out of
fears whatsoever…although I was extremely frightened during the Islamist rule I never
thought of conversion.” Following, Maha was assertive regarding this issue saying that “If
I was to choose between being killed by a terrorist for example or converting to Islam, I
would favor death over life.” By the same token, Salwa pointed out that “I do not think that
a Copt converted to Islam after the Islamists took power out of religious fears…however if
this happened, let them enjoy…for myself, I never thought about changing my religion
before or after the rise of Islamists to Egypt’s power.”
Regarding emigration, most of the participants either thought of leaving the country or
applied already for emigration due to the wave of Islamization following the
2011 revolution. For instance, Lydia said that “during Mursī’s tenure I was deeply
depressed since my family and I were forced to think about emigration leaving everything
here in Egypt…by the way, my family and I had already applied for emigration… personally
speaking, I was torn at that time between staying and suffering more, or emigrating
whenever our application would be accepted.” Although emigration did not have the
potential to resolve historical collective grievances shared among Copts, it was deemed a
plausible individual solution. Elaborating on this point, Peter explained that “in times where
you find churches are burned down and several Coptic families are forced to leave their
villages due to sectarian violence, one has nothing to do except thinking about
emigration… and this what exactly happened to me…although I was aware that
emigration would not resolve prolonged Coptic demands and grievances by any means, it
was at least considered an appropriate option for individual Copts.” When asked about
Copts who had already emigrated during the MB rule, Samya for instance stated that
“Copts who got the chance and migrated during Mursī’s presidency are so
lucky…personally speaking I thought of leaving the country at the time since I had nothing
to lose…for me, the matter was so clear… we Copts had no longer place in the country
while the MB was in office…I wished I had the chance to emigrate like these lucky people
who already emigrated.”
Social change
Contrary to social mobility, social change is a collective strategy through which members
of a certain group tend to act collectively changing the entire social structure threatening
interests of the whole group. The findings revealed that although both social mobility and
social change were employed by ordinary Copts as means for survival during the MB era,
the latter was considered a more effective means than the former. Social change was
noticeably recognized in the June 30 protests where large numbers of Christians
participated actively in the demonstrations, calling for eliminating what they perceived a
real threat to the Coptic community as a whole (i.e., the MB rule). Mona, for instance,
pointed out that “I think that resisting growing patterns of persecution we experienced
during the MB era on the collective level was much better than embarking on individual
solutions such as fleeing the country…I know that the former is risky and more difficult
than the latter, but it is more effective in sustaining communal interests and social positions
of Copts in general.” Agreeing, Heba stated that “I don’t blame those who already
emigrated or thought about it…I myself kept begging my father to fill the emigration
form…but since we had to stay I felt that the last resort for the Coptic community was to
sign off the Tamaroud Movement’s petition and participate in the June
30 events to get rid of the MB regime…in fact, I discovered later that the outcome resulting
from employing such communal behavior was much better than individual
solutions.”
It is worth mentioning here that the interviewees were aware that embarking on
“street politics”, participating collectively in the protests calling for ousting Mursī’s regime,
would ultimately invite the military to Egypt’s public affairs once again. To be sure, all of
the interviewees indicated that they had supported the SCAF against Mursī’s regime
regardless of the negative consequences of taking such position on the democratization
process. Peter made this point clear stating that “we participated in the
protests against the MB and we Copts were convinced at the time that these demonstrations
would lead to the return of the SCAF to politics…straightforwardly, I prefer to be ruled by
military than by Islamists…I know that military rule meant that everything would be put
under the army’s control…and individuals’ basic freedoms would be undermined like what
had been the case since the 1950s…however, the Islamist rule is much worse than the
military’s ... how could someone dare to ask Christians to live and enjoy in an Islamic
caliphate for example?! …how could we accept to be ruled by a group of people telling
their opponents the following: ‘if you guys do not like us or do not accept our thoughts as
they are you can leave the country and live abroad?” For her turn, Mona explained why
she supported the military’s intervention in politics during the MB rule arguing that “I
definitely was so happy that the military decided to intervene in politics toppling Mursī’s
government…this does not mean that I’m pro military rule all along…not at all, I’m just
comparing between military rule and Islamist one… for me the former is better than the
latter…at least the SCAF would not use religious claims while dealing with us like what
Islamists have always done.” Adding another reason, Samy indicated that “we Copts
wanted to get rid of the MB regime even if the military would rule us again… as a matter
of fact, the military would at least protect us from any external threats…in fact, I feel that
the main goal of the Islamist rule has been to humiliate us using religious claims.”
It is crucial before finishing this thesis to reemphasize the fact that sociopolitical
and religious grievances of Copts have been present not only under the Islamists’ reign but
also across Egypt’s consecutive regimes since the 1950s until the current incumbent.
As Jason Brownlee has put it, “Copts remain one of Egyptian society’s most vulnerable
communities.” This conclusion has been supported through the narratives provided by the
interviewees. To give just a few examples, Peter indicated how his life has changed upside
down due to his name which prevented him from achieving his dream to become a
policeman. He elaborated that “we Copts have encountered all sorts of discrimination in
this country regardless of the regime…may God forgive my father who had given me this
name: Peter…I remember that black day during Mubarak’s regime when I stood in front of
the committee choosing among nominee students to join the Police Academy…once I told
them my name one of the committee members asked me ‘why did you come here Peter in
the first place?’, referring to my Coptic identity…a few days later I was informed that my
application was refused…believe me or not, I have started to hate my name since then.”
Elaborating on the growing desires for emigration that have been adopted by Copts
across different regimes, Yasser indicated that “I have been thinking about
emigration since Mubarak’s regime until nowadays…I have filled several emigration forms
but the chance has not come yet…I have never felt I’m secured in this country regardless
of names of presidents or their backgrounds.” For her turn, Mona highlighted these
profound feelings of inferiority Copts have had to experience even under el-Sisi’s regime
saying that, “a couple of months ago it happened that I was sitting in a bus and noticed that
a man with a long beard kept starring at the Cross tattoo on my wrist and out of the blue
he spat on my arm and went as if he did nothing…I was extremely shocked and did not dare
to do anything except crying…although I was the one whose right was violated I was so
scared whereas the offender was so relieved and went away confidently…these feelings of
inferiority due to the fact that I’m just a Copt was so painful and unforgettable.” Bearing
the previous examples in mind, feelings of religious insecurity shared among the Coptic
community reached a peak during the Islamists’ reign as the results have revealed, however.
In conclusion, this thesis has been about the roles played by perceived identity
threats in motivating collective action of Copts that was noticeably noticed in June 30
protests. In addition, it has explored the mechanisms by which perceived threats were
transformed into real action. Taking other relevant economic and political issues into
account, this project has argued that religious threats were considered the main factor
triggering Copts’ collective activism against Mursī’s regime. Utilizing the social identity
theory and a complementary method constituting of both quantitative and qualitative
indicators, findings of this work were in supportive of study’s main argument.
This thesis contributes to literature on political transition in that it analyzes
sociopolitical behavior of religious minorities (i.e., Copts) in times of change, emphasizing
the influence of psycho-religious factors on inciting collective action among marginalized
religious groups. In the Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson argued that members of
a certain group “will not [Italics in original] act to advance their common or group
objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive,
distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest, is offered to the members
of the group individually.” The results of this project have supported this logic. As for
Olson’s first condition, it can be argued that ordinary Copts were “coerced” to act
collectively against MB’s Islamist rule which was posing a fundamental threat either to the
religious faith or the religious group to which they attach. Regarding the second constraint,
it seemed that regaining the status quo that non-Islamist presidents have usually offered
Copts was deemed the main “incentive” motivated individual Copts toward collective
mobilization.
In order to understand why religion-inspired factors hold such as direct influence on
people’s perceptions and behavior either those taken at the individual or group levels, it is
crucial to recognize what distinguishes religious beliefs from other philosophies or dogmas.
“The major characteristic of religious beliefs,” Clifford Geertz explains, “as opposed to
other sorts of beliefs…is that they are regarded as being not conclusions from
experience…but as being prior to it.” That is, “[t]hey are a light cast upon human life from
somewhere outside it,” as the author furthered. In fact, the current work has provided
empirical evidences supporting Olson’s and Geertz’s arguments, since the results have
emphasized the influential role religious affiliation played in shaping Copts’ communal
behavior during the Muslim Brotherhood’s era.
Although this thesis has achieved its primary goals, there were some unavoidable
limitations and shortcomings. First, due to the lack of nationally representative surveys that
have been conducted on Egypt’s Copt in particular, I had to rely on the AB datasets where
the sample size of Copts in the two waves under study was small. Thus, the statistical
procedures that have been performed using the Coptic samples only cannot be generalized.
However, the results in which varying responses of Muslims and Copts are compared can
be generalized. This is due to that percentages of Cops who participated in the two waves
(5.8% and 5.7% in wave II and wave III, respectively) arguably represent their distributions
in society. According to the latest official census conducted in 1986, Copts constitutes 6.2%
of the Egyptian population.
Second, the qualitative analysis in this work is based on narratives collected only
from Orthodox Copts (8 interviewees) and Protestants (3 interviewees). Other Christian
denominations such as the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic were not represented,
however. Despite the fact that the Orthodox Coptic Church is deemed the oldest among
other churches in Egypt and that Copts constitute the overwhelming majority of Egypt’s
Christians, adherents of other Christian sects should have been involved. This would have
enlarged the current study’s scope addressing all Christian denominations living in Egypt,
which in turn would have enhanced the likelihood of study’s generalizability.
Finally, this thesis suggests two main topics for further scrutiny in future research.
First, this work has primarily addressed the causes and dynamics that incited collective
mobilization among ordinary Copts during the MB rule. However, it is of crucial
importance that upcoming studies examine corresponding causes and mechanisms leading
to the formation of Coptic activists and Coptic social movements at that time. Relatedly,
examining when and why these activists and/or social movements are either mobilized or
radicalized would definitely add a lot to our understanding of the outcomes resulting from
democratization and regime change. Second, the current work examined the association
between perceived religious threats and collective action of Copts (i.e., participation in June
30 demonstrations) utilizing thematic analysis as a primary qualitative method, and other
relevant quantitative indicators available.
Nonetheless, future research can further elaborate the findings of this thesis by
examining this relationship employing primary or secondary surveys that are exclusively
designed to collect relevant data on the June 30 uprisings from Egypt’s Christian citizens
only. This would generate more robust results on the associations and casual mechanisms
proposed between religious identity and collective mobilization, i.e., between religion and
politics in times of political transformation especially among religious minorities.
