Snowden Is (not) A Whistleblower_ An Analysis Of Ideographs

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This dissertation constitutes a rhetorical criticism of the discourse surrounding Edward

Snowden. Through ideographic analysis, it analyzes public exchanges between media outlets and

U.S. governmental officials during the two years following Snowden’s revelations of illegal and

unethical U.S. government surveillance programs. The Snowden narrative begins on June 5,

2013 with the public exposure of classified government information. This analysis engages all

media exchanges with U.S. officials where Snowden is directly referenced until June 15, 2015,

two weeks after the expiration of Section 215 of the PATRIOT ACT of 2001. Section 215 of the

PATRIOT ACT authorized the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) to collect mass

communication data, like phone and email records, of U.S. citizens. The analysis allows for two

weeks of discourse after the expiration of Section 215 for any retroactive remarks. In sum, 126

artifacts are analyzed within this study.

Snowden’s disclosures publicized dozens of NSA practices that were disconcerting to

U.S. allies and citizens of democracy, both in the U.S. and around the world. It was revealed that

the NSA was tracking internet activity of U.S. citizens through sites like Google and Facebook,

and that, through a loophole, the NSA was able to view communication data of U.S. citizens

without obtaining a warrant. The NSA also regularly utilized its capabilities to electronically

surveil citizens of other countries. The NSA regularly hacked into the communication, security,

and information systems of other countries, including U.S. allies, and the NSA bugged multiple

European Union offices domestically and abroad. It was also published that an internal audit

revealed that the NSA violated privacy laws over a thousand times annually. With a multitude of

other revelations relevant to discussions on surveillance and democracy, Snowden’s disclosures

have undoubtedly maintained a significant political impact.

Prior to May of 2013, Snowden was an unknown figure. His anonymity disappeared

when he identified himself as the person responsible for leaking classified data on U.S.

government surveillance practices. Employed by Booz Allen Hamilton, a subcontractor of the

NSA, Snowden had access to extensive intelligence databases. Snowden flew from Hawaii to

Hong Kong on May 20, 2013 and met with journalists from The Guardian with the hope of

publishing documents he deemed vital information for the citizens of a democracy. Snowden

also sent the classified information to The Washington Post. This information was an extensive

collection of data detailing government surveillance practices. The documents were highly

classified and included phone and email records the U.S. government had illegally obtained.

While not officially authorized to obtain, review, and collect such information, Snowden did so,

citing concerns of governmental malfeasance as they related to the public. Rather than releasing

any information directly to the public, Snowden had all information vetted by The Guardian and

The Washington Post. The involved parties have maintained that appropriate due diligence was

upheld in the release of the information. As well, The Washington Post and The Guardian

contended that a significant amount of information was not publicly released, citing journalistic

ethics. As per both news outlets, all information was carefully reviewed and publicly released

only if it exposed illegal or unethical governmental surveillance. Snowden contended that

government transparency should be of the utmost importance in a democracy. He charged that

the civil liberties of U.S. citizens, as well as the citizens of foreign countries, were being severely

violated by American surveillance programs.

The Guardian began releasing the information on June 5, 2013. First released was the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), also known as FISA Court, demand that Verizon

release the communication information of its customers on a daily basis. Then on June 6, 2013,

both The Guardian and The Washington Post published information on the Planning Tool for

Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management (PRISM) security program that

collected real-time data on American citizens. A barrage of information then followed, sparking

an ongoing, intense public debate on governmental measures of surveillance in the name of

national security. Given their journalistic efforts in consciously reporting on Snowden’s

information, The Washington Post and The Guardian were both awarded a Pulitzer Prize for

public service on April 14, 2014.

U.S. officials were stunned by the revelations. On June 14, 2013 the United States

government charged Edward Snowden with theft of government property, willful

communication of classified intelligence with an unauthorized person, and unauthorized

communication of national defense information. As a legal matter, Snowden’s charges were

extensions of the Espionage Act of 1917. Snowden sought clemency from the United States

government and was denied. He was eventually granted asylum in Russia, where he has

remained since his departure from Hong Kong. Despite the threats and demands of the United

States government that Snowden returns to face criminal charges for three felonies, Snowden

refuses to comply and remains in exile. Government officials argued that Snowden’s actions

were breaches of national security and seriously damaged U.S. intelligence capabilities. Citing

concerns for national security, U.S. officials maintained that Snowden’s revelations threatened

the U.S. citizenry and abetted U.S. enemies. While Snowden garnered international support,

from organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the American Civil

Liberties Union, U.S. officials adamantly denied Snowden’s importance and repeatedly

criminalized Snowden in public statements.

Informed by contemporary theories of democracy, this dissertation addresses three

primary research questions:

Research Question 1: Within the Snowden narrative, how are established ideographs

utilized by U.S. government officials to maintain power imbalance?

Research Question 2: Are there any terms within the Snowden discourse that can be

theorized as ideographs, and, if so, how do they interact with other ideographs within the

discourse?

Research Question 3: In accordance with contemporary ideographic theory, how does the

Snowden narrative engage the intersection of whistleblowing and democracy?

The second chapter constitutes a review of literature on the relevant topics and theories

related to the Snowden discourse. Within this section, there are two primary tracts: democratic

theories and whistleblowing. Snowden’s revelations put contemporary democracies at a

proverbial crossroads. In a post-9/11 world, the classic inherent tensions of democratic theory,

namely liberty and security, are primed for public discussion. It is argued here that the situation

regarding Snowden’s release of U.S. surveillance information was pivotal in the historical

narrative of democracy and its theorization. The progression from historical democratic theory

through modern and postmodern conceptions provides the context in which to position the

discourse regarding Snowden.

As a form of freedom of expression, whistleblowing, especially against institutions of

power within a <democracy>, creates some unique challenges, since whistleblowing is protected

under the liberal conceptions of freedom of expression. Using whistleblowing techniques,

Snowden’s disclosures criticized the surveillance practices of the U.S. government.

Governmental authorities have, however, refused to recognize Snowden as a whistleblower. This

situation and others like it, most notably WikiLeaks, open the channels for rigorous debate as to

the implications that whistleblowing has on democracy. The second chapter explores these

implications, focusing on the relationship between whistleblowing and democratic theory.

The third chapter identifies and explains ideographic criticism, the methodological

approach employed in the dissertation. This chapter examines the specificities of ideographic

criticism, discussing its history, theoretical formulations, and applications. The chapter outlines

the purposes of the method and how the method is applied in the dissertation. Using traditional

and contemporary approaches to ideographic criticism, this dissertation analyzes media

engagements with U.S. officials on the topic of Snowden.

The fourth chapter analyzes noted ideographs within a synchronic schema. Ideographs

can be measured and evaluated diachronically or synchronically. Diachronic studies examine

ideographic interplay and progression over time. A synchronic analysis of ideographs is done

when ideographs are examined within a stated context as they relate to, and interact with, each

other. In conducting a synchronic analysis of the political discourse surrounding Snowden, this

project assists in developing an overarching critical rhetorical project in which scholars are

working to map societal ideologies. Analyzing the appropriate ideographs within the framework

of Snowden provides deeper understanding of the language and symbolism of U.S. hegemony.

The ideographs studied within the dissertation are as follows: <liberty>, <privacy>, <security>,

<terrorism>, <equality>, <justice>, <democracy>, <citizenship>, and <patriotism>. An

understanding of the relationship among these ideographs informs an understanding of how

power relations are maintained and perpetuated within the context of Snowden.

As well, chapter four develops ideographic theory and provides a methodological

contribution to ideograph criticism. The fourth chapter identifies that Snowden operated

ideographically within the examined exchanges. Over time, it is demonstrated how U.S. officials

obfuscated the concept of Snowden through rhetorical processes of abstraction. As a term,

Snowden became more than a simple referent to a person, but was operationalized ideologically

for statist purposes. The synchronic analysis of this chapter engages the aforementioned

ideographs in conjunction with <Snowden>, as a newly formulated ideograph.

Taking the ideographic criticism forward, the fifth chapter of this dissertation specifically

examines the term “whistleblowing” within the Snowden narrative. This chapter delves into a

rigorous explanation of the conceptualizations of whistleblowers from the perspectives of the

state, media, and citizenry. This chapter explores the synchronic relationship between

whistleblowing and the aforementioned ideographs. It is recognized that U.S. officials

approached the relationship between Snowden and whistleblowing in three distinct phases. In the

first phase, officials generally refrained from public commentary on Snowden’s status as a

whistleblower. In the second phase, officials outwardly denied Snowden of legal whistleblower

status, contending that Snowden failed to follow government whistleblower protocol. In the third

phase, the term whistleblowing is almost entirely absent from the discourse, despite the

regularity of discussions on Snowden. Critical valuations are made regarding these three postures

by U.S. officials. Of primary importance to the analysis is the recognition that government

officials labored to purge whistleblowing from the Snowden narrative. This is read as an

antidemocratic measure by U.S. officials. It is antithetical to theories of democracy for state

officials to dictate the rules of whistleblowing. Whistleblowing is a tool of a democratic

populace and, while paradoxical, it is productive for democratic discourse. Informed by

synchronic ideographic analysis, the fifth chapter exposes the rhetorical means by which statist

institutions controlled the discourse surrounding Snowden and disarmed the public of

whistleblowing, a fundamental democratic instrument of dissent.

Lastly, through the information gathered in this ideographic analysis, the dissertation

draws critical conclusions regarding the relationship between whistleblowing and democracy

within the parameters of the Snowden narrative. The sixth and final chapter concludes the

dissertation through a synthesis of ideas.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW OF THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY AND

WHISTLEBLOWING

1. Introduction

This chapter begins by discussing the history of democracy. Secondly, it explains the

fundamental tenets of democratic theory. Given these tenets, this chapter then explores the

literature surrounding the inherent paradoxicality of democracy. To follow, this chapter moves

into a discussion on radical democracy, a post-structural response to democracy’s innate

tensions. The chapter then engages the concepts of security and surveillance as they relate to

democracy. Lastly, this chapter discusses the intersection of whistleblowing and democracy, with

considerable attention paid to relevant cases studies. While the concept of democracy is

paramount within contemporary discussions on governance, its definitional existence is

nevertheless fluid.

2. History of Democracy

Although recent scholarship posits the earliest democracy to be in the Mycenaean period,

it is with Cleisthenes and Athenian democracy that the West typically associates (Keane. 2009).

Around 508 BCE, the Athenian constitution forwarded a system of government unlike that of

other nations (Keane, 2009). It granted the power of governance to the polis. Such a move

required a different conception of identity within the body of the state. Historically, controlled

lands had a very small ruling class while the vast majority of the population lived as subjects.

The conceptualization of democracy was an overt move to notate the citizen as a member of the

governing body. While persons in feudal, tyrannical, monarchical, and other such societies were

subjugated, the citizen, in its theoretical formulation, moves out of subjugation and into the

ruling class. Within this newly established ruling class, members of the citizenry each shares

equity of political voice, and possess the liberty by which they afford themselves.

Sustained democratic states were few in number for the centuries following these origins.

The inception of U.S. democracy, representative in form, formally began with the Declaration of

Independence in 1776. While U.S. democracy has changed over the years, the concepts of

citizenship, liberty, and equality have always been at the core of political discourse. In particular,

the idea of political equality has been paramount since the origination of the U.S. (Tocqueville,

2003). Upon these core concepts, U.S democracy has found its salience, both as at the domestic

level, and in international ventures. While citizenship, liberty, and equality have always been

essential to democratic theory, these principles have been further accentuated by the American

mythos. Such an assertion is not to say that such ideals exist or are implemented in practice;

indeed it is easy to build an argument to the contrary. Nevertheless, the idea of democracy has

found a way to gain traction.

3. Democracy Conceptualized

Democracy is a multi-faceted phenomenon with considerable variability in its

theorization and application (Haggerty and Samatas, 2010). There is no singular democracy, but

rather different and competing democracies (Kaul, 2012). Common to all democratic theories

however, are the principles of citizenship, equality, and liberty, though their applications vary. At

its core, as it moves from theory to praxis, democracy functions as a decision making process

(Cohen, 1998). Decisions affecting the polis are made by the polis. By their nature, democracies

must be committed to governance by the populace, wherein concerns of the public are decided

collectively (Shapiro, 1999). By allowing free and full discussion on public issues, democracy

can be exacted (Pennock, 1979). Democracy is a system of governance practiced by the whole of

the people who are equally represented (Mill, 1861). Generally speaking, democracy can be

understood as a form of government in which the decision making process rests in the hands of

the people (Rousseau, 1893).

As the democratic process unfolds, the populace is charged with the task of upholding the

ideals of citizenship, liberty, and equality to the greatest possible degree (Pennock 1979). Within

the democratic paradigm, citizens must recognize and uphold the shared social interests of their

counterparts (Dewey, 1922). Decisions should be made to benefit the greater social order, rather

than individuals themselves. In this, democracies are not set up to be static societies. To the

contrary, they can often be impulsive, flowing with the will of the people (Tocqueville, 2003).

The democratic process is most productive, Dewey (1922) argues, through public discourse. The

undertaking of the public deliberative process presumes that opinions can be revised through

discourse (Rawls, 1993). Healthy democracy exists when ideas are exchanged freely within the

political realm amongst equal participants (Habermas, 1991). Within this discourse, equality of

political voice must be protected as it correlates with civil liberties and free thought (Rawls,

1971).

3.1 Elements of Democracy

3.1.1 Citizenship

Democratic citizenship is the defined relationship between an individual and the concept

of the state (Heater, 2004). Citizenship works to distinguish a member of a state from those

existing externally from its borders. Traditionally, citizens are classified in a manner that

intentionally excludes outsiders (Cammaerts & Audenhove, 2005). Certain definitional factors

differentiate between members and non-members of the decision-making class. The demos,

based out of homogeneity, is the governing body for itself and that which it controls (Schmitt,

1985). As a core tenet of democracy, citizenship is the ability to actualize one’s civil liberties,

including that of engaging in the political sphere, without state intervention (Yashar, 2005).

Within an effective democratic order, all those who maintain the status of citizen have equal

access to the political sphere (Dahl, 2007).

3.1.2 Equality

As a member of the democratic collective, the citizen is of equal standing with the rest of

the citizenry. Equality within the political sphere is vital in the realization of democracy (Dahl,

2007). Democratic citizens are equal to their counterparts, but are also able to think freely as

individuals within the political process (Schmitt, 1985). Although democratic theorists agree that

citizenship, equality, and liberty are all integral for democratic societies, but differ on whether

equality or liberty should be more highly regarded.

Many democratic theorists, like Rousseau (1893), place an emphasis on equality as the

most important democratic principle. Stressing the necessity of social equality in the public

sphere, Rousseau (1893) asserts that nothing is more detrimental than private interests

controlling the fate of the public. It is up to the citizenry to ensure that each member of the polis

is granted equal voice within the political sphere (Rawls, 1993). Democratic equality in this

context strictly covers the political sphere, which necessitates the equality be monitored due to

innate human differences (Dewey, 1937). Maintenance of political equality is of the utmost

importance in the actualization of democracy (Rawls, 1993).

3.1.3 Liberty

Much like citizenship and equality, liberty is difficult to define. Generally, it is the ability

for members of the polis to have some qualified existence without state interference. Citizens

decide for themselves what liberties they shall afford themselves. Largely, democratic

institutions strive to uphold liberty of conscience, liberty of thought, and liberty of person

(Rawls, 1971). The liberty to express oneself and be free from arbitrary obstructions has become

highly regarded as an inalienable human right, elemental to the practice of democracy (Diamond,

2003).

Unlike Tocqueville (2003) and Rousseau (1893) who equate democracy with equality,

Aristotle (1998) contended that liberty is the most basic element of democracy. Furthermore,

while theorists like Rawls (1993) and Rousseau (1893) unequivocally favor the principle of

equality, theorists like Mill (1961) and Habermas (1991) argue that democracy should seek more

fervently to espouse liberty. Mill (1961) theorized that individual liberty is essential to protect

the minority from the majority. Systems of majority rule lend themselves to subjugate the

minority if liberty is sacrificed for the sake of equality. Such tyranny functions to the demise of

democracy (Mill, 1861). Habermas (1991), a proponent of deliberative democracy where social

agents convene freely to discuss political issues, also advocated for the preservation of liberty

through a differentiation between the public and private spheres. Citizens must be able to enter

the public sphere uninhibited. Productive civil discourse occurs when private liberties are

protected and social agents are able to freely express themselves (Habermas, 1991).

3.3 Paradoxes of Democracy

The explanation of democracy and its principles does more than simply inform; it

elucidates the inherent tensions of democratic institutions. The fluidity of democratic theory,

coupled with the elusiveness of its ideals, makes the actualization of democracy intrinsically

problematic. Mouffe (2000) argued that while the concepts of liberty and equality are both

integral to democracy, they exist in stark contrast with each other. Equality and liberty, while

both fundamental values of democracy, cannot be fully realized in accordance with each other.

Schmitt (1996) contended that the ideas of liberalism and democracy are insoluble. There is a

great amount of discordance between the ideas of democratic equality and ideas of liberty

(Lefort, 2007). Tocqueville (2003) went so far as to say that democratic states will sacrifice their

most basic civil liberties for sake of equality. Engel (2006) agreed, stating that equality in

principle inherently restricts liberty, and that liberty undermines formulations of equality.

Democracy then as an ideology, suffers the struggles of its own contradiction, falling victim to

its own paradoxes (Mastropaolo, 2012). The polysemic nature of democracy is both its strength

and its weakness. As democracy takes ownership of the ethics equality and liberty, it also

harbors the inherent confliction of democracy.

Within democratic societies, the state and the polis are conflated in a way that counters

adequate governance (Burckhardt, 1943). The citizenry, based out of a specified relationship, is

the governing body for itself and that which it controls. Schmitt (1985) explained how

democracy, as a political enterprise, faces two options, both of which are paradoxical. First, a

structured democracy, while maintaining its stance on homogeneity, ultimately denies political

voice to those on the outside. In this, democracy promotes equality among its citizens, but

requires inequality in denying those outside its political borders. Secondly, should democracies

attempt to alleviate this division and accept heterogeneity, they would be in violation of the ethic

which binds together democracy: that of equality. Universal heterogeneity here lacks all

practicality. Even in envisaging the abolition of such borders and accepting a global community

to create equality for humanity, democracy would subject itself to utter incompetence. The

vastness of such a project would only further produce the inequality and oppression it set out to

eliminate (Schmitt, 1985). Any attempt at actualizing democracy counters as a means of

inhibiting democracy (Thomson, 2005).

Derrida (2005) contemplated “in what sense may one still speak of equality – indeed of

symmetry – in the dissymmetry and boundlessness of infinite alterity? What right does one have

to speak still of the political, of law, and of democracy?” (p.233). This deconstructionist take on

democratic theory illuminates the inherent contradiction of the concept of democracy. Theorized

as a double movement, democracy cannot live up to its own standards (Thomson, 2005).

Democracy does not have any means of protecting itself against totalitarianism or

complete social apathy (Blackell, 2006). Innately then, democracy must afford itself its own

means of destruction (Keane, 2009). The primary elements which uphold democracy

paradoxically stand as tools of self-destruction. For instance, freedom of speech can be used to

the detriment of democracy if invoked in a counterproductive manner (Foucault, 1983). In

essence, the citizenry can use its freedom of choice to choose tyrannical oppression, or even to

completely abstain from the democratic process. Fundamentally, democracy must allow itself to

be destroyed by itself (Chou, 2012). Indeed, it would be anti-democratic for democracy to

structure itself in a manner that prohibits failure. “The very structure of the concept of

democracy implies that there can be no full democracy in the terms of the ideal which determines

the concept, there will be no democracy which does not sustain an anti-democratic current, no

democracy worthy of the name” (Thomson, 2005, p. 25).

In order for this system of self-governance to function, the citizenry must be kept

informed. As technology has progressed, so too have the means by which the populace is

informed on issues of merit. The advent and evolution of the internet further complicate the

actualization of democracy. Individual agency and the consummation of political voice online

seem to suggest that internet communities, while not able to replace physical communities, foster

a democratic activity that a hierarchical system of broadcast media could not. However, much

like other mass media, the realization of democracy online is significantly hindered by corporate

interests and institutional control of content, bandwidth, software, and management, which limit

the freedom of expression and access to information (Feenberg, 2009). Undoubtedly the internet

increases the layers of paradoxicality of a democratic society. Greater access to media allows for

a greater presence of dissenting voices, but solidarity is far more difficult to attain (Mancini,

2013). The existence of an online political space allows for a larger number of political agents,

but the increased nuances constrain political efficacy (Davis, 2010). New media also sanction

more nuanced opinions, but foster greater polarization. As well, while the internet is conducive

for mobilization on social issues, it lacks structure, making whatever benefits that accessibility

provides nearly moot (Mancini, 2013). Increased attention to the paradoxes contemporary

democracies face, critical scholars have attempted to theorize democracy in a manner that

accepts these inevitabilities while still maintaining democratic principles.

3.4 Radical Democracy

In response to the difficulties democratic institutions face, post-structural scholars have

theorized more radical conceptions of democracy. This move is an attempt to salvage the ethics

of democracy in the face of uncertainty. Radical democratic theory posits that while democracy

may be inherently difficult, if not impossible, this decision-making process is still more desirable

than any other alternative.

Understanding the inherent tensions existent within democratic theory, Dahl (1989)

posits that democracy, though integral, is not the ultimate end. Instead, democracy is an element

of a greater purpose toward that which is for the social good. Democracy as a process does not

seek finality; it is a process which assists in the creation of the favorable society. Democracy

should be understood as a boundless enterprise (Dahl, 1989). Democracy cannot be recognized

as a singular, overt socio-political theory. It is an ever expanding, ever adapting ideology (Dahl,

1989). The shift in theory toward a more radicalized democracy is in large part due to the

theoretical conceptions of Lefort (Inston, 2010). In shifting the power of governance to the

citizenry, a central space became necessary for the decisions relevant to the public. Yet, the

people can never actually govern themselves directly, so the place of power must always remain

where political decisions are made (Inston, 2010). Lefort conceptualized this as an empty

medium wherein the political discourse of a democracy takes place. In this, the democratic

political process is never static, and is in an ongoing method of contestation and reformulation

(Inston, 2010). Laclau and Mouffe (2001) built off of this conception of democracy to postulate

the sheer impossibility of the realization of democracy. Democracy then, being structurally

incomplete and impossible, becomes radicalized (Inston, 2010). Democracy is more than

government; it is a state of being. Democracy should not seek to eradicate antagonism, but

rather, embrace it (Inston, 2010). Butler agreed, rejecting the realizability of democracy (Lloyd,

2007). Democracy’s inability to actualize itself should not be seen as a deterrent, and the

impossibility should be celebrated. Democracy’s impossible nature is its strength (Lloyd, 2007).

Democracy is necessarily open-ended. It is the unending contestation over democratic ideals, like

liberty, equality, and justice that makes democracy radical (Lloyd, 2007).

Contemporary democratic theorists Agamben (1998), Mouffe (2005), and Derrida (2005),

have articulated ideas of a radical democracy that supports democracy writ large while admitting

its unrealizability. They recognized that the ideals of democracy necessarily inhibit the

realization of democracy. Mouffe (2005) theorized that it is impossible for a political actor to

concurrently enjoy absolute liberty and absolute equality. Liberty and equality counter each other

in praxis. Derrida explained how the very concept of citizenship is paradoxical in noting how

each individual citizen, while posited as a unique form, is a vital element of the collective.

Unending human uniqueness contradicts the very premise upon which equality operates

(Derrida, 2005). Likewise, Agamben (1998) explained how the citizen is both the subject and the

object of political power. In this, democracy is both liberating and oppressive at the same time.

The basic tenets of democracy, including freedom, citizenship, liberty, and equality, all force

political actors and democratic societies writ large into an ongoing paradox.

Connolly (2005) contended that this radicalized democracy exists in three parts. First, it

solicits a regime of deep, multidimensional pluralism. Second, and more critically, radical

democracy envisions a society in which the whole operates to reduce social inequity. Last, it

recognizes humanity’s interdependent relationship with the greater natural world (Connolly,

2005). Radical democracy cannot be exercised in the contemporary bourgeois conception of the

public sphere (Fraser, 1990). Inadequate for a critical formulation of democracy, this bourgeois

conception must be abandoned in favor of a posture without distinction between the state and

civil society (Fraser, 1990). Seeking a more fluid approach, Fraser (1990) posited that greater

public discourse among equal entities is possible if the public sphere is reconceptualized. In this,

it is not the realization of democracy that becomes important, but rather the expansive

possibilities of the democratic process.

The birth of radical democratic theory recognizes the self-destructive nature of

democracy as being its greatest strength. In this, democracy does not function through its

actualization, but rather through the processes that seek its actualization. This is Derrida’s (2005)

idea of “democracy-to-come”. Although a new conceptualization of democracy, Derrida (2005)

argued that this has been the strength of democracy since its inception. Radical democratic

theory postulates that while equality, liberty, and thus democracy, cannot exist in praxis, the

democratic process helps reduce social inequity. Thus, while paradoxical, it is in this that

democracy justifies itself.

Despite this paradoxicality, theorists contend that democracy and democratic theory

should not be abandoned. While admitting that pure democracy is unreachable, scholars have

argued that democracy should not be intent on finding a solution for itself. As Mouffe (2005)

discussed, while liberty and equality may be inherently disharmonious, the discourse which takes

place as a result of this tension is the true essence of democracy. Radical democracy is one way

to deal with the inherent tensions of democracy in theory and practice. Contestation and conflict

are inherent within democratic discourse and are the driving force of democracy (Laclau and

Mouffe, 2001).

However, in order for the citizen to be engaged with the democratic state, there must be

some type of boundary. The state cannot be a universal entity which creates fundamental

paradoxes. Blackell (2006) likened democracy to totalitarianism in that both refuse “all certain

external metaphysical markers, or transcendent sources, of authority” (p.56). A state defines

itself, in theory, by submitting itself to no other external entity. In this, democracies and

autocracies seek the same end, to be ruled by no one. Thus, all humanitarian ethics of democracy

become ancillary to the survival of the state. The democratic citizen is placed into a

contradiction. In its immediate practice, citizenship functions as an internal decision making

process, but in its full application, it serves the totalitarian interests of a state’s survival.

Democracies stand to lose the social elements of citizenship when classes and groups can no

longer be resolved within the political sphere (Blackell, 2006). Statist ideology thus, remains at

the center of all national and international policies among democracies and non-democracies

alike.

4. Surveillance and Security

Contemporary theorists are now tasked with rationalizing democracy in a world of

rapidly increasing measures of security. “In a surveillance society privacy is political” (Fiske,

1998, p.75). Technological advancements, coupled with threats of mass destruction, have rapidly

moved the world into a state of constant surveillance. Citizens in the digital age are constantly

monitored by corporations for marketing purposes, by means linked to growing American

militarism (McChesney, 2015). Whereas the domestic sphere once existed as a space of privacy,

contemporary surveillance mechanisms boast an intrusive, yet covert capacity (Prior, 2015).

Operating upon Bentham’s concept of the panopticon, where prison cells are constructed around

a singular guard watchtower, Foucault (2012) forwards the argument that society has

metamorphosed into a state of constant visibility where people are able to be monitored at all

times. The panopticon creates the continuous and inevitable exposure of the individual (Prior,

2015). This state of existence informs not only the practices of the populace, but also of the state.

As a means of managing and controlling people, surveillance, particularly at the domestic level,

has seen a significant evolution since 9/11. With the advent of new technologies, people are

inescapably visible, subjugated to state and corporate interests (Prior, 2015).

Citizens within a mediated world are now constant subjects of data monitoring. This is

done predominantly without the knowledge or consent of the citizenry (Lyon, 2002). In

technologically progressive societies, the watchperson in the panopticon has been replaced with

a multiplicity of watchpersons within media, the state, and the corporatized world (Prior, 2015).

Biopower is actualized in the visibility of seemingly every activity of members of a mediated

society (Prior, 2015). The security state is present and observant at all times, but also exists as a

safety net for the citizenry to rely upon during difficult times (Foucault, Senellart, Ewald, and

Fontana, 2009). This reduction of privacy is disempowering as it transforms dead information

into live knowledge (Fiske, 1998). Operating under the guise of security, constant surveillance is

altogether inevitable, covert, and controlling. Such practices have stealthily pervaded democratic

society writ large, creating yet another tension between the theorization and actualization of

democracy.

4.1 Security, Surveillance, and Democracy

The central principles of democracy are fundamentally in opposition to state and

corporate sponsored surveillance. Continuous surveillance, while operating in the name of

national security, infringes not only upon the liberties of every individual, it also detracts from

the equity of political voice. Mill argued that citizens should enjoy their liberties freely and

uncoerced (Mill, 1869). In a society where surveillance invades all public and private spaces,

individuals, knowing they are being watched, are likely to refrain from exercising their liberties

(Haggerty and Samatas, 2010). With everything act in cyberspace virtually trackable,

surveillance is inevitable (Schwartz, 1999). The identifiability of social actors within the

mediated realm by institutions of power dismantles the connective tissue of democracy. The

systems and techniques for data collection are the same for both the state and the greater

corporate conglomerate (De Zwart, 2014). The absence of a sense of privacy serves to inhibit the

citizenry from engaging in democratic discourse (Schwartz, 1999).

Surveillance systems showcase the paradoxicality of democracy (Prior, 2015). When the

privacy of the citizenry is counterposed with the necessity to keep the citizenry safe, democratic

states fundamentally self-destruct (Prior, 2015). Democratic societies are further problematized

when media sources, the only viable means by which the populace can be informed, are

controlled by corporate interests. As media outlets progress according to a capitalistic model, the

interests of the public, as a democratic voice, are grossly superseded by the interests of

neoliberalism (McChesney, 2015). Thus, not only are the tenets of a mediated society structured

to benefit the state, they are structured to benefit hypercommercialism, further widening the

chasm between the citizenry and the actualization of democratic principles. Within a democratic

society, everything should be held accountable by the demos, including surveillance (de Zwart,

Humphreys, and Van Dissel, 2014). Democratic governments nevertheless have transformed

expediently into security states, particularly since 9/11.

4.2 Legalism

Threats to national security have long been used to justify increased state surveillance,

but these arguments have experienced the greatest salience in the wake of 9/11 (Simone, 2009).

The idea of national identity is a driving force in creating the “other” from which the U.S. needs

secured. The ideas of communism and terrorism are two of the more recent fears planted upon

the American citizenry. The political discourse surrounding these fears promotes state sponsored

surveillance (Simone, 2009). Institutions of power use discourse to create a state of fear, which

in turn expedites political change in favor of state and corporate interests (Collins and Glover,

2002). The discourse of fear is integral in the development of U.S. legislation that restricts the

liberties of the citizenry.

Much of what is examined today within security studies can be traced back to 1947 when

the U.S. passed the National Security Act. This piece of legislation vastly increased the power of

the armed services in the name of national security, establishing the National Security Council

(NSG) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Prior, 2015). To follow in 1952, President

Truman instituted the Armed Forces Security Agency, since renamed the National Security

Agency (NSA). The NSA pioneered wiretapping, data interceptions, and other information

monitoring systems (Prior, 2015). The NSG, CIA, and NSA were made possible by the

Espionage Act, and were further cultivated by fears of national security threats, accentuated by

the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

4.2.1 Espionage Act

In 1791, the newly formed United States of America ratified the initial amendments to

the Constitution, starting first with the freedom of expression. This First Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States prohibits the restriction of the freedoms of speech, press,

assembly, religion, and petition. The freedom of speech, unchallenged for over 125 years

thereafter, saw its first formal contestation in the United States Supreme Court when fears of

obstruction of wartime efforts manifested at the governmental levels (Hall and Patrick, 2006).

Entering World War I on April 6, 1917, President Wilson contended that new legislation was

required to protect national security, and the Espionage Act of 1917 was passed soon thereafter.

Approved by Congress in 1917, and enacted on June 15 of that year, the Espionage Act

did little to address actual domestic or international espionage. Rather, it was formulated and

initially exercised primarily to quell anti-war efforts (Howlett, 2011). The 1917 Espionage Act

was a response to the backlash from the Selective Service Act, which was approved by Congress

on May 18 of that same year which allowed the U.S. government to draft American men into the

military. Government officials, in an effort to curb criticism of the war and silence war critics,

threatened the public with fines and imprisonment for obstructing wartime efforts. With the

enactment of the Espionage Act, it became felonious to show any level of public disloyalty to the

military, or obstruct military enlistment in any way (Howlett, 2011).

Despite President Wilson’s urging, Congress voted down the portion of the bill that

called for press censorship during times of war (Caso, 2008). Congress did pass two portions of

the bill which directly affected democratic citizenship. It became illegal, to “cause or attempt to

cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the

United States” (Caso, 2008, p. 25). As well, Congress passed the provision which authorized the

censorship of mailings that worked against the war effort (Caso, 2008). In the first few months

after the bill’s passing, over 900 people were sent to prison, and countless more hindered from

expressing their anti-war sentiments (Ball, 2004).

The coming years would see many more people arrested and numerous court trials as

legal limitations on free speech were being imposed. In the Supreme Court case U.S. v. Debs

(1919), Eugene V. Debs, was convicted under the Espionage Act for delivering an anti-war

speech in Canton, Ohio (Howlett, 2011). In arguably the most famous case surrounding the

Espionage Act, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that free speech was not absolute in the case of

U.S. v. Schenk (1919) (Howlett, 2011). At this Supreme Court trial, Justice Oliver Wendell

Holmes delivered the legal opinion which reads “The most stringent protection of free speech

would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater, and causing a panic”

(Caso, 2008, p.26). Leftist activists such as Emma Goldman, Bill Haywood, Philip Randolph,

Victor Berger, John Reed, Max Eastman, were imprisoned during this time in accordance to the

stipulations of the Espionage Act (Ball, 2004). By the end of World War I, over 2000 Americans

were tried as a consequence of the Espionage Act, with more than 1,000 of them being convicted

(Hall and Patrick, 2006).

Anti-war groups vehemently opposed to World War I (WWI) communicated primarily

through mass mailings during the early 20th century. The Espionage Act gave the United States

Postmaster the ability to pursue groups distributing disloyal flyers. Albert Burleson, postmaster

during this time period, had the authority to ban any mailings that violated the Espionage Act, or

advocated treason, insurrection, or resistance to United States law (Howlett, 2011). In 1918,

Congress passed the Sedition Act, which levied heavier fines and lengthier prison sentences for

those convicted of hampering wartime efforts (Howlett, 2011). While the Sedition Act was short

lived, repealed by Congress immediately after WWI, it was still able to justify more arrests and a

mass deportation frenzy (Caso, 2008). Led by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, the Palmer

Raids was the mass corralling and deportation of “radicals” and antiwar/antigovernment

activists. The Palmer Raids were also successful in deterring the strike talks of labor unions

(Caso, 2008).

In the decades following World War I, the strikes against “espionage” would wane, and

the “clear and present danger” language employed by Justice Holmes was substantially loosened

(Caso, 2008). In the present world of heightened security following the attacks of September 11,

2001, the Espionage Act of 1917 has taken a unique turn. Focusing on governmental officials

and members of the media in regards to leaking classified intelligence information, formal

indictments have risen significantly in recent years. Between World War II (WWII) and 2008,

three people were indicted under the Espionage Act for leaking classified government

information (Currier, 2013). President Barack Obama’s administration attempted to repress

governmental whistleblowing and truth-telling however, and Edward Snowden was the seventh

government employee, contractor, or subcontractor to have been charged with espionage

(Currier, 2013).

4.2.2 PATRIOT Act

The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to

Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act, or PATRIOT Act) of 2001, while a

response to the attacks of 9/11, was not purely out of the fear associated with that day.

Progressively throughout the 20th Century, and into the new millennium, the United States drew

closer to such legislation. While 9/11 served as a catalyst, decades of increasing terrorist activity

served to justify the passing of the PATRIOT Act. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

(FISA) created a system where United States officials in the CIA and FBI could engage in

foreign surveillance if approved by a FISA appointed court (Pohlman, 2008). The U.S. Congress

passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act in response to the explosion of Pan Am 103,

where a bomb was detonated forty minutes into a flight from London to New York. A joint

resolution in 1993 authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop

early detection systems for potential terrorist threats (Ball, 2004). The United States Congress

passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act in 1996, responding to the

bombing of the summer Olympics in Atlanta that same year (Ball, 2004). The most integral piece

of legislation to the forthcoming PATRIOT Act of 2001, however, was the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombing on April

19, 1995, this bill expanded the authority of the federal government. It allowed for increased

wiretapping and extended sanctioned the United States military to assist with criminal

investigations involving weapons of mass destruction (Ball, 2004). With the dissolution of the

USSR, fears of communism in the West were gradually replaced with fears of terrorism.

Ideological power structures began to build a system of legal safeguards against terrorism, much

like they had done to combat communism.

While an independent piece of legislation, the PATRIOT Act can be seen as an extension

of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Much of the PATRIOT Act was a formal

extension of the powers afforded by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. In

essence, the PATRIOT Act gave federal agencies the authority to “hunt, arrest, indict or deport,

and try suspected terrorists” (Ball, 2004, p. 17). Passed out of an atmosphere of terror, this

legislation significantly increased the surveillance abilities of the U.S. government (Simone,

2009). Legally, the PATRIOT act allowed the NSA to access not only telephone and email

records, but also online search histories, online chat conversations, and presence on major

internet companies like Google, Facebook, Skype, etc., all of which can be done in real time

(Prior, 2015). In its totality, the PATRIOT Act is comprised of ten titles and amongst them, 1016

sections. Of these titles, Title II and its subsections, is arguably the most relevant as it authorized

the acquisition of private communications, whether oral, telephonic, or electronic (Smith, 2009).

4.3 Surveillance and National Security

Within contemporary political discourse in the U.S., surveillance practices have been

positioned as integral to national security. The state has argued that for the U.S. to be protected

from threats to security, the government must be able to practice deep levels of surveillance.

Ongoing surveillance in a society of fear transforms a citizenry from a freer democratic populace

into a society where everyone is simultaneously watching and being watched. In effect, all

citizens are simultaneously the police officer and the suspect (Haggerty and Samatas 2010). The

George W. Bush Administration pushed hard for increased national security while repetitively

affirming a supposed allegiance to democratic principles (Romano, 2012). U.S. presidents have

constructed themselves as authoritarians in recent decades, with mediated assistance in

appropriating the superhero mantra. This posture affords the President with an unquestioned

secrecy, particularly in regards to intelligence and national security. While the state argues that

these secretive measures are necessary for national security, these measures work against

democracy by providing an information channel that surveils the masses, but is inaccessible to

the masses (Nelson, 2008).

4.4 Surveillance and Civil Liberties

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) vehemently opposed the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act and the PATRIOT Act, claiming that such actions infringed upon

the civil liberties of the American citizenry and created more harm than good (Ball, 2004).

Through analysis of governmental websites, Simone found that the information is controlled like

propaganda; it is a one-sided argument claiming that security, through legislation like the

PATRIOT Act, is necessary for liberty (2009). The U.S. government, with the assistance of

major media outlets, has perpetuated a state of fear in contending that the liberties of the

American people, threatened by terrorists, need to be secured by state surveillance. Appealing to

liberty is a means of justification for the state to invade the privacy of the populace (Simone,

2009).

5. Whistleblowing

Whistleblowing gives democratic theory an added layer of complexity. It is an exercise of

one’s freedom of expression, yet calls into question institutions of power. While there has been a

recent focus on the relationship between whistleblowing and democracy, the theoretical

postulations regarding this relationship still require significant development. This section will

outline some of the academic work that has been done on the rhetorical implications of this

relationship.

Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2011), in recognizing that whistleblowing is exercised

freedom of expression, argue that whistleblowing is an essential element of democracy.

Democracy, as a decision making process, requires a citizenry to be informed. Because the

governmental proceedings are handled by the populace within a democracy, citizens must be

knowledgeable on the topics at hand. Whistleblowing they claim, has epistemological value, and

thus is an important means of democratic progress. The act of blowing the whistle, regardless of

intent, is an informative process. The argument made by Lewis and Vandekerckhove (2011)

contends that anything that is informative is beneficial for the democratic process, thus making

whistleblowing a productive activity for democratic societies. Sauter and Kendall (2011) liken

Foucault’s idea of parrhesia to contemporary whistleblowing. They assert that democracy and

truth-telling are both conditions for, and threats to, one another.

Mansbach (2011) equated whistleblowing and truth telling in these instances to fearless

speech. Mansbach argued that fearless speech is the process of publicly disclosing the illegal or

unethical practices of powerful actors, despite the risks. These fearless speakers, or

whistleblowers, adopt tenuous positions. Whistleblowers are inherently defenseless, speaking out

against extremely powerful social actors or institutions (Mansbach, 2011). Whistleblowers risk

their jobs, friends, and livelihoods. The risks are exponentially greater within the context of the

nation state. Whistleblowers thus, challenge democratic ethics citizens as they exist in a situation

of great social inequity.

Fearless speech, Mansbach theorized (2011), preserves and extends the value systems of

democracy and further suggested that this position aligns with the theoretical postulations of

Laclau and Mouffe (2001) regarding radical democracy. While the actualization of democracy is

not possible due to the inherent tension between democratic ideals, radical democracy stresses

that the process is what is important. The space in which democratic discourse takes place

between equal social actors is the space where Mansbach (2011) sees whistleblowing to have the

greatest utility. Furthermore, Mansbach (2011) argued that actors within a democratic society

must continually critique and discuss the fundamental principles of democracy. Radical

democracy must remain committed to upholding its ideals in order to ensure that liberty,

equality, and justice remain at the forefront of the discourse within the state. Fearless speech is a

means of ensuring those ideals are sought. This process helps keep democratic ideals from being

solely ideological tools of the state. Fearless speech helps regulate the supervisory bodies of the

state (Mansbach, 2011).

The outgrowth of fearless speech is at the crux of the radical democratic theory where

argumentative discourse occurs (Mansbach, 2011). The debate between the public sphere and the

private sphere is akin to the intrinsic debate Mouffe (2000) discussed regarding equality and

liberty. The ongoing tension between the liberty and equality allows for productive democratic

discourse. The whistleblower does not work against the democratic collective, despite speaking

at the autonomous and singular level. The public and private spheres, existing in tension,

intersect, concurrently desiring to coexist without actually being able to do it. This tension

should not be reduced or avoided, but rather it is the strength of democracy. This reifies the same

paradox Derrida described in The Politics of Friendship (2005). It is the tension between equality

and identity. Whereas democracy requires a populace made up of equal parts, those parts are

ultimately unique. Democracy desires a populace of unique citizens that make up the whole, with

no one person having more political value than another. Derrida (2005) recognized that this

unending alterity is fundamentally contradictory to the concept of equality. Mansbach (2011)

expounded upon this concept, recognizing that truth-telling as an independent and autonomous

action functions to promote the collective.

5.1 Case Studies

This section discusses acts of whistleblowing as they have occurred in American history,

focusing on well-known cases of whistleblowers against the state. This will include a review of

literature on three of the more well-documented cases: Daniel Ellsberg, Thomas Drake, and

Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning. The chapter will then discuss the truth-telling organization

WikiLeaks, which pushes the conceptual boundaries of whistleblowing.

5.2 Daniel Ellsberg

Daniel Ellsberg began working for the U.S. Department of Defense in 1964 as a special

assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Ellsberg has

described that he was primarily directed to generate ways to escalate the war in Vietnam. After

spending considerable time in Vietnam, Ellsberg went back to work for the RAND Corporation

in 1967, where he was commissioned to research and author a top-secret report on U.S. defense

decision-making in Vietnam. The document exposed a barrage of objectionable practices by the

U.S. government in Vietnam, including war crimes and the intentional fabrication of false news

stories. Perhaps most damning of the revelations was the decision to continually send military

troops to Vietnam despite the consensus of top U.S. officials that the Vietnam War was

unwinnable. Ellsberg’s revelations became publicly known as The Pentagon Papers. Ellsberg

first shared the information privately with certain members of Congress, but none of them would

agree to make the matter public. Ellsberg then released the documents to the New York Times

which began publishing the information until a federal court issued an injunction against them.

When the New York Times was ordered to cease the publication of the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg

provided the papers to The Washington Post. The New York Times eventually won its case

against the federal government in the Supreme Court, and was able to resume publishing the

information.

Daniel Ellsberg was accused and tried under the Espionage Act. The presiding judge

eventually threw out the case due to the amount of misconduct which had occurred on behalf of

government officials. Most notably, former President Richard Nixon had hired secret

investigators to illegally gather information to be used against Ellsberg. The search included

illegally wiretapping Ellsberg’s telephone and raiding offices where Ellsberg was associated.

Since the dismissal of his trial, Ellsberg has been hailed by many as a hero of democracy for

blowing the whistle on government malfeasance.

5.3 Thomas Drake

Former senior executive of the National Security Agency (NSA) Thomas Drake also

faced charges under the Espionage Act for releasing information to The Baltimore Sun on the

fraud and misuse of funds within the NSA. Drake made attempts to share the information with

supervisors and members of Congress to no avail. Drake was charged on multiple counts of

espionage and illegal use of government information. Drake was the first U.S. citizen to be

indicted under the Espionage Act since Ellsberg. Given the available details about government

misconduct, Drake was able to strike a plea deal prior to standing trial. All charges against

Ellsberg were dropped in exchange for a misdemeanor guilty plea for misuse of government

property.

5.4 Chelsea Manning

As a member of the U.S. Army involved in war operation in Iraq, Chelsea Manning

released hundreds of thousands of war documents to the public through WikiLeaks. Published in

2010, the classified documents included war video footage, internal communications, and

military strategies of the U.S. Department of Defense. Manning was apprehended and

immediately imprisoned, often in solitary confinement. Manning faced trial for dozens of

criminal charges and was convicted in 2013 for twenty counts, including misuse of government

property, fraud, and most seriously, espionage. Manning was sentenced to 35 years in prison.

After serving seven years, Obama commuted the sentence and Manning was released. Manning’s

actions align more with conceptions of truth-telling than whistleblowing, like that of Ellsberg

and Drake. The difficulty in defining such actions highlights the paradoxicality of these actions

within democratic discourse.

5.5 WikiLeaks

WikiLeaks is a uniquely contemporary phenomenon that gives voice to truth-telling

through a cyberspace medium. WikiLeaks exists as a response to the contemporary mediated

society, where democracy is functionally inhibited as media access is granted almost exclusively

to powerful elites (Marlin, 2011). Journalism in particular, a primary means by which the demos

is informed, has been usurped by corporate interests (McChesney and Nichols, 2010). WikiLeaks

is a productive response to corporatized journalism, which now largely functions to perpetuate

power inequity (Rosner, 2011). With voice given back to the lower classes, democratic discourse

can be reignited through WikiLeaks (Marlin, 2011).

As one might expect, WikiLeaks has not received a warm reception from institutions of

power. To the detriment of these elite classes that hold plutocratic control, WikiLeaks and other

truth-telling organizations encourage uninhibited discourse. Powerful elites fiercely oppose

WikiLeaks in an effort to remain in power. Such political posturing is ideological and exposes

the class power struggle (Fuchs, 2011). New media, like WikiLeaks, allow for power structures

to be challenged in ways they never were before. These new media like WikiLeaks create chaos

for institutions of power, and make the management of these institutions incredibly more

difficult (McNair, 2012). In particular, WikiLeaks assists in reducing the ability for governments

to keep secrets, which is can be seen as productive to radical democracy (Dreyfus, Lederman,

Bosua, and Milton, 2011).

Yet, WikiLeaks presents an added layer of paradoxicality. WikiLeaks asserts itself as a

borderless, stateless, truth-telling organization. This stance affords itself a level of fluidity that

challenges the concept of the state. However, given the repercussions experienced by Manning,

Assange, and others, it can be argued that organizations like WikiLeaks have only strengthened

the power of the nation state (Christensen, 2014).

6. Conclusion

Advancements in technology have significantly altered the ways information is created,

stored, and shared. Citizens and institutions go to great lengths to protect their data from hackers

and cyber threats. The “seize and share” tactics of hackers, pranksters, and truth-tellers have

significantly blurred the lines of whistleblowing. The value of these actions is particularly

difficult to assess within the democratic discourse. Ellsberg and Drake used calculated methods

to release information to reputable news agencies to review and publish at their discretion. In

using a system of checks and balances, Ellsberg and Drake arguably used the most ethical tactics

that were available to them. Manning also exposed unethical practices of the U.S. government,

but did so rather haphazardly through WikiLeaks. Truth-telling organizations like WikiLeaks do

little to vet information prior to releasing it publicly, which raises serious questions about

information ethics and privacy, even if the victim is a hegemonic state. Manning’s information

undoubtedly illuminated unethical practices by the U.S. military, but other truth-tellers seem

more inclined to pranksterism for the sake of pranksterism.

For the purposes of this study, Edward Snowden is recognized as a viable whistleblower

for relying upon renowned news agencies to vet and release information with discretion.

Snowden’s status as a whistleblower is based heavily upon the illegal and unethical activities of

the U.S. government that the disclosures exposed. Snowden’s revelations are valued as

productive for democracy. While valid arguments can be made as to the value of unchecked

truth-telling, especially in relation to institutions of power, this dissertation focuses solely on

Snowden’s actions and the measured approach to whistleblowing. Informed by this perspective,

rooted in the above literature, this dissertation moves into a discussion on methodology in order

to engage and analyze the Snowden discourse.

Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY: IDEOGRAPHIC CRITICISM

1. Introduction

The methodological approach to this dissertation constitutes an ideographic criticism,

understood as a critical rhetorical analysis of ideographs, of the discourse regarding Edward

Snowden and his exposition of United States surveillance practices. Affixed in the crux of a

contemporary struggle over power relations between governmental bodies and <democratic>

<citizens>, the political discourse surrounding Edward Snowden is primed for ideographic

analysis.1 Methodologically speaking, this rhetorical analysis functions to better understand

ideological power relations and how they are manifested and perpetuated through discourse.

Operating from a critical perspective, this analysis identifies instances where language is used as

an ideological tool to maintain chasmic power inequity between governmental authority and the

mass populace. Ideological criticism is a form of academic inquiry in which texts and other

artifacts are analyzed to reify underlying values and attitudes of a society (Gunn, 2009). The

greater implications of this dissertation reify the inherent paradoxicality of <democracy>. In

advancing a vibrant discussion on the obstructions that democratic theories face in meeting

democratic actualization, this dissertation further exposes the lack of viability of <democracy>

writ large. The seeming inevitability of democracy’s inability to realize itself is illuminated

through this critical rhetorical analysis of known ideographs, namely <democracy>, <privacy>,

<liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and <justice> and, it is further

accentuated through the dissertation’s theorization of the term <Snowden> as ideographic. In

sum, the methodology of this project, ideographic criticism, fits within the greater realm of

academic inquiry regarding democratic theory.

Of significant relevance to this project is the democratic element of <freedom> of

expression and the problematization it actuates at the intersection of ideology and rhetoric within

political discourse, particularly within the U.S. While this dissertation provides a rigorous

ideographic criticism of the narrative surrounding Snowden in order to elucidate power

imbalance, it does so within the scope of democratic theory and the critiques thereof. The

element of <freedom> of expression, which is vital to American <democracy>, theoretically

allows for a wide array of expressive acts, including that of whistleblowing. Yet, as the discourse

surrounding Snowden demonstrates, the U.S., a self-proclaimed <democratic> society, finds

itself in a conundrum. The relationship between whistleblowing and <freedom> of expression

poses perplexing questions in relation to democratic theory writ large, especially within

discussions on <security>. Whistleblowing, a form of <freedom> of expression, is exercised to

the dismay of structures of power, as it can publicly reveal unethical and/or illegal institutional

behaviors. Whistleblowing operates paradoxically however, as it maintains the potentiality to

fortify agents who threaten democracy. In the case of Snowden, the exposure of surveillance

information and the techniques and mechanisms employed to acquire that information, has led to

a vigorous debate regarding the authority of <security> institutions like the U.S. National

Security Administration (NSA). Covert surveillance begs questions regarding the relationship

between governmental power and the populace as it relates to the tenets of democratic theory.

The ideographic criticism employed here examines this conundrum of whistleblowing’s

relationship to <democracy> on the grander theoretical scale. The process of exploring this

relationship first begins by discussing the conception and development of ideographic criticism.

As a methodology within the realm of rhetorical criticism, ideographic criticism found

formal recognition with McGee’s (1980) seminal article “The Ideograph”. When appropriately

employed, ideographic criticism can produce significant critical scholarship through two primary

means. First, it advances argument and “endless talk”, or ongoing discourse, which function to

continue essential academic discourse within primary topic areas (Brockriede, 1974). Here

Brockriede contends that a primary function of rhetorical scholarship is the continuation of

discourse on theories and concepts through “endless talk”. Secondly, such analyses contribute to

the growth and validity of critical rhetorical theory (McGeough, 2014). Thus, ideographic

criticism is integral to the development and legitimation of critical rhetorical scholarship.

Ideographic criticism fits under the umbrella of ideological criticism, and is informed by a

number of perspectives, including structuralism, Marxism, deconstructionism or

poststructuralism, postmodernism, and cultural studies (Foss, 2009). Kuypers (2009) furthers this

conceptualization, contending that ideographic criticism is heavily informed by rhetorical

materialism, which assumes an inherent relationship amongst rhetoric, discourse, and ideology.

The patterns of public consciousness noted by the rhetorical critic signify the evolution

and reiteration of power. Considered a method of value analysis (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001), or

critical rhetorical analysis (McKinnon, 2009), ideographic criticism admits its subjective posture

and seeks to make conclusions of judgment. “The definitions of values and their

operationalizations in social activity become the communication critic’s entry, often, into the

foundational notions defining a people, their orientations to the world outside their heads, and the

relationships they construct among themselves” (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001, p.189).

Ideographic criticism is apropos at this juncture, given the unwavering intensity of the

political climate in the United States and around the globe since <9/11>, especially as it relates to

the ideas of <liberty>, <equality>, <security>, and <democracy>. Furthermore, the political

discourse surrounding Snowden and the leaks of U.S. systems of surveillance are largely

underexplored by rhetorical critics. This dissertation helps fill that void, and in working with the

concept of the ideograph, fundamentally adopts a critical posture as it examines the inequities of

power within political discourse and the ideological impetus that discourse has on social and

political relations in the U.S.

This methodological chapter consists of five primary segments. First, it examines the

formulation of the ideograph as the intersection between rhetoric and ideology. Second, it

discusses the theoretical construction of the ideograph. This overview discusses the conception

and original postulations of the ideograph, and its place within the discourse regarding the

relationship between rhetoric and ideology. Thirdly, this chapter explicates how ideographs serve

as artifacts with significant utility for rhetorical critics. Herein, ideographic criticism as a method

of academic inquiry is formalized. Fourth, varying analyses of the ideograph and the theoretical

conceptions thereof are provided. This section examines relevant critiques regarding the

ideograph and ideographic criticism with particular attention paid to the studies which lay the

groundwork for this dissertation, notably publications which discuss the topics relating to

democratic theory. Fifth, and finally, the application of this methodology is described as it

pertains to the discourse surrounding Snowden’s disclosing of government documents pertaining

to U.S. surveillance strategies. This concluding portion outlines the scope of this dissertation and

the application of ideographic criticism within this specified discourse.

2. Formulation of the Ideograph

2.1 Ideology

In discussing ideographic criticism as a methodology, we recognize how ideology uses

symbolism to influence collective consciousness. Ideographic theory operates upon the basic

premise that humans behave differently as a part of a collective than they do when they are in

isolation (McGee, 1980). Prior to the conceptualization of the ideograph, Marxist critics focused

on the false consciousness of the masses created by ideology, while rhetorical critics endeavored

to explain human behaviors through narratives and cultural mythos (McGee, 1980).

Historically, Marxists have focused on the ideology of materialism, (McGee, 1980). This

fundamental divide served to restrict the rhetorical scholar from analyzing ideology. Seeking an

intersection of sorts, McGee theorized the ideograph, a means by which Marx’s materialism

could be reconciled with the rhetoricians’ symbolism. The Marxist perspective on ideology left

little room for agency within the sociopolitical realm. Although people think they have agency

within a political discourse, it is really only a “trick of the mind” which has deluded humankind

since the beginning of our individual cognitions (McGee, 1980). The interpellation processes of

ideology cognitively manipulate subjects of authority (Althusser, 1971). From this perspective,

our collective political consciousness is created and maintained by institutions and persons of

power. Unknowingly, the masses partake in their own subjugation while thinking they have free

will, a process generating false consciousness and a skewed collective reality.

While there are discernable differences in scholarly conceptualizations of ideology,

generally it is assumed that ideology fashions intellectual boundaries, effectively shaping reality

as it manipulates the cognitive capacity of the masses. Seeking ultimate control, ideology moves

toward hegemony, creating an unquestionable worldview for the unsuspecting masses beholden

to it. Force-feeding their ideals, institutions of power impart ideas of nationalism, moralism, etc.

upon an unassuming populace (Althusser, 1971). A hegemonic ideology directs individuals to

understand the world in particular ways, while fundamentally excluding other worldviews (Foss,

2009). Dominant ideologies function by controlling what social participants understand as

natural or obvious. Normal discourse helps maintain the ideology, and any challenges to those

norms seem egregious to the controlled masses (Foss, 2009). As hegemony is desired, ideology

is the crux of the struggle between the powerful and the powerless. Eagleton (1991) contends

that the struggle between subjects and institutions of power exists at the point of signification

and discourse. Rhetorical scholars posit that discourse is a primary means by which we come to

understand reality (McKerrow, 1989), with dilemmas arising when discourse is manipulated in

suppressive ways.

2.2 Rhetoric

Traditionally, rhetorical scholars have studied mythos and the narratives therein when

dealing with power relations (McGee, 1980). Critical scholars in this realm posit that power is

manifested through these narratives and the symbols that comprise them (van Dijk, 2006).

Narratives are constitutive in that they create and perpetuate a mass consciousness within the

social realm (Jasinski, 2001). Thus, <citizens> of a state are generally unaware of their cultural

roles within the grand mythos, and exist as social agents only insofar as is conceivable within the

boundaries of their corresponding culturally constructed narratives. Distinctive of culture,

narratives play significant roles in how people come to understand their relative realities

(Kuypers, 2004).

Traditionally, rhetorical scholars have studied these realities through analyzing the

pervasive symbolism which structures our worldviews (McGee, 1980). In critiquing this

symbolism, rhetoricians do not focus their efforts on the intent of the author. Instead, attention is

paid to what is produced by these symbols. With the populace fixated within a narrowed reality,

institutions of power benefit from this situation. Rhetorical critics focus on the ways that

symbolism relates to relationships of power, and how these relationships create reality (Jasinski,

2001). Such processes, while revealing, fundamentally kept the field of rhetoric outside of

ideological studies.

2.3 The Intersection of Rhetoric and Ideology

Prior to the ideograph, rhetorical scholars, entrenched in the creation, appropriation, and

perpetuation symbols and meaning through discourse, fundamentally lacked the medium through

which they could analyze ideology. The ideograph functions as a means to bridge the chasm

between materialism and symbolism. McGee (1979) contended that the most advantageous

linkage of rhetoric and ideology is methodological. Like Chinese symbols, ideographs signify

ideological commitment as they are elemental in the construction and maintenance of an

ideology (McGee, 1980). McGee was primarily concerned with analyzing the ways in which

ideographs manage political consciousness and public motives. The ideograph operates as an

extension of Weaver’s ideas on “God” terms and “Devil” terms, which address how political

meaning is imparted into terminology (Jasinski, 2001). “God” terms and “Devil” terms help

construct cultural identity, and the concept of the “other” within political discourse. In this

manner, the term “freedom” acts as a “God” term or unifier, while the term “tyranny” acts as a

“Devil” term and promotes exceptionalism by vilifying other societies (Weaver, 1953). While

Weaver’s theoretical postulations failed to unearth the core of the relationship between discourse

and ideology, it did move rhetoric closer to ideological analysis.

McGee’s concept of the ideograph created the theoretical link between rhetoric and

ideology. As a linguistic tool, the ideograph assists an ideology in maintaining its supremacy,

moving the public to act as the entities of power desire (DeChaine, 2005). Conceptually, the

ideograph is rooted in the rhetorical scholarship of appropriated meaning. This form, manifested

as an artifact for the rhetorical critic, transcends elements of space and time and acts in a manner

which creates, perpetuates, and directs the ideology of a society. The ideograph then is a primary

means by which institutions of power control the cognition of the masses (Delgado, 1995). The

concepts of ideology and rhetoric can be linked without the need for poetic metaphors (McGee,

1980). This linkage produces a complete description and explanation of a hegemonic ideology

and helps elucidate the relationship between institutions of power and the consciousness of its

people (McGee 1980).

Ortega (1957) argued that language inhibits cognition, and that while language helps

citizens conceptualize reality, it paradoxically restricts free thought. Because reality is largely

understood through language, our understandings of reality are limited (Ortega, 1957). For

example, the history of the ideograph <liberty> fundamentally informs our contemporary

conception of <liberty> (McGee 1980). Concepts like <liberty> cannot be taken out of their

historical context. Language is intrinsically tied to culture, and the ideograph develops over time

out of the ordinary lexicon of a specific culture. The public then engages and enacts the

hegemonic ideology through language (Potter, 2014). While ideology acts through a variety of

means, its linguistic manifestations link it specifically to the processes of symbolism. Hence, the

rhetorical critic can locate specific artifacts, ideographs, for analysis. Ideographs are not

artificially manufactured by social subjects to describe public behavior. Rather, they are artfully

crafted ideological terms with significant political valence (McGee, 1979). Institutions of power,

through ideology, use the language within political discourse as a means to defend the status quo,

effectively muting and containing dissent and resistance to reinforce its own dominance (Foss,

2009). While existing in ordinary discourse, ideographs are highly influential through multiple

defining characteristics.

3. Elements of the Ideograph

McGee (1980) postulated four primary features of ideographs, and authors such as Condit

and Lucaites (1993) and Winkler (2012) have condensed and isolated these features for a more

succinct understanding. Ideographs are largely understood according to how they function

(Jasinski, 2001), and can perhaps best be understood through examples (McGee, 1980). Thus, the

ideographs <liberty> and <equality> are used here to exemplify the conceptualization of the four

features of an ideograph.

Ideographs are linguistic terms that exist within ordinary political discourse. An

ideograph is a word or phrase that is well-known and often used by the masses in political

discussions. This definition excludes jargon, words highly technical in nature, and common

words that have minimal political valence. Ideographs work out of common political speech, as

this practice facilitates hegemonic institutions to engage discursively with the populace (McGee,

1980). This is a key means by which the ideology imposed by the institutions of power reaches

the collective. In order for these ideographs to affect the collective consciousness, they must be

easily accessible to the members of the society. Ideographs are the public vocabulary of an

ideology (Kuypers, 2004). As an apparatus of power, the ideograph is a way that inequity is

maintained unknowingly by the masses through their own iterations within their common

political discourse. The terms <liberty> and <equality> undeniably exist within the ordinary

political discourse of the U.S. These terms are core concepts within the American political

system and are part of the normalized lexicon of American culture. Thus, they fulfill the first

element of the ideograph.

Secondly, ideographic terms must be ultimately ambiguous. As Winkler (2012) states, an

ideograph “must be a high order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular

but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal” (p.12). Ambiguity enables the ideographic term to

have a multiplicity of meaning among the masses, but still work to perpetuate the overall

ideology. Ideographs thus exist as terms which the collective broadly understands, but

concurrently as terms that are all but impossible to specifically define. Ambiguity allows for the

ideographs to purposefully and uniquely affect each individual within the citizenry. Thus, the

ideological goals of the hegemonic ideologies become normative through the discursive power of

the ideograph. This definitional fluidity allows for ideographs to transcend context within a

society, and they can generally be utilized regardless of era.

<Liberty> and <equality> function in this manner. People generally understand the

concepts of <liberty> and <equality>, but these terms are not so easily defined. As McGee

(1980) explained, stating that no one has ever seen an <equality> walking down the street, but

everyone has a general idea of what <equality> should look like. Even if a citizen can quickly

articulate a definition of an ideograph, the nuances of that definition are undoubtedly unique.

Condit and Lucaites (1993) noted specifically how <equality> as an abstraction is impactful and

often calculated. These ideographs reference generally agreed upon ideals. The terms may be

perceived in slightly different ways, but in the end social agents want <equality> and <liberty>

as goals for the collective. Despite these shared goals, the populace lacks universal

understandings of what these terms mean.

The third element of the ideograph is that it warrants institutions to wield their power

(McGee, 1980). Ideographs excuse abnormal or unethical behaviors for the sake of the greater

institution. The ideas of <equality> and <liberty> serve as warrants for enacting policies that

seem counterproductive to the ideas of <equality> and <liberty>. For instance, an institution of

power can fundamentally infringe on the civil liberties of a population in the name of <liberty>.

With help from such ideographs like <liberty> and <equality>, governmental institutions engage

in otherwise egregious or odd activities, like killing (war, capital punishment, etc.) and

confinement (incarceration, travel regulations, etc). Under normal circumstances, citizens are not

authorized to kill or restrict the <liberty> of other citizens in this same manner. The state

however, wields the power to restrict, arrest, imprison, and even kill in order to defend

<equality> or <liberty>. It does so quite regularly in the name of counterterrorism (Winkler,

2012), militarism (Hamilton, 2012), and American hegemony (Cloud, 2004).

Institutions of power can operate in ways that are destructive and eccentric, even

antithetical to their systems of ideographs, for the sake of the greater ideology. These behaviors

functionally allow the institutions of power, through ideology, to absolve themselves of any

wrongdoing as the public is led to believe that the institutions are acting on behalf of the

collective good. Examples of these measures include asset forfeiture, the monitoring of library

records, and revocation of free speech, all of which have been exercised by the U.S. government

(Winkler, 2012). The collective <citizenry>, having been cognitively conditioned to subscribe to

the ideograph, cannot reasonably challenge the established order, and thus is willing to excuse

abuses of power in the name of the ideograph.

Fourth and finally, while <liberty> and <equality> serve ideographic means in other

cultures, they are uniquely entrenched within American culture. These two terms are embedded

in the American narrative of American culture, and, unable to be separated from that narrative,

they exist definitively within its context. This is the fourth characteristic of an ideograph; it is

culturally bound (McGee, 1980). Language is ever-evolving, and public perceptions of

<equality> and <liberty> may change over time, but ideographs cannot escape their past

connotations since present interpretations are intrinsically related to historical ones (Jasinski,

2001). Language, as an integral element of culture, helps fuel cultural evolution. Definitions may

change, but ideographic influence generally remains steady. To this end, while contemporary

conceptions of American ideographs like <liberty> and <equality> may vary from their earlier

manifestations, they are nevertheless entrenched within the narrative of American culture,

wielding significant power. Indeed, it is imperative that the ideograph is understood in

accordance with its cultural milieu (McGee, 1980).

While some elements of language transcend cultures, the ideograph is necessarily

confined within a specific culture (Winkler, 2012). This is one of the primary ways in which the

ideograph realizes its functionality. Culture works in ways which social actors must inherently

understand their own seeming exclusivity. A culture can only be recognized in relation to the

“other”. One can only feel invested in a culture if one understands how it is differentiated from

other cultures. Ideographs help facilitate this difference and foster a feeling of belonging. Being

culturally specific, ideographs cannot be applied from one culture to another. All ideologies have

their ideographs, but ideographs cannot transcend ideologies. They are rooted in the specificities

and historical contexts of the ideologies in which they were contrived. Members of society are

conditioned to know these ideographs; it serves as a prerequisite for belonging as a part of a

society and understanding a specific reality (Lee, 2009). While there is some tolerance for

variables, generally the citizens have a good conception of the applicable ideographs (Lee,

2009).

In review, ideographs are culturally bound terms within ordinary political discourse that

possess a high level of ambiguity and warrant excessive, eccentric behaviors and beliefs for the

sake of the ideology. These actions serve then to secure and maintain the imbalance of power

wherein the ruling class is seemingly unchallenged by the general populace. It is also important

to iterate that the word as a linguistic form, which can be conceived of as an ideograph, does not

always function in an ideographic manner (Lee, 2009). The term liberty for instance can be used

in a non-ideographic fashion. The ideographic critic is concerned only with the term as it relates

to relationships of power and ideology. When ideographs exist within this relationship, they

serve as artifacts for the rhetorical critic.

4. Ideographs as Artifacts

Ideographs become artifacts for study through their regularity within the political

discourse of a society. Because ideographs serve as foundational values for the identity of a

culture, the political arena is a primary starting point for the identification of these artifacts

(Winkler, 2012). Ideographs can be identified by testing them against the aforementioned

characteristics. Kuypers (2009) stresses that ideographs, as artifacts, are data, and the patterns

they generate over time and in relation to each other give the rhetorical critic analyzable material.

In the case of the ideograph, it is traced across multiple texts which are informed by a much

larger ideology (Gunn, 2009). As a method, ideographic criticism is more than simply mapping

however; it is a means of examining and analyzing how terms within political discourse shape

and organize cultural values. Using these artifacts, rhetorical critics examine how they function

amongst each other to perpetuate the ideology.

5. Analysis of Artifacts

McGee (1980) theorized that a full ideographic analysis of a culture requires three things:

ideograph identification, diachronic analysis, and synchronic analysis. McGee contends that this

process of isolating and analyzing ideographs, both diachronically and synchronically, reifies a

complete description of a society’s ideology. Such an endeavor would be an insurmountable task

for any researcher. Thus, these three elements of a full cultural analysis of ideology are broken

down into more manageable tasks. Even in a condensed form, critical conclusions can still be

drawn based upon the structures and patterns of ideographs (McGee, 1980). Condit and Lucaites

(1993) see ideographs as the sites of ideological and cultural struggle as meanings shift and

evolve. Describing and charting these most potent ideographs longitudinally, as well as within

specific contexts, helps illuminate the presence and influence of ideology within discourse

(Cloud, 1998).

The first task of ideographic analysis is identification. This requires an analyst to examine

the depths of political discourse to find the potent ideographs within a specific culture (McGee,

1980). In its complete form, this task constitutes the compilation of the entirety of a culture’s

ideographs. An overwhelming task for a singular critic at any given time, this first step is

typically condensed into the identification of only a small number of ideographs or artifacts.

These artifacts can be found within the common political discourse of a given society.

Once identified, the researcher may then trace the history of the ideographs

diachronically, or over time. This diachronic portion of the analysis requires the analyst to study

the evolution of individual ideographs (Potter, 2014). When analyzing diachronically, the

ideographic analyst can see how public discourse and public consciousness evolve with these

ideographs (Kuypers, 2004). The ideographic critic analyzes these developing values, finding the

ways in which a culture defines itself and how it constructs its attitudes regarding the external

world (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001). Diachronic patterns look much like vertical structures

mapped on a timeline. Ideographs expand, contract, and shift meaning over time and in regards

to specific socio-historical context (Potter, 2014). Diachronic patterns can be traced through

etymologies in historical dictionaries, as well as through usages in media, textbooks, popular

culture, and political discourse (Potter, 2014).

Rhetorical critics may also analyze the ideographs synchronically, or contextually, in

accordance with one another (Potter, 2014). Once the relevant ideographic artifacts are

identified, an understanding of a culture’s ideological directives can be found through a

synchronic and diachronic evaluation of each ideographic term (McGee, 1980). Synchronic

analysis examines the ideograph within a specific context and in relation to other ideographs in

that same setting. This is done by analyzing the ideographs of a society and understanding how

they are used in accordance with each other and cultural values (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001).

Ideographic value is largely reliant upon contextual relationships, that is, ideographs get their

meaning, in part, in relation to other ideographs within a specific period of time (Jasinski, 2001).

<Liberty> is best understood when counterposed with ideographs like <security>. An ideograph

cannot exist as such without the presence of other ideographs. Much of this project is a

synchronic analysis of the ideographic artifacts present in the political discourse surrounding

Snowden’s revelations. Due to the recency of Snowden, this dissertation does not engage a full

diachronic analysis. The arguments made in this dissertation, however, can be utilized for a

subsequent diachronic analysis. Through synchronic analysis, the dissertation analyzes known

ideographs as they perpetuate ideology through discourse, specifically <democracy>, <privacy>,

<liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and <justice>, and as well

postulates that <Snowden> functions ideographically. This postulation is shown through both a

progression of ideographic theory and a synchronic analysis of <Snowden> as it interrelates with

other relevant ideographs.

Doing a full historical analysis of a culture’s ideographs provides vital information for

understanding a culture’s ideology as a whole. As noted, ideographs, being fundamentally

ambiguous and indefinite, do not maintain a fixed meaning over time. To the contrary,

ideographs are inextricably fluid even within a particular context. Nevertheless, tracing these

meanings within their appropriate contexts can reveal a culture’s ideology by thoroughly

exposing this framework (McGee, 1980). While the diachronic analysis is vital for this process,

authors like McGee (1980), DeLuca (2012), and Hamilton (2012), have contended that the

synchronic examination is paramount. They have argued that the shape of an ideology can best

be revealed through a thorough analysis of a society’s ideographs within a particular context.

Outlining the entire diachronic and synchronic patterns of a society’s ideographs is

unfathomably daunting. Thus, rhetorical critics have condensed this methodology into more

attainable tasks. Connelly (2012) and Bridges (2008), for instance, have analyzed ideographic

influences within specific contexts. This narrow approach covers the synchronic patterns of

ideographs within a given framework. Other critics, such as Condit & Lucaites (1993) and

Winkler (2012) unveil the diachronic patterns of a singular ideograph, tracing the lineage and

cultural influence of the term. Meanwhile, certain scholars, like Hamilton (2012) and Potter

(2014) look at a more specific artifact, the pattern of one particular ideograph in a specified

context. These smaller scale analyses assist in describing the greater ideology of a society. They

are not the extensive ideographic analysis McGee (1980) originally postulated, but they

nevertheless contribute to the greater understanding of society and ideology. The patterns that

these scholars have identified work to regulate power and construct the reality of the populace

(Miller, 2004).

In addition, Kuypers (2004) argued that while ideographic criticism does not offer any

specific criteria which must be evaluated in accordance with the studied ideographs, such

critiques can functionally illuminate how cultural values relate to power, how those cultural

values shift, and lastly how those cultural values inform each other. The versatility of

ideographic criticism is thus elucidated (Lee, 2009). Informed by Brockriede’s (1974)

conception of rhetorical criticism, Lee (2009) discusses the implications of ideographic criticism,

namely, how rhetorical critiques can provide the reification of political irony, false

consciousness, and ideological-rhetorical trends. Ideographic criticism aims “to make us aware

of how specific articulations of ideographic terms can assist in tracing the workings of ideology

as it is instantiated into policy through rhetoric” (Stuckey, 2008, p.103).

6. Applications of Ideographic Criticism

Miller (2004) and Cawley (2013) contributed to ideographic theory by examining the

ways in which discursive ideological tools of the U.S. derive from the founding principle of

individuality. Cawley (2013) asserted that the <autonomous individual> functions as an

ideograph, helping to inform the public decisions of the United States since its inception. This

revelation contends that the contemporary Tea Party movement is functioning out of that element

of American ideology. Miller (2004) states that the ideographic <individual> differs from the

Western humanist conception of the individual, and that the ideographic individual must remain

diverse to maintain salience. Similarly, Connelly (2012), Hamilton (2012), and Hasian (2001)

advance McGee’s ideas that <privacy> and <national security>, <patriotism>, and <right to

privacy> respectively function as ideographs. As well, Winkler (2012) traces the diachronic and

synchronic patterns of <terrorism>, noting its ideographic influence on American society. The

United States, in what is now seemingly a perpetual state of war since invading Afghanistan in

2001, continues its international conquest for the sake of American <security>. Winkler (2012)

contended that as this narrative has evolved, <terrorism>, and all of its variations, have become

ideographic.

Stuckey’s (2008) analysis of presidential rhetoric notes that <human rights> is one of the

ways U.S. Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush pushed

an ideology of American exceptionalism and neoliberalism. Equating <human rights> with free

markets and consumer citizenship, each of these Presidents found ways to justify their doctrines

(Stuckey, 2008). As security threats like <terrorism> impose potential harm upon this conception

of <human rights> surveillance initiatives become imperative for the sake of protecting the

power structure (Winkler, 2012). Oppression as it exists in this American narrative is not the

infringement upon civil liberties by the state. Rather, it counterposes this infringement as a

necessary practice in the maintenance of neoliberal <human rights>, where free trade and

consumer citizenship can be upheld through the constant surveillance of publics. These studies

have been integral in the advancement of our understandings of the intersection of rhetoric and

ideology.

7. Evolutionary Applications

In addition to exploring the concept of the ideograph in its original construction,

rhetorical critics have also begun to expand the breadth of the ideograph, and formulate it in a

broader sense. Amernic and Craig (2004) and Bridges (2008) have theorized that the ideograph

can transcend ordinary discourse. They make the claim that September 11, 2001, stylized as

“9/11” or “September 11th”, functions as an ideograph. The distinctive element of this

progression is that this is not a term of historical significance prior to its denotation. As well,

<9/11> functions as an event and is beyond the original terminological conception of the

ideograph. While <9/11> moves outside of the confines of McGee’s initial postulation of the

ideograph, the argument is made that it still functions in an ideographic manner. Events like

<9/11> powerfully impact American culture, dynamically shift the political landscape, and are

referenced in ordinary political discourse to perpetuate power inequity.

Similarly, Edwards and Winkler (1997) have demonstrated how imagery can function

ideographically. While McGee’s (1980) concept of the ideograph did not account for visual

rhetoric, Edwards and Winkler (1997) claimed that images, like that of the American flag being

raised at Iwo Jima, can function in an ideographic manner. Images are fundamentally outside of

political terminology, but can often appear as much within a greater political discourse as known

ideographs like <liberty> and <equality>. As well, these images can be ambiguous yet

significant, and are often used to justify the wielding of power (Edwards and Winkler, 1997).

Thus, while images are not linguistic per se, they still function in an ideographic manner.

8. Application to Snowden

This dissertation specifically analyzes the responses from U.S. government officials when

directly discussing Edward Snowden. This analysis focuses on the operations of establishments

of power. First, this dissertation functions upon the premise that institutions of power effectively

manipulate mass consciousness, and is specifically concerned with the power of the U.S.

government. The revelations of Snowden put U.S. government officials, particularly those

presiding over surveillance practices, in a rhetorical exigency. Analyzing how these public

officials, as the managers of the political hegemony, responded to this situation is essential in

understanding relationships of power. Covert surveillance, a clear exertion of power by a

hegemon over an unknowing population, when revealed, begs an explanation. The state’s

response to this crisis is the core of this dissertation. Within this exigency it is theorized that

ideographs are integral to the state response on this matter. Critical analysis of the U.S.

government’s response illuminates how discourse is used to maintain power imbalance.

Ideographs, being intrinsically cultural, lack sound applicability at the international level.

Thus, this dissertation looks only at the U.S. government’s response to <Snowden>. Specifically

examined are messages and responses delivered to the press, which are intended for public

viewing. These communications provide material regarding how the state, in a time of crisis,

responds rhetorically to absolve itself of blame, circumvent situational guilt, and most

importantly, use linguistic and rhetorical means in maintaining its dominant position of power.

The dissertation works to expose political irony and false consciousness within the

American political spectrum through an analysis of power relations reified in the discourse

surrounding <Snowden>. McGee (1980), in outlining the ideograph, and giving examples like

<liberty>, <privacy>, and <rule of law>, lays the theoretical groundwork for this project, as these

concepts are at the crux of the political discourse surrounding <Snowden>. Since Snowden’s

releasing of government surveillance documents, the state and the public alike, in accordance

with media coverage, have engaged in debates regarding the topics of individual <democracy>,

<privacy>, <liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and <justice>.

Snowden exposed political ironies and limitless exercises of power operating for the sake of

hegemony.

8.1 Artifacts of Study

The United States, as a mediated democracy, distributes information from government

officials through press outlets. In these moments of information transfer, from government to

media, the state works to control the narrative of any given situation. It is at the intersection of

media and government official that ideology often transforms into discourse, and thus is the

primary grounds on which this study is based. The posture of this dissertation fundamentally

takes interest in the relations between state power and a <democratic> <citizenry>. This

ideographic criticism focuses on the discursive manifestations of ideology within the mediated

realm of distributed information as it is exchanged between state and media sources.

The dissertation analyzes the discourse between authorized U.S. government officials and

members of the press, where Snowden is specifically mentioned. The occurrences studied in the

dissertation are those of legitimate, government officials when they speak publicly with members

of the press. While it is not argued that the texts analyzed in this study are exhaustive, extensive

efforts were made to identify and examine as many of these occurrences as possible. The

dissertation analyzes all such occurrences over a two year period, between June 5, 2013 and June

15, 2015. This time frame assists in narrowing the scope of the project, but serves two primary

functions as well.

First, the USA PATRIOT Act saw many of its provisions expire at the dawn of June 1,

2015 as Congress opted not to approve the renewal of certain sections. Most notably of these

expired clauses was Section 215, which had allowed for the bulk data collection <Snowden>

brought to light. On June 2, 2015 Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by

Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection and Online Monitoring Act

(USA FREEDOM Act). While this Act broadly renewed many expired portions of the PATRIOT

Act, it specifically called for a ban on the activities allowed by Section 215. Regardless of the

how these acts evolved, it is argued here that the <Snowden> situation directly affected

legislation on government surveillance within the given time frame.

Secondly, this two year time span allows for the development of the narrative and the

underlying concepts. While such a time frame still justifies synchronic analysis, it also gives

ample time for the ideology to find its way to mold the discourse. The dissertation will not be

doing a full diachronic analysis, but it does monitor the development of the discourse over these

two years which could inform a larger diachronic scope in future studies. Given the artifacts

encapsulated by these specifics, this dissertation uses ideographic criticism to advance two

primary arguments. First, it identifies and analyzes known ideographs as they exist within the

<Snowden> discourse. In doing so, it formulates the term <Snowden> as an ideograph,

identifying it according to the primary characteristics of an ideographic artifact. The reification

of the <Snowden> abstraction develops ideographic criticism as a methodology as it

demonstrates how political agents can be obfuscated for ideological purposes. This dissertation

then subsequently analyzes <Snowden> artifact synchronically with other ideographs. The

analysis articulates how the <Snowden> ideograph was utilized to paradoxically in defense of

governmental surveillance. Secondly, this dissertation examines the interplay of ideographs and

terms of whistleblowing within the discourse. Through synchronic analysis it is reified how U.S.

officials utilized ideography to purge whistleblowing from the public forum and isolate it behind

legislative initiatives in the name of national <security>. Through these processes, U.S. officials

absolved themselves of culpability and engaged in measures antithetical to <democracy>. A

complete list of the analyzed artifacts of this political discourse can be found in Appendix A.

8.2 Analysis of <Snowden> Discourse

This dissertation identifies and analyzes the usages of known ideographs within the

political discourse surrounding <Snowden>. The ideographs of particular relevance here are

<democracy>, <privacy>, <liberty>, <equality>, <security>, <terrorism>, <patriotism>, and

<justice>. These ideographs have already been recognized as such at the scholarly level (McGee

1980, Condit & Lucaites, 1993, Winkler, 2012, Connelly, 2012, Hamilton, 2012, etc.). The

identification of these ideographs serves a number of purposes. First, it advances the scholarship

on ideographs as artifacts for rhetorical analysis. The continued usage of ideographs legitimates

the theoretical conception of the ideograph. Second, the identification of these ideographs

furthers the greater diachronic analysis of these terms. As noted, the understanding of a culture’s

ideology can be found through diachronic and synchronic analysis of all of its respective

ideographs. With the identification of these terms, this dissertation continues the ongoing

analysis of these ideographs over time. It also aids in the theoretical and analytical development

at the synchronic level. The ideographs will be examined and evaluated in accordance with each

other within a specified context. This synchronic analysis also illuminates various nuances, such

as political ironies, manipulation of terminology, and control of narratives, within American

ideology as it addresses the minutiae of these ideographs and how they function collectively to

perpetuate power imbalance.

This dissertation advances the theoretical development of the ideograph beyond the

limitations of the American political lexicon. As Amernic and Craig (2004) and Bridges (2008)

have noted, events can also function in an ideographic manner. In their work regarding

constructing <9/11> as an ideograph, they argue that ideographs can transcend specific instances

of language. It is in accordance with this concept that the dissertation advances theoretical

development. This project argues that <Snowden>, in transcending beyond the simple

signification of a name to a person, functions at the ideographic level. As the ideograph develops

a broader scope, becoming more inclusive of non-linguistic artifacts, the dissertation posits that

<Snowden> can be conceptualized as functioning in an ideographic manner. While not all

references to Snowden function ideographically, there is a distinct abstraction process of

<Snowden> dictated by the U.S. government over time. This dissertation argues that <Snowden>

and the situation surrounding the NSA security leaks, transcend their immediate contextual

meanings and connote broader, more fluid manifestations of power. <Snowden> becomes more

than a term appropriated to a particular American citizen. Rather, it becomes a term that

markedly alters the path of history. Common within American political discourse, yet

nevertheless ambiguous, <Snowden> warranted governmental behavior which would otherwise

have been deemed as bizarre and eccentric. The hegemonic power of the U.S. government is

particularly evidenced in how officials methodically deprived U.S. citizens of whistleblowing

power, a vital tool of <democracy>.

Better understanding of how institutions of power maintain hegemonic ideology and

control mass consciousness allows for the collective to address inequity. As a piece of critical

scholarship, this dissertation reifies ideological manifestations of power through symbolism. In

the end, this piece serves not only as a means of identifying the inner workings of U.S. statist

ideology, but also as a step toward alleviating the oppression of the populace by the state. The

dissertation contends that the control of individual and collective cognition is a primary

obstruction in the realization of a society where citizens can fully engage in the <democratic>

process. Using ideographic criticism, this dissertation identifies, in the name of progress, the

discursive means by which statist institutions subjugate the masses.

Chapter 4: THE <SNOWDEN> IDEOGRAPH

1. Introduction

Having revealed the covert surveillance tactics of the U.S., which violated laws and

agreements, both domestic and abroad, the <Snowden> disclosures served as serious threats to

U.S. hegemony. In order to combat these threats, U.S. officials labored to control the

<Snowden> narrative in their favor. U.S. officials systematically began a controlled public media

trial against <Snowden> wherein Snowden was transformed from a specific referent to a person

to a political abstraction laden with ideological meaning. The discourse of the trial set the

American public against itself as it assaulted certain fundamental tenets of <democracy> in the

name of <security>. The subtexts of the paradox as constructed by U.S. officials absolved the

U.S. of culpability, prosecuted <Snowden>, undermined American civil <liberties>, and

perpetuated a state of fear of <terrorism>. This chapter identifies how U.S. officials imparted

ideology into the term <Snowden> to transform it into a high order political abstraction. A

synchronic analysis follows which extrapolates upon the subtexts of <Snowden> as an

ideological construct.

Engaging in an exposition of the four qualifying elements of an ideograph as they relate

to <Snowden> requires a contextual understanding of the evolution of the ideograph. As

originally conceptualized, ideographs are ambiguously defined, culturally specific, ideologically

powerful terms used regularly within political discourse (McGee, 1980). While McGee’s (1980)

original postulations required ideographs to be linguistic, recent scholarship envisions that

ideographs are far more expansive. Edwards and Winkler (1997) theorize that ideographs

transcend the purely linguistic realm. As well, Armenic and Craig (2004) posit that significant

historical events can become ideographic. The subsequent analysis contends that people, or

rather the names of people, can evolve into ideographs. Despite the advancement in application,

the criteria for ideographic construction remain the same. Ideographs have four distinct

characteristics: regularity within political discourse, definitional ambiguity, cultural uniqueness,

and they warrant ideological power (McGee, 1980). The following subsections apply these

characteristics to <Snowden> to demonstrate how, while an outward referent to a particular

person, <Snowden> functions at an ideographic level. Shortly after the revelations are made

public, Snowden enters the narrative as the person responsible. As the narrative progresses, U.S.

officials and media alike assist in fashioning the <Snowden> abstraction. It is common practice

for rhetoricians to signify ideographs by placing them in carats. This chapter will contain two

instances of Snowden: Snowden and <Snowden>. References without carats are specific of

Snowden as a person within the narrative. References with carats signify the <Snowden>

ideograph.

As will be extrapolated within the analysis, the <Snowden> abstraction afforded the U.S.

government significant control over the narrative. While Snowden’s actions were illegal, the

U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that the domestic surveillance tactics of U.S. security agencies were

also unlawful. As the narrative unfolded, U.S. officials methodically conflated Snowden with

numerous antagonists of U.S. hegemony, and, enveloped <Snowden> within a palpable

ambiguity. Through multiple process of abstraction, U.S. officials systematically indemnified

themselves of wrongdoing and criminalized not only Snowden, but also, the ideological concept

of <Snowden>. The abstraction process afforded U.S. officials the ability to maintain an ongoing

fear of terrorism. As a result, government officials effectively defended governmental overreach

in the name of national security. Paradoxically, through the fabrication of the <Snowden>

ideograph, U.S. officials utilized <Snowden> to sustain the illegal practices Snowden had

reified.

2. Constructing <Snowden>

2.1 Political Regularity

In the immediate wake of the leaked documents The Guardian published in June 2013,

which revealed the illegal surveillance practices of U.S. security organizations, <Snowden>

existed almost exclusively as a referent to the person, Edward Snowden. Prior to the leaks,

<Snowden> was entirely absent from the American political narrative. Immediately after the

revelations however, <Snowden> became a focal point within daily political discourse. A Lexis-

Nexis search specific to this study was conducted to populate any news report that mentioned

“Edward Snowden” in the two weeks following the initial leaks on June 5, 2013. The search

yielded 1,968 results. Quite clearly, <Snowden> rapidly became commonplace within the

American political narrative. In a similar Lexis-Nexis search, “Edward Snowden” appeared in

937 news media stories in the month of June, 2015, a full two years after the initial release of

classified U.S. security documents. While the appearance of <Snowden> decreased over time,

most certainly the relevance of <Snowden> as a topic of political discourse overall was

maintained.

Vital to this dissertation is the recognition that <Snowden> not only existed regularly in

mediated discourse, but that many of these instances were engagements with U.S. government

officials. In the two years after the <Snowden> revelations, government officials publicly

discussed <Snowden> in 126 press events, thus producing 126 artifacts for this dissertation. In

each of the 126 artifacts analyzed, <Snowden> was directly mentioned at least once. Within the

126 artifacts, <Snowden> is directly referenced a total of 770 times. The high volume of direct

references to <Snowden>, sustained over time, indicates the importance of <Snowden> within

the narrative.

These data demonstrate the fulfillment of the first ideographic requirement: consistency

within political discourse. While <Snowden> was entirely absent from the political narrative

prior to the <security> disclosures, with a certain immediacy, <Snowden> became commonplace

within national and international politics. The regularity of <Snowden> within U.S. political

discourse endured over time which further supports this first clause. As the <Snowden> story-

arch developed, U.S. officials utilized <Snowden> as a rhetorical instrument to obscure public

perception. The constancy of <Snowden> within the political discourse thus, directly relates to

the ideographic characteristic of ambiguity.

2.2 Ambiguity

As the discourse developed, there was almost an immediate separation of <Snowden> the

concept from Snowden the person. Thrust into the political narrative, <Snowden> quickly

became the primary focus of intense political debate. Instantly, disputes arose as to whether

<Snowden> should be considered a hero or a traitor (Hampson, 2013). <Snowden> rapidly

became paramount in discussions of <terrorism> (Miller and Horwitz, 2013), was compared with

whistleblowers like Julian Assange and Chelsea Manning (Bradsher, 2013), was falsely

suspected of working with WikiLeaks (Feinstein, 2013, June 23) and was erroneously accused of

operating as a Chinese spy (Fox News, 2013, June 14). The metamorphosis from Snowden as a

person to <Snowden> as a malleable political concept began instantaneously. At the

terminological level, <Snowden> invariably became entrenched within an already vehement

political atmosphere. In this, the utility of <Snowden> within a political context became

exceedingly expansive.

A primary indicator to the ambiguity of an ideograph is the ability of powerful political

agents to use political abstractions regardless of public perception. As of July 28, 2015, 167,954

signatures had amassed on the White House’s petition site asking for Edward Snowden to be

pardoned of all potential crimes (Rhodan, 2015). The petition was created on June 9, 2013,

immediately after the release of the NSA documents, and claims:

Edward Snowden is a national hero and should be immediately issued a full, free, and

absolute pardon for any crimes he has committed or may have committed related to

blowing the whistle on secret NSA surveillance programs.

Polls directly following the <Snowden> leaks indicated the deep complexities of the

circumstance. A 2013 USA Today/Pew Research Poll showed that while 54% of Americans

thought <Snowden> should be prosecuted, as opposed to 38% who did not, the public was torn

49% to 48% as to whether they approved or disapproved of the American security practices

<Snowden> revealed (Page, 2013). While the American populace remained uncertain regarding

<Snowden> and surveillance, publicly, U.S. officials were markedly firm in their views. Rather

than deliberate openly, U.S. officials worked swiftly to control the <Snowden> narrative. One of

the most illuminative examples of the manufacturing of the <Snowden> construct was the

engineering of the aforementioned debate as to whether <Snowden> should be deemed as a hero

or a traitor.

On Good Morning America on June 10, 2013, Speaker of the House John Boehner stated

of <Snowden>: “He's a traitor….. the disclosure of this information puts Americans at risk. It

shows our adversaries what our capabilities are and it's a giant violation of the law.” As well, on

June 23, 2013 on Meet the Press, Chair of the House Intelligence Committee Mike Rogers

accused <Snowden> of aiding <terrorist> networks overseas that wish to do harm to American

citizens, and associated <Snowden> with North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Russia, all of

whom have strained relationships with the U.S. This posture by U.S. officials was sustained

throughout the narrative. On May 28, 2014 on The Daily Rundown, Secretary of State John

Kerry branded <Snowden> as a coward who betrayed his country.

In addition to the disassociation of <Snowden> from concerns of governmental

overreach, the ways in which U.S. officials and media pundits referred to <Snowden> further

fostered the ambiguity. <Snowden> was applied to numerous international political matters.

Indicative of the interweaving of <Snowden> into international political discourse was an

exchange between the press and State Department Press Office Director Patrick Ventrell on June

25, 2013. Ventrell is asked “Patrick, a couple questions on China.” Before the reporter can finish

the question another member of the press interrupted, asking if the question was going to be

related to <Snowden>. When the initial reporter responded “Yes, on Snowden”, Ventrell asserted

“It’s all related.” Ventrell’s affirmation indicated the conflation of <Snowden> with international

politics writ large, demonstrating the extensive applicability of <Snowden> within the discourse.

This conflation was again seen on August 12, 2013 in a press conference with State Department

Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf. Harf asks to move the conversation away from Syria. The first

reporter responded plainly “Russia, Snowden”. Such exchanges further accentuated the

coalescence of <Snowden> with topics of perceived political significance.

In a series of press conferences with White House Press Secretary Jay Carney in the

summer of 2013, <Snowden> was referenced in numerous different ways within the discourse

surrounding Russia’s relationship with the U.S. including the “Snowden situation” (2013, June

24), the “Snowden case” (2013, July 17), the “Snowden matter” (2013, August 1), the “Snowden

affair” and the “Snowden disagreement” (2013, August 8). During a press conference on July 12,

2013, U.S. State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki was asked a “non-Snowden Russia

question” as if to insinuate an inherent correlation between <Snowden> and U.S./Russia

relations. Furthermore, in a press conference on August 6, 2013, Psaki was asked about the

relationship between the U.S. and Russia with regard to “the Snowden thing.” This positioned

obscurity of <Snowden> functioned to support the broad utility of the term in political discourse.

In these references, there are no direct conversations regarding <Snowden>, as the respective

questions and answers revolved solely around U.S. and Russia relations.

Similarly in press conferences with Carney regarding U.S. and China relations,

<Snowden> existed at the crux of international tensions as <Snowden> appeared as the

“Snowden situation”, the “Snowden story”, and the “Snowden affair” on June 26, 2013, the

“Snowden case,” the “Snowden circumstance,” the “Snowden issue” on July 12, 2013, and the

“Snowden dispute” and the “Snowden matter” on August 1, 2013. Even in a discussion regarding

LGBTQ rights, the term <Snowden> appeared multiple times. Harf was questioned on July 31,

2013 regarding the calls to boycott Russia in the wake of Putin’s inflammatory comments on

homosexuality when vague references to the “Snowden case” were made twice. In addition to

the pertinence of <Snowden> in international relations, the applicability of <Snowden> existed

in domestic politics as well.

In discussions on national politics, regarding domestic surveillance, <Snowden> occurred

with a significant level of vagueness. In a press conference on June 11, 2013, Carney admitted

that the “Snowden incident” had sparked worthy discussion on government surveillance

concerning who should be authorized with access to U.S. surveillance systems. In a Department

of Defense press conference on June 26, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel mentioned the

“Snowden case” in a broad conversation on U.S. surveillance and <security>. Psaki discussed

“one more Snowden thing” in regards to passport questions in a press conference on July 10,

2013. There was a reference to the “Snowden saga” in the opening of Meet the Press on July 28,

2013. Likewise, in a Hardball interview aired on December 5, 2013 with Chris Matthews,

President Obama referred to the “Snowden disclosures” and how they relate to NSA procedures.

As Obama expounded upon these “disclosures”, he elucidated a key underpinning of this project:

the innate tension between <security> and <liberty>. The direct relationship between

<Snowden> and this historic conundrum amplified the ideographic nature of <Snowden> as it

was being used in the rhetorical posturing of powerful politicians.

Political posturing by U.S. officials assisted in the <Snowden> abstraction process.

Government officials regularly made broad, unwarranted accusations of <Snowden> in order to

publicly associate <Snowden> with unfavorable concepts and concurrently indemnify U.S.

officials of wrongdoing. On June 23, 2013 in an interview on Meet the Press, Rogers states

“Well, it’s concerning. Obviously, what appears to be as of today that he is flying-- will-- will

catch another flight from Moscow, many believe to Cuba. We know that there is air traffic from

Moscow to Cuba, then on to Venezuela. And when you look at it, every one of those nations is

hostile to the United States. I mean if he could go to North Korea and Iran, he could round out

his government oppression tour by Snowden.” The assertions made by Rogers were nonsensical

and never occurred. Yet, in associating <Snowden> with entities that have hostile relations with

the U.S., Rogers obfuscated <Snowden>.

Additionally, U.S. officials used <Snowden>’s passport revocation to blur public

perception of <Snowden>. The U.S. government revoked <Snowden>’s passport when

<Snowden> was in Hong Kong prior to departing for Russia. Ventrell stated in a press briefing

on June 24, 2013: “Hong Kong authorities were well aware of our interest in Mr. Snowden and

had plenty of time to prohibit his travel.” U.S. officials used <Snowden>’s revoked passport as a

means to further criminalize <Snowden> and deflect attention away from government

surveillance. At a press conference in Tanzania on July 1, 2013, Obama said “Mr. Snowden, we

understand, has traveled there without a valid passport, without legal papers.” Psaki also noted

<Snowden>’s revoked passport on multiple occasions, including in a press briefing on July 10,

2013: “he does not have a valid U.S. passport.” Carney scrutinized <Snowden>’s travels in a

press briefing on July 12, 2013, saying “Mr. Snowden should be returned to the United States

because of the charges filed against him and because -- which is normal practice when you've

been charged with felonies and the revocation of his passport, because he does not have travel

papers or a valid passport, that he ought to be returned to the United States, and where he will

face justice in a system that affords defendants all the rights that every American citizen enjoys.”

As a distraction maneuver, U.S. officials revoked <Snowden>’s passport and then publicly

derided <Snowden>’s travel choices, criminalizing <Snowden> for being abroad without a valid

passport. These rhetorical techniques by government officials deflected public attention away

from illegal governmental surveillance, and, drowned <Snowden> in discourse ancillary to the

informed packed within <Snowden>’s revelations. Overall, the existence of <Snowden> within

these wide-ranging dialogues showcases the ambiguous functionality of the term, which in turn

lent to the signification of its cultural context.

2.3 Culturally Bound

Showcased in the references below, the revelations of <Snowden> reified inherent

tensions within American <democracy>, as these disclosures resituated American political

discourse within the <liberty>/<security> continuum. The <Snowden> discourse evoked intense

dialogues on the limits of <democratic> voice, and how much influence an autonomous

<individual> has within the political realm. <Snowden> also provoked discussion on the

difficulties a mediated <democracy> faces, particularly within a representative system of

governance.

Revisiting the interview with George Stephanopoulos on Good Morning America on June

10, 2013, Boehner was asked about the privacy of American citizens in the wake of the

<Snowden> revelations. Boehner situated his response firmly within American political and

historical narratives:

George, throughout our history we've had this tug between our principle responsibility as

the government to, to keep Americans safe and at the same time, protect their privacy.

And so there's this balancing act that goes on. And I believe that when you look at this

program and what it does, we, you'll find that we protect the privacy of the American

people while at the same time, giving us tools to keep Americans safe and to go after the

terrorists.

In the June 23 broadcast of This Week, George Stephanopoulos questioned Director of the

National Security Agency Keith Alexander on <Snowden> and the implications of the

revelations. Alexander stated:

It's clearly an individual who's betrayed the trust and confidence we had in him. This is

an individual who is not acting, in my opinion, with noble intent. And when you think

about what our mission is, I want to jump into that, because I think it reflects on the

question you're asking. You know, my first responsibility to the American people is to

defend this nation. And when you think about it, defending the nation, let's look back at

9/11 and what happened. The intel community failed to connect the dots in 9/11. And

much of what we've done since then were to give us the capabilities -- and this is the

business record FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court], what's sometimes called

Section 215 and the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] 702 -- two capabilities that

help us connect the dots. The reason I bring that up is that these are two of the most

important things from my perspective that helps us understand what terrorists are trying

to do. And if you think about that, what Snowden has revealed has caused irreversible

and significant damage to our country and to our allies. When -- on Friday, we pushed a

Congress over 50 cases where these contributed to the understanding and, in many cases,

disruptions of terrorist plots.

Alexander’s comments placed the <Snowden> discourse distinctly within an American context.

By employing the deeply entrenched ideographs of <terrorism> and <9/11>, Alexander

associated <Snowden> with the primary ideological adversaries of the U.S. The subtext of

Alexander’s commentary positioned <Snowden> as an antagonist to American culture by

embedding <Snowden> within the narrative of <terrorism>. The public perceptions of

<Snowden>, as well as the related political implications, were specific to the U.S. within this

framework.

U.S. officials contrasted <Snowden> with American cultural values throughout the

discourse, particularly through the lens of <terrorism>. Kerry remarked in an interview on May

28, 2014 on The Daily Rundown, almost a full year after the <Snowden> leaks, that <Snowden>

put Americans at risk and that <Snowden> is not a <patriot>. On January 16, 2015 in a joint

press conference with the U.K., Obama linked <Snowden> with al Qaeda, a known adversarial

entity of the U.S. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest, who succeeded Jay Carney, in a

press conference on April 23, 2015 contended that <Snowden> had given insight to <terrorists>,

and condemned <Snowden> for aiding al Qaeda. On May 29, 2015 Carney, had made similar

claims. The consistent assertion that <Snowden> functioned as an aide for al Qaeda operatives

vilified <Snowden> within the American narrative. As the perpetrators of <9/11>, al Qaeda has

resounding significance in American culture. Placing <Snowden> alongside al Qaeda, and

<terrorism> generally, within the narrative tightly wove <Snowden> into the cultural

underpinnings of the U.S.

Demonstrably, <Snowden> has significantly shaped the political landscape of the United

States. The sustained argument of U.S. officials juxtaposing <Snowden> with American values,

like <liberty> and <individuality>, indicates the cultural relevance of <Snowden>. The story-

arch of <Snowden> fits within a greater narrative on <terrorism>, and thus the greater political

narrative of the U.S. The entrenchment of <Snowden> within the cultural narratives of the U.S.

undergirds the ideological leap that afforded U.S. officials with unassailable power.

2.4 Warrant of Power

The fourth and final characteristic which signifies the ideographic metamorphosis of

<Snowden> is the wielding of power by ideological institutions through the rhetorical

manifestations of the <Snowden> terminology. This fourth element distinctively positions the

ideograph at the intersection of rhetoric and ideology. Ideographs function rhetorically to assist

ideological powers in controlling the political cognizance of the masses. Indeed, the first three

elements discussed do not entirely separate ideographs from other political language. The

ideograph becomes uniquely tied to ideology when it grants and perpetuates unyielding powers

to institutional bodies, such as those of the state. The rhetorical magnitude of the fourth

ideographic element behests more nuance than do the previous three. Vital to this distinction is

the ability to indicate that <Snowden> is utilized to warrant manifestations of ideological power.

Such power is most visible in the ways in which U.S. government officials discussed

<Snowden> alongside other notable ideographs. In particular, this last characteristic is

discernable in how <Snowden> is molded into the narrative according to the state’s perspective.

Pursuant of fortifying <Snowden> as a political abstraction, the discussion of the fourth

ideographic element is broken down into the subsections of <security>, <liberty>, and

<freedom>.

2.4.1 <Security>

While the unwarranted wielding of power can be seen throughout the entirety of the

narrative in various ways, it was through the juxtaposition of <Snowden> and <security> that the

concept was arguably most identifiable. Commonplace within the discourse was the argument by

U.S. officials that <Snowden> served as a threat to American <security>. Indicative within these

arguments was the desired control of the masses by statist institutions. Hence, the most important

role of U.S. officials was to protect the <security> of the masses rather than protect the <liberty>

of the masses, a clear shift away from <democratic> principles.

Carney set a stark contrast between <Snowden> and the <security> of the American

people on May 1, 2014:

Well, I would refer you to the Justice Department for the case against Mr. Snowden. Our

position on him and the fact that he should be returned to the United States where he will

enjoy all the rights of defendants in this country has not changed. And our position on the

fact that as senior national security officials have made clear, including intelligence

officials have made clear, on the fact that those leaks were damaging to our national

security remains unchanged. So I don't have an update beyond that. The case against him

is what it is. I’d refer you to the Justice Department for more details.

The contrast in this case was elevated as Carney heightened the rhetorical implications of the

leaks by emphasizing the perspective of “senior national security officials”. Carney makes

similar remarks in six other briefings: July 13, 2013, August 1, 2013, October 31, 2013,

December 17, 2013, January 7, 2014, and May 29, 2014. In these utterances, Carney reinforced

the assertion that <Snowden> functioned to the detriment of American <security>. Kerry

reaffirmed this position stating that <Snowden> was a breach of American <security> on three

separate occasions, all on May 28, 2014 (CBS This Morning, The Daily Rundown, Good

Morning America). Thus, as the discourse continued over the period of two years, the position of

the White House remained steady.

The denigration of <Snowden> was crucial to the maintenance of power by U.S.

government officials who placed <Snowden> into a false binary, where <Snowden> was accused

of being antithetical American ideals. Consistently, U.S. government officials described how

much damage <Snowden> had caused, particularly within narratives of <terrorism>. Rogers

evoked elementary dichotomous rhetoric on June 23, 2013 on Meet the Press, speaking in the

literal terms of “good guys” and “bad guys”. He stated in regards to <Snowden>:

He has jeopardized our national security….. Clearly, the bad guys have already changed

their ways. Remember, these were counterterrorism programs essentially, and we have

seen that bad guys overseas, terrorists who are committing and plotting attacks on the

United States and our allies, have changed the way they operate. We’ve already seen that.

To say that that is not harmful to the national security of the United States or our safety is

just dead wrong.

In a press briefing on July 17, 2013 Carney claimed that <Snowden> caused great harm to

American national <security>. Carney as well contended on August 1, 2013 that <Snowden> put

American lives in danger.

In a speech on U.S. intelligence operations on January 17, 2014, Obama asserted again to

how disruptive <Snowden> had been to U.S. <security>.

We cannot prevent terrorist attacks or cyber threats without some capability to penetrate

digital communications -- whether it’s to unravel a terrorist plot; to intercept malware

that targets a stock exchange; to make sure air traffic control systems are not

compromised; or to ensure that hackers do not empty your bank accounts. We are

expected to protect the American people; that requires us to have capabilities in this field.

Moreover, we cannot unilaterally disarm our intelligence agencies. There is a reason why

BlackBerrys and iPhones are not allowed in the White House Situation Room. We know

that the intelligence services of other countries -- including some who feign surprise over

the Snowden disclosures -- are constantly probing our government and private sector

networks, and accelerating programs to listen to our conversations, and intercept our

emails, and compromise our systems. We know that.

Here, Obama set <Snowden> as the antithesis to the desires of American citizens, equating

<Snowden> with <terrorism> and cyber-crime, contending that the <Snowden> “disclosures”

threatened the everyday lives of Americans, from their bank accounts to their travel plans.

Despite the discourse, there was little change in the wake of the <Snowden> revelations

regarding domestic surveillance. In fact, throughout the narrative, U.S. officials used

<Snowden> to uphold their agenda. Throughout the political and social turbulence created by

<Snowden>, U.S. officials continued to justify their secretive surveillance practices. While

<Snowden> emphasized the interests of individual <privacy> and <liberty>, government

officials asserted that <Snowden> was a threat to <security>.

2.4.2 <Liberty>

The political contradictions existent within the discourse at the intersection of

<Snowden> and <security> are particularly poignant when compared to that between

<Snowden> and <liberty>. As has been mentioned, it is widely understood that the concepts of

<security> and < liberty> exist in an inherent state of tension with each other. Advances in

<security> are understood to negatively affect the realization of <liberty> and vice versa. In

understanding this tension, it can be assumed that <Snowden>’s revelations could have had a

destructive impact on either the general <liberty> of the American citizenry, or on the general

<security> of the American citizenry, but not both. In their attempts to absolve themselves of

culpability in response to the <Snowden> revelations, U.S. officials argued at length that

<Snowden> severely endangered both the <security> and the <liberty> of the American people.

Considering the theoretical implications of this position, U.S. officials created for themselves an

illogical and perplexing position, ignorant of the <liberty>/<security> continuum. <Snowden>’s

revelations most certainly resituated the American public within the <liberty>/<security>

continuum; however, the inherent contrast between <security> and <liberty> makes the position

of U.S. officials inconsistent as they contended that <Snowden> adversely affected both. The

rhetorical strategy of U.S. officials, albeit irrational, was nonetheless commonplace within the

narrative of a post-<9/11> America, where the tension between <security> and <liberty> is

inescapably fervent.

NSA Director General Keith Alexander claimed on June 23, 2013 on This Week that it

was a fundamental ethic of the NSA to protect <privacy> and civil <liberties>. <Snowden>,

Alexander contended, caused irreversible damage to that process, harming American citizens and

their allies. Similarly, Obama asserted in a White House presser on December 20, 2013 that the

U.S. operates under rule of law, and is a country that cares about <privacy> and civil <liberties>.

In the same breath, while neither confirming nor denying the allegations of <Snowden>, Obama

denigrated other nations, claiming that the surveillance tactics of more authoritarian regimes are

far worse than that of the U.S. In essence Obama attempted to avert blame from the U.S.

government to <Snowden> by claiming that other countries spy on their respective citizenries

significantly more than the U.S., thus failing to not address the illegal spying done by the NSA.

As a deflection tactic, Obama’s remarks counterposed American ideals with <Snowden> by

affiliating <Snowden> with non-democratic states who have fewer civil <liberties>.

On January 17, 2014 Obama publicly addressed the Department of Justice regarding the

state of national security in the U.S., seven months after the <Snowden> revelations.

Moreover, after an extended review of our use of drones in the fight against terrorist

networks, I believed a fresh examination of our surveillance programs was a necessary

next step in our effort to get off the open-ended war footing that we’ve maintained since

9/11. And for these reasons, I indicated in a speech at the National Defense University

last May that we needed a more robust public discussion about the balance between

security and liberty. Of course, what I did not know at the time is that within weeks of my

speech, an avalanche of unauthorized disclosures would spark controversies at home and

abroad that have continued to this day. And given the fact of an open investigation, I’m

not going to dwell on Mr. Snowden’s actions or his motivations; I will say that our

nation’s defense depends in part on the fidelity of those entrusted with our nation’s

secrets. If any individual who objects to government policy can take it into their own

hands to publicly disclose classified information, then we will not be able to keep our

people safe, or conduct foreign policy. Moreover, the sensational way in which these

disclosures have come out has often shed more heat than light, while revealing methods

to our adversaries that could impact our operations in ways that we may not fully

understand for years to come.

This excerpt performs two notably conflicting functions. First, Obama worked to emphasize his

own policy while making <Snowden> seem ancillary to the evolution of U.S. surveillance.

Obama admitted that societally, American citizens needed to find the right balance between

<security> and <liberty>, suggesting that the status quo was insufficient. Obama took credit for

wanting the surveillance practices of the U.S. government revisited, effectively disregarding the

impact of <Snowden> within that context, as he claimed that the changes to surveillance were

being reviewed before <Snowden>. Although Obama attempted to delegitimize <Snowden>

when he outwardly stated that he will not discuss <Snowden>, he was actively, in fact,

discussing <Snowden>. Second, while Obama labored to diminish the value of <Snowden>, he

justified the presence of <Snowden> within the narrative. In essence, Obama stated that although

he admitted the U.S. needed to find the right balance between <security> and <liberty>, the

answer could not be found via <Snowden>. In this, Obama fixates <Snowden> as oppositional to

democratic discourse.

2.4.3 <Freedom>

The political irony of U.S. officials is also conspicuous when dissecting the <Snowden>

discourse in relation to the <democratic> ideal of <freedom>. <Snowden> illuminated the

fluidity of these ideographs within the discourse, but as well, ignited a public debate as to the

boundaries of expressive <freedoms> as they relate to political voice. <Snowden> contended that

by exposing U.S. surveillance tactics, he was working in the best interest of American civil

<liberties> (Starr and Yan, 2013). U.S. officials exerted the complete opposite, stating that by

disrupting American <security> strategies, <Snowden> had caused grave harm to American

<freedoms>. Carney claimed on June 24, 2013:

Let me say this about that question, which is that Mr. Snowden’s claim that he is focused

on supporting transparency, freedom of the press, and protection of individual rights and

democracy is belied by the protectors he has potentially chosen -- China, Russia,

Ecuador, as we’ve seen. His failure to criticize these regimes suggest that his true motive

throughout has been to injure the national security of the United States -- not to advance

Internet freedom and free speech.

Carney was adamant that <Snowden>’s usage of <free> speech was to the detriment of

American <security>. Carney also contended that <Snowden> operated as a detriment to

<freedom> and <free> speech. Relatedly on June 24, 2013, Ventrell, in a press briefing,

forwarded contradictory statements as he condemned the actions of <Snowden> while

simultaneously contending that the U.S. strongly supports the <freedom> of information:

Well, from our perspective he leaked classified information, and that’s a serious crime in

this country. Having said that, the United States has long been a supporter of freedom of

access to the internet, of free communication, and certainly we do these programs to help

keep the American people safe and to help keep people safe in other countries by sharing

tips on terrorists, potential terrorist attacks, and to keep others safe.

The sweeping statements of Ventrell both celebrated <free> communication and chastised

<Snowden> for using it. Correspondingly, on July 12, 2013, Psaki fumbled through a press

conference when being asked about a public forum involving <Snowden> at

Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow. Psaki iterated that the U.S. State Department “broadly

believes in free speech”, but that <Snowden> should not have been allowed a public forum.

Psaki thus forwarded an argument where <free> speech is only permissible if approved by statist

powers. This contradictory argumentation of state officials was common throughout the

<Snowden> discourse. The desired deprivation of <Snowden>’s <free> speech is indicative of

layers of authoritarianism within the U.S. federal government.

The analysis of the rhetoric of U.S. officials within the <Snowden> discourse does not

forward a normative argument as to what <freedom>, <liberty>, and <democracy> should look

like. Rather, it is to, first, reify the political contradictions advanced by U.S. officials, and,

second, to recognize the implications of those arguments. Thus, it is insufficient to say that

<Snowden> appropriately exercised <freedom> of expression. Likewise, it is an overreach to

contend that <Snowden> went too far. The most important element of the <Snowden> discourse

as it relates to ideological manifestations of power is the outright contention by U.S. officials to

renounce public discussion on the extensive and illegal surveillance overreach revealed by

<Snowden>. Within the narrative, the U.S. government rejected any possibility that <Snowden>

worked in the interests of the American citizenry. The irony of the greater discourse is the verbal

commitment to <freedom> of expression by U.S. government officials, while unequivocally

silencing the debate created by <Snowden>. U.S. officials pledged support to <democratic>

discourse, but not if it involved <Snowden>, exacting a posture which was paradoxically non-

democratic.

2.2.4 Justification

The condemnation of <Snowden> was only the beginning of the response by the U.S.

government, as U.S. officials employed <Snowden> as an abstraction used for ideological

means. <Snowden> was existent within, and inserted into, extant narratives on concepts like

<liberty>, <security>, <freedom>, and <terrorism>. The successful scapegoating tactics of

<Snowden> by U.S. officials allowed for the further abstraction of <Snowden> into domestic

and international political narratives. Through their speaking engagements, U.S. officials

threatened <Snowden> with felonies and imprisonment, though they were mute on the illegality

of the NSA’s activities. Certainly it was unlawful for <Snowden> to reveal classified documents,

but the U.S. Court of Appeals found that the revelations regarding the bulk collection of

telephone data by the U.S. government was also illegal (Roberts and Ackerman, 2015).

Rather than engage and foster <democratic> discourse on the NSA surveillance tactics

and the information gathered, U.S. officials diverted public attention away from their

transgressions and the fundamental discussion between <liberty> and <security>. Instead,

officials promoted faux <democratic> debates focusing on <Snowden> as a political abstraction.

The <Snowden> revelations ignited discourse on fundamental tensions within American society,

but that discourse was heavily quelled within the public exchanges between U.S. officials and

members of the press. Instead of using <Snowden> as a channel through which to engage in

<democratic> discourse on the complexities of <security>, <liberty>, and <surveillance>,

<Snowden> became the focal point of the discourse. Indicative of the hegemonic power of the

U.S. governmental system, U.S. officials focused intently and exclusively on criminalizing

<Snowden> rather than on the substantive topics that <Snowden> reified.

The position of U.S. government officials was clear, albeit contradictory, and yet

seemingly active in the perpetuation of its own hegemony. In part, U.S. officials exacted the

perpetuation through the juxtaposition of <Snowden> and <democracy>. As well however,

American officials largely maintained their hegemony through an emphasis on <terrorism>,

<Snowden>, and the associated fears therein, rather than on the substantive discourse

surrounding the actualization of <democracy> in the U.S. The diversion of the discourse allowed

for U.S. government officials to continue the preservation of power with little resistance,

including their covert surveillance tactics. The dissemination of the narrative of fear of

<terrorism> allowed the hegemonic institution of the U.S. to maintain, if not embolden, its

totalitarian practices. In casting <Snowden> as the problem, U.S. officials were quietly able to

continue covert surveillance to advance their greater global military complex.

2.3 Summary

In sum, <Snowden> encompasses all four aspects of the ideograph. <Snowden> existed

with regularity in American political discourse with far-reaching utility. The ambiguity allowed

for <Snowden> to be turned into a term with a negative valence, effectively permitting the U.S.

government to continue its questionable surveillance practices. Engrained within the narrative of

American society, officials framed <Snowden> as a threat to the American way of life, hence

justifying the activities of U.S. surveillance programs. The identifiable evolution of <Snowden>

throughout the discourse implores a synchronic analysis for the purposes of reifying the

discursive outgrowths of ideological power. The synchronic analysis is conducted through the

examination of how <Snowden> intersects with other established ideographs, namely

<security>, <liberty>, <freedom>, <democracy>, <justice>, and <terrorism>, within the context

of a propagated trial against <Snowden> as created by U.S. officials.

3. Synchronic Analysis

3.1 <Snowden> on Trial

The synchronic analysis of <Snowden> in relation to other common ideographs reveals

two distinct trials as fabricated by U.S. officials. The first referenced trial is one of actual

legalism which would require Snowden to physically return to the U.S. and enter the judicial

system. The second is not a trial of legalism, but of public perception. The first was regularly

called for, yet never occurred through the entirety of the narrative. The second trial, was never

overtly announced, but has been consistently disseminated by U.S. officials throughout the

entirety of the <Snowden> discourse. The second trial, packaged through covert rhetorical

tactics, was propagated by U.S. officials surreptitiously throughout the <Snowden> discourse for

rights to control public perception. The consistent demands for the <Snowden> legal trial were

used to distract the American public from the ongoing media trial U.S. officials were

promulgating, and, more importantly, from illegal NSA surveillance behaviors. Throughout the

covert trial, U.S. officials prosecuted <Snowden> through the juxtaposition of <Snowden> with

the American values of <justice>, <liberty>, <freedom>, and <democracy>, equating

<Snowden> with <terrorism> and threats to U.S. <security>.

3.2 <Snowden>, <Security>, and <Justice>

Commonplace throughout the <Snowden> narrative is the assertion by U.S. officials that

<Snowden> return to the U.S. to face a trial by jury. Using phrases like “due process” and “fair

trial”, notions that imply <democratic> <justice>, U.S. officials regularly impressed their trial

against <Snowden> upon the public. On Face the Nation on June 23, 2013 Chair of the Senate

Intelligence Committee Debbie Feinstein said:

I want to get him caught and brought back for trial, and I think we need to know exactly

what he has. He could have a lot, lot more. It may really put people in jeopardy. I don't

know. But I think the chase is on. And we'll have to see what happens.”

Psaki stated in a press conference on July 2, 2013

As you know, Mr. Snowden has been lawfully charged in U.S. courts. He is, as a routine

matter, and I know we’ve talked about this but it’s very relevant here - persons with

felony arrest warrants are subject to having their passport revoked. He remains a U.S.

citizen. We welcome him back to the United States to face the charges against him in

accordance with due process and U.S. law.

Psaki again stated that <Snowden> “should return to the United States to face these charges that

– where he will be accorded a fair trial” in a press conference on July 12, 2013. Carney uttered

similar statements in a press conference on July 16, 2013:

And it should be clear when we see discussions about -- or suppositions or discussions

about the idea that Mr. Snowden is somehow being persecuted, he is a United States

citizen who has been charged with crimes, and under our system of law, he should be

afforded every bit of due process here in the United States, and he should return here to

face trial.

In fact, the message from U.S. officials that <Snowden> should return to the U.S. to face a “fair

trial” or “due process” is repeated a total of 23 times throughout the discourse. On June 24, 2013

Kerry stated in an interview with Elise Labott on CNN:

Well, the United States, through various agencies, is reaching out to lots of countries in

an effort to try to secure Mr. Snowden. He needs to come back to America and face the

justice system based on the choices that he’s made.

The rhetorical posturing of Kerry was strongly presumptuous of <Snowden>’s culpability. On a

June 24, 2013 in a press briefing, Carney concurred:

I would say that we are obviously in conversations and that we are working with them or

discussing with them -- or rather expecting them to look at the options available to them

to expel Mr. Snowden back to the United States to face justice for the crimes with which

he is charged.

The continued assertion of <Snowden>’s criminality worked to indemnify U.S. officials as it

directed focus toward the illegalities of <Snowden>, which assisted in the public amnesia of

unconstitutional U.S. <security> practices. The public trial of <Snowden> was intensified as

U.S. officials demanded that <Snowden> face <justice>.

The claims that <Snowden> be brought to <justice> held rhetorical significance of a

much greater magnitude than did the claims that <Snowden> face a “fair trial” or “due process”.

While at the definitional level, such legal speak can have synonymy, rhetorically these

phraseologies are work rather differently. While the phrases “fair trial” and “due process” served

paradoxically as accusations against <Snowden>, the utterances that called <Snowden> to be

brought to justice impose exaggerated guilt. Ventrell stated in a press conference on June 24,

2013 that: “we hope that the Russian Government will look at all available options to return Mr.

Snowden back to the U.S. to face justice for the crimes with which he’s charged”. Ben Rhodes,

Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, emphatically reiterated this

position eleven times on June 27, 2013 stating that <Snowden> should be brought to <justice> as

did Obama on June 27, 2013. Correspondingly, Carney’s messages consistently mentioned

bringing <Snowden> to <justice>, uttering the phrase ten times in five different press

engagements (July 12, 2013, July 24, 2013, August 1, 2013, October 28, 2013, and February 10,

2014). In fact, Dan Pfeiffer, Senior Advisor to the President (November 3, 2013), Kerry (May

28, 2014, CBS This Morning, Today Show), Psaki (May 29, 2014), Harf (August 11, 2014, June

1, 2015), and State Department Deputy Spokesperson Jeff Rathke (June 15, 2015) all iterated

that <Snowden> should be brought to <justice>. The connotations behind “being brought to

<justice>” functioned to project a guilty verdict upon <Snowden>. These connotations are

particularly indicative of the ideological posturing of U.S. officials. Whereas U.S. officials use

the definitional values to claim consistency throughout the discourse in regards to <Snowden>

facing “due process” and <justice>, rhetorically the phraseologies indicate the public trial being

propagated behind the façade of a requested formal legal trial. U.S. officials further indict

<Snowden> by contrasting <Snowden> with American values.

In nearly every analyzed artifact within this discourse, U.S. government officials not only

emphasized the criminality of <Snowden>, but set <Snowden> in stark contrast with American

values to forward a prosecution case. U.S. officials regularly referred to <Snowden>’s felony

charges throughout the narrative despite clear evidence reifying the illegality of U.S. surveillance

tactics. The prosecutorial posture of the U.S. government is consistently maintained throughout

the two years of discourse. On July 11, 2013, Carney contended:

But let me say that our position on Mr. Snowden is what it was, which is that we believe

that, and have communicated this to numerous countries, that he should be returned to the

United States, where he faces felony charges and is accused of serious crimes.

On May 29, 2015 Carney reiterated: “What I can say is there’s been no change in our position.

Mr. Snowden is accused of leaking classified information, and he faces felony charges here in

the United States.” Exemplified by Carney’s statements, the rhetorical posture of the U.S.

government remained unchanged over the course of the first two years of the <Snowden>

discourse.

Rogers expanded the accusation of <Snowden> on January 19, 2014 on Face the Nation

by insinuating that <Snowden> had afforded himself <security> clearances not available to the

common American.

There's some security things that he did get around that were clearly above his

capabilities. The way he departed and how he ended up in Moscow -- now, we still have

some questions there, but I can guarantee you he's in the loving arms of an FSB agent

right today, and that's not good for the United States and it's not good for the information

to be shared with nation-states. That actually hinders and will cost us billions of dollars,

by the way, Bob, to try to rectify the problems he's caused in the military operations.

Not only was <Snowden> juxtaposed with <security> in these statements, <Snowden> was

accused of using his privileges to escape the U.S. This is a rhetorical move by Rogers to

disparage <Snowden> by counterposing <Snowden> with the average American. Although

<Snowden> claimed to have worked in interests of the American public, Rogers contends the

opposite, attempting to create a stronger prosecution case against <Snowden>. A devaluation of

<Snowden> through the association with unwarranted privilege, coupled with an accusation of

an intimate relationship with Russian intelligence (RSB), functioned to move the discourse and

public perception in favor of U.S. government officials. Obama advanced himself as the catalyst

for public debate on issues of national <security>, dismissing the efficacy of <Snowden>. By

claiming to have created the debate, Obama disenfranchised <Snowden> in the political context,

wrongly asserting that <Snowden> was an ancillary element of the discourse. Obama made

similar claims in a White House press conference on August 9, 2013 in reference to the

reevaluation of U.S. surveillance tactics as he acknowledged that while <Snowden> may have

made the discourse more exciting for the press, Obama planned to create the same change

“without putting at risk our national security”. Obama admitted that America needed to find a

productive balance between <security> and <liberty>, but that <Snowden> served as an

obstruction to that process.

The criminalization of <Snowden> was also used as a means to elevate the position of

U.S. officials within the public debate between <security> and <liberty>. As <Snowden> was

equated with criminality, <Snowden> was cast as a detriment to national <security> and was

fashioned as an impediment to public discourse. When used in consistent repetition, the strategy

of U.S. officials indicted <Snowden> while muting both dissent against American systems of

surveillance and <democratic> discourse regarding <Snowden> and American values.

3.3 <Snowden> and <Democracy>

In functioning to criminalize <Snowden> and indemnify U.S. officials within the

manufactured trial of <Snowden>, the discourse surrounding the disclosures also challenged

inherent values of <democracy>. Analysis of the <Snowden> discourse reveals that U.S.

government officials regularly juxtaposed <Snowden> with <democratic> ideals.

On June 24, 2013 in a press conference, Carney discussed <Snowden> alongside

<democracy> and other notable ideographs:

…Mr. Snowden’s claim that he is focused on supporting transparency, freedom of the

press, and protection of individual rights and democracy is belied by the protectors he has

potentially chosen -- China, Russia, Ecuador, as we’ve seen. His failure to criticize these

regimes suggest that his true motive throughout has been to injure the national security of

the United States -- not to advance Internet freedom and free speech.

Carney’s categorization of political actors within this statement is indicative of the prosecutorial

stance of the U.S. government. While <Snowden> claimed he had acted on behalf of the people

for the betterment of American <democracy>, Carney paralleled <Snowden> with notable non-

democratic regimes (China, Russia, and Ecuador). The rhetorical posturing of the U.S.

government demarcated <Snowden> as the antithesis to American <democracy>. Thus, the

conflation of <Snowden> with countries deemed to lack <freedoms> of expression, like China,

Russia, and Ecuador, postulated that <Snowden>, and in particular the ideals that informed

<Snowden>, were un-American. The recognition of <Snowden> as a political abstraction is

paramount here. The inference of Carney’s rhetoric attempted to place anyone, including

American citizens who supported the mission of <Snowden>, in opposition to American

<democracy>.

At an international press engagement in Senegal on June 27, 2013 Obama, exercised a

rhetorical move which again presupposed <Snowden> as the antithesis to <democracy>. In his

address, Obama counterposed <democracy> against <Snowden> as he transitioned from

<democracy> to <Snowden>, and then back to <democracy>. The language used in these

commentaries, in particular the transitions from topic to topic, was telling. In the relevant section

of the dialogue, Obama was asked a two part question. The first inquiry was regarding the 2013

Supreme Court decision to strike down provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1964, and the

second was in regards to <Snowden>. While Obama responded in the order of the questions, the

contrast which ensued was significant.

But in the wake of this Supreme Court ruling, surely we can all agree that people should

be able to vote. They shouldn't be restricted from voting or have to jump through a whole

bunch of hoops in order to vote, and that there should be some uniformity in terms of

how that right is upheld. It's the cornerstone of our democracy. It's what makes our

democracy work. With respect to Mr. Snowden, we have issued through our Justice

Department very clear requests to both initially Hong Kong and then Russia that we seek

the extradition of Mr. Snowden. And we are going through the regular legal channels that

are involved when we try to extradite somebody. I have not called President Xi

personally or President Putin personally. And the reason is because, number one, I

shouldn't have to. This is something that routinely is dealt with between law enforcement

officials in various countries. And this is not exceptional from a legal perspective.

Number two, we've got a whole lot of business that we do with China and Russia. And

I'm not going to have one case of a suspect who we're trying to extradite suddenly being

elevated to the point where I've got to start doing wheeling and dealing and trading on a

whole host of other issues simply to get a guy extradited, so that he can face the Justice

system here in the United States.

Obama carried on regarding Snowden and was asked if there was any more damage that

<Snowden> could do.

In the meantime, we've got other business to do. For example, we're here in Africa and I

don't want people to forget why we're here……We're seeing countries like Senegal that

have sustained democracy and have sustained peace for many years who want to partner

with us, who are making sacrifices in places like Mali to maintain regional stability.

Within the entire discourse, Obama contested that <Snowden> was inconsistent with

<democracy>. Advantageous to the prosecution of <Snowden>, Obama positioned <Snowden>

as an inhibitor of <democratic> progress. The rhetorical implication of “In the meantime” was

particularly significant, as it simultaneously emphasized <democracy> while destabilizing

<Snowden>. It demarcated the <Snowden> actions as detrimental to the progress of

<democracy> and adversative to <democratic> principles. Obama enveloped the discourse

regarding <Snowden> with discourse on <democracy>, creating a stark contrast between the

two. By moving from <democracy>, to <Snowden>, then back to <democracy>, Obama created

a distinct disparity between these ideographs.

The juxtaposition is evident not only through the analysis of the intersection of

<Snowden> and <democracy>, but also through an analysis of the intersection of <Snowden>

and <democracy>’s principles. On June 24, 2013 Carney, expressed contempt for <Snowden>

and placed the <Snowden> abstraction as antithetical to <freedom>, a <democratic> principle.

The claims here attested that <Snowden> was un-American by association. By Carney’s logic, it

matters not what <Snowden> did, but rather who was keeping <Snowden> safe. “When it comes

to Mr. Snowden, he’s been indicted for the unauthorized release of classified information. And,

again, I think the point I made is that if his passion here is for press freedom and freedom of the

Internet and the like, that he has chosen unlikely protectors.”

Carney here admitted the tension between the U.S. government and <Snowden> although

both of these entities claimed to be working in the name of <freedom> and <liberty>. Rather

than engage the nuances of the dilemma, Carney employed a logically fallacious argument

stating that in this matter, <Snowden>, through the states within which he has found asylum, was

antithetical to <democracy>. Carney conflates <Snowden> and <Snowden>’s supporters with

authoritarianism.

Ventrell, echoed Carney’s sentiments claiming that if <Snowden> was concerned about

<freedom> of press and <freedom> of the internet, he chose some unlikely state asylums:

I mean, just to say there is a certain irony here, of course, that somebody who says that

he’s about freedom of the internet and freedom of information, of course, would seek out

some of these countries, and particularly you don’t see him standing up for the free flow

of information in some of these countries that don’t always have that.

After another related question on <Snowden>, Ventrell continued:

Well, from our perspective he leaked classified information, and that’s a serious crime in

this country. Having said that, the United States has long been a supporter of freedom of

access to the internet, of free communication, and certainly we do these programs to help

keep the American people safe and to help keep people safe in other countries by sharing

tips on terrorists, potential terrorist attacks, and to keep others safe.

Ventrell’s flawed logic was similar to Carney’s in attesting that because <Snowden> had found

asylum in non-democratic states, his motives must have been non-democratic. Claiming that the

U.S. has always been a proponent of the <freedom> of information, Ventrell exposed an

underlying political conundrum within the discourse. This propagation is, of course, hypocritical,

as Ventrell is concurrently prosecuting <Snowden>, who, through freedom of information,

exposed covert governmental surveillance. There was an operative chasm between the actions of

<Snowden> and the constructs put forth by U.S. government officials, who, in denying the

efficacy of <Snowden>, claimed identical actions as <democratic> when they did not relate to

<Snowden>.

The generated opposition between the abstractions of <Snowden> and <democracy>,

further indicted <Snowden> within the manufactured public trial. Yet, contrary to the façade

built by U.S. officials who contended that Snowden should return home to face trial,

ideologically, U.S. officials were better served if Snowden remained abroad. In reality, officials

did very little beyond lip service to have Snowden extradited. If Snowden was a true threat to

U.S. hegemony, Snowden would have been sought with much greater fervor. Edward Snowden’s

absence actually allowed for the perpetuation of <Snowden> as a political abstraction, which

sanctioned greater statist and dictatorial powers. In Edward Snowden’s absence, U.S. officials

were able to continue to prosecute <Snowden> in front of the American people within the greater

<terrorism> narrative.

3.4 <Snowden> and <Terrorism>

American political discourse saw an historic shift with the events of <9/11>. In the

aftermath, <terrorism> immediately became one of the most prominent ideographs within the

historical narrative of the U.S. While the American public had feared <communism> for

decades, those fears progressively waned after the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. Without

any impending threat to American hegemony at the turn of the century, <terrorism>, as an

abstraction, had little interference as it quickly began to inform the cognizance of the American

citizenry with the events of <9/11>. As <terrorism> gained salience within political discourse.

<Snowden> fits distinctively within the post-<9/11> discourse on <terrorism>, <security>, and

<counterterrorism> efforts.

In the immediate wake of <Snowden>, U.S. officials were quick to associate <Snowden>

with <terrorism> and accuse <Snowden> of aiding “the enemy”. Boehner contended that U.S.

surveillance programs were vital tools for fighting against <terrorists> and denounced

<Snowden> as a traitor on June 10, 2013. On June 23, 2013, in an interview on Meet the Press,

Rogers argued that because of <Snowden>, <terrorists> immediately began changing the ways

they communicated. Rogers went on to say that <Snowden> had disrupted <counterterrorism>

efforts to stop <terrorists> who were then plotting attacks against the U.S. and its allies (June 23,

2013). That same day on Face the Nation, Feinstein asserted that <Snowden> had significantly

damaged <counterterrorism> programs that had disrupted over fifty <terrorist> plots. In an

interview as well on This Week on June 23, 2013, Alexander issued a similar argument as he

referenced the more than fifty <terrorist> cases U.S. surveillance had disrupted. Alexander

further contended that <Snowden> had done irreversible damage to America and its allies, and

made America vulnerable to <terrorist> attacks. On CBS This Morning on May 28, 2014 Kerry

called <Snowden> disgraceful, and accused <Snowden> of telling <terrorists> what they could

do to avoid detection. The relationship between <Snowden> and <terrorism> was further

emphasized throughout the discourse as <Snowden> was often used as a discursive segue into

<terrorism> and vice versa.

While <Snowden> and <terrorism> were often treated as separate talking points, the

transitional regularity with which they were used reinforced the relational significance through

rhetorical association, further criminalizing <Snowden> and enforcing public perception of the

trial by media. On July 2, 2013, in a State Department press briefing, Psaki was asked a question

about <terrorism> in Pakistan, after which Psaki was asked a question on <Snowden>. Likewise,

Carney fielded a question on <terrorism> and unrest in Egypt at a press conference on July 8,

2013. Directly after Carney’s response, a reporter asked to “switch” the conversation to

<Snowden>. Carney briefed the press again on July 9, 2013 and was asked one question on

<Snowden>, which was interestingly placed between a question regarding Guantanamo Bay,

where Carney addressed <terrorism> <justice>, and a question on Afghanistan and the Taliban,

staple entities within the <terrorism> narrative.

It was as if that <Snowden> served only as a means through which to discuss

<terrorism>. On the July 28, 2013 edition of Meet the Press, host David Gregory interviewed

Rogers on the NSA and American <security> generally. Rogers responded by describing

American surveillance programs, emphasizing them as <counterterrorism> efforts. <Snowden>

was not mentioned in the entire discussion until Gregory signaled closure, stating: “Chairman,

I’ve got about 30 seconds left. Edward Snowden”. Rogers moved expediently through his

remarks on a variety of topics, predictably relating <Snowden> to Russia and <terrorism>. While

<Snowden> and <terrorism> were treated as separate topics, they were conflated through

association within the discourse. On August 5, 2013 Carney was being asked a long series of

questions at a press briefing on <terrorism>, <counterterrorism>, and al-Qaeda. Almost naturally

the discussion transitioned to <Snowden>: “And we are obviously continuing to gather

information to work with our partners and allies as we do that to combat this threat and the

overall threat posed by terrorist organizations that wish us harm”. A reporter then immediately

responded “And on Edward Snowden”. After two statements by Carney on <Snowden>, the

conversation shifts once again back to <terrorism>. As well, after answering a series of questions

on <Snowden> in a press briefing on August 12, 2013, Harf signaled for a new subject. The next

four questions were all distinctively about <terrorism>. These outlined exchanges, where two

seemingly unrelated discussions on <terrorism> and <Snowden> occur successively, happened

regularly over the course of the first two years after the <Snowden> revelations. Furthermore, in

assessing the discourse within the entirety of the 126 artifacts, only 19 artifacts do not directly

associate <Snowden> with <terrorism>, issues of national <security>, or political violence.

Such segues showcase the informative power ideology has over discourse. Functioning to

manipulate cognizance, ideological structures of American exceptionalism adamantly associated

<Snowden> with <terrorism>. The regularity of discursive transitions from <Snowden> to

<terrorism>, and vice versa, exhibit the ideological control over the progressions of thought

among the media and U.S. officials, and thus, the American public. The conflation of

<Snowden> and <terrorism> functioned not only as a scapegoating mechanism, but it created

and perpetuated a false binary within the discourse. As <Snowden> was associated with

<terrorism>, debates were formulated which forcibly shifted discourse into faux <democratic>

discourse.

4. Discussion

The recognition of <Snowden> as a facilitator the objectives of <terrorism> operated

rhetorically to afford U.S. officials the ability to maintain their positions of power. As

<Snowden> is accused of aiding <terrorist> organizations, <Snowden> allows U.S. officials the

rhetorical leap to set <Snowden> as the antithesis to American ideals. Insofar as <terrorism> has

been established as the enemy of American values, <Snowden> too is cast as the enemy of

America. The mediated prosecution of <Snowden> juxtaposed <Snowden> against the welfare

of the American citizenry. Discursive agents propagating the <Snowden> trial became quickly

fixated upon the character concerns of <Snowden>. As the debate was steered toward

<Snowden> within the greater discourse on <terrorism>, and effectively away from

governmental surveillance, actual discussions on <terrorism> writ large were clandestinely

suppressed. American citizens were made witnesses of a dialogue where <Snowden> was argued

as a hero or a traitor. In result, the deeper conversations on the relationship between <liberty>

and <security> within a <democracy> was largely ignored. For instance, debates on

<Snowden>’s <patriotism> ignored the critical inquiries which engaged the structural elements

of <terrorism>, and the basis for <terrorism> fears altogether. Centering the discourse on

<Snowden> assumed the reality of <terrorism> and yet failed to critique capitalistic and statist

structures that created, enabled, and perpetuated <terrorist> activities.

The conflation of <Snowden> with <terrorism> reinforced the ideology of American

exceptionalism, and effectively obstructed critical discourse which questioned American

hegemony and its relationship with political unrest. Within the narrative of the <Snowden>

media trial, the prosecution team of U.S. officials worked to classify <Snowden> with arguably

the most rebuked nomenclature of a post <9/11> world: <terrorism>. Successful rebranding of

<Snowden> within the narrative of the trial worked as well to indemnify U.S. officials of

governmental illegality, and granted U.S. officials carte blanche in the continued implementation

of domestic surveillance practices.

Like any narrative, <terrorism> needs systematic reinforcement in order to maintain

relevance. <Terrorism>’s power within the political arena can only be maintained if it is

consistently elemental within the discourse. Acts of <terrorism> alone do not advance a narrative

of <terrorism>. A strong narrative of <terrorism> does not need a <terrorist> attack so long as

the fear of a <terrorist> attack is maintained. Contrarily, <terrorism>, even when exacted, only

needs a mass medium in order to maintain relevance within the narrative. The perpetuation of the

fear allows the state to garner greater powers through the dissolution of civil <liberties> in the

name of <security> against <terrorism>, thus U.S. officials tied major events like <Snowden> to

<terrorism> and exploited it.

Throughout the 126 artifacts of the study, terms of <terrorism> (terrorism, terrorist, and

counterterrorism) are mentioned 579 times. The artifacts of this study were chosen specifically

because they were press engagements with U.S. officials where <Snowden> existed within the

discourse. Within the two years after <Snowden>’s revelations, <Snowden> appeared 770 times

within the discourse. In recognizing that the presence of <terrorism> was not a filter in

compiling the artifacts, it can be argued that <Snowden> serves significant utility for the

preservation of American hegemony within the <terrorism> story-arch. <Snowden> afforded

institutions of power the ability to continue to perpetuate the narrative of <terrorism>. As

<terrorism> was calculatedly intertwined within the discourse surrounding <Snowden>, the

propagation of fear grew in its salience. Since the centralized government in the U.S., a

<democratic> institution, cut the basic civil <liberties> of its citizens in the name of <security>,

such impacts are incontrovertibly substantial.

The prosecution of <Snowden> generated a paradox for the American citizenry.

<Snowden> represented American civil <liberties> and resistance to illegal governmental

surveillance. U.S. officials, however, positioned <Snowden> through public discourse in a

manner that put American civil <liberties> on trial. Unbeknownst to the American citizenry, it

has been set up against itself. While Snowden represented the revolution against governmental

overreach, U.S. officials have fabricated <Snowden> into the antithesis of American

<democracy>. Rather than recognizing covert governmental surveillance as un-American, U.S.

officials reproached <Snowden> and political dissidents broadly. The successful implementation

of the <Snowden> mythos served the purposes of hegemonic ideology as it set the American

public against itself. This position is particularly significant in the context of <freedom> of

expression within a <democracy>. According to its theorization, <democracy> inherently allows

for agonistic discourse. Ergo, <democratic> theorization sanctions, indeed welcomes, the

contestation between <citizens> who feel their civil <liberties> have been violated, and their

elected officials. The evocation of criminality in association with actors and actions like

<Snowden> is markedly authoritarian. The political ironies identified in these analyses, along

with the recognized perpetuation of authoritarianism within the <Snowden> discourse, are

illuminative of the ideological powers of <Snowden> and ideographs generally.

As was originally theorized by McGee (1980), ideographs function quite powerfully as

tools of ideology. In this case, <Snowden>, and everything associated with <Snowden>, such as

governmental dissent and citizen opposition against <security>, are conflated with <terrorism>

and enemies of American <democracy>. Within the narrative of the <Snowden> media trial, not

only does the prosecution absolve U.S. officials of culpability, it justified the dissolution of

certain civil <liberties> through the perpetuation of the myth of <terrorism>. Effectively thus,

U.S. officials were able to turn Snowden, a civil <liberties> advocate, into <Snowden>, the

antithesis to American <democracy>.

The ideographic utility of <Snowden> informs a multitude of non-<democratic>

tendencies within U.S. governmental bodies. <Snowden> served as an illusion of <democratic>

discourse, effectively deterring public attention away from increasing infringements upon civil

<liberties> in the name of <security>. U.S. officials used <Snowden> to perpetuate faux

<democratic> discourse through a covert media trial. As well, <Snowden> was propagated to

preserve an authoritarian perspective, rooted in fear and perpetuated within a narrative of

<terrorism>. Despite the illuminative powers of <Snowden> on the illegal and non-

<democratic> surveillance practices of the U.S. government, the narrative of <terrorism>

forwarded by U.S. officials repudiated public dissent, effectively silencing <democratic>

discourse surrounding <Snowden>. With substantive <democratic> discourse heavily restrained,

U.S. government officials faced few impediments in the continuation of authoritarian practices,

which expanded the propagation of American exceptionalism and hegemonic constructs like

neoliberalism and neocolonialism. Thus, regardless of Snowden’s best intentions in actualizing

<democracy> and <democratic> discourse, <Snowden> was utilized to forward the fears of a

<terrorism> narrative and advance the authoritarian dominance of American hegemony. To this

end, U.S. officials and their covert surveillance practices are best suited if Snowden never returns

to the U.S.

Although U.S. officials may claim they want a formal Snowden tribunal, they have

already prosecuted <Snowden> through a public trial. So long as Snowden remains abroad, U.S.

officials can continue to propagate the narrative of <terrorism> in the name of <Snowden>.

Through the rhetorical postulations of <Snowden> within the execution of a media trial, the

ideological institutions of the U.S. keenly used a whistleblower who publicized governmental

infringement of civil <liberties> to justify the continuation of governmental infringement of civil

<liberties> through covert surveillance.

The continued demand by U.S officials that Snowden return to the U.S. functioned to

conceal the public trial that was propagated against <Snowden>. At this juncture the embedded

powers of statist ideology are exposed. Through the implementation of a <Snowden>

prosecution, U.S. officials have been able to use unlawful <counterterrorism> efforts to exact the

continuation of unlawful, authoritarian <counterterrorism> practices. In the end, neither the

<security> of U.S. citizens in the face of <terrorism>, nor the protection of American civil

<liberties>, are the accomplishments of <Snowden>. Rather, the result of the <Snowden> trial is

the advancement of a statist ideology that functions not out of a <democratic> ethos, but solely

out of the continued hegemonic domination of a statist ideology which operated unwaveringly to

maintain the power imbalance of the status quo. Ideologically, <Snowden> functions to forward

American exceptionalism and the abstract enemy of <terrorism>, within which the ideological

structures of capitalism and statism are reinforced. As well, in response to <Snowden>, the

discourse strongly suggests that U.S. officials operated as authoritarians working under the guise

of <democracy>. Even through high profile dissent like <Snowden>, hegemonic institutions can

usurp a narrative for the maintenance of their power. Counterbalancing <democratic> ideographs

against, <Snowden> the political abstraction, through an association with the narrative of

<terrorism>, U.S. officials used the revelation of covert governmental surveillance to further

authenticate, with the approval of the majority of the American public, ongoing covert

governmental surveillance.

Finally, this analysis formulates significant theoretical development for ideographic

criticism. While scholars have soundly analyzed political terminology and imagery, rhetorical

scholarship has not yet identified the ways in which social agents are transformed into

manifestations of ideology. Methodologically, the Snowden ideograph proposes a rich path of

scholarship for rhetoricians. From the outset, it is reasonable to theorize that a multitude of

political actors are utilized in the same manner as Snowden. Recalling agents from recent

history, the rhetorical valence of President Barack Obama is quite different than condemnatory

allusions to “Obama”. Begrudging mentions of “Hillary” palpably extend beyond a reference to

Hillary Clinton and the variety of public offices she has held. The Snowden ideograph fosters

future rhetorical scholarship around the ideological abstraction of public agents. Through this

analysis it is clear that public figures, particularly those within the political arena, transcend

beyond corporal existence. Through heavily mediated discourse public persona can often become

ideological constructs. In many instances, like in the case of Snowden, that construct operates in

a manner antithetical to the intentions of the original person. In short, <Snowden> was used to

undermine Snowden. In order to further understand ideology and the interpellation processes

thereof, significant extrapolation of these phenomena is required. This analysis illuminates how

institutions of power usurp and rhetoricize public figures for the purposes of their own

hegemony. Additional, similar research can reify the rhetorical nuances of hegemonic ideologies,

providing deeper understanding of their pathologies and political power.

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CHAPTER 5: <SNOWDEN>, WHISTLEBLOWING, AND <DEMOCRACY>

1. Introduction

The development of the <Snowden> ideograph within an overarching whistleblowing

discourse formalized a significant juncture in U.S. history. The Snowden disclosures occurred at

a time when the events of <9/11> were becoming less salient and the subsequent wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan had aged beyond the threshold of a decade. As well, information technology was

experiencing rapid development and with it a regularity of cybersecurity breaches. Additionally,

rogue truth-tellers like Julian Assange and Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning were garnering

international attention. Manning, for instance, while serving in the U.S. military, was arrested in

May, 2010 for releasing hundreds of thousands of war documents through WikiLeaks, which had

become an entity known for revealing secret government information.

The upsurge of challenges regarding the ethics of information <security> and the

increased scrutiny of U.S. security agencies prompted the U.S. federal government to exercise a

number of initiatives to protect its own systems of information and technology. One of those

measures was the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA) of 2012, which provided

protected channels for federal employees who wished to expose governmental misconduct. The

WPEA was passed to deter the continued release of top-secret government information. The

Snowden revelations ignited public discourse on whistleblowing and the protective measures of

the WPEA.

Given the polemics over whistleblower distinctions throughout the discourse, this chapter

constitutes a synchronic ideographic analysis of pertinent, recognized ideographs as they

interreacted within the discursive tension of whistleblower classification. A synchronic

ideographic analysis examines the interplay of ideographs within a particular context. Prior to the

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synchronic analysis, this chapter first provides an overview of U.S. whistleblower protection

laws and previous U.S. whistleblowers. The chapter considers Snowden within these contexts.

The chapter also provides a brief comparative analysis of the whistleblower protection laws of

other nation states. While whistleblowing can occur in any organization, this chapter focuses

succinctly on whistleblowers, most notably Snowden, who illuminate government misconduct.

Through synchronic ideographic analysis, this chapter progresses by discussing the discursive

ideological manifestations of <Snowden> in accordance with whistleblowing vocabulary. The

synchronic analysis is formulated into two primary sections. The first part engages the

intersection of <Snowden> and whistleblowing terminology. In particular, this section

recognizes the progression of how the U.S. government approached <Snowden> within the

greater whistleblowing discourse. The second section analyzes the engagement between

whistleblowing terms and other discursive ideological manifestations, namely <security>,

<democracy>, <privacy>, <liberty>, <freedom>, and <terrorism>. Critical valuations are then

postulated regarding these findings as they relate to the relationships between the citizen and the

state within the U.S. and <democracy> writ large.

2. Whistleblower Legislation

2.1 U.S. Legislation

The first legislative effort by the U.S. to protect whistleblowers was in 1978 with the

Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). It was the first legislation to afford federal employees of the

U.S. government with protection rights. In 1989, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection

Act (WPA), which strengthened the CSRA by creating more explicit descriptions of the legal

protections. The WPEA extended the protections of the WPA to include contractors of the U.S.

government. While the WPEA directed government employees to report misconduct to the U.S.

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Office of Special Counsel, it legally included protections for whistleblowers who disclose

information to other sources as well, including the media. The WPEA did not, however, offer

overt legal protection to subcontractors of the government or their employees. The National

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2013 offered additional protection for governmental

whistleblowers, and even extended those protections for subcontractors of the U.S. government.

However, the NDAA of 2013, and all subsequent renditions (altered and approved annually),

explicitly excluded whistleblower protections for employees, contractors, and subcontractors

within the intelligence community.

2.2 Comparative Analysis

A comparative analysis of whistleblower protection laws around the globe indicates that

the WPA and WPEA are on par with most of their <democratic> international counterparts.

Iceland, for instance, is recognized as having some of the strongest whistleblower protection

laws in the world. Drafted in response to the Icelandic financial crisis in 2008,

the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative (IMMI) legally protects whistleblowers and journalists

alike. The IMMI offers explicit protections for the communication between whistleblowing

sources and journalists. Furthermore, the IMMI protects journalists who publish information

which illuminates the unethical or illegal activity of government officials and corporate

executives. Based on a 2013 report published by Transparancy International, funded by the

Directorate General of Home Affairs within the European Commission, a branch of the European

Union (EU) system of governance, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom

(U.K.) are all rated to have “comprehensive or near-comprehensive provisions and procedures

for whistleblowers in the public and/or private sectors” (Worth, 2013, p8). The U.K. for instance,

passed the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) in 1998. Updates in 2013, among other things,

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protected government employees who disclosed information of public interest directly to news

media (Worth, 2013).

All of these whistleblower protection statutes, including that of Iceland, suspend

protections to whistleblowers who divulge information to outside sources if it is deemed vital to

national security. This has served as a point of contention outside of just the Snowden case. The

U.K., while recognized as having some of the strongest whistleblower protections in the world,

regularly utilizes its Official Secrets Act (OSA) to protect classified information from being

published. Originally passed in 1889, the OSA, akin to the U.S. Espionage Act of 1917, has been

updated four times. The U.K. government has been criticized regularly for being too generous

with classifying information as relevant for national security (Ala’i and Vaughn, 2014). The

U.K.’s legislative efforts overrule whistleblower protection laws in favor of national security.

2.3 U.S. Whistleblower History

Snowden’s existence in U.S. history is unique, in comparison to other prominent

whistleblowers. Daniel Ellsberg, former Special Assistant for the U.S. Department of Defense,

publicly exposed the Pentagon Papers in 1971, long before formal legal protections had been

outlined for whistleblowers against the U.S. government. Former senior executive of the

National Security Agency (NSA) Thomas Drake faced charges of espionage after he blew the

whistle in 2005 on fraud and misuse of funds within the NSA. Drake’s correspondence occurred

before the WPEA, but could have potentially qualified for protections under the WPA had they

not been related to the NSA. Drake contended that he had attempted to follow the appropriate

protocol but was shut down. Given the available details, Drake was exonerated of all charges

except one misdemeanor. Manning’s release of classified information could arguably be

considered whistleblowing, but Manning’s practices were much more haphazard than that of

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Ellsberg, Drake, or Snowden. Manning’s unrestrained decision to release highly classified

information pertaining to national security negated any opportunity for whistleblower

protections. Choosing WikiLeaks as the medium, an organization famous for releasing massive

amounts of classified information into the public forum, did not help Manning, and Manning was

arrested, tried, and convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917. As well, as was demonstrated in

Manning’s trial, whistleblowers are not able to use legal protections like the First Amendment

(U.S.), the Fourth Amendment (U.S.) or the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1967 (U.S.).

Violations of the Espionage Act negate whistleblower protections, and Manning served seven

years in federal prison before President Barack Obama commuted the sentence.

2.4 Snowden and Whistleblower Protection

Snowden did not qualify for any whistleblower protections under the WPEA or the

NDAA. As an employee of a subcontractor within the intelligence community, the U.S.

government was not obligated to provide Snowden with any protections under U.S. law.

Furthermore, the NDAA of 2011 authorized the U.S. government to indefinitely detain

individuals without trial who were deemed as threats to national security. Each subsequent

rendition of the NDAA maintained or strengthened that dictate. Thus, Snowden could have

easily been detained without due process by those laws.

Unlike Julian Assange of WikiLeaks, or Chelsea Manning, who used WikiLeaks,

Snowden only communicated classified information with longstanding, reputable news agencies.

Many democratic theorists argue in defense of WikiLeaks. Certainly the argument for freedom of

information has its validity within liberal democracies, but it is also recognized here that

WikiLeaks often operates quite haphazardly. Snowden, on the contrary, was methodical, and

relied upon journalistic entities with reputations for high ethical standards. Snowden was the first

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internationally known whistleblower after the passage of the WPEA. Snowden contended that he

attempted to follow appropriate whistleblower protocol, but was ignored. Snowden then shared

the information he had gathered with revered institutions of journalism, The Guardian and The

Washington Post, for them to review. Both of the news outlets, and eventually others,

systematically revealed information that illuminated surveillance overreach by the U.S.

government. Given Snowden’s methods, Snowden certainly seems to fit within general

conceptions of whistleblowing. U.S. officials argued, however, that Snowden violated the

Espionage Act and threatened national security, and thus had recused himself of legal

protections. Furthermore, U.S. officials contended that Snowden was not eligible for

whistleblower protections as he did not follow the established protocol, despite Snowden’s

admissions otherwise. Given the measures Snowden took, the content of the information that was

revealed, and the international praise that followed the public disclosures, U.S. officials appear

stubbornly recalcitrant in their position to deny Snowden whistleblower status.

The complexities of the Snowden revelations reify a significant quandary in

<democratic> theory as it relates to whistleblowing. Snowden insisted that he attempted to go

through appropriate channels on at least ten occasions, but was silenced and ignored. Without

legal protections as a whistleblower, but with information that served of significant public

interest, Snowden chose to flee the U.S. to meet with journalists from The Guardian. While U.S.

officials condemned Snowden for disclosing the information and fleeing the U.S., there is good

reason to believe that had Snowden remained in the U.S., he would have been detained

indefinitely and the information never released. Snowden’s decisions were defended by former

whistleblower and former Senior Executive of the NSA, Thomas Drake, who stated that parts of

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the U.S. intelligence community “have become a criminal enterprise” and that releasing the

information from a secure location abroad was Snowden’s only viable option (Nelson, 2013).

Snowden’s dilemma demonstrates a point of contention within <democratic>

actualization. Snowden readily admitted that he illegally downloaded and released classified

information to the media and that in so doing he violated his non-disclosure agreement.

However, it was also ruled in 2015 that some of the NSA’s surveillance measures, like the bulk

collection of phone records, were illegal. The Planning Tool for Resource Integration,

Synchronization, and Management (PRISM), a problematic U.S. security program that collects

real-time data on U.S. citizens from sites like Facebook and Google, has also been heavily

scrutinized since Snowden’s disclosures. A public advocate appointed by the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), also known as FISA Court under the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act of 1978, to investigate PRISM concluded in 2016 that the program was patently

unconstitutional for violating the Fourth Amendment. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight

Board made similar assessments in 2014. Despite these assessments, PRISM was nonetheless

defended by the FISC magistrate and was reauthorized by Congress in 2018 (Nakashima, 2016).

Snowden’s disclosures have shown to have significant value in <democratic> discourses

on whistleblowing, civil <liberties>, <security>, and governmental surveillance. Public

knowledge of these surveillance systems stems directly from Snowden’s revelations. The

disclosures elucidated illegal and unethical behaviors of the U.S. government, yet, the legal

structures of the U.S., or any nation state for that matter, prohibited and continue to prohibit

political agents in Snowden’s situation to take action. Snowden’s actions have been defended

and celebrated on countless fronts, including by prominent <democratic> organizations like

Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Yet, the

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U.S. government continues to criminalize Snowden and defend its surveillance tactics.

Furthermore, U.S. officials refused to accept any level of accountability for their illegal actions,

and have effectively done little to alter their surveillance measures. Perhaps most alarming is the

refusal to address the shortcomings in whistleblower protections for agents like Snowden. The

laws that created Snowden’s predicament have only been strengthened since Snowden’s

revelations, further strengthening the inviability of whistleblowing against the intelligence

community of the U.S. government. As the forthcoming synchronic analysis reifies, national

defense is the measure by which statist ideology perpetuates itself.

3. Whistleblowing and the Ideograph

3.1 The Classification of Snowden

Consistently throughout the Snowden discourse U.S. officials and members of the media

grappled with the legal classification of whistleblowers. In the two public interviews by U.S.

officials the day after the Snowden saga began, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney (June

10, 2013) and Speaker of the House John Boehner (June, 10, 2013) were each asked about

Snowden’s status as a whistleblower. Throughout the first six months of the discourse, press

agents continued to inquire about Snowden’s whistleblowing status. A full reading of the

dialogue illuminates three primary postures the U.S. government adopted in relation to

Snowden’s whistleblower status. In the first phase, U.S officials abstain from discussions on

Snowden and whistleblowing. Shifting into the second phase, U.S. officials directly address

Snowden, and outwardly deny Snowden of whistleblower status. The final phase is signified by

an aversion to discussions on Snowden and the formal purging of whistleblowing from the

discourse. These three postures shift through the chronology, connoting three distinct phases

which are discussed in turn.

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3.2 Phase I: Refrain

In the first phase, U.S. officials refrained from forwarding whistleblower distinctions

altogether, and avoided direct commentary related to Snowden’s distinction as a whistleblower.

During this phase, the federal government remained publicly observational. While the U.S.

government largely abstained from commenting on whistleblowing in the opening weeks of the

Snowden narrative, the public and the press were not so reserved. Sparked by media attention,

debates on <Snowden> captivated the public. Largely, the debates revolved around how

Snowden should be classified. The posture adopted by U.S. officials helped in obscuring

<Snowden> and demonstrates Goodnight’s (1982) private sphere, where political deliberation

occurs outside of the public forum. Undoubtedly, officials were discussing Snowden behind

closed doors, but those deliberations were not offered into the public forum during the first

phase.

Spanning the immediate two weeks following Snowden’s revelations, the U.S.

government displayed a precautious posture during the first rhetorical phase. Only five artifacts

exist in this first phase, despite the regularity with which Snowden appeared in the general news

discourse. Of the five artifacts, four of them were press briefings with Carney. The other was an

appearance by Boehner on Good Morning America.

When asked in a press briefing on June 10, 2013 about public assertions that Snowden

should be considered a whistleblowing hero, Carney refrained from any formal

acknowledgement, stating “Well, I won’t comment specifically on an individual or his status.”

Similarly in the White House press briefing the following day, Carney was asked if Snowden

should be considered a traitor. Carney answered “Again, I won’t comment specifically on

someone who’s under investigation. I won’t characterize him or his status”. Later in that same

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briefing, Carney delivered a prepared statement on whistleblowers and the protections afforded

to them by the WPEA, which was enacted in November of the previous year.

The Obama administration has demonstrated a strong commitment to protecting

whistleblowers. The whistleblowers can play an important role in exposing waste, fraud,

and abuse. There are established procedures that whistleblowers can employ that also

protect -- rather ensure protection of national security interests. And I would -- if you

look at the history here, the President appointed strong advocates to the Office of Special

Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board, who have been widely praised. They

have collectively issued an all-time high number of favorable actions on behalf of

whistleblowers and have begun to change the culture so that whistleblowers are more

willing to come forward. On November 27th, 2012, after four years of work with

advocates and Congress to reach a compromise, the President signed the Whistleblower

Protection Enhancement Act, which provides whistleblower protections for federal

employees by clarifying the scope of protected disclosures, expanding judicial review,

expanding the penalties imposed for violating whistleblower protections, creating new

protections for transportation security officers and scientists, creating whistleblower

ombudsmen, and strengthening the authority of the Office of Special Counsel to assist

whistleblowers. Because it was clear that Congress would not provide protections for

intelligence community whistleblowers, the President took executive action, issuing a

landmark directive that extended whistleblower protections to the intelligence and

national security communities for the first time. The directive prohibits retaliation against

whistleblowers who report information through the appropriate channels and established

procedures, including a review panel of IGs of other agencies to ensure that such

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retaliation does not occur. The President’s commitment on this issue far exceeds that of

past administrations, which have resisted expanding protections for whistleblowers and in

doing so have steered away from transparency.

Carney’s statement articulated the U.S. government’s official position on whistleblowers and the

protections afforded to them. The position publicly indicates the legal arguments that U.S.

officials will begin forwarding in the campaign against <Snowden>. While Snowden is not

directly addressed by Carney, the U.S. government was positioning itself to deny Snowden of

whistleblower status.

Immediately thereafter, Carney was asked if the White House viewed Snowden as “a

whistleblower or a leader”. Carney responded by stating “I am not willing to comment on the

status of the individual under investigation.” (June 11, 2013). Carney relayed the same message

again the next day: “I've simply said what our disposition is on this, that we're not going to

comment on the subject of a recently begun and ongoing investigation into the unauthorized

disclosure of classified information” (June 12, 2013). Carney repeated this equivalent claim

again the following day.

After Carney’s press conference on June 13, 2013, ten days passed before any U.S.

official addressed <Snowden> again. The first phase includes these ten days of silence as it

represents the initially cautious posture the U.S. government assumed regarding Snowden’s

revelations and corresponding whistleblowing implications. The lack of artifacts in the first

phase reveals the hesitancy with which U.S. officials approached <Snowden>. This silence

demonstrates not only the ongoing investigation that Carney described, but also the attempts by

the U.S. to apprehend Snowden abroad. As Snowden avoided international seizure, U.S. officials

began their ideological campaign against <Snowden>.

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3.3 Phase II: Denounce

The rhetorical shift into the second phase was initiated by Snowden’s move from Hong

Kong to Moscow on June 23, 2013. Having failed to negotiate Snowden’s return to the U.S.,

governmental officials assumed a formal posture on Snowden’s whistleblowing status. The

second phase highlights a rhetorical turn where U.S. officials adopted the perspective that

Snowden was indeed not a whistleblower. Officials actively engaged in denoting the importance

of this distinction. U.S. officials agree to enter the public phase of political deliberation

(Goodnight, 1982), denouncing Snowden publicly and denying Snowden of whistleblower

status.

Chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee Dianne Feinstein (June 23, 2013) and

Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee Mike Rogers (June 23, 2013) effectively

launched the second phase of the discourse by openly stating that Snowden was not a

whistleblower. In regards to Snowden’s status, Rogers contended that:

He went outside all of the whistleblower avenues that were available to anyone in this

government, including people who have classified information. We get two or three visits

from whistleblowers every single week in the committee, and we investigate every one

thoroughly. He didn’t choose that route”. Feinstein concurred, stating “Well, I don't think

this man is a whistleblower.

The second phase of the discourse is marked by an adamant denial of Snowden’s whistleblowing

status by U.S. government officials, and justifications of felony charges due to accusations of

irreparable harm to U.S. interests. The most detailed and pejorative remarks came from Jen

Psaki, State Department Spokesperson, in a Department of State press briefing on July 12, 2013.

Earlier that day, Russia had afforded Snowden a public forum in the Moscow airport. Psaki’s

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press briefing was largely a direct response to the forum. When asked if the Department of State

believed that Snowden should not have been allowed to speak publicly, Psaki stated “Our

concern here is that he’s been provided this opportunity to speak in a propaganda platform” and

that “Russia has played a role in facilitating this, that others have helped elevate it.” The press

prodded further, asking “people who are accused of crimes are allowed their right of free speech,

are they not?” Psaki eventually retorted “We certainly are upset that there was a platform for an

individual who’s been accused of felony crimes.”

The respective dialogue during Psaki’s public briefing is the quintessence of the

overarching quandary surrounding the <Snowden> discourse as it reified governmental

hypocrisy and exposed the unconditional self-interest of U.S. security agencies. Within the same

conversation, Psaki defended the right to free speech, but condemned Snowden for being granted

a public forum. The exploration of this quandary serves as a primary impetus for rhetorical

inquiry into the contestation over the term “whistleblower”. Contentions analogous to that of

Psaki manifested with Carney on August 1, 2014 as well. Carney asserted:

Mr. Snowden is not a whistleblower. He is accused of leaking classified information and

has been charged with three felony counts, and he should be returned to the United States

as soon as possible where he will be accorded full due process and protections.

After another question, Carney continued:

When you take an oath to protect the secrets of the United States, you're bound to protect

them and there are consequences if you don't. There are also procedures in place for

whistleblowers that are available to those who would blow the whistle, if you will. The

unauthorized leaking of classified information has and can do enormous damage to our

national security interests.

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In a Department of State press briefing on June 24, 2013, State Department Press Officer

Patrick Ventrell, when asked of Snowden and whistleblowing, stated:

Well, from our perspective he leaked classified information, and that’s a serious crime in

this country. Having said that, the United States has long been a supporter of freedom of

access to the internet, of free communication, and certainly we do these programs to help

keep the American people safe and to help keep people safe in other countries by sharing

tips on terrorists, potential terrorist attacks, and to keep others safe. So there’s really a

pretty strong distinction there, and we feel pretty strongly about it.

On July 28, 2013, Rogers heightened the <Snowden> rhetoric on Meet the Press:

He has disclosed programs that make it easier for terrorists overseas. And the first people

who are going to feel that damage are our soldiers in Afghanistan. We need to understand

that. This is serious and it’s real. As well as empowering Chinese and Russian

intelligence officials….He missed every opportunity to be a whistleblower when he

missed every opportunity to talk to a whole host of avenues for him.

Similarly, during the White House press briefing on August 1, 2013, Carney contended:

Mr. Snowden is not a whistleblower. He is accused of leaking classified information and

has been charged with three felony counts, and he should be returned to the United States

as soon as possible where he will be accorded full due process and protections.

It is no surprise that the U.S. government responded to Snowden in this manner. Historically,

U.S. officials go immediately on the defensive against whistleblowers, like in the case of

Ellsberg and Drake. While Ellsberg and Drake both understood their potential for extensive

prison sentences, they were both guaranteed a trial. Under the NDAA of 2013, Snowden had no

such guarantee.

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Having signed whistleblower protections into law, Obama contended that Snowden

should have used the prearranged avenues set forth by the WPEA (August 9, 2013):

If the concern was that somehow this was the only way to get this information out to the

public, I signed an executive order well before Mr. Snowden leaked this information that

provided whistleblower protection to the intelligence community -- for the first time. So

there were other avenues available for somebody whose conscience was stirred and

thought that they needed to question government actions.

Obama asserted that by not using these protections, Snowden forfeited all whistleblower defense

rights. Congruently, Feinstein suggested on the November 3, 2013 installment of Face the

Nation, that by not following protocol, Snowden forfeited any opportunity for clemency:

He had an opportunity, if what he was was (sic) a whistleblower to pick up the phone to

call the House intelligence committee, the Senate intelligence committee and say, look, I

have some information you ought to see. And we would certainly see him, maybe both

together, maybe separately, but we would have seen him and we would have looked at

that information. That didn't happen. And now he's done this enormous disservice to our

country. And I think the answer is, no clemency.

Rogers as well indicated disdain for Snowden on the December 22, 2013 episode of This Week:

He has traded something of value for his own personal gain that jeopardizes the national

security of the United States. We call that treason. And I think that letter -- I think very

clearly lays out who this gentleman is and what his intentions were clearly. And so would

I like him to come back? He should come back. He didn't use any of the whistleblower

protection avenues laid out before him. None. Zero.

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While government officials were emphatic that Snowden was not a whistleblower, the topic was

regularly addressed throughout phase two, that is, through the end of 2013. The second phase is

defined by the U.S. government outwardly contending, quite extensively, that Snowden was not

a whistleblower. The third and final phase marks a distinctive shift away from comprehensive

discussions on whistleblowing by U.S. officials, despite the continued regularity of

whistleblowing discussions in the public forum.

3.4 Phase III: Purge

The final turn, denoted when governmental proceedings resumed in January of 2014 after

the holiday break, also signified the U.S. government’s general averseness to public discussion

on <Snowden> and whistleblowing. In this last stage U.S. officials maintained their few key

talking points and deflected additional questions that pertained to <Snowden>. Whistleblower

language was noticeably absent in the third phase. Whistleblowing was not mentioned in the first

27 artifacts of 2014, and whistleblowing did not reappear in the <Snowden> discourse until May

29, 2014. Instead, officials focused exclusively on the U.S. government’s request that Snowden

return to the U.S. and face trial for three felony charges. Members of the press had regularly

inquired about Snowden’s whistleblower status in phases one and two, but not in phase three.

The purging phase moved whistleblowing discourse into Goodnight’s (1982) technical phase.

U.S. officials refused to engage the topic of whistleblowing in the public forum, having defaulted

to legalistic language throughout the second phase. The silent posture in the third phase marks

the formal disassociation of the public from whistleblowing deliberations. Forcing deliberation

into the technical sphere is a decidedly anti-democratic move as it disassociates the public from

the political forum.

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There was a clear shift by both the media and the U.S. government, when interacting with

each other, away from whistleblowing terminology at the beginning of 2014. Of the eighty total

occurrences of whistleblowing terms in the entirety of the discourse, 75 happen prior to 2014.

The final phase effectively purged the concept of whistleblowing from the narrative. The

rhetorical shift in phase three demonstrates the control that statist ideology has upon U.S.

<democracy>. Whereas theories of <democracy> unequivocally agree that media should

function as the fourth estate, U.S. news organizations yielded to the dictates of the U.S.

government and stopped pressing officials about Snowden and whistleblowing. Despite the

publication of Snowden’s disclosures, media outlets exposed their submissiveness by

participating in the development of each phase. The development of three distinct phases

throughout the <Snowden> discourse informs the subsequent synchronic analysis.

4. Synchronic Analysis

4.1 Phase I: Refrain

Through the discursive exchanges in phase one, U.S. officials established their

definitional position on whistleblowing, affording themselves carte blanche in their eventual

handling of <Snowden>. Only once was Snowden directly addressed by U.S. officials in the

first two weeks of the discourse when George Stephanopoulos of Good Morning America asked

Boehner on June 10, 2013 if Snowden should be considered a “whistleblowing patriot” or a law

breaker who betrayed the American people. Boehner then immediately used the question

concerning whistleblowing to perpetuate the <terrorism> mythos by replying: “He's a traitor. The

President outlined last week that these were important national <security> programs to help keep

Americans safe, and give us tools to fight the terrorist threat that we face.” Boehner did not

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directly address the status of Snowden as a whistleblower, but insinuated that whistleblowing is

counterproductive to American <security> interests.

Carney issued the most extensive comment on whistleblowing during the first phase with

a prepared statement in a press briefing on June 11, 2013. Within that statement, which mentions

whistleblowing terms fourteen times, <security> is referenced three times. <Security> is the only

other ideograph present within Carney’s statement. Carney defends the President’s authorization

of whistleblower protections in the interest of protecting those who work in national <security>.

While Carney never directly mentioned Snowden, the statement implied that Snowden’s actions

were harmful to national <security>: “There are established procedures that whistleblowers can

employ that also protect -- rather ensure protection of national security.” Although the discussion

on whistleblowing was minimal in phase one, Boehner and Carney were laying the groundwork

for the U.S. government’s position on whistleblowers.

4.2 Phase II: Denounce

4.2.1 <Terrorism> and <Security>

The most evident relational interplay within the <Snowden> discourse between

whistleblowing and relative ideographs was with that of <security> and <terrorism>. Throughout

the <Snowden> dialogue, <terrorism> and <security> appeared with regularity and significance.

<Terrorism>, one of the most prominent ideographs in the U.S. after <9/11>, was continuously

reinforced throughout the discourse, and was juxtaposed against U.S. <security>. <Terrorism>

and <security> operated not only in conjunction with the construction of the <Snowden>

ideograph, but also worked to jettison whistleblowing from the narrative. U.S. officials did this

by denying Snowden whistleblower status for not following WPEA protocols and threatening

national <security> by abetting <terrorists>. Thus, U.S. officials utilized prominent ideographs,

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like <terrorism> and <security>, to concurrently obfuscate <Snowden> and usurp the power of

whistleblowing.

During phase two, federal officials constructed the <Snowden> abstraction and removed

<Snowden> of all whistleblowing distinctions. In doing so, U.S. officials utilized the media

attention to reiterate the ideological threats of <terrorism> and reemphasize the importance of

secretive national <security> initiatives. Additionally, U.S. officials admitted that they were

unaware of how much information Snowden had not yet released. The campaign against

<Snowden> is also read as preemptive, in order to criminalize Snowden before the exposure of

additional information. Anticipating the continued disclosure of classified intelligence

information, especially during the beginning of the denunciation phase, U.S. officials publicly

campaigned against <Snowden> as a measure of self-preservation.

Throughout phase two, the state labored to protect itself against future public dissent.

State officials continuously reduced the acceptable designation of the public whistleblower; they

used their platform to misappropriate the discursive value of public whistleblowers writ large by

confining whistleblowers to governmental mandates. In an interview on Face the Nation on June

23, 2013, Feinstein stressed that Snowden was not a whistleblower, further asserting of Snowden

“the damage he's done is essentially to reveal a program which has worked well and disrupted

<terrorist> plots. And there are more than 50 <terrorist> plots that it has played a role in.” On

July 28, 2013 Rogers stated on Meet the Press that Snowden had bypassed all opportunities to be

a whistleblower and in doing so, had made it easier for <terrorists> overseas. In a press briefing

on August 1, 2013 Carney contended of Snowden: “He’s not a dissident. He’s not a

whistleblower.”, and further stated “The unauthorized leaking of classified information has and

can do enormous damage to our national <security> interests.” Continuing the narrative on the

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January 19, 2014 airing of This Week, Rogers reiterated that Snowden had blown every

opportunity to be a whistleblower and “has traded something of value for his own personal gain

that jeopardizes the national <security> of the United States.” Reaffirming the U.S.

government’s position nearly a year after the initial Snowden revelations, Carney remarked on

May 29, 2014 in a White House Press Briefing that Snowden failed to follow whistleblower

protocol. In that same briefing, Carney also accused <Snowden> of supporting al Qaeda and

other <terrorist> networks.

The unreserved prosecutorial stance of the U.S. government remained throughout the

<Snowden> discourse. Oftentimes, U.S. officials simply refused to engage in discussions on

specifics saying, for instance, they will not comment on individuals in an “open investigation”

(Obama, 2014, January 17). While U.S. officials largely refrained from discussing the particulars

of Snowden, a review of the discourse indicates that officials were most concerned that Snowden

revealed how U.S. security institutions surveilled the masses. U.S. officials stressed that

Snowden compromised national security by exposing to potential enemies “the nature and

methods of our intelligence collection” (Rhodes, 2013, June 27). However, those methods were

declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Court of Appeals. Phase two illuminates the campaign by

U.S. officials to dismiss public debate on <Snowden> and whistleblowing by pushing the

discourse eventually into the technical sphere.

U.S. officials redirected the discussion of whistleblowing to the ideological perpetuation

of fears of <terrorism> to assist in the denial of whistleblowing within the narrative. Thus, in the

same way that <Snowden> functioned to maintain ideological fears, terms of whistleblowing

were utilized as trigger mechanisms for the continuation of the <terrorism> narrative. When

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asked about Snowden and blowing the whistle on state sponsored surveillance, Ventrell

defaulted to <terrorism> rhetoric, stating:

Well, it is, and it is for a reason, because we’re talking about very different things here.

On the one hand, you’re talking about some of our intelligence programs, which again, I

can’t always get into detail, but broadly speaking are to help keep us safe, to go after

terrorists, and that are done in a legal way through our different branches of government,

including with judicial oversight, including through the Congress (June 24, 2013).

Obama articulated that signing off on protections for whistleblowers allowed the U.S. to

continue to safeguard itself against <terrorists>:

I’ve got a problem with what’s going on here, I’m not sure whether it’s being done

properly. If, in fact, the allegations are true, then he didn’t do that. And that is a huge

problem because a lot of what we do depends on terrorists networks not knowing that, in

fact, we may be able to access their information.

At times, government officials were asked specifically about the weakness of whistleblower

protections for intelligence community subcontractors, like Snowden. In those instances, U.S.

officials skirted interrogation and reiterated fears of <terrorism>. For instance, in a press

conference on May 29, 2014, Carney was asked “Do you acknowledge that the whistleblower

protections in the intelligence community are essentially much weaker than in any other part of

government?” Averting the question, Carney responded:

What I can tell you is that there are avenues available to somebody like Mr. Snowden to

raise those kinds of concerns and whistleblower allegations.…I think that it is fair to say

that it is the view of the U.S. government that what Mr. Snowden did was a violation of

the law, that it was a serious offense; that as many senior people in the national security

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apparatus have attested to, damaging to our national security, made it easier for or gave

insight to our enemies, to terrorists that makes it harder for the United States and our

allies to go after them….Unauthorized disclosures of classified information harm U.S.

and allied efforts to identify, track and disrupt the activities of our adversaries, including

terrorists. Many of these efforts are born of years of carefully managed intelligence

efforts. As a result of these disclosures, our adversaries, including terrorists and their

support networks, now have a better understanding of our collection methods and are

taking counter measures.

In addition to this avoiding the concept of whistleblowing, federal officials reiterated their

appeals for power as they pressed the <terrorism> narrative.

Throughout the discourse, U.S. officials used whistleblowing both as a keyword prompt

to proliferate a fear of <terrorism> and as a platform to contrast whistleblowing against the

interests of national <security>. While whistleblowing terms themselves did not authenticate

ideological manifestations of power, they functioned as linguistic mechanisms which recurrently

preempted ideological posturing. Recognizing the context and the public awareness of the

whistleblowing discourse, U.S. officials used keyword language to reinforce the predominant

fear of terrorism in the wake of <9/11>. The ideological hegemony of the state was largely

maintained through consistent discussions of external <security> threats. While this posture is

not uncommon for hegemonic states, Snowden’s revelations of illegal governmental surveillance

placed the U.S. government in a precarious position. Given that there were no legal ramifications

for any U.S. official in the wake of <Snowden>, it appears that U.S. government officials were

able to absolve themselves by controlling the discourse in their favor.

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4.2.2 <Liberty>, <Freedom>, <Privacy>, and <Democracy>

In addition to being synchronically analyzed with <security> and <terrorism> discourse,

whistleblowing utterances will also be analyzed alongside the ideographs <liberty>, <freedom>,

<privacy>, and <democracy>. Unlike <terrorism> and <security>, these ideographs were almost

entirely absent from discussions on whistleblowing in all three phases. The absence is striking

considering the regularity of these terms within the greater political discourse outside of

interactions with U.S. officials. For instance, of the examined artifacts, the term <democracy>

appeared 180 times. None of these utterances were in regards to whistleblowing conversations

between the press and state officials. <Liberty> only appeared 12 times, but never within the

context of whistleblowing discourse. The term <liberties>, as an ideographic variant of

<liberty>, was uttered 66 times within the <Snowden> discourse. Like the utterances of

<liberty>, not once was this term mentioned in the context of whistleblowing. <Privacy> was

mentioned 256 times in the entirety of the <Snowden> discourse. None of these occurrences

existed in the same comment from a U.S. official as the term whistleblowing.

The only examined ideograph to exist directly within conversations between state

officials and members of the media was the term <freedom>. It appeared 176 times within the

entire discourse. However, only 3 of these utterances occurred within relevant whistleblowing

conversations. In each of these 3 occurrences, <Snowden> was juxtaposed against the concept of

<freedom>. On June 24, 2013 Ventrell conflated <Snowden> with heavy governmental oversight

stating:

I mean, just to say there is a certain irony here, of course, that somebody who says that

he’s about freedom of the internet and freedom of information, of course, would seek out

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some of these countries, and particularly you don’t see him standing up for the free flow

of information in some of these countries that don’t always have that.

The aforementioned exchange between Psaki and the press on July 12, 2013 contained the

second utterance. Psaki never mentioned the word <freedom>, but in response to a question as to

whether or not Snowden should forfeit the right to <freedom> of speech, Psaki stated “He’s not a

whistleblower. He’s not a human rights activist. He’s wanted in a series of serious criminal

charges brought in the eastern district of Virginia and the United States.” Lastly, Rogers, on

December 22, 2013, made claims similar to that of Ventrell, asserting of Snowden: “He didn't

use any of the whistleblower protection avenues laid out before him. None. Zero. He went to the

press. Then he went to the bastion of internet freedom, China, and then Russia.” In each of these

three occurrences, <Snowden> and the practice of whistleblowing are postulated as antithetical

to the concept of <freedom>.

The presence of whistleblowing terms were not moderated in the mediated public forum,

signifying the value of the whistleblowing’s absence within media interactions with U.S.

officials. Through a variety of news media searches, media outlets congruently discussed

<Snowden>, whistleblowing terms, and democratic concepts like <liberty>, <freedom>,

<privacy>, and <democracy>, with an incredibly high regularity. LexisNexis searches were

conducted to measure the frequency of the analyzed ideographs within news media. Searches

were performed within specific date ranges as the two years of discourse provided an

innumerable amount of results. Searches were conducted for mediated stories that included

“Snowden” and any whistleblowing term which also included either <democracy>, <freedom>,

<privacy>, or <liberty>. From June 5, 2013 through July 5, 2013, LexisNexis populated 2571

news items that matched the criteria. The same search was conducted for the last month of the

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analyzed discourse, from May 15, 2015 through June 15, 2015 which populated 398 results. For

all searches, new publications of high similarity were excluded to avoid redundancy. The sheer

volume of results demonstrates the regularity of discussions at the intersection of <Snowden>,

whistleblowing, and democratic ethos. Clearly, news media and the public were grappling with

these concepts. The avoidance of this discursive intersection by U.S. officials further indicates

their attempts to purge whistleblowing, control the narrative, and silence government dissent.

Historically, one of the paradoxes of <democracy> is striking a publicly amenable

balance between <security> and <liberty>. Contemporarily, that discussion has been

concentrated to a debate between concerns of <privacy>, as a conflated subsidiary of <liberty>,

and <terrorism>, as a threat to <security>. While Snowden’s whistleblowing actions were a

primary catalyst for public discourse, the U.S. government sought to ensure that Snowden did

not provide the public with the impetus for further deliberation. While mediated public discourse

regularly admitted the importance of Snowden within the debate between <security> and

<liberty>, U.S. officials refused to acknowledge the connection. Whistleblowers are granted

narrative power when referenced as stimuli for public dialogue. Thus, while U.S. officials

frequently addressed public concerns of <privacy> and <security>, the discussions occurred at a

considerable distance from whistleblowing discourse. U.S. officials treated Snowden’s

whistleblowing in the same way they treated Ellsberg, Drake, and Manning, reducing them to

their criminal accusations and stripping them of any importance within the narrative. Within the

<Snowden> discourse U.S. officials contended that they were sincerely concerned with finding

the right balance between <security> and <privacy>, but the relative deliberative processes were

entirely unrelated to <Snowden> or whistleblowing.

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4.2.3 Legalism

U.S. officials regularly diminished the role of <Snowden> within the context of the

debate, which afforded the state control over the discourse. Carney was asked on June 10, 2013:

There’s a petition on the White House website saying, ‘Pardon Edward Snowden

immediately,’ calling on the President to issue a pardon -- 12,000 signatures last time I

saw. What is the White House reaction to such a notion and to the sense that he is a hero?

Some are calling him a hero for being a whistleblower on this. What does the White

House say to that?

The question by the press specifically asked about Snowden and whistleblowing within the

context of governmental surveillance. Regardless of the intent of the petitioners, Carney showed

no interest in directly addressing Snowden or Snowden’s growing public support. Instead,

Carney instantly disassociated Snowden and whistleblowing from the narrative, and rebranded

Snowden’s actions as disastrous, reckless, and criminal. “When it comes to the petitions, we

obviously await a threshold being crossed before we respond to it, and that threshold has not

been crossed.” Carney further stated:

I think Director Clapper has spoken about this, I think the President has, that in general,

leaks of sensitive classified information that cause harm to our national security interests

are a problem -- a serious problem. And they’re classified for a reason. And as I said I

think to Jessica, when you -- and I’m basically paraphrasing Director Clapper -- that

when you divulge information that provides a playbook, if you will, to how we -- to

efforts that this government undertakes to counter the efforts of those who would kill

Americans or attack the United States in some way, or our allies, you’re assisting them in

evading those measures.

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The following day (June 11, 2013), Carney strengthened the rhetoric, and further articulated that

Obama had already emphasized the importance of publicly addressing the relationship between

<privacy> and <security>.

As you heard the President say on Friday, he believes that we must strike a balance

between our security interests and our desire for privacy. He made clear that you cannot

have 100 percent security and 100 percent privacy, and thus we need to find that balance.

He believes as Commander-in-Chief, that the oversight structures that are in place to

ensure that there is the proper review of the kinds of programs that we have in place,

authorized by Congress through the PATRIOT ACT, and FISA do strike that balance. He

also said that he understands and believe it is entirely legitimate that some may disagree.

Some may believe that that balance ought to be shifted in one direction or the other from

where it currently is, and he welcomes the debate about that. He mentioned this very

explicitly in his speech to the National Defense University several weeks ago on the

broader topics of our counterterrorism programs, but he spoke specifically about

surveillance and the balance that we need to strike between security and privacy, between

security and inconvenience. And that is a worthy discussion to have in public and he

welcomes that debate, because it’s an important debate. And I think it’s important to note

that we have had this debate every time the PATRIOT ACT has come up for passage and

reauthorization. And it has been a spirited debate with strongly held opinions expressed

by people who are opposed to the structures that are in place that have been authorized by

bipartisan majorities in Congress, that are overseen by the courts, as well as internally by

the executive branch. So that's important and it’s healthy and we should continue to have

that debate.

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Governmental control of the narrative continued throughout the second phase of the <Snowden>

saga wherein U.S. officials assumed ownership of the debate and downplayed <Snowden> and

whistleblowing in general. In a White House press conference on August 9, 2013, Obama

exemplified such governmental control. As Obama proposed actions to address the public

concerns regarding illegal surveillance, he minimized the federal government’s culpability while

subversively acknowledging fault, and further stressing the ideological enemy of <terrorism>.

And that's why, over the last few weeks, I’ve consulted members of Congress who come

at this issue from many different perspectives. I’ve asked the Privacy and Civil Liberties

Oversight Board to review where our counterterrorism efforts and our values come into

tension, and I directed my national security team to be more transparent and to pursue

reforms of our laws and practices. And so, today, I’d like to discuss four specific steps --

not all inclusive, but some specific steps that we’re going to be taking very shortly to

move the debate forward. First, I will work with Congress to pursue appropriate reforms

to Section 215 of the PATRIOT ACT, the program that collects telephone records. As

I’ve said, this program is an important tool in our effort to disrupt terrorist plots. And it

does not allow the government to listen to any phone calls without a warrant. But given

the scale of this program, I understand the concerns of those who would worry that it

could be subject to abuse. So after having a dialogue with members of Congress and civil

libertarians, I believe that there are steps we can take to give the American people

additional confidence that there are additional safeguards against abuse.

Obama carefully framed Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act in a manner that recognized the legal

impetus for reform while also indemnifying the federal government in its surveillance matters.

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Obama’s rhetoric, in a convoluted manner, afforded himself the credit for reforming the

illegal practices that he adamantly defended. Principally, this was done by discursively

convicting <Snowden> and purging whistleblowing from the narrative. Obama claimed that he

would work with Congress to “improve the public’s confidence in the oversight conducted by the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court”, create more transparency for these programs by

directing “intelligence community to make public as much information about these programs as

possible”, and foster additional oversight by “forming a high-level group of outside experts to

review our entire intelligence and communications technologies”. Obama assumed the onus for

the development of the contemporary debate as he assured the public he would provide “greater

assurances that the court is looking at these issues from both perspectives -- security and

privacy”, but did so by devaluing <Snowden> both directly and indirectly. He first alluded to

Snowden by stating:

The men and women of our intelligence community work every single day to keep us

safe because they love this country and believe in our values. They're patriots. And I

believe that those who have lawfully raised their voices on behalf of privacy and civil

liberties are also patriots who love our country and want it to live up to our highest ideals.

Obama was then directly asked about Snowden and his status as a whistleblower, to which

Obama responded,

So the fact is, is that Mr. Snowden has been charged with three felonies. If, in fact, he

believes that what he did was right, then, like every American citizen, he can come here,

appear before the court with a lawyer and make his case. If the concern was that

somehow this was the only way to get this information out to the public, I signed an

executive order well before Mr. Snowden leaked this information that provided

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whistleblower protection to the intelligence community -- for the first time. So there were

other avenues available for somebody whose conscience was stirred and thought that they

needed to question government actions.

Later, Obama directly referenced Snowden as well by stating:

And there’s no doubt that Mr. Snowden’s leaks triggered a much more rapid and

passionate response than would have been the case if I had simply appointed this review

board to go through, and I had sat down with Congress and we had worked this thing

through. It would have been less exciting. It would not have generated as much press. I

actually think we would have gotten to the same place, and we would have done so

without putting at risk our national security and some very vital ways that we are able to

get intelligence that we need to secure the country.

Obama’s rhetoric defended covert governmental surveillance while downplaying whistleblowers,

like Snowden, within the narrative. In essence, while Obama admitted that the debate between

<security> and <liberty> was important, Obama devalued Snowden’s tactics. The subtext of

Obama’s statements imply that U.S. citizens would be better off not knowing that they were

being illegally surveilled. Obama’s posture deprived <Snowden> and whistleblowers of narrative

power, despite the obvious catalytic relationship between whistleblowing and the relevant

debate. Obama achieved this by pointedly rejecting whistleblowing as an integral element to the

deliberations. Obama negated the significance of whistleblowing when he contended that

Snowden failed to use the appropriate protocol. Whistleblowing thus, as designated by Obama,

was delegitimized when executed outside of statist interests. Obama accosted Snowden, and

threatened future whistleblowers who operate outside the control of the state.

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4.3 Phase III: Purge

4.3.1 Discourse

Officials in phase three seemingly eliminated the concept of whistleblowing from the

discourse. Having delegitimized whistleblowing and obfuscated <Snowden>, U.S. officials

halted the elaboration of the <Snowden> narrative and avoided discussions on whistleblowing

almost entirely. With only five mentions of whistleblowing in the third phase, it seems the

concept was successfully avoided. Governmental officials certainly did not initiate discussions

on whistleblowing, and press officials stopped engaging U.S. officials on the matter. Having

reemphasized the ideological manifestations of <terrorism> and <security>, U.S. officials

utilized the <Snowden> discourse to position public whistleblowing as destructive to American

society. The extraction of whistleblowing from the narrative in the third phase symbolized the

federal government’s covert control over the <Snowden> discourse and public whistleblowing

writ large. <Snowden>, having been fabricated by U.S. officials as a political abstraction,

assisted in the dismantling of public whistleblowing against the state.

4.3.2 Legalism

Snowden and a host of legal experts contended that because the Whistleblower Protection

Act of 1989 and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 both explicitly deny

protections for subcontractors of the intelligence community, whistleblower protection laws

would not have applied to Snowden. Yet, U.S. officials continuously asserted that Snowden

would have been ensured whistleblower protections had the appropriate protocol been followed.

The difficulty for legal defense in this case is that Snowden publicly admitted to exposing

classified information. The U.S. federal government deemed the exposed information vital for

national <security>, and thus Snowden was charged with violating the Espionage Act. Felony

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