Multiplicity Of Conflicting Philosophy Of Law

Introduction

Despite the grandeur that might justly be ascribed to the collective

achievement of the philosophers, from its inception philosophy has been

hounded by a particularly vexatious problem, one which continually

threatens to undermine belief in the very viability of philosophy as a

discipline. That problem is the history and ongoing existence of a

multiplicity of conflicting philosophies. Few philosophers have been as

sensitive to the problem presented to philosophy by the existence of a

multiplicity of conflicting philosophies as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

The primary task of the present dissertation will be to recover and explicate

Hegel’s explanatory account of philosophical differences.

Regarding Hegel’s effort to explain philosophical differences, it is

likely to be asked: why does the existence of philosophical differences

constitute a problem worthy of the sustained philosophical examination

Hegel devotes to it? Why, indeed, should it be a major philosophical concern

that there exists a multiplicity of philosophies and philosophers seem

constantly to disagree? Granting the reasonableness of such questions, the

rest of the present introductory chapter will be directed towards clarifying in

greater detail the case for why the problem of philosophical differences is a

fundamental problem calling for a thoroughgoing philosophical explanation.

Fortunately, Hegel himself provides a rather strong case for why the

problem of philosophical conflict demands the kind of sustained

philosophical response which he devotes to it. Thus, the rest of this

Introduction will unpack and expand upon the most relevant set of points

Hegel makes in motivating the significance of both the problem of

philosophical conflict and his response to it. In pursuing this task the

following points will be established:

1) The perennial character of philosophical differences has provided

the basis for a particularly damning criticism of philosophy as a

meaningful practice.

2) The aforementioned damning critique levelled against philosophy

has become enormously exacerbated by certain unprecedented

social and cultural developments in modernity, the result of which

has been an increasing marginalization of philosophy’s cultural

status.

3) From philosophy’s inception philosophers have been

fundamentally motivated by the desire to respond to the challenge

of intellectual conflict.

4) Developing an explanatory account of the existence of the

multiplicity of conflicting philosophies such as is found in Hegel is

necessary for the attainment of the level of self-knowledge

required to solve the problems that philosophy has set for itself.

A fifth section of this Introduction will be dedicated to clarifying more

precisely the actual goals of the dissertation itself.

Let us proceed to section 1 in order to begin to establish why the

problem of philosophical differences is itself a major philosophical problem.

1. The Conflict of Philosophies Revealing the Futility of Philosophy

Exactly why is the existence of a multiplicity of conflicting

philosophies itself a major philosophical problem? Hegel addresses this

question in myriad ways throughout his corpus. One of his most direct and

sustained response to this question occurs in the Prefatory Note as well as

Introduction to his Lectures on the History of Philosophy (LHP). It should

be noted that in these sections of the LHP Hegel often provides a surrogate

voice to the viewpoint of “common sense” or “ordinary consciousness”. For,

it is ordinary consciousness that is most distinctly troubled by the ongoing

existence of a multiplicity of conflicting philosophies. Why should this be

so?

The answer, according to Hegel, is that when confronted with the

history of philosophy ordinary consciousness derives a singularly

demoralizing lesson, to wit:

“from the History of Philosophy a proof of the futility of the science is

mainly derived” (LHP xliv). Upon examining – however cursorily – the

history of philosophy, ordinary consciousness concludes that the science of

philosophy itself is futile. Why does ordinary consciousness draw this

dispiriting conclusion?

On Hegel’s account, the basis for ordinary consciousness’s charge of

futility against philosophy lies in the apparently quite desolate cumulative

result of the history of philosophy with its incessant conflicts and disputes.

For, when looked at merely from the “superficial view” of ordinary

consciousness, according to Hegel,

The whole history of philosophy becomes a battlefield covered with

the bones of the dead; it is a kingdom not merely formed of dead and

lifeless individuals, but of refuted and spiritually dead systems, since

each has killed the other. (LHP I 167)

For ordinary consciousness the history of philosophy reveals that the

different philosophies have collectively nullified one another leaving in their

wake nothing but a senseless tableau of intellectual corpses. Upon

witnessing such a scene the conclusion that ordinary consciousness draws is

that philosophy is a futile enterprise and that all philosophers “have erred,

because they have been contradicted by others” (LHP I 16).

Clearly, this damning indictment against philosophy is of major

concern. Insofar as ordinary consciousness represents the form of

consciousness most commonly operative amongst people in a given culture,

the ongoing history of perpetual philosophical conflict and dispute presents a

significant problem for the cultural viability of philosophy. For, due to that

ongoing history of conflict the ordinary consciousness inhabited by the

majority of people in a given culture will be convinced of the futility of the

practice of philosophy as a whole.

Indeed, the charge that the history of philosophy reveals the futility of

philosophy is an issue of serious importance on a variety of fronts, not the

least of which is the effect it has on prospective philosophers. As Hegel

states, “[T]his diversity in philosophical systems is far from being a merely

evasive plea. It has far more weight as a genuine ground of argument against

the zeal which philosophy requires” (LHP I 16). Hegel is here calling

attention to the discouraging effect the perpetual and unresolved disputes

among philosophers can have upon the desire to pursue philosophy at all,

especially among beginners. For, it seems reasonable enough to expect that

few people would be especially inclined to practice a discipline whose

cumulative result is commonly held to be little more than a particularly

grisly intellectual No Man’s Land.

Thus, a first indication as to why the problem of philosophical

differences is of major philosophical importance is that the history of

philosophical differences and conflicts provides the basis for the charge

levelled by ordinary consciousness that philosophy is a futile endeavor. The

dissemination or otherwise common acceptance of this charge, moreover, is

likely to enervate the serious dedication that is required to learn the

discipline of philosophy.

2. Intensifications in Modernity of the Charge of Futility Levelled

Against Philosophy

Philosophers themselves have long been aware of how the incessant

and apparently irresolvable conflicts among philosophies frequently

undermines the patience and zeal necessary to undertake the difficult labor

of learning to philosophize. In fact, philosophers themselves have taken

measures to overcome this problem and admonish those contemplating

practicing philosophy not to become discouraged by the apparent futility of

the philosophical endeavor. Indeed, despite the severity of the charge of

futility brought against it by ordinary consciousness, philosophy has

managed to survive and even experience periods of significant cultural

prestige and influence. Thus, it might be asked why the problem of

philosophical differences calls for the kind of sophisticated and

comprehensive response that Hegel develops and which this dissertation will

seek to explicate.

For, it is true that the problem of philosophical differences and

conflict has continually threatened to undermine belief in the

worthwhileness of philosophy. Philosophers have likewise been keenly

aware of this problem and have attempted to respond to it. Why should it

now be of such special concern that nothing short of the monumental effort

of Hegel to respond to it will any longer suffice? In order to address this

question it will be useful again to note some important points Hegel makes

in the early sections of the LHP.

2.1 Futility and the Presentation of the History of Philosophy

Afirst factor contributing to the intensification of the charge of the

futility of philosophy, according to Hegel, is the manner in which the history

of philosophy has often come to be presented. For Hegel, “the view very

usually taken of the history of philosophy […] ascribes to it the narration of

a number of philosophical opinions as they have arisen and manifested

themselves in time” (LHP I 11). The history of philosophy is thus very often

reduced to an “accumulation of opinions” and the only relation that is

acknowledged among these various opinions is their “contingency in time-

succession” (LHP 11). Plato said this; then, Aristotle held this opinion; then,

came Plotinus who affirmed this, and so on. Yet, “What could be more

useless than to learn a string of bald opinions, and what more unimportant?”

(LHP I 12)

To be sure, since Hegel’s time the task of providing a more critical and

scientific account of the history of philosophy has been taken up by a

number of highly sophisticated and erudite philosophers and historians. It is

important to bear in mind, however, that Hegel is expressing the viewpoint

of ordinary consciousness. When ordinary consciousness confronts the

history of philosophy the basic lesson it draws is that philosophy is futile.

Hegel is now identifying the manner in which ordinary consciousness

commonly presents the history of philosophy, namely, as a more or less

haphazard succession and agglomeration of opinions or even “senseless

follies” (LHP I 11). The result is that by being exposed to such histories of

philosophy, ordinary consciousness finds itself all the more confirmed in its

negative view of philosophy. Indeed, even the “erudite investigation” into

the history of philosophy, when it fails to do more than give an

“enumeration of various opinions,” can actually reach a point of diminishing

returns (LHP I 11). For the excavation and mere enumeration of an ever

increasing number of conflicting viewpoints can often simply provide fuel to

the flames of perdition into which ordinary consciousness would just as soon

see works of the philosophers cast.

In summary, an initial factor which Hegel identifies as responsible for

intensifying the charge of futility levelled against philosophy is the increased

awareness, both within and without academic philosophy, of the sheer

number of different philosophies that have emerged throughout history,

combined with the tendency in ordinary consciousness to present the history

of these differences as a mere haphazard succession of opinions. The effect

of this is to produce an even greater strain on the cultural viability of

philosophy than in previous times.

2.2 The Futility of Philosophy in Modern Culture

Asecond and more significant factor that has increased the pressure on

philosophy to demonstrate that it is not a futile endeavor is the major

cultural shifts that have occurred in the rise of modernity. Hegel of course

lived during the period in which modernity was coming into full swing. As a

deeply sensitive and insightful observer of his time he was keenly aware of

the rapid changes in interests and values that were taking hold in modern

European cultures. Thus, for example, in his Inaugural Address delivered at

the University of Heidelberg in 1816, after referring to philosophy as an

“almost dead science,” Hegel indicates what has been responsible for

placing philosophy in such a dire state:

The necessities of the time have accorded to the petty interests of

everyday life such overwhelming attention: the deep interests of

actuality and the strife respecting these have engrossed all the powers

and forces of the mind – and also the necessary means – to so great an

extent, that no place has been left to the higher inward life, the

intellectual operations of the purer sort; and the better natures have

thus been stunted in their growth, and in great measure sacrificed.

(LHP I xli)

On Hegel’s view, the realm of mere “actuality”, the realm that does not

pause to question and discern the complex principles that govern the

actualities that happen to exist, or, in other words, the realm of petty political

and economic interest, has arrogated to itself the lion’s share of the

intellectual powers and “practical” resources available in modern culture

(LHP I xlii). As a result, the patient cultivation of the life of the mind

necessary for the proper practice of philosophizing has been thoroughly

neglected.

To be sure, this is an only too familiar narrative of the deleterious

effects which many of the major cultural shifts in modernity have wrought

upon philosophy.

Philosophy demands a sustained withdrawal from the mere practical

interests or “externalities” of the immediately present moment (LHP I xliii).

The unremitting demand of the constantly expanding market economy for

short-term results and immediate practical application as conditions for any

significant investment of resources has led to the rapidly decreasing cultural,

not to say, economic, standing of philosophy. The further question as

pertains to this dissertation, however, concerns precisely what role the

problem of philosophical differences has played in this progressive

consignment of philosophy to cultural irrelevance. In order to respond

adequately to this query it will be necessary to take note of one of the most

significant cultural developments in modernity:

the emergence of modern science.

2.2.1 The Futility of Philosophy and Modern Science

Hegel indicates his sensitivity to the problem posed to philosophy by

the emergence of modern science when he notes that in the “European

countries in which the sciences and the cultivation of the understanding have

been prosecuted with zeal and with respect, Philosophy, excepting in name,

has sunk from memory” (LHP I xlii). Without entering at present into an

examination of the merits of Hegel’s larger critical appraisal of modern

science, however, it can still be observed what it is about modern science,

especially as it has come to be viewed by ordinary consciousness, which

casts philosophy in a particularly unfavorable light.

The peculiar characteristic of modern science that is so damaging to the

relative value of philosophy, at least from the viewpoint of ordinary

consciousness, is the success of science in routinely and methodically

overcoming initial conflicts and disagreements and arriving at more or less

universal agreement over its various problems. As is often the case, Galileo

can be used to illustrate this point. Prior to Galileo, philosophers notoriously

disagreed over whether or not heavier bodies fell faster than lighter bodies.

Galileo, however, deliberately prescinded from the principles traditionally

invoked by philosophers to explain kinematic and dynamic motion. Instead,

on the basis of empirical investigations he generated a hypothesis which he

proceeded to test and verify by means of an ingenious series of techniques.

Thus, by applying what has come to be called the “scientific method”

Galileo was able entirely to eschew the ancient and hitherto futile debates

among the philosophers and proceed rigorously to a single, verified answer

to the question of the nature of the free fall.

For ordinary consciousness, the discovery of the law of the free fall

provides an all-encompassing image: modern science triumphantly

succeeding in settling questions that had previously been the source of much

futile controversy among philosophers. Thus, as a result of the

unprecedented success and influence of modern science, philosophy has

come to be viewed as not a science or source of “real” knowledge precisely

to the degree that it is ever embroiled in the same unresolved and seemingly

fruitless disputes. Unlike pre-modern times, then, ordinary consciousness

now possesses a rather compelling phenomenon to which it can appeal in

order to vindicate its perennial charge of futility against philosophy. The

task of developing a scientific account of why there should exist a

multiplicity of philosophies which find themselves in constant disagreement

has thus become exceedingly more exigent.

2.3 Summary of Preceding Points

The charge of futility levelled against philosophy by ordinary

consciousness has intensified enormously in the modern period due to a

confluence of changes, both cultural and otherwise. One problem stems

simply from the manner in which the history of philosophy is often

conceived and presented, namely, as a more or less haphazard succession of

distinct positions or arguments with no discernible set of principles

governing their relations and process of unfolding. A second factor is the

socio-economic changes in modernity whose increasingly unquestioned

demands for immediate practical results undermine the zeal necessary to

undertake the kind of sustained reflection and withdrawal from immediate

practical concerns required to cultivate a truly philosophical consciousness.

Lastly, there is the emergence of modern science and the technologies to

which it has given rise whose apparent success at routinely solving the

various problems they encounter casts such an unfavorable light on

philosophy which seems ever to be embroiled in the same old controversy

and confusions. These are three major factors motivating the significance of

Hegel’s effort to provide an explanatory account of philosophical

differences.

3. Historical Responses to the Problem of Philosophical Differences

In order to establish more firmly the significance of the problem of

philosophical differences along with its enormously increased significance

in modernity it will be useful briefly to examine how intellectual and

philosophical conflict has motivated philosophy throughout its history. An

exhaustive treatment of the history of philosophical responses to the problem

of intellectual and philosophical conflict extends well beyond the scope of

the present work. Instead, Hegel’s treatment of four important historical

instances of philosophical response to intellectual and philosophical conflict

will be discussed:

1) The Socratic response to the emergence of intellectual and moral

discord in the ancient Greek world.

2) The Skeptical response to the proliferation of conflicting

philosophies that immediately succeeded the Socratic effort.

3) The Early Modern and Enlightenment response to the incessant

disputations among the philosophical schools.

The Socratic response to the problem of intellectual and moral conflict in

ancient Greece will be discussed because it shows how philosophy itself

emerged in great measure as a response to this problem. The Skeptical

response is worth mentioning because it is perhaps the first instance in

which the charge of futility is levelled against philosophy as a whole due to

the constant conflict among the various philosophies. The Early Modern and

Enlightenment response is worth discussing because Hegel himself comes

on the scene at perhaps the zenith of the Enlightenment’s violent rejection of

the notoriously disputatious Scholastic tradition. As such it will prove

extremely useful in understanding Hegel’s own effort at responding to the

problem of philosophical differences to compare and contrast it with that of

the Early Modern and Enlightenment thinkers.

3.1 The Problem of Disagreement in Ancient Greece

For Hegel, philosophy is fundamentally concerned with the sublation

of an apparently contradictory or irreconcilable manifold of elements into

higher, more universal unity. Thus, according to Hegel, “with Thales we,

properly speaking, begin the History of Philosophy” (LHP I 171). For,

Thales was the first to attempt to reduce the “conflict of an endless quantity”

of cosmological principles operative in the prephilosophical Homeric

universe to a “simple unity” or “universal.”10 Thales, as the first philosopher,

however, was evidently searching on the largely speculative or metaphysical

level for the unifying principle operative in and governing the distinct and

apparently conflicting elements constitutive of the entire cosmos. Yet, along

with an enduring speculative interest, what especially motivated the

emergence and continued development of philosophy in Greece was the

search for the principle of unity within the specifically intellectual and moral

sphere.

On Hegel’s showing, the period in ancient Greece immediately

preceding the emergence of philosophy was marked by a fundamental

breakdown of intellectual and moral agreement and cohesion. An especially

important development that led to intellectual and spiritual conflict in

Greece was the ongoing displacement of large portions of the Greek

population whether as the result of Persian military incursions in Asia

Minor, the colonial and mercantile expansion of major Greek city-states like

Athens, or increased internal economic and political differentiation within

the city-states themselves.11 Prior to these geographical and cultural shifts,

as Michael Forster points out, Greek Ethical Life was, for Hegel,

characterized by “complete and automatic agreement on fundamental

principles” (Hegel and Skepticism 76). Forster states further that, for Hegel,

“it is only by going beyond the confines of their own communities and

considering views of alien communities that individuals can come to

recognize the actuality or even possibility of conflicts between fundamental

principles” (Hegel and Skepticism 76).

Through being exposed to a multiplicity of distinct cultures, the

Greeks gradually discovered the relativity of their own customs and

common sense. The shock of discovering the relativity of ethical customs

and common sense created a crisis that eventually called forth a pair of

distinct but related intellectual and spiritual responses: the Sophistic and the

Socratic responses, respectively.

Hegel’s overall estimation of the Sophists is far from merely critical.

The intellectual attitude expressed and cultivated by the Sophists was, for

Hegel, an important

cultural development; in fact, it was a necessary precondition for the

emergence of philosophy. For, as a result of their familiarity with a plurality

of cultural and ethical customs, the Sophists were able to detach themselves

from an unquestioned commitment to the validity of any particular common

sense view. They were consequently ready to consider a multiplicity of

positions or viewpoints on a given matter. Speaking of the Sophists’ much

reputed eloquence, Hegel thus states, The particular characteristic of

eloquence is to show the manifold points of view existing in a thing, and to

give force to those which harmonize with what appears to me to be most

useful; it thus is the art of putting forward various points of view in the

concrete case, and placing others in the shade. (LHP I 358)

Indeed, for Hegel, this familiarity with and willingness to consider a

multiplicity of viewpoints represents a stage in which thought begins to pass

from the “particular to the universal” (LHP I 365). As such, the cultured

detachment of the Sophists represents an important preliminary stage

through which consciousness must pass on its way to becoming at home in

the universal determinations proper to philosophy.

The limitation of the Sophists according to Hegel, however, was that

despite their detachment from the content of any particular common sense,

they nevertheless failed to pursue and discern the universal principle that

would organize and sublate these relative viewpoints into a higher, more

concrete unity. Instead, the Sophists left it to the more or less arbitrary

inclinations of the individual to select from among the plurality of

conflicting views which they brought forth for consideration. Thus, Hegel

states, “to the Sophists the satisfaction of the individual himself was now

made ultimate” (LHP I 3701). Not only was this offensive to traditional

culture, more importantly it failed actually to satisfy the philosophical

impulse to sublate multiplicity into unity. It was left to Socrates and Plato to

take up the more properly philosophical task of searching out the universal

principle permeating and governing the multiplicity of conflicting common

senses operative in Greece.

3.2 The Socratic Response to the Problem of Disagreement and the Birth of

Philosophy

The Socratic effort and achievement is well known, but it is worth

emphasizing the significance of the role intellectual and moral disagreement

had in motivating it. Socrates and Plato after him were dissatisfied with the

Sophistic response to the discovery of the relativity of common sense.

Rather than being content to allocate all normative intellectual and moral

criteria to the particular inclinations of the individual will, Socrates and

Plato chose to pursue the task of searching out universal normative criteria

that would transcend the relativity of common sense viewpoints.

Several dialogues, such as the Meno and Euthyphro, explicitly

identify and attempt to respond to the problem of intellectual and moral

disagreement. It is the dialogue form itself, however, which perhaps most

profoundly bears witness to Plato’s keen and subtle awareness of the

problem of intellectual and moral conflict, not to mention the difficulty of

responding to it effectively. For the dialogues portray the dramatic encounter

of a multiplicity of often radically conflicting viewpoints, but to that extent

they themselves manifest a distinct sensitivity to the existence of such

conflict. As Hegel notes, “[In] the dialogues of Plato… the divergency of

opinions which comes out is examined, and a conclusion arrived at as to the

truth; or, if the result is negative, the whole process of knowledge is what is

seen in Plato” (LHP II 12-13). Within the dialogues, then, the conflict

between the viewpoints articulated by the interlocutors is either resolved

through the discovery of a higher, more comprehensive viewpoint, or at least

brought into clearer focus through the production of an aporia. Thus, for

Hegel, the dialogue form itself manifests the awareness on Plato’s part of the

problem of intellectual and moral conflict.

As evidenced by both the content and form of the Platonic dialogues,

philosophy from its inception has been motivated by the exigency to respond

to and in some way overcome the problem of intellectual and moral conflict.

Socrates and Plato responded to the problem of intellectual and moral

conflict by searching for universal principles that would transcend the

limited or relative horizons of the conflicting common senses operative in

ancient Greece as well as overcome the relativism of the Sophists.

As far as the present dissertation is concerned, however, what is of

especial importance regarding the Socratic breakthrough into the realm of

universal intellectual and moral principles is that, despite its monumental

impact on subsequent philosophical and scientific thought, it nevertheless

decidedly did not resolve or otherwise overcome the problem of intellectual

and moral conflict. Rather, the problem would now be transposed into the

history of the conflicting philosophies themselves. As Hegel notes,

“The most varied schools and principles proceeded from the doctrine of

Socrates” (LHP I 449). Indeed, disputes emerged about the very nature of

the universal principles or forms themselves: what they were, where or how

they existed, whether or not they existed at all, and so on. Thus, the Socratic

search for the universal ironically gave rise to a splintering into several

different schools each with a particular conception of the universal.

3.3 The Skeptics

The ancient Skeptics mark an important occurrence in the history of

responses to philosophical differences. The Socratic search for the universal

did not succeed in overcoming the problem of intellectual differences;

rather, the entire problem was transposed into the history of the conflicting

philosophies. The Skeptics were perhaps the first to level the charge of

futility against philosophy specifically on the basis of the discord obtaining

among the philosophies themselves. Thus, as Hegel notes, the “Later

Tropes” of Sextus Empiricus, the very first trope invoked in order to induce

the desired skeptical attitude of “suspended judgment” (ataraxia) is the

diversitude in opinions” (LHP II 357). Sextus, as Hegel notes,

Adduces the manifold nature of dogmas, and from this the conclusion is

drawn that the one has just as much support as the other. Philosophers and

others still make copious use of this sceptical trope, which is consequently

in great favor: on account of the diversitude in philosophies, the say,

Philosophy has no value, and truth is unattainable because men have thought

about it in ways so contradictory. This diversitude in philosophic opinion is

said to be an invincible weapon against Philosophy. (LHP II 357-8)

For what appears to be the first time, at least to any sustained and methodical

degree, the Skeptics cite the conflicting views of the philosophers as grounds

for denying the viability of philosophy.

Worth noting, however, is that, similar to the Sophists with their

cultured detachment from commitment to any particular common sense,

Hegel is far from merely critical of the ancient Skeptical inculcation of

suspended judgment with respect to the conflicting philosophies. For Hegel,

the ability to detach or abstract from the immediate attachment to a

particular viewpoint or position is an essential moment on the way to a more

properly philosophical, which is to say, universal, viewpoint. Not

surprisingly, however, for Hegel, the merely detached or abstract

universality of the Skeptical consciousness is inadequate since, among other

things, it takes all particular determinations – including the philosophies

themselves – and merely abstracts from them, rather than demonstrating the

laws in and through they have emerged and thereby determining them

concretely.

3.4 The Early Modern and Enlightenment Response to Philosophical

Disagreement

Perhaps the key difference that separates the Early Modern and

Enlightenment response to intellectual and philosophical differences from

that of the Ancients is the fact that the Early Modern and Enlightenment

thinkers could and did increasingly appeal to the unprecedented successes of

modern science and its routine overcoming of disagreements as grounds for

denouncing philosophy, at least as had been hitherto practiced, as a

fundamentally futile enterprise. Since the immediately received

philosophical tradition Scholasticism was so utterly characterized by

incessant and seemingly fruitless disputations while, simultaneously, the

new science appeared to hold out the promise of doing away once for all

with the entirety of the old Scholastic confusions and controversies, there

emerged the new conviction that all traditional learning should be left

behind to make room for the full flowering of the new science. Tradition,

history and even “mere” nature, beset as they had hitherto been by incessant

conflict or even a war of all against all, were thus to be shed like dead skin

or else mastered and possessed by the new scientific techniques.

This new attitude towards the history of intellectual and philosophical

differences emergent in this period lasts right up until the time of Hegel, and

of course beyond.23 Hegel’s own response to the history of intellectual and

philosophical conflict, however, is notably different from than that of the

Early Modern and Enlightenment thinkers that precede him. It will thus be

worth recalling some of the more salient views put forward by these prior

thinkers in order better to understand and appreciate Hegel’s contribution.

3.4.1 Montaigne

Montaigne explicitly revives the Skeptical charge of the futility of

philosophy based upon the conflicts obtaining among the philosophies

(Essays 318ff.). Indeed, in an argument that will be a major point of interest

for Descartes, Montaigne states that since there is no philosophical position

that has not been subject to dispute, all the philosophies are dubious and as

good as false. Montaigne also revives the older Sophistic insight into the

relativity of common sense viewpoints as a further basis for denying the

viability of philosophy. Just as the Greek colonial expansion helped

precipitate the discovery of the relativity of common sense, Montaigne

specifically cites the discovery of the vastly different customs and traditions

among the people of the New World as providing unmistakable evidence of

the relativity of common sense including, if not especially, the philosophies

that had been assimilated into the common heritage of Europe (Essays

1509). Montaigne, however, does not align himself with the emerging view

that the new science will be able to succeed where philosophy had

previously failed. Instead he counsels a certain kind of detached or perhaps

ironic cultural conservatism in which one maintains the views of one’s

tradition while simultaneously acknowledging the validity of conflicting

views.

3.4.2 Bacon

Bacon, setting the tone for so many of his successors, maintained a

“polemical attitude towards scholastic methods as they had hitherto existed”

(LHP III 44). Especially noteworthy is that of the Four Idols of the mind that

he lists and critiques in the Novum Organon, the entire fourth Idol – the

Idols of the Theater – specifically deals with the problem of philosophical

differences. Bacon states, “the Idols of the Theatre are not innate, nor do

they steal into the understanding secretly, but are plainly impressed and

received into the mind from the play-books of philosophical systems and the

perverted rules of demonstration” (Novum Organon LXII) In contrast to this

“theater” or ceaseless parade of conflicting philosophical systems and

Scholastic disputations, Bacon of course famously advocates the

“experimental method.” Through the application of the experimental method

the history of all the conflicting philosophies will become obsolete and a

new era will be ushered in. In conclusion to his discussion of the Four Idols,

Bacon thus writes,

So much concerning the several classes of Idols, and their equipage:

all of which must be renounced and put away with a fixed and solemn

determination, and the understanding thoroughly freed and cleansed;

the entrance into the kingdom of man, founded on the sciences, being

not much other than the entrance into the kingdom of heaven,

whereinto none may enter except as a little child (Novm Organon

LXVIII).

Despite their shared antipathy for the disputatious Scholastics, Bacon differs

from Montaigne in thus advocating for the embrace and vigorous

development of the new science. For the new science promises, among other

things, to extirpate once for all the nefarious influence of the Idols of the

Theater or, in other words, the problem of philosophical differences.

3.4.3 Descartes

Treatment of Descartes is usually confined to discussion of his method,

his first application of that method in the Meditations in which he deduces

the Cogito, or his subsequent proof for the existence of God. It is worth

recalling, however, that the primary motivating factor for Descartes in the

development of his method was the fact that philosophers are in constant

conflict and disagreement. In an explicit invocation of Montaigne’s skeptical

argument mentioned above, Descartes affirms that since there is no issue

that the philosophers have treated which has not been subject to dispute, all

of the historical philosophical teachings are doubtful and to that extent

worthless (Discourse 5). Descartes, however, is not content with the

skeptical detachment of Montaigne and instead launches a quest for an

indubitable foundation upon which to erect all philosophical and scientific

knowledge. Descartes thus sets about constructing a method that will not be

susceptible to doubt and, therefore, to disagreement or dispute.

Importantly, Descartes identifies the influence of mere nature and

tradition as the underlying cause for all the disputes and confusions among

the philosophers. The teachings of the philosophers are like the tangled

streets of ancient cities or the confused agglomeration of laws and statutes

characteristic of traditional jurisprudence. They have all emerged

haphazardly in accordance with the non-rational whims of custom and

natural process. Accordingly, the first step in the Cartesian method is to raze

the whole edifice of previous learning by submitting it in one fell swoop to

universal doubt (Discourse 6-9). Thus, perhaps even more emphatically than

Bacon, Descartes calls for jettisoning all previous learning consisting as it

has of such futile conflict and dispute and erecting a whole new edifice of

knowledge based on the method of the new science.

3.4.4 Locke

Importantly, Locke’s epistemology is constructed with a view to

responding to the disputes and extravagancies of the Scholastics. Locke

develops the position that was already articulated by Montaigne and which

will be taken up again by Hume and Kant, namely, that it is essential to

establish the limits of human knowledge in order preemptively to

circumvent the vain and futile speculations of the philosophers generally

since such activity has given rise to so much controversy and violence. Thus,

in the Introduction to An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke

states that a primary motivation for the work is to establish

The grounds of those persuasions which are to be found amongst men,

so various, different and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted

somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence, that he that

shall take a view of opinions of mankind, observe their opposition,

and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith

they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are

maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no

such thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to

attain a certain knowledge of it […] It is therefore worth while to

search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge, and examine

by what measures, in things whereof we have not certain knowledge,

we ought to regulate our assent and moderate our persuasions.

Hegel famously critiques the Locke’s and Kant’s respective attempts to

establish the limits of knowledge on strictly phenomenological grounds. Yet,

it is important to note that motivating the development of Locke’s position is

the desire to respond to intellectual and philosophical differences and

conflict.

Worth noting as well is the reason why Locke rejects the position of the

Rationalists who argued in favor of innate ideas. Locke’s argument is, as

Hegel points out, that with respect to the putatively innate ideas “universal

consent is not to be found” (LHP III 301). Locke’s point here is that if such

ideas were in fact innate then they would automatically generate universal

consensus; yet, as a matter of empirical fact, no such consensus is to be

found; therefore, the ideas are not innate. Locke thus appeals to

philosophical conflict as a further reason for rejecting the Rationalist and

Scholastic ideal of science as a deductive system proceeding from self-

evident first principles. Along with his rejection of at least certain aspects of

the more Rationalist ideal of knowledge espoused by Descartes, however,

Locke nevertheless continues the line of Early Modern and Enlightenment

thinkers who seek to move beyond or at least marginalize the disputatious

Scholastic tradition in favor of the new science.

3.4.5 Hume

Hume also sets out to determine the limits of human knowledge. He

pursues his effort, moreover, in order to diffuse the philosophical disputes

and subsequent violence that seem to erupt as result of philosophers and

theologians claiming knowledge of realities which as a matter of fact lie

beyond human ken. Thus, in An Enquiry Concerning Human

Understanding, immediately after articulating his basic distinction between

impressions and ideas, Hume states that a primary purpose for drawing such

a distinction will be the quashing of philosophical discord:

Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself,

simple and intelligible, but, if a proper use were made of it, might

render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon

which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and

drawn disgrace upon them […] When we entertain, therefore, any

suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning

or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what

impression is that supposed idea derived? […] By bringing ideas into

so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which

may arise, concerning their nature and reality.

Along with his deflationary epistemology, Hume also makes use of

the same argument adopted by the ancient Skeptics as well as Montaigne in

order to quell the pretensions of the philosophers regarding moral questions.

As Hegel notes, “Hume, like the sceptics of former days, appeals to the

various opinions of various nations: amongst different nations and in

different times various standards of right have been held” (LHP III 373).

Hume is thus clearly motivated by the problem of intellectual and

philosophical differences. He is to be distinguished from many of his

contemporary Enlightenment thinkers, however, in being far less sanguine

than they regarding the possibility of such differences being definitively

overcome through the advance of scientific technique. Similar to Montaigne,

he seems to advocate a detached acceptance of the “common rules of reason,

morality, and prudence” of the culture in which he happens to find himself

as the surest way of overcoming or at least avoiding intellectual and

philosophical conflict(“Of Superstition and Sophistry ).

3.4.6 Kant

Kant continues along the trajectory of Montaigne, Locke, Hume, et al.

for whom a chief task of philosophy was to establish the limits of knowledge

in order thereby to circumvent the conflict and violence that seems to arise

from speculation about realities that lie beyond human ken. The underlying

assumption to this deflationary effort seems to be that since such disputes,

by definition, do not admit of any possibility of rational resolution, they can

only be resolved through some form of violence, be it intellectual, military

or otherwise. Thus, Kant’s famous phrase early in the Critique of Pure

Reason that he needed to “deny knowledge in order to make room for faith”

can be understood as directed primarily against the excessive speculation not

only of the Rationalists but also the disputatious Scholastics and indeed

ultimately against the entirety of the confused philosophers (CPR Bxxx).

Kant contributes something new, however, to the response to the

problem of philosophical differences by subjecting it to a dialectical critique.

Thus, the Transcendental Dialectic is dedicated to revealing the source of the

confusion and conflicts among the philosophers and, in turn, to revealing

how such disputes can be resolved or, rather, dissolved. As Hegel points out,

one of Kant’s crucial points is that confusion and conflict among

philosophers arises from applying the finite categories of the Understanding

to the realm of infinite or unconditioned: “If […] for the determination of

the infinite we employ these categories which are applicable only to

phenomena, we entangle ourselves in false arguments (paralogisms) and in

contradictions (antinomies)” (LHP III 445).

Thus, for Kant, philosophical conflict emerges from the illicit

extension of the categories beyond the realm of possible experience.

Accordingly, the solution to the problem of philosophical differences lies

largely in the recognition of the futility of reason in its quest to grasp the

unconditioned by means of the categories of the Understanding. It is true

that, for Kant, reason spontaneously is driven beyond the realm of possible

experience in search of the unconditioned. Yet, this spontaneous desire of

the unconditioned immanent in reason can be educated and made aware of

the futility of its metaphysical aspiration. Such recognition on the part of

reason can circumvent the quixotic and potentially violent quest of the

philosophers to settle questions regarding the nature of the unconditioned in-

itself.

3.5 Summary of Preceding Section

From the inception of philosophy, philosophers have been concerned to

respond to the problem of intellectual and philosophical conflict and

disagreement. The Socratic effort was fundamentally motivated by the desire

to respond to the discovery on the part of the ancient Greeks of the relativity

of their customs and common sense by discerning and promulgating a

universal principle that would transcend such relativity. Importantly,

however, the problem of pre-philosophical intellectual conflict was not

thereby transcended or overcome but was rather transposed into the ongoing

history of conflicting philosophies. The ancient Skeptics took such conflict

and disagreement among the philosophers as evidence of the futility of

philosophy and thus became perhaps the first group to level such a charge

against the entire discipline of philosophy. The early Modern and

Enlightenment thinkers turned to promoting or attempting to justify the

legitimacy of the emergent science with its promise of generating universal

intellectual consensus not to say progressive technological mastery over

nature. Several of these thinkers also sought to delimit the proper scope of

possible human scientific knowledge in order thereby to circumvent the

tendency among philosophers to engage in the kind of futile metaphysical

speculations that seem invariably lead to conflict and dispute and ultimately

to overt violence.

We thus return to the original factor motivating the significance of

providing an explanatory account of philosophical differences, namely,

philosophical multiplicity and conflict is thought to provide sufficient

evidence for the futility of philosophy. Such a demoralizing critique of

philosophy, as it turns out, becomes more or less programmatic among Early

Modern and Enlightenment philosophers themselves. Significantly, the

Early Modern and Enlightenment philosophers, unlike their skeptical

forbears, could appeal to the new science and its attendant technologies as

providing eminent justification for their own deflationary critique of the

erstwhile pretensions of philosophy. For, in contrast to philosophy, these

institutions seemed to hold out the promise of a truly effective and

progressive resolution to intellectual disputes.

Hegel comes on the scene as this new orientation towards philosophy

and its apparent futility was beginning to reach the height of its intensity.

His response to the problem of philosophical differences, however, stands in

marked contrast to that of his immediate predecessors. Unlike them, Hegel

asks a set of new and more radical questions, namely, “What is the source of

the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies? Why do they exist in the first

place? What are the laws governing their emergence, differentiation and

development?” Providing a response to these questions constitutes, for

Hegel at least, a necessary step towards responding effectively to the charge

of futility levelled against philosophy.

4. Self-knowledge and Philosophical Differences

A final factor motivating the significance of pursuing an explanatory

account of philosophical differences is more directly concerned with the

internal efforts of philosophy itself. For Hegel, the multiple philosophies are

expressions of different forms of the mind. The different philosophies thus

manifest differentiations within the mind itself. The history of philosophy

with its successive emergence of distinct and conflicting philosophies is

therefore the history of the mind’s own ongoing self-differentiation.

The fact that the mind itself is responsible for the multiplicity of

conflicting philosophies is no small matter; rather, it is fraught with

consequences for the actual practice of philosophy. For Hegel, the history of

philosophy as the history of the mind’s self-differentiation is thus the history

of the mind’s development and ultimate coming-toitself. The stages that are

traversed by the mind in the course of its development, however, are not

simply discarded upon its completion. Rather, the mind retains the lower

stages of development within itself as differentiated moments of the

complete whole.34 For Hegel, moreover, the end of philosophy is the mind’s

knowledge of itself.35 What this means is that a conditio sine qua non of the

mind’s self-knowledge is the knowledge of how it itself has and continues to

be the source of conflicting philosophies. Stated negatively, unless one can

provide an explanatory account of the multiplicity of conflicting

philosophies one will eo ipso lack the self-knowledge which is the goal of

all philosophy. For, the various philosophies are themselves but expressions

of the mind’s own self-differentiation. Thus, full self-knowledge demands

knowledge of the mind precisely as the source of the multiplicity of

philosophies.

The different stages of development of the mind also call forth or posit

different philosophical questions and problematics. Prior to the emergence

of such forms of the mind certain philosophical problematics simply do not

become explicitly thematized for the mind.36 For example, according to

Hegel, it was only with the development of a later form of the mind that the

modern problematic of distinguishing and reconciling the realms of

subjectivity and objectivity was explicitly posited as a problem.37 Thus, like

the philosophies themselves, philosophical problematics do not simply

emerge haphazardly; rather, they emerge concomitant with the various

forms of the mind that also give rise to the different philosophies.

What this fact entails is that in order to make progress towards resolving

different philosophical problematics it is ultimately necessary to grasp how

they are grounded in certain forms of the mind. For, often problematics that

emerge at a certain stages of the mind’s development can only be resolved

through the attainment of a higher viewpoint. Such resolution can take the

form of a solution to the problem. It is also possible, however, that the

resolution will involve a dissolution of the problem; that is to say, what

appear to be true and perhaps vexing problematics from a lower viewpoint

are often revealed to be mere pseudo-problems upon the emergence of a

higher viewpoint.38 Thus, for Hegel, in order to avoid getting bogged

down in continually belaboring pseudo-problems it is ultimately necessary

to understand their origin in the selfdifferentiation of the mind itself. Indeed,

for Hegel, in order for philosophy to be able truly to refute the charge of

futility, philosophers must reach the level of self-knowledge adequate to the

problems which they pose for themselves. Essential to such self- knowledge

will be knowledge of the mind as the source of the philosophical

problematics themselves and such self-knowledge goes hand in hand with an

explanatory account of philosophical differences.

5. The Goals of this Dissertation

Before moving on, it will be helpful briefly to clarify the precise set of

goals that this dissertation seeks to achieve. Broadly speaking, there are

essentially two goals of this dissertation: one exegetical and one systematic.

5.1 The Exegetical Goal

The exegetical goal is to show that, in writing the Phenomenology of

Spirit (hereafter, PhG), Hegel himself is essentially engaged in pursuing two

related goals: 1) demonstrating that, despite appearances to the contrary,

there in intelligible unity among the different philosophies in order thereby

to refute the charge of futility levelled against philosophy by common sense

and 2) mediating the development of self-knowledge within the reader.

These two goals are, indeed, related in fundamental ways since, as just

discussed, self-knowledge is ultimately dependent upon the mind

recognizing itself as the source of the multiplicity of philosophies and that

the various philosophies correspond to stages in its own development. Yet,

in recognizing this about the multiplicity of philosophies one is thereby able

to discern that the multiplicity of philosophies form an intelligible unity

since that unity is isomorphic with the unity of the mind itself. Moreover,

just as self-knowledge, for Hegel, fundamentally includes knowledge of

one’s mind as dialectically developing towards ever higher viewpoints, so

through such selfknowledge one can discern the dialectical development

among the various philosophies.

One is thereby able to recognize that development or progress within

philosophy is possible and, in fact, actual and that therefore philosophy is

not merely a futile enterprise. The reason why this exegetical effort is

needed is because these two central goals motivating Hegel’s effort in the

PhG have not been articulated with sufficient precision and detail by

commentators. This point is readily evidenced by a pair of lacunae in the

secondary literature. First, one can study reams of articles and monographs

on Hegel’s effort in the PhG and not come across a single mention of the

charge of futility against philosophy and Hegel’s insistence on the need to

respond to it. Yet, the issue of the potential futility of philosophy was a

central concern to Hegel throughout his career beginning with his earliest

works.

To mention some notable instances in Hegel’s corpus in which he

directly treats the problem of philosophical multiplicity and the threat of

futility to which it gives rise as well as the need for a response to this threat,

the early essay, On the Relation of Skepticism to Philosophy (hereafter,

“Skeptizismus”), discusses at length the charge of futility against philosophy

brought by the ancient skeptics due to the fact of philosophical multiplicity

and conflict as well as the need for true philosophy to respond to this charge

(Di Giovanni 313-62). The early essay, The Difference Between Fichte’s and

Schelling’s System of Philosophy (hereafter, DZ), opens by observing that an

age with so many philosophical systems lying behind it would seem

invariably to give rise to a general sense of indifference or futility with

respect to the very viability of philosophy as a meaningful discipline; it then

proceeds to discuss the need for responding to this discouragement and

disillusion (DZ 85ff.). The Introduction to the LHP spends over sixty pages

discussing the problem of the charge of futility against philosophy as well as

the need to respond to it with a comprehensive theory of development, in

general, and of the development of the mind – which would be manifested in

the history of philosophy – in particular. The Introduction to Encyclopedia

Logic (hereafter, EL) discusses at length the problem of philosophical

multiplicity and the demand to discern the intelligible unity present therein

(EL 37-9). Finally, in just the second paragraph of the Preface to the PhG

Hegel announces that a central aim of the work will be to “comprehend the

diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth” (2).

Second, along with and connected with this first lacuna in the

scholarship, another lacuna is strikingly manifested in the fact that countless

commentators observe at some point throughout their respective discussions

of Hegel that Hegel has been the source of perhaps the most variegated array

of conflicting interpretations in the history of philosophy, yet, not a single

one of these commentators, as far as I have found, has once mentioned that

Hegel himself might provide the very means for explaining this conflict.

For, as will be shown throughout the course of this dissertation, the mind,

according to Hegel, relates to its object according to the level of

development it has attained. The fact that different individuals are operating

on different levels of development thus explains why they fall into

philosophical disagreement. For, as a result of this discrepancy in levels of

development, they will be relating to qualitatively different objects even

though perhaps they think they are talking about the same thing. In the case

of commentators on Hegel, then, if two commentators are operating on

different levels of development, then the object to which each would be

referring in speaking or writing of “Hegel” would be qualitatively different.

As a result, disagreement between such commentators about, for example,

the meaning of “Hegel’s” philosophy would be inevitable.

This basic phenomenon would thus explain the vast panoply of

conflicting interpretations of Hegel. For, there are as many possible

interpretations of Hegel as there are forms of the mind. As noted, however,

no commentator of which I am aware has ever even alluded to the possibility

that this would be the way Hegel would explain the philosophical

disagreement surrounding his own philosophy. This fact suggests, then, that

the nature of Hegel’s effort to explain the ground of philosophical

multiplicity and conflict has not been adequately understood.

There are thus two major reasons for the current exegetical project of

clarifying with greater precision the motivation for, and nature of, Hegel’s

effort to explain philosophical disagreement. First, scholars have overlooked

the role of philosophical disagreement as motivating and specifying the

nature of Hegel’s effort in myriad of his central works including the PhG.

Second, scholars have entirely neglected the fact that Hegel provides the

means for explaining the disagreements and conflicts which surround his

philosophy. Beyond the exegetical goal for this dissertation, however, there

is also a modest systematic goal.

5.2 The Systematic Goal

Hegel is, of course, not only keenly aware of the charge of futility

against philosophy; he also provides a response to it. The response which

Hegel provides will be discussed throughout the course of this dissertation.

As noted, in the most general terms, Hegel explains the multiplicity of

conflicting philosophies in terms of the polymorphism of the mind. Different

philosophies correspond to and express different developmental forms or

stages of the mind. Insofar as two philosophers are operating within different

levels of development they will invariably fall into conflict. Still, progress in

philosophy is possible, and philosophy is therefore not futile, inasmuch as

development of the mind is possible. For Hegel, such progress does indeed

take place, and in the PhG he sets out his account of its basic dialectical

structure.

The systematic argument of this dissertation is not that Hegel supplies

the correct explanation for the multiplicity of philosophies. Rather, it is

simply to show that it is an intelligible way to respond to problem of

philosophical multiplicity, one worth seriously grappling with.

A further point to make in this respect is that Hegel’s effort is also

original in both its precision and comprehensiveness. Prior philosophies,

most notably Kant’s and Fichte’s, provided nascent efforts to provide an

explanatory account for philosophical disagreement. Their efforts, however,

were enormously restricted in comparison to Hegel for at least two reasons.

First, in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, in

which he, indeed, attempts to provide an explanation for the fact of

philosophical multiplicity and conflict, Kant only invokes two factors in

order to explain the emergence of different philosophies (A310/B366ff.).

These two factors are the transcendental categories and empirical intuition or

experience. According to Kant, philosophies differ inasmuch as some

illicitly employ the categories with respect to putative objects beyond the

realm of empirical experience, thus treating them as not merely

transcendental but as transcendent categories, while others fail to recognize

that the categories are, indeed, valid for objects of empirical experience.

Philosophies that illicitly employ the categories beyond the realm of possible

experience are rationalist or otherwise dogmatic. Philosophies that refuse to

accept that the categories do, in fact, apply to objects of experience are

empiricist.

In comparison to Hegel, the weakness of Kant’s transcendental

dialectic lies, first of all, in its lack of comprehensiveness. For, through this

technique Kant is only able to explain the emergence of just two very

general types of philosophy. The history of philosophy, however, is

composed of a vast range of positions whose details cannot be exhaustively

accounted for merely on appeal to the relative validity and applicability each

ascribes to the categories. For example, what explains the difference

between the “dogmatism” of Plato versus that of Aristotle since both of them

treat of objects beyond what Kant considers to be the bounds of experience?

Kant has no way to answer to this question.

Hegel, then, is original in his comprehensiveness and precision.

For, Hegel attempts to account for the whole range of philosophies

including all of their relevant details.

Hegel also adds an element which is simply not present in Kant’s

analysis. For, on the basis of Kant’s analysis there is no way in which to

explain why any given individual might opt to become an empiricist,

dogmatist or transcendental idealist. One simply as a matter of fact winds up

in one of these positions. By contrast, Hegel can explain why individuals opt

for the philosophies which they do. For, individuals adopt certain

philosophies according to their level of development. Thus, Hegel can

explain why there is this whole range of differing philosophies and why

individuals adopt and perpetuate them.

Thus, along with the exegetical goal, the systematic goal of this

dissertation is to show that Hegel presents, not necessarily the best, but at

least an intelligible response to the problem of philosophical disagreement, a

response that is original in its comprehensiveness, precision and explanatory

power.

5.3 On the Need for a Detailed Analysis of the PhG

A final note should be made regarding the space dedicated in this

dissertation to examining parts of the PhG in detail. As is well known, the

PhG is a dense and not only systematically but organically ordered text.

Thus, in order to understand one part, it is often necessary to explicate

several others. Besides this commonly made point, however, there is a

further exigence peculiar to this dissertation for examining parts of the PhG

in such detail. For, as was noted, certain key elements of the very motivation

and nature of Hegel’s effort in the PhG have hitherto gone unnoticed or at

least underemphasized. Thus, the detailed analysis of the parts of the PhG

provided in this dissertation will often depart in small but important ways

from the more traditional exegeses of this classic philosophical tome. Thus,

despite the fact that some well-trod ground will be covered, this will

function at the service of a larger and unique set of goals peculiar to this

dissertation.

6. Summary of the Chapter

To summarize this introductory chapter, let us recall the major factors

motivating the significance of recovering and explicating Hegel’s response

to the problem of philosophical differences. First, for ordinary

consciousness, the ongoing history of philosophical differences provides

sufficient grounds for dismissing philosophy as a fundamentally futile

enterprise. Second, in modernity the charge of futility levelled against

philosophy has been dramatically intensified by the emergence of modern

institutions, modern science in particular. For, from the viewpoint of

ordinary consciousness in modernity at least, philosophy is to be

distinguished from “real” science precisely to the degree that the latter,

unlike the former, routinely succeeds in overcoming initial disagreement and

conflict to arrive at more or less universal consensus regarding the various

problems it sets for itself. Moreover, the practical efficacy of the

technologies which have emerged as a result of or alongside modern science

contrast rather markedly for ordinary consciousness with the apparently

meagre results of philosophical reflection. Third, philosophy from its

inception has been concerned to respond to the problem of intellectual and

philosophical conflict. Moreover, with the emergence of modernity it was

philosophers themselves who increasingly brought, or at least capitulated to,

the charge of the futility of philosophy. Yet, it was not until Hegel that the

question of generating a science of that history of conflict was first posed.

Lastly, the source of the multiplicity of philosophies, for Hegel, lies within

the self-differentiation of the mind itself. Thus, attaining the self-knowledge

that Hegel identifies as the true end of philosophies demands developing an

explanatory account of philosophical differences. Moreover, in order for

philosophy to move forward and make genuine progress on the problematics

it sets for itself – and thereby be able truly to deny the charge of futility –

philosophers must attain the level of self-knowledge involved in explaining

philosophical differences.

Given these motivating factors, let us now turn to a critical examination

of Hegel’s method of explaining philosophical differences.

Hegel’s Theory of Development

Famously, for Hegel, the mind develops. Thus, in order to understand

the nature of the mind according to Hegel it is necessary to understand his

account of the development of the mind. Yet, in order to understand Hegel’s

theory of the development of the mind it is necessary to understand Hegel’s

overall theory of development. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the notion

of development figures so heavily throughout his entire corpus, there are

only rare instances in which Hegel issues clear and detailed statements about

the basic terms and relations constitutive of his overall theory. Chief among

these few occasions are the sections in the Introduction to the LHP entitled

“The Notion of Development” and “The Notion of the Concrete” (20ff.). In

these sections Hegel identifies and articulates a closely related series of

terms and relations that form the basis of his theory of development. He also

employs some instructive images and analogies for aiding in grasping his

technical terms and distinctions.

The present chapter will be dedicated to explicating central elements in

Hegel’s technical account of his theory of development. The LHP will

provide the basic point of departure for explicating Hegel’s larger theory.

Other texts in Hegel’s corpus will be drawn upon in order to supplement this

analysis.

As will quickly become evident, Hegel’s theory of development owes

an enormous debt to Aristotle. Thus, there will be immediate occasion to

examine Hegel’s appropriation of key elements of Aristotle. Space does not

permit, however, a detailed examination of the Aristotelian science of

change; neither does it permit a critical evaluation of the philosophical

validity of Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle. Focus will instead be

restricted to discussing the specific parts of Aristotle’s theory that Hegel

means to appropriate and the way in which he happens to appropriate them.

Again, this chapter will be concerned to examine Hegel’s overall

theory of development, leaving it to the following chapters to work out in

detail Hegel’s theory of the development of the mind in particular. That

being said, there will be several and everincreasing occasions upon which it

will be necessary to discuss elements of Hegel’s theory of consciousness.

The simple reason for this fact is that, for Hegel, the mind and its

development represents the highest and truest instance of the phenomenon of

development as such. Thus, in order to explicate Hegel’s theory of

development in general it will at times be necessary to make recourse to an

analysis of what for Hegel is the quintessential instance of development.

The examination of Hegel’s theory of development will proceed as follows:

Section 1 will provide an initial examination of the main terms and

relations of Aristotle’s theory of change which Hegel appropriates for his

own theory of development. Again, the analysis will focus strictly on the

terms and relations in Aristotle that Hegel explicitly means to appropriate

and on the manner in which Hegel intends to appropriate them.

Section 2 will examine an especially helpful analogy Hegel draws

between biological development, on the one hand, and the development of

the mind, on the other. This part of the examination will demand making

greater recourse to discussing Hegel’s theory of the mind. In order to avoid

introducing too much complexity too soon, however, the discussion in these

sections will not extend into the specifics of Hegel’s technical discussion of

the development of the mind as it occurs in the PhG. Instead, any discussion

of the mind in these sections will be restricted to unpacking certain basic

structural elements of the mind whose explication will help illuminate

Hegel’s overall theory of development.

Section 3 will examine Hegel’s furtherance of his theory of

development through his addition of the “Concept of the Concrete”. In

particular what will be examined is how when Hegel combines his notion of

development with his notion of the concrete he thereby articulates the basic

contours of a theory of development that is not only teleological but, as I

will call it, “vertically teleological”. The full import of Hegel’s theory of

development as a vertical teleology, or what will eventually be called

“sublation”, will not become apparent until the next chapter since it is only

with the development of consciousness that Hegel’s overall theory of

development comes into its own. Yet, it will prove useful to unpack some of

the basic aspects of this notion of vertical teleology in the discussion of

Hegel’s theory of development in general. Section 4 will examine Hegel’s

basic theory or concept of development as it is manifested in perhaps its

quintessential instance, namely, the development of the Concept which turns

out to be coincident with the mind itself. An account of the development of

the Concept will provide, among other things, a useful point of focus and

application for the ideas discussed in the preceding sections.

Having established the basic layout of the chapter let us turn to the first

task of examining Hegel’s appropriation of central aspects of Aristotle’s

theory of change.

1. Dunamis and Energeia

Hegel begins his technical discussion of his notion of development by

stating In order to comprehend what development is, what may be

called two different states must be distinguished. The first is what is

known as capacity, power, what I call being-in-itself (potentia,

dunamis); the second principle is that of being-forself, actuality

(actus, energeia). If we say, for example, that man is by nature

rational, we would mean that he has reason only inherently or in

embryo: in this sense, reason, understanding, imagination, will are

possessed from birth or even in the mother’s womb. But while the

child only has capacities or the actual possibility of reason, it is just

the same as if he had no reason; reason does yet exist in him since he

cannot yet do anything rational, and has no rational consciousness.

Thus what man is at first implicitly becomes explicit, and it is the

same with reason. If, then man has actuality on whatever side, he is

actually rational. (LHP 20-21)

A great deal of information regarding Hegel’s theory of development is

packed into this passage. It will be useful to begin by examining the central

technical distinction it draws, namely, between being-in-itself versus being-

for-itself, and to do that we must first examine the Aristotelian background

to the distinction that Hegel explicitly invokes. Hegel fairly equates his

distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself with the Aristotelian

distinction potency (dunamis) and act (energeia). Development then, for

Hegel, as for Aristotle, is a matter of actualizing potency. Hegel also

employs a standard Aristotelian image of an embryo or seed contrasted with

a fully mature organism for illuminating this notion of development. On the

Aristotelian account, an acorn is an oak tree in potency; that is to say, while

it possesses the nature of an oak tree, it has yet to become fully what it is by

nature. In the passage above, Hegel makes a similar point when he speaks of

man as rational by nature; but insofar as a man is merely a child “it is as if

he had no reason” since he is only potentially rational. It is only through

actualizing its potentiality that an acorn becomes a tree, or a child becomes a

truly rational being. Thus, in most general terms, development for Hegel

consists in the transition from potency to act.

In appropriating the Aristotelian distinction between potency and act to

his own distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself, however,

Hegel is in fact performing a radical philosophical maneuver. The full extent

and import of this maneuver will only be slowly unpacked throughout the

course of the present dissertation.

Nevertheless, it will be useful to call attention to some of its most

fundamental aspects. The radical character of Hegel’s appropriation of

Aristotle in this particular case concerns the fact that it very deliberately

alludes to and evokes the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself. Without at

present launching into a detailed explication of the complexities of Kant’s

doctrine of the thing-in-itself, it is still possible to appeal to fairly well-

established aspects of that doctrine in order to generate an initial sense of the

radical character of Hegel’s maneuver.

Thus, according to Kant, the thing-in-itself is just that: the thing as it

exists truly or actually in-itself. The thing-in-itself is thus to be distinguished

from the thing-for-us, which is the thing as it appears in experience insofar

as the thing has been subjected to the conditions of possible experience.

Moreover, it is only in being subjected to the conditions of possible

experience that the thing can become an object of knowledge. Thus, for

Kant, we do not know or otherwise experience things as they are in-

themselves; rather, we only know or experience them insofar as they appear

to us, which is to say, insofar as they have been conditioned by the

conditions of possible experience. In correlating being-in-itself with

potency and being-for-itself with act Hegel radically problematizes the neat,

if controversial, Kantian distinction between the thingin-itself and the thing-

for-us. For, whereas according to Kant the thing-in-itself is the thing as it

really or actually is, for Hegel being-in-itself, at least in the first instance, is

not anything at all; it is merely potency. By implication, then, in order to

become actual the in-itself must become for-itself. In other words, there is

not a ready-made, complete and self-sufficient reality of thing-in-themselves

set out over against human knowledge and experience; rather, being-in-itself

itself comes to be; it transitions from potency to act. Reality in-itself is thus

fundamentally dynamic, for Hegel. The in-itself is not reality as it actually

is; rather, it is simply potency.

1.1 Three Senses in which Reality Transitions from Potency to Act

Importantly, there are three distinct but closely related senses in which

a given reality could be said to transition from in-itself to for-itself, and thus

from potency to act. First, a reality such as a flower transitions from a state

of in-itself to for-itself inasmuch as what was enclosed in the seed gets

unfolded and appears in full display and articulateness – in other words,

inasmuch as what is implicit becomes explicit. Indeed, in a further

problematization of the Kantian distinction between things-in-themselves

and mere appearances, to say that the implicit becomes explicit is just to say

that what was hidden or enclosed in potentiality comes to appearance. There

is no flower-in-itself lurking behind appearances or our “representations”.

The in-itself was merely the seed which, as potential, was no actual flower at

all. It is only in becoming explicit, in coming to appear in full, determinate

display, that the flower actually exists.

In thereby rendering itself explicit and actual the flower becomes for-

itself in a second a sense of the term, as well. For, through this process of

self-articulation and selfactualization the flower thus becomes self-

determining; in other words, it begins act on its own behalf or, indeed, for-

itself. For example, it differentiates its various organs and biological

functions such as photosynthesis, the Krebs cycle and so on. It also begins to

exert a degree of control upon its surrounding environment, setting down

roots, for example, so that it ceases to be entirely at the mercy of external

forces such as wind or erosion. Thus, in an initial sense, the transition from

the implicit to the explicit, is a process of coming to appearance, of self-

articulation and thus of self-determination or, in other words, of becoming

for-oneself.

Third, a reality such as a flower can also be said to transition from in-

itself to foritself inasmuch as it posits or objectifies itself. In one sense, in

coming to an articulate or determinate appearance the flower thereby posits

itself into existence, for it thereby becomes an actually existing flower. Yet,

there is a further sense of self-positing manifested in the plant’s bearing of a

fruit in which there is contained a further seed. For, in producing a seed the

plant exemplifies a tendency that Hegel detects to be working throughout

reality, namely, an ever-intensifying tendency towards self-positing and

selfobjectification – in other words, the self becoming explicit for-self. In

bearing fruit carrying a seed that shares its nature, the plant thus posits itself

into existence in a profound way.

This process of self-determination as simultaneously self-

objectification also opens up the possibility of a reconciling moment in

which the in-itself that has become for-itself ultimately becomes in-and-for-

itself. The examination of the precise nature and meaning of this further

stage in development must wait until after further preliminary issues have

been explored. For now, it is enough to have given an initial description of

how Hegel intends to appropriate the Aristotelian distinction between

potency and act. Development for Hegel is a transition from potency to act.

Such a transition can be described as a movement from being-in-itself to

being-for-itself as well as from the implicit to the explicit. Moreover, there

are three distinct but intimately related senses in which a given reality

transitions from being-in-itself to being-for-itself, from implicit to explicit.

1.2 Brief Clarification of Aristotle’s Notion of “Nature”

In the context of drawing upon the Aristotelian distinction between

potency and act, Hegel also draws upon the Aristotelian notion of “nature”

in order to articulate his notion of development. While there are several

aspects of the specifically Aristotelian notion of nature that extend well

beyond the scope of the present work, it will still be useful to give some

specification of that notion before continuing with the explication of Hegel’s

employment of potency and act; the reason being that to different natures

correspond different potencies and eo ipso different acts.

For Aristotle, nature is an immanent principle of motion and rest. As

an immanent principle of motion, nature is a dynamic principle of “coming-

to-be” or “innate impulse to change” (193b13, 192b18). Thus, as a dynamic

principle, nature in one sense is potency. As an immanent principle of rest,

nature is a dynamic impulse as purposive or ordered to an end. Thus, Hegel

states in the PhG, “Aristotle, too, defines Nature as purposive activity,

purpose is what is immediate and at rest” (PhG. 12). As an immanent

principle of motion and rest nature is a principle dynamically ordered to a

proportionate end which, once attained, will give rise to a state of rest which,

as will be discussed below, may also be identified as a kind of act.

Nature is evidently teleological for both Aristotle and Hegel. For,

nature is an immanent and dynamic principle of motion or change ordered to

a proportionate end. It remains unclear, however, how the end of a given

nature can be both a state of rest and activity. Clarifying this ambiguity will

help in understanding how Hegel can appropriate the Aristotelian notion of

nature while simultaneously maintaining his own doctrine according to

which the end of the development of the mind is an infinite activity. The key

to clarifying this ambiguity lies in the distinction Aristotle draws between

two distinct kinds of act, namely, motion (kinesis) and operation (energeia).

1.2.1 Kinesis vs. Energeia

For Aristotle, nature is an immanent principle of motion and rest.

Hegel, moreover, clearly means to appropriate this notion of nature for his

own theory of development. Yet, a tension arises inasmuch as throughout his

corpus Hegel calls attention to the ceaseless labor of mind or Spirit and

insists that the culminating moment of the mind’s development is not a state

of restful inertia but one of vigorous, even infinite, activity. How is it

possible, then, to square the Aristotelian account of nature according to

which the end of nature is a state of rest with Hegel’s insistence that infinite

activity is the proper and culminating end of the mind? An at least partial

solution to this difficulty lies in clarifying the Aristotelian distinction

between motion (kinesis) versus operation (energeia).

Bernard Lonergan provides a concise summary of the distinction:

A movement becomes in time; one part succeeds another; and a whole

is to be had only in the whole of the time. On the other hand, an

operation such as seeing or pleasure does not become in time but

rather endures through time; at once it is all that it is to be; at each

instant it is completely itself. In a movement one may assign instants

in which what now is is not what will later be. In an operation there is

no assignable instant in which what is occurring stands in need of

something further that will make it specifically complete. A similar

contrast occurs in the Metaphysics. There is a difference between

action (praxis) distinct from its end and action coincident with its end.

One cannot at once be walking a given distance and have walked it,

be being cure and have been cured, be learning something and have

learned it. But at once is seeing and has seen, one is understanding

and has understood, one is alive and has been alive, one is happy and

has been happy. In the former instances there is a difference between

action and end, and we have either what is not properly action or, at

best, incomplete action – such are movements. In the latter instances

action and end are coincident – such are operations (Verbum, 112).

For present purposes, the first point to notice is that, in contrast to

operations, the activity of motion is distinct from its end. Once the end of a

motion is reached the activity ceases. For example, one cannot be

simultaneously engaging in the activity of walking and have reached the end

of one’s walk. Aristotle also includes activities such as healing and learning

as instances of “motion” since they, too, are activities which are distinct

from their ends. One cannot be both engaging in the activity of learning

some topic, for example, and have understood it.

In contrast to motion, Aristotle specifies operation or energeia.

Operations are activities which are coincident with their ends. In the activity

of seeing, the end of the activity – to-be-seeing – is coincident with the

activity itself – seeing. Similarly, when one understands, the end of the

activity – to-be-understanding – is coincident with the act of understanding

itself. In other words, upon understanding one does not thereby cease to

understand; rather, one is actively understanding. Thus, unlike the case of

motion, in operations the attainment of the end of the activity does not entail

its cessation; rather, the end and the activity are coincident.

For Aristotle, therefore, the end that is achieved or actualized in and

through operations, while it may involve a kind of repose and a release from

the strain of effort, nevertheless does not entail the cessation of all activity.

Rather, such activities as these which are coincident with their ends are in

fact higher or more perfect forms of activity than such actions as motion or

mere study prior to understanding. Thus, to the extent that operation is

distinguished from motion, we have our first indication as to how to

reconcile Hegel’s appropriation of the Aristotelian notion of nature with his

own insistence on the infinite activity as the proper end of Spirit. For the

“rest” that is attained by a given nature through such operations as living,

understanding or happiness is in fact a reposeful activity, and the highest

activity is in fact coincident with the profoundest rest.

1.2.2 Natures Specify Corresponding Potencies and Acts

The second aspect of Aristotle’s theory of development the clarification

of which will help in understanding how it can be reconciled with, and in

fact support, Hegel’s insistence that the ultimate end of the mind is infinite

activity is Aristotle’s discussion of how specific natures possess distinct

potencies which specify proportionate acts.

Generally speaking, for Aristotle, all natures seek to fulfill their

natures; that is to say, they are dynamically oriented towards actualizing

what they are initially in potency. As Aristotle says in the Physics, “nature in

the sense of a coming-to-be proceeds towards nature”; and, again, “the

nature is the end or that for the sake of which” (193b13, 194a29). Each

nature, moreover, possesses certain potencies which specify the acts that will

actualize those potencies. In the De Anima Aristotle discusses the nature of

the three different kinds of soul – the vegetative, the sensitive and the

rational – and hence their potencies as well as the acts proportionate to those

potencies. The vegetative soul possesses potencies for nutrition, growth and

decay (413a25-34). These potencies when actualized would, strictly

speaking, constitute motions. They also contribute to the overall

development of the plant or its coming-to-be what it truly is, namely, a fully

developed, mature and flourishing living organism. Indeed, Aristotle does at

times speak of living itself as a species, not of motion, but of operation.

In addition to the potencies possessed by the vegetative soul, the

sensitive soul possesses the potency for locomotion and sensation (413b1-5

et passim.). As already discussed, acts of sensing are operations, and so the

sensitive soul when fully actualized would consists in a developed, awake,

sensing and flourishing animal.

Aristotle’s discussion of the rational soul is of greatest interest for

understanding Hegel’s theory of development since the potencies

characterizing the rational soul are quite remarkable. The rational soul or

Nous is potens omnia facere et fieri: it can make and become all things. In

other words, since Nous stands in potency to making or becoming all things,

its objective horizon is unrestricted – the totality of all things.57 Moreover,

the activity proper to Nous is the operation of understanding. The operation

which would actualize the unrestricted potency of Nous can be nothing other

than an unrestricted act of understanding. For Aristotle, the unrestricted act

of understanding ultimately consists in the divine Nous’s self-understanding.

Thus, the rational soul is naturally ordered to the end of understanding the

divine Nous itself and thus to imitate or participate in its unrestricted act of

self-understanding or perfect self-knowledge.

There can be little doubt that Hegel means to appropriate the

Aristotelian notion of the rational soul as well as the view that the ultimate

end of the rational soul or mind is the perfect and unrestricted activity of

self-knowledge. For example, the PM opens with a declaration and extended

comment upon the Delphic enjoinder to know thyself and culminates with a

long passage from Metaphysics XII, 7 on the self-knowledge of the rational

and divine Nous. Later, in the PM, Hegel explicitly identifies his conception

of the soul with “the passive Nous of Aristotle, which is potentially all

things” (PM 29). In the culminating paragraph of the PhG, Hegel asserts that

the goal of Spirit’s development is “Absolute Knowing” which he identifies

as perfect self-knowledge or “Spirt that knows itself as Spirit” (PhG 808). In

the Introduction to the LHP Hegel asserts that selfknowledge or “this being-

at-home-with-self, or coming-to-self of mind [Geist] may be described as its

complete and highest end: it is this alone that it desires and nothing else”

(LHP 23). In the Aristotle section in the LHP Hegel affirms that there is no

“higher idealism” than the Aristotelian notion of God as actus purus or pure

operation and he heaps praise upon “the Absolute of Aristotle, which in its

quiescence is at the same time absolute activity” (LHP II 143-144).

Thus, we would seem to have at least partially eliminated the difficulty

of understanding how Hegel can both appropriate Aristotle’s notions of

nature and development while at the same time insisting upon the absolute

activity of the mind as its ultimate end. For, while it is true that, for

Aristotle, nature is a principle of motion and rest, the culminating act of the

fully developed rational nature or soul for Aristotle is both an unrestricted

act of self-knowledge and a quiescent reposing in such knowledge.

For Hegel, then, development, generally speaking, is a transition from

potency to act. In the case of the mind, development consists in the

transition of the mind from initially a potentia omnia facere et fieri to the

absolute activity of perfected selfknowledge. Thus, in the “Concept of

Development” section of the LHP, Hegel asserts, “Everything that from

eternity has happened in heaven and earth, the life of God and all the deeds

of time simply are struggles for Mind to know itself, to make itself objective

to itself, to find itself, be for itself, and finally unite itself to itself” (LHP

23).

From this last passage, moreover, we can derive a clearer indication as

to how and why Hegel means to appropriate and assimilate the Aristotelian

notion of development as a transition from potency to act to his own

technical formulation of that process as a transition from being-in-itself to

being-for-itself. 61 For, on the Aristotelian account, the proper end of the

dynamic development of the rational soul is a sharing in the perfected self-

contemplation of the divine Nous. In other words, it consists in the full

objectification of rational mind for itself; such knowledge of self is the

complete actualization of its potency for knowledge. Thus, the becoming

for-itself of what it is initself just is the complete actualization of the rational

soul. Properly grasping Hegel’s view of development as a transition from

potency to act and therefore as a series of selfobjectifications of mind leads

us into the next section.

2. Biological Analogy for the Development of Consciousness

In transitioning from “The Notion of Development” to “The Notion of

the Concrete” section of the Introduction to the LHP, Hegel provides an

analogy intended to illuminate both his notion of development in general and

of the mind in particular. The analogy is quite instructive as it sheds light on

several central, if occasionally elusive, elements of Hegel’s theory of the

mind and its development. It will thus be worthwhile to unpack the analogy

in detail in order both to flesh out the immediately forgoing discussion and

to prepare the ground for subsequent discussions of Hegel’s notions of

development and of the concrete.

The analogy that Hegel draws is that between the biological

development of a plant and the development of the mind. Regarding the

development of the plant, Hegel states,

Because that which is implicit comes into existence, it certainly

passes into change, yet it remains one and the same, for the whole

process is dominated by it. The plant, for example, does not lose itself

in mere indefinite change. From the germ much is produced when at

first nothing was to be seen; but the whole of what is brought forth, if

not developed, is yet hidden ideally and contained within itself. The

principle of this projection into existence is that the germ cannot

remain merely implicit, but is impelled towards development, since it

presents the contradiction of being implicit and yet not desiring to be.

But this coming without itself has an end in view; its completion fully

reached, and its previously determined end is the fruit or produce of

the germ, which causes a return to the first condition. The germ will

produce itself alone and manifest what is contained in it, so that it

then may return to itself once more thus to renew the unity from

which it started. (LHP I 22)

Hegel’s discussion of the development of the plant of course demonstrates

his ongoing appropriation of the Aristotelian notion of development. The

germ or seed as possessing the nature of the plant is thus a dynamic potency

ordered to an end. All changes and developments within the plant are

anticipatorily or implicitly contained in this potency and are governed by the

end towards which the germ is impelled, or rather, towards which it impels

itself.

Especially worth nothing, however, is the end towards which the germ

develops. For, there is twofold end, that is to say, a twofold raising of the

plant from being-in-itself to being-for-itself: the germ produces both itself

and its fruit in which another germ is contained. Thus, in one sense, the

germ is ordered towards the end of attaining full maturity such that it might

“manifest what is contained in it”, which is to say, differentiate and

construct the various biological organs, process and systems whose

successful operation will constitute it as a fully developed organism. Yet, it

is also ordered towards the bearing of fruit as its culminating moment of

development.

To be sure, the processes by which the plant matures and by

which it bears fruit constitute a unitary process. For, in order to bear fruit the

plant must mature; and in developing itself such that it can bear fruit the

plant eo ipso matures itself. This overall process of development, moreover,

Hegel importantly identifies as a “projection into existence”; it is, in other

words, a self-positing of the plant from its germinal potency to its fully

actualized maturity. Yet, it is also important to recognize how at its

culminating moment of development the plant posits a fruit. For, it is here

that Hegel identifies a quite instructive dis-analogy between merely

biological development and the development of the mind.

2.1 Dis-analogy between Biological Development and the Development of

Consciousness

Regarding the very significant dis-analogy between merely biological

development and the development of consciousness as such, Hegel states,

With nature it certainly is true that the subject which commenced and

the matter which forms the end are two separate units. The doubling

process has apparently the effect of separating into two things that

which in content is the same. Thus in animal life the parent and the

young are different individuals although their nature is the same. In

Mind [Geist] it is otherwise: it is consciousness and therefore it is

free, uniting in itself the beginning and the end. As with the germ in

nature, Mind indeed resolves itself back into unity after constituting

itself another. But what is in itself becomes for Mind and thus arrives

at being for itself. The fruit and seed newly contained within it on the

other hand, do not become for the original germ, but for us alone, in

the case of Mind both factors not only are implicitly the same in

character, but there is a being for the other and at the same time a

being for self. That for which the “other” is, is the same as that

“other;” and thus alone Mind is at home with itself in its “other.” The

development of Mind lies in the fact that its going forth and

separation constitutes its coming to itself. (LHP I 22-23) Like the

plant, the mind “goes forth” from itself qua potency to posit itself as

actually existing. It heads towards the end of constituting itself as

fully self-differentiated and mature organic unity. Also like the plant,

there is a culminating moment in the development of the mind: the

positing of an “other”. In the case of the plant, this positing of an

“other” is in fact a return to unity with itself inasmuch as the “other”

which it posits the fruit which contains another germ – shares the

same nature as the original germ; the original germ, of course,

existing now as a fully matured plant. Yet, herein lies the crucial dis-

analogy to which Hegel means to draw our attention.

For, the plant achieves a unity or “coming-to-itself” through positing

an “other” inasmuch as the “other” shares the same nature with itself. Yet,

this self-doubling does not occur for the plant itself, but only for “us”, that is

to say, we phenomenologists of development and readers of the LHP. Once

the fruit ripens and falls from the tree, it, along with the seed contained

within it, ceases to constitute an aspect of the selfdifferentiation and self-

determination of the plant itself. It now falls outside of the plant and exists in

a relation of mere externality to it. At the culminating moment of its

selfdifferentiation the plant fails to preserve unity with itself. Stated

differently, unity is preserved inasmuch as the original plant and the germ

contained in fruit share the same nature – yet, that unity is not preserved for

the plant. For the plant, the germ it has posited now merely stands over

against it as something entirely alien and external.

Hegel sharply contrasts this final state of alienation characteristic of

merely biological development with the culminating moments of self-

differentiation through which the mind develops. Like the germ of a plant,

the mind begins in an embryonic state of potency. The mind develops

through a process of self-differentiation through which it constitutes its

various functions and operations into an organic unity. There is finally a

culminating moment in the development of the mind wherein it, like the

plant, bears fruit. In other words, consciousness, too, posits an “other”,

something distinct from itself, namely, the object of knowledge. Yet, unlike

the plant, the mind preserves itself in this difference. For when the mind

posits its fruit the object does not thereby fall “outside” of consciousness and

stand over against the mind in a merely external relation. Rather, the mind

preserves its unity with itself in positing its object such that the distinction

that the mind draws between itself and its object remains internal to

consciousness.

In order to grasp more precisely why Hegel maintains that the object

of the mind does not, like the fruit of the plant, fall outside of the mind but

rather is preserved as internally constitutive of the mind itself, it will be

necessary to discuss two distinct but related aspects of Hegel’s larger

account of the nature of the mind and its development. First, it will be

necessary to examine some general aspects of the object of consciousness,

according to Hegel. Second, it will be necessary to discuss some general

aspects of Hegel’s appeal to phenomenological fact in grounding his account

of the nature of consciousness.

2.2 Important General Aspects in Hegel’s Account of the Object of

Knowledge

In the LHP Hegel specifies in helpful, if still fairly general terms, the

nature of the object that the mind posits for itself as the fruit of its self-

differentiating development. That which is in itself must become an object to

mankind, must arrive at consciousness, thus becoming for man. What has

become an object to him is the same as what he is in himself; through the

becoming objective of this implicit being, man first becomes for himself; he

is made double, is retained and not changed into another. For example, man

is thinking, and thus he thinks out thoughts. In this way it is in thought alone

that thought is object; reason produces what is rational: reason is its own

object (21).

Initially, rationality exists merely potentially or in-itself. The mind of the

child, for example, is potentially rational. Yet, as Hegel indicates here, the

mind develops precisely insofar as it manages to objectify its own immanent

rationality. As Hegel goes on to note, “All knowledge, and learning, science,

and even commerce have no other object than to draw out what is inward or

implicit and thus to become objective” (LHP 22).

Consciousness develops by becoming rational, but this development is

mediated by the ongoing objectification of rationality by and for itself – in

other words, through the constitution of a rational object. Like the germ

which in developing to maturity finally issues forth an object whose nature

corresponds to itself, so the mind through the course of its development

produces an object which corresponds to itself:

The human soul does not merely have natural differences, it

differentiates itself within itself, separates its substantial totality, its

individual world, from itself, sets this over against itself as the subjective. Its

aim here is that what the mind is in itself should become for the soul or for

the mind, – that the cosmos contained, in itself, within the mind should enter

into mind’s consciousness (PM 86). The plant produces a fruit containing a

seed whose nature corresponds to that of the original germ. Yet, as already

discussed, this self-doubling and self-objectification is not preserved within

the plant. In contrast, the rational object that rational mind posits for itself

remains for consciousness. The objects of knowledge, learning and science

which the mind posits for itself do not stand over against consciousness as

an alien existence like the fruit separated from the plant. Rather,

consciousness inhabits that world as its very own; it recognizes itself in the

object it has posited and the object thus continues to exist for it.

Thus, we have a first indication as to why Hegel maintains that the

object of the mind is different than the fruit of mere biological development,

namely, inasmuch as the object, even after being posited into existence,

nevertheless remains for and thus in consciousness.

2.3 Hegel’s Appeal to Phenomenological Fact

There is an important sense in which Hegel is appealing to

phenomenological fact in noting that when consciousness posits its object

the object does not thereby fall outside of consciousness. Take, for example,

the learning of some science like geometry or Newtonian mechanics. In the

analogy with a plant, the phase of learning for the student would correspond

to the period in which the plant is growing to full maturation. Unlike the

plant and its final relation to its fruit, however, when the student has finally

learned geometry or Newtonian science the object of knowledge does not at

that instant fall “outside” her mind. Rather, in positing it object the mind is

eo ipso conscious of that object. The fruit of intellectual labor is thus

preserved within the mind, and the presence of the object of knowledge in

the mind is given as a phenomenological fact. Thus, Hegel states,

“consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the

other, consciousness of itself” (PhG 85).

The distinction between the mind and its object, a distinction which the

mind itself posits,71 is preserved within consciousness. As Hegel states, “the

essential point to bear in mind throughout the whole investigation is that

these two moments, ‘Concept’ and ‘object’, ‘being-for-another’ and ‘being-

in-itself’ both fall within that knowledge which we are investigating” (PhG

84). Again, the distinction that the mind draws between itself and its object

but which it preserves within itself is indeed given in consciousness as a

phenomenological fact:

The distinction between the in-itself and knowledge is already present

in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something

is for it the initself; and knowledge, or the being of the object for

consciousness is, for it, another moment. Upon this distinction, which

is present as a fact, the examination rests [Emphases mine]. (PhG 85)

Thus, PhG Hegel bids heed to the point that he will rearticulate in the LHP,

namely, that unlike the development of a plant, the mind at its culminating

moment of development and self-differentiation preserves itself in this

difference such that its object remains for it; moreover, this positing,

distinguishing and relating is given in consciousness as a phenomenological

fact. Indeed, as noted, Hegel identifies this point as “the essential point to

bear in mind throughout the whole investigation” of the PhG, for it is upon

this point that the entire “examination rests”.

A number of difficulties and confusions often emerge surrounding

Hegel’s discussion of the immanence of the object of knowledge to

consciousness as well as his appeal to phenomenological fact in order to

ground his account of the structure of consciousness. While a more thorough

treatment of some of these issues will have to wait for subsequent chapters,

it would be well to address promptly one of the more salient difficulties that

tend to arise: the confusion arising from the use of spatial prepositions in

describing the relationship of consciousness to its object.

2.3.1 The Problem of Spatial Prepositions Vis-à-vis the Object of Knowledge

In the earlier section on the difference between motion (kinesis) and

operation (energeia) it was noted that, unlike movements, operations are not

temporal realities, at least not in the sense that movements are temporal.

Movements occur over time; operations endure through time. Similarly,

operations, unlike movements, are not spatial realities, either. Hegel, due

perhaps in large part to his close reading of Aristotle, and especially the De

Anima, is keenly aware of this aspect of operations. Indeed, in the section on

the De Anima in the LHP Hegel affirms his appreciation and appropriation

of Aristotle’s account of energeia as it applies to acts of sensation and

understanding or “thinking”, declaring that it contains “many clear and far-

reaching glimpses into the Nature of consciousness” (LHP II 191).

In order to understand more clearly how these “clear and far-reaching”

elements in Aristotle’s conception of sensation and understanding help

clarify what is meant by the immanence of the object of knowledge to

consciousness, it will be necessary to examine a few more details of

Aristotle’s account of the nature of energeia.

According to Aristotle, the reality of an act (energeia) is received in

the patient of the act, as he states: “for it is in the passive factor that the

actuality of the active or motive factor is to be realized” (426a4-5) In the

case of sensation, the patient of the act is the sense-organ. Thus, for

Aristotle, the reality or actuality (energiea) of sounding is in the hearing, just

as the energeia of color(ing) is in the seeing. In other words, sense in act is

sensed in act. Hearing and sounding, seeing and color, respectively, do not

constitute two distinct realities; rather each pair constitutes a single actuality.

There is no actual color outside of seeing, just as there is no actual sound

outside of hearing.75 “Subject” and “object” are one in act: ““For the acting-

and-being-acted-upon is to be found in the passive, not in the active factor,

so also the actuality of the sensible object and that of the sensitive subject

are both realized in the latter” (426a9-11).76

The further point regarding the use of spatial prepositions to discuss the

relation between the object of sensation and the conscious act in which it is

experienced is that one must be careful not to imagine or “picture-think” the

manner in which an object is thus “in” consciousness. Insofar as sense and

sensed are one in act, the object of sensation – the sensed – is “in” the mind

since it is one with the conscious operation of sensing. Yet, it is not spatially

“in” the organ of sense. The ear is spatially distinct from the guitar amp

generating the sound waves, just as the eye is spatially distinct from the

painting reflecting the light wavicles. However, sound is not spatially

distinct from hearing, nor is color spatially distinct from seeing. Sounding is

“in” hearing, and color(ing) is “in” seeing, in the sense that each respective

pair constitutes a single reality.

Hegel accedes to this aspect of Aristotle’s “clear and far-reaching”

account of the structure of consciousness:

There is a body which sounds and a subject which hears; they are

twofold in the aspect they present, but hearing, taken by itself, is intrinsically

an activity of both. In like manner, when I have by sense the perception of

redness and hardness, my perception is itself red and hard: that is, I find

myself determined in that way, even though reflection says that outside of

me there is a red, hard thing, and that it and my finger are two; but they are

also one, my eye is red and the thing. It is upon this difference and this

identity that everything depends; Aristotle demonstrates this in the most

emphatic way, and holds firmly to his point. The later distinction of

subjective and objective is the reflection of consciousness. (LHP II 192)

Thus, for Hegel sense and sensed are one in act. Hegel goes further and

clarifies that the distinction between “subject” and “object” is only

subsequently constituted “reflectively” by and “in” consciousness. In other

words, for Hegel, as for Aristotle, the duality between “subject” and “object”

is not a primordial or “brute fact” which is simply “given” to consciousness.

The distinction is the result of the mind’s own deed of positing and

distinguishing.

In Aristotle’s account, the rational soul is initially a potentia omnia

facere et fieri: it can make and become all things. As Hegel would say, it is

the entire cosmos in-itself. Through its activity, the rational soul both makes

things intelligible and becomes one with those things in act. Thus, as with

sense and sensed, knower and known are one in act: “Actual knowledge is

identical with its object” (430a20). The actuality of the intelligible, or what

Hegel will call the “determinate”, “in” rational consciousness is knowledge.

Just as there is no sounding “outside” of hearing, there is no intelligibility

“outside” of intelligence, no thought outside of thinking; the two are one in

act. While the known object may be spatially distinct from one’s body it is

not spatially distinct from one’s act of understanding it. Thus, as Hegel

indicates, any distinction between knower and known is the result of the

“reflection” of consciousness.

A further point to notice regarding the way in which the object of

knowledge is “in” consciousness is that, unlike sensation, the intelligibility

or determinateness of all objects is contained potentially “in” the rational

soul. As Aristotle states, referring to the Platonic doctrine of Anamnesis

according to which the knowledge of all things is “in” the soul and simply

needs to be “recollected”: “It was a good idea to call the soul ‘the place of

the forms’, though this description holds only of the thinking soul, and even

this is the forms only potentially” (429a27-29). Thus, unlike sensation, in

principle nothing is “outside” of the scope of the rational soul, for it is a

potential totality (omnia). As Hegel states,

[W]hat [Aristotle] says of thought is explicitly and absolutely

speculative, and is not on the same level with anything else, such

as sense-perception […] This fact is moreover involved, that

reason is implicitly the true totality. (LHP 2, 200-1)

As thus “containing” the totality of all knowledge potentially “within” it, the

development of knowledge “in” the rational soul is not a matter of “gaining

access” to the

“world” “out there”, but of actualizing its own immanent potentiality.

Hegel thus criticizes the common view according to which the

“passivity” involved in Aristotle’s account of knowledge is supposed

to make the latter an “empiricist” and/or “realist” when compared, for

example, to Kant’s critical idealism. As Hegel points out, such “passivity”

does not entail a “receptivity” of objects, or their forms, “into” the soul.

Rather, the passivity refers simply to the fact that in moving from ignorance

to knowledge the soul moves from potency to act and therefore undergoes

change:

Thought is implicitly the content of the object of what is

thought, and in coming into existence it [i.e. thought] only

coincides with itself; but the self-conscious understanding is not

merely implicit, but essentially explicit, since it is within itself

all things. That is an idealistic way of expressing it and yet they

say that Aristotle is an empiricist. The passivity of

understanding has therefore here only the sense of potentiality

before actuality, and that is the great principle of Aristotle.

(LHP II 196) Knowledge is thus in the first instance, not a

“gaining access” to or “receiving influence” from an object “out

there”, but a development of the knower; it is the rational soul in

act, for the rational soul is potentially all things.83

Thus, according to the Aristotelian identity theory of knowing which

Hegel appropriates, just as sense in act is sensed in act, so knower in act is

known in act. Moreover, unlike sensation, nothing whatsoever stands

“outside” the scope of the rational soul or mind. All knowledge for Aristotle

is an actualization of the dynamic potency that is “in” or rather is the rational

soul or mind itself. All of these points must be borne in mind in order to

appreciate what Hegel means when he says that the object of knowledge,

unlike the fruit of the plant, is preserved “in” consciousness.84

3. The Concept of the Concrete

From Hegel’s “Concept of Development”, let us turn to his account of the

“Concept of the Concrete”. The concept of the concrete, for Hegel, is a

continuation of the concept of development. Stated simply, for Hegel, “the

concrete is the unity of diverse determinations and principles” (LHP II 13).

Development, therefore, is a process of concretization, for it entails the

positing of diverse elements and the simultaneous preservation of the unity

of those elements. In the specific case of the mind, the mind posits for itself

an object; yet, it preserves its unity with itself in this very act of positing.

Furthermore, complete self-knowledge will constitute the highest

instance of the concrete, for Hegel, since it will involve the full objective

positing of the mind by the mind in a perfected concrete act. For, the mind is

initially a potency or something that exists merely in-itself, but “it is its

interest that what is in itself should be there for it” (LHP I 24). Such a

conscious act or operation of objectification in turn “is the retention of these

diverse elements within itself,” namely, the mind and the object it has

posited for itself; “the act thus is really one, and it is just this unity of

differences which is the concrete” (LHP I 24).

3.1 Development as Vertical Teleology in Hegel

In combining his concept of development with his concept of the

concrete Hegel adds an important element to his overall theory of

development, one that will prove quite useful in understanding his account

of the development of the mind. The element that Hegel adds is a discussion

of how development is ultimately a cumulative process in which later

advances presuppose earlier achievements. Thus, Hegel states

The fruit of development, which comes third, is a result of motion, but

inasmuch as it is merely the result of one stage of development, as

being the last in this stage, it is both the starting point and the first in

order in another such stage…Matter – which as developed has form –

constitutes once more the material for a new form…The application

of thought to this, supplies it with the form and determination of

thought. This action thus further forms the previously formed, gives it

additional determinations, makes it more determinate in itself, further

developed and more profound. As concrete, this activity is a

succession of processes in development which must be represented

not as a straight line drawn out into vague infinity, but as a circle

returning within itself, which, as periphery, has very man circles, and

whose whole is a large number of processes in development turning

back within themselves (LHP I 27).

Clearly, Hegel is again invoking the Aristotelian context. For, learning is a

kind of motion that issues forth a fruit. Such fruit, however, may be enjoyed,

and such enjoyment would constitute an operation or energeia, for the

activity and the end would then be coincident. Thus, the rational mind or

nature, like all natures, is an immanent, teleological principle of motion and

rest.

Hegel adds a further element, however, one that is certainly anticipated in

Aristotle but which still calls forth a further specification on Hegel’s part. In

effect, Hegel is taking what might be called the “horizontal teleology” of

Aristotle and transforming it into a “vertical teleology”. By “horizontal

teleology” would be meant the process whereby a given nature moves

toward an end proportionate to itself and rests in the enjoyment of that end.

Thus, for example, a merely biological organism – or “nutritive soul” – will

differentiate its various organs such that it can engage in the activities

proportionate to its nature, namely, a flourishing biological existence. Such a

process of self-differentiation and immanent perfection would constitute an

instance of horizontal teleology since biological development would be

ordered to the end of biological activity and fulfillment.

Hegel’s points out, however, that along with the horizontal teleology in

which a given nature pursues a proportionate end, development also

involves a process whereby a preceding moment of development provides

the conditions for the pursuit and attainment of a higher end, thus giving rise

to vertical teleology.

As Hegel states, the fruit of development of a given level, which is

already a certain actualization of the potency immanent in a given nature,

can provide the proximate “matter” or potency for a subsequent

development. The standard Aristotelian examples which at least suggest this

process of vertical teleology are instances in which it is observed how water

and earth form the matter for tin as well as copper, while tin and copper

when combined in turn form the matter for bronze, which in turn forms the

matter for a statue, and so on. In such cases, the initial matter has a

proportionate end, namely – at least in the Aristotelian universe – resting in

its proper location. Yet, the attainment of each end functions in turn as an

instrument for the attainment of a higher end, namely, the production of a

beautiful work of art and the contemplative energia by which such beauty is

appreciated.

Hegel goes further, however, and points out that there can be instances

in which a given phenomenon such as biological organism, or, even more

conspicuously, the developing mind, does not have to wait for some external

factor to bring together the matter out of which will emerge a higher form

as, for example, the tin and copper must wait for the metalsmith to smelt

them into bronze, which in turn must wait for the sculptor to transform it

into a work of art, and so on. In contrast, the animal, like the plant,

differentiates its biological organs in order that it may pursue its

proportionate biological ends. Yet, in achieving that proportionate end, the

animal simultaneously produces through itself the conditions or matter

necessary for the emergence of a wholly new set of operations with their

own respective proportionate ends, namely, the operations of sensation. In

turn, the processes of sensation which the animal has differentiated and

constituted within itself can provide the matter from which intelligent

operations might emerge, and so on.

For Hegel, development, properly speaking, should therefore be

understood, not as a kind of line extending out into a vague infinity, but as a

constant return to, enrichment and elevation of previous achievements

through the placing of them in the service of ever higher ends. In other

words, nature is a principle of motion and rest not only horizontally but

vertically, with each “resting station” serving at least potentially as the

instrumental matter for a still higher stage. Indeed, as will soon be discussed

at greater length, consciousness goes through a series of these stages in

which the achievements of the prior stages form the concrete “matter” for

the succeeding stage. Thus, development as concrete entails the preservation

of the diverse elements of what has gone before, although these previous

elements will now function in the service of a higher end.

4. The Concept of Development and the Development of the Concept

Ultimately, in order to understand Hegel’s theory of development it is

necessary to clarify what he means by the “Concept”. To be sure, the

Concept in Hegel has a variety of distinct but related meanings, and as such

it impossible to provide a univocal definition of the term. Present purposes,

however, require that an explication of the Concept proceeds only so far as it

contributes to understanding Hegel’s theory of development.

As a first approximation, Hegel’s Concept corresponds closely to

Aristotle’s “nature”. For, the Concept is a principle of motion and rest.

Indeed, the Concept just is the very dynamic principle which drives any and

all instances of development, including the entirety of universal historical

process. As such, it is possible provisionally to distinguish between, on the

one hand, the Concept as the principle of motion and rest of universal

process, including human history, and, on the other hand, the vast

multiplicity of more particular concepts which propel and govern the

development of the more particular aspects of universal process. The

distinction can at best be provisional, however, since it is ultimately the

same Concept which operates in and through the particular concepts such

that the particular concepts can be rightly be declared to be but “moments”

of the all-embracing Concept. The particular concepts as governing the

development of particular aspects of the universal nevertheless function in a

generically similar manner to the Concept.

4.1 The Concept’s Tripartite Scheme of Development

The Concept, and therefore all particular concepts, develops according

to a tripartite scheme. First, there is an initial state of undifferentiated unity.

This moment could be further specified as the Concept existing in potency,

in-itself and implicitly. Second, the Concept negates its initial unity and

posits for itself a difference in the form of an object. In positing an object for

itself the Concept thereby attains to a degree of actuality and begins to exist

explicitly for-itself. Third, there is culminating moment of reconciliation in

which the Concept negates the initial negation and overcomes the difference

it had posited for itself by sublating it into a higher, differentiated and more

concrete unity. At this highest stage, the Concept is fully actualized; indeed,

it explicitly recognizes not only its object as manifesting itself but also that it

is responsible for positing the object; thus, it comes to exist in-and-for-itself.

Let us unpack each of these basic moments of the development of the

Concept in greater detail.

4.1.1 The Concept’s Initial State of Potency, Implicitness and

Indeterminateness

First, while the Concept’s initial state of undifferentiated unity evidently

lacks any explicit determinations, Hegel routinely insists that it is not a state

of mere lifeless inertia.

Rather, it is a fecund state of potency ordered to its ultimate fulfillment and

actualization.

Second, the Concept in-itself, while lacking explicit determinacy,

nevertheless contains within itself all the objective determinations that it will

eventually posit for itself. As Hegel says, reverting to organic analogy, “A

plant develops from its germ: the germ already contains the whole plant

within itself” (EL 237). In similar fashion, the Concept contains all its

eventual objective determinations within itself.

Third, while the Concept in-itself constitutes a kind of unity, it is

nevertheless unstable and cannot long preserve itself. It is important to see

why this is the case. In terms of greatest generality, the reason why the

Concept, or any concept, in-itself is unstable is that it contains a

contradiction. For Hegel, the Concept in-itself, despite its initial unity,

nevertheless contains a contradiction, and it is due to this immanent

contradiction that Concept is driven beyond its initial state towards its

successive stages of development.98

4.1.2 Contradiction as Impelling the Concept’s Development

It might be asked in what, more precisely, the contradiction immanent

in the Concept in-itself consists. This question can be answered both from a

more strictly logical perspective and from the perspective of concrete

experience. To be sure, these two realms – the order of logic and the order of

experience – are intimately connected in Hegel. Indeed, as we will see in

Chapter Four, Hegel so generalizes his conception of experience that the

logical determinations of thought are recognized to be constitutive of

conscious experience. Nevertheless, it is possible, and at times helpful,

provisionally to distinguish these two orders.

From a logical perspective the contradiction within the Concept is that

between the universal and the particular. For, at its initial stage, the Concept

is universal. As Hegel states, “The beginning, the principle, or the Absolute,

as at first immediately enunciated, is only the universal” (PhG 11). Of

course, a traditional view of concepts is that they are indeed universals, but

universals which merely subsume particular instances “under” them. Hegel’s

view of concepts, not to say, of the Concept, is fundamentally opposed to

this traditional, subsumptive view of concepts. A very brief comparison and

contrast between the traditional view and Hegel’s of concepts, however, will

help clarify the nature of the contradiction between the universal and the

particular that Hegel affirms to exist within the Concept in-itself.

4.1.3 Hegel’s Concept of Concept versus the Traditional Concept of Concept

A first contrast obtains insofar as, for Hegel, the universal is present at

the beginning of development, including, as we will, intellectual

development, whereas for the traditional view, the universal emerges, if it

ever emerges, only at the end of a process of logical abstraction. As a result,

for the traditional view the universal is dependent upon the particulars

whence the former was abstracted.

Second, since for the traditional view the universal emerges as a result

the

“subjective” activity of abstraction, the universal itself is therefore viewed as

something “merely subjective”, an “item” merely “in” the mind, and thus

not constitutive of objective reality. This aspect of the traditional view for

which Hegel has little patience will become more relevant in later portions

of this dissertation. Needless to say, however, for Hegel the Concept qua

universal is not merely abstracted from an already existent reality “out

there”, but instead constitutes that very reality.

Lastly, on the traditional view the universal and particular confront

each in an insoluble contradiction. For, by its very definition the universal

on this view abstracts from particular differences. As the saying goes, all

humans are the same insofar as you abstract from their differences. For

Hegel, however, the problem is that a universal which abstracts from

differences is not worthy of the name. For, to be universal ultimately means

to encompass the universe with all its manifold of particular differences and

determinations. It is precisely this fact, namely, that the universal, to be

worthy of its name, must not abstract from particularity, but must somehow

encompass it, penetrate it and constitute it, that Hegel sees as responsible for

the contradiction obtaining within the

Concept in-itself at its initial stage of development.

For, again, the Concept in its initial stage is the universal, but it is the

universal in a still abstract form. It is universal since it contains all the

differences and determination within itself. Yet, it is abstract since these

differences and determinations exist only in potency; they do not yet

constitute an objective world with a manifold of concrete, particular

determinations. Logically, however, the universal cannot abide this

contradiction. For, logically, any universal worthy of the name cannot

remain abstract but must become the concrete universal; it must not simply

express one aspect common to every instance; rather, it must encompass,

penetrate and constitute everything about everything.

4.1.4 The Experience of the Concept’s Contradiction

Moving from the logical order to the experiential order will further

clarify the nature of the contradiction obtaining within the Concept in-itself.

The contradiction between the universal and particular emerges into

consciousness, in the first instance, in the experience of need [Not] and drive

[Trieb]. These are “the felt contradiction, as it occurs within the living

subject itself” (EL 281). Need, drive and desire [Begierde] just are the initial

experiential manifestations of the logical contradiction between the universal

and the particular.

To take the example of the plant, the germ is a kind of universal in that

it contains within itself all the determinations that will eventually

characterize the whole mature plant. Yet, it contains them merely in abstract

potency. They lack, in other words, determinate, concrete existence or

actuality. Need and drive just are the felt experience of this lack or

contradiction in which the universal is not yet truly universal.

Needless to say, need, drive and desire are not merely the experience of

this lack, this contradiction, but they are of their nature ordered to an end.

Thus, need, drive and desire are teleological. As Hegel says, “Need and

drive are the readiest examples of purpose” (EL 281). As purposive,

however, need, drive and desire represent the transition point between the

merely in-itself to the for-itself for the Concept. Thus, it will be apposite

ourselves to transition to this next stage in the tripartite development of the

Concept. Before doing so, let us briefly recall what has been established thus

far regarding the Concept as it is in-itself.

4.1.5 Brief Summary of the First Stage of the Concept’s Development

In its first stage, the Concept in-itself is an abstract, indeterminate,

implicit universal. Yet, precisely to that extent it exists in a state of

contradiction, since for Hegel to be universal means to encompass, penetrate

and constitute the universe in all of its particularity, which is to say, in its

totality. This contradiction is experienced in the first instance as need and

drive. Need, drive and eventually desire are the positive experience of a

lack, they are the Concept’s experience of itself as both universal and not

universal, as universal in potency and abstraction, but not yet universal in

determinate act and concretion. It is in Hegel’s view of need and drive as

experiential manifestations of the Concept’s initial internal contradiction that

we see in a more illustrative fashion how the Concept drives itself towards

ever higher stages of development.

4.2 The Second Stage of the Concept’s Development

The second stage of Concept’s development is its becoming for-itself. The

Concept for-itself is the Concept in its experience of need and drive, and

these as ordered to an end, as purposive, as teleological. Thus, Hegel states,

“the Concept that now exists for itself is purpose” (EL 279). The question

that immediately arises here regards what exactly is the end towards which

the Concept drives itself. The deceptively simple answer is that the end

towards which the Concepts drives itself is the positing of an existence

adequate to itself in order that it might thereby recognize and be at home.

The moment of the Concept’s existing for-itself corresponds primarily to the

moment of positing, whereas the moment of recognition, reconciliation and

rest corresponds to the Concept qua in-and-for-itself. Let us accordingly

focus first on the moment of the Concept’s positing.

4.2.1 The Concept’s Self-positing

In the case of the plant there is a kind of twofold self-positing of an

existence adequate to the plant’s concept. For, in concept, the plant is the

fully developed, flourishing plant. Thus, in developing, the plant, driven by

perhaps the most primitive form of need and drive, posits the various

concrete determinations that together come to constitute its concrete

functioning. Upon attaining maturity the plant thereby exists in a way that is

adequate to its concept.

Here we have, moreover, a first indication of Hegel’s theory of truth.

Space does not admit of a lengthy discussion on this point. Briefly, however,

we can note that truth for Hegel is a matter of existence becoming adequate

to its concept. Thus, a plant that has become adequate to the concept of a

plant is a true plant. Needless to say, Hegel’s view of truth thus seems to

entail a potentially scandalous inversion of the traditional correspondence

theory of truth according to which truth is a matter of the concept becoming

adequate to existence or the object. A discussion of the details of this point

of controversy, however, will have to wait for Chapters Two through Four.

Along with positing an existence adequate to its concept by developing

into a fully mature organism, the correlative end towards which the plant

drives itself is the positing of a fruit. This aspect of the plant’s process of

development reveals instructive aspects about the limitation of the very

concept of the plant.

As already discussed, in producing its fruit the plant posits into

existence an object whose nature corresponds to itself. Yet, when the plant

posits its fruit and it falls to the ground it ceases to function as a concrete

determination of the plant. Thus, in one sense the plant, in developing itself

to full maturity, has posited for itself an existence adequate to its concept.

Yet, in another sense its culminating moment of development points to an

insurmountable lack, an incompleteness, an alienation endemic to the very

nature of the plant. This intrinsic incompleteness and alienation

characteristic of the culminating moment of the plant’s self-development

thus reveals the intrinsic limitation of its very concept.

The limitation of the concept of a plant – to put it perhaps a bit

tautologically – is its finitude. It is of the very nature or concept of a mature

plant that its existence be restricted to a rather finite portion of space and

time. Moreover, the concrete determinations of a plant are restricted to a

very limited range of organs, functions and processes. At best, organisms

like plants participate in the spurious infinity of one generation succeeding

the next ad infinitum. No actually existing plant, however, can be actually

infinite, for the concept of a plant is finite.

As such, the concept of a plant is not universal in the most radical

sense of the term. It is at best universal in a qualified sense. The concept of a

plant, existing as it does in-itself in the germ, does contain all the

determinations that will eventually characterize the plant. Yet, the totality of

these determinations is intrinsically limited. In other words, the plant is

determined throughout or “universally” by its concept. Yet, the concept

itself is restricted and nowhere is this restriction more evident than in the

fact that at the culminating moment of its own development the plant posits

a difference for itself that it cannot preserve within itself. The abstract genus

preserves itself in this difference, but not the concrete, actual plant.

It is otherwise, however, with the concept of mind. The concept of

mind posits for itself an existence adequate to itself by developing out of

itself a fully mature, rational adult. At the culminating point of its

development the mind posits a fruit in analogous fashion to the plant. The

difference, however, is that mind preserves itself in this difference. The

ultimate reason for this is that the concept of mind is infinite, unrestricted:

potentia omnia facere et fieri.

The important point to note is that since we have learned that need and

drive and their higher manifestations are what drive the development of any

given concept, the development of the mind must be driven by an

unrestricted or infinite desire. Hegel will also refer to this desire as a desire

for the Absolute or even Absolute desire. It is a desire for the absolute or

unconditioned, not in the sense of that which lacks conditions, but for the

totality of conditions – in other words, the infinite, the concrete universal,

everything about everything.

Thus, the concept of mind seeks to rest in an existent mind that has

posited for itself an absolute, infinite universe. As such, the Concept reveals

itself to be the mind. It is ultimately mind from beginning to end that has

driven the totality of universal process. Noting this fact, however,

immediately raises questions regarding the proper way to interpret mind in

its most radical sense. For, as concretely existing, mind only appears at the

last stages of universal historical development. Thus, it becomes unclear in

what sense Hegel could mean that mind nevertheless has driven the entirety

of universal process from beginning to end. For example, is mind God?

Does He providentially work throughout all of universal historical process,

directing things to their ultimate completion?117 Yet, if He himself, being

mind, is not actual until the end of this process, how could He be directing it

from the beginning? These are all questions that would lead into a discussion

of Hegel’s philosophy of religion, a topic which falls well outside of the

scope of this dissertation. For now it will be sufficient to summarize what

has been covered regarding the Concept in its moment as for-itself.

4.2.2 Brief Summary of the Concept in its Second Stage of Development

Qua for-itself, the Concept is, in the first instance, a species of need

and drive which is itself the felt contradiction of being at once universal yet

lacking concrete existence and determination and thus not being universal in

a more radical sense. The concept of mind is the only properly universal and

infinite drive or desire. It thus drives itself to posit for itself a universe

adequate to its own universality and infinity. In this sense, what is for-itself

– the concept of mind qua universal and infinite desire – become for-itself,

that is to say, it becomes objective for-itself what it is in-itself, namely, the

unrestricted, infinite totality of concrete determinations. Once this moment is

achieved the conditions are thereby set for the ultimate moment of

development when the Concept, which is to say, the mind, becomes in-and-

for-itself.

4.3 The Third Stage of the Concept’s Development

The final moment of the development of the Concept is the becoming

of mind inand-for-itself. As noted, this moment entails the Concept positing

for itself an existence that is adequate to what it is in itself. It also entails

that the Concept recognizes the objective existence it has posited as indeed

itself. The Concept must finally overcome the semblance or illusion that the

objective reality of which it is aware and which it inhabits is something

other than its own self. For, at the for-itself stage the Concept does gradually

succeed in positing an objective existence adequate to itself. Yet, at this

stage the Concept does not recognize this fact. Rather, it takes the objective

universe which it has posited for itself as something alien and found “out

there” and thus standing overagainst it.

In other words, while still in the merely for-itself stage the Concept is

in a position analogous to that of the plant after it has posited its fruit. Like

the plant, the Concept has posited an objectivity for itself. Yet, unlike the

plant, the object that the Concept has posited for itself does not ultimate fall

“outside” it. The Concept, however, does not yet know this. As Hegel will

repeatedly note, the Concept forgets the path of its development and that of

its object and so takes the object as it appears immediately to it, namely, as a

kind of brute fact standing over-against it. It takes the object, in other

words, to stand in a relation to it like that of the fruits relationship to the

plant. The Concept overcomes this illusion through a two-pronged

recognition.

First, the Concept recognizes that the object it has posited for itself is

not in fact “outside” of it, not something different or other than it which

stands over-against it. It recognizes instead that the object is constitutive of

its very self as mind. Second, in the same moment the Concept also

recognizes that it itself has posited this objective existence. It takes

responsibility for its deed and thus recognizes itself for what it is: a world-

constituting, universal totality.

In achieving these culminating moments of recognition the Concept

thus comes to exist in-and-for-itself. It knows itself and its world and

recognizes them for what they are. It is at home with itself and thus attains to

that elevated rest which is at once an infinite activity. The Concept thereby

has also become the Truth, for it has posited an existence adequate to itself.

It is true both in the sense of a perfect correspondence between Concept and

existence, thought and being, and in the sense of being absolute or

unconditioned, for the existence that the Concept has posited for itself is the

concrete universal which encompasses, penetrates and constitutes all

particular determinations. As Hegel states, “The True is the whole. But the

whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its

development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result,

that only in the end is it what it truly is” (PhG 11).

As a final note regarding this culminating moment of development, it

can be noted that insofar as something succeeds in positing an existence

adequate to its concept it becomes Idea, and the absolute or infinite Concept,

when it posits an existence adequate to itself, becomes Absolute Idea. Hegel

often appears to use Concept, Idea and Mind interchangeably, but Idea refers

more specifically the Concept as realized in existence.

5. Summary of the Chapter

It is now time to turn from Hegel’s general theory of development to

his theory of the development of consciousness in particular. Before doing

that, however, it will be useful to summarize the major points of Hegel’s

theory examined thus far.

First, Hegel’s theory of development owes a major debt to a number of

core Aristotelian notions. Foremost among these notions would be 1) the

distinctions between potency and act 2) the teleological conception of

nature(s), 3) the rational nature or mind as a potens omni facere et fieri and

4) the view that the highest end and energeia is the perfection of self-

knowledge. Thus, for Hegel all development is a transition from potency to

act. Yet, as Hegel learned from Aristotle, acts can either be motions or

operations. Operations are acts which are coincident with their ends. Thus,

the attainment of the end of certain natures entails a continual activity that

does not occur over time but endures through time. Moreover, since the

rational nature is a potential positing and understanding of all things, the

fulfillment of its nature would be the nothing less than a perfected grasp of

the totality of all things which would itself be identical with perfected self-

knowledge.

Hegel’s employment of the analogy and dis-analogy of the biological

development of the plant to illuminate the development of consciousness

was also instructive. Hegel notices even in plant life the teleological

tendency towards selfdifferentiation which culminates in a moment of

positing in which what is in-itself seeks to become for-itself. Thus, the plant

differentiates its various organs, thereby bringing itself to full maturation,

and in a final instance bears fruit. Yet, in this final moment of development

the plant fails to preserve its identity with itself: the fruit falls outside plant

and takes up a merely external relation over-against it. The relation between

the fruit and the plant is not concrete. In contrast, in the final moment of

development of the mind – the positing of the object of knowledge – is a

concrete energeia in which the various moments are preserved within the act

itself. For, on the Aristotelian identity theory of knowledge, knower and

known are one in act.

Indeed, each new stage in the development of the mind with its

proportionate object will in turn provide the concrete material conditions out

of which a subsequent stage will emerge. The term “vertical teleology” was

introduced to describe this process whereby the attainment of lower ends

comes to serve as instruments for the attainment of still higher ends.

The discussion of the development of the Concept helped to clarify

further details of Hegel’s concept of development. It was noted how

development qua transition from potency to act can be further specified as a

transition from the in-itself, to the for-itself, to the in-and-for-itself.

Having established these fundamental points regarding Hegel’s overall

theory of development, we are now prepared to examine in closer detail

Hegel’s account of the development of the mind itself.

Consciousness

Hegel’s account of the polymorphic development of the mind in the

PhG provides the basis upon which he explains the emergence, and critiques

the multiplicity, of conflicting philosophies. In moving to an examination of

this account we thus enter into the heart of this dissertation.

The present chapter will consist of three main sections each of which

will examine one of the three sections of “Consciousness”, the opening

chapter of the PhG. The names of these sections of Consciousness are:

“Sense-certainty”, “Perception” and “Force and Understanding”.

The first section of this chapter will track Hegel’s phenomenology of

the experience of Sense-certainty as a form of the mind. The details of

Hegel’s analysis are quite complex and often require extended examination

and commentary. Still, the overriding goal of this dissertation is to

demonstrate how Hegel provides an explanatory account for the fact of

philosophical multiplicity and conflict. Thus, a special effort will be made to

draw out more precisely just how Hegel’s phenomenology of Sense-

certainty in fact provides the means for explaining the very existence of

determinate philosophical positions.

As will be shown, one philosophical position the existence of which is

explained in and through Hegel’s phenomenology of Sense-certainty turns

out to be that of the naïve realism/skepticism manifested in the thought of

Hegel’s contemporary, G.E. Schulze. It is worth noting that, starting perhaps

with Jean Hyppolite’s The Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology

of Spirit, there has been a tendency among commentators to view the initial

stages of Hegel’s analysis of Sense-certainty as providing an explanatory

account of the nature and emergence of the Parmenidean philosophy,

particularly its conception of Being. There is perhaps some warrant to this

view given 1) that there seems to be correlation between the immediate

Being which is the initial object of Sense-certainty and the indeterminate

Being analyzed at the beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic (SL), and 2)

that the Being analyzed at the beginning of the SL would seem to correspond

to the Paremindean conception of Being. Still, it will hopefully become clear

that the philosophy whose emergence is explained via the phenomenology of

Sense-certainty much more closely corresponds to the naïve realism typified

by Schulze.

The next section of this chapter will examine Perception. A particular

philosophical position which is provided with an at least initial explanation

in Perception is the distinction between appearance and reality. To be sure,

this fundamental distinction in the history of philosophy will receive an even

fuller explanation in the subsequent section of the PhG, Force and

Understanding. Nevertheless, important elements in Hegel’s larger effort to

explain this crucial distinction will be unpacked in this section.

The section examining the Perception will also include a special sub-

section in which it will be shown how the phenomenology of the viewpoint

of Perception provides, not only the basis for an explanatory account of

certain historical philosophies, but also the grounds for explaining the

existence of the ordinary conception of the history of philosophical

multiplicity itself which was discussed in the introductory chapter to this

dissertation. For, views on the history and nature of philosophical

multiplicity and disagreement are de facto philosophical positions. As such,

they require an explanation for their very emergence. Perception provides

some truly astounding insights into how it ever came about that the history

of philosophy should be conceived of as a mere haphazard succession of

externality related and mutually exclusive positions.

The last major section of this chapter will examine the Force and

Understanding. This section will continue to draw out Hegel’s explanatory

account for the emergence of the appearance/reality distinction. The

viewpoint of Force and Understanding is also quite important inasmuch as it

marks the point of transition from “mere” consciousness to self-

consciousness, which latter will be the subject of the next chapter of this

dissertation.

Thus, it will be necessary to track those aspects of Hegel’s phenomenology

of Force and Understanding that will prove salient to grasping the nature of

self-consciousness.

Brief Prelude on an Important Methodological Technique Employed

Before moving to the beginning of the PhG it will be helpful first to

explicate an all-important technique Hegel employs in aiding the reader in

the very interpretation of his text. Throughout the course of the PhG Hegel

draws a distinction between what the form of the mind or “viewpoint” under

phenomenological investigation takes or interprets itself to be experiencing

or doing, on the one hand, and what we, the phenomenological observers,

know the form of the mind to be actually experiencing or doing. In fact,

properly drawing and maintaining this distinction turns out to be

indispensable to understanding the true import of the PhG’s argument

concerning the source of philosophical multiplicity and conflict.

The basis of the distinction lies in the fact that lower forms of the mind

lack selfknowledge. Therefore, they undergo experiences and engage in

activities but they do not understand these experiences or activities. More

specifically, lower forms of the mind do not adequately understand either

themselves, their objects or their relations to their objects and thus do not

recognize the role they have in developing and constituting themselves and

their objects. Lower forms of the mind thus routinely mis-take themselves,

their objects and their relations to their objects as being and doing things

other than what they are or do.

In contrast, we, the phenomenologists, that is to say, the readers of the

PhG, are granted privilege to a higher viewpoint by means of which we are

enabled to understand both what actually occurs in the experience or activity

of a lower form of the mind and also what that form of the mind interprets or

takes itself to be experiencing or doing. To be sure, this is a privilege not

lightly bestowed and comes with a host of responsibilities.

First and foremost, it places a burden on the reader of the PhG to transpose

herself imaginatively into the viewpoint of the form of the mind currently

under investigation. One must phenomenologically rehearse within one’s

own experience the experience of another viewpoint. One must envisage, not

just what the form of consciousness experiences and does, but also what it

takes itself to be experiencing and doing. In other words, one must

understand the viewpoint’s self-interpretation. At the same time, however,

one must maintain a reflective distance from this form of mind in order

thereby to understand what it is actually experiencing and doing, its self-

interpretation notwithstanding. The point of course being that there is a

difference between what occurs within the experience of a given form of

mind and what that form of mind takes to be occurring.

The significance of this phenomenological technique for the present

dissertation can hardly be overstated. For, as it turns out, the different

philosophies can be understood as expressions of the self-interpretations of

the various forms of the mind. In other words, different philosophies emerge

inasmuch as different forms of the mind 1) undergo certain experiences 2)

interpret those experiences and 3) express those interpretations in more or

less philosophical terms. Thus, drawing the distinction between the self-

interpretation of a certain form of the mind, on the one hand, and our

phenomenologically detached interpretation of that form, on the other, turns

out to be a conditio sine qua non for understanding Hegel’s philosophy of

philosophies. For, different and conflicting philosophies turn out to result

from varying degrees of deficiency in self-knowledge, and these deficiencies

cannot be diagnosed unless one consistently draws and maintains the

distinction between the viewpoint of the form of the mind under

phenomenological investigation, on the one hand, and the viewpoint of we,

the phenomenologists, on the other.

Having noted this fundamental methodological distinction, let us now

turn to examining Hegel’s phenomenology of Sense-certainty in which he

concretely employs it.

1. Sense-certainty

The PhG begins with the section “Sense-certainty: Or the ‘This’ and

‘Meaning’” within the larger chapter entitled “Consciousness”.

Consciousness is a form of the mind and Sense-certainty is a sub-form or

sub-specification of that form. The terms “This” and “Meaning” mentioned

in the subtitle refer to the dialectic between the particular and universal that

will drive this section forward. For, the word “This” would seem invariably

to refer to or mean some particular object. Yet, as Hegel will attempt to

show, it is impossible to say what is thus apparently meant, namely, the

particular in its particularity. Before examining this point, however, let us

first establish the basic structure of the viewpoint of Sense-certainty.

Sense-certainty is constituted by two poles: the ‘I’ and the object, or the

‘This’. From the viewpoint of Sense-certainty, the object, or the ‘This’, is

present in immediately sensuous experience. Sense-certainty, moreover, is

certain indeed that the object is, that the object is “really there” for it, and

that all the ‘I’ must do is simply be receptive to the absolute presence of the

object. Thus, for Sense-certainty the object is the absolute, the true, the

essential; for, it is, whereas the ‘I’, as the principle of awareness correlative

to this object, is entirely dependent upon the object if it – the ‘I’ – is going to

be what it is. As Hegel states, “But the object is: it is what is true, or it is the

essence. It is, regardless of whether it is known or not; and it remains even if

it is not known, whereas there is no knowledge if the object is not there”

(PhG 59). Certainty is a quality of the ‘I’. Yet, from the viewpoint of Sense-

certainty, its very certainty is dependent upon the object, for there would be

no ‘I’ unless there was an object existing independently of the ‘I’.

Therefore, given the fact that the ‘I’ is aware of the object, it can be certain

in its knowledge that the object exists independently of itself, that it is

“really there”. For, there would be no ‘I’ if there was no object.

As Hegel quickly notes, however, a question arises as to whether or not

“in sensecertainty itself the object is in fact the kind of essence that sense-

certainty proclaims it to be; whether this notion of it as the essence

corresponds to the way it is present in sensecertainty” (PhG 59). In other

words, a question immediately arises as to whether or not Sense-certainty’s

interpretation of its own experience corresponds to what is actually given or

undergone in that experience.

The way Hegel begins to drive a wedge between Sense-certainty’s

selfunderstanding and an understanding of Sense-certainty that can be

generated by us, the phenomenologists, is simply to pose the question:

“What is the This?” (PhG 59) It is important to note that Hegel does not

specify who is asking this question: Sense-certainty itself, or we, the

phenomenologists. Given the fact that immediately after posing the question

Hegel refers to how “we” might take the ‘This’ according to it shape of

being ‘Now’ and ‘Here’, it would seem that this kind of questioning is an

operation performed by the phenomenological observer. Yet, the fact that it

is posed as a question would also seem to suggest that Hegel is providing an

invitation for Sense-certainty to transcend its present viewpoint. In other

words, although in pursuing the question we, the phenomenologists, will

indeed discover that Sense-certainty’s self-interpretation is flawed, Sense-

certainty is nevertheless not excluded from posing the question itself and

thereby gaining the critical distance vis-à-vis its own experience necessary

for transcending its flawed perspective. As Hegel famously notes in the

Preface, the PhG is intended to be a ladder by means of which individuals

might transcend their lower viewpoints and attain the highest standpoint of

Science (PhG 14). Hegel is thus perhaps revealing that that “ladder” is at

least partially constituted by a certain method of questioning and the

willingness to pursue that method all the way through.

Be that as it may, we, the phenomenologists, along with Hegel, do

certainly take up the question that Hegel poses. Again, Hegel’s point is that

despite its certainty that its object – the immediate, sensuous ‘This’ – is the

absolute, the essential, the true, Sensecertainty has never in fact investigated

in any seriousness sense what the ‘This’ is. Sensecertainty says of the ‘This’

“It is!” Hegel asks “What is it?”

1.1 The ‘This’ qua ‘Now’ and ‘Here’

Hegel suggests that we begin by examining the ‘This’ according to its

two aspects or “shapes”: ‘Now’ and ‘Here’. Hegel does not provide any

reason as to why the examination should proceed in this way, nor does he

make clear exactly why the aspects ‘Now’ and ‘Here’ should be taken

without any further ado as obvious characteristics of the ‘This’. Presumably

Hegel is taking it for granted that since the object of Sensecertainty is

something by definition sensuous then it must be spatially and temporally

determined since all sense-experience would seem to be qualified thusly.

Moreover, since the object of Sense-certainty is, from the viewpoint of

Sense-certainty, experienced immediately, it must therefore be experienced

according to the immediate temporal and spatial determinations ‘Now’ and

‘Here’.

Hegel thus proceeds to his famous analysis of the determinations

‘Now’ and ‘Here’ in which he reveals these two determinations not to be

what Sense-certainty took them to be. Sense-certainty took its object to be

the absolute, the essential, the true. Hegel shows, however, how this

presumption gets inverted. Yet, Hegel would insist that this inversion of the

original presumption or self-interpretation of Sense-certainty is not the result

of an artificial technique imposed from without by Hegel himself; rather, the

inversion results merely from a thinking-through of what is already

contained in the ‘This’ and its two determinations ‘Now’ and ‘Here’.

Hegel’s procedure thus bears certain potential similarities to Kant’s

procedure in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic.

Indeed, a great deal of secondary commentary on this section of the PhG has

attempted to sort out the precise nature of Hegel’s debt, if any, to Kant in

this context. Space does not permit, however, wading into this point of

dispute presently. Suffice it to say that Hegel will at times speak of his

general philosophical procedure as a kind of deduction. Yet, he is always

quick to insist that it is not a deduction in any ordinary or “formally” logical

sense of the term – hence, the temptation to construe it as a species of

transcendental deduction. For present purposes, however, perhaps the most

felicitous way to characterize Hegel’s procedure is as a “thinking-through”

driven by a determinate species of question, namely, “What?” “What is the

‘This’?” “What is the object of experience, more generally?” “What is the

quality or form of the mind correlative to such an object?” These are the

questions that drive the thinking-through or “phenomenological deduction”

forward.

Interestingly enough, this point would seem to suggest that there is a

sense in which the phenomenological onlooker does play some role in

pushing the dialectic forward. To be sure, there is an immanent critique or

thinking-through of the object or form of the mind at any given stage of

development. In other words, there is a sense in which we merely look on as

the internal “logic” of the object or form of the mind unfolds before us. Yet,

by the same token, unless we posed these questions regarding the immanent

intelligibility of the object or form of the mind and pursued them ourselves,

nothing would actually unfold. Thus, it may be that the ultimate driving

principle of the dialectic is the intellectual desire of the phenomenological

onlooker. It is our demand for the absolute, the essential, the true that turns

out to be the ultimate criterion for judging the adequacy of any given

viewpoint. In following through on that demand we participate in revealing

how any viewpoint shy of the Absolute Standpoint invariably fails in its

claim to having achieved the absolute.

1.1.1 Thinking-through the ‘Now’

As noted, Sense-certainty claims to know the absolute in the

immediate sensuous ‘This, Now, Here’. Hegel, in moving the dialectic

forward, poses a further “What” question, namely, “What is Now?” Hegel

provides on behalf of Sense-certainty a provisional answer: “Now is Night.”

(PhG 60) Recall, however, that on Sense-certainty’s self-interpretation the

‘This, Now, Here’ is absolute, the essential, the true. Thus, insofar as Sense-

certainty proclaims ‘Now is Night’, it is eo ipso claiming that Night is the

absolute and that the statement ‘Now is Night’ is absolutely true.

Hegel directs us to write down the proposition ‘Now is Night’. He

then observes that, upon writing this proposition down, if we wait, we will

see that ‘Now’ has become ‘Noon’. The contradiction is clear. According to

Sense-certainty, the ‘Now’, as a determination of the ‘This’, was absolute

and the proposition proclaiming it was thus absolutely true. On the basis of

this assumption we proceeded to proclaim that ‘Now is Night’, which

entailed that ‘Night’ must be absolute and the statement proclaiming it must

be absolutely true. Yet, merely by waiting a certain period of time, ‘Night’

ceased to exist and the statement proclaiming it ceased to be true. Thus, the

‘Now’ qua ‘Night’ turns out not to be absolute and the statement

proclaiming it turned out not to be absolutely true.

Yet, notice, the ‘Now’ indeed persists or preserves itself. For, now it

is ‘Noon’.

As Hegel states, “The Now does indeed preserve itself, but as something

that is not Night; equally, it preserves itself in face of the Day that it now is,

as something that also is not Day, in other words, as a negative in general”

(PhG 60). ‘Now’ is equally and indifferently ‘Night’ and ‘Day’, just as it is

equally and indifferently ‘not-Night’ and ‘not-Day’. The ‘Now’ preserves

itself through its ongoing series of particular positions (“Now is…”) and

negations (“Now is not...”) and thereby negates these negations and assumes

the character of a universal determination: It is always Now.

Recall, however, that we are thinking-through the object that Sense-

certainty took to be the absolute, the essential, the true. Sense-certainty took

the immediate, particular, sensuous ‘This’ to be the absolute. Yet, the ‘This’

in the case of the ‘Now’ turned out not to be a particular at all but a universal

determination. Thus, the thinking-through of the object of Sense-certainty

reveals that object to be other than what Sense-certainty took it to be.

1.1.2 Linguistic Expression of the ‘Now’

Hegel adds a further element to his discussion which perhaps both

illuminates and threatens to obscure his analysis. He states:

It is as a universal too that we utter what the sensuous [content] is.

What we say is: ‘This’, i.e. the universal This; or, ‘it is’, i.e. Being in

general. Of course, we do not envisage the universal This or Being in

general, but we utter the universal; in other words, we do not strictly

say what in this sense-certainty we mean to say. But language, as we

see, is the more truthful; in it, we ourselves directly refute what we

mean to say, the universal is the true [content] of sense-certainty and

since language expresses this true [content] alone, it is just not

possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that

we mean. (PhG 60)

The “we” to which Hegel appears to refer in this instance is not we, the

phenomenologists, at least not the phenomenologists as inhabiting the more

detached phenomenological perspective. Rather, the “we” referred to

appears to be those who inhabit as a matter of fact, or through

phenomenological transposition, the viewpoint of Sense-certainty. We, in

Sense-certainty, thus utter the word ‘This’ or ‘Now’ when attempting to

speak of what we take to be our object. Yet, Hegel claims, ‘This’ or ‘Now’

are universal determinations; they apply equally to all ‘Thises’ and all

‘Nows’. Thus, our speaking betrays or refutes our meaning inasmuch as we

would mean the particular yet we invariably speak the universal. According

to Hegel, what this all reveals is that language is more truthful than our

intentions or meanings, at least at this stage of development. For, language

indirectly reveals that the true object of Sense-certainty – if Sense-certainty

would but think it through – is the universal.

Unfortunately, it is not perfectly clear what exactly this portion of

Hegel’s discussion contributes to his larger effort to think-through the object

of Sense-certainty and thereby expose that it is not what Sense-certainty

took it to be. It seems to be something of a digression into a nascent but, at

this point, woefully underdeveloped theory of language and, as such, it

threatens to obscure as much as it might illuminate Hegel’s overall point.

One way to recover some useful instruction from Hegel’s discussion,

however, is to see how it illuminates the very process of self-interpretation

in which the various viewpoints engage, especially insofar as this self-

interpretation would seek to express itself in more or less philosophical

terms.

Thus, a given philosophy might declare or utter that the absolute or

“Being” is the immediate sensuous particular object, the ‘This’. Hegel would

point out that ‘Being’ and ‘This’ are universal determinations. Thus, in the

very act of declaring its position, such a philosophy would appeal to a realm

of universal determinations or objects which it nevertheless fails to account

for. In other words, although this philosophy may not explicitly advert to the

realm of universal determinations or objects, such determinations or objects

are nevertheless constitutive of its experience.

Thus, Hegel’s brief and entirely inadequate digression on the nature of

language and its potential role in the unfolding of the dialectic can

nevertheless perhaps be usefully interpreted as illuminating the problem of

performative self-contradiction that is liable to beset any viewpoint shy of

the Absolute Standpoint when it attempts to articulate its own self-

understanding.

1.1.3 Thinking-through the ‘Here’

Hegel next provides a similar analysis of the other determination of the

‘This’, namely, ‘Here’. Sense-certainty presumes that the ‘This’ which is

‘Here’ is absolute, essential, true. Yet, just as it was a mere matter of waiting

in order to reveal that the temporal determination ‘Now’ that was ‘Night’

was not absolute, so all that is required is a mere change of spatial location

in order to reveal that the ‘Here’ is not absolute, either. As Hegel states

‘Here’ is, e.g. the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is

converted into its opposite. ‘No tree is here, but a house instead’.

‘Here’ itself does not vanish; on the contrary, it abides constant in the

vanishing of the house, the tree, etc. and is indifferently house or tree.

Again, therefore, the ‘This’ shows itself to be a mediated simplicity,

or a universality. (PhG. sec. pp. 60-61)

Hegel’s point is that in thinking-through the ‘Here’ we discover that it is not

what Sensecertainty took it to be, namely, a particular object or

determination, but is rather a universal determination: Everywhere is Here.

The analysis of Sense-certainty continues through several more

dialectical variations as Hegel describes how Sense-certainty continually

shifts its ground in order to hold onto its original conviction that it knows or

otherwise experiences the absolute in the immediate sensuous particular.

There is no pressing need to rehearse all the details of this analysis at

present; instead, let us focus on a few of the more salient lessons learned by,

or at least about, Sense-certainty in this section.

1.2 The Dialectical Reversals and Ground-shifting of Sense-certainty

According to Hegel, as a result of Sense-certainty’s discovery that its

object is in fact a universal, the relation between knowing or the ‘I’ and the

object has been reversed.

Previously, Sense-certainty took the object to be the absolute, the essential,

the true. Sense-certainty, in other words, was certain of the object’s

existence and that the latter was given in immediate sensuous experience.

That pretension, however, has been dispelled with the discovery that the

object was not what Sense-certainty took it to be.

Thus, according to Hegel,

The certainty is now to be found in the opposite element, viz. in

knowing, which previously was the unessential element. Its truth is in

the object as my object, or in its being mine [Meinen]; it is, because I

know it. Sense-certainty, then, though indeed expelled from the

object, is not yet thereby overcome, but only driven back into the ‘I’.

(PhG 61)

At least two points are noteworthy about Hegel’s discussion. First, what is

unfolding is Sense-certainty’s shifting of its ground in order preserve its

initial conviction that it knows its object through immediate sensuous

experience. Previously, the object was taken to be the absolute and essential

element, and knowing was dependent upon it. Now, the knowing or the ‘I’ is

held to be the absolute and essential element, while the object is relegated to

a dependent status. Whereas before, the ‘I’ knew or experienced the object

strictly because the object was “really out there”, now, the object – the

‘Now’ and/or the ‘Here’ – is there because I experience it “in the immediacy

of my seeing, hearing, and so on” (PhG 61).

Second, although Sense-certainty’s immediate concern is evidently to

shift its ground in order to preserve its original conviction as to how it

knows its object, the effect of its effort is, despite itself, to move the dialectic

forward. For, what begins to emerge at this point is a nascent appreciation on

the part of the mind of the role of consciousness or the ‘I’ in constituting its

object. Previously, the ‘I’ was little more than an afterthought for Sense-

certainty – the object was absolute; it was being. Now the ‘I’ steps forward

as an explicit object of inquiry and reflection. To be sure, as we will see, the

‘I’ in turn is subjected to a similar dialectical treatment as the ‘This’ has

been. Yet, an invaluable, if still incomplete, lesson regarding the very nature

and structure of the mind will have been won in the process. Self-knowledge

is beginning to emerge.

1.3 The ‘I’ of Sense-certainty

Hegel, indeed, demonstrates that the ‘I’ is subject to a dialectical

critique similar to that of the ‘This’. For, Sense-certainty now wants to

maintain that the ‘I’ is absolute and essential. The ‘I’ does not experience the

‘Now’ or the ‘Here’ because they are; rather, “‘Now’ is day because I see it;

‘Here’ is a tree for the same reason” (PhG 101).

Yet, Hegel continues,

In this relationship sense-certainty experiences the same dialectic

acting upon itself as in the previous one. I, this ‘I’, see the tree and

assert that ‘Here’ is a tree; but another ‘I’ sees the house and

maintains that ‘Here’ is not a tree but a house instead. Both truths

have the same authentication, viz. the immediacy of seeing, and the

certainty and assurance that both have about their knowing; but the

one truth vanishes in the other. (PhG 61)

Thus, insofar as Sense-certainty maintains that this ‘I’ is absolute and

essential, and that ‘Here’ is here because this ‘I’ sees it, it will find itself

contradicted or negated by a subsequent ‘I’ which experiences something

different but which has equal claim to absoluteness and essentiality. Both

‘I’s’ are absolute; therefore, neither ‘I’ is absolute. Each one, in fact,

vanishes upon the appearance of the other.

The problem, of course, lies in the attempt on the part of Sense-

certainty to think of the ‘I’ as a ‘This’ after the manner of a putatively

immediate sensuous object. For, the ‘I’ qua ‘This’ is subject to the same

dialectical critique as the object qua ‘This’. Thus, as Hegel notes, while each

particular and putatively absolute ‘I’ vanishes upon a mere shift of attention,

“What does not disappear in all this is the ‘I’ as universal, whose seeing is

neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house, but is a simple seeing which,

though mediated by the negation of this house, etc. is all the same simple

and indifferent to whatever happens in it, to the house, the tree, etc.” (PhG

62) Once again, Sense-certainty discovers that what it took to be the

absolute, in this case, the immediate ‘I’ qua ‘This’, turns out not to be

absolute, after all. Instead, the ‘I’ turns out to be a universal principle of

awareness that encompasses and penetrates any particular intentional act

such as seeing or hearing.

1.4 The ‘I-Object’ Relation as Absolute

Hegel next turns to indicating the lesson that Sense-certainty has thus

far learned in the experience of thinking-through its own initial

presuppositions about the nature of its object and its ‘I’.

Sense-certainty thus comes to know by experience that its essence is

neither in the object nor in the ‘I’, and that its immediacy is neither an

immediacy of the one nor of the other; for in both, what I mean is

rather something unessential, and the object and the ‘I’ are universals

in which that ‘Now’ and ‘Here’ and ‘I’ which I mean do not have a

continuing being, or are not. Thus we reach the stage where we have

to posit the whole of sense-certainty itself as it essence, and no longer

only one of its moments, as happened in the two cases where first the

object confronting the ‘I’, and then the ‘I’, were supposed to be its

reality. (PhG 62)

Recall, Sense-certainty has twice now experienced what it took to be

absolute and essential turn out not to be absolute and essential, after all.

According to Hegel, Sensecertainty is pushed to adopt a third alternative,

namely, positing that neither the object nor the ‘I’ but rather the whole

relationship obtaining within Sense-certainty between consciousness or the

‘I’ and its object is absolute and essential. Hegel does not explain why

Sense-certainty, or even we, the phenomenologists, would make this move.

Nevertheless, the insight gained by Sense-certainty at this point – which it

will unfortunately promptly forget – is instructive in terms of the larger

trajectory of the mind’s development.

Sense-certainty – however tenuously or provisionally – gains some

insight into the nature of the relationship between consciousness and its

object. While by no means identical, a close analogue to the insight gained

by Sense-certainty at this point is the famous Husserlian insight that

consciousness is always consciousness-of, or, more precisely, that

intentional acts and intentional objects are correlative. In other words,

Sense-certainty gains some appreciation of the fact that, just as there is no

consciousness without an object, there is equally no object without

consciousness or an ‘I’.

To be sure, this is a profound and demanding insight and Hegel

unfortunately does little to explicate its full significance at this point.

Instead, Hegel moves directly to discussing how Sense-certainty makes use

of its insight merely in order once again to try to salvage its initial

conviction that it knows its object in a state of pure immediacy. Sense-

certainty – again, in a quasi-Husserlian sense – brackets its presupposition of

the transcendence or absoluteness of the object as well as that of the ‘I’,

thereby attempting to constitute the correlation between the two into “a

relation […] into which also no distinction whatever can penetrate.” (PhG

62) Sense-certainty also attempts to bracket any relationship it might have

with distinct conscious acts and their correlative objects. The result is the

following:

I, this ‘I’, assert then the ‘Here’ as a tree, and do not turn round so that

the Here would become for me not a tree; also, I take no notice of the

fact that another ‘I’ sees the Here as not a tree, or that I myself at

another time take the Here as nottree, the Now as not-day. On the

contrary, I am a pure [act of] intuiting; I, for my part, stick to the fact

that the Now is day, or that the Here is a tree; also I do not compare

Here and Now themselves with one another, but stick firmly to one

immediate relation: the Now is day. (PhG 62-3)

Noteworthy, here, is the bathos of the predicament into which Sense-

certainty has worked itself by shifting its ground in order to preserve its

original conviction. For, originally Sense-certainty was certain that its

knowledge of its object was “the richest kind of knowledge, indeed a

knowledge of infinite wealth for which no bounds can be found” and in

which nothing was omitted from the object (PhG 58). Sense-certainty

originally took the realm of sensuous immediacy as one of infinite expanse

and richness. Yet, in order to maintain its conviction that this realm is indeed

given in immediate sensuous experience, Sense-certainty now finds itself

restricted to a single act of wouldbe pure intuiting, an act, that is to say,

which has been abstracted from the concrete context of other acts through

which the object indeed might have been experienced in much greater

richness. Sense-certainty thus finds itself banished, or rather has banished

itself, from a garden of infinite immediate sensuous delight into a domain of

utter experiential impoverishment.

1.4.1 Thinking-through the ‘I-Object’ Relation

Hegel pushes the dialectic forward by instructing us, the

phenomenologists, to enter phenomenologically into the viewpoint of Sense-

certainty at this point – the reason being that since Sense-certainty has

confined itself to a single act of intuiting it is incapable of “standing at a

distance” from its very experience in order thereby to articulate it to us (PhG

63). We must therefore enter into the viewpoint of “this ‘I’ which confines

itself to one ‘Now’ or one ‘Here’” and we must “point them out to

ourselves” (PhG 63). In other words, we, the phenomenologists, must

confine our attention to a particular ‘Now’ or ‘Here’ and indicate for

ourselves what we experience through an act of sheer pointing.

We, the phenomenologists, point to the particular this ‘Now’ that

we are experiencing. Yet, as Hegel points out, this ‘Now’ “has already

ceased to be in the act of pointing to it.” (PhG 63) This ‘Now’ has

now become that ‘Now’ which merely has been. Recall, however,

that for Sense-certainty its object is. Yet, if Sense-certainty’s object is

this ‘Now’, then Sense-certainty’s object is of such a nature as “to be

no more just when it is.” (PhG 63) As Hegel goes on to state The

Now, as it is pointed out to us, is Now that has been, and this is its

truth; it has not the truth of being. Yet this much is true, that it has

been. But what essentially has been [gewesen ist] is, in fact, not an

essence that is [kein Wesen]; it is not, and it was with being that we

were concerned. (PhG 63)

In the very act of pointing the object of Sense-certainty ceases to be and

instead merely has been. Thus, Sense-certainty is again frustrated in its

attempt to maintain its original conviction regarding its object.

Indeed, the object of Sense-certainty is again revealed to be a universal

determination, as Hegel lays out in the following dialectical progression:

(1) I point out the ‘Now’, and it is asserted to be truth. I point it out,

however, a something that has been or as something that has been

superseded; I set aside the first truth. (2) I now assert as the second

truth that it has been, that it is superseded. (3) But what has been, is

not; I set aside the second truth, its having been, its supersession, and

thereby negate the negation of the ‘Now’, and thus return to the first

assertion, that the ‘Now’ is. (PhG 63)

The ‘Now’ that is returned to, however, is different than the original ‘Now’.

For, instead of vanishing upon being pointed out, the new ‘Now’ preserves

itself through the passing of various immediate, particular ‘Nows’ as well as

their being pointed to. It is “a Now which is an absolute plurality of Nows.”

(PhG 64) An hour would be an example of such a ‘Now’ since it preserves

itself in the passing of its various minutes; yet it may be pointed to

throughout all of those minutes. Thus, Hegel concludes, “a plurality of Nows

all taken together” is the result of the experience of Sense-certainty at this

stage, and “the pointing-out is the experience of learning that Now is a

universal” (PhG 64).

1.5 Review of the Dialectic of Sense-certainty

Initially, Sense-certainty took the particular sensuous object – the

‘This’ to be the absolute, the essential, the true. Thinking-through the ‘This’

according to its two principal determinations – the ‘Now’ and the ‘Here’

revealed that they are both universal determinations. In response, Sense-

certainty shifted its ground and insisted instead that the ‘I’ was the absolute,

the essential, the true. Yet, like the object, the ‘I’ turned out to be a universal

determination, as well. In response to this insight, Sensecertainty once again

shifted its ground by attempting phenomenologically to bracket any

presuppositions about the transcendence or absoluteness of either the ‘I’ or

the ‘object’ as well as any awareness of intentional acts other than the one in

which it was immediately engaged. In thinking-through the ‘Now’ and

‘Here’ which were supposedly constitutive of this phenomenologically

purified experience, however, it was once again revealed that these were

universal determinations.

In the process of this examination Hegel also introduced elements of a

theory of language and a phenomenology of meaning, presumably in order

to explicate and underscore his larger argument. According to Hegel, even

singular demonstrative pronouns are universal terms. Thus, while one might

merely “mean” a particular ‘This’, it is apparently impossible to say what

one means in such a case, for every term is ultimately a universal. For Hegel,

the lesson to be derived from this fact is that language reveals that, despite

Sense-certainty’s pretensions to the contrary, the true object of Sense-

certainty is the universal. Without wading into the controversy over the

adequacy of Hegel’s underdeveloped theory of language, it was suggested

that one possible insight to be gleaned from Hegel’s discussion would be his

identification of the possibility of performative self-contradiction when a

given form of the mind attempts to give linguistic philosophical expression

to a problematic self-understanding.

In the last two sections of Sense-certainty Hegel calls attention to a few

of the central lessons learned from the analysis of the experience of Sense-

certainty and then pivots to setting up the subsequent discussion to take

place in the following chapter, Perception. Thus, in beginning to round off

the Sense-certainty chapter, Hegel states “It is clear that the dialectic of

sense-certainty is nothing else but the simple history of its movement or of

its experience, and sense-certainty itself is nothing else but just this history”

(PhG 64). Hegel thus reminds us that Sense-certainty undergoes the

previously adumbrated dialectical movement within its viewpoint. Indeed, in

an important sense, Sense-certainty just is this dialectical experience.

The basic structure of the dialectic has thus assumed the following

shape, one which will repeat itself throughout the subsequent stages of the

mind’s dialectical development. First, there is a presupposition or

expectation on the part of the form of the mind in question – in this case,

Sense-certainty – as to the nature and “location” of the absolute, the

essential, the true. Second, there is a thinking-through of this presupposition

or expectation in light of what is actually given in experience the upshot of

which is to expose that the absolute, the essential, the true is neither what

nor “where” the form of the mind thought it was. Third, in order to preserve

what remains of its initial presupposition or expectation, the form of the

mind shifts its ground and maintains that the absolute, the essential, the true

is still susceptible to being known or experienced within its limited horizon

– in this case, immediate sensuousness – albeit on slightly different grounds.

Lastly, in thinking-through the terms of this new ground the form of the

mind is once again disappointed in its presuppositions or expectations, as the

absolute, the essential, the true again turn out not to be what the form of the

mind took it to be. At this point, the mind finds itself on the threshold of a

fundamental reorientation of its basic presuppositions and expectations

regarding the absolute, the essential, the true, and is thus primed for a

transition to a higher viewpoint.

In the case of Sense-certainty, the lesson that it learns is that the

absolute, the essential, the true is not an immediate, particular, sensuous

‘This’, but rather a universal determination. It learns that the universal is its

proper object and that its ‘I’, too, is something that perdures after the manner

of a universal. Sense-certainty learns, moreover, that the immediate

particular is dependent upon and only emerges within a more universal

relational context, and that without that context the immediate particular is

as nothing. Thus, for example, the immediate, particular ‘Now’ is a mere

vanishing point whose nature is “to be no more just when it is.”

Hegel goes so far as to suggest that there is a an incipient awareness of

the nullity of the immediate, particular, sensuous object revealed in the

practices of ancient mystery cults and even that of animals. According to

Hegel, in placing the consumption of sensuous objects like bread and wine

at the center of their practices, the initiates of these ancient cults made

explicit for themselves – albeit in a merely symbolic, not yet scientific, form

– the nothingness of such things. Hegel further states

Even the animals are not shut out from this wisdom but, on the

contrary, show themselves to be most profoundly initiated into it; for

they do not just stand idly in front of sensuous things as if these

possessed intrinsic being, but, despairing of their reality, and

completely assured of their nothingness, they fall to without

ceremony and eat them up. And all Nature, like the animals,

celebrates these open Mysteries which teach the truth about sensuous

things. (PhG 65).

Sense-certainty began with the conviction that immediate, particular,

sensuous objects were absolute, were being, and built up an entire

worldview based upon this conviction. Yet, animals treat them as ephemeral

vanishing points and as such manifest a greater insight into the nature of

reality.

1.6 Brief Interlude on the Phenomenon of the Mind’s Self-forgetting

Before moving on to Hegel’s account of the viewpoint which begins

to appreciate that the universal is its proper object, it will be worthwhile

calling attention to one further point Hegel makes in summarizing the

dialectical experience of Sense-certainty. After noting that Sense-certainty is

constituted by the very dialectical movement of its experience, Hegel states,

“[t]hat is why the natural consciousness, too, is always reaching this result,

learning from experience what is true in it; but equally it is always forgetting

it and starting the movement all over again” (PhG 64). The form of the mind

or consciousness under investigation does indeed learn from its experience.

In the case of Sense-certainty, the lesson that it learned was that, not the

immediate, particular, sensuous ‘This’, but the universal was the absolute,

the essential, the true. Yet, according to Hegel, while we, the

phenomenologists, explicitly appreciate the import of this lesson and

recognize that it calls for the transition to a higher viewpoint, Sense-

certainty itself repeatedly forgets the lesson it has learned and falls back into

a dialectically less sophisticated viewpoint.

This phenomenon of the mind’s repeated forgetting of the history and

result of its own development is, in fact, an utterly crucial, yet often

underappreciated, aspect to Hegel’s larger account of how the dialectical

development of the mind unfolds. Indeed, one of its most important

functions is to help explain how different philosophies emerge from

different stages of the minds development. Therefore, it will be worth briefly

pausing to explicate some of its basic facets since doing so will both further

clarify what has already been covered and also provide great help in the

treatment of later stages of the mind’s development.

Hegel’s notion of forgetting actually covers a range of distinct but

related phenomena. What all these phenomena have in common is a failure

or refusal on the part of the mind to appreciate and appropriate the history

and results of its own development. Thus, in the case of Sense-certainty,

upon thinking-through its own presuppositions it finds that its object, for

example, was not what it initially took it to be. Yet, instead of appreciating

and appropriating this discovery and using it as the basis for a deliberate

transition to a higher viewpoint, Sense-certainty shifts its ground and

ultimately “forgets” the result of its previous lesson in order to avoid being

forced to change its fundamental presuppositions and expectations regarding

the nature of the absolute. As already noted, for Hegel, in spite of its

intentions, the effect of Sense-certainty’s efforts to avoid being forced to

change and develop is in fact to push the dialectic forward. For, in shifting

its ground, Sense-certainty simply thereby exposes another of its basic

presuppositions or expectations to the process of thinking-through. Hegel

often refers to this working out of the development of the mind behind its

own back as the “Ruse of Reason” [Der List der Vernunft].

Another way in which the process of forgetting functions will make

greater sense if we recall the second stage of the basic structure of the

Concept’s development discussed in the previous chapter. In the second

stage of its development, the Concept manages to posit an object for-itself.

Yet, it fails to recognize the object as its own production and instead treats it

as an alien ob-ject or gegen-stand which it merely “finds” existing “out

there”, over-against the mind. In other words, the mind “forgets” the

dialectical history through which it constituted both its object and,

correlatively, itself qua producer of the object. As a result, the mind

routinely takes the object or itself as something both immediately and

absolutely given, instead of as the result of process of dialectical

development.

In both of these cases of “forgetting” the mind blocks or simply

neglects to appreciate and appropriate its own development and as a result

repeatedly mis-takes the nature and location of the absolute. The

effectiveness of grasping and deploying this notion of the mind’s self-

forgetting in explaining the emergence of different philosophies is profound.

Hegel provides a first taste of the power of this technique in the closing

sections of Sense-certainty.

1.6.1 The Self-forgetting of the Mind Used to Explain the Emergence of

Schulze’s

Philosophy

After pointing out that each form of natural mind repeatedly learns

only to forget basic lessons about the nature of itself, its object and its

relation to its object, Hegel states,

It is therefore astonishing when, in face of this experience, it is

asserted as universal experience and put forward, too as a

philosophical propositions, even as the outcome of Scepticism, that

the reality or being of external things taken as

Thises or sense-objects has absolute truth for consciousness. (PhG 64-

65)

Among Hegel’s contemporaries who asserted such a position was G. E.

Schulze. Schulze incurred the brunt of Hegel’s philosophical scorn on more

than one occasion, most notably, in the “Skeptizismus” essay from Hegel’s

Jena period. Schulze at times wrote under the pseudonym, Aenesidemus,

who himself was member of the ancient skeptical school. Hegel had great

regard for the tradition of ancient skepticism but felt that modern

practitioners, like Schulze, despite thier professed allegiance to the

traditional school, fell well short of the ideal form of skepticism. Schulze’s

overall position, moreover, manifests a quintessential philosophical

expression of the viewpoint of Sense-certainty, including the phenomenon of

forgetting which both complexifies and clarifies the dialectical nature of the

mind’s development.

As a self-professed skeptic, Schulze divides his skepticism into a

“positive side” and a “negative side”. The positive side affirms that the

existence of immediate, particular sensuous objects is given in

consciousness with indubitable certainty. The negative side denies the

possibility of speculative or rational cognition of the absolute grounds or

conditions of these immediately known objects. In announcing the positive

side of his skepticism, Schulze states,

The existence of what is given within the compass of our

consciousness has undeniable certainty; for since it is present in

consciousness, we can doubt the certainty of it no more than we can

doubt consciousness itself; and to want to doubt consciousness is

absolutely impossible, because any such doubt would destroy itself

since it cannot occur apart from consciousness and hence it would be

nothing; what is given in and with consciousness we call an actual

fact [Tatsache] of consciousness; it follows that the facts of

consciousness are what is undeniably actual, what all philosophical

speculations must be related to, and what is to be explained or made

more comprehensible through these speculations. (qtd. in

“Skeptizismus” 318)

Later in the same work Schulze continues along similar lines, stating

The intuiting subject cognizes the objects and their existence directly

and as something which exists and subsists in complete independence

of the workings of the presentative power just as the cognitive subject

exists and subsists independently. (qtd. in “Skeptizismus” 319)

Obviously, the positive side of Schulze’s skepticism expresses the viewpoint

of Sensecertainty. Thus, for Schulze, as with Sense-certainty, the existence

of an object insofar as it is given in immediate intuition – a ‘This’ – is

thereby known with absolute certainty. Schulze refers to the existence of

these objects along with the indubitable certainty with which they are

cognized as “facts of consciousness” [Tatsache der Bewusstsein]. Also like

Sense-certainty, Schulze conceives of the cognizing subject – or the ‘I’ –

after the manner of ‘This’ in that he views the mind to be constituted by

discrete, particular “powers” or faculties which merely rest “in here”

alongside the mind’s other faculties in a mental quasi-space.

The negative side of Schulze’s skepticism amounts to, as Hegel puts

it, little more than a “vulgar Kantianism” (“Skpetizismus” 318). Thus, for

Schulze, despite the fact that the aforementioned facts of consciousness are

known with indubitable certain, all “speculative” or “rational” cognition is

nevertheless restricted to “the formal unity which is to be assigned to those

facts” (“Skeptizismus” 318). As a result, according to Schulze, “although the

being of things is quite certain according to the verdict of consciousness, this

in no way satisfies Reason, because with the existing things of our

acquaintance it is not self-explanatory, that they are, and that they are what

they are” (qtd. in “Skeptizismus” 319).

To clarify further, Schulze draws a distinction between two types of

types of cognition and two types of object. In terms of cognition, on the one

hand, there is the immediate sensuous certainty of the facts of consciousness,

or what Hegel calls the “perpetual glassy-staring perception of objects,” and,

on the other hand, there is rational cognition through concepts

(“Skeptizismus 319). These concepts, again, provide the formal unity of the

objects of immediate sensuous certainty, but through rational cognition of

these concepts the existence of no object can be inferred.

In terms of objects, Schulze distinguishes between the objects of

immediate sensuous certainty, on the one hand, and the “unconditioned

causes of all conditioned things whose actuality we are otherwise certain

of,” on the other (qtd. in “Skeptizismus” 317). Thus, despite being

indubitably known to exist, the objects of immediate sensuous certainty are

nevertheless conditioned by, among other things, the concepts providing

their formal unity. Beyond these absolutely existing yet conditioned objects,

however, Schulze maintains that reason seeks to discover the things which

provide their unconditioned ground. He concludes, in accord with standard

Kantian doctrine, that such objects are beyond the ken of human cognitive

ability. In other words, although Schulze maintains that rational cognition of

the concepts that lie “in here” in the mind is possible, he is skeptical about

the possibility of rational cognition of the unconditioned causes of the

objects whose existence, while conditioned, nevertheless possesses

immediate and absolute certainty.

Hegel moves quickly to point out the rather egregious contradiction

into which the two sides of Schulze’s skepticism cannot help but fall. First,

he notes that “if every fact of consciousness has immediate certainty, then

this insight that something exists only in a conditioned way is impossible;

for ‘to exist in a conditioned way’ is synonymous with ‘not being certain on

its own account’” (“Skeptizismus” 319). In other words, there would be no

occasion for the mind to seek out the grounds for anything if its existence

was absolutely certain. If something exists in a conditioned way, then its

existence cannot be certain through itself, which is what Schulze

nevertheless maintains for the objects of immediate sensuous certainty.

Hegel continues to press the point in noting that Schulze states that

“although the being of things is quite certain according to verdict of

consciousness, this in no way satisfies Reason, because with the existing

things of our acquaintance it is not selfexplanatory, that they are, and that

they are what they are” (qtd. in “Skeptizismus” 319). To this statement,

Hegel duly responds

In view of this absolute certainty that things exist (and certainty of

how they exist) how can it at the same time, be the case that it is not

self-explanatory that they are and that they are what they are? Two

cognitions are asserted simultaneously: one in which the existence

and character of things is self-explanatory and another in which this

existence and character is not at all self-explanatory. One could not

devise a more complete contradiction. (“Skeptizismus” 319)

Hegel thus exposes a rather flagrant contradiction on the part of Schulze in

the latter’s attempt to maintain simultaneously that the very being of things

is known with absolute certainty and thus without need for any further

explanation and that the existence of such things is not self-explanatory, at

all.

To bring the discussion back to more present concerns, it should be

noted that in the “Skeptizismus” essay Hegel is providing a rather ruthless

example of a dialectical critique of Schulze’s position by revealing an

egregious contradiction. By contrast, in the PhG Hegel is doing something

different. There, he is providing a dialectical explanation for the very

emergence of a viewpoint like Schulze’s. For, in the “Sense-certainty”

chapter Hegel provides not just a critique but a phenomenology of a

particular form of the mind and then shows how from such a form of the

mind a determinate philosophical position such as Schulze’s emerges.

For, it is clear that in constructing his philosophy, Schulze operates

within the viewpoint of Sense-certainty. Indeed, as he states explicitly, all

philosophical speculations must be referred back to the “facts” of sensuous

certainty. Thus, we have the grounds for not only a dialectical critique but

also a dialectical explanation for Schulze’s position. Why does Schulze

maintain the position that he does? Answer: he is giving philosophical

expression to the experience of Sense-certainty.

Other aspects of Hegel’s analysis of Sense-certainty provide an

explanatory basis for still further details of Schulze’s position. For example,

the phenomenon of the mind’s forgetting its own development would seem

to be noticeably at work in the case of Schulze. For, juxtaposed – however

haphazardly – alongside his positive skepticism, there is Schulze’s negative

skepticism. Yet, whereas his positive skepticism expresses the viewpoint of

Sense-certainty, his negative skepticism, as we will see, is much closer to

the viewpoint of Perception as well as in some ways Force and

Understanding, the two viewpoints whose respective analyses succeed that

of Sense-certainty in the PhG. Thus, Schulze’s negative skepticism reveals

that at some point Schulze, himself, managed to learn some of the lessons

that Sense-certainty learns perhaps, first of among them being the insight

that the immediate, particular, sensuous ‘This’ is not absolute but rather

depends on some further context for its existence. Yet, his positive

skepticism betrays the fact that he has forgotten or otherwise failed to

appropriate this lesson, and therefore he finds himself reverting to a less

developed position and insists that all philosophical speculations refer back

to the convictions of this viewpoint.

On the basis of these observations it actually becomes possible to

correct Hegel when he expresses his astonishment that a position like

Schulze’s should emerge. The point is rather that, given the phenomena of

the mind’s dialectical learning and subsequent forgetting and regression, it is

all too understandable that Schulze should have carved out the incoherent

position that he did. Indeed, herein lies the power of Hegel’s dialectical

phenomenology: making such seeming strangeness explicable.

Before moving on to examining Hegel’s discussion of Perception it

will be useful show how Hegel’s phenomenology of Sense-certainty, along

with providing the basis for a dialectical explanation for the emergence of a

position like Schulze’s, also provides the basis for an even more

sophisticated dialectical critique than was on display in the “Skeptizismus”

essay. Thus, based upon the analysis of Sense-certainty, Hegel would not

criticize Schulze for maintaining that the absolute is given in conscious

experience. In fact, he ultimately chides Schulze as much for his negative

skepticism as for his positive inasmuch as the former posits that the absolute

or unconditioned is both forever beyond the ken of human cognition and yet

somehow known to cause the objects of cognition. What Hegel reveals in

Sense-certainty is, not that the absolute is not given in consciousness, but

merely that it is not given in the way that Sense-certainty and Schulze take it

to be, namely, as an immediate, particular, sensuous ‘This’.

The absolute or unconditioned is given consciousness, not as an

isolated ‘This’ (which turns out to be conditioned, anyway), but rather as the

conditioned along with its conditions which together form a self-

conditioning totality or concrete universal. Indeed, as the analysis of the

‘This’ shows, the self-conditioning totality through which a ‘This’ can be

experienced at all is given in consciousness, albeit at first only in-itself. The

task of the PhG itself is to render explicit or for-itself what is at first present

merely in-itself.

As Hegel already notes in the Skeptizismus essay by way of rejecting

Schulze’s view that speculative philosophy is concerned with the (ultimately

futile) pursuit of the hidden unconditioned causes of the objects of conscious

experience,

The causal relation is wholly banned from speculative thought; if it

seems sometimes to occur in form of producer and product, then it is

only the verbal expression for the relationship not the relationship

itself that is employed; for the producer and the product are posited as

equivalent, that is equivalent to the effect, one and the same

[substance is posited] as cause of itself, and as effect of itself, so that

the relationship is immediately sublated. There is simply no question

in speculative philosophy of the unconditioned being inferred from

the constitution of the conditioned. (Skeptizismus 345)

There will be occasion to discuss in more detail Hegel’s critique and

sublation of the notion of causality when we examine the “Force and

Understanding” and “Selfconsciousness” sections of the PhG. Hegel’s basic

argument, however, which is indicated, here, is that all would-be causal

relationships ultimately function within the context of a self-conditioning

totality. Moreover, the task of speculative philosophy is not to infer the

unconditioned from the conditioned, but, as the etymology of the term

phenomen-ology indicates, to “read off” or otherwise think-through the self-

conditioning totality that is actually given in experience. Hence, Hegel’s

original subtitle for the PhG: the science of the actual experience of

consciousness. In sum, Schulze, like Sensecertainty, was right that the

absolute is given in consciousness; he was simply wrong about how it is

given.

2. Perception

Perception is the form of the mind which takes over the truth revealed

in the experience of thinking-through Sense-certainty. The truth of Sense-

certainty, despite its own initial preoccupations with the immediate,

sensuous, particular ‘This’, turned out to be the universal. Within

Perception, there are in fact two” immediately selfdifferentiating moments”,

both of which are universals unto themselves, namely, the ‘I’ and its object

(PhG 67). In the specific context of Perception, the ‘I’ is the act of

perceiving, whereas the object is that which is perceived. For us, the

phenomenologists, or in-itself, both moments together constitute a concrete

unity, which is to say, selfdifferentiating and self-relating, universal. Yet, for

Perception, the two moments are related as opposites only one of which can

constitute the essential element in the relationship.

As with Sense-certainty, the emphasis for Perception initially falls on

the object, and so it is taken to be the essential moment while the ‘I’ is

relegated to an unessential element, “the unstable factor which can as well

be as not be” (PhG 67). Therefore, again, as with Sense-certainty, Hegel

immediately turns to thinking-through the object of Perception. The form of

the mind or the ‘I’ correlative to the object will, of course, come under

phenomenological investigation in its own turn. Let us turn first to

examining Hegel’s initial phenomenology of the object of Perception.

2.1 The Thing and Its Properties

Regarding the object of Perception, Hegel states, “[s]ince the principle

of the object, the universal, is in its simplicity a mediated universal, the

object must express this its nature in its own self. This it does by showing

itself to be the thing with many properties” (PhG 67). As was first indicated

in Sense-certainty, the universal, for Hegel, is not a mere abstraction which

excludes difference; rather, it is a self-differentiating totality, or mediated

universal, a universal which preserves difference within itself. Therefore,

since the principle of the object of Perception is the universal, the object

must constitute a self-differentiating totality or whole. Such an object would

be a Thing with many different properties.

Having established that the object of Perception is the Thing with many

properties, Hegel proceeds more or less simultaneously to think-through the

following: 1) the nature of the Thing, 2) the nature of its properties and 3)

the nature of the relations between both the Thing and its properties and

amongst the properties themselves. For, it becomes apparent that, despite

initial appearances, the Thing, its properties and their respective mutual

relations mutually define one another.

The properties of the Thing preserve yet supersede or sublate the

sensuous element present in Sense-certainty. For, while they stand in

relation to sensuousness, the properties are not particular ‘Thises’ but rather

universal determinations which include different particular instances within

themselves. In other words, with respect to its properties, the Thing of

Perception is not this or that immediate swatch of orange, but the universal

quality or property “orange”, or the universal property “sweetness” and so

on.

The Thing, of course, possesses these properties. Yet, initially it would

seem that they exist within the Thing as mutually indifferent determinations,

each existing independently of the others. As such, the Thing would appear

to be an “abstract universal medium” in which the properties subsist (PhG

68). The Thing is what has become of the ‘This’, namely, a spatio-temporal

location that preserves within itself a plurality of indifferent differences or

determinations. Thus, with the respect to a perceived Thing like salt,

Perception can say, “Here and Now is white and also tart and also a cubical

shape and also a specific gravity and so on” (PhG 113). Importantly, each

property is everywhere present in the Thing, yet they simultaneous manage

not to affect one another. For example, the whiteness of the salt, while it

qualifies the entire salt, nevertheless does not affect the cubical shape, nor

does either affect the tartness (PhG 68-9). Thus, in the first instance, the

Thing appears to be an indifferent ‘Also’, a medium which permits the

properties to subsist in it while also allowing them not to directly affect each

other.

Hegel demands, however, that we think-through such a conception of

the Thing, its properties and their mutual relationships. Thus, he states,

[I]f the many determinate properties were strictly indifferent to one

another, if they were simply and solely self-related, they would not be

determinate; for they are only determinate in so far as they

differentiate themselves from one another, and relate themselves to

others as to their opposites. (PhG 69)

Here, Hegel indicates his basic acceptance of the Spinozist principle: omnis

determinatio est negatio. All determinations are negations. All

determinations, in other words, cannot be merely self-related but presuppose

a relation of negation to that which they are not. Orange is orange, not

simply because it is orange – that would have been Sensecertainty’s

position; rather, orange is orange because it is not green, or red, or sweet, or

round and so on.

The fact that the properties of the Thing must negate and exclude one

another in order to be what they are presents a problem, however, for the

would-be simple unity of the Thing. Thus, Hegel states,

As thus opposed to one another [the properties] cannot be together in

the simple unity of their medium, which is just as essential to them as

negation; the differentiation of the properties, in so far as it is not an

indifferent differentiation but is exclusive, each property negating the

other, thus falls outside of this simple medium; and the medium,

therefore, is not merely an Also, an indifferent unity, but a One as

well, a unity which excludes an other. (PhG 69)

If the properties exclude one another that would seem to preclude the

possibility that they could exist together in one Thing as their shared

medium. Yet, that medium is as essential to their existence as the fact that

they exclude each other. In other words, in order to exist, the properties must

both exclude each other and share a common medium. Reconciling this

tension or contradiction intrinsic to the relationship of the properties to one

another and to the Thing becomes the task for the succeeding sections of

Perception.

Important to note, however, is that Hegel also leaps to asserting that

the Thing, too, like its properties is both a universal and exclusive. The

Thing is universal qua “abstract medium”, and it is exclusive qua One Thing

among other Things which it is not. Thus, we in fact have a twofold set of

contradictions to be worked out, or thought-though, during the course of the

ensuing sections of Perception: 1) the properties must simultaneously be

exclusive and share a common medium; 2) the Thing must be both an

indifferent or “abstract” universal medium in which the properties subsist

and a determinate, exclusive One.

2.2 The Thing, Self-identity, Truth and Error

Recall that so far as Perception is concerned at this point the object is

the absolute. Thus, the task of consciousness is simply to take the Thing in

an act of pure apprehension. It must not actively engage with the object or

alter it in any way since to do so would undermine its truth. Perception is

nevertheless aware that it can fail to apprehend the object correctly. For, the

principle of the object is universality, and universality contains differences

or otherness; therefore, it is possible that Perception can take the object as

other than what it is. Accordingly, the criterion of truth for Perception is

self-identity or self-sameness. Previously, in Sense-certainty, the criterion of

truth had been immediate, sensuous presence. Now, the criterion the object

must satisfy in order to be considered the true object is that it should remain

identical to itself.

In a sense, the criterion of self-identity was operative – albeit

implicitly – in Sense-certainty. What Sense-certainty learned was simply

that the immediately, sensuously present ‘This’ was never what it was

immediately taken to be. Moreover, immediacy continues to be a criterion

for truth into Perception and, as we will see, beyond. The point is that what

is immediately present to Perception is a mediated object, namely, a

universal. Thus, in Perception, the criterion of immediacy is sublated

through the mediation of the universal. The criterion of self-identity will also

be sublated by further mediations. Yet, at present, Perception is not aware of

this and so begins with an unmediated or immediate criterion of self-identity

for the object.

Again, since the object is a differentiated totality, consciousness is

aware of the possibility of taking the object differently than what it is; in

other words, it is aware of the possibility of error. The problem of error is a

crucial if at times neglected aspect for all philosophy. For, indeed, a theory

of error is an intrinsic correlate to any theory of knowledge; in other words,

no theory of knowledge could be considered complete without at the same

time providing a theory of error. Hegel, for his part, is providing at least the

basic outlines for such a theory in this section of Perception.

For Perception, then, the object is the absolute, the true. Yet, in order to

be true the object must be self-identical. Still, diversity is constitutive of

Perception’s object at this point. Therefore, Perception is forced to conclude

that anything in its experience which appears to undermine the self-identity

of the object, and thereby cause an erroneous rather than truthful “taking” of

the object, cannot be due to the object in-itself but rather must be the fault of

consciousness. Consciousness is the source of any deception or untrue

“taking” in the experience of Perception.

The self-identity of the object does indeed seem to be undermined in

the very first instance in which it is taken by Perception. For, in the first

instance, the Thing presents itself as a ‘One’, as a distinct and singular unity;

yet, at the same time, Perception perceives in the Thing the universal

property which transcends singularity. According to Hegel, Perception

therefore concludes that it errored in taking the Thing as a ‘One’, as a unity,

and in turn maintains that the object is an association or community of

properties. Immediately, however, Perception perceives that the properties

are mutually exclusive which prevents them from forming a community.

Thus, consciousness again convicts itself of error in taking the object as a

community or continuity of properties and reverts to positing the object as

an exclusive unity (PhG 70-71).

Perception once again discovers, however, that the Thing has many

properties, and so consciousness was wrong to take it as exclusive. As a

result Perception finds that what it perceives is not common medium or mere

community, but rather the single property itself. Yet, by itself the property

can be neither a property, since it is not related to the Thing, nor

determinate, since it is not related to or distinguished from the other

properties. Such an immediate, unrelated or context-less sensuous being,

moreover, is scarcely distinguishable from the immediate, sensuous object

of Sense-certainty. Consciousness would thus appear to have been thrown

back to the beginning of its development.

2.3 Clarification and Upshot of the Preceding Analysis

To be sure, these sections of Perception can come across as an exercise

in a dialectical frenzy the point of which is not always immediately evident.

Hegel, nevertheless, pauses to bring out a nest of key points regarding what

consciousness learns in the course of this somewhat frenzied experience.

For, what appears to be happening to the object is actually happening to

consciousness itself in relation to its object.

In thinking-through the first object of Sense-certainty, consciousness

was forced to reflect upon itself, upon the ‘I’, in order to maintain its

original conviction that its object is given in immediate, sensuous

particularity. In thinking-through Perception, consciousness is once again

forced to reflect upon itself qua perceiver. The difference is that, whereas

Sense-certainty was driven to reflect upon the ‘I’ and thereby concluded, at

least provisionally, that its truth lay within the ‘I’ rather than the object,

Perception, being aware of a diversity or contradiction in its object,

concludes that it is the source of error or untruth which it experiences. Yet,

this is an enormous discovery unto itself, and for more than one reason.

First, consciousness is hereby engaged in a process of discovering its

own activity in constituting the object it experiences. In other words, in

undergoing the preceding dialectical frenzy, consciousness begins to

discover that the way in which the object appears, the way that it is taken,

depends upon consciousness’ own taking, its own perceptual activity. To be

sure, at this point, for Perception, the object is still the absolute and the true,

and so, as far as Perception is concerned, any activity on its part can only be

the source of error or illusion. Yet, in recognizing this point, consciousness

discovers a second factor about itself, namely, that it possesses the criterion

of correction within itself. To be sure, since Perception takes the object to be

the absolute at this point, it will draw the naïve conclusion that correction is

a matter of eliminating the distorting affects that consciousness has upon the

object in order thereby to get back to the object as it really is in-itself or “out

there” in the “world”.146 Yet, despite its own preoccupations with the object,

consciousness is learning that it possesses its own immanent, self-correcting

criterion. In other words, in convicting itself of error or untruth,

consciousness thereby enacts and partially gleans its own immanent criterion

of truth.147

2.4 Phenomenology of the Thing Resumed

Hegel duly returns to Perception as it begins again to think-through the

Thing, with the difference now that it is equipped with an explanation of the

source of error to go along with its criterion of self-identity. Thus, in the first

instance, Perception is aware of the Thing as One, as a unity. Yet,

Perception also perceives a multiplicity of properties, which, qua multiple,

contradict the unity of the Thing. Still, the Thing is One, and so Perception

concludes that the source of the multiplicity of properties which would

contradict the truth of the object – its self-identity – must lie in

consciousness. As Hegel states,

So in point of fact, the Thing is white only to our eyes, also tart to our

tongue, also cubical to our touch, and so on. We get the entire

diversity of these aspects, not from the Thing, but from ourselves; and

they fall asunder in this way for us, because the eye is quite distinct

from the tongue, and so on. We are thus the universal medium in

which such moments are kept apart and exist each on its own.

In order to preserve its original conviction of the unity of the Thing which it

perceives, consciousness shifts its ground and makes itself responsible for

the diversity of properties which it also perceives. The Thing is a unity, but

consciousness possesses different organs of perception – eyes, ears, tongue

and so on – which, accordingly, perceive the unified thing in different ways.

Consciousness itself thus becomes a universal medium which preserves

these different properties in their exclusivity.

Important to note is the similarity between this move on the part of

conscious and the earlier one which took place in Sense-certainty. In Sense-

certainty, upon first being driven back into itself, consciousness conceived

of itself after the manner of the object – the particular ‘This’. In Perception,

upon being driven back into itself, consciousness conceives of itself as it had

initially conceived of the Thing, namely, as an indifferent, universal medium

in which the different properties subsist.

Having drawn this conclusion about consciousness, however,

Perception is immediately confronted with a problem when it returns to

thinking-through the Thing in its unity. For, in order to be a One, the Thing

must exclude other Things. Yet, it is not through being a One that it is

thereby exclusive. Rather, according to Hegel, oneness or unity is “the

universal relation of self to self” (PhG 73). All unified Things possess such

intrinsic self-relating, which entails that, to the extent that it is self-relating,

the Thing is indistinguishable from other Things. It is by being determinate

not merely self-relating that the Thing distinguishes itself from other Things,

and it is through its properties that the Thing is determinate. A Thing,

therefore, in order to be itself and not some-Thing else, must possess

properties intrinsic to itself. The properties cannot simply be the possession

of consciousness. They must be, indeed, proper to the Thing.

Yet, insofar as consciousness maintains that the Thing is the bearer of

its own intrinsic properties, it reverts to conceiving of the Thing as an

indifferent universal medium in which the mutually exclusive properties

subsist. As a result, the problem of the unity of the Thing returns. In

response to this problem consciousness takes it upon itself to maintain the

unity of the Thing, albeit by means of a contrived artifice. The Thing is

perceived as a unity but also as an indifferent medium in which exclusive

properties subsist. Consciousness thus perceives the Thing as, for example,

white and also tart and also cubical and so on. In order to preserve the unity

of the Thing, however, consciousness adds the further contrivance that “in

so far as it is white, it is not cubical, and in so far as it is cubical and also

white, it is not tart, and so on” (PhG 73).

Hegel’s invocation of the “insofar” is not perfectly clear, but his

general point seems to be that it is a distinction which consciousness draws

in order to preserve or otherwise make intelligible for itself the fact that it

perceives the Thing as both a unity and an indifferent universal medium of

mutually exclusive properties. It is, effectively, another instance of

consciousness shifting its ground in order to preserve its original conviction

about its object. The Thing is a unity with determinate properties. Yet,

consciousness can think or perceive these properties apart from one another

by specifying the Thing only insofar as it is white and therefore not tart, and

so on. It is, more or less, a sheer contrivance, but one through which

consciousness nevertheless manages to learn something of exceeding

importance about itself and its object.

2.5 Clarification of the Preceding Analysis

As Hegel notes, if we survey the course of Perception’s development

thus far we notice that it has made a pair of complementary discoveries

about itself and its object.

If we look back on what consciousness previously took, and now

takes, responsibility for, on what it previously ascribed, and now

ascribes to the Thing, we see that consciousness alternately makes

itself, as well as the Thing, into both a pure, many-less One, and into

an Also that resolves itself into independent ‘matters’ [i.e. properties].

(PhG 74)

Through the course of Perception, consciousness has alternatingly ascribed

to itself and to the Thing the principle of unity and the principle of

differentiation. Yet, in recognizing this very fact, “Consciousness thus finds

through this comparison that not only its truthful perceiving [Nehmen des

Wahren], contains the distinct moments of apprehension and withdrawal

into self, but rather that the truth itself, the Thing, reveals itself in this

twofold way” (PhG 74). Just as consciousness found itself in both Sense-

certainty and Perception driven back from its immediate apprehension of its

object into a reflection upon itself, so now the object, too, has been

discovered to possess its own duality of moments: 1) a moment of

presentation for consciousness apprehending it and 2) a moment of

reflection into itself.

Here we have a major moment in Hegel’s ongoing explanation of the

emergence of different philosophies and so it will be worthwhile to pause

and flesh out more precisely just what Hegel is articulating. Perception has

been attempting to think-through how its object can be both one and many.

In the course of doing so it has discovered that the object itself can be

considered both as it appears to consciousness and as it is initself. Thus, in

thinking-through the object qua one-and-many, consciousness is led to posit

a distinction between appearance and reality. Consciousness draws a

distinction between the Thing insofar as appears for or is related to

consciousness, on the one hand, and the Thing insofar as it is self-related, on

the other. Several important points must be noted with respect to this

distinction.

First, Hegel is providing a more or less generic or typological

explanation for a distinction that historically has received myriad specific

expressions. The Platonic distinction between appearance and reality, the

Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and the

Kantian distinction between the phenomena and noumenon, just to name a

few, would all constitute instances of this generic type. The important point

to note, however, is that Hegel is providing an explanation as to how and

why these philosophies – at least in this particular respect – emerge in the

first place. They emerge in and through a determinate experience of

consciousness, specifically, that of Perception, as it attempts to think-

through the complexity of the object which it in fact perceives.

Second, the distinction drawn by consciousness has its correlate in the

structure of consciousness itself. Thus, although the emphasis still remains

on the object, what is actually set up at this point is a parallel set of

distinctions within both consciousness and the object, respectively. In other

words, we have the beginnings of a distinction drawn by consciousness with

respect to how it knows its object. For, the consciousness to which the object

appears has de facto been distinguished from the consciousness that

withdraws into itself. Thus, along with the Platonic distinction between

appearance and reality, we have the beginnings of the Platonic distinction

between aesthesis and noesis; or, along with the Kantian distinction between

phenomena and noumenon, we have the beginnings of the distinction

between the empirical and transcendental ego, and so on.

Third, the fact that it is consciousness itself which draws the distinction

between the object qua appearing-to-consciousness versus the object qua

withdrawing-into-itself must not be lost sight of. Hegel does not emphasize

this point, here, but the Introduction to the Phenomenology has prepared us

to watch for it. As Hegel states in the Introduction, “The essential point to

bear in mind throughout the whole investigation is that these two moments,

‘Notion’ and ‘object’, ‘being-for-another’ and ‘being-in-itself’, both fall

within that knowledge which we are investigating” (PhG 53). Consciousness

draws the distinction between the object as it is for-consciousness, on the

one hand, and as it is initself, on the other. Consciousness distinguishes

between the object as related to consciousness and the object as self-relating.

The distinction is not a given, “brute” fact which consciousness merely finds

“already there”, but is rather constituted and preserved by and in

consciousness itself. Thus, the object as self-relating, and thus presumably

independent of consciousness, nevertheless remains within consciousness.

Part of the reason why this point is essential to bear in mind is that even

though we, the phenomenologists, know that the distinction between what is

for-consciousness and what is in-itself is internal to consciousness,

Perception does not. Therefore, the emphasis throughout Perception will

continue to fall on the object. Consciousness need no longer convict itself as

the strict source of error since it has come to recognize that the object can

appear to consciousness differently than it is in-itself. Yet, it will still be

preoccupied with thinking-through the object in its complexity, rather than

directing its attention upon its own concrete activity in constituting the

object.

2.6 Analysis of the Thing Resumed

To return to the analysis, then, Hegel points out how, now, the object

contains within itself the two moments which were previously constitutive

of consciousness’ relation to its object: “The Thing is One, reflected into

itself; it is for itself, but is also for an other; and, moreover, it is an other on

its own account, just because it is for an other” (PhG 74). Previously, the

object was self-related or for-itself, and yet also related to or for-

consciousness. Now, in continuing to attempt to think-through the

complexity of the object, consciousness posits that the Thing is self-related

or for-itself and also related to or for another Thing. In other words,

consciousness posits that the Thing is a unity qua self-related; yet, in

interacting with other Things, the Thing is drawn into manifesting different

properties. For example, consciousness might posit a planet as a unified

Thing and maintain that it is only upon interacting with another planet that

either object manifests its various properties of solidity, specific gravity and

so on. Or, consciousness might posit a squirrel as a Thing and maintain that

it is only through its relation to other Things such as fellow squirrels and

sources of food that it manifests it various properties of intussusception,

sympathy, aggression, parturition and so on.

The problem with this solution is that each Thing, through its self-

relating identity, is supposedly in-itself different from other Things. Yet, it is

only in its relation to other Things that the Thing can be differentiated from

these others according to its various determinate properties. Therefore,

consciousness once again shifts its ground and maintains instead that the

Thing possesses an absolute difference that is essential to it initself. Yet, this

essential property which constitutes its absolute difference is posited

precisely as a means to distinguish the Thing from other Things, which is the

same as saying that through this absolute difference the Thing is absolutely

related to all other Things.

Here, consciousness seems to be in the throes of another dialectical

frenzy. It is working feverishly to maintain its original conviction that the

Thing unto itself constitutes a unity with many properties. Yet, as it thinks-

through this position consciousness is continually forced to recognize that

the Thing only is what it is through its relation to something else. Thus,

consciousness is on the cusp of grasping the fact that the notion of a Thing

with properties which could be defined in abstraction from its relational

context to other Things is illusory. As Hegel states,

The experience through which consciousness discovers that the Thing

is demolished by the very determinateness that constitutes its essence

and its beingfor-self, can be summarized as follow. The Thing is

posited as being for itself, or as the absolute negation of all otherness,

therefore as purely self-related negation; but the negation that is self-

related is the suspension of itself; in other words, the

Thing has its essential being in another Thing. (PhG 76)

Consciousness might posit for the Thing an “essence” through which it is

absolutely One and therefore absolutely distinct from other Things. Yet, in

order actually to differentiate the Thing from other Things it is necessary to

make reference to the apparently unessential properties that only become

manifest through the Thing’s relation to other Things. Thus, the unessential

turns out to be necessary and therefore essential, while the essential turns out

to be unnecessary and therefore inessential to differentiating and therefore

defining the Thing. The being of the Thing is thereby revealed to be

determined, not through itself, but through its relations to other Things.

2.7 Consciousness’s Discovery of Constitutive Relationality

At this point, consciousness has broken-through to the insight that

reality in its concreteness is constitutively relational. Things maintain

relations to other Things in order to be what they are. As such, Things are

not prior to but emerge out of their relational orders. In other words, “what

we now have is unconditioned absolute universality” (PhG 77). The singular

Thing is not universal or absolute; or, more precisely, it is not universal and

therefore not absolute. What is absolute is a universal relational context.

Perception’s invocation of “Also” and the “in so far”, and its

distinction between the “essential” versus the “inessential”, were all attempts

to preserve its original conviction that the Thing with properties was primary

and absolute. While Perception in principle transcended the domain of the

immediately sensuous present and posited for itself a Thing with universal

properties, still “this universal, since it originates in the sensuous, is

essentially conditioned by it, and hence is not truly self-identical universality

at all” (PhG 76). Perception does not break decisively with its attachment to

the sensuous and so it oscillates back-and-forth between the universal which

it perceives and the immediate sensuous particular which it also perceives.

Yet, it cannot see – that is, sense – how they are related. Perception cannot

preserve the self-identical in its universality. It does not see the universal

relational totality that governs the universe and which is thus the truly

absolute, because self-conditioning, Thing.

Understanding, the viewpoint which succeeds Perception, by contrast,

begins by accepting that “Seeing and Hearing,” or, in other words, the

senses, “have been lost to consciousness” (PhG 79). It is at home – however

tenuously, at first – with “the unconditioned universal” as its proper object.

Perception ultimately still found this object to be a mere “mental entity”; it

did not recognize, in other words, the universal relational context as the

realm of “pure essences, the absolute elements and powers” which governs

the universe in its concreteness (PhG 78). Understanding begins with this

recognition, so we are led to examine how Understanding goes about

thinking-through this object.

2.8 Summary of Perception

Before turning to the viewpoint of Force and Understanding, let us first

recall the experiences undergone and lessons learned by Perception that

were especially pertinent to Hegel’s explanation of the emergence of

different philosophies.

Perception began with the conviction that its object was a Thing with

many properties. Importantly, however, the principle of Perception’s object

was the universal while Perception’s criterion of truth was self-identity. As a

result, Perception was faced with the task of thinking-through how its object

could be both self-identical and universal since the universal is that which

preserves difference within itself. The dialectical frenzies which it

underwent in the course of thinking-through its object were but various

permutations on this basic dialectic between particular self-identity and

universality. Yet, many of these permutations produced lessons that were

valuable not least for their use in explaining how different philosophies

emerge as the result of the ongoing dialectical development of the mind.

Recall that due to the dialectical tension between its principle of the

object and its criterion of truth, the threat of error or deception immediately

presented itself to Perception. According to Hegel, however, “At first, then, I

become aware of the Thing as a One, and have to hold fast to it in this its

true character” (PhG 72). Initially, then, the primacy falls on the unity of the

Thing. Therefore, when Perception perceives something that contradicts this

unity, such as the multiplicity of exclusive properties, it contrives for itself a

solution by which it can “hold fast” to the Thing’s primary unity and thereby

preserve the latter’s self-identity. The solution that Perception first contrives

for itself is to make consciousness responsible for the “error” of perceiving

the Thing to be constituted by a multiplicity of exclusive properties. The

Thing is One; therefore, it is white only to our eyes, tart only to our tongue

and so on.

As a result of drawing this distinction, and despite the fact that it is

primarily concerned simply with preserving the self-identical unity of the

Thing, Perception hits upon the appearance/reality distinction for the first

time. As previously mentioned, this distinction will manifest itself

throughout the history of philosophy in various guises. Yet, the crucial point

is that Hegel has provided an explanatory account of the basis of the

distinction – and therefore of the philosophies which adopt it – namely, a

particular experience of consciousness. The drawing of the

appearance/reality distinction is thus not some haphazard event in the history

of philosophy; rather, it is the result of a particular viewpoint, in this case,

Perception, thinking-through a contradiction within its experience.

Recall, also, that in and through drawing this initial distinction

between appearance and reality, consciousness is driven back into itself, if

only provisionally or tenuously. The object remains its focus; yet,

consciousness cannot help but become more reflectively aware of its own

role in constituting its object of experience. Indeed, it is this nascent

awareness on the part of consciousness as being forced to reflect upon itself

that sets the conditions for a subsequent permutation in its conception of its

object.

For, on taking upon itself the responsibility for the multiplicity of

determinate properties that it perceives, Perception discovers that it has no

basis for distinguishing the Thing from other Things. Therefore,

consciousness inverts the conception of the object which it had just

established and posits the Thing as a universal medium in which the

properties subsist while making itself responsible for the unity of the Thing.

In so doing, however, consciousness breaks-through to the insight that, not

only itself, but the Thing contains the two moments of 1) a differentiated and

determinate appearance forconsciousness and 2) a withdrawal into

undifferentiated self-identity.

Here we have, in other words, the basis in conscious experience for

the Kantian phenomena/noumenon distinction. Indeed, there can be little

doubt that Hegel means to provide an explanatory account of at least this

central aspect of Kant’s philosophy in this analysis of Perception, for in the

PM, Hegel states, “The more specific stage of consciousness at which

Kantian philosophy conceives the mind is perception” (PM 149). To be sure,

the analysis in Perception is hardly Hegel’s last word on Kant. Yet, it

remains that we have here in the PhG the beginnings of a thoroughgoing

dialectical explanation for the very existence of the Kantian philosophy.

In connection with the dialectical explanation that Perception provides

for the Kantian philosophy, it should be further recalled that a major

limitation of Perception is its continued naïve attachment to sensuousness.

To be sure, Perception in principle has transcended the attachment to

immediate sensuous particularity characteristic of Sensecertainty. Yet, its

appropriation of the universal is only partial and so the particular Thing of

sensuous consciousness merely rests “alongside” its own universal

determination. In other words, the sensuous has not yet been properly

reduced by consciousness to a mere moment of the “unconditioned absolute

universality,” but instead retains its own quasiabsoluteness in opposition to

the universality of the property, which latter, for its part, is revealed to be

still a merely “sensuous universality”154 (PhG 77). Thus, Hegel states

My ‘meaning’ has vanished, and perception takes the object as it is in

itself, or as a universal as such. Singular being therefore emerges in

the object as true singleness, as the in-itself of the One, or as

reflectedness-into-itself. But this is still a conditioned being for-for-

self alongside which appears another being-forself, the universality

which is opposed to, and conditioned by singular being […] The

sophistry of perception seeks to save these moments from their

contradiction, and it seeks to lay hold on the truth, by distinguishing

between the aspects, by sticking to the ‘Also’ and the ‘in so far’, and

finally by distinguishing the ‘unessential’ aspect from an ‘essence’

which is opposed to it. But these expedients, instead of warding off

deception in the process of apprehension, prove themselves on the

contrary to be quite empty. (PhG 77) Thus, as Hegel famously says

about the Kantian philosophy in particular, so it might be said of

Perception more generally, “it consists merely in a tenderness for the

things of this world” (EL 92). Perception retains a tender and perhaps

nostalgic attachment to the seeming absolute integrity of the

immediate, sensuous particular. As a result, it makes recourse to all

manner of sophistry and contrivance in order to avoid ascribing to the

Thing in-itself the contradiction that it nevertheless perceives between

the particular and universal, for this would involve reducing the

sensuous to a mere moment in an “unconditioned absolute

universality”.

2.9 A Special Note on Perception and Explaining Philosophical Multiplicity

As it turns out, the “Perception” chapter contains embedded within it a

very special lesson vis-à-vis Hegel’s larger effort to explain and critique the

multiplicity of philosophies. As such, it behooves us to note this lesson in

some detail before moving on to examining the “Force and Understanding”

chapter.

In order to appreciate this lesson properly, it is necessary, first of all,

to recall a major point Hegel makes at the very beginning of the Preface to

the PhG. Thus, regarding the problem of philosophical differences, Hegel

states,

The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth

and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to

be either accepted or contradicted; and hence its finds only the

acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend t diversity of

philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather

sees in it simple disagreements. The bud disappears in the bursting-

forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by

the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up

in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now

emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just

distinguished from one another, they also supplant one another as

mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes

them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not

conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this

mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole. But he who

rejects a philosophical system does not usually comprehend what he

is doing in this way; and he who grasps the contradiction between

them does not, as a general rule, know how to free it from its one-

sidedness, or maintain it in its freedom by recognizing the

reciprocally necessary moments that take shape as a conflict and

seeming incompatibility. (PhG 2)

Here, Hegel is, of course, providing a general statement about how to

interpret the multiplicity of different philosophies. Let us pause to clarify

this general point and then show how Hegel’s analysis of Perception can

now be used to illuminate specific elements of Hegel’s point that otherwise

would not be readily apparent.

2.9.1 Hegel’s General Point Regarding the Explanation of Philosophical

Multiplicity in the “Preface”

Hegel’s general point is that the multiple philosophies do not stand in

a relationship of mere conflict and contradiction. Rather, each historical

philosophy constitutes a moment in the unfolding of an organic whole. Still,

as Hegel points out, it is possible to view the various different philosophies

as simply contradicting one another.

Invoking, once again, an organic analogy, Hegel observes that it is possible

to view the blossom as simply refuting the bud and the fruit as refuting the

blossom in its turn such that what is in fact the organic unfolding of the

whole plant is viewed instead as the successive emergence of discrete and

incompatible stages, with each stage refuted the prior stage only to find itself

refuted and excluded in turn.

Hegel chastises this view, however, for failing to notice and account

for the unitary dialectico-organic process governing the emergence of the

different philosophies. According to Hegel, previous philosophies constitute

necessary intellectual preludes to subsequent developments. Yet, the genuine

insights contained within these earlier positions are not simply discarded

upon the appearance of a more advanced position; rather, they are preserved

and sublated by being released from their one-sidedness and thereby finding

their place within a larger organic whole.

2.9.2 Perception as Providing Greater Insight into Hegel’s General

Explanation of Philosophical Multiplicity

The analysis of Perception allows us to extricate at least two further

specific components from Hegel’s general point regarding philosophical

multiplicity. First, as we have already seen, the transition from Sense-

certainty to Perception gives a concrete instance of dialectical development

and sublation. Second, the experience of Perception, and specifically its

conception of its object, actually provides the means for explaining the very

emergence of the kind of interpretation of the history of philosophy Hegel

critiques. Let us examine each of these points.

Dialectical development entails undergoing the experience of

thinking-through what is implicit in a given viewpoint. Typically, this

thinking-through involves the negation of an initial position only to have that

negation negated which results in the return of the original position but in a

sublated form. Thus, sublation entails the preservation and transposition of

an insight or position from a lower viewpoint into a higher viewpoint by

means of which the original insight is reduced to a moment of a larger

whole. For example, the ‘This’ qua immediate ‘Now’ of Sense-certainty was

negated by a subsequent immediate ‘Now’ only to have this very process of

negation negated by the emergence of a mediated and universal ‘Now’

which reduced the many immediate ‘Nows’ to mere moments of a larger

whole. The original ‘This’ qua ‘Now’ was thus preserved, not merely

refuted or contradicted, within the subsequent higher viewpoint.

By analogy, insofar as it can be shown that a given philosophy

expresses the position of Sense-certainty regarding the nature of the ‘This’

and that a subsequent philosophy expresses the transposed and sublated

insight of Sense-certainty as manifested in Perception, then we have the

means for understanding how the two philosophies stand in a relationship

not of mere refutation and contradiction but of dialectical continuity. Thus, a

philosophy of Perception such as Kant’s does not simply refute but rather

sublates a philosophy of Sense-certainty such as Schulze’s.

Yet, it remains that the history of the multiple philosophies itself has

not always been so interpreted. As Hegel notes, conventional opinion has

viewed the various philosophies as each forming fundamentally distinct

units standing in relationships of mere opposition and contradiction to one

another. To be sure, there are theories regarding how one philosophy

“influenced” a subsequent philosophy in historical time. For Hegel,

however, such talk of influence does little to help move the discussion

beyond conceiving the various philosophies as still simply contradicting one

another; it does not help, in other words, in demonstrating the dialectico-

organic pattern by which the totality of philosophies are intrinsically united.

Importantly, however, in the analysis of Perception, Hegel provides the

means for not merely critiquing but for beginning to explain the very

existence of this kind of interpretation of the history of the multiple

philosophies itself.

This point is the special insight that the phenomenology of Perception

provides for elucidating Hegel’s larger explanatory account of philosophical

multiplicity. For, the analysis of Perception reveals why philosophy is so

often interpreted as a mere haphazard succession of mutually exclusive

‘Things’ or ‘positions’.

2.9.3 Perception as the Basis of Naïve Interpretations of Philosophical

Multiplicity

It should be recalled that Perception identifies itself as the viewpoint

of “sound common sense”. Yet, as noted in the Introduction of this

dissertation, it is precisely the viewpoint of sound common sense or

conventional opinion that views the history of philosophy as a history of

mere contradiction and refutation. The experience of Perception, however,

explains why this would be the case.

For Perception, reality is constituted by discrete and mutual exclusive

Things with their various properties. As such, we only need to imagine how

the history of philosophy would appear to such a viewpoint. For,

philosophies themselves could only appear to Perception as fundamentally

distinct and mutually exclusive quasi-Things which have various

“properties”. The properties of the various philosophies would be their

various “positions” and “arguments” concerning the litany of philosophical

topics and questions that each takes up.

Thus, when Perception looks at the history of philosophy, it will

invariably arrange philosophies according to distinct groupings, each

marked by their different traits or “properties” according to which they

exclude and contradict each other. Such groupings are only too common.

Thus, according to the ordinary conception of philosophy, there are Realists,

and also Idealists, and also Materialists, and also

Empiricists, and so on. Realists share various properties amongst

themselves, as do Idealists amongst themselves, and these properties

contradict one another, just as they both equally contradict those of

Empiricists, and so on. If it becomes necessary to make distinctions within a

certain group, then one simply identifies and adds the contradictory

properties. A Kantian Idealist is to be distinguished from a Platonic Idealist

inasmuch as the former holds that the ideas or categories are located in the

transcendental ego whereas the latter holds that they are located in a noetic

heaven. A Kantian Idealist is transcendental and also this, and this, and this

and so on.

Lost in this catalogue of the mutually exclusive philosophies with their

various essential properties, of course, is any account as to why the

philosophies emerge in the way that they do, at all. Yet, the present point is

that this very fact, namely, that the history of philosophy is so often

conceived, or rather Perceived, in this way, is now explained, at least in part,

by Hegel’s phenomenology of the experience of Perception.

Moreover, if we recall the experience at which Perception culminates and

thus transitions into Understanding, we see the ground laid for a radical

reinterpretation of the manner in which the different philosophies relate to

one another. Indeed, in an important sense, this radical reinterpretation of the

relationships among the different philosophies just is the PhG. Thus, the

transition from Perception to Understanding provides an at least partial guide

on how to interpret the PhG itself.

2.9.4 Transition to Understanding as Providing Suggestions for

Reinterpreting Philosophical Multiplicity and Conflict

Although we have not yet accompanied Hegel in thinking-through the

viewpoint of Understanding, we have seen what drives the transition from

Perception to that higher viewpoint. As Hegel states, Perception culminates

in the recognition that “the object in its pure determinateness, or in the

determinatenesses which were supposed to constitute its essential being, is

overcome just as surely as it was in its sensuous being” (PhG 76).

Perception’s ideal of a discrete object capable of being defined apart from its

relational context has been overcome. It has been sublated as a moment

within a larger universal process, one governed by an order of “pure

essences, the absolute elements and powers” (PhG 78). The ensuing chapter

on Force and Understanding will take up an examination of these absolute

elements and powers. It will start with a conception of Force and culminate

with a conception of Life as a self-conditioning totality.

For Hegel, as he maintained starting from some of his earliest works, in

order to interpret the history of the different philosophies adequately it is

important to transition from viewing that history after the manner of

Perception and into a viewpoint which grasps the many philosophies as

forming a self-conditioning dialectico-organic whole.

The long passage from the Preface of the PhG quoted above makes this

abundantly clear. The Introduction to LHP provides an even more extended

meditation on the need to make this transition from a Perception-based

interpretation of the history of the different philosophies to an interpretation

based on a higher viewpoint. Let us briefly examine the account provided in

that Introduction.

First, Hegel critiques those Perception-based interpretations which treat

“the diversity in philosophies as if the manifold were fixed and stationary

and composed of what is mutually exclusive” (LHP I 33). Then, he

articulates the need for what would be entailed in transitioning to a higher

viewpoint in interpreting the history of different philosophies. Hegel’s basic

point is that the different philosophies must be understood as constituting

expressions of the development of the mind itself and thereby forming

moments in the unfolding of a self-conditioning, self-differentiating

universal organic process:

A complete form of thought such as is here presented, is a philosophy

But everything hangs on this: these forms are nothing else than the

original distinction in the Idea itself, which is what it is only in them.

They are in this way essential to, and constitute the content of the

Idea, which in thus sundering itself, attains to form. The manifold

character of the principles which appear, is, however, not accidental,

but necessary: different forms constitute an integral part of the whole

form. They are the determinations of the original Idea, which together

constitute the whole; but as being outside one another, their union

does not take place in them, but in us, the observers. Each system is

determined as one, but it is not a permanent condition that the

differences are thus mutually exclusive. The inevitable fate of these

determinations must follow, and that is that they shall be drawn

together and reduced to elements or moments. (LHP I 34-5)

The Idea and/or Concept, which is the “pure essence and absolute power”

mentioned in the PhG, differentiates and concretizes itself into various

forms of thought or the mind such as Sense-certainty and Perception. These

forms, when expressed, just are different philosophies. Accordingly, the

different philosophies do not constitute mutually exclusive and contradictory

options but rather moments in a self-differentiating, organic whole which

just is the mind itself.

In the first instance, however, the philosophies themselves are unaware

of their intrinsic dialectico-organic unity with one another. Rather, it remains

for us, the phenomenological and historical observers, to discern this unity.

For a viewpoint such as Perception, the history of philosophy appears to be

an inorganic if not thoroughly unintelligible agglomeration of mutually

exclusive positions. As such, then, the Hegelian philosophy, with its

breakthrough into grasping the dialectico-organic unity of the different

philosophies, constitutes the latest and highest development of philosophy

itself. As Hegel states,

It is only the living and mental [Geistig] which internally bestirs and

develops itself. Thus the Idea as concrete in itself, and self-

developing, is an organic system and a totality which contains a

multitude of stages and of moments of development. Philosophy has

now become for itself the apprehension of this development, and as

conceiving Thought, is itself this development in Thought.

The more progress made in this development, the more perfect is the

Philosophy. (LHP I 27)

What Hegel is providing is the foundation for a thoroughgoing scientific

hermeneutic of the history of philosophy. He is providing the means of

eschewing the all too conventional Perception-based practice of the viewing

the different philosophies as forming discrete and mutually exclusive

positions which can be grouped and aggregated according to various

“properties”. In its stead, Hegel shows how to interpret the different

philosophies as forming moments of a dialectico-organic whole. He replaces

the basic terms and relations by which philosophies are conventionally

distinguished – for example, Realists are “in between” Empiricists and

Idealists – with a new set of basic terms and relations derived from a

phenomenology of the development of the mind itself. Philosophies differ

inasmuch as different stages in the development of the mind differ. As such,

they do not form mutually exclusive and contradictory positions; rather they

are expressions and moments of a unitary, organic process.

For Hegel, again, it is only the latest and highest philosophy – the

Hegelian philosophy – that grasps this fact. Yet, by that very fact, Hegel is

able to provide an explanation as to why the other philosophies fall short of

such an understanding. For, the ultimate conclusion to which Hegel’s

explanatory account of philosophical multiplicity drives us, at this point, is

that the other philosophies are expressions of forms of the mind that are

inadequate to grasping the very notion of development itself.

The chapter on Force and Understanding greatly augments our

understanding of Hegel’s conception of development as consisting in the

dialectical unfolding of an organic whole. It is apposite, then, that we should

now turn to that discussion.

3. Force and Understanding

The viewpoint of Force and Understanding begins where Perception

leaves off. Consciousness has sublated its view of the object as a self-

identical Thing with many universal properties into the notion of the object

as an “unconditioned universal” or universal relational context. As Hegel

states, with the emergence of this universal relational context,

[t]he unity of ‘being-for-self’ [i.e. self-identical unity] and ‘being-for-

another’ [i.e. properties defined by their relations to others] is posited;

in other words, the absolute antithesis is posited as a self-identical

essence. At first sight, this seems to concern only the form of the

moments in reciprocal relation; but ‘being-forself’ and ‘being-for-

another’ are the content itself as well, since the antithesis in its truth

can have no other nature than the one yielded in the result, viz. that

the content taken in perception to be true, belongs in fact only to the

form, in the unity of which it is dissolved. This content is likewise

universal; there can be no other content which by its particular

constitution would fail to fall within this unconditioned universality.

(PhG 80)

It is not that the mind has simply come to recognize that its objects – the

Things – have the form of relating to one another. Rather, the content of the

present object is the relation, or more precisely, it is the universal reciprocal

relationality in which Things, with their particular constitutions, have been

reduced to mere moments. Thus, the present chapter is a prolonged

examination on the nature of relationality, which for Hegel is typified in the

relationship which he calls “Force”.

Before moving on to the examination of Force, it would be worth

recalling Hegel’s comments in the first paragraph of this new chapter. He

reminds us that the object currently under investigation appears differently

to the form of consciousness presently under investigation, namely,

Understanding, than it does to us, the phenomenologists. Thus, Hegel states,

It is essential to distinguish the two: for consciousness, the object has

returned into itself from its relation to an other and has thus become

Concept in principle; but consciousness is not yet for itself the

Concept, and consequently does not recognize itself in that reflected

object. For us, this object has developed through the movement of

consciousness in such a way that consciousness is involved in that

development, and the reflection is the same on both sides, or, there is

only one reflection. (PhG 79)

The mind now has an object that has returned to itself through its relation to

another. Yet, only we, the phenomenologists, know that such an object qua

relational pattern is a very tissue of the mind itself and that therefore what

consciousness grasps in its object is but an objectification by consciousness

of its own self. To be sure, this is a theme that runs throughout the

Phenomenology. Nevertheless, it is a point worth emphasizing again as we

examine the continued development of both consciousness and its object in

Understanding.

Not all of the details of Hegel’s analysis of relationality in the mode of

Force are of equal interest, not least because they often rely on antiquated

conceptions of science. For example, in contemporary physics the very idea

of gravity or universal attraction as a kind of “force” has been superseded by

the view of gravity as a curvature in spacetime. Thus, it will be useful to

dilate only on those sections of Force and

Understanding that help in understanding Hegel’s larger effort to explain the

emergence of different philosophies.

3.1 Universality and Particularity Sublated in the Unity of Force

According to Hegel, within the unconditioned universal, at least

provisionally, there is still a distinction to be drawn between the two

moments of the universal medium of diverse properties, on the one hand,

and the One reflected into itself, on the other, or in other words, between

being-for-another and being-for-itself. Yet, he immediately clarifies that, in

examining Understanding,

[w]e have to see how these moments exhibit themselves in the

unconditioned universality which is their essence. It is clear at the

outset that, since they exist only in this universality, they are no

longer separated from one another at all but are in themselves

essentially self-superseding aspects, and what is posited is only their

transition into one another. (PhG 81)

The unconditioned universal or absolute relational context is the object for

the mind in Understanding. Thus, being-for-another and being-for-self have

been reduced to moments in this universal process. Still, it remains to show

how these two moments operate within this higher context which is their

essence.

According to Hegel, the diverse properties or “matters”, provisionally

taken as independent, in fact “pass over into their unity,” while their unity,

again, provisionally taken as independent, “directly unfolds its diversity, and

this once again reduces itself to unity” (PhG 81). This very dialectical

movement, however, according to Hegel, just is Force. Thus, there are not

two problematically independent realities – Thing and properties – but only

one universal relational context or process, namely, the totality of Force.

Yet, this process has two moments: 1) its dispersal into a plurality of

properties or “matters”, which Hegel calls the “expression of Force”, and 2)

its withdrawal back into unity from its expression, which Hegel calls “Force

proper”. These two moments constitute one process inasmuch as Force

proper must express itself, yet, in expressing itself, it remains entirely within

itself.

Hegel quickly clarifies, however, that the truth of the intrinsic unity of

Force is, at this stage, only for us, the phenomenologists. By contrast, while

it has broken into the realm of the unconditioned universal, Understanding

still shares with Perception the proclivity for holding the two moments apart

from one another as independent. As Hegel states, “the Understanding, to

which the Concept of Force belongs, is strictly speaking the Concept which

sustains the different moments qua different.” (PhG 82) As a result,

Understanding initially posits Force proper as the “inner being of Things”.

(PhG 83)

Force thus initially appears as a unitary substance reflected into itself,

which entails that the unfolding of the diverse properties must be something

other than Force. In order for Force to be the very the subsistence of Things

with their properties which consciousness perceives, however, it must

express itself. Thus, it would seem that Force is solicited into expressing

itself by what is other than it, namely, the unfolded or universal medium of

matters or properties. Yet, this soliciting is itself Force, and so it would

appear that Force proper resides in its expression. The Force that is

expressed, however, is itself solicited to reflect back into itself by the

principle of unity which is now other than Force, which in turn reveals itself

in fact to be Force.

Upon further thinking-through, however, Hegel shows that in order to

solicit Force proper to express itself, the soliciting Force must be solicited to

do so, namely, by Force proper. Thus, Force was never solicited by

something alien to express itself; Force rather ultimately solicits itself.

Moreover, it is also Force proper which solicits itself to solicit it out of

expression and back into the latent unity of Force proper. “Consequently”,

Hegel states, “this distinction, too, which obtained between the two Forces,

one of which was supposed to be soliciting, the other solicited, Force is

transformed into the same reciprocal interchange of determinatenesses”

(PhG 84). We have thus another dialectical frenzy the immediate upshot of

which it will be important to clarify.

3.1.1 Clarifying the Previous Section

Although its proper object is the unconditioned universal context of Force,

For Understanding there was nevertheless an obvious distinction to be

drawn between latent Force, or Force proper, on the one hand, and the

expression of Force, on the other. It thus drew a distinction for itself

between the condition and the conditioned. Force proper was posited as the

condition for the expression of Force in the unfolding of various properties

perceived by consciousness. Thus, qua conditioned, the expression of Force

had to be posited as other than Force, since Force is the universal

unconditioned. Yet, as the subsistent condition of its own expression, Force

proper nevertheless must be solicited to express itself by its other. To that

very extent, however, Force proper is revealed to be itself conditioned. The

ultimate lesson for consciousness up to this point, then, is that Force is

unconditioned precisely and only to the extent that it is a self-conditioning

whole with various moments.

3.2 Form and Content Sublated in Force

Hegel pauses, here, to draw a distinction between the form and content

of the Concept of Force currently under investigation. According to Hegel,

what has thus far been examined, namely, the distinction between Force

proper versus the expression of Force, concerns more precisely the content

of Force. In contrast, the distinction between the Force which solicits versus

Force as solicited concerns the form of the relation. Hegel’s point is to make

clear that the preceding investigation has revealed that “the differences, qua

differences of content and form, vanished in themselves” (PhG 85). In other

words,

On the side of form, the essence of the active, soliciting or

independent side, was the same as that which, on the side of content,

presented itself as Force driven back into itself; the side which was

passive, which was solicited or for an other, was, from the side of

form, the same as that which, from the side of content, presented itself

as the universal medium of the many ‘matters’. (PhG 85)

On the side of form, that which solicits another turned out to be the same as

the Force which, on the side of content, withdraws back into itself. By the

same token, however, that which was solicited into activity, on the side of

form, turned out to be the same as the expression of Force itself, in terms of

content.

According to Hegel, then, Force exists only as actual, and actual Force

is not a substance or a Thing but a pure relationality. The two moments of

Force, Force proper and the expression of Force, are not divided into two

independent extremes offering each other only an opposite extreme: their

essence rather consist simply and solely in this, that each is solely through

the other, and what each thus is it immediately no longer is, since it is the

other. They have thus, in fact, no substances of their own which might

support and maintain them. (PhG 86)

For Hegel, substances or Things are not absolute. They are but moments in a

pattern of relations. As Hegel states, “the moments of [Force’s] actuality,

their substances and their movement, collapse unresistingly into an

undifferentiated unity, a unity which is not Force driven back into itself (for

this is itself only such a moment), but is its Concept qua Concept” (PhG 86).

Thus, in recognizing that the reality of Things is dependent upon and

governed by a pattern of pure relationality, the mind has thereby broken into

the realm of pure conceptuality, as well. The result, for the mind, is that “the

realization of Force is at the same time the loss of reality” (PhG 86).

Understanding had initially taken Force to be a form in which

substances related to one another. Now, it realizes that Force is the very

content of its object, as well. Its object, in other words, is pure relationality

grasped under the auspices of pure conceptuality, which is to say, apart from

any even quasi-sensuous determinations which hitherto had provided

consciousness with its basic sense of “reality”.

3.3 Inner and Outer, or Reality and Appearance, Sublated in Force

At this point, Hegel calls attention to a distinction which consciousness

draws between the universal which appears to the mind as the “play of

forces”, on the one hand, and the inner being of this play as it is understood

in its pure conceptuality, or under the “Concept of Force qua Concept”, on

the other (PhG 86). The play of forces is what appears to the mind as the

ongoing manifold of changes among the Things in its sensuous perceptual

field, whereas the pure Concept of Force “exists only as an object for the

Understanding” (PhG 86). Understanding thus understands itself to be that

which “looks through this mediating play of Forces into the true background

of Things” (PhG 86).

Hegel frames his discussion in terms of a sort of syllogism in which the

sensuous appearance of the play of Forces functions as a middle term uniting

the extremes of the Understanding, on the one hand, and the inner world of

Force in its pure conceptuality, on the other. The middle term, as Hegel

states “is therefore called appearance; for we call being that is directly and

in its own self a non-being, a surface show” (PhG 87).

In one sense, then, for the mind, the sensuous appearance of the play

of Forces is merely a kind of epiphenomenal reality through which it peers

in order to understand the real phenomenon of Force itself. Yet, Hegel

quickly qualifies this point by stating,

It is not merely a surface show; it is appearance, a totality of show.

This totality, as totality or as universal, is what constitutes the inner

[of Things], the play of Forces as a reflection of the inner into itself.

In it, the Things of perception are expressly present for consciousness

as they are in themselves, viz. as moments which immediately and

without rest or stay turn into their opposite, the One immediately into

the universal, the essential immediately into the unessential and vice

versa. This play of Forces is consequently the developed negative; but

its truth is the positive, viz. the universal object that, in itself,

possesses being. The being of this object for consciousness is

mediated by the movement of appearance, in which the being of

perception and the sensuously objective has a merely negative

significance. (PhG 87)

The ongoing play of Forces experienced in the mind’s perceptual field, in

which the Things of Perception have indeed been reduced to perpetually

negated or vanishing moments, nevertheless presents merely a negative side

to the more positive reality of the realm of pure conceptuality which is the

inner truth of this show and which is the object strictly of the Understanding.

This inner realm of pure conceptuality is thus equally the play of Forces but

in its totality or strict universality – the total pattern of intelligible relations,

in other words.

According to Hegel, the positing by consciousness of a distinction

between the play of Forces and its inner truth actually manifests – albeit,

only for us, the phenomenologists – a movement of the mind or

consciousness itself. As he states, in drawing this distinction

Consciousness, therefore, reflects itself out of this movement back

into itself as the True, but, qua consciousness, converts this truth

again into an objective inner, and distinguishes this reflection of

Things from its own reflection into itself: just as the movement of

mediation is likewise still objective for it. This inner is, therefore, for

consciousness an extreme over against it; but it is for consciousness

the True, since in the inner, as the in-itself, it possess at the same time

the certainty of itself, or the moment of its being-for-self. But it is not

yet conscious of this ground or basis. (PhG 87)

In positing an inner Truth “behind” the play of Forces, the mind is in fact

objectifying itself since it is the true being-for-itself. Yet, the mind does not

recognize that it has done this and so treats the inner Truth as an object-in-

itself that stands radically over against it. In other words, what should, or at

least could, constitute for the mind a moment of profound self-recognition

instead produces a state of utter self-alienation. For the mind now treats

what is in fact an objectification of itself as a “pure beyond”, an object-

initself existing intrinsically outside the scope of consciousness.

3.3.1 The Appearance/Reality Distinction as a Further Explanation of

Kantian

Philosophy

Important to note is that the in-itself “beyond” is posited as the

supersensible world in contrast to the sensuous world experienced in

perception. For, in noting this point we are able to recognize how Hegel is

providing a more profound explanatory account of the Kantian distinction

between Things qua appearing, or phenomena, versus the Thing-in-

themselves, or the noumenal realm. The noumenal realm, for Kant, is indeed

the realm of the Thing-in-themselves beyond the scope of conscious

experience, whereas the phenomena are the Things inasmuch as they can be

perceived within what Kant declares to be the limits of human conscious

experience. Indeed, noumenon literally means “object of Nous [or

Understanding]”. It is the would-be object of pure Understanding. Yet,

Hegel’s point is that Kant does not recognize that this object is in fact simply

a self-objectification of Understanding. The real Thing-in-itself is the mind.

The mind, including the mind of Kant, at this stage, however, does not

recognize itself in the object it has posited. Ironically, then, although it is in

fact nothing other than a self-objectification of consciousness, the Thing-in-

itself, insofar as it is posited as a “pure beyond” of the mind, can only be

interpreted by the mind as “void of all spiritual relationships and distinctions

of consciousness qua consciousness” (PhG 88). The Thingin-itself, the

putatively real thing, is thus ironically reduced to a mere void lacking all the

rich determinations of conscious experience.

3.4 Determining the ‘Inner’ or ‘Beyond’: The Emergence of Law

According to Hegel, although Understanding takes the object in its

truth to lie in a supersensible “beyond” devoid of all determinations, it

nevertheless sets about positing determinations for this realm. The first

determination that Understanding posits for the supersensible is that of the

notion of “Law”. Law is the expression of the universal difference or

relational totality that Force proved itself to be upon being thought-through.

According to Hegel,

This [universal] difference is expressed in the law, which is the stable

image of unstable appearance. Consequently, the supersensible world

is an inert realm of laws which, though beyond the perceived world –

for this exhibits law only through incessant change – is equally

present in it and is its direct tranquil image. (PhG 90-91)

Rather than being beyond consciousness, the supersensible is grasped by the

Understanding as the realm of laws which is itself simply the truth of

sensuous perception. The realm of laws is what governs the pattern and

order of incessant transitions constitutive of the realm of perceptual

appearance. It is not separate from the perceptual field, but is rather the

latter’s own immanent intelligibility. Nor is it beyond the scope of

consciousness, rather it is given the very experience of Understanding.

According to Hegel, there is a limitation at this point to the mind’s

positing of a realm of laws governing appearance. The limitation is actually

twofold: 1) scientific laws are abstract and so prescind from the particular

determinations given in perceptual experience, 2) the realm of laws itself

ipso facto constitutes a plurality, which is a problem insofar as that plurality

violates the simple, tranquil unity which was supposed to characterize the

realm of laws inasmuch as they transcended the flux of appearance. It is this

twofold limitation within the very concept of law that constitutes the

fulcrum point upon which consciousness is lifted out of Understanding to a

higher viewpoint. There are several details in Hegel’s analysis of Force and

Understanding that lead up to the emergence of this higher viewpoint, not all

of which, however, are equally important. Nevertheless, the most important

points admit of being summarized in short order.

3.4.1 The Emergence of Law as Mediating the Movement to Self-

consciousness

In response to the second problem vis-à-vis the realm of laws

mentioned above, Hegel states that, in contrast to the many specific laws of

the contemporary physics of his time, consciousness posits a “pure Concept

of law” (PhG 92). This pure Concept of law is the Newtonian law of

universal attraction. This law in effect encompasses, and thereby reduces to

unity, the plurality of more particular laws which the physics of Hegel’s time

had managed to formulate. The problem with this solution is that, within the

formulation of universal attraction, plurality and difference still remain

inasmuch as the terms constituting the definition of universal attraction are

distinguished and related in the definition itself. Thus, the pure Concept of

law, as simple, undifferentiated unity, “is turned against law itself” (PhG

92). As a result, a distinction appears to be drawn between the phenomenon,

Force, which is a simple unity, on the one hand, and its expression in law,

which necessarily posits differences, on the other.

Hegel’s major concern in this context is that the existence of Force as

an actually existing phenomenon cannot be derived with necessity from the

Concept of law expressed in its definition. “Law and Force, or […] Notion

and being” are indifferent, Hegel states (PhG 93). The indifference affects

both the relation between law and its existence as Force as well as the

relation between the different parts of the law itself: “either the universal,

Force, is indifferent to the division which is law, or the differences, the

parts, of the law are indifferent to one another.” (PhG 94) Yet, it turns out

that in the actual explanation of the phenomena of perception,

Force is constituted exactly the same as law; there is said to be no

difference whatever between them. The differences are the pure,

universal expression of law, and pure Force; but both have the same

content, the same constitution. Thus the difference qua difference of

content, of the thing, is also again withdrawn. (PhG 95)

The immanent intelligibility of the law and the immanent intelligibility of

the phenomenon to be explained by the law are the same. Thus, in

understanding the law, we thereby simply understand the phenomenon

which it explains, nothing more.

The difference that was no difference which was experienced in the

play of soliciting versus solicited Forces is now repeated in the

Understanding itself in the difference that is no difference between law and

Force as well as between the parts of law which consciousness moves back

and forth between. The result is that consciousness learns a more basic law,

namely the law of appearance itself, according to which “differences arise

which are no differences, or that what is selfsame repels itself from itself;

and similarly, that the difference are only such as are in reality no

differences and which cancel themselves; in other words, what is not

selfsame is self-attractive” (PhG 96). Both the realm of appearance and the

realm of inner Truth or law thus posit distinctions within themselves only to

supersede these differences and return to a unityin-difference.

The first supersensible inner realm, the realm of inert law, which was

“the tranquil kingdom of laws, the immediate copy of the perceived world,”

is now changed into its opposite, one in which the simple, selfsame and

tranquil realm of law repels itself from itself thus becoming a realm of pure

change. (PhG 96) Hegel calls this s;econd supersensible world which is

opposite the realm of inert, tranquil law, the “inverted world”:

The first supersensible world was only the immediate raising of the

perceived world into the universal element; it had its necessary

counterpart in this perceived world which still retained for itself the

principle of change and alteration. The first kingdom of laws lacked

that principle, but obtains it as an inverted world. (PhG 96-97)

In thinking-through the inversion of the supersensible world into its

opposite, Hegel maintains “We have to think pure change, or think

antithesis within the antithesis itself, or contradiction” (PhG 90). The

supersensible realm of laws is the antithesis of the realm of appearance; yet,

within that antithesis is the difference constitutive of law as such, a

difference which is produced as a matter of pure change. The inverted world

is thus the opposite of the opposite of the realm of appearance and so

“overarches” the latter and “has it within in” (PhG 99). Only thus is the

difference between the inner world and its expression in appearance a

“difference as inner difference, or difference in its own self, or difference as

infinity” (PhG 99).

This “simple infinity, or the absolute Concept,” according to Hegel,

“may be called the simple essence of life,” and it is with the emergence of

this conception of Life that Hegel proposes to overcome the twofold

limitation of the realm of laws as previously discussed (PhG 100). For laws

are 1) abstract and so fail to determinate the actual in its particular and 2)

lack simple unity and so fall asunder into mutually indifferent moments.

Life, by contrast, in its infinity eo ipso determines the totality of its moments

or differences; yet, it simultaneously supersedes these differences and

preserves itself in a higher unity. Accordingly, regarding the simple essence

of Life, Hegel states that it is “the soul of the world, the universal blood,

whose omnipresence is neither disturbed nor interrupted by any difference,

but rather is itself every difference, as also their supersession; it pulsates

within itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest” (PhG 100).

Infinity as the self-supersession or sublation of all differences,

moreover, just is the mind or consciousness, according to Hegel, and so in

having infinity or Life as its object, consciousness thereby becomes self-

consciousness. Again, for Hegel, it is through its attempt to explain Force

that the Understanding manages to objectify for itself the very nature of

consciousness. As Hegel states,

The Understanding’s ‘explanation’ is primarily only the description of

what selfconsciousness is. It supersedes the differences present in the

law, differences which have already become pure differences but are

still indifferent, and posits them in a single unity, in Force. But this

unifying of them is equally and immediately a sundering, for it

supersedes the differences and posits the oneness of Force, only by

creating a new difference, that of Law and Force, which, however, at

the same time is no difference; and, moreover, from the fact that this

difference is no difference, it goes on to supersede this difference

again, since it lets Force be similarly constituted to Law (PhG101).

Understanding posits Force as a unitary phenomenon which is merely

explained by the law which contains indifferent differences. Yet, this

positing of Force as unitary itself produces a difference between Law and

Force, or Concept and Being. At the same time, however, Understanding

posits the essential unity of content of Law and Force and so maintains that

it is a difference that is no difference. This very movement, however, of

positing differences only to sublate them is of the very nature of the mind

itself. Thus, in the process of explaining Force, consciousness becomes

conscious of itself, or selfconsciousness.

Hegel maintains that while the self-sublating infinity of Life which is

the new object of the mind, has in fact been produced by the mind, it is

nevertheless not an object for consciousness, but only for us, the

phenomenologists:

To the Understanding, the movement, as it is found in experience, is

here a [mere] happening, and the selfsame and the unlike are

predicates, whose essence is an inert substrate. What is, for the

Understanding, an object in sensuous covering, is for us in its

essential form as a pure Concept. (PhG 102)

For Understanding, there is still an object – for example, a substance or

Thing with a sensuous covering “out there” – which constitutes the basic

content of reality and to which are attached the various predicates of

selfsame and unlike. It does not understand that the very movement of Life,

the process of its self-sublating infinity, is its proper object and, moreover,

that it itself is responsible for it.

The fact that the mind has as its object the infinity of Life, yet

simultaneously does not recognize itself therein, will form the basis for the

ensuing dialectic of selfconsciousness.

3.5 Summary of Force and Understanding

The viewpoint of Force and Understanding provides a provisional

sublation of Perception, in particular the tension between particularity and

universality operative therein. The key insight for Understanding is that

Things or substances are not primary; rather, they are moments in a

universal relational context.

The further question that Understanding thinks-through is the nature

of relationality itself. Understanding goes through several stages in its

attempt to conceive of relation as Force. It initially conceives of Force

according to the residual restrictions of the viewpoint of Perception and

distinguishes between Force as a latent, universal power and the particular

expressions of Force. Upon thinking-through this distinction, however,

Understanding experiences a dialectical frenzy in which latent Force is

revealed to be indistinguishable from its expression. This was only to be

expected inasmuch as Force is not a ‘Thing’ with properties, but a concrete

and universal relational pattern.

In order to preserve its original conviction regarding the distinction

between the universal and particular aspects of Force, Understanding shifts

its ground and postulates a distinction between the appearance of Force and

its reality behind or beyond the realm of appearance. The realm of

appearance is the realm of perceptual or sensuous flux, while the ‘beyond’

consists of the tranquil unity which is the essence or pure form of

appearance.

In terms of explaining the multiplicity of philosophies, Hegel thus

shows how the distinction between appearance and reality, as manifested in

a plurality of instances such as Kant’s phenomena/noumenon distinction, is

not simply a haphazard event. Rather, the positing it is to be explained as the

result of a form of the mind attempting to account for what is given in its

experience, albeit from a restricted viewpoint. For, the mind experiences the

difference between that which is given in sensuous perception, on the one

hand, and that which is grasped by the Understanding, on the other. Yet, it

struggles to grasp the nature of the relation between these two aspects of its

experiences, and at this stage of its development it contrives to explain the

nature of the relation in terms of the appearance/reality distinction.

Understanding eventually postulates the realm of Force qua ‘beyond’

as the realm of the pure form of law as opposed to the appearance of Force.

Yet, this postulation proves to be doubly problematic. For, the realm of Law

postulated is supposed to represent the tranquil unity of Force as the opposed

to flux of its sensuous appearance. Yet, the law contains difference within

itself. Thus, in the Newtonian formulation F = MA, a distinction is drawn

between Force, on the one hand, and Mass times Acceleration, on the other.

This distinction undermines the tranquil unity of the pure form of law. Still,

the difference is immediately annulled inasmuch as Force is affirmed to be

identical to Mass times Acceleration. Thus, the difference is revealed to be

no difference.

The larger point is that this transition from the tranquil unity of the

pure form of law, to the positing of a difference which negates that unity, to

the subsequent negation of this negation through the affirmation of an

identity in a higher unity – this tripartite transition itself manifests the pure

form of change or development. Yet, the realm of law was postulated

precisely as the opposite or negation of the realm of changing appearances.

This point pushes the analysis to the second problematic aspect of positing a

realm of law ‘beyond’ that of the appearance of Force.

For, the realm of appearance is postulated as the realm in which Force

is enacted in the play of changing appearances. Thus, Understanding would

presume to posit a distinction between Force and law, or Reality and

Concept. Yet, the immanent intelligibility of Force is identical to that of its

law. Thus, consciousness again posits a difference which in fact is no

difference. Indeed, the realm of law already revealed itself to be the realm of

pure change. Thus, the distinction between law and Force proves to be

doubly a difference which is no difference. For, the tranquil realm of law is

the realm of pure change, just as the realm of changing appearances

manifests the immanent and abiding intelligibility of law, as such.

According to Hegel, the process by which differences are posited only

to be negated and sublated into a higher unity constitutes the very essence of

Life qua infinity. Infinity, for Hegel, as will be discussed at greater length in

Chapter Four, does not prescind or abstract from differences or limitations,

but posits them in order to preserve itself within them. Life manifests this

form of infinity in a form that, as we will see, is only surpassed by the mind

itself. At any rate, insofar as the object of consciousness consists in such

self-sublating infinity, then the object of consciousness has become Life. It

is with the emergence of Life as the object of consciousness that the mind

transitions from mere consciousness to self-consciousness. For, the work of

self-sublation manifested in the object is actually performed by the mind

itself. Yet, at this stage, the mind does not yet recognize this fact. In-itself

the object of the mind is now consciousness itself. Still, it will only be in and

through the dialectical development of Self-consciousness that this fact will

become for consciousness.

Self-consciousness and Hegel’s Explanation of Transcendental

Philosophy

The “Self-consciousness” chapter constitutes a pivotal turning point in

the development of the Phenomenology for several reasons. The present

chapter is charged with the task of explicating the most salient among these

reasons in the service of the larger goal of demonstrating how Hegel

explains the emergence of the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies. This

chapter will accordingly proceed as follows.

First, there will be a brief review of key points that precipitated the

transition from consciousness to self-consciousness in the Phenomenology.

Second, there will be an extended analysis of key aspects of J.G.

Fichte’s system as it is primarily found in the Wissenschaftslehre (WL),

although other texts from Fichte’s corpus will be called upon to provide

support or clarity, as needed. The reason for this analysis of Fichte is that a

central argument of the present chapter will be that Fichte’s system

constitutes an indispensable point of reference for any proper

comprehension of Hegel’s effort in the “Self-consciousness” chapter,

especially the Lord/Bondsman dialectic.

Third, there will be an examination of Hegel’s initial response to

Fichte’s system in the Differenzschrift (DZ). The DZ provides crucial

insights into Hegel’s view of Fichte’s system, insights which can in turn be

used to help analyze the account put forth in the “Self-consciousness”

chapter of the Phenomenology.

Fourth, the “Self-consciousness” chapter will be examined in close

detail and in light of the preceding discussion of Fichte’s system and the DZ.

In this part of the chapter, the controversial argument will be put forth that

the Lord/Bondsman dialectic constitutes an allegory for the internal

experience of an individual consciousness. Such an interpretation is, to say

the least, unorthodox. For, the overwhelming consensus among

commentators has been to read the Lord/Bondsman dialectic as the account

of a primordial social encounter between two distinct individuals in which

they attempt to extract mutual recognition from one another. A close reading

of the text, especially in light of a sustained analysis of Fichte’s system and

Hegel’s initial critique thereof, however, will show that the orthodox reading

is unsustainable.

John McDowell has recently defended this heterodox interpretation of

the Lord/Bondsman dialectic, as well. He identifies Kant as providing the

crucial backdrop for properly understanding the Lord/Bondsman dialectic.

While Kant’s distinction between the transcendental ego versus the

empirical ego does provide the remote context for Hegel’s effort in the

Lord/Bondsman dialectic, Fichte’s appropriation and elaboration of that

distinction provides the proximate context and, as such, greatly overshadows

Kant’s influence. McDowell, unfortunately, almost entirely neglects the role

of Fichte. Still, the helpful insights he provides will be enlisted in support of

the larger argument I will be presenting.

With respect to the overall argument of this dissertation, the reason

why it is important to establish that the Lord/Bondsman dialectic, at least as

it unfolds in the “Selfconsciousness” chapter, is a dialectic which occurs

within an individual consciousness is that, as such, the Lord/Bondsman

dialectic provides a rather unique and profound means for explaining the

emergence of a vast range of different philosophies. In fact, so it will be

argued, the Lord/Bondsman dialectic qua internal to consciousness turns out

to be applicable to the entire panoply of differing philosophies. For, the

Lord/Bondsman dialectic provides the means for differentiating philosophies

according as they more or less succeed in reconciling the relation of lordship

and bondage, or domination and servitude, internal to any given individual

consciousness.

Fifth, Hegel’s continued analysis of the development of self-

consciousness in the sections of Stoicism, Skepticism and the Unhappy

Consciousness will be explicated, albeit rather summarily. The discussions

of Stoicism and Skepticism are of interest in this context largely because the

forms of consciousness which give rise to these philosophies are

unambiguously correlated with the philosophies themselves. Thus, little to

no interpretive subtlety is needed to show just how Hegel is explaining the

emergence of these differing philosophies. The discussion of Unhappy

Consciousness calls for a summary treatment for a different set of reasons.

First, Unhappy Consciousness constitutes a form of consciousness that

undergirds not only some set of particular philosophies but in fact the

philosophico-theological outlook characteristic of an entire culture which

extended over the course of roughly a thousand years, namely, medieval

Christianity. Second, the analysis of Unhappy Consciousness is incredibly

rich, suggestive and provocative in its detail and, as such, calls for an

extended treatment in order to make sense of its precise import, an effort

which present restrictions of space do not permit.

Lastly, the transition from self-conscious into Reason will be briefly

discussed in order to set up the following chapter.

1. Review of the Transition from Consciousness to Self-consciousness

As mentioned, the “Self-consciousness” chapter of the Phenomenology

constitutes a pivotal point of transition in Hegel’s account of the ongoing

development of the mind. To recall, according to the viewpoint of

consciousness out of which the mind has just emerged, the object or the true

“is something other than [consciousness]” (PhG 104). In other words, mere

consciousness took the object to be utterly different than consciousness.

Consciousness thereby also took the object to exist independently of or

“outside” consciousness. The object existed in and through itself: “the object

is, and it is, merely because it is” (PhG 58). The object was self-sufficient

and self-explanatory. In contrast to the self-sufficient, self-explanatory

object, consciousness’s awareness of the object was something merely

accidental and inessential. While the object was independent and self-

sufficient, consciousness itself was dependent upon the prior existence of the

object in order that it should be conscious and, therefore, exist at all.

During the course of development from Sense-certainty, through

Perception, to Force and Understanding, consciousness is disabused of its

conviction regarding the primacy, independence and self-sufficiency of the

object. Each time consciousness believed that it had seized upon an object

that would conform to its ideal of independence and self-sufficiency it

would soon learn that the object was radically dependent upon a universal

relational context. Consciousness ultimately reaches a point at which the

object of which it is conscious is the self-differentiating, self-relating

universal relational context which just is consciousness or the mind itself.

In having itself for its own object consciousness thus transitions into

selfconsciousness. It is this development which marks out the “Self-

consciousness” chapter as so pivotal to the progression of the

Phenomenology. For, as Hegel states, “With selfconsciousness, then, we

have therefore entered the native realm of truth” (PhG 104). Indeed, Hegel

maintains a unique species of correspondence theory of truth according to

which truth is the correspondence between thought and being, concept and

reality. The uniqueness of Hegel’s correspondence theory of truth lies in the

fact that, instead of conceiving truth as a matter of thought or the mind

becoming adequate to or otherwise conforming an “independent” object,

Hegel envisaged truth as a matter of the object or existence progressively

becoming more adequate to its concept. The Concept or the mind is the

criterion which existence must satisfy in order for truth to emerge. Thus, it

was only upon the emergence of an object that corresponded to

consciousness that we entered the native realm of truth.

Importantly, however, while at the culmination of the “Consciousness”

chapter consciousness indeed has itself as its own object and has thereby

attained to selfconsciousness, consciousness is nevertheless not conscious of

this fact. At this point consciousness is conscious of itself in its object only

on the level of immediacy or initself. This immediate consciousness of itself

will have to be mediated through the continuing experience of the mind as

this is recounted in the ensuing chapter on selfconsciousness. Consciousness

is to become conscious of itself, or self-conscious, not merely in-itself but

for-itself. In so doing, the mind will learn to inhabit more properly its native

realm of truth.

Due to its pivotal role in the development of the Phenomenology, the

“Selfconsciousness” chapter has generated immense interest and voluminous

commentary. In order to pierce to the core set of issues and concerns

motivating and guiding Hegel’s analysis in the “Self-consciousness” chapter

it will be necessary first to widen the scope of the present inquiry. As noted,

a chief point of reference for Hegel in his analysis of self-consciousness is

the thought of Fichte. Thus, it will be necessary to proceed to a thorough

analysis of the salient aspects of Fichte’s system.

2. Fichte’s System

The goal of the Fichtean system is to provide an account of the explanatory

ground of experience, and from there to provide a scientific deduction of the

total system of experience.173 Thus, Fichte’s system is transcendental. For,

Fichte’s system is a science of knowledge and, as such, it is concerned to

provide a scientific account of what grounds empirical knowledge or

experience. Yet, according to Fichte, the explanatory ground of something is

necessarily distinct from that which it grounds. Thus, insofar as one seeks to

provide an account of the explanatory ground of empirical experience itself,

one must make recourse to that which transcends empirical experience.

Accordingly, Fichte’s system constitutes an instance of transcendental

philosophy.

2.1 The Argument of the Wissenschaftslehre: The Self-Positing I

The foundation of Fichte’s system is the absolute self-positing of the

self. In order to express the peculiar character of this act Fichte coins a

neologism: Tathandlung. Literally, the term might be translated into English

as “deed-act”. As such, the term is meant to emphasize the identity of

subject and object in this act of self-positing. In describing the self’s self-

positing Tathandlung, Fichte states

The self’s own positing of itself is thus its own pure activity.

The self posits itself, and by virtue this mere self-assertion it

exists; and conversely, the self exists and posits its own

existence by virtue of merely existing. It is at once the agent and

product of action; the active and what the activity brings about;

action and deed are one and the same. (WL 97)

Insofar as the self posits itself, the activity (i.e. the “subject”) and the

product of that activity (i.e. the “object”) are the same. Agent and product of

the act are one and the same. The self is a subject-object. The proposition

which expresses this identity is ‘I am I’ or ‘I = I’, in which subject and

predicate, or “object”, are identified.

Importantly, the identity of subject and object posited in and through

the self’s self-positing is an immediate one. As Fichte states, “the self is a

necessary identity of subject and object: a subject-object; and is so

absolutely, without further mediation” (WL 99). The identity of the self with

itself in its self-positing is absolute and immediate.

Important to note, as well, is that along with being absolutely self-

identical, the self-positing self is absolutely spontaneous and self-sufficient

in its activity. Its activity is unconditioned and strictly without relation to, or

dependence upon, anything external to itself. As Fichte states,

To posit oneself and to be are, as applied to the self, perfectly

identical. Thus the proposition, ‘I am, because I have posited myself’

can also be stated as: ‘I am absolutely, because I am.’ (WL 99)

The Fichtean self is because it is. It is self-sufficient. One can note the

inversion of the principle articulated at the beginning of the “Self-certainty”

section in which the object was because it was. For Fichte, the self or

consciousness is because it is. Thus, as will become clearer throughout the

ensuing analysis, in Hegelian terms, the Fichtean self is the “self-conscious”

self. At any rate, the beginning or foundation of Fichte’s system is the

absolute, self-sufficient self-positing self or I.

2.1.1 The Counter-positing of the Not-I

It must be recalled that the goal of Fichte’s science of knowledge is to

provide an explanatory account of the ground of experience and empirical

knowledge. As it stands, however, the absolutely self-positing self, merely

unto itself, cannot provide such an explanation. For, while the absolute self

is in principle perfectly self-identical, empirical experience, by contrast, is

marked distinction, opposition and non-identity. In empirical experience the

self finds itself opposed by an object, or range of objects, distinct from itself.

For Fichte, this experience of distinction and opposition is simply a “fact of

empirical consciousness,” which, as such, demands an explanation (WL

102).

In order to explain the fact of distinction and opposition given in

empirical experience, Fichte argues that, along with positing itself, the

absolute self also posits, or rather counter-posits, a not-self or not-I. Several

important aspects of Fichte’s account of the process whereby the absolute

self posits the not-self bear immediate examination.

First of all, empirical consciousness is not directly conscious of this

act of counter-positing on the part of the absolute self. This point is

consistent with Fichte’s methodological principle according to which that

which explains must necessarily lie outside of that which is explained. As

Fichte states,

It follows from the mere thought of a basis or reason that it must lie

outside of what it grounds or explains. The basis of an explanation

and what is explained thus become posited – as such – in opposition

to one another. (IW 9)

Yet, the counter-positing of the not-self by the absolute self is meant to

explain the fact of empirical consciousness and the experience of distinction

and opposition contained therein. Hence, such an act must fall outside

empirical consciousness. Indeed, the totality of acts of the absolute self

never actually emerges into empirical consciousness.

Second, insofar as the primordial activity of the absolute self never

emerges into empirical consciousness, empirical consciousness thus, as it

were, “forgets” the activity of the absolute self by which the not-self is

posited. Through his doctrine of the unconscious character of the positing of

the not-self by the absolute self, Fichte sets a radical precedent for Hegel’s

key methodological conceit according to which consciousness, as it

develops, repeatedly forgets the prior activity through which it has posits its

object and so, in the first instance, naively assumes the object to be distinct

from itself and to have its source in something other than itself. As Fichte

states,

We do not become aware of our own action, and are necessarily

bound to assume that we have received from without what we have in

fact ourselves produced by our own forces, and according to our own

laws (WL 255).

Empirical consciousness experiences the not-self, not as a production of the

self, but rather as an alien object (Gegenstand) or check (Anstoss) external to

and independent of itself. The not-I is experienced by empirical

consciousness as the whole expanse of the natural world which stands

opposed to itself.

Along with maintaining that empirical consciousness “forgets” the

positing of the not-self by the absolute self and so naively takes the object to

be “out there”, Fichte maintains that it is the task of philosophy to recollect

the activity of the absolute self in order thereby to generate a scientific

account of the ground of knowledge itself – which is to say, a science of

knowledge. Indeed, such a task of recollection is, for Fichte, the signal

calling of transcendental philosophy and, as such, Fichte denies that Kant’s

doctrine of the thing-in-itself is a residue of the very kind of forgetting and

naïveté that transcendental philosophy would deliver us from. What remains

to be determined at this point, however, is to what extent Fichte, especially

according to Hegel, succeeds in the task of radical recollection of the activity

of the absolute self.

At any rate, while the counter-positing of the not-self by the absolute

self would seem to provide an explanation for the fact of distinction and

opposition between subject and object experienced in empirical

consciousness, it nevertheless raises its own peculiar problem. In order to

clarify this problem it will first be necessary to examine Fichte’s account of

the absolute self.

2.1.3 The Opposition between the Absolute Self and the Empirical Self

As its name indicates, the absolute self is indeed absolute. Yet, Fichte

states:

Insofar as the self is absolute, it is infinite and unbounded. Everything

that exists it posits; and what it does not posit, does not exist (for it;

and apart from it there is nothing). But everything it posits is posited

as self; and the self posits it as everything that it posits. From this

point of view, therefore, the self includes everything, that is, an

infinite, unbounded reality (WL 225).

The absolute self is unbounded, infinite, self-identical, self-sufficient and

unconditioned by anything external to itself. It posits all that is. It is the

supreme source of everything which exists. Nothing exists external to or

apart from it.

To say that that the absolute self posits a not-self, however, presents

immediate problems for the unboundedness, infinity, unconditioned-ness

and, therefore, the absoluteness of the absolute self. For, as Fichte’s states,

“Insofar as the not-self is posited, the self is not posited; for the not-self

completely nullifies the self” (WL 106). The notself, by definition, limits the

self precisely to the extent that it, the not-self, is posited. How can it come to

pass that the absolute self should posit a not-self which would by definition

limit it, when the former is precisely infinite, unbounded and absolute?

Fichte’s answer to this problem will prove of enormous significance for

understanding Hegel’s discussion of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic.

Fichte’s key argument in this context is that the absolute self posits

within itself an empirical self. Fichte refers to the empirical self also as the

“divisible self”. According to Fichte, it is the divisible empirical self which

is limited by the not-self, not the absolute self. The empirical self and the

not-self are both divisible and mutually limiting. Thus, insofar as the

divisible not-self is posited, the divisible empirical self is not posited, and

vice-versa.

On this account, the absolute self seems to preserve its utter

independence, unrestrictedness, self-sufficiency and self-identity vis-à-vis

the not-self. For, while the empirical self is opposed and limited by the not-

self, “As opposed to the absolute self […], the not-self is absolutely nothing”

(WL 109). Moreover, rather than being opposed to the absolute self, the not-

self, along with the empirical self to which it is opposed, is posited within

the absolute self. As Fichte states, “In the self I oppose a divisible not-self to

the divisible self” (WL 110).

Inasmuch as he maintains that the not-self is not opposed to the

absolute self but is opposed only to the empirical self, Fichte would seem to

preserve the perfect selfidentity, unrestrictedness and independence of the

absolute self. Yet, the matter is much more complicated. For, inasmuch as

the absolute self posits within itself an empirical self which is opposed by

the not-self, the absolute self thus finds itself paradoxically identical with yet

opposed by the empirical self. As Fichte states,

The self is to be equated with, and yet opposed to, itself. But in regard

to consciousness it is equal to itself, for consciousness is one: but in

this consciousness the absolute self is posited as indivisible; whereas

the self to which the not-self is opposed is posited as divisible. Hence,

insofar as there is a not-self opposed to it, the self is itself in

opposition to the absolute self. (WL 109)

The absolute self is unrestricted, infinite, self-sufficient and opposed by

nothing. The empirical self, by contrast, is defined precisely as that which is

restricted, limited, finite and dependent in many ways upon the not-self. Yet,

the empirical self with its correlative and opposed not-self is posited within

the absolute self. Thus, within the absolute self there is something which by

definition is opposed to the absolute self. It is this contradiction between the

absolute self and the empirical self and the attempt to overcome it which in

effect sets in motion the rest of Fichte’s system and which also provides the

fulcrum point of Hegel’s eventual critique thereof.

2.1.4 The Empirical Self qua Intelligence and qua Practical Reason

Having distinguished between the absolute self and the empirical self,

Fichte further subdivides the empirical self into the empirical self qua

intelligence and the empirical self qua practical reason. The empirical self

qua intelligence resembles the larger form of consciousness described in the

“Consciousness” part of the Phenomenology. For, the intelligence is the

empirical self insofar as it passive with respect to the not-self or object. The

intelligence is caused by, and therefore dependent upon, the object. As

Fichte states, “The self, qua intelligence, stood in a causal relation to the

not-self, to which the postulated check [Anstoss] is to be ascribed; it was an

effect of the not-self, as its cause.” (WL 221) The absolute self thus posits a

not-self which is experienced by the empirical self qua intelligence as an

external force impinging upon it and upon which it is dependent for its very

existence.

Yet, we are here presented with a major contradiction afflicting the

self. For the absolute self is purely active and is unconditioned by and thus

independent of any external principle. Yet, the empirical self qua

intelligence is passive and caused by the not-self. There is thus a radical

opposition within the self, as such, one which threatens to undermine its

perfect self-identity and which therefore demands to be overcome,

reconciled or sublated. As Fichte states, “there lies a major antithesis, which

spans the entire conflict between the self as intelligence, and to that extent

restricted, and the self as an absolutely posited and thus unrestricted entity”

(WL 219).

Fichte’s solution to this antithesis within the self is to posit the absolute self

as the cause of the not-self:

Since the absolute self must be capable of no passivity whatever, and

be absolute activity and nothing other than activity, we have had to

assume that even this postulated not-self must be determined, and thus

passive; and that the activity of the not-self must be determined, and

thus passive; and that the activity opposed to this passivity has to be

posited in the opposite of the not-self, namely the self; and not indeed

in the intelligent self, since this is itself determined by the not-self,

but rather in the absolute self. But a relationship of the kind thus

assumed is the causal relation. The absolute self must therefore be

cause of the not-self, insofar as the latter is the ultimate ground of all

presentation; and the not-self must to that extent be its effect (WL

221).

In order to overcome the antithesis within the self that results from the fact

that, while the empirical self qua intelligence is limited, passive and

dependent, the absolute self is unrestricted, purely active and independent,

Fichte states that we must posit the absolute self as ultimately causing the

not-self.

Yet, this solution turns out to be not quite so simple, for another

contradiction emerges. On the one hand, Fichte notes,

The self is to exert causality on the not-self, and first bring forth the

latter for possible presentation by itself, because nothing is

attributable to the self which it does not posit in itself, either

mediately or immediately, and because it has to absolutely everything

that it is by means of itself. – Hence the demand for causality is based

on the absolute essentiality of the self (WL 225).

Yet, on the other hand, Fichte states,

The self can exert no causality on the not-self, because the not-self

would then cease to be a not-self (to stand opposed to the self) and

would itself become the self. But it is the self that has opposed the

not-self to itself; and this opposition cannot therefore be eliminated

unless by eliminating something that the self has posited, and thus by

the self’s ceasing to be a self, which contradicts the identity of the

self. – Hence the contradiction confronting the required causality is

based on the fact that a not-self is, and must remain, absolutely

opposed to the self (WL 225)

Let us clarify the contradiction. If the absolute self were directly to cause the

not-self, then either the not-self would simply be absorbed into the absolutes

self’s own act of self-positing/self-causing and as such cease to be a not-self,

at all, or, insofar as the notself was in fact posited absolutely, it would

destroy the absolute self since by its nature the not-self excludes or annuls

the self. Thus, in order to preserve the reality of the notself without thereby

destroying the absolute self, Fichte must show the absolute self to be, not the

direct cause of the not-self since that would nullify the reality of the not-self,

but rather its mediate or indirect cause.

The means by which the absolute self mediately causes the not-self is

by positing or causing a practical faculty within the empirical self which will

itself directly cause the not-self. Thus, whereas the empirical self qua

intelligence was caused by and dependent upon the not-self, the empirical

self qua practical reason will causally determine the not-self. Fichte thus

distinguishes two types of activity within the self: 1) the pure activity of the

absolute self and 2) the objective activity of the practical faculty of the

empirical self. Fichte designates the second type activity as “objective”

because it posits an object and is itself objectively determinate with respect

to this object. Thus, the absolute self posits or causes the empirical self, and

the empirical self in its practical capacity causes the not-self.

We thereby seem to have found a solution to the previous dilemma

threatening to undermine the reality of either the absolute self or the not-self.

As Fichte states,

The self which, regarded in general as an intelligence, is dependent on

the notself, and is an intelligence simply to the extent that a not-self

exists, is nonetheless to depend merely on the self; and to find this

possible, we again had to assume a causality of the self in determining

the not-self, insofar as the latter is to the object of the intelligence self.

At first sight, and taking the word in its full extension, such a

causality annulled itself; once it was presupposed, either the self was

not posited, or the not-self was not, and hence no causal relationship

could occur between them. We attempted to mediate this conflict by

distinguishing two opposed activities of the self, the pure and the

objective; and by supposing that perhaps the first might be

immediately related to the second, as cause to effect; while the second

might be immediately related to the object, as cause to effect. And

hence we supposed that the pure activity of the self might at least

stand mediately (through the intermediacy of the objective activity) in

a causal relation with the object (WL 231).

The absolute self posits or causes the objective activity of the empirical self

which in turn causes the not-self, thereby allowing the absolute self

mediately to cause the not-self without thereby destroying itself or the not-

self.

Having identified the objective activity of the empirical self qua

practical reason, we have pushed more explicitly into the realm of Fichte’s

ethical philosophy. We must briefly examine the salient aspects of Fichte’s

ethical philosophy, as it figures prominently in Hegel’s eventual critique of

the larger Fichtean system.

2.2 Fichte’s Ethical System: A Realm of Domination and Servitude

Let us begin by recalling the precise state of the discussion at this

point. For that we can turn to the following helpful passage from Fichte:

The absolute self is identical with itself: everything therein is one and

the same self, and belongs […] to one and the same self; nothing

therein is distinguishable, nothing manifold; the self is everything and

nothing, it is nothing for itself, and can distinguish not positing or

posited within itself. – In virtue of its nature it strives […] to maintain

itself in this condition. – There emerges in it a disparity, and hence

something alien to itself. […] That this happens, can in no sense be

proved a priori, but everyone can confirm it in his own experience

(WL 233).

The foundation of Fichte’s system is the self-positing absolute self. The

absolute self is absolutely self-identical in its self-positing. If there is a

distinction between the absolute self qua positing and the self qua posited, it

is distinction which is immediately annulled or sublated. It is a distinction

which is yet not a distinction. For subject and object are perfectly identical: I

= I.

Fichte adds that the absolute self naturally strives to preserve itself in

its selfidentity. In the first instance, this striving is thus not what is ordinarily

thought of as striving. Fichte states that it can be considered striving only in

a qualified or “figurative” sense. For, typically, striving involves an object

for which one strives. Yet, in the first instance, there is nothing for which the

absolute self might strive since no object has been posited for it. Instead, the

absolute self strives simply to maintain itself in its absolute and perfect self-

identity.

Yet, according to Fichte, as a matter of a posteriori empirical

experience, disparity and distinction emerge within the self. It is in

acknowledging and attempting to reconcile this alien principle with the

absolute self-identical character of the absolute self that the complexity of

Fichte’s system truly enters in.

For, Fichte explains that the experience of the alien object in empirical

consciousness is the result of the positing of the not-self by the absolute self.

For the absolute self, therefore, the not-self is nothing. The not-self is only

an object for the empirical self. Yet, the fact that the empirical self and the

not-self are posited within the absolute self poses its own problem.

For, the absolute self finds itself both identical to and yet opposed by

the empirical self with its correlative object. Indeed, the absolute self is

opposed to the empirical self precisely to the degree that the latter is itself

opposed and limited by the not-self. For, were it not opposed and limited by

the not-self, the empirical self would simply be the absolute self.

By the same token, however, the absolute self does not merely posit

but spontaneously strives to maintain its absolute identity with itself. Yet,

the very opposition within itself of the empirical self threatens to undermine

this perfect self-identity. Thus, in order to preserve or otherwise restore is

perfect self-identity the absolute self must make use of the empirical self as

an instrument for causally determining the not-self. Insofar as the empirical

self causally determines the not-self it subordinates the not-self to its own

immanent laws and thus transforms the not-self into the self. Transforming

the not-self into the self would thus negate the limitation or negation of the

empirical self by the not-self which would in turn eliminate the opposition

between the empirical self and the absolute self. The empirical self would in

fact become the absolute self, and the absolute self would thus succeed in

preserving its perfect self-identity.

The primary means by which the empirical self causally determines

the not-self is through the activity of its practical reason. In the practical

reason of the empirical self the abstract striving-in-general of the absolute

self to preserve its perfect self-identity becomes determinate and objective.

The activity of practical reason is objective in the dual and correlative sense

that the activity is itself an objective operation of empirical consciousness

and it also determines on object which hitherto stood opposed to it. In order

to clarify this point further, let us specify the relation between striving

[Streben] and drive [Trieb] in Fichte as well as the distinct types of drives

constitutive of the empirical self.

Striving in general, or, you might say, striving überhaupt, is the

absolute self’s spontaneous striving to preserve its perfect self-identity.

Insofar as that striving becomes determinate within the experience of the

empirical self, it becomes a drive. As Fichte states, “striving that is fixed,

determinate and definite in character is known as a drive” (WL 253). The

drive of practical reason is, generally speaking, to causally determine the

not-self and thereby to preserve the perfect self-identity of the absolute self.

This picture, however, gets more complicated when it is noted that the pure

drive of practical reason is not the sole drive of the empirical self.

2.2.1 Pure Drive versus Natural Drives

For Fichte there is a division within the empirical self between the self

and its object, namely, the not-self or nature. Yet, the self is partly

determined by nature. The most important way in which the empirical self is

determined by nature is through what Fichte calls “the original and

determinate system of drives and feelings” (SE 113-4).

Regarding the way in which this system determines the empirical self, Fichte

states Consciousness of them obtrudes on us and, at the same time, the

substance in which this system of boundaries is found is supposed to be the

substance which freely thinks and wills, and which we posit as ourselves. So

the nature that obtrudes is our nature (SE 113-4).

The system of natural drives, feelings and inclinations which partially

determines the empirical self thus obtrudes as something alien on the truer

nature of the self. For, these drives are determined mechanically by laws that

the empirical self does not itself cause. As such, a task emerges for the self,

specifically for its practical faculty, to causally determine the natural drives

which otherwise obtrude upon the freedom of the self to act according to

laws and determinations it gives to itself.

Fichte thus distinguishes two fundamentally different drives: 1) the

system of lower, natural drives of the self which is directed towards more or

less biological enjoyment and 2) the higher drive of the practical faculty

which is directed towards freedom for freedom’s sake. The higher drive for

freedom is capable of reflecting on the on the lower, natural drive and,

through raising it to consciousness, subordinating it to the ends of the higher

drive. As Hegel states regarding this aspect of Fichte’s system,

That which reflects is higher than what is reflected: the drive of him

who does the reflecting, that is, of the subject of consciousness, is

called the higher drive. The lower drive, that is, nature must be placed

in subservience to the higher, that is, to reflection. This relation of

subservience which one appearance of the self has to the other is to be

the highest synthesis (DZ, 138).

At the core of Fichte’s ethical system, one part of the empirical self, the

natural drives, goes into subservience to another part, the practical faculty.

This domination of the “merely natural” within the empirical self by the pure

practical drive of the empirical self is, moreover, a mediated expression of

the domination of the empirical self in general by the absolute self. For, the

empirical self qua pure practical drive functions as a mere instrument and,

therefore, servant of the absolute self’s more basic striving to preserve its

pure self-identity.

Indeed, the empirical self qua “merely natural” is, as we have seen,

equated with the not-I since the not-I has been identified with nature.

Therefore, for Fichte, the quest for domination over the empirical self qua

“merely natural” extends to the whole expanse of the natural world, which is

to say, the world which the empirical self naively assumes to be independent

of the absolute self. Thus, Fichte states,

Man’s ultimate and supreme goal is complete harmony with himself

and – so that he can be in harmony with himself – the harmony of all

external things with his own necessary, practical concepts of them

(Philosophy of German Idealism 8).

And, again,

Man’s final end is to subordinate to himself all that is irrational, to

master it freely and according to his own laws (Philosophy of German

Idealism 9).

The empirical self is to become master or lord over its lower nature and, by

extension, the entirety of all irrational nature, in order that the absolute self

might preserve or otherwise restore its threatened pure self-identity or

harmony.

Such a relation of domination and servitude within the self, moreover,

is supposed to be the highest synthesis in the self and would lead it back to

the pure identity or perfect harmony of the absolute self. The relation of

domination and servitude within the different parts of the self thus

constitutes the highest moral ideal for Fichte. As he states,

Man is supposed to determine himself and not permit himself to be

determined by something foreign. He is supposed to be what he is

because this is what he wants and is supposed to want to be. The

empirical I is supposed to be determined in a manner in which it could

be eternally determined. Therefore, I would express the principle of

morality in the formula […]: ‘Act so that you could consider the

maxim of your willing as eternal laws for yourself.’ The ultimate

characteristic feature of all rational beings is, accordingly, absolute

unity, constant self-identity, complete agreement with oneself. This

absolute identity is the form of the pure I and is its only true form, or

rather, in the conceivability of identity we recognize the expression of

the purer form of the I (Philosophy of German Idealism 6-7).

The highest synthesis in the self and Fichte’s highest moral ideal thus turns

out to be a scenario in which the empirical self submits to the domination of

the form of the absolute ‘I’ and, in so doing, sets itself about the task

subordinating nature to that form.

Important to note in this context is that, according to Fichte, “mere will

is not sufficient for removing [the influence of the not-I on the empirical

self] and restoring the original pure shape of our I; we require, in addition,

that skill which we acquire and sharpen through practice” (Philosophy of

German Idealism 7). The fact that labor and practice is necessary for the

empirical self to be able to develop the skill to carry out the task to which it

is set by the absolute self will prove quite relevant vis-à-vis the necessity of

work in the experience of the Bondsman in Hegel’s Lord/Bondsman

dialectic.

2.3 The Failure of Fichte’s System to Demonstrate the Identity of the

Empirical Self and the Absolute Self

While, in principle, the complete causal determination of the not-self,

including the empirical self itself qua part of nature, by the empirical self

qua practical reason would preserve or restore the perfect identity of the

absolute self by, in effect, sublating the empirical self into the absolute self,

as a matter of fact no such sublation occurs within Fichte’s system. Instead,

what occurs is an infinite and indefinitely prolonged striving on the part of

the empirical self qua practical reason.

Fichte’s argument here is complex, but the main outline admits of a

ready sketch. Fichte draws a distinction between the empirical self’s finite

objective activity versus its infinite objective activity. The activity of the

empirical self qua practical reason is objective in the dual sense that it is

both a determinate operation of empirical consciousness and also directed

towards a determinate object. Fichte specifies further that such objective

activity can be either finite or infinite.

The infinite and the finite activity of the empirical self, however,

cannot both be objective in the same sense. According to Fichte, the

distinction lies in the fact that, “the finite objective activity of the self relates

to a real object, while its infinite striving is directed upon a merely

imaginary object” (WL 236). While perhaps initially appearing odd, what

Fichte means here is rather straightforward. Qua finite, practical reason

consists in a drive that engages with and attempts to causally determine

particular, finite “real” objects, whether these be material objects, bodily

movements, or “lower” natural drives. Qua infinite, practical reason, as it

were, looks past any finite object towards an ideal horizon in which the

object would be a pure product of the self.

Importantly, however, even the infinite objective activity of the

empirical self is not purely infinite; rather, it is characterized by a

juxtaposition of finitude and infinitude, a juxtaposition which in the end

amounts to a contradiction which is never reconciled or sublated. With

respect to the simultaneous finitude and the infinitude which characterizes

the infinite objective striving of the empirical self, Fichte states,

But how far is the striving nonetheless finite? To the extent that it

refers in general to an object, and must posit limits to this object, as

surely as the latter is to be such. In the real object, it was not the act of

determining in general, but the limits of the determination, that

depended on the not-self: but in the ideal object, both the act of

determining, and the limits, depend solely on the self; the latter is

subject to no condition, save that it must posit limits in general, which

it can extend out to infinity, because this extension depends solely on

itself. The ideal is an absolute product of the self; it can be elevated

out to infinity; but at each determinate moment it has its limits, which

at the next determinate moment must be utterly different (WL 237).

According to Fichte, any object is intrinsically limited and finite. In the case

of the finite objective activity, the object of this activity is a “real” object

and as such prescribes an initial set of limits – for example, the quantity of

matter or the spatio-temporal limits of the bodily movement – to the action.

The empirical self in this case does not prescribe the limit of the object per

se, but rather seeks to actively determine the object by subordinating it to the

immanent laws of practical reason – for example, by subordinating bodily

movements or lower drives to some intelligent or moral action. In the case of

infinite objective activity, by contrast, practical reason is not limited by any

pre-given object but instead posits the limits and determines the object

entirely through itself.

The contradiction arises due to the fact that, even though in the mode

of infinite objective activity practical reason is not limited by a pre-given

object, still the object which it posits must itself be limited and therefore

finite. “Hence,” Fichte states, “the juxtaposition of infinite and objective is

itself a contradiction” (WL 237). In other words, infinity is not a

characteristic of any object for Fichte. Infinity is rather external to the

object. It lies not in the actual object but in the possibility of practical reason

to posit and determine some further object beyond the finite one that it had

just posited and determined.

Infinity is never actualized, for Fichte; it is never actually objectified.

Instead, it forever remains an indefinitely deferred possibility or ideal. Still,

according to Fichte

The idea of an infinity to be thus completed floats as a vision before

us, and is rooted in our innermost nature. We are obliged, as it enjoins

us, to resolve the contradiction; though we cannot even think it

possible of solution, and foresee that in no moment of an existence

prolong to all eternity will we ever be able to consider it possible. But

this is just the mark in us that we are destined for eternity (WL 238).

Recall that the absolute self is immediately infinite. It is infinite in its

immediate selfrelation in which it is opposed by nothing. Yet, the absolute

self nevertheless finds itself opposed by the empirical self. To that extent the

absolute is not infinite. Still, the wouldbe-infinite absolute self naturally

strives to maintain itself in its perfect and infinite selfidentity. In order to

preserve or restore its effectively negated infinity it confers upon or imbues

the empirical self with a striving to completely dominate and thereby negate

the alterity of the object which opposes it. This striving can take a finite

form, as mentioned above. It can also take an infinite form which, qua

infinite, would thus seem to be rooted in “our innermost nature”, namely, the

self-identity of the self-positing absolute self.

Yet, this very objective, infinite striving is beset by finitude since

objectivity intrinsically entails finitude, for Fichte. Hence, the empirical self

is obliged to resolve a contradiction for which the solution, according to

Fichte, is not even thinkable, namely, the positing and determining of an

object which is infinite. The result of being thus obliged is that the empirical

self, like Sisyphus, is condemned to undertake an infinitely renewed yet

intrinsically futile task.

2.4 Brief Summary of Section 2

We have thus laid out the aspects of Fichte’s overall system which will

figure most prominently in Hegel’s explanation and critique of that system.

The goal of Fichte’s system is to provide a scientific account of the ground

of all experience and knowledge. His first move is to postulate an absolutely

self-positing, self-identical self. Yet, in order to explain the fact of

distinction and opposition within empirical consciousness, Fichte postulates

that the absolute self also counter-posits a not-self which is opposed to the

empirical self. Insofar as the empirical self is opposed and thus limited by

the not-self, however, the absolute self finds itself in opposition to the

empirical self, a state which threatens the absolute self’s claim to

absoluteness. In order to overcome this threatened contradiction, Fichte

postulates that the empirical self, particularly in its capacity as practical

reason, causally determines the not-self. The completion of this causal

determination of the not-self by the empirical self, however, is infinitely

deferred. Let us turn now to examining the important details of Hegel’s

initial response to these aspects of Fichte’s system in the DZ.

3. Hegel’s Initial Response to Fichte in the DZ

Hegel’s critical response to Fichte in the DZ is complex. Still, it is

possible to isolate the most crucial aspects of that response which will prove

relevant to understanding Hegel’s later and dialectically more sophisticated

response in the “Selfconsciousness” chapter of the Phenomenology. The

most crucial of Hegel’s criticisms of Fichte in the DZ are: 1) the end of

Fichte’s system fails to correspond to and fulfill its beginning and 2)

Fichte’s system is permeated by a relation of domination and servitude

within the experience of self-consciousness.

3.1 The End of Fichte’s System Fails to Correspond to the Beginning

According to Hegel, in the DZ the task of philosophy is to sublate the

distinction between pure or transcendental self-consciousness and empirical

consciousness, or in Fichtean terms, the distinction between the absolute self

and the empirical self. The way in which the philosopher is to achieve this

goal is by deducing empirical consciousness from pure self-consciousness.

More specially, according to Hegel,

Philosophy must show that empirical consciousness in all its

manifoldness is identical with pure consciousness, and it must show

this by its deed, through the real evolution of the objective out of the

Ego [Ich]. Philosophy must describe the totality of empirical

consciousness as the objective totality of self-consciousness (DZ 121-

2).

It is important to note the ways in which Hegel’s position both agrees with

and subtly diverges from that of Fichte. For, Hegel evidently agrees with

Fichte that the major task of philosophy is to provide an account of the

explanatory ground of empirical experience and that this is done by showing

that empirical consciousness is grounded in absolute or pure self-

consciousness and that the former can be deduced from the latter.

Still, beyond this transcendental requirement, Hegel adds the further

speculative requirement that the completeness of the explanation of

empirical consciousness show that empirical consciousness is, or at least

becomes, identical to pure self-consciousness.

In ordinary consciousness the Ego [Ich] occurs in opposition.

Philosophy must explain this opposition to an object. To explain

means to show that it is conditioned by something else and hence that

it is appearance. Now, if empirical consciousness is shown to be

completely grounded in, and not just conditioned by, pure

consciousness, then their opposition is suspended [Aufgehoben] as

long as the explanation is otherwise completely shown – i.e., as long

as it is not merely a partial identity of pure and empirical

consciousness that has been shown. The identity is only a partial one

if there remains as aspect of the empirical consciousness in which it is

not determined by the pure consciousness, but is unconditioned. And

as only pure consciousness and empirical consciousness are presented

as the elements of the highest opposition, pure consciousness would

then be determined and conditioned by empirical consciousness so far

as this was unconditioned. The relation would in this way be a sort of

reciprocal relation, comprised of mutual determining and being

determined. It presupposes, however, an absolute opposition of the

reciprocally effective terms; and then it would be impossible to

suspend [Aufheben] their dichotomy in absolute identity (DZ 11920).

Philosophy must explain the opposition experienced in empirical

consciousness. It does so by showing that empirical consciousness is

grounded in pure self-consciousness. So far, Hegel is in agreement with

Fichte. Hegel adds, however, that insofar as empirical consciousness is

shown to be completely grounded in pure consciousness, insofar as it is

shown to evolve out of the latter and thereby constitute the latter’s objective

existence, the difference between them is sublated into an absolute unity.

Insofar as the explanation is only partial, however, and the empirical

self remains opposed and thus conditioned by an aspect which is not itself

determined by pure consciousness, then pure consciousness and empirical

consciousness find themselves opposed. Indeed, pure self-consciousness thus

finds itself not to be absolute at all since it is conditioned by the empirical

consciousness which is opposed to it. Instead, pure consciousness and

empirical consciousness fall into a relation of mere reciprocal determination

which presupposes an absolute dichotomy which is never resolved or

sublated into an absolute identity.

The application of the immediately forgoing discussion to the earlier

discussion of Fichte’s system should be readily apparent. What is more,

Fichte in some sense did recognize the speculative requirement to produce

an absolute identity between the empirical self and the pure or absolute self.

The problem for Hegel at this point is that Fichte simply fails to produce the

requisite identity between empirical consciousness and pure self-

consciousness. In Fichte, the infinite objective activity of practical reason is

supposed to be the “supreme synthesis” (DZ 134). Yet, as Hegel notes, the

“infinite progression” of the objective activity of practical reason in Fichte

intrinsically entails an “absolute opposition” (DZ 134). For, according to

Hegel, true, speculative infinity is, in Fichte, “shoved in to the form” of

mere finitude, which is to say, time, and “time […] immediately involves

opposition, extraneousness. What exists in time is something that is opposed

to itself, a manifold” (DZ, 134). Indeed, as we have already witnessed,

Fichte concedes to the intrinsic incompleteness and opposition which

characterizes the infinite, temporal striving of the empirical self’s objective

activity. Thus, he states, “The ideal is an absolute product of the self; it can

be elevated out to infinity; but at each determinate moment it has its limits,

which at the next determinate moment must be utterly different” [Emphases

mine] (WL 237).

We arrive at a clarification of Hegel’s first major criticism of Fichte in

the DZ. For, Hegel’s criticism is that the end of Fichte’s system fails to

correspond to or fulfill the beginning and, as such, fails to produce the

speculative identity of pure selfconsciousness and empirical consciousness.

Fichte’s system begins with the absolutely self-positing, self-identical

absolute self. The absolute self is the immediate identity of subject and

object. Yet, in order to explain the experience of opposition within empirical

consciousness, Fichte also postulates that the absolute self posits within

itself an empirical self opposed by the not-self or object. Thus, the absolute,

unopposed, selfidentical, self-positing self with which Fichte’s system

begins finds itself opposed by an alien principle, namely, the empirical self

with its own correlatively opposed object. As a result, Fichte is unable to

show how the absolute self overcomes or otherwise sublates this opposition

which it has posited for itself and so, in contrast to its beginning, the end of

Fichte’s system is marked by an absolute opposition.

It helps to make sense of Hegel’s critique if we examine more closely

some of the particular terms he employs in articulating it. Thus, in the DZ

Hegel identifies pure selfconsciousness as the “subjective Ego [Ich]”, while

the empirical self constitutes the “objective Ego [Ich]” with its correlative

opposed object (DZ 124). As Hegel states, “The subjective Ego is Ego, the

objective is Ego + non-Ego (DZ,124). Pure self-consciousness is the

subjective Ego inasmuch as it is opposed to and “conditioned by abstraction

from empirical consciousness” (DZ 123). Indeed, as Hegel states, “the act of

selfconsciousness differs decisively from all other consciousness in that its

object is the same as the subject. Ego = Ego is in this regard opposed to an

infinite objective world” (DZ 121).

Since pure self-consciousness is an immediate identity of subject and

object, it might be referred to as the “subjective subject-object”, whereas

empirical consciousness qua objective Ego would constitute the “objective

subject-object”. For Hegel, the task of philosophy is to demonstrate how the

objective subject-object becomes identical to the subjective subject-object.

The way in which this presumably could be accomplished would be for the

subject of the objective subject-object to completely determine its object and

thereby sublate the distinction between empirical consciousness (i.e. the

objective subject) and its object (i.e. the objective object). For, in so doing,

the objective subject-object would overcome the opposition which

characterizes it and thereby constitute itself as a sublated identity of subject

and object. As such, it would itself attain to an identity with the subjective

subject-object which latter just is a sublated identity of subject and object. In

Fichte’s system a residual absolute opposition remains between the subject

and object of the objective subject-object which in turn entails an unsublated

opposition between the subjective subject-object and the objective

subjectobject. Thus, to repeat, the end of Fichte’s system fails to correspond

to or fulfill its beginning.

Before moving on, one small but important point of interest that

should be noted regarding the immediately preceding discussion is that

Hegel characterizes the “objective world”, which is opposed to the

subjective subject-object and which includes both the objective subject and

its object, as infinite. Hegel is speaking of Fichte, here, and so it should be

immediately recalled that a prime reason for the failure of Fichte’s system to

sublate the opposition between the objective subject and its object is that the

objective subject fails to posit an infinite object. Yet, here, Hegel is saying

that the objective realm in in fact infinite.

This point will become more relevant once we turn to examining

Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness. Yet, what might be noted is that

Hegel is pointing out that there are two infinities already operative in Fichte,

but that neither constitutes a properly speculative infinity. First of all, the

subjective subject-object of pure selfconsciousness or the absolute self is

infinite inasmuch as it is purely self-sufficient, selfrelating act of self-

positing. For Hegel, however, it will turn out that this infinity is a merely

abstract infinity, an infinity which does not preserve itself in, but rather

abstracts from, all differences. Second, the objective subject-object is also

infinite. Yet, unlike the abstract infinity of the subjective subject-object

which abstracts from all differences, the infinity of the objective subject-

object is an infinity which is beset by an absolute difference or opposition

which it cannot sublate. Again, the full significance of this point will

become clear only later in the present discussion, but it is worth noting even

at present.

3.2 Fichte’s System is Beset by Relations of Domination and Servitude in

Consciousness

Hegel’s second point of criticism of Fichte’s system concerns the

relations that wind up obtaining between the un-sublated opposed principles

in Fichte’s system. Hegel is especially concerned with the fact that in Fichte

the relation between the absolute self and empirical self as well as between

the empirical self and its object is ultimately a relation of causality.

For, the absolute self strives to causally determine the not-self by

using the empirical self as an instrument, while the empirical self qua

determinate objective drive seeks to directly causally determine the object.

Yet, according to Hegel, the causal relation is intrinsically one of inequality

and non-identity. Moreover, it entails a relation of domination and servitude

between the terms of the relation. Thus, in the DZ regarding the causal

relation, Hegel states,

The causal relation […] is a false identity; for absolute opposition is at

the basis of this relation. In the causal relation both opposites having

standing, but they are distinct in rank. The union is forcible. The one

subjugates the other. The one rules, the other is subservient. The unity

is forced, and forced into a mere relative identity (DZ 115).

In Fichte, the relation between the opposed elements is one of causality.

Hegel identifies such a relation as a false identity in which the terms enter

into a relation of domination and servitude. The absolute self dominates the

empirical self which in turn dominates the object. Stated inversely, the

empirical self enters into a state of bondage to the absolute self and becomes

a mere instrument which the latter uses for the domination of the object.

The situation is even more complex if we recall that the object of the

empirical self includes itself qua natural. According to Hegel, the harshness

of this relation of domination and servitude within the self becomes even

more pronounced in works such as Fichte’s FNR and SE. Speaking of the

former work, Hegel states, “As a result of the absolute antithesis between

pure drive and natural drive Natural Right offers us a picture of the complete

lordship of the intellect and the complete bondage of the living being” (DZ

148). Thus, according to Hegel, the ultimate expression of freedom for

Fichte is a mode, not of unrestricted self-positing, but of self-bondage in

which one part of the self goes into subservience to the other. Through the

relation of domination and servitude within the self, “the inner harmony is

destroyed” (DZ 150).

3.3 Brief Summary of Section Three

These are the two major points of criticism which Hegel addresses to

Fichte in the DZ. First, the end of Fichte’s system fails to preserve or sublate

the initial self-identity of the absolute or transcendental ego (i.e. the

subjective subject-object) in its relation to the empirical ego (i.e. the

objective subject-object). Instead, the Fichtean system culminates in an

infinitely recurring absolute opposition between the empirical ego and its

object and, therefore, also between the empirical ego and the absolute ego.

Second, while Fichte is aware of the speculative task of achieving a sublated

identity between the terms that remain opposed in his system, the best he can

offer is a relationship of causality between these terms. For Hegel, the causal

relationship is invariably one of domination and servitude. Thus, rather than

overcoming the opposition between the empirical ego and the absolute ego,

the causal relation succeeds merely in solidifying it further.

The time has come to transition into an examination of the “Self-

consciousness” part of the Phenomenology. In order to aid in this transition,

however, it will be helpful to give a point of reference to help focus the

results of the preceding discussion of Fichte as well as Hegel’s initial

response to Fichte in the DZ. This effort can be achieving by briefly

returning to Hegel’s larger theory of development, especially as it is

illuminated by the biological analogy, and applying it to what has been

covered in Fichte’s theory of self-consciousness, thus far.

4. “Self-consciousness” in the Phenomenology

It is highly significant that the subtitle for the “Self-consciousness”

chapter is “The Truth of Self-certainty” [Die Wahrheit der Gewissheit seiner

Selbst]. For, as we saw, in the course of the “Consciousness” chapter the

certainty with which consciousness began vis-à-vis its object eventually had

to give way to the truth of that object since the object was not what

consciousness initially took it be. Consciousness was certain that its object

was something distinct and independent of itself, but upon the experience of

“thinking-through” the object, consciousness is disabused of this certainty

and forced to confront the truth that what it initially took to be its object is

radically dependent upon a universal relational context which is itself

constituted in and by consciousness. Thus, as Hegel states, “the in-itself

turns out to be a mode in which the object only is for an other” – which is to

say, the object exists only as for and thus in consciousness (PhG. 166, p.

104). By contrast, in self-consciousness, “certainty is to itself its own object,

and consciousness is to itself the truth” (PhG. 166, p. 104). In self-

consciousness, consciousness draws a distinction between itself and its

object which is at the same time not a distinction, for its object is precisely

itself.

Two important points bear immediate mentioning in regards to the

point that, in self-consciousness, consciousness becomes its own object.

First, insofar as consciousness thus posits a distinction which is not a

distinction, this entails that the distinction is to be sublated. What is different

about self-consciousness, however, is that, while the distinction between

consciousness and its object was in fact sublated in the experience of mere

consciousness, that sublation occurred only for us, the phenomenological

observers. By contrast, the sublation of the distinction between self-

consciousness and its object will be something that occurs, not just for us,

but for consciousness, which is to say, selfconsciousness. Thus, part of what

occurs in the course of the experience of selfconsciousness is that the mind

learns to observe or otherwise know itself in a manner that is more than

analogous to the way in which we, the phenomenologists, observe the whole

range of phenomenal consciousness.

Second, as Hegel famously states, “With self-consciousness, then, we

have therefore entered the native realm of truth” (PhG. 167, p. 104). Truth

for Hegel is the adequacy and correspondence of the object to the subject, of

existence to Concept. In order to attain truth, the task of the mind is to posit

an objective existence for itself which is adequate to itself. A non-conscious

object such as a mere Thing could never satisfy the criterion of truth. Truth

demands that consciousness have consciousness for its own object, that

certainty become certain of certainty. Insofar as consciousness becomes

conscious of consciousness it becomes self-consciousness. Yet, this implies

that in order for its object to be adequate to itself, self-consciousness’s

object must be selfconsciousness, too. Only such a duplication of self-

consciousness within itself could produce the adequacy of object to subject

by which truth can be attained and the distinction between the mind and its

object be sublated.

The process of sublation by which truth thus emerges in the course of

the “Selfconsciousness” chapter is complex and demands a close reading of

the text. Fortunately begins, with a helpful outline of the basic structure of

the experience of selfconsciousness at the beginning of its development. Let

us begin by examining this brief prospectus.

4.1 First Stages in the Development of Self-consciousness

The first task is to examine the state of self-consciousness as it first

comes on the scene. Thus, Hegel states If we consider this new shape

of knowing, the knowing of itself, in relation to that which preceded,

viz. the knowing of an other, then we see that though this other had

indeed vanished, its moments have at the same time no less been

preserved, and the loss consists in this, that here they are present as

they are in themselves. The [mere] being of what is merely ‘meant’,

the singleness and universality opposed to it of perception, as also the

empty inner being of the Understanding, these are no longer essence,

but are mere moments of self-consciousness. (PhG 104-5)

According to Hegel, while the various objects of Sense-certainty, Perception

and Force and Understanding have been thought-through and thus

“vanished” at least in their pretension to independence and self-sufficiency,

they are at the same time preserved as moments of self-consciousness itself.

Here we encounter a crucial complexity that derives primarily from the fact

that we are as yet only dealing with self-consciousness as it first comes on

the scene.

For, regarding the apparent vanishing of the independence of the

object of mere consciousness, Hegel immediately clarifies that,

Thus it seems that only the principal moment itself has been lost, viz.

the selfsubsistent existence for consciousness. But in point of fact self-

consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense

and perception, and is essentially a return from otherness. (PhG 105)

The nuance of the point here is subtle and needs to be tracked very closely.

For, the various objects of mere consciousness have been revealed to be

moments of selfconsciousness. To that extent, then, they have been

preserved. It would thus seem that only the principal moment of these

moments has been lost, namely, their collective pretension to self-

subsistence or self-sufficiency. But – and this is the crucial point – in point

of fact, this is not entirely the case. For, while in one sense, self-

consciousness constitutes the sublation and preservation of these distinct

moments (save, of course, for their principal moment – i.e. independence

and self-sufficiency – which has vanished), in another sense, self-

consciousness is the reflection out of the world of sense and perception

entirely. Thus, within self-consciousness Hegel distinguishes between, on

the one hand, self-consciousness for which the being of Sense-certainty, the

Thing of Perception and so on have been preserved, albeit as mere moments,

and, on the other hand, self-consciousness which has reflected entirely out of

the world of sensuousness into a pure self-relation.

Grasping the nature of this distinction between two self-

consciousnesses within self-consciousness is utterly essential for

understanding the entirety of Hegel’s subsequent analysis in the “Self-

consciousness” chapter. Let us track Hegel’s initial account of the distinction

between the two.

4.1.1 The Two Self-consciousnesses within Self-consciousness

Hegel first describes the self-consciousness which is a withdrawal or return

out of otherness:

As self-consciousness, it is movement; but since what it distinguishes

from itself is only itself as itself, the difference as an otherness, is

immediately superseded for it; the difference is not and it [self-

consciousness] is only the motionless tautology of: ‘I am I.’ (PhG

105)

This self-consciousness which reflects or abstracts out of otherness clearly

corresponds to the absolute self of Fichte’s system. For, as self-

consciousness, it is movement; in other words, it does posit a difference

within itself. Still, this difference is immediately sublated. Similarly, in

Fichte’s system the absolute self qua positing is distinct from the absolute

self qua posited; yet, this difference is immediately sublated. The difference

is not, for ‘I am I’. Therefore, there is “movement” in this immediate self-

consciousness inasmuch as a difference is posited and then sublated. But

there is no mediation. It is therefore motionless, for neither side undergoes

development.

The abstract and immediate self-consciousness which reflects out of the

being of the world of sense and perception eo ipso does not preserve as

moments of itself the otherness experienced in mere consciousness. It posits

and preserves a form of difference – namely, the difference between ‘I’ and

‘I’ – but “for it the difference does not have the form of being”. Instead, it is

immediately sublated.

The point, here, is that the difference between the absolute I qua

positing and the absolute I qua posited is a difference that lacks the being of

the world of sense and perception. It is a difference which is not. The result,

according to Hegel, is that for selfconsciousness which is reflected out of the

sensuous world and into itself “otherness is for it in the form of a being, or

as a distinct moment” (PhG 105). In other words, selfconsciousness in-itself

preserves as a moment of itself the otherness of the being of the sensuous

world of “Consciousness”. Yet, for abstract self-consciousness that reflects

itself out of the being of the world of sense and perception, the otherness of

this world returns as it was in the experience in mere consciousness, namely,

as a being – be it a ‘This’ or a ‘Thing ‘ – which is entirely distinct from and

independent of selfconsciousness.

Yet, since what we are examining is not mere consciousness, but

rather selfconsciousness, “there is also for consciousness the unity of itself

with this difference as a second distinct moment” (PhG 105).Thus, there are

two distinct moments constituting the experience of self-consciousness as it

first comes on the scene. Regarding the first moment, as Hegel states, “self-

consciousness is in the form of consciousness, and the whole expanse of the

sensuous world is preserved for it” (PhG 105). Thus, in one of its moments

self-consciousness has preserved the being of the world of sense and

perception. Yet, according to Hegel, this first moment is preserved “only as

connected with the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with

itself” (PhG 105). Thus, there is a difference and connection between, on the

one hand, the self-consciousness that preserves the being of the world of

sense and perception and, on the other hand, the selfconsciousness which

reflects out of that world in order to maintain its exclusive identity with

itself. They are different inasmuch as the self-consciousness which preserves

the being of the sensuous world as a determination of itself is thus distinct

from the selfconsciousness which reflects entirely out of the sensuous world.

Yet, they are connected inasmuch the two self-consciousnesses – albeit as

yet merely in-themselves and not forthemselves – constitute the unity of

self-consciousness with itself.

Now, since the first moment of self-consciousness exists only in

connection with the second moment, Hegel states that for self-consciousness

“the sensuous world is an enduring existence which, however, is only

appearance, or a difference which, in itself, is no difference” (PhG 105).

The enduring existence or independence of the sensuous world is a mere

appearance or difference which in itself is no difference. Still, the quality of

the sensuous world as a mere appearance is not yet for self-consciousness –

specifically, for self-consciousness which reflects itself out of the sensuous

world. Thus, “the antithesis of its appearance and its truth has, however, for

its essence only the truth, viz. the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this

unity must become essential to self-consciousness” [Emphasis mine] (PhG

105). The truth of the distinction between the sensuous world (i.e.

appearance) and self-consciousness has as its essence or basis the truth,

namely, the unity of self-consciousness. Yet, its essence is only this truth.

However, it is not yet for self-consciousness, and therefore not certain, that

the distinction between itself and the appearance of the sensuous world has

its essence in itself.

4.2 Self-consciousness as Desire

Immediately following this observation Hegel famously states,

“selfconsciousness is Desire [Begierde] überhaupt” (PhG 105). Much ink

has been spilt trying to sort out what Hegel means by the statement that self-

consciousness is “desire überhaupt” which might be translated as “desire in

general” or “desire as such”. If we keep in mind the vital connection

between this part of the Phenomenology and Fichte’s system as well as

exploit some clarifications provided by the PM “Phenomenology” section,

however, Hegel’s basic point can be explicated without undue difficulty.

Desire for Hegel is, in the first instance, simply the felt tension of the

inner contradiction between one’s concept and one’s existence, and the

concomitant urge to sublate this contradiction. In other words, desire is what

contradiction feels like. According to the PM, the concept of self-

consciousness “consists in being in relation to its own self, being I = I” (PM

155). Qua reflected out of the sensuous world, selfconsciousness thus does

attain to its concept, this pure self-relation. Yet, qua reflected out of the

sensuous world, self-consciousness attains this self-identity only in an

abstract manner. As a result, self-consciousness as reflected into itself and

merely self-relating finds itself simultaneously in a “relationship to an

immediate Other not posited ideally, to an external object, to a non-I, and is

external to its own self” (PM 155).

Self-consciousness qua reflected into itself simultaneously finds itself

in relation to something external. Therefore, self-consciousness qua

reflected into itself both does and does not correspond to its concept, which

is the purely self-relating I = I. Hence, it is in contradiction with itself and,

accordingly, feels the urge to sublate this contradiction.

Importantly, the external object to which abstract self-consciousness is

related is self-consciousness, too. Thus, insofar as self-consciousness is, at

least implicitly, always the unity of subject and object, we have distinction

now between a merely subjective subject-object (an “abstraction which is

supposed to be objective”) and a merely objective subject-object (an

“external object [which] is supposed to be subjective”) (PM 154). Like the

subjective subject-object, or self-consciousness reflected out of sensuous

existence, the objective subject-object initially will turn out both to

correspond and not to correspond to its concept. Yet, it will manifest this

contradiction in a different manner. For, whereas the subjective subject-

object constitutes self-consciousness that does not yet recognize itself in its

object, the objective subject-object will constitute the object which does not

yet recognize itself as self-consciousness. Thus, as Hegel states, in-itself

selfconsciousness “is a totality, a unity of subjective and objective” (PM

155). Yet, initially, self-consciousness is “something identical with itself

which bears within itself a contradiction and is filled with the feeling of its

implicit identity with itself as well as with opposite feeling of its inner

contradiction” (PM 154-55).

The place to turn to make sense of the overriding point is Fichte’s

discussion of the relation between the absolute and the empirical ego. For

recall, according to Fichte, The self is to be equated with, and yet opposed

to, itself. But in regard to consciousness it is equal to itself, for

consciousness is one: but in this consciousness the absolute self is posited as

indivisible; whereas the self to which the not-self is opposed is posited as

divisible. Hence, insofar as there is a not-self opposed to it, the self is itself

in opposition to the absolute self. (WL 109)

In Hegel’s terms, what Fichte is expressing is that, in-itself, self-

consciousness constitutes “a totality, a unity of subjective and objective”.

Yet, the absolute self constitutes selfconsciousness as merely the subjective

subject-object, or self-consciousness merely foritself. For, in Hegel, just as

well as in Fichte, the subjective subject-object is “indivisible” inasmuch as it

consists in the immediate and exclusive self-relating identity of ‘I = I’. Yet,

simultaneously it is opposed by the empirical self. Herein lies the

contradiction which is explicit in Hegel, but only partially and

problematically confronted and dealt with by Fichte.

For, recall, according to Fichte, “nothing is equated or opposed to” the

absolute self (WL 117). Yet, simultaneously there is something opposed to

the absolute self, namely, the empirical self. Thus, the absolute self is

exclusively self-related and opposed by nothing, on the one hand, and also

related to and opposed by something external, on the other. But, how can

this be unless the absolute self is itself internally contradictory?

Here we might also have the materials for generating greater insight

into what Hegel means when he refers to self-consciousness as desire

überhaupt. For, recall that – albeit perhaps only partially and

problematically – Fichte is aware of the internally contradictory nature of

the absolute self:

The absolute self is identical with itself: everything therein is one and

the same self, and belongs […] to one and the same self; nothing

therein is distinguishable, nothing manifold; the self is everything and

nothing, it is nothing for itself, and can distinguish not positing or

posited within itself. – In virtue of its nature it strives […] to maintain

itself in this condition. – There emerges in it a disparity, and hence

something alien to itself. […] That this happens, can in no sense be

proved a priori, but everyone can confirm it in his own experience

(WL 233).

The absolute self strives to preserve its perfect self-identity. Yet, Fichte

immediately follows this statement by pointing that, while the absolute self

is perfectly identical with itself, still, disparity emerges within it. Fichte

seems to treat the striving of the absolute self to preserve its perfect self-

identity as something which is at least in principle prior to the contradiction

that emerges within the absolute self. For Hegel, the point would be that the

absolute self of its nature strives to preserve its self-identity precisely

because in its nature it is contradictory.

Thus, through connecting it with its Fichtean backdrop, we have an at

least first approximation to what Hegel means by saying that self-

consciousness is desire überhaupt. Self-consciousness, in the first instance,

is the desire of self-consciousness to sublate its own internal

contradictoriness, which is to say, the contradiction between its concept (i.e.

perfect self-relation) and its existence (i.e. relatedness to, and thus ultimately

dependence upon, another). In other words, in the first instance, desire is a

principle of self-mediation. As such, desire is not directly related to any

object, unless that object is self-consciousness itself. Self-consciousness qua

desire überhaupt does not desire what it takes to be external objects because,

for example, it seeks to possess them or even to negate them. What self-

consciousness desires as such, or überhaupt, is to overcome its own internal

contradiction. The putatively external objects which, as we will see, it

attempts to negate turn out to be not directly desirable in themselves but

rather merely as means for this more basic process of self-sublation.

Let us not forget, as well, that self-consciousness will turn out to be

doubly selfcontradictory. For, just as the subjective subject-object is

simultaneously exclusively selfrelated and also related to something

external, so the objective subject-object will inversely turn out to be

simultaneously related to something external – namely, the subjective

subject-object – and also purely self-related. The self-sublation of

selfconsciousness will thus involve the supersession of this duplication of

self-consciousness within itself.

4.3 The Double Object of Self-consciousness

Having thus clarified, in part, what Hegel means by calling self-

consciousness desire überhaupt, let us return to the thread of the discussion

in the PhG. What needs to be emphasized is Hegel’s following discussion of

the double object of selfconsciousness:

Consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth has a double object:

one is the immediate object, that of sense-certainty and perception,

which however for selfconsciousness has the character of a negative;

and the second, viz. itself, which is the true essence, and is present in

the first instance only as opposed to the first object. In this sphere,

self-consciousness exhibits itself as the movement in which this

antithesis is removed, and the identity of itself with itself becomes

explicit for it. (PhG 105)

There is thus a double object for self-consciousness: 1) the object of mere

consciousness and 2) itself. In the first instance, however, the second object

is present in selfconsciousness only as opposed to the first, for, indeed, the

second object has reflected itself out of the first object and into itself.

The truth, however, is that these two objects actually form an identity.

The problem is that this truth is only in-itself, not yet for self-consciousness.

The immediately succeeding sections of “Self-consciousness” delineate the

process whereby the truth of self-consciousness becomes explicit for self-

consciousness so that the truth of selfconsciousness can become certain in-

and-for-itself.

4.3.1 One Object of Self-consciousness: Life

During the course of the “Consciousness” chapter, the first object of

selfconsciousness mentioned above, namely, the “whole expanse of the

sensuous world” has, like consciousness, returned into itself. For Hegel,

“[t]hrough this reflection into itself the object has become Life” (PhG 106).

The first object of self-consciousness mentioned above is thus life.

Accordingly, since self-consciousness is itself desire “the object of

immediate desire is a living thing” (PhG 106). Self-consciousness thus

sunders itself into self-consciousness, on the one hand, and life, on the other.

According to Hegel, self-consciousness is “the unity for which the

infinite unity of differences is”, whereas life “is only this unity itself, so that

it is not at the same time for itself” (PhG 106). The whole expanse of the

sensuous world qua life is the infinite unity of self-differentiating and self-

reconciling development that emerged during the course of the

“Consciousness” chapter. This infinite, dynamic unity, however, is not yet

explicit for life; it is only for self-consciousness, which latter, however,

treats life as a merely “negative element” which it desires but only, as we

will see, that it might negate it in order to preserve its own pure self-relation.

According to Hegel, life is a dialectic between the “simple universal

fluid medium” or “restless infinity” of life in-itself, on the one hand, and the

positing of individual shapes or members existing for-themselves, on the

other (PhG 106-7). The two initial aspects of the dialectic mutually produce

and negate each other. Life for-itself must negate life in-itself in order that

the former might live, for life lives on life. Yet, the simple universal fluid

medium of life is preserved precisely in and through the perpetual positing

and negation of the individual members.

Thus the simple substance of Life is the splitting-up of itself into

shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these existent

differences; and the dissolution of the splitting-up is just as much the

splitting-up and a forming of members. With this, the two sides of the

whole movement which before were distinguished, viz. the passive

separatedness of the shapes in the general medium of independence,

and the process of Life, collapse into one another. The latter is just as

much as an imparting of shape as a supersession of it; and on the

other, the imparting of shape, is just as much a supersession as an

articulation of shape. (PhG 108)

Life, then, is not just the simple universal fluid medium or the positing of

individual members but the “self-developing whole” of these two moments

in their dialectic sublation (PhG 108).

Hegel specifies that the resultant sublated whole or unity is indeed not

the immediate unity of the simple universal medium of life, but a “reflected

unity”, or, in other words, a “universal unity, which contains all these

moments as superseded [aufgehoben] within itself” (PhG 108). Life, then,

according to Hegel, is not simply an immediate universality, but a sublated

universality which posits and sublates differences.

As such, it is was Hegel calls a simple genus [Gattung] or mediated

universal.

Recall, however, that life does not yet exist for itself. Thus, it does not

yet exist for itself qua this simple determination of genus. Rather, life just is

the infinite, universal self-differentiating and self-sublating generic process.

According to Hegel, life qua simple genus, therefore, “points” [verweist] to

something other than itself, namely, consciousness (PhG 109). It is for

consciousness that life exists as a mediated universal or genus.

4.3.2 The Second Object of Self-consciousness: Self-consciousness

Self-consciousness is that consciousness for which the genus of life

exists. As such, according to Hegel, it is an-other life. Hegel adds the further

important point that self-consciousness is itself a “genus on its own account”

(PhG 109). Self-consciousness qua genus has itself as pure ‘I’ for object. In

other words, self-consciousness, in one sense, is the immediate identity of

subject and object: ‘I = I’. Thus, self-consciousness is a genus whose

immediate object is the pure ‘I’ which just is self-consciousness itself and is

therefore also a genus. At least two points of reference ought to be kept in

mind in order to keep track of Hegel’s discussion at this stage, one of which

has already been discussed in a previous chapter at some length and the

other is on the immediate horizon of the current chapter and so permits a few

anticipatory remarks.

The first point of reference is Aristotle’s notion of rational Nous as

potentia omnia facere et fieri. Rational Nous, in the first instance, is a

potential totality or, as Hegel would put it, a genus in-itself. Education, for

Hegel, is the process whereby this “initially abstract universality is

developed to concrete universality” (PM 53). In other words, in the first

instance, self-consciousness qua genus is the abstract ‘I’ which contains the

totality of individual determinations within itself, but only in-itself, in

potency. Its development consists in positing these determinations for-itself,

thereby rendering them actual and concrete. Thus, Hegel states that the

abstract ‘I’ qua object “will enrich itself for the ‘I’ [qua subject] and

undergo the unfolding which we have seen in the sphere of life,” for, as we

have just seen, the sphere of life is the sphere of a universal medium which

posits individual differences only to sublate them (PhG 109).

The apex of this development will, of course, entail self-

consciousness or mind qua genus in-itself becoming actualized for-itself

such that the immediate and abstract identity of the ‘I = I’ of self-

consciousness becomes the mediated and concrete identity of the

Aristotelian Noesis noeseos. As Hegel states,

In natural things their substance, the genus, is different from their

existence The content of natural things does not acquire the form of

universality and essentiality through itself, and their individuality is

not itself the form; only subject thinking is the form for itself and in

philosophy gives that universal content an existence for itself. The

human content by contrast is the free mind itself, and it comes to

existence in mind’s self-consciousness. This absolute content, the

intrinsically concrete mind, is just this: to have the form itself,

thinking, for its content. Aristotle soared above the Platonic Idea (the

genus, the substantial) to the heights of the thinking consciousness of

this determination in his concept of the entelechy of thinking, which

is Noesis tos noeseos. (PM 254-5)

In natural things, the individual remains in contradiction with its genus or

concept. Life attains to a mediated identity of the abstract universal medium

and the equally abstract individual, thereby producing a concrete universal,

or a universal which posits and preserves its individual differences. Yet, life

achieves this mediated universal only initself. It remains for the individual

self-consciousness, which is an abstract universal or genus in-itself, to posit

its implicit universality for-itself in order thereby to actualize the true

concrete unity of individual and universal in which the individual is both

itself and the genus.

Aside from Aristotle, the other major point of reference that must be

borne in mind in order to make sense of Hegel’s point that the abstract ‘I’ of

self-consciousness is itself a genus is Kant’s notion of self-consciousness as

the Transcendental Unity of Apperception (TUA). Fichte is, of course,

relevant as well in this context, but mainly as extending or otherwise

refining Kant’s position.

For Hegel, the TUA is more or less cognate with Aristotelian rational

Nous at least in the latter’s initial abstract or potential quality. Thus, in the

case of the TUA, the mind or self-consciousness just is a genus or, as Hegel

will specify later, a category which turns out to be a category of categories –

which is to say, a mediated universal, or a category/genus which posits and

sublates differences within itself. Yet, like the abstract ‘I’ of self-

consciousness, the TUA is thoroughly abstract and lacks concrete, individual

determinations. Moreover, the concrete determinations which it does achieve

are problematically derived in the Kantian system. Again, all of these points

will be returned to in later discussions. Yet, they are helpful to bear in mind

when attempting to make initial sense of Hegel’s claim that life qua self-

consciousness has in the first instance itself qua abstract ‘I’ which is itself a

genus as an object.

4.3.3 Self-consciousness as Desire Redux

Having established the nature of the double object of self-

consciousness, namely, life qua genus in-itself and itself qua genus for-

itself, let us return to the thread of the

Phenomenology and further examine Hegel’s discussion of the simple,

abstract genus or

‘I’ that is self-consciousness. Thus, Hegel states,

The simple ‘I’ is this genus or the simple universal, for which the

differences are not differences only by its being the negative essence

of the shaped independent moments; and self-consciousness is thus

certain of itself only by superseding [Aufheben] this other that

presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-

consciousness is Desire. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it

explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it

destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty

of itself as a true certainty, a certainty which has become explicit for

self-consciousness itself in an objective manner (PhG 109).

Recall, the simple, abstract ‘I’ qua genus for-itself is also self-consciousness

qua reflecting out of the world of sensuous life and existence. Thus, for self-

consciousness qua reflecting out the world of sensuous life and existence,

that world is not even a mere moment of itself (although, to be sure, that

world is indeed a moment of selfconsciousness in-itself). Therefore, the

world of sensuous life and existence is for abstract, reflecting self-

consciousness, at this stage, nothing at all. At the very same time, however,

abstract, reflecting self-consciousness is confronted by the otherness of the

sensuous world of life. Thus, there is for abstracting, reflecting self-

consciousness a difference which is not a difference, for it is confronted by

an other which for it is nothing. Stated differently, abstract, reflecting self-

consciousness is self-contradictory since, for-itself, it both is and is not

related to something other.

Recall, further, that along with being reflected out of the sensuous

world of life, the simple, abstract ‘I’ or self-consciousness is also a genus.

Therefore, the difference between itself and the sensuous world of life which

confronts self-consciousness is not a difference only insofar as self-

consciousness constitutes the negative essence of the independent moments,

only insofar as self-consciousness is “infinity as the supersession of all

distinctions” (PhG 106). How, then, does abstract, reflecting self-

consciousness sublate the distinction between itself and the world of

sensuous life that confronts it, thereby proving that the distinction was no

distinction? Answer: in the first instance, through desire.

Recall, once more, that desire qua self-consciousness is not primarily

concerned with consumption or destruction in the satisfaction of desire.

Rather, desire primarily is the felt contradiction within self-consciousness

between its existence and its concept as well as the concomitant urge to

sublate this contradiction. Thus, self-consciousness qua reflected, abstract

‘I’ is in contradiction with itself inasmuch as it is both purely selfrelated and

related to something external. Pure self-relation or I = I, however, is the

concept self-consciousness. Thus, in order to achieve an existence that is

adequate to its concept, self-consciousness must negate the object – the

sensuous world of life – which stands opposed to it.

In so doing, self-consciousness actually achieves two correlative

goals. First, in consuming or otherwise destroying the object, self-

consciousness proves to itself that the object was in fact nothing and that

self-consciousness is purely self-related. Second, through its activity of

consumption or negation, self-consciousness explicitly objectifies for-itself

its own – previously implicit – certainty of existing purely for-itself, of being

purely self-related. As such, the subjective or abstract certainty of self-

consciousness now becomes its objective or concrete truth. This is the

overall pattern of development, for Hegel: an initially abstract principle

actively posits differences within itself in order to recognize itself

objectively therein.

Still, despite the success with which self-consciousness meets in

destroying the objectivity of the sensuous world of life and thereby

objectifying for-itself its own implicit certainty of itself as purely self-

relating, the achievement is fleeting, even somewhat illusory. Indeed, a

crucial turning-point in the experience of self-consciousness occurs when in

the very satisfaction of its desire it realizes that the object has its own

independence. For, despite the fact that it would affirm the nothingness of

the other by negating it, self-consciousness realizes that its self-certainty

comes precisely through overcoming this other. Thus, according to Hegel,

self-consciousness experiences the irony that “by its negative relation to the

other, [self-consciousness] is unable to supersede it” (PhG 109).

Were self-consciousness truly independent and self-sufficient, and

were its object truly nothing, then it should not feel the desire to negate its

object. For, in such a case, self-consciousness would not be self-

contradictory. Yet, insofar as it does experience such desire and its

subsequent satisfaction, self-consciousness eo ipso establishes a relation,

indeed a relation of dependence, to the object of which it would otherwise

presume to be independent.

As the result of this ironic experience, self-consciousness is forced to

the realization that while, in one sense, self-consciousness is the essence of

desire or desire überhaupt (for desire, in the first instance, seeks to sublate

the internal contradiction of self-consciousness), still, in another sense, and

despite or perhaps because of the selfcontradictory nature of self-

consciousness, the essence of desire “is something other than self-

consciousness” (PhG. 175, p. 109). For desire qua desire, despite its initial

pretensions to the contrary, is inextricably linked with and therefore

dependent upon something distinct from itself.

Yet, by the very same token, self-consciousness does exist absolutely

for-itself, and it must experience the satisfaction of overcoming the other,

namely, the world of sensuous life. The true overcoming of the other and the

concomitant establishment of independence and self-certainty, however,

cannot take the form of a desire which simply negates the object. For, that

effort ironically only reveals the dependency of selfconsciousness qua desire

on its object. Instead, Hegel asserts that the other of selfconsciousness,

namely, its object-qua-life, must negate itself. Only then, can

selfconsciousness attain the satisfaction which would attend upon its own

self-certainty and self-sufficiency.

4.4 Life as the Concrete, Developing Object of Self-Consciousness

With Hegel’s claim that the sensuous world of life must negate itself in

order for self-consciousness to truly objectify its own certainty of itself, and

thereby raise that certainty to truth, we have entered into a new phase of the

discussion of selfconsciousness. For, previously the focus of the attention

was placed on selfconsciousness as reflected out of the world of sensuous

life and existence along with its failed attempt to preserve or otherwise

sublate its hitherto abstract self-identity by merely negating the sensuous

world of life which threatened the purity of that self-relation. Now, the focus

broadens to include the activity and development of the sensuous world of

life itself in relation to abstract, reflecting self-consciousness.

To begin the discussion it must be recalled that, according to Hegel,

insofar as it is both the independent genus of life and its own self-negation,

this object of selfconsciousness is consciousness (PhG. 175, p. 110). Thus,

while, on the one hand, selfconsciousness reflects out of the world of

sensuous life, it also posits and preserves that life for which the whole

expanse and infinite variety of the natural world is its own object. Self-

consciousness is, accordingly, divided into: two moments: 1) abstract

selfconsciousness and 2) consciousness which is immersed in and opposed

by the entire sensuous world – in other words, life.

In the PM Hegel clarifies the point, stating

The defect of abstract self-consciousness lies in this: it and

consciousness are still two different things confronting each other,

they have not yet achieved a reciprocal equilibrium. In consciousness,

we see tremendous difference, on the one side, of the I, this wholly

simple entity, and on the other side, of the infinite variety of the

world. The opposition of the I and world, which does not yet come to

genuine mediation here, constitutes the finitude of consciousness.

Selfconsciousness, by contrast, has its finitude in its still wholly

abstract identity with its own self. (PM 153)

Abstract self-consciousness is “burdened” by an external object –

consciousness – which latter is itself opposed by the infinite variety of the

sensuous world. The correlative terms in Fichte’s system should be readily

apparent. For, there, the absolute self (i.e. abstract self-consciousness) was

identified with, yet opposed by, the empirical self (i.e.

consciousness) which latter was opposed by the world nature or the not-I

(i.e. the whole expanse of the sensuous world).

Yet, it is important not to lose track of the fact that the distinction

between selfconsciousness and consciousness is a distinction within self-

consciousness itself. As Hegel states, “The rift between self-consciousness

and consciousness forms an inner contradiction of self-consciousness with

itself, because self-consciousness is also the stage directly preceding it,

consciousness, and consequently is the opposite of itself (PM 153). Again,

the correlates in Fichte should be readily apparent. For, there, the empirical

self was simultaneously opposed to, yet posited within, the absolute self.

Important to note, as well, is that Fichte’s system essentially stops at

the viewpoint of abstract self-consciousness. For, it does not succeed in

moving past the moment of desire or striving in self-consciousness and the

concomitant effort to negate the object. As noted, however, the source of

Hegel’s eventual critique of Fichte lies in Hegel’s decision to take on the

viewpoint of the empirical self, which up to this point has been characterized

as mere consciousness.

Yet, Hegel proceeds to observe how the would-be merely conscious

life which is the opposed object of self-consciousness turns out to be itself

self-consciousness. For, recall that as consciousness qua life is a genus. Yet,

it is a genus which is conscious of itself, and a genus that is conscious of

itself, for Hegel, just is self-consciousness. Thus, the self-negating

independent object of self-consciousness is a self-consciousness. In the

terms of the DZ, the objective subject-object of life is truly a subject-object.

Recall that self-consciousness seeks the satisfaction derived from the

certainty that its object corresponds to itself. Yet, we have just learned that

the object of selfconsciousness is a self-consciousness. As a result, Hegel

states, “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-

consciousness” (PhG 110). In other words, abstract, reflecting self-

consciousness will achieve satisfaction only in the independent world of

sensuous life which has itself become self-consciousness.

4.4.1 McDowell’s Challenge to the Orthodox Interpretation of Self-

consciousness

According to McDowell, the claim that self-consciousness achieves

its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness “is usually taken to claim

that there can be a self-conscious individual, say a self-conscious human

being, only if there are at least two, each recognizing the other as another of

what it is one of” (HWV 159). The strongest part of McDowell’s larger

argument occurs precisely in his response to this more or less orthodox

position, as he states,

The otherness that needs to be aufgehoben by the movement of self-

consciousness appeared in the first instance as the otherness of ‘the

whole expanse of the sensible world’, one moment in the doubled

object of self-consciousness, whose movement is to overcome the

antithesis between that moment and the other, namely itself. It was

that moment in the doubled object, ‘the whole expanse of the sensible

world,’ that returned into itself and became life, and then revealed

itself as consciousness and finally self-consciousness. This is the

‘another selfconsciousness’ of our passage. It should surely be in

some sense the same object, or moment in a doubled object, that we

began with, only now more hygienically – less immediately –

understood. But if ‘another self-consciousness’ here is a literally other

mind, say a different human being, what has happened to ‘the whole

expanse of the sensible world’? How does replacing the first moment

in the doubled object of self-consciousness [i.e. the whole expanse of

the sensuous world] with someone else’s self-consciousness belong

with the unfolding of that moment that Hegel seemed to be offering in

the text up to this point? [Emphases mine] (HWV 159)

The orthodox interpretation would replace the entire expanse of the sensuous

world, which is the first object of the doubled object of self-consciousness

and which through its own inward reflection reveals itself to be conscious

life and ultimately selfconsciousness, with “a literally other mind, say a

different human being”. Yet, in such a scenario, what happens to the entire

expanse of the sensuous world? How is the other self-consciousness qua

other individual human being which self-consciousness would thus confront

itself the entire expanse of the sensuous world of life? Moreover, how is the

entire expanse of the sensuous world preserved as a moment within self-

consciousness? All of these questions are avoided if the orthodox

interpretation is jettisoned, and the two self-consciousnesses which find

themselves opposed are interpreted as abstract/absolute self-consciousness,

on the one hand, and empirical self-consciousness, on the other.

4.4.2 Summary of Preceding Section and Transition to the Lord/Bondsman

Dialectic

At this point, Hegel briefly summarizes the state of the argument thus

far:

The notion of self-consciousness is only completed in these three

moments: (a) the pure undifferentiated ‘I’ is its first immediate object.

But (b) this immediacy is itself an absolute mediation, it is only as a

supersession of the independent object, in other words, it is Desire.

The satisfaction of Desire is, it is true, the reflection of self-

consciousness into itself, or the certainty that has become truth. (c)

But the truth of this certainty is really a double reflection, the

duplification of selfconsciousness. Consciousness has for its object

one which, of its own self, posits its otherness of difference as a

nothingness, and in so doing is independent. (PhG 110)

In the first instance, self-consciousness has the abstract or undifferentiated

‘I’ as it immediate object: I = I. This is self-consciousness qua reflected into

itself and out of the sensuous world of life. But this immediate, self-

sufficient identity can only be preserved by negating the independent object,

life. The demand for this negation is experienced as desire and its fulfillment

as satisfaction. Thus, in one sense, the satisfaction of desire is the very

“reflection of self-consciousness into itself”. It is that by which

selfconsciousness becomes certain of itself in its self-sufficiency and

independence. Yet, the truth of this experience of self-certainty reveals that

there must be a double reflection: one by self-consciousness and one by the

object. Since the object is a genus, however, the reflection of itself into itself

reveals it to be self-consciousness. Thus, self-consciousness is duplicated

within itself.

With the discovery that the object of self-consciousness is a self-

consciousness, “we already have before us the concept of mind [Geist]”

(PhG 110). Yet, Hegel maintains that the experience of what mind is still

lies ahead for consciousness. For mind in its fullest sense is the “absolute

substance which is the unity of different independent self-consciousness,

which in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that

is ‘We’ and ‘We” that is ‘I’” (PhG 110).

The vast majority of commentators take this statement to imply that in

the “Selfconsciousness” chapter we thus entered upon the stage in which the

analysis has shifted from the the experience of a single self-consciousness to

the experience of the social encounter and interplay between two distinct and

independent individual selfconsciousnesses. McDowell is right to

emphasize, however, that Hegel clearly states that the experience of this

truth about the mind still lies ahead for consciousness (HWV 16061). We are

as yet dealing with an individual self-consciousness which has itself as its

own object.

This claim can be verified by simply recalling the beginning of the

present analysis of self-consciousness in which Hegel states that the being of

the whole expanse of the sensuous world was but a moment of self-

consciousness, albeit merely in-itself (PhG 105). For abstract self-

consciousness, as it first comes on the scene, this infinitely self-

differentiating sensuous world, the world of life, is taken to be an

independent object. Thus, self-consciousness found that it had two objects:

itself and life. In truth, or inthemselves, these two objects were the same, but

self-consciousness was not yet certain of it; the truth was not yet explicit for

self-consciousness. Self-consciousness initially tried to make this truth

explicit for itself by simply negating the object. This procedure, however,

only revealed the independence of the object. It was necessary for the object

to negate itself in order for self-consciousness to become certain of itself in

its own object. For in thus reflecting into itself, the object constituted itself

as the genus which exists for itself, which just is self-consciousness. Thus,

self-consciousness duplicates itself in order that its self-certainty might

become objective for-itself.

The parallel between the present analysis of self-consciousness in the

Phenomenology and the previous analysis of Fichte’s system and Hegel’s

critique thereof has also been revealed. For, self-consciousness qua reflected

into itself would correspond to the absolute self of Fichte’s system. Indeed,

Hegel explicitly invokes the foundational principle of the WL, I = I, in

describing this moment of self-consciousness. The selfconsciousness

constituted by the object reflecting into itself would correspond to the

empirical self, or objective subject-object, of Fichte’s system. Self-

consciousness reflected into itself would correspond the subjective subject-

object.

Importantly, self-consciousness in the first instance, or the subjective

subjectobject, is an abstract and immediate self-identity which lacks motion

or mediation. It will therefore be within the objective subject-object that

mediation and development take place. More precisely, development and

mediation will occur both in the relation between the subjective subject-

object and the objective subject-object as well as among the distinct aspects

of the objective subject-object. The fact that the development and mediation

that occur will take place through the form of lordship and bondage,

however, indicates that Hegel will be here extending his critique of the

ultimate inadequacy of Fichte’s system.

4.5 The Lord/Bondsman Dialectic

The initial phase of Hegel’s account of the relationship between the

subjective subject-object and the objective subject-object takes place in the

section entitled, “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness:

Lordship and Bondage” (PhG 111). It begins by noting that self-

consciousness exists in-and-for-itself only insofar as it exists for another.

Thus, the object of self-consciousness must be self-consciousness in order

for self-consciousness properly to exist, which is to say, in order for

selfconsciousness not to be in contradiction with its own concept. Each self-

consciousness must exist for the other in order for either to exist, at all. In

other words, selfconsciousness exists only insofar as it is acknowledged by

self-consciousness. The process in and through which this acknowledgement

is achieved is what Hegel calls the “process of recognition” (PhG 111).

Self-consciousness has “come out of itself” (PhG 111). In terms of

Fichte’s system, the absolute self or subjective subject-object has posited for

itself an empirical existence. The absolute self, as it were, loses itself

inasmuch as it finds itself as an-other being. In other words, the absolute self

finds itself objectified in an-other being, namely, the empirical self, which,

while constituting an objectification or positing of the absolute self,

nevertheless is opposed to the absolute self. At the same time, however, the

absolute self has already superseded the other for the empirical self is

posited within the absolute self; therefore, “it does not see the other as an

essential being, but in the other sees its own self.” (PhG 111)

For Hegel, the twofold relation of the absolute self to the empirical self

yields a twofold ambiguity [gedoppelte Doppelsinn]. First, the absolute self

must overcome the ambiguous opposition of the empirical self to itself in

order thereby “to become certain of itself as the essential being” (PhG 111).

Yet, overcoming this ambiguous opposition gives rise to a second

ambiguity, namely, that in thereby overcoming the opposed empirical self,

the absolute self simply overcomes its own self, “for this other is itself”

(PhG 111).

According to Hegel, the abstract or absolute self’s “ambiguous

overcoming of its ambiguous otherness” thus constitutes an “ambiguous

return into itself” (PhG 111). For, in the first sublation, the absolute self

returns into itself inasmuch as it regains the selfidentity of I = I, while in the

second sublation, the empirical self “gives back” the absolute self to itself

inasmuch as it, the empirical self, overcomes or negates its very being-other

in the absolute self.

Hegel’s primary critique of Fichte should be recalled here, namely,

that the latter’s system does not achieve this very kind of return of the

objective subject-object back into identity with the subjective subject-object.

Hegel, himself, proposes to accomplish this return in the PhG, yet it will not

be completed during the course of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic. Rather, the

Lord/Bondsman dialectic will reveal the ultimate futility of attempting to

produce this return by way of a relation of domination and servitude within

self-consciousness.

Hegel’s observation that the empirical self would negate or overcome

its own otherness to the absolute self, thereby giving back to the absolute

self its self-identity, precipitates his subsequent comment that, while in one

sense, the dialectic between the absolute and the empirical self is driven by

the activity of the absolute self, nevertheless this activity of the absolute self

has a double significance inasmuch as it is the activity of the absolute self

and the activity of the empirical self. Absolute self-consciousness has the

empirical self before it, not as the mere object of desire, but as a self-

relating, selfnegating self-consciousness in its own right. In principle, then,

the absolute self cannot treat the empirical self as a mere instrument which it

would subordinate to its own purposes. Still, although this is true as a matter

of principle or in-itself, it will not prevent the absolute self from attempting

to reduce the empirical self to the status of a mere instrument. The point is

simply that such an effort is doomed to failure since it neglects the

intrinsically self-relating and self-determining character of the empirical

self. The doomed attempt by self-consciousness to achieve this return into

itself through a relation of domination and servitude, however, will not be

entirely fruitless since in the process consciousness will learn several

important lessons about itself.

4.5.1 The Lord/Bondsman Dialectic as the Expression of an Allegorical Self

interpretation by Self-consciousness

Hegel observes that the doubled activity of self-consciousness repeats

the double reflected-ness into self that we witnessed in the play of Forces,

yet with the crucial difference that this dialectic will now occur, not just for

us, the phenomenologists, but for the consciousness we are observing itself.

Thus, as previously mentioned, the account of self-consciousness marks an

important turning point in the emergence of the very form of the mind which

could conduct the Phenomenology itself. Yet, just like for the forms of the

mind within the “Consciousness” chapter, the forms of the mind within

selfconsciousness, while they will achieve a heightened level of self-

observation, nevertheless will misinterpret the object of their observation,

namely, themselves, and will thus be forced to learn through experience to

adjust, in this case, their own selfinterpretation.

Importantly, the account of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic begins with

Hegel stating, “We have now to see how the process of this pure Concept of

recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness, appears

to self-consciousness” [Emphasis mine] (PhG 112). The point of Hegel’s

examination in this section of “Selfconsciousness” is to analyze the process

by which the absolute self and the empirical self come to recognize one

another. McDowell rightly points out, however, that to begin with, we will

not be examining how this process occurs properly or for us,

phenomenological observers, but rather, how it appears to the self-

consciousness(es) we are observing (HWV 160-61). The image or pattern of

the relationship between the absolute self and the empirical self that is thus

portrayed, therefore, will be distorted or skewed due to the inadequacy of

self-consciousness to observe and properly interpret itself.

According to McDowell, the Lord/Bondsman dialectic is thus a kind

of allegory that self-consciousness constructs for itself in order

(inadequately) to interpret its own observation of itself (HWV 161ff.). Just

as Sense-certainty and Perception routinely mistook themselves, which is to

say, misinterpreted themselves and their experience due to their lack of

self-knowledge, so the Lord/Bondsman dialectic is not an account of the

experience that Self-consciousness actually undergoes at this stage of its

development, but is rather an expression of its own misinterpretation of

itself and its experience. To be sure, such misinterpretation or inadequate

self-understanding will push the dialectical development of consciousness

forward in spite of itself. Nevertheless, it is important not to confuse Self-

consciousness’s inadequate self-understanding of its experience with what

we, the phenomenologists, know it actually experiences. 4.5.2 The Life-

and-Death Struggle of Self-consciousness

As the name indicates, the Lord/Bondsman dialectic entails an

inequality between the two terms of the relationship. Thus, in its allegorical

account of its experience, Selfconsciousness will exhibit the absolute self

and the empirical self in a relationship of inequality in which one is merely

recognized and the other is merely recognizing. In the allegory, what is other

for the absolute self, namely, the empirical self, is experienced by the

absolute self as a mere object submerged in the immediacy of biological

existence. Yet, the same is true for the empirical self. Thus, the relation

internal to selfconsciousness between the absolute self to the empirical self

is understood by selfconsciousness at this stage to be a confrontation

between two individuals.

Initially, therefore, no distinction has been drawn within the allegory

between absolute versus empirical self-consciousness since for both self-

consciousnesses as they appear immediately on the scene the other does not

appear to be self-conscious, at all. Instead, for each individual the other

appears as a form of consciousness “which ha[s] not yet accomplished the

movement of absolute abstraction, of rooting-out all immediate being, and of

being merely the purely negative being of self-consciousness; in other

words, they have not as yet exposed themselves to each other in the form of

pure beingfor-self, or as self-consciousness” (PhG 113). Each fails to

recognize the other as selfconscious. In order to attain the necessary mutual

recognition, therefore, each must demonstrate to the other that it is indeed a

self-consciousness.

The means by which self-consciousness demonstrates that it is the pure

selfrelating of self-consciousness “consists in showing itself as the pure

negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any

specific existence, to the individuality common to existence as such, that it is

not attached to life” (PhG 113). Selfconsciousness shows itself to be self-

conscious inasmuch as it demonstrates that it is not attached to the world of

sensuous life which includes its individual biological existence – that it is

capable, in other words, of abstraction from or reflecting out of this

specificity and individuality.

Such abstraction from merely biological existence entails a twofold

action from self-consciousness, one aspect of which is on the part of the

other and one on the part of itself. Thus, there are two actions, each with a

twofold aspect. Insofar as the action is on the part of the other, “each seeks

the death of the other” (PhG 113). Yet, in the very action of the other,

“action on its own part is involved” as well (PhG 113). Here we have

another double ambiguity that can only be clarified if we recall the

distinction between the viewpoint of the form of the mind which we are

investigating, namely, selfconsciousness as it immediately comes on the

scene, and that of we, the phenomenologists.

For, why should seeking the death of the other necessarily involve

risking one’s own life? Surely, one might figure out a means of killing the

other – for example, through cunning and deceit, or simply superior

technology – which would not entail risking one’s own life. If, however, the

other is one’s own objective mode of biological existence, then, by

definition, to seek the death of this existence would simultaneously be to risk

one’s own life. In other words, the radical abstraction from one’s merely

biological existence is in fact a twofold action: 1) the (attempted) negation

of one’s biological existence and 2) the risking of that very existence. For

the form of self-consciousness under observation, however, these two

aspects of a single activity would appear, at least initially, as two separate

realities.

As a result of this twofold action on the part of each self-

consciousness, a lifeand-death struggle ensues. According to Hegel,

They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty

of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in

their own case. And it is only through staking one’s life that freedom

is won; only thus it is proved that for self-consciousness, its essential

being is not just being, not the immediate form in which it appears,

not its submergence in the expanse of life, but rather that there is

nothing present in it which could not be regarded as a vanishing

moment, that it is only pure being-for-self. (PhG 114)

The result of “Consciousness” was consciousness’s discovery that the entire

expanse of sensuous life and being was but a moment of its own being-for-

self. Consciousness became self-consciousness. Yet, this self-certainty of

self-consciousness was merely immediate; it had yet to be objectified or

raised to truth for self-consciousness. It is only in the activity of staking

one’s life that the certainty of self-consciousness begins to be raised to truth.

To the extent that the trial-by-death issues in the death of both self-

consciousnesses, however, self-consciousness fails to raise its certainty to

truth. For, each self-consciousness was to the other its biological existence,

and insofar as each succeeds in killing the other, they thereby achieve, not

mutual recognition, but merely mutual destruction. In this case, the

relationship between the two self-consciousnesses “collapses into a lifeless

unity which is split into lifeless, merely immediate, unopposed extremes”

(PhG 114).

Through the experience of the futility of the life-and-death struggle as a

means for attaining mutual recognition and thus raising the certainty of self-

consciousness to truth, “self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it

as pure self-consciousness” (PhG 115). As a result of this experience the

initial immediate unity of self-consciousness, the simple I = I, is dissolved

into the two essential principles of self-consciousness: 1) pure, self-relating

self-consciousness and 2) consciousness as immediately bound up with

biological existence.

While both moments are essential to self-consciousness, they come on

the scene as unequal and lacking true unity. Pure self-consciousness

experiences itself as independent and existing for-itself, while the

consciousness bound up with biological existence experiences itself as

dependent and existing, not for-itself, but for another, namely, pure self-

consciousness. In the relationship between the two self-

consciousnesses, then, pure self-consciousness is the Lord, while

consciousness bound up with biological existence is the Bondsman.

Here, then, is expressed in allegorical terms the process described in

the WL by which the immediate identity of the purely self-positing I is

differentiated into absolute or pure self-consciousness, on the one hand, and

empirical self-consciousness which is bound up with the not-self, on the

other. The I = I of self-consciousness, in other words, has dirempted itself

into: (I therefore I) + (I therefore not-I).

It might be further noted that a major difference between Hegel and

Fichte in this context is that, while Fichte’s procedure is deductive, starting,

as it does, from a first principle and proceeding “downwards”, Hegel’s

procedure can only be called “emergentist.” For, although in Hegel’s

account the life-and-death struggle issues in the dissolution of the immediate

self-identity of pure self-consciousness, the distinction thus posited itself

constitutes, as we will see, the concrete conditions or potency for a higher,

more profound unity, a unity in which empirical consciousness will become

adequate, indeed identical, to pure self-consciousness.

4.5.3 The Structure and Elements of the Lord/Bondsman Dialectical

Relationship

The structure of the relationship between the Lord and Bondsman, or

pure selfconsciousness and empirical consciousness, is complex but can be

summarized in fairly clear terms. Like the immediate I = I, the Lord is self-

consciousness existing for-itself. The difference, however, is that a

mediation has occurred in which the I relates not strictly to itself but to itself

through another, namely, the Bondsman or empirical consciousness. The

Bondsmna is, again, that consciousness which is bound up with the

independent objects of empirical existence or “thinghood in general” (in

Fichtean terms, the not-I) (PhG 115). As such the Lord relates both to the

Bondsman and the latter’s object; moreover, the Lord relates immediately to

both as well as mediately to both through the other.

First of all, the Lord relates mediately to the Bondsman through the

things of empirical existence. For, the Bondsman was unable to free himself

from being determined by this very realm. Insofar as the Bondsman finds

himself dependent upon his objective existence he corresponds to Fichte’s

divisible empirical self especially in its mode as intelligence as well as its

mode as a system of merely natural drives. For, qua intelligence, the

divisible, empirical self found itself determined by and dependent upon the

empirical object or not-self. Moreover, in its mode as a system of natural

drives the empirical self was thoroughly immersed in or even identified with

the whole expanse of sensuous existence. As with the absolute self,

however, for the Lord, the object that keeps the Bondsman in bondage is

“something merely negative” (PhG 115). As such the Lord has immediate

power of the object and mediate power over the Bondsman through the

object

Second, the Lord also relates mediately to the object through the

Bondsman. For, the Bondsman, like the empirical self, is also self-conscious

and is thus capable of negating the object – albeit not to the degree of the

Lord whose action entailed the (apparent) total abstraction from the object.

Rather, the Bondsman works on the object and in so doing he transforms it

into a form which can be enjoyed by the Lord. Thus, through the mediation

of the labor of the Bondsman the Lord succeeds where mere desire failed,

namely, in ridding himself of the independent aspect of the object and taking

to himself the merely dependent aspect of it which permits him the pure

enjoyment of the object. In other words, the object as worked on by the

Bondsman, for the Lord, just is the experience of mere satisfaction which, as

such, is a determination of the Lord, not the object.

Needless to say, the discussion of the labor by which the Bondsman

actively determines the object, as opposed to being merely determined by it,

points to the transition in Fichte from empirical self qua intelligence to the

empirical self qua practical reason. Further aspects of the ongoing

relationship between the Lord and Bondsman make this point even clearer.

At the current stage of the relationship, the Lord has achieved for

himself two of the crucial moments in the process of recognition.

Recognition, first of all, calls for each side to do to themselves what the

other does to it. Thus, in setting aside his own immediate desires and

working for the sake of the Lord, the Bondsman places himself in the service

of the Lord just as much as the Lord forces the Bondsman into servitude.

Second of all, in order to achieve recognition, the action of one party must in

fact be the action of the other. Thus, the activity of the Bondsman is really

just a mediated activity of the Lord. Here we have, moreover, an evocation

of the process in Fichte in which the striving of the empirical self to

determine the not-self is simply an indirect expression of the absolute self’s

striving to preserve its own pure (or, for Hegel, abstract) self-identity.

The problem to which Hegel’s account calls attention, however, is that the

recognition is unequal and one-sided. For, while Bondsman does to himself

what Lord does to the Bondsman, the Lord does not do to himself what the

Bondsman does to the Lord, nor is the action of the Lord’s truly that of the

Bondsman.

4.6 The Dialectical Inversion of the Lord/Bondsman Relation: The

Development of the Bondsman

The result of the analysis, thus far, has shown the Bondsman entering

into servitude to the Lord. The Lord treats the Bondsman as a mere object or

instrument indistinguishable, in fact, from the biological existence in which

the latter is immersed. Yet, the fact that the Bondsman constitutes the object

of the Lord sets up a radical turning point in the entire analysis of the

Lord/Bondsman dialectic, one which marks the beginning of a rather

profound dialectic critique and inversion of the entire Fichtean backdrop to

this dialectic. For, insofar as the object of the Lord is the Bondsman, the

Bondsman thus is the latter’s truth. What that means is that, as Hegel states,

“The truth of independent consciousness is accordingly the servile

consciousness of the Bondsman” (PhG 117). Understanding more precisely

what it means to say that the servile consciousness of the Bondsman is in

fact the truth of the independent consciousness of the Lord requires tracking

very closely Hegel’s subsequent analysis of what servile consciousness itself

is.

To begin with, in contrast to the Lord, the Bondsman has the

independent consciousness that exists for-itself of the Lord as his truth.

Servile consciousness, however, is not yet explicitly aware that it contains

this truth implicitly within itself. Yet, what does it mean to say that the truth

of the Bondsman is the pure being-for-self of the

Lord’s consciousness? It means that the abstraction from or reflected-ness

out of immediate attachment to merely biological existence which the Lord

putatively achieved in the risking of his life in the life-and-death struggle is,

ironically, even more radically achieved by the Bondsman who seemed to be

utterly attached to this biological existence.

How is this radical abstraction from the whole expanse of sensuous

biological existence achieved by the Bondsman? It is achieved in and

through the fear of death. Thus, ironically, despite the fact that Bondsman

would cling to his biological existence, in the experience of fearing its loss

he is actually driven all the more deeply into himself and thus reflects all the

more out of his immediate identity with that biological existence.

Speaking of the experience of servile consciousness in its fear of death,

Hegel states,

This consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing

or just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with

dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In

that experience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every

fibre of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to

its foundations (PhG 117).

In the fear of death, even more so than in the staking of one’s life,

consciousness succeeds in the universal abstraction from and nullification of

the whole expanse of sensuous biological existence. Thus, in fact implicit in

servile consciousness is the absolute negativity or pure being-for-itself

which had hitherto been ascribed to the Lord.

To be sure, while we, the phenomenologists, are able to recognize the

implicit truth contained in the experience of servile consciousness, for the

Bondsman himself his pure being-for-self is still only objectified in the

Lord. This alienated objectification or projection of his own intrinsic power,

however, is eventually overcome by the Bondsman in and through his very

work for the Lord – although, it should be noted, this work of the Bondsman

will take the remainder of the PhG itself to be completed, and so will not be

achieved within the “Self-consciousness” chapter. For work accomplishes

two things: 1) it makes concrete in every particular detail what was merely

an abstractly universal detachment from biological existence experienced by

the Bondsman in his fear of death; 2) it objectifies, not just for us, but for the

Bondsman himself, the truth about the Bondsman, namely, that it is he, not

the Lord, who truly possesses the universal negating and abstracting power

of being-for-self.

Through work the Bondsman imparts form and permanence to what

previously

had been fleeting objects of mere desire. In the work itself, then, the

Bondsman is able to recognize himself in the objective order which he in

fact posits. As Hegel states, “consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the

independent being [of the object] its own independence” (PhG 118). What is

more, insofar as the Bondsman imparts form and permanence to the world of

fleeting sensuous biological existence he thereby negates it, at least in the

form in which it initially presented itself to him. Yet, it was precisely this

realm of sensuous biological existence before which the Bondsman had

trembled in fear. Thus, through work, the Bondsman “destroys this alien

negative moment, posits himself as a negative in the permanent order of

things, and thereby becomes for himself, someone existing on his own

account” (PhG 118).

Through fear, service and labor, then, the Bondsman, unlike the Lord,

simultaneously forms an objective order in which he can recognize himself

and forms himself into a master or universal power over “the whole of

objective being” (PhG 196, 119). In other words, he forms himself into a

pure self-consciousness or being-for-self.

The Bondsman has become the Lord.

4.7 Explication of the Upshot of the Lord/Bondsman Allegory

It is important to clarify the precise nature and scope of the dialectical

inversion that has just been allegorically represented as an encounter

between a Lord and a Bondsman. First of all, in terms of scope, the

significance of the relationship of domination and servitude (as well as, of

course, its dialectical sublation), for Hegel, is practically unrestricted. From

his earliest to his most mature works Hegel was especially preoccupied by

this theme. Indeed, the Lord/Bondsman dialectic can be read as an

allegorical figure for virtually all relationships that Hegel addresses

throughout his corpus shy, of course, of the culminating moment of

development in which this relationship is finally sublated.213

Second, in terms of the significance of the dialectical inversion for the

PhG, it now becomes possible 1) to qualify accounts of earlier stages of

development as manifesting an at least implicit relationship of domination

and servitude, and 2) to qualify accounts of later stages of development as

further workings-out of this relationship by, for and within consciousness.

Thus, for example, in Sense-certainty consciousness takes itself initially to

be dominated by and dependent upon the object. Through the intellectual

labor of thinking-through this object, however, consciousness manages,

albeit still problematically and tenuously, to invert this relationship. It

remains to be seen how subsequent sections of the PhG manifest further

developments and sublations of the relation of domination and servitude.

Third, the significance of the dialectical inversion of the

Lord/Bondsman relationship for this dissertation is that, on the basis of

Hegel’s analysis, it now becomes possible to explain the multiplicity of

conflicting philosophies in terms of their manifesting various stages of the

dialectic of domination and servitude within consciousness. We have already

discussed at some length the way in which the Lord/Bondsman relationship

serves as an allegorical figure for explaining the constituent elements of the

Fichtean philosophy in particular as well as transcendental philosophy more

generally. It will be useful, however, to return again to this theme in order to

explain more fully how, in the allegory, Hegel is providing an initial

schematic of his eventual full dialectical explanation of transcendental

philosophy as resulting from a failed sublation of the relation of domination

and servitude within consciousness.

4.7.1 The Lord/Bondsman Dialectic and Transcendental Philosophy

Perhaps the most crucial turning-point in the Lord/Bondsman dialectic

occurs when it is observed that “the truth of independent consciousness is

the servile consciousness of the bondsman” (PhG 117). What this fact

entailed was that true beingfor-self or self-consciousness was achieved, not

by the Lord, but by the Bondsman. Indeed, the Bondsman became the true

Lord of his objective existence. In terms of the experience of consciousness

as well as the task of explaining the emergence of different philosophies,

such as Fichte’s, to say that the Bondsman becomes the true Lord is,

allegorically, to say that the empirical self becomes the absolute self.

What does it mean to say that the empirical self becomes absolute or

pure selfconsciousness? It means that Fichte’s philosophy expresses a

misinterpretation of the experience of empirical consciousness. For,

empirical consciousness becomes absolute or pure self-consciousness. At the

present stage of its development as represented allegorically by the

Lord/Bondsman dialectic, however, the empirical self does not recognize

this fact. In other words, in-itself, the empirical self is or has become pure

selfconsciousness. Yet, for the empirical self qua Bondsman, pure self-

consciousness actually resides in an alien element, namely, the Lord. It is

just this alienated selfinterpretation, moreover, which Fichte’s philosophy

expresses inasmuch as in that philosophy the true absoluteness of empirical

consciousness is said to reside in an alien element, namely, the absolute or

transcendental self. To put the point in terms of the overall thesis of this

dissertation: Fichte’s philosophy expresses in philosophical terms an

alienation within and misunderstanding of the experience of empirical

consciousness.

In Fichte’s philosophy, the empirical self is alienated from absolute or

pure selfconsciousness – they do not achieve an identity. Rather, in Fichte,

the absolute self lords it over the empirical self and uses the latter as a mere

instrument for reestablishing the lost certainty of its self-identity. The result

of this domination of the empirical self by the absolute self, however, is the

mere condemnation of the empirical self to a futile infinite striving to

completely determine its object, the not-self. Fichte thus fails to appreciate

how through fear, service and labor the empirical self becomes the absolute

self. Fichte’s philosophy thus expresses a flawed and alienated self-

interpretation of the empirical self. It represents, in other words, a lack of

self-knowledge on the part of the empirical person, Fichte, himself.

The empirical person, Fichte, has failed to understand that through his

own fear, service and labor as a philosopher he has become an absolute or

pure self-consciousness. In a very pregnant passage Fichte does allude to the

possibility that empirical consciousness, through the labor of education and

philosophical development, might attain to pure self-consciousness:

The more a determinate individual can think away of himself, the

closer does his empirical consciousness approximate to pure self-

consciousness; – from the child who leaves his cradle for the first

time, and thereby learns to distinguish it from himself, to the popular

philosopher who still accepts material idea-pictures, and searches for

the seat of the soul, and thence to the transcendental philosopher, who

at least entertains and abides by the rule of conceiving a pure self.

(WL 216)

This passage is highly suggestive and instructive. In order to understand its

significance it will be important to recall a central aspect of Fichte’s overall

system, specifically, the means by which it explains the fact of empirical

experience.

For, recall, Fichte maintains that the absolute self unconsciously posits

a not-self which the empirical self confronts as an external object opposed to

it. The empirical subject “forgets” this aboriginal act of positing by the

absolute self and so, under the domination of the absolute self and its

striving in general to preserve its perfect selfidentity, the empirical self sets

about on its infinitely deferred task of determining the object in a manner

that would be ultimately adequate to the infinity of the absolute self.

Yet, in the above passage Fichte describes what is in effect the inverse

task or, rather, a task which is apparently the inverse but which would in fact

constitute the same task, for Hegel. For, Fichte is describing a process

whereby the empirical self infinitely approximates to the absolute self. Yet,

if we were to apply the logic of Fichte’s own explanation of empirical

experience which culminates in an infinite approximation to an infinite or

absolute object, then we must conclude that Fichte has forgotten that the

absolute self has in fact been posited by Fichte himself. In other words,

rather than there being merely one moment of forgetting on the part of

empirical consciousness, as in Fichte, what Hegel’s account of the

Lord/Bondsman dialectic permits us to see is that there are in fact two

correlative acts of forgetting: one by which empirical consciousness posits

and then forgets its positing of an independent, absolute object, and the other

by which the empirical self posits and then forgets its positing of an

independent, absolute self or subject.

Indeed, this act of forgetting penetrates to the very core of Fichte’s,

not to say, Kant’s, philosophy – yet, it is also patently on the surface for all

to see. For, to what is Fichte himself referring in discussing the absolute

self’s infinite, unrestricted, selfsufficient act of self-positing if not an

absolute and infinite object? In WL, this object has been constituted by the

empirical consciousness of Fichte and by anyone who has understood

Fichte’s system. Fichte, however, has forgotten this and so declares that

empirical consciousness – including his own – can only ever infinitely

approximate to the absolute self.

Like the Bondsman vis-à-vis the Lord, Fichte locates his own absolute

or pure self-consciousness in a principle outside of his empirical self,

namely, in the absolute self, which, by definition, never appears in empirical

consciousness.216 The same dialectical explanation would apply to Kant and

to most all philosophy in the Kantian transcendental tradition inasmuch as

these draw a distinction between the absolute or transcendental ego and the

empirical ego.

For Hegel, by contrast, educated empirical consciousness just is

absolute or pure self-consciousness. In other words, for Hegel, there is no

absolute self distinct from the empirical self. That there is such a distinction

is simply how things appear to the selfconsciousness at this stage of its

development. For us, the phenomenologists, and thus initself, the empirical

self becomes the absolute self. This fact simply does not yet become explicit

for the empirical self, and so it misinterprets itself. This is the primary lesson

of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic.

4.8 Preemptory Response to a Potential Objection

Since passages from the PM have been made use of in supporting the

current nest of arguments, it is only fair to note that select few passages in

that PM give some support to the orthodox interpretation according to which

the confrontation between the two selfconsciousness hitherto discussed is

that between two distinct human beings. Thus, regarding this confrontation,

Hegel states,

In this determination lies the massive contradiction that, since the I is

what is wholly universal, absolutely pervasive, interrupted by no

limit, the essence common to all men, the two selves here relating to

each constitute one identity, so to speak one light, and yet they are

also two selves, which subsist in complete rigidity and inflexibility

towards each other, each as a reflection-into-self, absolutely distinct

from and impenetrable by the other (PM 157).

Such passages must be read within the context of the larger works in which

they are embedded and ultimately within the larger context of Hegel’s entire

corpus.

First, none of the terms used by Hegel to describe the relation between

the two selves operative within self-consciousness (e.g. “rigidity,”

“inflexibility”) run counter to the interpretation of self-consciousness

offered, thus far. To be sure, according to the orthodox interpretation as

voiced by Pippin, to maintain that two rigidly opposed selves or self-

consciousnesses are nevertheless unified in a single individual is to consign

such an individual to a “schizophrenic frenzy” (Hegel on Self-Consciousness

48). Yet, according to that logic, the Kantian who finds her particular,

natural inclinations rigidly and inflexibly opposed by her universal, absolute

moral conscience is but a mere schizophrenic. Indeed, the limitation of self-

consciousness as it first comes on the scene lies precisely in the fact that

abstract self-consciousness and empirical consciousness are each only

reflected into themselves and thus stand in a relation of mere externality to

one another, rather than being sublated into a higher unity.

It would be useful to recall the figure of Christ. For, according to

traditional Christology, which Hegel at least partly accepts, Christ is a single

individual with an absolute/lordly as well as empirical/human or even

slavish consciousness. Indeed, in The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate,

Hegel describes Christ as instantiating in his individual person a sublation of

the radical Kantian dichotomy between absolute and empirical self-

consciousness which characterizes self-consciousness in its initial stages.219

Second, immediately preceding the above passage from the PM, while

discussing the opposition between empirical consciousness and abstract self-

consciousness, Hegel states, “The two things are one and the same, the

identification of [self-consciousness’s] consciousness and its self-

consciousness” (PM 144). For Hegel, however, as we know from the PhG as

well as the PM consciousness just is self-consciousness.220 Thus,

selfconsciousness is in fact the identity of abstract self-consciousness and

empirical selfconsciousness – they are one and the same.

Third, like the PhG, the PM indicates how it will be only for the form

of the mind under investigation, not for us, the phenomenological observers,

that the development which occurs in the objective, empirical self-

consciousness is something truly distinct from the ‘I’ or subjective/abstract

self-consciousness:

In phenomenology , the soul, by the negation of its bodiliness, raises

itself to pure self-identity, becomes consciousness, becomes I, is for

itself over against its Other. But this first being-for-self of mind is still

conditioned by the Other from which the mind originates. The I is still

completely empty, an entirely abstract subjectivity; it posits all the

content of immediate mind outside itself and relates to it as to a world

it finds before it. Thus what was initially only our object, does indeed

become an object for mind itself, but the I does not yet know that

what confronts it is the natural mind itself. There, the I, in spite of

being-for-self, is at the same time not for itself, for it is only in

relation to an Other, to something given.

In other words, abstract self-consciousness forgets that the mind which

apparently confronts it as an “external,” “given” body is just its own “natural

mind”, or empirical consciousness. Indeed, as a rule, it only appears to the

form of consciousness under investigation that its object operates

independently of itself, including when that object is empirical self-

consciousness itself. To interpret the Lord/Bondsman dialectic along

orthodox lines, however, would effectively do away with the distinction

between how things merely appear to the form of consciousness under

investigation and how things actually are in-themselves or for us, the

phenomenological observers. For, it would entail that the first moment of the

doubled object of self-consciousness, namely, empirical selfconsciousness,

does not merely appear to be, but is in fact or in-itself, a wholly alien,

external object – namely, another human being.

Fourth, McDowell’s objection still stands: the orthodox interpretation

leaves entirely unexplained what happens to the whole expanse of sensuous

being inasmuch as it constitutes a moment of self-consciousness.

Fifth, the orthodox interpretation renders virtually meaningless the

strikingly evident Fichtean and Kantian context to the entire discussion of

self-consciousness in the PhG. For, that context concerns precisely the

distinction in Fichte and Kant between the transcendental or absolute ego

and the empirical ego as well as the experience within an individual

consciousness of the tension between these two principles – specifically, the

experience of domination and servitude, lordship and bondage. To say, for

example, that one of the two distinct human beings in the orthodox

interpretation constitutes abstract or pure self-consciousness while the other

constitutes empirical self-consciousness does not solve anything. For, I fail

to see how the results of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic which do occur could

be attained on the assumption that one of the two distinct human individuals

involved was not empirically conscious.

5. Stoicism, Skepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness

Before turning to the “Reason” chapter, let us first briefly examine

how Hegel advances upon the results of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic in

explaining the emergence of Stoicism, Skepticism and Unhappy

Consciousness.

5.1 Stoicism

In the experience of consciousness which gives rise to Stoicism, the

first point to note is that, while, for us, or in-itself, the object of

consciousness qua formed by the Bondsman’s fear, service and labor is

identical with the being-for-itself of selfconsciousness, still, for the form of

consciousness under investigation these two elements

“fall apart” (PhG 120). Stated differently, self-consciousness at this stage of

development achieves the identity of its being-for-self and being-in-itself,

but only on the level of immediacy. Insofar as it recognizes the unity of itself

and its object, self-consciousness becomes thinking consciousness. “For,” as

Hegel notes, “in thinking, the object does not present itself in picture-

thoughts [Vorstellungen] but in Concepts [Begriffen], i.e. in a distinct being-

in-itself or intrinsic being, consciousness being immediately aware that this

is not anything distinct from itself” (PhG 120).

Thinking consciousness, moreover, is a free or independent form of

consciousness inasmuch as, in thinking, consciousness is not determined by

something alien to itself. Yet, insofar as the identity recognized by self-

consciousness between itself and its object is merely immediate,

consciousness remains merely thinking consciousness in general [denkendes

Bewusstsein überhaupt]. Therefore, consciousness identifies only with the

universal aspect of conceptual thinking in general and forgets the

“development and process of its manifold being” (PhG 197 and 122). As a

result, the development and process of its manifold being remains for

consciousness an alien “multiplicity of things” (PhG 122).

Stoicism as a philosophy thus expresses a form of consciousness which

has undertaken the intellectual labor of forming its object as an

objectification of itself but which is still, as it were, under the sway of the

moment of fear and the general withdrawal out of objectivity characteristic

of that experience. As Hegel states, “As a universal form of the World-

Spirit, Stoicism could only appear on the scene in a time of universal fear

and bondage, but also a time of universal culture which had raised itself to

the level of thought” (PhG 121). Thus, the object with which Stoicism

identifies lacks the fullness of life. Instead, Stoicism finds itself inhabiting a

world of mere generalities which lack concrete determinations. Its

pretension to freedom is therefore compromised inasmuch as the concrete,

individual determinations of natural existence from which it would presume

to abstract are simply given to it from without.

5.2 Skepticism

Despite the intellectual labor entailed by its level of education,

Stoicism expresses the moment of fear in the experience of the Bondsman.

Skepticism, by contrast, expresses the labor of the Bondsman who sets about

actively negating the independence of the merely natural object. As Hegel

states, “In Skepticism […] the wholly unessential and non-independent

character of this ‘other’ becomes explicit for consciousness; the [abstract]

thought becomes the concrete thinking which annihilates the being of the

world in all its manifold of determinateness, and the negativity of free self-

consciousness comes to know itself in the many and varied forms of life as a

real negativity” (PhG 123).

Recall that with the emergence of self-consciousness it was discovered

that the whole expanse of life and the being of natural existence constitute

merely vanishing moments of self-consciousness itself. Yet, this occurred

only in-itself, or for us, not yet for the form of consciousness under

investigation. In Skepticism, consciousness succeeds in actively bringing

about this negation of the seeming stability and objectivity of natural

existence.

Skepticism causes to vanish “not only objective reality as such, but its

own relationship to it, in which the ‘other’ is held to be objective and is

established as such” (PhG 124). Stoicism abstracted itself from identifying

with the flux of life and empirical existence. Skepticism does not merely

abstract from but actively negates this object, and not only this object but its

relationship to it which had been established by the abstraction of Stoicism.

As a result, Skeptical consciousness careens back and forth between two

different ways of experiencing itself. At times Skeptical consciousness

experiences itself as “a consciousness which is empirical […] a single and

separate, contingent and, in fact, animal life, and a lost self-consciousness”,

while at other times it experiences itself as “a consciousness that is universal

and self-identical; for it is the negativity of all singularity and all difference”

(PhG 125).

The fundamental limitation of Skepticism is that it is unable to unite

these two ways of thinking about and experiencing itself. Through the

method of “equipollence” the skeptics were able to negate the certainty of

any determinate position by marshalling its opposite, thereby revealing to

others as well as the skeptics themselves their own universal power of

negating all determinate or singular principles. Yet, these very same skeptics

advised that it was appropriate to allow oneself to be guided by merely

sensuous phenomena and to live in conformity with the particular customs

and laws of the country in which one happened to find oneself (LHP III

342ff.). Skepticism holds apart these two contradictory aspects of its

consciousness.

5.3 The Unhappy Consciousness

The form of consciousness which succeeds Skepticism, namely

Unhappy Consciousness, knows that it is both the “self-liberating,

unchangeable and self-identical” being-for-itself of pure self-consciousness

and the contingent, animal, and lost empirical consciousness (PhG 126).

Thus, in the experience of the Unhappy Consciousness, according to Hegel,

“the duplication which formerly was divided between two individuals, the

lord and the bondsman, is now lodged in one” (PhG. 206, p. 126).

As McDowell notes, this statement might seem to count against the

previously advanced interpretation according to which the Lord/Bondsman

dialectic is best understood as dialectic internal to the experience of one

individual consciousness, rather than as occurring between two individuals

(HVW 164-5). The point to be recalled, however, is that the image of self-

consciousness as divided into two different individual is merely how things

appeared to consciousness at that stage of its development. The emergence

of Unhappy Consciousness is precisely the emergence of a form of

consciousness which not only experiences in-itself, but recognizes for-itself

its own dual nature.

Even with Unhappy Consciousness, however, the duplication of self-

consciousness within itself is not present in its unity. To the contrary, the

internal contradictoriness of consciousness is experienced all the more

poignantly by the Unhappy Consciousness; this is its special burden from

which it cannot liberate itself.

In terms of explaining the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies, Unhappy

Consciousness expresses the overarching philosophico-theological

viewpoint of the Middle Ages as mediated through the religious institution

of the Catholic Church. Thus, while in principle Unhappy Consciousness is

aware of its dual nature, it initially projects one aspect of that duality,

namely, the unchangeable being-for-self of pure selfconsciousness into alien

Beyond, while simultaneously reducing the here-below to an unessential

vanishing realm.

We have, in fact, already witnessed the basic form of this alienation

whereby empirical projects its own mastery onto a “Lord” external to it. In

the case of the Unhappy Consciousness, the external Lord which comes to

be invested with the power and mastery of developed empirical

consciousness is that of the Judeo-Christian God. As will be discussed

further, in the case of Kantian and Fichtean transcendental philosophy,

Unhappy Consciousness reemerges in a more poignant form inasmuch as the

Lord upon which empirical consciousness projects its mastery and power is

the transcendental ego.

At this stage, Unhappy Consciousness acknowledges that the Unchangeable

Beyond also resides within itself, but it cannot reconcile this indwelling of

the Unchangeable with its simultaneous experience of itself as a wretched

and fleeting natural existence. The Church and, in particular, the priest as

mediators between the absolute, Unchangeable Beyond and the vanishing,

changeable here-below, provide a kind of anticipatory figure for the

subsequent form of consciousness, namely, Reason. For, Reason is the form

of consciousness which is certain that, “in its particular individual, it has

being absolutely in itself, or is all reality” (PhG 138). As such, it will

apposite to turn to examining the “Reason” chapter of the PhG.

8. Chapter Summary

Self-consciousness is that form of consciousness for which

consciousness has become its own object. As it first appears on the scene,

this fact is true only in-itself, not yet for self-consciousness. Self-

consciousness undergoes a complex series of dialectical transformations, the

upshot of which is to mediate the development by which selfconsciousness

comes recognize for-itself that its object just is itself.

Insofar as self-consciousness eventually discovers that its object is, in

fact, itself, it thereby recognizes that its object is not merely conscious, but

self-conscious. The unfolding of this dialectical development necessitates a

complex and doubly ambiguous self-duplication of self-consciousness. For,

in the process of coming to recognize itself in its object, self-consciousness

divides itself into an abstract and putatively absolute or lordly self-

consciousness, on the one hand, and a slavish, empirical self-consciousness,

on the other. The moment of recognition emerges inasmuch as empirical

selfconsciousness, through its fear, service and labor, succeeds in producing

a truly universal object, an object, that is to say, of thought. For, in

producing such an object, empirical consciousness itself becomes a

universal, absolute mind whose object – qua universal – turns out to be just

itself.

In terms of explaining and critiquing the existence of various

philosophies, Hegel’s analysis of self-consciousness proved to be quite

illuminating. For, through this analysis it became possible to explain the

emergence of transcendental philosophy to be the result of the alienation and

faulty self-interpretation operative within empirical consciousness at a

certain stage of its development. Thus, Fichte’s philosophy emerges

inasmuch as empirical consciousness does not recognize itself to be the

universal power of thought which it has become, and instead projects that

power onto an alien principle, namely, a would-be lordly absolute or

transcendental ego.

The existence of other philosophies was also explained. For example,

Stoicism was revealed to result from the residual effect of the moment of

fear in the development of empirical consciousness. For, while Stoicism

attains to the level of universal thought, in fear it withdraws or abstracts

from the realm of natural, empirical existence. Stoicism recognizes itself

only in abstract universality; the realm of natural, empirical existence, by

contrast, strikes it as a realm terror and bondage.

Reason and Hegel’s Explanation of the Conceptions of Objectivity

Early in the “Reason” chapter of the PhG Hegel articulates a point

which is crucial to the overall argument of this dissertation:

Consciousness will determine its relationship to otherness or its object

in various ways according to the precise stage it has reached in the

development of the World-Spirit into self-consciousness. How it

immediately finds and determines itself and its object at any time, or

the way in which it is for itself, depends on what it has already

become, or what it already is in itself. (PhG 234)

The overall argument of this dissertation is that, for Hegel, the multiplicity

of philosophies is to be explained and critiqued by way of a theory of the

polymorphism of the mind. As has been established, different philosophies

express different stages in the development of the mind. The above quote

helps to specify further that inasmuch as the polymorphism of the mind

explains the fact of the multiplicity of philosophies it thereby explains the

fact of the multiple conceptions of objectivity – that is to say, the multiple

conceptions of the mind, the mind’s object and the relationship between the

mind and its object – operative within those philosophies.

For, that which perhaps most radically distinguishes philosophies is

their respective conceptions of objectivity. Thus, in order to explain how

Hegel’s account of the polymorphism of the mind provides an explanation

for the multiplicity of philosophies it is necessary to show how the

polymorphism of the mind is responsible for the multiple conceptions of

objectivity.

The present chapter, therefore, will be broken up into two major

sections:

First, there will be an examination of Hegel’s own conception of

objectivity. It will be useful to establish at least the basic elements of

Hegel’s conception of objectivity first since, for Hegel, conceptions of

objectivity other than his own constitute restrictions on, and distortions of,

his more developed position. The examination of Hegel’s conception of

objectivity will address the following elements:

1. Hegel’s effort to generalize his conception of objectivity

beyond the restrictive distortions of lower viewpoints.

2. The experiential element of Hegel’s conception of

objectivity.

3. The principle determinations of Hegel’s conception of the

mind, the mind’s object and the relation between the mind

and its object. Second, the chapter will show in the case of

Kant how Hegel’s phenomenology of the polymorphic

development of the mind can be used to explain the

conceptions of objectivity operative within the various

philosophies. In order to achieve this goal, the discussion

will return to the “Reason” chapter of the PhG. For, Reason

as it first appears on the scene is beset by a peculiar set of

limitations which causes it to maintain more than one

conception of objectivity. It is Hegel’s explanation of how

Reason comes to maintain these multiple and, as it turns out,

conflicting conceptions of objectivity that reveals even more

fully the effectiveness of his phenomenological method of

explaining the existence of different philosophies.

As will be shown, the Kantian philosophy, and, in particular, the

multiple conceptions of objectivity operative therein, expresses the

viewpoint of Reason as it first appears on the scene. Accordingly, certain

details of Kant’s philosophy will be examined inasmuch as they correspond

to Hegel’s explanation of the multiple conceptions of objectivity operative

within the viewpoint of Reason as it first appears on the scene. Having

established the twofold goal of this chapter, let us turn to examining Hegel’s

conception of objectivity.

1. Hegel’s Conception of Objectivity

Hegel does not have a systematic work in which he spells out in

precise and exhaustive detail his conception of the objectivity of knowledge.

Indeed, Hegel has often been criticized for taking a cavalier or even

dismissive stance towards traditional epistemological questions. To be sure,

Hegel lacks the kind of rigorous gnoseology that has become de rigueur in

our post-Husserlian context. As a result, we often only get indirect insight

into Hegel’s own position by way of his explanation and critique of more

restricted viewpoints. Still, through a close examination of works such as the

PhG, the PM and the “Positions on Objectivity” section of the EL, it

becomes possible to articulate at least the basic outlines of Hegel’s larger

conception of objectivity. In order to begin sketching this outline let us turn

first to examining how Hegel would generalize his – and our – conception of

objectivity.

1.1 Hegel’s Generalized Conception of Objectivity

Hegel’s effort to generalize his conception objectivity involves several

key elements. First, one must recall the passage quoted above in which

Hegel states that the conception of objectivity operative within a given form

of the mind will be determined by the stage of development to which that

form of the mind has managed to reach. For, a conception of objectivity is

constituted by the manner in which the mind determines

itself, its object and its relation to that object. Thus, Hegel shows that it is

possible to derive particular conceptions of objectivity from the more basic

and general principle of the polymorphism of the mind.

For example, in the case of Sense-certainty, consciousness or the mind

is determined to be largely an inessential afterthought, while the object is

determined to be an absolute and immediate ‘This’. The mind’s relation to

the object in the case of Sensecertainty is determined to be that of immediate

“receptivity”. Objectivity according to this form of the mind thus entails the

mind being merely “receptive” or “passive” with respect to the “external”

object existing “out there.” Other viewpoints, as we have seen, determine

themselves, their objects and their relations to their objects according to their

respective levels of development.

In contrast to the multiplicity of more or less restricted conceptions of

objectivity, however, Hegel would generalize his conception of objectivity

beyond any such restrictions by, first of all, showing how they themselves

are grounded in a more basic and general principle. Thus, an important part

of achieving this generalization lies simply in the reflective recognition by

the mind that the mind will determine in its conception of objectivity

according to the level of development it has reached. In other words, for

Hegel, in order to generate a properly generalized conception of objectivity

it is necessary to abstract from or reflect out of all the more or less restricted

conceptions of objectivity in order to observe how all conceptions of

objectivity are derived from a more basic principle, namely, the

polymorphism of the mind. Needless to say, the very ability to engage in this

kind of self-observation is mediated by the experience of Selfconsciousness.

A second and deeply related element involved in specifying the nature

of Hegel’s generalized conception of objectivity involves his larger theory of

development. For Hegel, development is a transition from potency to act.

Hegel accepts, moreover, the Aristotelian view of the mind as potentia

omnus facere et fieri. The mind contains within itself the totality of all

objects. To be sure, it does so, in the first instance, only in potency, or in-

itself. Yet, what this basic point entails is that, for Hegel, unlike for the

viewpoints of Sense-certainty and Perception, the mind relates immediately

to objects, not through “receptive” sensuous experience or intuition, but

through itself. For, the mind contains, or rather is, the totality of objects in-

itself. On such a view, objectivity is not a matter of gaining “access” or

being “receptive” to an “object” “out there”. Rather, objectivity is

fundamentally a matter of self-mediation, of explicitly positing what is

implicit in the mind, of actualizing the mind’s potency.

To affirm this point, however, is just to generalize one’s conception of

objectivity beyond any naïve restrictions. For, the mind on such an account

is, by definition, unrestricted; it is potentially all things. Thus, for Hegel, an

object can be defined in abstraction from the restrictions of any particular

stage of the mind’s development as simply the actualization of the mind’s

potency. In the most generalized sense, then, an object, for Hegel, is

whatever the mind posits for itself.

1.1.1 Preemptory Response to Potential Objections to Ascribing to Hegel

Such a Generalized Conception of Objectivity

Before continuing to examine the basic outlines of Hegel conception

of objectivity, it would be worthwhile to note that many commentators, such

as Pippin and McDowell, refuse to ascribe to Hegel the generalized

conception of objectivity just articulated. For them, to affirm that, for Hegel,

objects are actualizations of the mind’s potency is wrongly to ascribe to him

“wild [and] improbable psychological and metaphysical claims” (Hegel’s

Idealism 14). According to these commentators, Hegel’s conception of

objectivity simply must entail some notion of “external constraint” lest it

devolve into a theory of mere “projections of the mind” upon the

“independently real” (HWV 152-3). A crucial point which these

commentators miss, one which has already been suggested several times, is

that the degree of probability or plausibility one discerns in a given

philosophical position will depend upon the viewpoint one has attained

oneself. Thus, for example, what appears to be “wild” and “improbable” or

otherwise incomprehensible to a lower viewpoint will appear perfectly

intelligible and rational to a higher viewpoint. Nevertheless, it would

behoove us to clarify why, for Hegel, objectivity is not a matter of an

“external” object supplying a normative principle of “constraint” upon the

mind.

According to Hegel, that the mind should come to presuppose that

there is, or must be, a “constraint” supplied by an “external” object is itself

the result the mind operating at fairly restricted stage of development.

Indeed, such a presupposition is but a manifestation of the ruse that the mind

or Reason plays upon itself in its complex process of self-mediation. The

mind generates for itself the illusion that there is, or must be, an “externally

constraining” object, but does so precisely as a means of sublating itself. In

other words, for the mind at a certain stage of its development, there can

appear to be an “external” object “constraining” it. Yet, we, the

phenomenologists, know that this is just the mind itself mediating its own

self-development and that, accordingly, no such “externally constraining”

object exists. Still, in order to clarify this point still further, let us return to

Hegel’s use of the biological analogy and dis-analogy for understanding the

development of the mind.

1.1.2 The Biological Analogy and Clarifying Hegel’s Generalized

Conception of

Objectivity

The process of the plant’s development is indeed one of self-

mediation. The plant posits differences or “constraints” within itself which it

preserves and sublates within a higher unity. Importantly, however, the self-

mediation of the plant involves an element of “externality,” an element

which is instructive precisely because it is not present in the self-mediation

of the mind. For, in order to develop, the plant must be “receptive” to

“external” “matter” such as, for example, the soil and carbon-dioxide. Thus,

despite the fact that its development is largely a matter of self-mediation, the

plant is nevertheless dependent upon “external” matter.

Regarding the plant’s relation of dependence upon something external

to itself, however, a few points must be borne in mind. First, although it

initially finds itself dependent upon something “external”, the plant

immediately negates and sublates this externality by incorporating that

which was external to it into its own process of selfmediation. In other

words, it does not treat the “matter” external to itself as an object or

something supplied by the thing-in-itself which “externally” “constrains” it.

Quite to the contrary, it reduces such “matter” to a means or moment

constitutive of its own process of self-mediation or self-“constraint”; it

makes such “matter” a part of itself.

Second, insofar as it might be proper to speak of an object or thing-in-

itself at all in the case of the plant, it would not be of the “external” “matter”

“standing over-against” the plant of which one spoke, but rather of the plant

itself, including, if not especially, its culminating moment of development,

the fruit. Thus, even in the case of the plant, the object or thing-in-itself is

the result of the process of self-mediation and self-positing. It is not

something “already out there” which imposes “constraints” on that process.

Thus, if there are constraints on the development of the plant qua thing-in-

itself, they are in the final instance constraints or limitations which the plant

imposes upon itself in its process of self-development and self-mediation.

So much for the self-mediation of the plant. As far as present concerns

go, the most important dis-analogy between the self-mediation of the plant

and that of the mind lies in the fact that, while in the self-mediation of the

plant there is a moment of dependence upon an external element, in the self-

mediation of the mind no such dependency or externality obtains. For, while

the soil in the ground or the CO2 in the atmosphere might be spatially

external to the plant, nothing is external – spatially or otherwise – to the

mind.

To be sure, the mind can “forget” its process of self-development and

treat its object as something “external” upon which it is somehow dependent

or by which it is “constrained.” Indeed, for Hegel, such forgetting is part and

parcel of the ruse that the mind plays upon itself in mediating its own self-

development. Yet, as was revealed in the chapter on self-consciousness,

anything of which the mind is conscious is already a moment or

determination within the mind’s process of self-mediation. There is nothing

“outside” the mind.

Furthermore, for Hegel, pace Sense-certainty and Perception,

sensuous experience and our would-be “passive reception” of what is given

therein bears no especial significance for objectivity.230 Sensuous experience

may prove to be a factor in objectivity. Yet, as we have already seen in the

chapter on self-consciousness, that which is given in sensuous experience

has already been reduced to a mere means or moment of the mind’s own

self-mediation and development.231 The object or thing-in-itself does not

supply the “matter” for this moment; rather, the object or “thing-in-itself”

emerges from this “matter” as act emerges from potency, or as the fruit

emerges from the tree.

1.1.3 Summary of the Initial Discussion of Hegel’s Generalized Conception

of Objectivity

The preceding section sought to establish the initial point that Hegel

attempts to conceive of objectivity according to its full generality. The two

keys aspects to Hegel’s effort to generalize his conception of objectivity

identified were the following:

1. Hegel contributes to generating a generalized conception of

objectivity inasmuch as he abstracts from all more or less restricted

conceptions of objectivity. Hegel achieves this abstraction

precisely in and through his observation that the mind will

determine itself, its object and its relation to its object according to

the level of development it has reached.

2. Hegel’s appropriation of the Aristotelian definition of the mind as

potentially all things permits him to conceive of a radically

generalized conception objects and objectivity as ultimately a

matter of the mind’s self-mediation.

Some initial objections to ascribing to Hegel such a generalized conception

of objectivity were noted and met through an appeal to Hegel’s use of the

biological analogy and disanalogy in his overall account of the mind’s

development. It was also noted how Hegel’s articulation of these elements of

his generalized conception of objectivity is itself mediated by the experience

of self-consciousness as it learns to abstract from and observe itself. For, in

analyzing that experience Hegel thereby explains the emergence of this

crucial aspect of his own philosophy.

1.2 The Experiential Element in Hegel’s Conception of Objectivity

Having examined certain key elements in Hegel’s effort to generalize

his conception of objectivity, it will be useful to examine the manner in

which experience functions in Hegel’s overall conception of objectivity. For,

just as Hegel generalizes his conception of objectivity, he also generalizes

his conception of the role of experience in objectivity. Indeed, the

generalized character of Hegel’s conception of objectivity runs parallel to

his generalized conception of the role of experience in objectivity.

For Hegel, sensuous experience, while perhaps a contributing factor to

the objectivity of knowledge, is nevertheless certainly not decisive in the

way that it is for Sense-certainty or Perception. Yet, it remains that

experience is a crucial element in the mind’s attainment of objectivity. In

order to understand the role of experience in Hegel’s conception of

objectivity it will be useful to begin by examining his dialectical

appropriation and sublation of the Empiricist’s insistence on the role of

experience in their conception of objectivity.

1.2.1 Hegel’s Appropriation of Empiricism

The demand that knowledge be grounded in conscious experience, for

Hegel, marks the peculiar contribution of the Empiricists to the history of

philosophy and, therefore, to the ongoing genesis of self-knowledge. For,

according to Hegel, the flaw afflicting the traditional Scholastic and

Wolffian metaphysics rests in their failure to ground their theorizing in

concrete experience. The Empiricists provide an important corrective to this

deficiency by insisting that all theorizing be grounded or otherwise

verifiable in experience. As Hegel states,

Empiricism was the initial result of a double need: there was the need

first for a concrete content, as opposed to the abstract theory of the

understanding [e.g. Scholastic and Wolffian metaphysics] that cannot

advance from its universal generalizations to particularization and

determination on its own, and secondly for a firm hold against the

possibility of proving any claim at all in the field, and with the

method, of the finite determinations. Instead of seeking what is true in

thought itself, Empiricism proceeds to draw it from experience. (EL

77)

Thus, Empiricism represents an important contribution to a fully generalized

conception of objectivity inasmuch as it insists upon the experiential element

of objectivity in contrast to the abstract theorizing of, for example, the

Scholastics whose objects, or termini technii, could apparently not be

discerned within experience.

For Hegel, the flaw with Empiricism, therefore, lies not in its

insistence upon the experiential element of objectivity but rather in its

restricted conception of experience and, therefore, of objectivity itself. As

Hegel states, inasmuch as, so far are the content is concerned, Empiricism

restricts itself to what is finite, the consistent carrying through of its

programme denies the supersensible altogether or at least its cognition and

determinacy, and it leaves thinking with abstraction, [i.e.,] with formal

universality and identity. – The fundamental illusion of scientific

empiricism is always that it uses the metaphysical categories of matter,

force, as well as those of one, many, universality, etc., and it goes on to

draw conclusions, guided by categories of this sort, presupposing and

applying forms syllogizing in the process. It does this without knowing that

it thereby contains a metaphysics and is engaged in it, and that it is using

those categories and their connections in a totally uncritical and

unconscious manner. (EL 77)

Empiricism thus corresponds to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and,

perhaps, the empirical consciousness of the Bondsman at an early stage in

his development. For, like Sense-certainty and the Bondsman, Empiricism

is, in the first instance, wholly immersed in the realm of the sensuous. As a

result, Empiricism restricts its conception of experience to the finite and

sensible. Yet, despite this restriction, Empiricism, behind its own back,

presupposes and, in fact, employs the “lordly” categories – indeed, the very

categories of the old metaphysics which it would presume to jettison –

which clearly transcend the realm of the merely sensuous. Since these

categories are not given in sensuous experience, the Empiricist denies that

cognition of these categories or objects is possible and, therefore, consigns

them to the realm of merely abstract or “subjective” thought. Thus,

Empiricism’s restricted conception of objectivity runs parallel with its

restricted conception of experience.

By contrast, Hegel recovers the Empiricist insistence upon the

experiential element in objectivity, but, as with his conception of objectivity,

he generalizes his conception of experience well beyond any Empiricist

restrictions. Perhaps the clearest statement of Hegel’s generalized

conception of experience occurs in the EL in which Hegel states:

“everything that is in consciousness at all is experienced (This is even a

tautological proposition.)” (32). To repeat: for Hegel, everything that is in

consciousness at all is experienced. To appreciate the significance of this

radical claim it would be helpful to view it in light of Hegel’s comment on

Locke in which he explicitly accepts Locke’s insistence that objective

knowledge be grounded in experience yet, simultaneously, generalizes his

conception of experience beyond Locke’s Empiricist restrictions:

As to the question in point we must in the first place say that it is true

that man commences with experience if he desires to arrive at

thought. Everything is experienced, not merely what is sensuous, but

also what excites and stimulates my mind. Consciousness thus

undoubtedly obtains all conceptions and Concepts from experience;

the only question is what we understand by experience [Emphases

mine]. (LHP III 303)

Thus, for Hegel, everything is experienced - not simply what is sensuous, but

also objects which “excite the mind,” objects, including, as we will see,

universal, necessary, concrete, infinite and absolute determinations. To

recognize this point, however, one must generalize one’s conception of

experience.

Hegel’s effort to articulate his generalized conception of experience is

verily pursued throughout his entire corpus. Thus, for example, as often

noted, the original subtitle of the Phenomenology was “The Science of the

Experience of Consciousness”. Indeed, Hegel’s recognition of the

experiential element in objectivity is part and parcel of his recognition that

empirical consciousness becomes absolute consciousness. For, in becoming

the universal power of thought that is absolute consciousness, empirical

consciousness does not thereby cease to be empirically conscious. Rather,

since everything that is in consciousness at all is experienced, for the fully

developed mind everything that is given in universal, absolute consciousness

is experienced.

1.3 Determinations of Hegel’s Conception of Objectivity

Having outlined both Hegel’s attempt to conceive of objectivity

according to its full generality and his generalized conception of the role of

experience in objectivity, it will now be possible to outline with greater

clarity the basic determinations of Hegel’s more or less mature conception

of objectivity. Recall that the mind’s conception of objectivity is determined

by three factors: the manner in which the mind determines 1) itself, 2) its

object and 3) its relation to its object. Let us take up each of these

determinations in turn.

1.3.1 Hegel’s Determination of the Mind

Beginning with the discussion of Hegel’s overall theory of

development through the examination of his phenomenology of the

dialectical development of selfconsciousness, the manner in which Hegel

conceives of or determines consciousness or the mind has already been

outlined in great detail in this dissertation. To be sure, further specific

elements regarding Hegel’s conception of the mind will be analyzed in the

present chapter when the discussion turns to Hegel’s phenomenology of

Reason. Still, the basic elements of Hegel’s conception of the mind have

been sufficiently established. For Hegel, the mind is a potential totality

which, through a dialectico-organic process of self-mediation and self-

developing, actualizes itself. The process of selfmediation occurs inasmuch

as the mind posits differences – including objects – within itself, only to

sublate those differences in a higher unity. Inasmuch as the development of

the mind culminates thusly, the relation between the fully developed mind

and its object is, first of all, one of sublated identity. Before examining

further details of this relationship between the mind and its object, however,

let us first examine Hegel’s determination of the nature of object itself which

is known in and through this identity.

1.3.2 Hegel’s Determination of the Object

To be sure, for Hegel, the ultimate object of the mind is the mind itself.

Still, it is possible to identify at least five more specific manners in which

the mind determines this object: 1) universality, 2) necessity, 3) infinitude,

4) absoluteness and 5) concreteness. Thus, for Hegel, in order to

demonstrate the objectivity of knowledge of some object of inquiry one

must demonstrate that its development and eventual existence is universal,

necessary, infinite, absolute and concrete. It turns out, of course, that the

development and existence of only one such object can be demonstrated,

namely, the mind itself in its self-development and self-mediation.

Thus, to begin with, Hegel, like Kant, retains the ideal of universality

as a determination of objectivity of the mind. Unlike Kant, however, for

Hegel, the universal mind is not abstract but concrete; or, more precisely, the

universal mind begins as abstract, but then proceeds to concretize itself. The

universal mind is abstract insofar as it contains the totality of its eventual

determinations within itself but only in potency. The universal mind

becomes concrete inasmuch as it posits the determinations and differences

which it contains within itself and preserves itself within them. In other

words, a universal which abstracts from concrete determinations is not

properly uni-versal since eo ipso it does not penetrate, govern and order the

particular determinations from which its abstracts and, therefore, fails to

sublate them into a uni-ty. Thus, the universal qua

truly universal must not abstract from its particular determinations and

differences but, again, must posit and preserve itself concretely within them.

Regarding the determination of absoluteness, it is clear that the

concrete universal mind must be absolute. For, were the universal to be

restricted in extension, it would not be fully universal. Yet, were the

universal to be restricted in intension, it would not fully concrete. Thus, the

concrete, universal mind determines not just everything, but everything

about everything. As such, it is absolute or unconditioned. For, there are no

conditions external to it. Rather, it posits and preserves within itself all

possible conditions or determinations. It is absolutely self-conditioning and

self-determining.

The concrete universal mind is also thereby infinite in the sense that it

is unrestricted by anything external. It posits restrictions and determinations

within itself only to sublate them into its own concrete, absolute

universality. 239

The self-development and self-mediation of the infinite, absolute,

concrete and universal mind is also, for Hegel, necessary. A task of

philosophy is to demonstrate this necessity which, for Hegel, entails

demonstrating how all particular forms of the mind, along with their

correlative objects, derive necessarily from the Concept of mind itself:

[S]peculative thinking has to demonstrate each of its objects and the

development of them in their absolute necessity. This happens when

each particular concept is derived from the self-producing and self-

actualizing universal concept or the logical Idea. Philosophy must

therefore comprehend mind as a necessary development of the eternal

Idea and must let what constitutes the particular parts of the science of

mind evolve purely from the concept of mind. Just as in the living

creature generally, everything is already contained, in an ideal

manner, in the germ and is brought forth by the germ itself, not by an

alien power, so too must all particular forms of the living mind grow

out of its concept as from their germ. (PM 6-7)

According to Hegel’s particular conception, the necessity of the mind’s

development rests in the fact that the mind supplies its own conditions for

emergence. For, the mind qua potency is in contradiction with its concept

and so spontaneously desires to posit an existence for itself that is adequate

to its concept. Yet, in thereby positing its existence the mind is not restricted

by any external principle but instead supplies the grounds or conditions for

its own development from within itself.240 As a result, the freedom or self-

determination of the mind in its development is, for Hegel, famously

coincident with its necessity.241

Thus, for Hegel, the normative determinations of the mind’s objectivity

consist of universality, necessity, concreteness, absoluteness and infinitude.

Such an object, in the end, can only consist of the mind itself in its full

actuality. These determinations of the object thus do not constitute

“constraints” supplied by an “external” object. They are immanent in the

mind, and are posited by and for the mind as it engages in its process of

dialectical self-mediation.

1.3.3 Hegel’s Determination of the Mind’s Relation to Its Object

As already noted, the mind’s ultimate relation to its object is one of

mediated or sublated identity. As such, recognition is also a quality of the

relation between the fully developed mind and its object. For, the fully

developed mind is not merely identical with its object in-itself, but it also

recognizes this fact for-itself.

Inasmuch as the fully developed mind is identical to its object and

recognizes itself therein, truth itself must also be a quality of the relation of

the mind to its object. Indeed, as was noted in the Chapter One, Hegel

appropriates the traditional conception of truth as the correspondence

between thought and being, or the mind and its object. Hegel, 241 Cf. Hegel:

“The truth of necessity is thereby freedom” (EL 232). of course, adds the

crucial point that the only object which could ultimately correspond to or be

adequate to the mind would be the mind itself.

Insofar as it is the mind itself which is its own object, then not only is

truth a quality of the relation between the mind and its object, but so is

certainty. For, to the extent that the mind’s object is ultimately just itself,

this would seem to preclude the possibility of skeptical doubts that the mind

might somehow not be adequate to knowing its object or that, in coming to

know its object, the mind would be at risk of distorting it. Indeed, as we

have already seen in earlier sections of this dissertation, Hegel not only

critiques but explains the very existence of such skeptical doubts, showing

them to manifest a lower stage of the mind’s development. At any rate, this

quality of certainty which turns out to be coincident with truth and is that

according to which the mind relates to its object will become clearer when

we turn to the discussion of the “Reason” chapter whose subtitle is “The

Certainty and Truth of Reason.”

Thus, the mind relates to its object in and through identity, recognition,

truth and certainty. The mind, in the course of its self-development, posits an

object for itself which slowly becomes adequate to the mind itself. Once the

object becomes adequate to or corresponds to the mind, the mind recognizes

itself therein, truth is attained and the mind and its object enjoy the certainty

of their sublated identity.

1.4 Summary of Preceding Section

We have thus provided an outline of Hegel’s more or less mature

conception of objectivity. As mentioned, Hegel’s conception of objectivity

is often lacking in gnoseological detail and rigor. Still, it was possible to

determine that Hegel’s conception of objectivity includes an effort to

generalize it beyond the restrictions of all viewpoints shy of the absolute

viewpoint. This effort of removing any naïve restrictions on his conception

of objectivity runs parallel with his effort to conceive of the experiential

element of objectivity according to its full generality, as well. For Hegel,

everything that is in consciousness at all is experienced. Therefore, contrary

to lower viewpoints such as Sense-certainty or Perception, sensuous

experience bears no special significance for the objectivity of knowledge,

for Hegel. Instead, sensuous experience is but a means or moment in the

minds process of self-mediation.

In terms of the basic determinations of Hegel’s conception of

objectivity, the mind is a self-developing, self-mediating totality which

posits an ultimately universal, concrete, absolute, infinite and necessary

object for itself, which object turns out to be the mind itself. Hence, the

mind relates to its object according to the qualities of identity, recognition,

truth and certainty.

2. Reason

Now that we have established a basic outline of Hegel’s conception of

objectivity, it will be useful to return to the ongoing analysis of the PhG.

For, we are now in a position to diagnose with even greater precision how

Hegel explains the multiplicity of philosophies. As Hegel makes clear, the

conception of objectivity operative within a given viewpoint will be

determined according to that viewpoint’s level of development. Lower forms

of consciousness will necessarily maintain distorted conceptions of

objectivity coincident with their restricted viewpoints. Yet, now that we

have established Hegel’s mature conception of objectivity, we can specify

more precisely exactly wherein those restriction and distortions lie. As such,

we can also specify more precisely how Hegel explains the emergence of the

philosophies which express these restricted and distorted conceptions of

objectivity.

Reason is the next form of consciousness which Hegel analyzes in the

PhG. As noted, Reason constitutes a very highly developed form of

consciousness. Still, Reason as it first appears on the scene is beset by some

peculiar restrictions which manifest themselves in the conceptions of

objectivity to which they give rise. In order to explicate this set of issues, let

us turn to examining the initial portions of Hegel’s phenomenology of

Reason.

2.1 An Examination of the Initial Stages of Reason

Like all the major parts of the PhG, the “Reason” chapter is rich and

multifaceted.

Its points of analysis extend from the arcane theories of Phrenology and

Physiognomy of Hegel’s time all the way to ancient Greece and Sophocles’

great play Antigone. Much of this analysis, however, does not admit of

proper treatment in the current context. Focus will remain, instead, on those

aspects of Hegel’s discussion which serve most directly to advance the

larger effort of this dissertation, namely, to explicate the method by which

Hegel explains the emergence of the multiplicity of conflicting philosophies.

Fortunately, some of the most pertinent aspects of Hegel’s discussion in this

respect occur within the opening few sections of the “Reason” chapter. For,

these sections pick up and carry forward in a most explicit fashion Hegel’s

ongoing effort to explain just how Kantian and Fichtean transcendental

philosophy emerges.

Reason, like the whole of reality with which it turns out to be

coincident, is an emergent phenomenon. Reason, qua actual, comes into

being. The account of the experience of consciousness and self-

consciousness which has thus far been provided shows the basic schematic

structure by which Reason has developed. Reason results from the

“movement” in which the mind posits “the completely developed single

individual” (PhG 139). The completely developed single individual is that

form of the mind which grasps that it is “in itself Absolute essence” (PhG

139). In other words, Reason is the form of consciousness which possesses

the certainty that, “in its particular individuality, it has being absolutely in

itself, or is all reality” (PhG. 230, 138).

Needless to say, that Reason should constitute the consciousness of

the fully developed, single individual, and that the “Consciousness” and

“Self-consciousness” chapter of the Phenomenology have described the

development of this consciousness, serves to confirm all the more one of the

central arguments of the preceding chapter, namely, that the course of

development described within the “Self-consciousness” chapter is that of a

single, empirical, individual consciousness. Be that as it may, what calls for

some initial clarification is just what Hegel means by stating that Reason is

the form of the mind which is certain that it is all of reality.

2.1.1 Reason qua All of Reality

According to Hegel, what does it mean to say that Reason is, and

recognizes itself as, all of reality? The simple answer is that, according to

Hegel, Reason recognizes that the world it inhabits is one which it has

posited for-itself and which, in fact, is itself. For, Reason is the successor or

continuation of the empirical servile consciousness. Yet, the servile

consciousness labored to develop an object in which it could recognize

itself, and in so doing it correlatively produced itself as a fully developed,

individual mind. Reason is the recognition that the mind and the object

which have been thereby produced are in fact the same.

The object which the servile consciousness produces as it proceeds on

its journey is the universal. Yet, as Hegel states, “In this movement

[consciousness] has also become aware of its unity with this universal, a

unity which, for us, no longer falls outside of it since the sublated

[Aufgehoben] single individual is the universal” (PhG 139). In producing a

universal object, the mind of the particular individual thus becomes

universal itself. As such, it is united to the universal. Indeed, this is just what

an educated, individual empirical consciousness consists in for Hegel: a

mind which has overcome in its initial one-sided particularity and now

actively inhabits a universal viewpoint.

Now, despite the fact that the world which the developed empirical

mind of Reason inhabits is indeed a universe, a universe in which it is

certain that whatever it may come to know will be just its own self, certain

limitations still afflict the mind at this point. We have already seen similar

limitations afflicting the mind qua consciousness and qua self-consciousness

during each of their respective initial stages of development. The two main

limitations afflicting Reason with which Hegel is concerned are 1) that at

this stage we are as yet only dealing with Reason in its immediacy, or

Reason as it first comes on the scene, and 2) as a result of its immediacy

Reason has forgotten the path of development which it has traversed in order

to become Reason. Let us examine both of these limitations.

2.1.2 The Immediacy of Reason and its Self-forgetting

According to Hegel,

Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality; thus does

idealism express its Concept. Just as consciousness, that comes on the

scene as Reason, possesses that certainty directly [unmittelbar] in

itself, so too does idealism given direct expression to that certainty: ‘I

am I’, in the sense that the ‘I’ which is an object for me is the sole

object, all reality and all that is present. (PhG 140)

In a sense, we have returned to the truth already revealed in the experience

of selfconsciousness, namely, that the object of which consciousness is

conscious is itself, which truth, moreover, is expressed in the foundational

principle: ‘I am I.’ The difference, however, between mere self-

consciousness, on the one hand, and Reason, on the other, is that while in

self-consciousness it was true that the object of which it was conscious was

indeed itself, that truth had yet to be raised to certainty; it had yet to be

rendered fully explicit for consciousness. In-itself, or for us, the

phenomenological observers, self-consciousness could be expressed as ‘I am

I’; yet, it is only with the emergence of Reason that consciousness expresses

itself thusly.

The emergence of Reason is thus concomitant with the emergence of

philosophical Idealism. Reason is emergent in and through Idealism. For,

Idealism objectifies and expresses for consciousness the truth that Reason is

all of reality, thus raising this truth to certainty. Needless to say, Hegel is

here explicitly confirming the basic thesis of this dissertation, namely, that

different philosophies express different stages of the development of the

mind.

Hegel makes the further point that Reason sublates the viewpoint of the

two previous major forms of consciousness, namely, consciousness and self-

consciousness. For, from the viewpoint of consciousness, its object or the

true “had for [it] the determinateness of being”, while, for the viewpoint of

self-consciousness, the object or the true “had the determination of being

only for consciousness” (PhG 140). Yet, with the emergence of Reason,

these two viewpoints, “[r]educed themselves to a single truth, viz. that what

is, or the in-itself, only is in so far as it is for consciousness, and what is for

consciousness is also in itself or has intrinsic being” (PhG 140-41). The

mind posits the objective world which it inhabits. By the time we arrive at

the viewpoint of consciousness, however, the mind has already forgotten

that it has posited its object, so it naively treats it as a “being” which it

“finds” “out there” in the “world.” As such, mere consciousness also naively

assumes that any activity on the part of the mind can only distort the object

thereby resulting in the object becoming “merely” for consciousness and so

not possessing intrinsic being or existence in-itself.

The experience of self-consciousness breaks the mind of this naiveté.

In its culminating moment of development, self-consciousness overcomes

the naïve assumption that there is an object “out there” in “the world” and

that its active positing or determination of this object would thus somehow

render it “merely” “subjective” or only for consciousness. Instead, mind qua

Reason “contains no determination that it does not recognize as a

determination posited by itself” (PM 16). Thus, in becoming Reason, the

mind recognizes that the objective world which it has posited for itself is the

real world, or is being-in-itself.

Philosophical Idealism expresses this emergent certainty on the part of

Reason that it is all of reality or that the world which it inhabits is one which

it has posited for itself. Yet, in the first instance, Reason is present only in

its immediacy. It has therefore forgotten the path which it traversed in order

to reach its current stage of development. Several aspects of this forgetting

and its consequences demand immediate clarification.

First, because Reason as it first appears on the scene has forgotten the

course of its development it “does not comprehend its own self” (PhG 141).

In other words, recollecting the developmental path which the mind has

traversed in order to arrive at its current viewpoint is essential to its self-

knowledge. Needless to say, such self-knowledge is crucial, for Hegel, since

its lack distorts Reason’s own interpretation of what it means to be all of

reality.

Second, in forgetting its path of development Reason is also unable to

“make itself comprehensible to others” (PhG 141). The issue raised, here, is

explicitly that of the problem of philosophical disagreement. For, in first

coming on the scene, Reason asserts the truth that it is all of reality as an

immediate certainty. Here, Hegel surely has in mind that fact that Fichte’s

system begins with the immediate affirmation of the self-positing I, which is

expressed in the formula: “I am I, my object and my essence is I” (PhG

141). For Hegel, the discovery on the part of the mind that, qua Reason, it is

all of reality is the result of an arduous journey of intellectual development.

Fichte’s Idealism, by contrast, begins with the immediate assertion of this

principle.

The problem with beginning with the immediate assertion that Reason

is all of reality, according to Hegel, is that such Idealism thereby admits of

being refuted by the mere counter-assertion of another certainty, namely,

that of ordinary consciousness for which there is an object other than it

which is its essence, or, that the I is the essence of consciousness only “by

drawing back from the ‘other’ altogether, and taking [its] place as an

actuality alongside it” (PhG 141). In other words, in merely asserting the

truth that it is all of reality as an immediate certainty, Fichtean Idealism 1)

proclaims a truth which is incomprehensible to ordinary naïve consciousness

and 2) gives ordinary naïve consciousness license to proclaim its own

immediate certainty that it is confronted by an “external” object distinct

from itself. In such a scenario, philosophical discourse between those

philosophies which proclaim the immediate certainty of Reason and those

which proclaim the immediate certainty of ordinary naïve consciousness, or

indeed Sensecertainty, rapidly devolves into battle of counter-assertions.

Hegel is perhaps somewhat unjust to Fichte on this score since Fichte is

at least aware that ordinary naïve consciousness is immediately certain that

it is confronted by an “external” object that is distinct from itself. Moreover,

one of the overriding goals of the WL is to provide an explanation of this

naïve assumption. Thus, Fichte in principle recognizes the need both to

comprehend, and to make oneself comprehensible to, naïve consciousness.

Hegel’s critique, however, seems to focus on the fact that Fichte does

not provide an account of the genesis of Reason’s own self-certainty.

Fichte’s Idealism “appeals to the self-consciousness of each and every

consciousness” in order to make itself comprehensible; in other words, it

asks those who would wish to comprehend it to engage in the radical

abstraction that Fichte describes on various occasions. Yet, it does not

thereby generate a genetic account of the very emergence of self-

consciousness and the self-certainty of Reason. It does not, in other words,

provide the “natural history of consciousness” which it promised. Instead, it

forgets this history and proclaims without further ado the certainty of

Reason that it is all of reality.

For Hegel, ordinary consciousness needs more than the immediate

assertion of Reason if it is to comprehend and indeed come to adopt the

viewpoint of Reason. This point, of course, connects back to Hegel’s famous

declaration in the Preface to the PhG according to which “the individual has

the right to demand that Science should at least provide him with the ladder

to this standpoint, should show him this standpoint within himself” (PhG

14-5). Ordinary consciousness has the right to demand that it be provided

not simply with a bare assertion that Reason is all of reality but with a very

ladder by which it could raise itself to this viewpoint.

To be sure, for Hegel, the PhG, not the WL, would constitute such a

ladder. For, the PhG will demonstrate to ordinary consciousness much more

precisely and comprehensively than the WL that

Consciousness will determine its relationship to otherness or its object

in various ways according to the precise stage it has reached in the

development of the World-Spirit into self-consciousness. How it

immediately finds and determines itself and its object at any time, or

the way in which it is for itself, depends on what it has already

become, or what it already is in itself (PhG 141-2).

Fichte can explain to ordinary consciousness the source of its naiveté. For

Hegel, however, Fichte does not provide ordinary consciousness with a

precise phenomenology of the stages (i.e. steps on the ladder) it must

traverse in order to break itself of its naiveté and ascend to the viewpoint of

Reason. As a result, ordinary consciousness can only find in Fichtean

Idealism an incomprehensible mere counter-assertion against its own

assertion of its immediate certainty.

2.1.3 Summary of Hegel’s Initial Account of Reason as it first Appears on

the Scene

Reason as it first appears on the scene, or in its immediacy, is Reason

which immediately asserts the certainty that it is all of reality. Reason in its

immediacy is thus incomprehensible to ordinary consciousness for whom,

by contrast, it is simply obvious that Reason or the mind is not all of reality,

but rather that the mind is confronted or otherwise “constrained” by an

“object” “out there”. The result is that the assertion of immediate Reason’s

certainty – ‘I am I’ or ‘I am because I am’ – can only appear to ordinary

consciousness as a mere incomprehensible counter-assertion to its own

immediately asserted certainty, ‘The object is because it is.’ In the context of

this analysis, Hegel provides an explanation for the ever-renewed and

seemingly futile conflict and mutual incomprehension between naïve

Realists and transcendental Idealists.

Importantly, Reason in its immediacy also has forgotten the path by

which it developed itself into its current form of the mind. Reason in its

immediacy, therefore, fails to comprehend itself. It is this self-forgetting and

consequent lack of selfcomprehension or self-knowledge on the part of

immediate Reason, moreover, which, as we will see, serves to explain in

greater precision the very emergence of Kantian-style transcendental

philosophy. Let us turn, then, to examining this aspect of Hegel’s analysis.

2.2 Kantian Transcendental Philosophy as Expressing the Viewpoint of

Immediate Reason

Recall that Reason just is the single individual which affirms for-itself

that it is the universal power of thought, or that it is all of reality. As such, it

is coincident with philosophical Idealism. Still, when Reason first appears

on the scene it has forgotten the path of development by which it has

attained to the standpoint of the universal. As a result of having forgotten its

path of development, moreover, Reason , according to

Hegel, reverts “to the standpoint of ‘meaning’ and ‘perceiving’” (PhG 145).

The fact that Reason as it first appears on the scene forgets its path of

development and reverts to the viewpoints of Sense-certainty and Perception

is all-important for certain of the details of Hegel’s explanatory account of

the emergence of Kant’s philosophy.

For, to begin with, recall that for Sense-certainty and Perception

objects are given in immediate sensuous experience. Thus, despite the fact

that Reason has in-itself constituted the universal as its object and has in-

itself become the universal power of thinking, due to its self-forgetting and

thus lack of self-knowledge, it reverts to the naïve standpoint of Sense-

certainty and Perception according to which objects are not universal but

rather particular ‘Thises’ or ‘Things’ “out there” which are given in

immediate sensuous experience. Insofar as Kant’s philosophy expresses the

viewpoint of Reason which has forgetfully and thus unwittingly reverted to

the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception we can expect that its

conception of itself and its object will correspond to that which we have

already found in Sense-certainty and Perception. Indeed, this is precisely

what we find.

For, despite attaining to the viewpoint of Reason, Kant also clearly

reverts to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception. This fact is

revealed throughout the Critique of Pure Reason. For example, the opening

passages of the Transcendental Aesthetic clearly articulate a viewpoint that

has reverted to Sense-certainty and Perception: “In whatever way and

through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through

which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is

directed as an end, is intuition” (A19/B33). Thus, according to Kant,

cognition relates to objects, not through self-mediated identity and truth, but

rather immediately through intuition. All thought, moreover, is directed as a

mere means to intuition. More direct expressions of the viewpoint of Sense-

certainty and Perception could scarcely be imagined.

Kant continues to express the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and

Perception in the clearest of terms:

The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way

in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are

therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us

intuitions; but they are thought through the understanding, and from it

arise concepts. But all thought, whether straightaway (directe) or

through a detour (indirecte), must ultimately be related to intuitions,

thus, in our case, to sensibility, since there is no other way in which

objects can be given to us (A19/B33).

Objects are given to us through sensibility which is a receptive capacity for

being affected by objects. These statements correspond precisely to the self-

understanding operative on the level of Sense-certainty and Perception. For

Sense-certainty and Perception, the object is a particular ‘This’ or ‘Thing’,

given in “sensibility” and by which consciousness is “affected.” Evidence

of Kant’s having reverted to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and

Perception could be multiplied. Yet, that is not the end of the story. For,

Kant has also attained to the viewpoint of Reason. What does it mean to say

that one has attained to the viewpoint of Reason? It means that one has

posited and determined the universal within one’s experience and that one

has indeed become the universal power of thought. Thus, we must conclude

that Kant has constituted the universal within his own experience. The

fact that Kant both attains to and yet reverts from the viewpoint of Reason –

or, as Hegel will express more precisely, the fact that Kant “shifts” back-

and-forth between the viewpoint of Reason, on the one hand, and Sense-

certainty and Perception, on the other – this fact is an essential basis upon

which Hegel explains the very existence of the Kantian philosophy (PhG

144). For, Hegel has already succeeded in explaining the very existence of

certain statements in Kant inasmuch as they express the viewpoint of Sense-

certainty and Perception. Yet, Hegel’s explanatory account can be further

specified and enriched by showing how it permits him to account for the

different conceptions of objectivity operative within Kant’s philosophy.

2.2.1 The Multiple Conceptions of Objectivity Operative within Kantian

Philosophy

Insofar as Kant’s philosophy expresses the viewpoint of immediate

Reason, which is to say, Reason which has also unwittingly reverted to the

viewpoint Sensecertainty and Perception, it will contain at least two distinct

conceptions of objectivity, two conceptions, moreover, which, in the event,

prove to be at odds with one another. For, in the case of immediate Reason,

there will be a conception of objectivity which corresponds to the mind qua

operating within the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception as well as

a distinct conception of objectivity which corresponds to the mind qua

operating within the viewpoint of Reason.

Hegel provides a quite helpful account of these two distinct

conceptions of objectivity operating simultaneously within Kant’s

philosophy in the EL. In fact, as it turns out, Hegel identifies a third, distinct

conception of objectivity operative within Kant’s philosophy. As will

become evident, however, this third conception has already been shown to

be grounded in the experience of Perception – or, to be more precise, this

third conception of objectivity will prove to result not merely from the

experience of Perception, but from the distortion that emerges inasmuch as

Kant unwittingly shifts back and forth between the viewpoint of Sense-

certainty and Perception, on the one hand, and that of Reason, on the other.

Thus, with respect to the distinct conceptions of objectivity operative in

Kant’s philosophy, Hegel states:

’Objective’ and ‘subjective’ are convenient expressions which we

employ currently, but their use can very easily give rise to confusion too. So

far our explanation has shown that ‘objectivity’ has a threefold significance.

To start with, it has the significance of what is externally present, as distinct

from what is only subjective, meant, dreamed, etc.; secondly, it has the

significance, established by Kant, of what is universal and necessary as

distinct from the contingent, particular and subjective that we find in our

sensation; and thirdly, it has the lastmentioned significance of the In-itself as

thought-product, the significance of what is there, as distinct from what is

only thought by us, and hence still distinct from the matter itself, or from the

matter [Sache] in-itself.” (EL 83) Let us take each of these conceptions of

objectivity in turn and note how they are grounded in the polymorphism of

the mind.

First, within Kant’s philosophy there is a conception of objectivity

according to which what counts as objective is that which is “externally

present” in sensible experience. Such a conception of objectivity

corresponds to that operative in Sensecertainty and Perception.

There is a second conception of objectivity within Kant’s philosophy

according to which in order to count as objective the object must consist of

universal and necessary determinations. Such a conception of objectivity

corresponds to that operative within Reason.

There is, of course, a third conception of objectivity according to

which to count as objective the object must be independent or absolute. Of

course, each viewpoint determines what it considers to be independent or

absolute, or what exists through itself. For Sense-certainty, the absolute is

the immediate being of the ‘This’: it is because it is. For self-consciousness,

the absolute is itself: I am because I am. As we saw in the specific case of

Perception, however, consciousness at a certain point conceives of the

absolute as a wholly indeterminate ‘Thing’ lurking behind the multiplicity of

sensuous phenomena. As will be shown, moreover, that, for Kant, this thing-

in-itself ultimately cannot be known as it is in-itself results from the ad hoc

solution he devises for reconciling the prior two conceptions of objectivity.

Thus, Kant’s three conceptions of objectivity clearly are grounded the

polymorphism of Kant’s mind as he unwittingly shifts back and forth

between different viewpoints.

2.2.2 The Significance of Kant’s Multiple and Conflicting Conceptions of

Philosophy for Explaining and Critiquing his Philosophy

Let us explore in even more depth the precise nature of the dialectical

explanation and critique of Kant’s position which Hegel is articulating both

in his phenomenology of Reason and in his treatment of Kant’s multiple

conceptions of objectivity laid out in the EL.

Based on what has been covered, thus far, it is clear that, according to

Hegel, in Kant there is an experiential, a universal and necessary, and an

absolute element to objectivity. Importantly, however, for Hegel, these

various elements and conceptions of objectivity in Kant are not synthesized

and sublated into a unitary conception of objectivity, but rather the different

elements and conception remain opposed to one another. Thus, the first

conception of objectivity emphasizes the experiential element of objectivity.

Here, Kant would appear to be deriving the previously discussed lesson from

the Empiricists, namely, that in order to be objective knowledge must be

grounded in experience. Yet, since, like the Empiricists, Kant’s conception

of experience is restricted to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and

Perception, he can only conceive of experience in terms of sensation,

whether the so-called inner or outer sense.

This fact, however, creates a tension with the second conception of

objectivity according to which the objectivity of an object depends upon its

consisting of universal and necessary determinations. Yet, such universal

and necessary determinations are not given in sensation or sensible intuition.

Thus, Kant’s first conception of objectivity would seem to be at odds with

his second conception. For Hegel, it is just this tension between these two

conceptions of objectivity operative within Kant’s philosophy – along with

the further complicating factor introduced by the third, absolute, aspect of

objectivity – which precipitates several of the various problematic aspects of

Kant’s philosophy.

Hegel articulates the state of the problem facing Kant by observing

that, on the one hand, for Kant, “only what is singular and only what

happens are contained in perception [taken] on its own account”, while, on

the other hand, “Critical Philosophy holds on to the factum that universality

and necessity, being also essential determinations, are found to be present in

what is called experience” (EL 81). In other words, from the viewpoint of

Sense-certainty and Perception, only singular ‘Thises’ or ‘Things’ as well as

their contingent succession in imaginable space and time (i.e. “what

happens”) are given in experience. Yet, the viewpoint of Reason, as a matter

of fact, experiences universal and necessary objects or determinations.

Kant’s challenge as a philosopher is to attempt to reconcile these two

viewpoints.

Again, it is helpful to correlate this discussion with the analysis of the

Lord/Bondsman dialectic. For, it is through the development of the empirical

consciousness of the Bondsman that the universal is actually constructed as

the object of experience and that a universal mind comes into existence.

Thus, in the case of Kant, the empirical person, Immanuel Kant, through the

fear, service and labor involved in becoming an educated denizen of 18th

Century Prussia, learned to construct in his experience such putatively

universal and necessary objects or determinations as one finds, for example,

in the laws of Newtonian science or the laws of moral conscience. Yet, the

mere emergence of the universal within the experience of the empirical

consciousness of the Bondsman does not imply that the Bondsman has

attained to perfect self-knowledge. Rather, in the first instance, the

Bondsman forgets himself and his process of development, and as a result

ascribes to an alien principle, the Lord, his own universal power of thought.

A precisely analogous phenomenon occurs in Kant’s philosophy.

For, Kant has “forgotten” the empirical process of the education and

intellectual development by which he has posited and determined for himself

in conscious experience the universal objects and determinations of, for

example, Newtonian science or moral conscience. Still, these objects are

indeed given in his conscious experience, provided that one generalizes

one’s conception of experience. Yet, Kant has reverted to the viewpoint of

Sense-certainty and Perception according to which experience is restricted to

the realm of the sensuous and objects must be given in sensuous experience

in order to be considered objective. Thus, in order to account for the Faktum

of putatively universal and necessary objects constitutive of his experience,

the empirical person, Kant (like the Bondsman) ascribes to an alien, lordly

power – namely, the Transcendental Unity of Apperception (TUA) – his

own universal power of thought.

Hegel thus summarizes the upshot of Kant’s effort:

While Hume attacks the universality and necessity of the categories

generally, and Jacobi their finitude, Kant merely argues against their

objectivity in so far as they are present in external things themselves,

while maintaining them to be objective in the sense of holding good

as universal and necessary, as they do, for instance, in mathematics

and natural science. The fact that we crave for universality and

necessity as that which first constitutes the objective, Kant thus

undoubtedly allows. But if universality and necessity do not exist in

external things, the question arises ‘Where are they to be found?’ To

this Kant, as against Hume, maintains that they must be a priori, i.e.

that they must rest on reason itself, and on thought as self-conscious

reason; their source is the subject, ‘I’ in my self-consciousness. This,

simply expressed, is the main point in Kantian philosophy (LHP III

427-8).

Thus, Kant has attained to the viewpoint of Reason. As such he both

experiences universal and necessary determinations and insists upon these as

the normative criteria for the objectivity of objects. Yet, Kant has also

reverted to the viewpoint of Sensecertainty and Perception according to

which the criteria for the objectivity of an object consist not in its possessing

universal and necessary determinations but in being “external” to the mind

and being given in sensible experience or intuition. Since universal and

necessary objects are not given in sensible intuition they cannot be

“objective” according to the conception of objectivity operative within

Sense-certainty and Perception. Yet, it is their very universality and

necessity which ensures their objectivity from the viewpoint of Reason.

According to Hegel, Kant responds to this pseudo-problem by

contriving an ad hoc solution. Kant’s solution is to maintain the following

two positions simultaneously:

1) The universal and necessary determinations of pure science,

mathematics and moral conscience are objective in the sense that

they are not reducible to the “mere” subjectivity of empirical

consciousness but are instead grounded in the transcendental

subject, or TUA.

2) The universal and necessary determinations are also not objective

in the sense that they do not qualify “external” objects as they are

in themselves.

The first aspect of this ad hoc solution satisfies the conception of objectivity

operative within the viewpoint of Reason, while the second aspect satisfies

the conception of objectivity operative in Sense-certainty and Perception –

satisfies this conception in the sense that it A) responds to Sense-certainty

and Perception’s demand that, in order to be considered truly objective,

objects must be given in sensuous experience, and then B) acknowledges

that this criterion fails to be met in the case of universal and necessary

determinations.260

Yet, for Hegel, the result of Kant’s ad hoc attempt to satisfy these two

conflicting conceptions of objectivity between which he unwittingly shifts

back and forth consists is a mere contradiction in which knowledge of

objects is held to be both objective and not objective, true and not true:

The pure Reason of this idealism, in order to reach this ‘other’ which

is essential to it [i.e. it is needed to supply the “matter” of sensation],

and thus is the in-itself, but which it does not have within it, is

therefore thrown back by its own self on to that knowing which is not

a knowing of what is true; in this way, it condemns itself of its own

knowledge and volition to being an untrue kind of knowing, and

cannot get away from ‘meaning’ and ‘perceiving’, which for it have

no truth. It is involved in a direct contradiction; it asserts essence to

be a duality of opposed factors, the unity of apperception and equally

a Thing; whether the Thing is called an extraneous impulse, or an

empirical or sensuous entity, or the Thing-in-itself, it still remains in

principle the same, i.e. extraneous to that unity (PhG 144-5).

Kant, despite having attained to the viewpoint of Reason, nevertheless

“cannot get away from” from Sense-certainty and Perception (i.e. “meaning”

and “perceiving”). As a result, he contrives an ad hoc solution which in the

end condemns him to a knowing which is yet a not knowing, for the object

which is known is denied to be the thing-initself as it is in-itself. Most

importantly, as far as this dissertation is concerned, this “direct

contradiction” is not just critiqued, but explained to be an expression of the

polymorphism of Kant’s mind.

2.2.3 The Significance of Kant’s Restricted Conception of Experience for

Explaining and

Critiquing his Philosophy

As noted, Kant’s conception of the role of experience in objectivity is

restricted and distorted due to his inability to get away from Sense-certainty

and Perception. This fact adds a still further element to Hegel’s dialectical

explanation and critique of Kant’s philosophy that bears at least brief

mention.

For Kant, insisting that the pure categories of the TUA do not derive

from experience, or are “a priori”, is meant to preserve their objectivity in

the face of Hume’s critique. Yet, for Hegel, this ad hoc maneuver can only

appear necessary to the extent that one retains a restricted conception of

experience, a conception of experience, that is, which corresponds to the

viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception. Once one generalizes one’s

conception of the experiential element of objectivity and thereby recognizes

that everything given in consciousness is experienced, then it no longer

becomes necessary to insist on the “a priority” of universal and necessary

determinations in order to preserve their objectivity. For, in that case, the

fact that a determination is not given in sensuous experience does not mean

that it is not given in experience at all; nor does it threaten to undermine the

objectivity of what is thereby experienced, for on a generalized conception

of experience, sensuous experience possesses no special relevance for

objectivity. For Kant, by contrast, inasmuch as he reverts to the conceptions

of experience and objectivity operative in Sense-certainty and Perception,

the fact that universal and necessary determinations are not given in

sensuous experience necessarily entails that they are not objective.

2.2.4 An Example by Way of McDowell

It will help to clarify and solidify Hegel’s point regarding how the

mind can attain to the viewpoint of Reason yet revert to a lower viewpoint

by examining an example other than Kant. As it turns out, we need look no

further than McDowell for an example of a philosopher and reader of both

Kant and Hegel who, despite useful insights, clearly reverts to the

restrictions of the Sense-certainty and Perception. This reversion to the

viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception on the part of McDowell can be

used 1) to explain McDowell’s own interpretation of certain aspects of

Hegel which was briefly discussed earlier in this chapter and 2) to

demonstrate, once again, the ambiguities and contradictions involved in

Kant’s multiple and conflicting conceptions of objectivity.

McDowell states, both as a matter of explicating Kant and as a matter

of fact: “Intuitions are immediately of objects” (HWV 148). McDowell thus

clearly shares in Kant’s reversion to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and

Perception. Inasmuch as McDowell reverts to the viewpoint of Sense-

certainty and Perception, however, we have an explanation as to why he

would insist that objectivity for Hegel must entail an element of “external

constraint” on the part of the object. For, from the viewpoint of

Sensecertainty and Perception, the object does indeed supply an “external

constraint” upon or otherwise determines the mind.

Thus, McDowell’s very interpretation of Hegel can be shown to result

from McDowell’s own reversion to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and

Perception. Indeed, McDowell is explicit that Hegel’s conception of

objectivity must be made to fit with within the more restricted horizon of

Sense-certainty and Perception, or ordinary consciousness, more generally:

A stress on self-determining subjectivity is characteristic of German

Idealism in general. Hegel takes this theme to an extreme with his talk

of absolute knowing as the free self-realization of the Concept […] If

a conception expressible in such terms is to fit subjective engagement

with objective reality, the realization of the Concept had better itself

embody a responsiveness to constraints that are in some sense

external. Rather than disappearing from the scene, the external

constraint that figures in a more ordinary conception of objectivity

must be incorporated within what we are supposed to be shown how

to conceive as self-determination. (HWV 90)

According to McDowell, Hegel “incorporates” the ordinary conception of

objectivity as entailing “external constraint” into his generalized conception

of objectivity as a matter of self-mediation. As was discussed earlier, this is

not what Hegel does. Hegel explains and critiques the conception of

objectivity as entailing “external constraint” by showing it be the expression

of a lower viewpoint. He then sublates the very notion of constraint by

showing it to be a matter of the “internal” self-differentiation and self-

determining of the mind. Similarly, Hegel, unlike Kant, does not

“incorporate” the Empiricist conception of objectivity according to which

intuition is immediately “of” objects. Rather, he dialectically explains and

critiques such a conception as being the expression of a lower form of the

mind, and then sublates the very notion of experience itself by generalizing

it.

For McDowell, Hegel had better include the notion of “external

constraint” on the part of “objective reality” if he is going to meet the

criterion of objectivity operative on the level of ordinary conception. Yet,

what McDowell in fact proposes would entail “constraining” Hegel’s

speculative or rational conception of objectivity to fit within a more

restricted horizon. Such a constraint would itself ultimately result in the

confusions and distortions as manifested in, for example, the pseudo-

problems and ad hoc solutions which characterize Kant’s position. For

Kant’s philosophy, as we have seen, represents Reason operating within the

“constraining” horizon of Sense-certainty and Perception.

The shortcomings of McDowell’s interpretation of Hegel

notwithstanding, his discussion of Kant is still instructive precisely

inasmuch as it throws into relief the ambiguities involved in Kant’s multiple

conceptions of objectivity. Thus, after unquestioningly stating that intuitions

are immediately “of” objects, McDowell proceeds to quote the following

passage from the CPR: “The same function which gives unity to the various

representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of

various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general

expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding” (A79/B104-5).

According to McDowell, what Kant means in this passage is that “The

objective purport of intuitions is to be understood, then, in terms of their

exemplifying logical unities that are characteristic of judging” (HWV 148).

Thus, McDowell seems to think that the point of the CPR is to

demonstrate how intuitions gain “objective purport.” Yet, in point of fact,

we should already know how, according to Kant, intuitions possess

“objective purport.” For, McDowell has just told us.

Intuitions have “objective purport” immediately. They are immediately “of”

objects. In other words, that intuitions have “objective purport” ought not to

be a point that requires justification, for Kant, since it is apparently

immediately obvious. Kant’s concern in the CPR, rather, would seem to be

to justify the “objective purport” of “the pure concepts of the

understanding”, or the TUA. For, these objects are not given in immediate

intuition. Yet, according to Kant, cognition relates immediately to objects

through intuition. Thus, the overriding question of the CPR, namely, “How

are synthetic judgments a priori possible?” is a question seeking to

determine, not how intuition, but how the pure concepts of the

understanding have “objective purport” (B19).

McDowell, in fact, misses the great tension and contradiction that

Hegel’s account of the Lord/Bondsman dialectic reveals to be afflicting

Kant’s philosophy. For, despite their lordly universality and necessity, in the

first instance, the pure concepts lack objectivity or “objective purport.” Unto

themselves, they do not determine any object. It is only insofar as the pure

concepts relate to intuition that they gain “objective purport.” In other

words, despite its pretensions to lordly self-sufficiency and spontaneity, the

TUA is ultimately dependent upon what is given in sensuous intuition in

order to gain “objective purport.” Thus, in order to show how the categories

have “objective purport” Kant must show how the categories relate to or

otherwise determine intuition. Indeed, demonstrating this relation of the

categories to intuition is the entire point of Kant’s infamous doctrine of the

schematism. For, unless this relation can be demonstrated, the categories

will lack all “objective purport”.

Yet, there is a further piece of instruction to be derived from

McDowell’s misguided effort, a piece of instruction which can only be

specified precisely now that we have examined Hegel’s diagnosis of the

multiple and conflicting conceptions of objectivity operative in Kant. For,

what McDowell’s discussion helps again to confirm is that the within Kant’s

philosophy itself there is operative multiple conceptions of objectivity or

“objective purport,” multiple conceptions, moreover, which are never

properly distinguished but merely juxtaposed. Witness the following passage

from Kant that makes this point clear:

But since in us a certain from of sensible intuition a priori is

fundamental, which rests on the receptivity of the capacity for

representation (sensibility), the understanding, as spontaneity, can

determine the manifold of given representations in accord with the

synthetic unity of apperception, and thus think a priori synthetic unity

of the apperception of the manifold as sensible intuition, as the

condition under which all objects of our (human) intuition must

necessarily stand, through which then the categories as mere forms of

thought, acquire objective reality, i.e. applicable to objects that can be

given to us in intuition, but only as appearances; for of these alone are

we capable of intuition a priori. (CPR B150-1)

“Objects” are given to us through the passive faculty of sensibility. It is thus

only insofar as the categories “apply” to this manifold that they acquire

“objective reality”. Yet, by the same token, the manifold of intuition must

necessarily be determined by the categories in order that objects can appear

at all in experience. Thus, while the conception of objectivity operative

within Sense-certainty and Perception is satisfied inasmuch as Kant

determines cognition to relate to its object immediately through intuition,

this determination fails to satisfy the conception of objectivity operative

within the viewpoint of Reason. For, from the viewpoint of Reason, the

criteria of objectivity are not immediacy and sensuous intuition but

universality and necessity, neither of which is given within Kant’s restricted

conception of experience. Kant’s ad hoc compromise between these two

conflicting conceptions of objectivity is to deny that universal and necessary

determinations qualify things as they are in-themselves but only as they

“appear” to us.

There is a sense, then, in which McDowell is correct that, for Kant,

even though intuition is immediately “of” objects and thus already possesses

“objective purport” (according to Kant’s first conception of objectivity),

nevertheless intuition needs to conform to conditions of TUA in order to

have “objective purport” (according to Kant’s second conception of

objectivity). The problem is that McDowell misses the contradiction

involved in the mere juxtaposition of these two conceptions of objectivity as

well as the manner in which Hegel explains and critiques it.

2.3 Summary and Clarification of Section 2

On the basis of his phenomenology of Reason as it first comes on the

scene, Hegel identifies three conceptions of objectivity operative within

Kant’s theoretical philosophy. These three conceptions emerge inasmuch as

Kant shifts back and forth between the viewpoint Sense-certainty and

Perception, on the one hand, and that of Reason, on the other. Like all

conceptions of objectivity, each of these conceptions contains a

determination of the mind, the mind’s object and the relation between the

mind and its object. It will be helpful to summarize the three elements of

objectivity which characterize Kant’s three conceptions of objectivity as

whole.

First, insofar as Kant operates within the viewpoint of Sense-certainty

and Perception, his conception of the mind is that of a passive faculty of

sensibility, the relation of the mind to its object is one of immediacy and

receptivity to the “external” object and the object itself is simply that to

which the mind is immediately related through intuition.

Second, insofar as Kant operates within the viewpoint of Reason, the

mind is an active faculty, the relation of the mind to the object is one of

(self-)mediation and spontaneity and the object itself is a pattern of universal

and necessary determinations, or more precisely, “that in the [universal and

necessary] concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is unified”

(B137). As established in the previous chapter, however, for Hegel, the

unification achieved through of the TUA spontaneously determining the

manifold of empirical intuition is not a true synthesis or sublation, but

manifests rather a relationship of domination and servitude.

Third, insofar as Kant shifts back-and-forth between the viewpoint of

Sensecertainty and Perception, on the hand, and Reason, on the other, a

certain hybrid conception of the mind emerges. Thus, Kant conceives of the

possibility of an “intuitive intellect” which would immediately intuit or

experience the absolute or thing-in-itself (CPR B145). Indeed, in the very

phrase “intuitive intellect” one sees the kind of confused juxtaposition –

rather than sublation – of the conceptions of the mind operative within

Sense-certainty and Perception, on the one hand, and Reason, on the other.

Still, because he has indeed reverted to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and

Perception according to which experience is restricted to the realm of

experience, Kant denies this possibility of such an intuitive intellect. The

object on such a view, then, while in some sense absolute or unconditioned,

is relegated to the status of a mere noumenon which can never be known or

experienced as it is in-itself. The relationship of the mind to the object in this

case is thus one of “mere” thought (CPR A254ff./B310ff.). At best the object

can only be infinitely or indefinitely approximated to, but never properly

known or experienced.

Needless to say, as was established in the previous chapter, for Hegel,

it is precisely in thought that the mind first recognizes itself in its object.

Thus, the notion that thought should represent, as it does in Kant, a profound

state of alienation from the object simply reflects the confusions that result

from Kant unwittingly shifting back-and-forth between more than one

viewpoint.

Hegel thus shows that the very problems which Kant sets for himself

as well as the solutions which he proposes are not simply haphazard

developments in the history of thought but have a clear explanatory basis in

the polymorphism of Kant’s own mind.

3. Summary of the Chapter

The present chapter has been concerned to examine further aspects of

Hegel’s method of explaining the existence of the multiplicity of conflicting

philosophies. The chapter began by examining the various elements

constitutive of Hegel’s mature and fully generalized conception of

objectivity. For, it was noted that in order to explain the existence of the

multiplicity of philosophies it is ultimately necessary to explain the

existence of the multiplicity of conceptions of objectivity. Yet, in order to

understand the details of Hegel’s explanatory account of the multiple

conceptions of objectivity it was necessary first to examine Hegel’s own

conception of objectivity. For, in the event, all conceptions of objectivity shy

of Hegel’s own manifest restrictions and distortions of his mature position.

Hegel’s mature conception of objectivity was shown to entail several

elements. First, Hegel generalizes his conception of objectivity primarily by

1) demonstrating how the mind itself is the basic and general principle

which determines the total set of conceptions of objectivity and 2) showing

that objects can be defined in the most general terms as actualizations of the

mind’s potency. Second, while Hegel notoriously lacks in rigorous

gnoseological detail, it was still possible to examine the basic outlines

according to which he determines his conception of objectivity. Thus,

Hegel’s determinations of the nature of the mind, the mind’s object and the

mind’s relation to its object were established.

The discussion then proceeded to examine the “Reason” chapter of the

PhG in which Hegel articulates further aspects of his dialectical explanation

and critique of the existence of transcendental philosophy in the Kantian

tradition. Along with expressing an alienated form of consciousness in

which one aspect of the mind or self falls into a relation of subservience to

another aspect, as was established in Chapter Three, transcendental

philosophy in the Kantian tradition also expresses a form of consciousness

which, in fact, shifts back and forth between the viewpoint of “lordly”

transcendental apperception and that of “slavish” empirical consciousness.

More precisely, transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition expresses

a form of consciousness which has developed to the viewpoint of Reason,

yet which has simultaneously “forgotten” the course of its own development

and so repeatedly and unwittingly reverts to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty

and Perception in its attempts, for instance, to address the philosophical

problem of the objectivity of knowledge.

Conclusion

1. Chapter Review

The goal of this dissertation has been to explicate the general method

by which Hegel not only critiques but explains the very existence of the

multiplicity of philosophies. As discussed in the Introduction, the main

motivating factor for pursuing this goal lies in the fact that, as Hegel

discusses at length, the existence of a multiplicity of conflicting and

seemingly irreconcilable philosophies threatens to render the entire

philosophical enterprise futile. As also discussed in the Introduction, the

urgency of this threat has only been increased in light of the spectacular

credentials of modern science and technology. For, from the perspective of

ordinary consciousness in the modern world, science is to be distinguished

from philosophy precisely to the degree that it succeeds, while philosophy

fails, in progressively overcoming initial disagreement and conflict to arrive

what appears to be universal consensus. In order to respond to the challenge

posed by this threat, the following efforts were taken.

In Chapter One, Hegel’s overall theory of development was analyzed.

Establishing the basic elements of Hegel’s theory of development was

essential. For, as was soon to be demonstrated, Hegel explains the

multiplicity of conflicting philosophies in terms of the development of the

mind. Yet, in order to understand how Hegel explains the development of

the mind, it was first necessary to establish the basic principles of his overall

theory of development. It was shown in this chapter that a large source for

Hegel’s theory of development is Aristotle’s conception of the transition

from potency to act. The all-important biological analogy for understanding

Hegel’s theory of development was also examined in detail.

Chapter Two initiated the examination of Hegel’s phenomenology of

the development of the mind. The initial effort, then, was made to show how

Hegel explains the emergence of the multiplicity of philosophies in terms of

the dialectical development of the mind. Thus, it was shown, for instance,

that the problematic skepticism/naïve realism adopted by Hegel’s

contemporary, G.E. Schulze, could be explained to result from Schulze

inhabiting and expressing the viewpoint of Sense-certainty. Chapter Two

also provided an initial discussion of the “meta” quality of Hegel’s effort in

the PhG. For, the viewpoint of Perception was shown to be the source of the

naïve view of the history of philosophy as a mere agglomeration of mutually

exclusive viewpoints. Yet, the transition from Perception to Force and

Understanding provided rich suggestions as to how Hegel himself would

reinterpret the history of philosophy as a dialectico-organic whole.

Chapter Three examined in minute detail how Hegel’s phenomenology

of selfconsciousness provides essential aspects in his effort to explain the

emergence of transcendental philosophy in the Kantian and Fichtean

traditions. It was shown that, for Hegel, transcendental philosophy emerges

inasmuch as one aspect of an individual selfconsciousness falls into a

relation of subservience to another aspect. The various permutations of this

dialectic of domination and servitude within self-consciousness were shown

to give rise to several of the key elements in transcendental philosophy most

notably of which would be the distinction between transcendental or

absolute selfconsciousness, on the one hand, and empirical self-

consciousness, on the other.

Chapter Four added a new element to the examination of Hegel’s

explanatory account of the multiplicity of philosophies. For, it showed how,

in explaining the emergence of the various philosophies, Hegel thereby

explains the various conceptions of objectivity operative therein. This

analysis was applied in detail to Kant who was shown to manifest at least

three different and often conflicting conceptions of objectivity. Through

demonstrating this fact, however, certain of the more problematic details in

Kant were provided, not simply with a critique, but with an explanation as to

their very existence.

Thus, for Hegel, the multiplicity of philosophies is not a mere

haphazard agglomeration of mutually incomprehensible and irreconcilable

positions. Rather, all philosophies have as their core explanatory principle

the dialectical development of the mind. To the extent that this is true, then

philosophy is absolved of the charge of futility. For, true development can

be discerned within the history of philosophy inasmuch as it manifests the

successive efforts of the mind to develop and thereby come to know itself.

Recognizing this fact, however, as Hegel would insist, nevertheless requires

a great deal of philosophical development.

Appendix

In response to corrections required from members of the dissertation

panel the following appendix has been supplied. Generally speaking, the

panel members wanted the dissertation to demonstrate more clearly the

unique argument and contribution this dissertation is providing vis-à-vis

other scholarly treatments of Hegel. In order to accomplish this task it was

suggested that I clarify the position delineated in this dissertation by

contrasting it with the work of Michael Forster in his book, Hegel’s Idea of a

Phenomenology of Spirit (hereafter Hegel’s Idea). Given its highly specific

character, rather than attempt to integrate this critical discussion of Forster

into the main body of the dissertation, it seemed more efficient simply to

include it as an appendix. The present appendix will accordingly proceed in

the following manner. The first section will examine Forster’s interpretation

of Hegel’s theory of the structure of consciousness. This section will show

that Forster is misguided in his ascription to Hegel of a “representationalist”

theory of consciousness. The second section will examine Forster’s

interpretation of Hegel’s theory of truth. This section will show that Forster

is misguided in his ascription to Hegel of an “enduring communal

consensus” theory of truth. The third section will examine several

weaknesses within Forster’s overall treatment of Hegel’s account of

development, in general, and of the development of the mind, in particular.

The fourth section will examine Forster’s discussion of the crucial question

of the relation between the PhG to the history of philosophy and, therefore,

to the history of philosophical multiplicity and conflict. This section will

show that Forster’s interpretation of the relation between the PhG and the

history of philosophy is misguided.

The fifth section will turn to showing how the core analyses and arguments

of this dissertation provide a better means for understanding the relation

between the PhG and the history of philosophy, including the history of

philosophical multiplicity and conflict.

The sixth, and final, section will attempt to recover an aspect of Forster’s

interpretation of Hegel’s theory of truth; doing so will also help illustrate

Hegel’s ultimate view of how the problem of philosophical multiplicity and

conflict is to be resolved.

1. Forster on Hegel’s Theory of the Structure of Consciousness

According to Forster, in his account of the structure of consciousness,

Hegel presupposes the theory of his predecessors Kant, Reinhold and Fichte.

As Forster states, According to this theory, all consciousness essentially

includes three interdependent elements: consciousness of consciousness

itself, or of the self, as such; consciousness of something other than oneself,

or of an object; and consciousness of one’s representation of this other

something or objects as such (Hegel’s Idea 116-7).

Forster states further that Hegel takes this theory of the structure of

consciousness “somewhat for granted” due, at least in part, to its

“widespread acceptance by his immediate predecessors” (Hegel’s Idea 117).

An examination of Hegel’s texts, especially in light of what has been

covered thus far in the present dissertation, demonstrably shows, however,

that Forster’s ascription of such a theory of consciousness to Hegel as well

as Forster’s rather perfunctory explanation as to why Hegel would have

chosen to adopt it is misguided.

To begin with, the account of the structure of consciousness laid out by

Forster is to be found nowhere in Hegel’s texts except in the instances in

which Hegel dialectically explains and critiques it. In order to begin

establishing this point, let us examine the first passage from Hegel which

Forster enlists in support of his interpretation:

Consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and

on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is

the True, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth […] But the

distinction between the in-itself and knowledge is already present in

the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something is

for it the in-itself; and knowledge, or the being of the object for

consciousness, is, for it, another moment (PhG 54).

In his rendering of this passage Forster translates the German term, Wissen,

as “cognition”, whereas Miller translates it as “knowledge”. More

importantly, however, Forster forcibly inserts the term “representation” in

brackets immediately following the first usage of the term Wissen as if to

indicate that, for Hegel, knowledge or cognition is equivalent to

“representation”.

The first thing to note is that the German term which is typically

translated as “representation”, namely, Vorstellung, is nowhere to be found

in the present passage or in any other relevant instance in the entirety of

Hegel’s corpus in which Hegel is discussing his own mature view of either

consciousness or knowledge. This fact is not merely an accident which

Forster’s insertion helps to ameliorate. It is rather grounded in Hegel’s

radically critical view of the “representationalist” theories of consciousness

and knowledge which were, indeed, to varying degrees, shared by many of

his predecessors. Before examining the details of Hegel’s dialectical

explanation and critique of representationalist theories of consciousness, let

us first establish more clearly the basic elements of Hegel’s own theory.

1.1 Hegel’s Theory of the Structure of Consciousness

A first approximation to Hegel’s theory of consciousness is supplied by

a passage from slightly earlier in the Introduction to the PhG in which Hegel

states:

Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something,

and at the same time relates itself to it, or as it is said, this something

exists for consciousness, and the determinate aspect of this relating or

of the being of something for a consciousness, is knowing. But we

distinguish this being-foranother from a being-in-itself; whatever is

related to knowledge or knowing is also distinguished from it, and

posited as existing outside of this relationship; this being-in-itself is

called truth. Just what might be involved in these determinations is of

no further concern to us here. Since our object is phenomenal

knowledge, its determinations too will at first be taken directly as they

present themselves; and they do present themselves very much as we

have already apprehended them. (PhG 52-3)

On Hegel’s account, then, consciousness, or the mind, is self-differentiating.

Like the plant, the mind posits a fruit or object for itself. Insofar as it posits

such an object, the mind forms a relation to that object. Thus, there are three

crucial elements in Hegel’s basic theory of the structure of consciousness or

the mind. These elements, however, are not those identified by Forster in his

account. According to Forster, the three elements constitutive of Hegel’s

theory of the structure of the mind are: 1) the mind, or consciousness, 2) the

mind’s object and 3) the mind’s representation of that object (Hegel’s Idea

116-7). In point of fact, however, the three elements which are actually

constitutive of Hegel’s theory of the structure of the mind are: 1) the mind,

or consciousness, 2) the mind’s object and 3) the mind’s relation to that

object.

Important to note is that Hegel distinguishes between, on the one

hand, the relation between the mind and its object which actually obtains in-

itself or for us, the phenomenological observers, and, on the other hand, the

relation as it merely appears for the form of the mind under investigation.

The fact that Forster makes absolutely no use of this crucial methodological

distinction would help explain the misguidedness of his interpretation. For,

as discussed at length in Chapter Four of this dissertation, according to

Hegel, the mind will determine itself, its object and the nature of the relation

between itself and its object according to the level of development it has

reached (PhG 141-2). The relation between the mind and its object is in-

itself or for us, the phenomenological observer, always one of identity. True,

until the final moment of its development, the identity between the mind and

its object is only partial. That partiality, however, is not based upon the fact

that up until the final moment there was a “representation”, as it were,

“between” the mind and its object precluding such perfect identity. Rather,

as will be discussed below in the critique of Forster’s interpretation of Hegel

conception of truth, the lack of identity consists in the fact that the object

posited by the mind is not yet adequate to the mind itself, or, what amounts

to the same thing, it has not yet become fully actual.

The reason why it is especially important to note in this context that

the mind determines its relation to its object according to the level of

development is that the mind can, indeed, thus take or determine itself to

relate to its object by way of some kind of “representation”. Yet, such a self-

taking or self-interpretation will prove to be the result of the mind’s having

forgotten itself and the history of its own development. It will not, in other

words, express the basic structure of consciousness or the mind as such,

according to Hegel.

It should be further added that, in point of fact, the account of the

structure of the mind just provided in the above passage does not correspond

precisely to Hegel’s own theory, at least not in terms some of the details.

Rather, there are elements contained in that passage which, as Hegel states,

correspond to how things present themselves to merely phenomenal

consciousness or knowledge. By qualifying his comments with clauses such

as “as it is said” [wie diß ausgedrückt wird] and “[b]ut we distinguish”

[unterscheiden wir], Hegel provides an indication as to which parts of his

analysis in particular correspond to the viewpoint of mere phenomenal

consciousness versus which would correspond to the viewpoint of us, the

phenomenologists.

Thus, on Hegel’s account, the mind is a self-differentiating totality in

which there are three moments: the mind, its object and the mind’s relation

to its object. Still, “it is said” that the object or the in-itself exists “outside”

of this relation. Yet, as has been established throughout the course of this

dissertation, for Hegel, nothing exists “outside” of or independently of its

relation to consciousness or the mind. Indeed, in order to confirm this point,

we need only look later on the same page of the previous passage in which

Hegel states, “But the essential point to bear in mind throughout the whole

investigation is that these two moments, ‘Concept’ and ‘object’, ‘being-for-

another’ and ‘being-in-itself’, both fall within that knowledge which we are

investigating” (PhG 53). Consciousness or the mind distinguishes its object

from itself, yet it simultaneously preserves the object within itself. Thus,

there is no object existing “out there”, perhaps lurking behind or apart from

our “representation” of it.

1.1.1 Example of the Meno

A useful example for examining this general point can be found in the

famous Paradox of Learning in the Meno. For, first of all, despite its

seeming skeptical sophistication, the paradox can be shown to be grounded

in the naïve presupposition that knowledge must consist in some kind of

comparison between our “representations” “in here” and objects “out there”.

Secondly, the speculative response to this paradox supplied by Socrates is

precisely that taken up by Hegel, provided that we acknowledge the

intervening mediation of Aristotle.

In the dialogue Socrates articulates the paradox which Meno initially

sets forth thusly:

Do you realize [Meno] what a debater’s argument you are bringing

up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he

does not know? He cannot search for what he knows – since he knows

it, there is no need to search – nor for what he does not know, for he

does not know what to look for. (80e)

The source of this paradox is precisely the “representationalist” view of

knowledge which Forster ascribes to Hegel. For, on the representationalist

view of knowledge in which consciousness consists of the three elements

“consciousness”, “representation” and “object”, it is impossible to learn

anything. Either one already has the “representation” of the object, in which

case it would be pointless to search for the object since one already knows it,

or one lacks the representation of the object, in which case it would be

impossible to know whether or not one had found what one was searching

for. Socrates’ solution to this problem is the speculative one in which

knowledge is conceived to be, not a matter of comparing our

“representations” “in here” with “objects” “out there” and then seeing

whether or not they “correspond”, but rather a kind of selfmediation which

he calls “recollection” [Anamnesis]. Aristotle appropriates this notion of

knowledge as self-mediation but sublates it into his larger explanatory

theory of development of potency and act. Thus, with respect to the doctrine

of Anamnesis, Aristotle states, “It was a good idea to call the soul ‘the place

of the forms’, though this description holds only of the thinking soul, and

even this is the forms only potentially” (429a27-29). Hegel, in turn,

explicitly appropriates this aspect of Aristotle’s sublation of Plato and

sublates it into his own theory of knowledge as self-mediation:

The claim in the Platonic philosophy that we remember the Ideas

means that Ideas are implicitly in the human mind and are not (as the

Sophists maintained) something alien that comes to mind from the

outside. In any case, this interpretation of cognition as ‘reminiscence’

does not exclude the development of what is implicit in the human

mind, and this development is nothing but mediation (EL 116).

For Aristotle and Hegel, knowledge is not a matter of determining whether

or not “representations” “in here” correspond to “objects” “out there”;

rather, it is an ontological perfection (energeia) of the knower.

1.2 Hegel’s Critique of the Viewpoint of Representation

Having clarified the basic structure of consciousness according to

Hegel, it would be worth examining a few aspects of Hegel’s critical

treatment of the viewpoint of Representation in order to drive home the

point about the misguidedness of Forster’s interpretation. Let us, then,

examine Hegel’s critical appraisal of the viewpoint of Representation in the

PhG and then complement that examination by drawing on Hegel’s

discussion of the viewpoint of Representation in the Philosophy of Mind.

For, it is precisely the viewpoint of Representation which, according to

Hegel, finds it so difficult to conceive of a relationship such as that

constitutive of the mind itself in relation to its object in which a difference is

posited only to be sublated into a higher unity or identity. As such, it may be

possible to attribute Forster’s misinterpretation of Hegel’s position on

consciousness to the fact that Forster is himself viewing it from something

like the viewpoint of Representation.

In the PhG as well as preceding and subsequent works, Hegel will

often rely on a shorthand method or schema for identifying viewpoints that

fall short of his own speculative or absolute viewpoint. Among the most

common of these lesser viewpoints would be that of Representation. The

relationship between the more generic viewpoint, Representation, and that of

the more specific forms of the mind delineated in the PhG is never worked

out by Hegel in detail.273 Still, the basic contours of what Hegel means by the

viewpoint of Representation in the PhG can be specified without undue

strain. In terms of what Hegel means by the viewpoint of Representation,

Miller’s often disputed but not entirely inapt translation of the term

“Vorstellung” as “picture-thinking” provides a first approximation. For,

despite its weaknesses, what Miller’s translation captures is the fact that the

viewpoint of Representation is essentially restricted to the realm of the

sensuous or imaginable. This point is important because, from the viewpoint

of sensation or imagination, if two things are distinct then they must be

“outside” one another. In other words, it is impossible to sense or to imagine

the unity-in-difference, or speculative identity, according to which

consciousness, or the mind, is ultimately related to its object.275

Thus, for the viewpoint of Representation, insofar as the mind’s object

is posited as distinct from the mind then the former must be “outside” the

later. It is this fact, moreover, which actually gives rise to the seeming

obviousness of conceiving the fundamental task of epistemology to be that

of solving the Problem of the Bridge, that is to say, “justifying the belief”

that the representations we have “in here” correspond to objects-in-

themselves “out there” in the “world”.

Thus, in the Introduction to the PhG, Hegel famously criticizes the

naiveté of such putatively critical philosophies of Representation as Kant’s

which take as their basic point of departure the epistemological task of the

Problem of the Bridge. According to Hegel, these philosophies engage in the

futile attempt to determine the nature of the instrument by which our

“representations” of objects existing “out there” are generated “in here” –

that is to say, “in” the mind – in order thereby to subtract the effect which

our faculty of cognition or “representation”, has upon the object-in-itself

“out there”, in order, in turn, to provide for consciousness a (doomed to fail)

“representation” of the object-in-itself in its purity.276 Thus, for Hegel, the

very notion that the basic structure of consciousness entails a

“representation” of the “object” which is distinct from the objectin-itself is

hardly a basic or normative account of its structure but rather simply

expresses the impoverished viewpoint of Representation itself.

1.2.1 Hegel’s Critique of the Viewpoint of Representation in the Philosophy

of Mind

Regarding Hegel’s discussion of the viewpoint of Representation in

the PM, it should be immediately noted that the representations discussed

there are not the representations of some further object distinct from the

representations. Rather, the representations are the object. The problem with

the viewpoint of Representation in this case is not that it is perhaps unable to

“justify belief” in the correspondence between its representations and the

objects-in-themselves. Rather, a representation as such constitutes a not-

fully-developed or actualized object of the mind. For, representations as

such are still conditioned by a sensuous material or intuition which the mind

treats as “found” or “given” by the object-in-itself “out there” and which

thus has not been reduced to a mere moment of the mind itself. As Hegel

states:

But as representing begins from the intuition and the ready-found

material of intuition, this activity is still burdened with this difference,

and its concrete productions within it are still syntheses which become

the concrete immanence of the concept only in thinking (POM 185).

Again, the object of the viewpoint of Representation is the representation.

Still, because the viewpoint of Representation has not reduced the sensuous

material of intuition to a moment of the mind, it relates to that material as

coming from an object “out there”. As a result, it can only conceive of its

own activity, not as a process of self-differentiation and self-mediation, but

as the production of syntheses among the various manifolds of intuition

whose ultimate source is another object “external” to the mind.

On the whole, then, Hegel’s view of the viewpoint of Representation

and the representationalist theory of the structure of consciousness to which

it gives rise is far from that indicated by Forster. According to Forster, Hegel

simply takes up the representationalist theory of consciousness because it

was popular and happened to be laying around.278 As it is, however, Hegel

not only heavily criticizes this view of consciousness, but, going beyond

Socrates’ skeptical critique of this view, explains how it comes into

existence in the first place, namely, as the expression of the mind at a certain

lesser stage of its development. The fact that Forster would take this to be

Hegel’s position and then supply what he takes to be “quite a forceful

argument” on behalf of it suggests that it is Forster himself who is operating

within something like the viewpoint of Representation in interpreting Hegel.

2. Forster’s Interpretation of Hegel’s Theory of Truth

Forster’s misinterpretation of Hegel’s theory of the structure of

consciousness, or the mind, has important implications for his

misinterpretation of Hegel’s theory of truth. According to Forster, Hegel

rejects the correspondence theory of truth in favor of what

Forster calls an “enduring communal consensus” theory. It will be necessary

first briefly to unpack what Forster seems to intend by this notion of

“enduring communal consensus” as well as his reasons for ascribing it to

Hegel. It will then be possible to demonstrate more clearly the

misguidedness of Forster’s interpretation.

According to Forster, Hegel’s theory of truth would

[P]artially reconceive/reconceptualize “truth,” dropping the offending

idea that truth consists in the correspondence of representations to

independent facts, and instead substituting for this the idea that it

consists in representations being agreed upon by an enduring

communal consensus (and falsehood in their failure to be agreed upon

by such a consensus). (Hegel’s Idea 233)

Forster is right that Hegel rejects the naïve conception of truth as a

correspondence between “representations” that are “in here” with objects or

“independent facts” which are “out there”. Indeed, he not only rejects it, but

explains how it comes into existence.

However, likely due in part to his misinterpretation of Hegel’s theory of

consciousness, Forster does not seem to appreciate that Hegel’s theory of

truth would eschew reference to the term “representation” altogether.

As stated, according to Forster, Hegel maintains that truth consists in

“representations being agreed upon by an enduring communal consensus”.

The support that Forster actually marshals in favor of this interpretation in

terms of direct evidence drawn from Hegel’s texts is scanty at best. It will

therefore be helpful to note the broader context from which Forster is

arguing in order to make sense of his decision to proffer such an

interpretation.

In both Hegel’s Idea as well as his earlier work, Hegel and

Skepticism, Forster emphasizes the role of skepticism, especially ancient

skepticism, in shaping the very essence of Hegel’s overall project. Thus,

according to Forster, despite the fact that Hegel himself supposedly

subscribes to a representationalist theory of consciousness, the PhG, at least

from the viewpoint of Consciousness up through the viewpoint of the

Spiritual Animalkingdom section of the Reason chapter, provides a series of

skeptical paradoxes the ultimate upshot of which is to show that there is no

“coherent way of articulating a conception of representations standing over

against independent facts” (Hegel’s Idea 236). According to Forster, the

culminating instance of this skeptical critique of the correspondence theory

of truth occurs when Hegel shows that consciousness reaches a stage at

which “objective reality […] is a moment which itself no longer possesses

any truth on its own account” (PhG 245). The lesson Forster draws from this

statement is that, for Hegel, insofar as objective reality no longer possesses

any truth for consciousness, then it would seem that the very notion of truth

as a correspondence between our “representations” and the “objects-in-

themselves out there” is no longer possible since “objects-in-themselves” or

“objective reality” no longer possesses any truth for the mind. Thus, Hegel

apparently demonstrates that maintaining such a correspondence theory of

truth necessarily results in a final skeptical paradox according to which

“there is no such thing as truth” (Hegel’s Idea 236).

In response to this apparent skeptical paradox or impasse, Hegel offers,

according to Forster, a “skeptical solution” according to which truth would

consist in an “enduring communal consensus”. The main passage from the

PhG which Forster cites in support of his claim runs as follows:

Reality therefore has for consciousness only the value of a being …

whose universality is one with the action [of consciousness]. This

unity is the true product; it is the matter itself, which simply maintains

itself in being asserted and is experienced as something which

endures, independently of the matter which is the contingency of the

individual action as such …The matter itself is thus an expression of

spiritual essentiality, in which all … moments are sublated as

autonomous, and so are only valid qua universal, and in which

consciousness’s certainty of itself is …the object born of self-

consciousness as its own, but without ceasing to be a free, real object.

(Hegel’s Idea 236-7)

It should be noted that Forster states that in paragraph 418 of the PhG Hegel

glosses the term “spiritual essentiality” [geistige Wesenheit] mentioned in

the above passage as “the action of the single individual and of all

individuals, … the action of each and everyone” (Hegel’s Idea 237). Thus,

Forster finds evidence for his interpretation of Hegel’s theory of truth in

Hegel’s apparent view that “the matter itself” [die Sache selbst] consists in

an expression of spiritual essentiality which itself consists in the action of all

individuals. In other words, for Hegel, truth, or “the matter itself”, now

seemingly just is what is expressed, and thus agreed upon, by the community

as a whole. As such, truth would seem not to consist in the agreement or

correspondence between our “representations” and “objects”, but instead in

“representations” being agreed upon by an “enduring communal consensus”.

Unfortunately, Forster’s interpretation does not hold up upon a close

examination of the relevant texts.

Before examining the problematic aspects of Forster’s interpretation of

the PhG and the theory of truth which he purports to find there, however, it

would be useful to note a brief auxiliary point. For, notice, Socrates already

articulated what might be considered the definitive skeptical paradox which

afflicts the viewpoint of Representation along with its naïve correspondence

theory of truth. Moreover, Hegel appropriates, by way of Aristotle and in

sublated form, the very theory of truth and knowledge which

Socrates proposes as a response to this paradox. Thus, Forster fails

adequately to identify Hegel’s peculiar contribution to this whole discussion,

which is that Hegel not only critiques the naïve representationalist

correspondence view of truth, but he explains how it comes into existence in

the first place. This point is worth noting because it is part and parcel of

Hegel’s effort to show that the various and conflicting philosophies (e.g. of

knowledge and truth) do not emerge simply haphazardly and with no

intelligible relation to one another but rather have an explanatory ground in

the polymorphism of the mind. Yet, as will be discussed again below,

Forster never articulates this central point with sufficient clarity and

precision.

2.1 Critique of Forster’s Interpretation of Hegel’s Theory of Truth

To return to Forster’s discussion of Hegel’s theory of truth, Forster’s

interpretation of the passage in which Hegel says “[O]bjective reality […] is

a moment which itself no longer possesses any truth on its own account in

this consciousness” is misguided. According to Forster, what this passage

expresses is that the form of consciousness operative within the viewpoint of

“Reason” has reached a level of development for which there no longer

exists an objective reality distinct from its own “representations”. Previous

forms of consciousness presupposed such a distinction and, on Forster’s

reading, the dialectic of the entire PhG up to this point has unfolded as a

“serial critique” in which has Hegel demonstrated that ultimately there is “no

coherent way of articulating a conception of representations standing over

against independent facts” and that, therefore, there is no coherent way in

which to articulate, much less defend, a “correspondence” theory of truth

(Hegel’s Idea 236). Thus, for Forster, The Spiritual Animalkingdom

subsection of Reason marks a radical shift in the entire trajectory of the

PhG. For, at this stage, not only in-itself, but for consciousness or the mind,

as such, the correspondence theory of truth has been jettisoned in favor of an

enduring communal consensus theory.

Hegel’s point, however, in stating that “objective reality” is a moment

which no longer possesses any truth on its own account for Reason at this

stage is far from what Forster contends. To begin with, it must be

immediately noted that we have already passed through a similar stage in

Self-consciousness. For, Self-consciousness recognizes that “being” or

“objective reality” is but a moment of Self-consciousness itself and, as such,

“being” or “objective reality” does not possess any truth on its own account.

That does not mean, however, that Self-consciousness ceases to have an

object; rather, the object has become Self-consciousness itself.

Yet, there is a further element to this story which – ironically – Forster

forgets. For, despite the fact that, in-itself, “being” or “objective reality” has

been reduced to a mere moment of Self-consciousness as a result of its prior

development in Consciousness, Self-consciousness nevertheless forgets this

fact and, as a result, relates to the Self-consciousness which it itself is as

another Self-consciousness existing “out there” in “objective reality”. As a

result, there emerged within Self-consciousness the distinction between

abstract Self-consciousness which reflects out of the world of “objective

reality”, on the one hand, and the Self-consciousness which is coincident

with such reality, or Life, on the other. The history of the development of

Self-consciousness, then, is the dialectic between these two moments of

Self-consciousness itself.

Next, it must be noted that a similar dialect unfolds in the case of

Reason; in fact, it does so more than once. For, recall that, generically,

Reason is the viewpoint which is confident that it will find only itself in its

object. Thus, in Observing Reason, Reason is confident that it will find itself

within the “objective reality” of the sensuous existence which in Self-

consciousness confronts it as an other.

Still, despite having reached the viewpoint of Reason, a certain

recapitulation of the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception takes place

on the level of Reason as it first comes on the scene. For, as we know,

Reason when it first comes on the scene reverts to the viewpoint of Sense-

certainty and Perception. Yet, such immediate Reason is also, of course,

Reason, and Reason knows, at least implicitly or in-itself, that its object will

simply be itself. Thus, Hegel states,

[Immediate Reason] reverted from self-consciousness to

consciousness, i.e. to the consciousness for which the object is

something which merely is, a Thing; but here, what is a Thing is self-

consciousness; the Thing is, therefore, the unity of ‘I’ and being – the

category. The object being determined thus for consciousness, the

latter possesses Reason. (PhG 208)

For both Perception and immediate or Observing Reason, its object is a

Thing existing “out there”. The difference, however, is that Observing

Reason’s object is a new object, namely, the category, which, in-itself or for

us, the phenomenologists, just is Reason itself.

The problem with Observing Reason is thus that despite the fact that it

has produced its object i.e. through rational observation, modern scientific

technique, etc. it forgets this very activity and, therefore, like Perception,

relates to its object as something found “out there” (PhG 209). As Hegel

states, “The pure category, which is present for consciousness [at this stage]

in the form of being or immediacy, is the object as still unmediated, as

merely given, and consciousness is equally unmediated in its relation to it”

(PhG 209). In Observing Reason, as revealed through its confidence that it

will find nothing but itself in its object, “objectively reality” or being “out

there” has been reduced to a mere moment of Reason itself, and thus does

not possess any truth for Reason. Still, despite this implicit confidence that it

will only find itself in its object – hence, its active observation and

experimentation upon its object – Observing Reason nevertheless explicitly

treats its object as ultimately something found “out there” in the

“world”. It will remain for the ensuing form of consciousness to objectify

and thereby “recollect” the very activity of Reason itself.

The viewpoint which at first takes up the task of more fully objectifying for

Reason its own activity is that of “Individuality Which Takes Itself To Be

Real In and For Itself” along with its subsection, The Spiritual

Animalkingdom, the latter of which Forster claims marks the definitive

break within the PhG in terms of the mind’s explicit conception of truth.

Again, Forster’s claim is that since by the time we reach The Spiritual

Animalkindgom the moment of “objective reality” no longer possesses any

truth on its own account, consciousness or the mind, at this stage no longer

has an object to which a “representation” could possibly correspond. As a

result, the very notion of truth as “correspondence” between

“representations” and “objects” has ceased to be operative now and within

all subsequent forms of the mind to be treated in the PhG. But this is not at

all what is happening at this stage of the PhG.

To begin with, although “objective reality” or “being” that is “out

there” has been reduced to a moment of Reason and thus has ceased to

possess any truth on its own account for the mind, Reason still has an object.

At this stage, the object of Reason is rational action itself. Thus, in The

Spiritual Animalkingdom, Hegel provides a phenomenology of the rational

activity which is the object of Reason and which is, in fact, coincident with

Reason. As Hegel states,

Action is present at first in the form of object, an object, too as

pertaining to consciousness, as End and hence opposed to a reality

already given. The second moment is the movement of the End

conceived as passive, and realization conceived as the relation of the

End to the wholly formal actuality, hence the idea of the transition

itself, or the means. The third moment is, finally, the object, which is

not longer in the form of an end directly known by the agent to be his

own, but as brought out into the light of day and having for him the

form of an ‘other’. (PhG 239)

The object of Reason at this stage is thus a complex object composed of

three elements: the end, the means by which the end is achieved and the

achieved end itself.

In- itself, or implicitly, rational action is not a means by which

Reason, as it were, acts upon some “objective reality” “out there”; rather,

rational action is a process of the self-mediation and self-development of

Reason itself. As Hegel states, in the case of rational action, “objective

reality” or the “limitation of being […] cannot limit the action of [rational]

consciousness, for here consciousness is a relation purely of itself to itself:

relation to an other which would be a limitation of it, has been eliminated”

(PhG 238). The fact that in rational action Reason is not related to an

“objective reality” or being “out there” therefore does not entail that it has

no object. Rather, its object is the complex object that just is rational action

itself.

Importantly, there is an ambiguity built into the very phenomenology

of action which sets the stage for another dialectic in which the mind forgets

its own activity and, as a result, re-confronts its object – which just is itself –

as something once again external or existing in “objective reality”. For, as

was noted, the third element of action is the achieved work. According to

Hegel, the mind at the stage of Reason “withdraws from its work” because

it, the mind, is the “universal consciousness” while the work, despite being

an objectification of the mind itself, nevertheless is “determinate or

particular” (PhG 243). In other words, rational mind is the universal power

of thinking; yet, every action qua achieved work is particular. As such,

these two elements – indeterminate, universal rational mind and its

particular, determinate action – find themselves opposed. The subsequent

paragraphs of “The Spiritual Animalkingdom” are dedicated to working out

these dialectically opposed aspects of rational action.

According to Forster, the ultimate upshot of Hegel’s phenomenology

between the universal and particular aspects of rational action is that truth is

revealed to be, not the correspondence between “representations” and

“objective reality”, but an enduring communal consensus. Again, he cites

the passage in which Hegel states that the nature of “matter in hand” [die

Sache selbst] is such that “its being is the action of the single individual and

of all individuals and whose action is immediately for others, or is a ‘matter

in hand’ and is such only as the action of each and everyone” (PhG 251-2).

Hegel’s point at this stage, however, is far from what Forster contends.

For, it is not that there is no longer any object for consciousness.

Indeed, the “matter in hand” is precisely this object. It is an object, however,

which is a sublation of the universal and particular elements of rational

action. Thus, Hegel states,

The ‘matter in hand’ […] is rather substance permeated by

individuality, subject in which there is individuality just as much qua

individual, or qua this particular individual, as qua all individuals;

and it is the universal which has being only as this action of all and

each, and a reality in the fact that this particular consciousness knows

it to be its own individual reality and the reality of all. The pure

‘matter in hand’ itself is what was defined above as the ‘category’,

being that is the ‘I’ or the ‘I’ that is being, but in the form of thought

which is still distinguished from actual self-consciousness. Here,

however, the moments of actual self-consciousness insofar as we call

them its content (purpose, action, and reality), and also insofar as we

call them its form (being-for-self and being-foranother), are posited as

one with the simply category itself, and the category is at the same

time the entire content. (PhG 252)

In rational action, the particular individual ultimately recognizes that its

object is that towards which all rational individuals act; it is a universal end.

In Observing Reason, the activity of Reason and its object (i.e. the universal

category), while implicitly identical, were nevertheless experienced by the

mind for-itself as opposed elements. However, when rational activity is itself

objectified, Reason eventually recognizes that its particular action is in fact a

universal action, that the ‘matter in hand’ or the thing-in-itself is that which

is produced through the rational activity of all rational individuals and, as

such, is universal. Truth, then, at this stage is the coincidence or

correspondence of actual selfconsciousness with the category or “matter in

hand”.

Needless to say, this coincidence or correspondence between

consciousness or the mind and its object at this stage of development will

prove to be only partial and, therefore, will be found to possess a hitherto

unsublated element. Hence, the dialectic between consciousness, or the

mind, and its object will continue until their perfect, sublated identity or

correspondence is achieved and the True becomes self-conscious, or

substance corresponds to subject.

2.1.1 Further Solidification of the Critique of Forster’s Interpretation of

Hegel’s Theory of Truth

In order to solidify the forgoing critique of Forster, it will be useful to

recall the many instances in which Hegel states explicitly that truth is the

correspondence or adequation of the mind and its object as well as clarify

the peculiar sense that Hegel intends for this formulation of truth. Here is a

partial list:

“Truth in philosophy means that the concept corresponds to reality”

(EPR, 53); “What is required by the definition of truth, namely, the

agreement of the Concept and its object (SL, 595); the definition of

truth as agreement of cognition with its object is “a definition of great,

indeed of supreme, value” (SL, 593); “The Idea is what is true in and

for itself, the absolute unity of Concept and objectivity” (EL, 286);

“Only when we consider mind in this process of the self-actualization

of its concept, do we know it in its truth (for truth just means

agreement of the concept with its actuality). In its immediacy, mind is

not yet true, has not yet made its concept an object for itself, has not

yet transformed what is present in it in an immediate way, into

something posited by itself, has not yet converted its actuality into an

actuality appropriate to its concept” [Emphases mine] (PM, 7). It is

telling that Forster cites the following passage from the EL in which

Hegel rejects the naïve representationalist correspondence theory of

truth: “In the ordinary way, what we call ‘truth’ is the agreement of an

ob-ject with our representation. We are then presupposing an ob-ject

to which our representation is supposed to conform” (60; cited in

Hegel’s Idea 234). For, Forster then proceeds to entirely neglect the

immediately succeeding passage of the EL in which Hegel affirms his

own speculative correspondence theory of truth: “In the philosophical

sense, on the contrary, ‘truth,’ expressed abstractly and in general,

means agreement of the a content with itself. This is therefore a

meaning of ‘truth’ quite different from the one mentioned above” (EL

60). Thus, the problem with ordinary consciousness is not that it

maintains a correspondence theory of truth; rather, the problem lies in

the fact that it naively posits an object distinct from its

“representations” and therefore is driven to conceive of the basic

epistemological problem as the Problem of the Bridge.

In summation in can be stated that the uniqueness of Hegel’s theory of

truth lies not in the fact that it proposes to replace the correspondence theory

of truth with one of

“enduring communal consensus”. Rather, it lies in the fact that

1) Hegel would both explain and critique the naïve correspondence

theory of truth inasmuch as he explains and critiques the very

theory of consciousness which Forster ascribes to him, and

2) Hegel inverts the notion of correspondence such that the

challenge is not for mind to conform itself or its “representations”

to objects “out there”, but rather for mind to posit an existence or

object which is adequate to itself.

2.2 Problems with Forster’s Conception of Hegel’s Theory

of Development

Since Forster so fundamentally misinterprets Hegel’s theory of the

structure of consciousness as well as Hegel’s theory of truth, it is inevitable

that Forster should misinterpret Hegel’s account of the dialectical structure

of consciousness’s development as it proceeds towards truth. In fact,

Forster’s misinterpretation of Hegel’s account of consciousness’s

development is unsurprisingly intertwined with his failure to adequately

explicate Hegel’s overall theory of development. Let us turn then to

examining how Forster treats of this nest of issues surrounding the theme of

development in Hegel.

2.2.1 Forster’s Neglect of Hegel’s Appropriation of

Aristotle’s Theory of Potency and Act

Forster entirely neglects Hegel’s debt to and appropriation of

Aristotle’s theory of development, with its central elements of potency and

act. He makes a fleeting mention of Hegel’s possible debt to Aristotle’s

conception of the soul as the first act of body with life potentially within it,

but merely in the context of arguing that Hegel is not a “dualist” with respect

to the relation between the mind and body (Hegel’s Idea 41). Had Forster

paid due heed to Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle in this regard he might

have avoided his problematic interpretation of Hegel’s theory of truth. For,

Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle’s theory of potency and act provides a

crucial context for understanding the manner in which, for Hegel, truth is the

correspondence between concept and existence, mind and object.

As discussed at length in Chapter One, for Hegel, development is a

transition from potency to act. Development proceeds inasmuch as an

initially immediate and unstable or “dynamic” unity – for example, a seed or

the mind of a human child – posits a difference within itself and sublates that

difference in a higher unity. The initial immediate and unstable unity is itself

the concept, albeit merely in-itself or in potency. As such, it contains all the

objective determinations that will eventually become actualized in and

through the process of self-differentiation. Development is complete when

the actual existence of the concept corresponds to itself, that is to say, to the

totality of determinations which were present – in potency – at the beginning

of the development. The coincidence or correspondence between concept

and existence, or mind and object, is what Hegel calls the Idea and “it alone

is Truth” (LHP I 20).

2.2.2 Hegel’s Theory of Development and its Relation to

Philosophical Multiplicity

Along with contributing to his misinterpretation of Hegel’s theory of

truth, Forster’s neglect of Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle’s theory of

potency and act also has serious consequences for how Forster understands

Hegel’s diagnosis of and response to the problem of philosophical

multiplicity and conflict. This point will be returned in more depth

momentarily when the discussion turns to examining a central part of

Forster’s interpretation of how the PhG is related to the history of

philosophy and philosophical multiplicity. Still, it will be apposite presently

to establish certain basic ways in which Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle’s

theory of potency and act and, therefore, Hegel’s overall theory of

development is related to the problem of philosophical multiplicity and

conflict.

Hegel states with respect to the difference between potency and act,

The whole variation in the development of the world in history is

founded on this difference. This alone explains how since all mankind

is naturally rational, and freedom is the hypothesis on which this

reason rests, slavery yet has been, an in part still is, maintained by

many peoples, and men have remained contented under it. The only

distinction between the Africans and the Asiatics on the one hand, and

the Greeks, Romans, and moderns on the other, is that the latter know

and it is explicit for them that they are free, but the others are so

without knowing that they are, and thus without existing as being free.

This constitutes the enormous difference in their condition. (LHP I

21)

Despite the shocking offensiveness of Hegel’s racism and Eurocentrism, the

relevant philosophical point Hegel is making, here, can be extricated. For,

Hegel’s point is that the differences among the various cultures – whether

they are historically or merely geographically separated – is to be explained

by the notion of development, which is to say, in terms of the transition from

potency to act. Implicitly or in potency, all humans are rational and,

therefore, free, according to Hegel. The fact that some people remain in

bondage simply entails that their implicit or potential rationality has not

been actualized or explicitly posited. The relative stage of development of a

given culture can thus be judged in terms of the relative level of

actualization of its potential rationality.

Needless to say, this general point is, for Hegel, all the more true with

respect to the multiplicity of different and conflicting philosophies. For, as

Hegel states, “Philosophy is system in development” (LHP I 29). Thus, the

various philosophies represent and express the various stages to which the

mind has succeeded in developing itself, in actualizing the mind’s potency.

As, Hegel states:

Now if we thus grasp the principles of the Concrete and of

Development, the manifold [of philosophies] obtains quite another

signification [than mere seeming haphazard and irreconcilable

conflict], and what is said of the diversity in philosophies as if the

manifold were fixed and stationary and composed of what is mutually

exclusive is at once refuted and relegated to its proper place […]

Those who believe the principle of diversity to be one absolutely

fixed, do not know its nature, or its dialectic; the manifold or diverse

is in a state of flux; it must really be conceived of as in the process of

development, and as but a passing moment. Philosophy in its concrete

Idea is the activity of development revealing the differences which it

contains within itself. (LHP 33-4)

Thus, different philosophies represent different stage of the development of

the mind. Moreover, it is possible for these differences to obtain both

historically and contemporaneously. Lower stages of development can

manifest themselves in latter periods if, for example, an individual mind

fails to fully actualize the concept of mind which it implicitly is. For, every

mind is a potential totality, which is to say, every mind contains within itself

albeit, in the first instance, merely in potency – the totality of philosophies.

What distinguishes one mind from another, just as what distinguishes one

culture from another, is the relative degree to which they have actualized

that potency. It is worth noting further that there is a kind of heightened

reflexivity in the case of philosophy and its very relation to the notion of

development. For, as Hegel states, Philosophy has now become for itself the

apprehension of this development [i.e. of the mind as a “self-developing

organic system and a totality which contains a multitude of stages and of

moments in development”], and as conceiving Thought, is itself this

development in Thought. The more progress made in this development, the

more perfect is the philosophy. (LHP I 27) Thus, the highest development or

perfection of philosophy is manifested in that philosophy which most

precisely grasps and explicates the very notion of development, in general,

and the notion of the mind as a self-developing, systematic organic totality

in which the various other philosophies constitute but moments or stages, in

particular.

As noted, this discussion of Hegel’s notion of development and its

concomitant notions of potency and act along with their relation to the

problem of philosophical conflict will be returned to momentarily. Before

turning to that task, however, let us note a few further elements of Hegel’s

account of the dialectic of development which Forster unfortunately

neglects.

2.3 Forster’s Forgetting of Hegel’s Notion of “Forgetting”

An absolutely essential element in Hegel’s overall effort to provide an

explanatory account of the multiplicity of philosophies resides in his notion

of the mind’s forgetting of itself. As already mentioned, far from adequately

explicating this notion of the mind’s self-forgetting and its role in Hegel’s

overall account of the mind’s development in the PhG, Forster does not so

much as mention it. As it stands, it is Forster’s forgetting of Hegel’s account

of forgetting that would, in part, explain the misguidedness of his various

interpretations of Hegel that have been discussed, thus far.

For example, the fact that Forster forgets Hegel’s account of

forgetting helps to explain why Forster would ascribe to Hegel the

problematic theory of consciousness which he does. For, Hegel’s notion of

forgetting is especially instructive for understanding how he explains and

critiques the view of consciousness which Forster ascribes to him. For, it is

only upon the mind forgetting that it has posited its object in the course of its

own development that it might treat or relate to the object as something

“found” “out there”. Moreover, it is only upon relating to its object as a

something “found” “out there” or “external” to itself that the mind might

then wonder how its “representations” “in here” could “correspond” to

objects “out there”. Thus, Forster’s forgetting of Hegel’s account of

forgetting also leaves Forster unable adequately to account for how Hegel

explains and critiques the naïve notion of truth which emerges from the very

view of consciousness which, again, Forster ascribes to Hegel himself.

The mind’s forgetting of itself is also ultimately explicable in terms of

Hegel’s overall theory of development, which, of course, Forster also forgets

or neglects. For, every object of which the mind is conscious is the result of

the mind’s own process of self-differentiation and self-development. Yet, the

mind forgets its development and, hence, its responsibility for the object

and, as a result, relates the object as something “found” “out there”. Still, as

we have just learned, at its highest moments of development, the mind

begins to objectify for itself its own activity and, eventually, its own process

of development. Hence, Active Reason, that is to say, Reason for which its

own activity becomes its object, for example, is higher than merely

Observing Reason which, while indeed active, has yet to objectify or render

explicit this action for-itself. Thus, for Hegel, the antidote to the mind’s self-

forgetting is self-knowledge conceived as a kind of recollection

[Erinnerung], which is to say, a taking-possession-of-self or turning inward

which is achieved in the very process of self-positing or self-differentiation.

Unfortunately, these points go entirely undiscussed in Forster’s work, even

though for Hegel the self-recollection of the mind as a self-developing

organic totality constitutes it highest end.

2.4 Forster’s Neglect of the Problem of Futility in Motivating the PhG

Throughout his first chapter, Forster provides and unpacks an

elaborate list of the factors that motivate Hegel in the writing of the PhG.

Yet, he fails to mention what, alongside the goal of mediating self-

knowledge in the reader, is perhaps its overriding concern, namely,

responding to the charge of futility levelled against philosophy due to the

fact of philosophical multiplicity and conflict. This point is worth noting

especially because it is upon discussing this problem at length in the long

Introduction to the LHP that Hegel immediately turns to elaborating in detail

his larger theory of development. For, it is only in and through an adequate

theory of development, in general, and of the development of the mind, in

particular, that, according to Hegel, one can adequately respond to this

charge of futility against philosophy (not to mention, treat the problem of

truth). Yet, like so much else needed in order to understand Hegel’s effort in

the PhG, the problem of futility and its important connection to Hegel’s

theory of development goes entirely unmentioned in Forster’s account.

3. The Relation Between the PhG and the History of Philosophy

It is now time to turn to a portion of Forster’s work in which he raises

a set of related problems which are quite relevant to the overall aim of the

present dissertation. Thus, it will be apposite to 1) explicate this set of

problems as articulated by Forster, 2) recount Forster’s own attempt to

respond to them and 3) show how the present dissertation provides the

means of providing a better overall response to them.

3.1. Historical Chronology in the PhG

Forster articulates this set of problems in his chapter “History in the

Chapters Consciousness through Reason”. The general problem to which

Forster calls attention concerns the extent to which the phenomenologies of

the various forms of the mind provided in the PhG are supposed to

correspond to specific historical philosophies. It will be recalled that a

central thesis of this dissertation is that, in the PhG, Hegel attempts to

provide an explanatory account for the totality of different and conflicting

philosophies.

Thus, it would seem that the total analysis provided in the PhG should

in some way correspond to the totality of historical philosophies. Yet, what

are the precise mechanics of this? Do earlier philosophies necessarily

correspond to earlier forms of the mind and, thus, earlier sections of the PhG

such that the philosophies which express Sense-certainty will necessarily be

found to have emerged historically prior to philosophies which express

Observing Reason, for example? Or, is the issue of historical chronology in

effect irrelevant to the PhG provided that it does, in fact, succeed in

integrating the totality of philosophies into a unified explanatory account?

These are questions which Forster raises and attempts to respond to.

The first step of Forster’s response to these questions is simply to

attempt to show that there is, in fact, a strict chronological order to the

successive forms of the mind dealt with in the PhG, or at least those that are

covered from Consciousness through Reason. Thus, to briefly summarize

elements of Forster’s chronology, Sense-certainty, for example, being the

earliest form of the mind analyzed in the PhG corresponds to the viewpoint

of “early prehistory” manifested in ancient Persia; Perception, coming next,

corresponds to “early prehistory” in India; Lordship and Bondage, dealt with

a few stages later, corresponds to Late 5th Century Athens as well as Rome

after the 2nd Punic War; Reason as Testing Laws, showing up towards the

end of Reason, corresponds to Kant’s moral philosophy; and finally the

concluding paragraphs of the Reason chapter correspond to Hegel’s

viewpoint (Hegel’s Idea 297-353). There are further details to Forster’s

chronology, but the above list provides a rough summary of its basic

structure and nature.

3.2. Forster’s Response to Potential Objections against His Chronology

After delineating this account of the correspondence between the

chronology of historical philosophies, or viewpoints, and the forms of

consciousness successively analyzed in the PhG, Forster acknowledges a set

of objections that might be raised with respect to his effort. Let us note two

of these objections as well as discuss the manner in which Forster would

respond to them. The first objection Forster articulates concerns the fact that

in Consciousness, especially, but also in Self-consciousness and Reason,

Hegel seemingly makes few references to specific historical dates,

individuals or works, and the ones that he does make would seem to be

extremely vague. Thus, against his own argument that there is a strict

chronological order to the forms of the mind successively analyzed from

Consciousness to Reason, Forster notes that one might object, “If Hegel had

really intended to give a chronological history here, would he not have made

the allusions clearer, or included specific reference?” (Hegel’s Idea 353).

The second objection that Forster articulates concerns the fact that

many of the clear historical references that are provided in Hegel’s

phenomenology of the forms of the mind from Consciousness through

Reason occur out of chronological order (Hegel’s Idea 354). As Forster

notes, this would seem to pose the greatest threat to his argument that there

is a strict chronological order to the forms of the mind successively analyzed

in those chapters and sections.

Forster responds to these two objections by introducing what he

regards as a “very important principle”, one which he considers to be

operative within the overall design of the chapters Consciousness through

Reason but which is distinct from the principle of strict chronological order

(Hegel’s Idea 354). Thus, according Forster, [T]he sequence of shapes of

consciousness presented in these chapters is supposed to be not only a

chronological history of consciousness’s development but also and

simultaneously a collection of the strata constitutive of the modern

consciousness. (Emphases Forster’s; Hegel’s Idea 354)

Thus, according to Forster, in the chapters Consciousness through Reason

there are effectively two distinct but related principles governing the

successive analyses of the forms of the mind provided therein. First, there is

the principle of strict chronological order according to which Hegel attempts

to provide an account of the emergence in historical time of the various

forms of the mind and their concomitant viewpoints or philosophies.

Second, there is the principle according to which Hegel attempts to show

how forms of the mind which first emerged in earlier historical periods are

nevertheless preserved within the “strata” of the modern mind.

According to Forster, insofar as one recognizes that these two

principles simultaneously govern the overall presentation provided by

Consciousness through Reason, one can adequately respond to the objection

previously raised. Thus, to the first objection that the chapters

Consciousness through Reason lack specific historical references, Forster

provides a pair of related responses. First, he states:

The depiction in these chapters [i.e. Consciousness through Reason]

of a series of shapes of consciousness is supposed to serve not only as

a chronological history of consciousness, but also and simultaneously

as an analysis of the strata of the modern consciousness. The intrusion

of historical details, while it might have benefitted the former project,

could have done so only at the serious cost of interfering with the

latter. Hegel therefore decided to omit historical details as far as

possible. (Emphases Forster’s; Hegel’s Idea 357)

Thus, a first reason Hegel refrained from making clear historical references

in these chapters was apparently in order not to interfere with his

simultaneous effort to provide an analysis of the strata of forms of the mind

present in the modern consciousness or mind.

The second reason why the early stages of the PhG apparently lack

specific historical references, according to Forster, has especially to do with

the Consciousness chapter. Thus, Forster states,

[W]hen Hegel actually wrote this chapter, he in all probability had no

more precise idea of the historical reference of its first two sections,

Sense-certainty and Perception, than that they depicted shapes of

consciousness from the very beginnings of human prehistory. He was

therefore not even in a position to provide historical details in these

sections when he wrote them. (Hegel’s Idea 357)

Thus, according to Forster, Hegel omitted any specific historical references

from his account of Sense-certainty and Perception simply because there

were no specific historical details to which he might make references since

the period of time to which they might refer would be that of prehistory.

Forster follows this pair of responses with his response to the second

objection that could be raised against his argument that the chapters

Consciousness through Reason are governed by a strict chronological

principle. That objection, again, was that the historical references that do, in

fact, occur within the Consciousness through Reason very often do so out of

chronological order. Forster responds to this objection by stating, Hegel

intends these chapters to provide not only a chronological history of

consciousness but also and simultaneously, in exploitation of the putative

circumstance that consciousness’s development has been cumulative in

nature an analysis of the structure of modern consciousness. Consequently,

within any given section he will wish to allude, not only to examples of the

shape of consciousness at issue from the period of its original emergence,

but also to examples of its preservation in the modern consciousness.

(Hegel’s Idea 358) Thus, the reason why some historical references are out

of chronological order is that at times Hegel wishes to draw attention to the

instances in which historically earlier forms of the mind are retained in the

strata of modern consciousness. This fact would explain, for example, the

many references to Newtonian physics in the Force and Understanding

chapter, despite the fact that, according to Forster, the historical reference of

this section is to certain ancient viewpoints which culminate in Greek

rationalism. As Forster states, Greek rationalism’s distinction between the

sensible appearances of things recognized by the sensuous representation of

the native investigator and the underlying supersensible constitutions and

causal principles of things recognized only through a more exalted mode of

cognition is preserved as a fundamental background assumption within

modern physics. (Hegel’s Idea 358-9)

Thus, in making multiple clear references to Newton in the course of Force

And Understanding Hegel is not undermining the strict chronological

sequence of Consciousness through Reason. Rather, he is fulfilling the

ulterior task of showing the reader how the form of the mind first emergent

in Greek rationalism is still preserved among the strata of the modern mind.

Before moving to a critical examination of Forster’s articulation of

these possible objections to his argument for a strict chronological sequence

to Consciousness through Reason as well as his proffered responses to them,

it will be worth noting an important point which Forster notes in the context,

albeit merely in a footnote. Concerning this general problem of explaining

why certain historical references occur out of chronological order, Forster

adds in the footnote that in the PhG Hegel is probably also concerned with

the problem of “atavism”, which occurs when “later perspectives which do

not so much preserve an earlier perspective in a modified form within

themselves as attempt to return to it” (Hegel’s Idea 359). Thus, for example,

according to Forster, [I]t is plausible to interpret the Sense-certainty section

as an attack, not only on the historically original form of the outlook which

it describes, but also on later positions which Hegel regards as attempts to

revert to that outlook, such as certain types of philosophical empiricism.

(Hegel’s Idea 359) In his reference to the phenomenon of the “atavism” of

the mind in its course of development, Forster thus in effect alludes to a

crucial set of elements of Hegel’s entire effort in the PhG, such as the

phenomenon of the mind’s self-forgetting and its reversion to lower

viewpoints. The fact that Forster mentions this nest of issues only in a

footnote and does not explicate it in any more detail provides some

indication as to inadequacy of his overall analysis of the PhG. This point

will be returned to in the course of the ensuing critical examination of

Forster’s articulation of his position on the issue of historical chronology in

the PhG, the possible objections to his position and his response to those

objections.

3.3 Critique of Both Forster’s Chronology and His Responses to the

Potential Objections against It

Clearly, the aspects of Forster’s work just adumbrated are quite

relevant to the overall argument of the present dissertation. For, a central

part of overall the argument of this dissertation is that in the course of the

PhG Hegel attempts to demonstrate how it is possible not only to critique

but to provide an explanation for the very emergence of the multiplicity of

conflicting philosophies. Hegel shows that the various conflicting

philosophies are explicable as expressions of the various stages in the

development of the mind. In showing that the multiplicity of philosophies

are expressions of stages of development of the mind Hegel is thus able to

show 1) that these philosophies do not emerge haphazardly but have an

intelligible ground for their emergence and 2) that they are not ultimately

irreconcilable and that the disputes that have emerged among them are not

doomed to persist in perpetuity. For, in showing how the various

philosophies are expressions of the stages of the mind’s development Hegel

shows 1) that there is an intelligible pattern or unity to the totality of

philosophies inasmuch as there is an intelligible unity to the mind and 2) that

it is possible for there to be progress and development within the history of

philosophy inasmuch as there is progress and development within the mind.

A key challenge facing the overall argument of this dissertation which

the discussion of Forster’s work in the previous section helps to focus is the

challenge of showing precisely how the phenomenology of the development

of the mind provided in the PhG relates to the history of the conflicting

philosophies. According to Forster, the PhG, at least in the Consciousness

through Reason chapters, adheres to a strict chronology which begins in

prehistory and culminates with the viewpoint of Hegel himself in the

beginning of the 19th Century. This argument is qualified by Forster’s claim

that the PhG also supposedly shows how the historically emergent

viewpoints are preserved within the modern mind – a qualification intended

to explain, for example, the historical references that are out of

chronological sequence. Despite perhaps some prima facie plausibility,

however, Forster’s argument in this context is flawed. Let us turn to

delineating this critique of Forster’s argument.

3.3.1 Forster’s Problematic Interpretation of the Relation between the

History of

Philosophy and the “Strata” of the Modern Mind Delineated in the PhG

A first point of entry for a critique of Forster’s argument concerns his

claim that the intrusion of historical details in Hegel’s analysis of

Consciousness through Reason, while it might have helped clarify the

chronological principle operative in those sections, would nevertheless have

seriously interfered with Hegel’s simultaneous effort to show how the forms

of the mind analyzed in these sections are also present as strata in the

modern mind. Forster, unfortunately, makes no argument and provides no

evidence in support of this claim. More importantly, the fact that he makes it

reveals a misunderstanding of the very nature of Hegel’s effort in the PhG as

well as with Hegel’s philosophy at large. In order to show this more clearly

it would be helpful to advert to a crucial point Hegel makes in the

Introduction to the LHP.

Hegel is addressing the issue of what it takes to properly interpret the

history of philosophy. It is worth quoting Hegel at length in this context

since he makes a series of crucial but interlocking points:

[T]he study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy

itself, for, indeed, it can be nothing else. Whoever studies the history

of sciences such as physics and mathematics, makes himself

acquainted with physics and mathematics themselves. But in order to

objtain a knowledge of its progress as development of the Idea in the

empirical, external form in which philosophy appears in history, a

corresponding knowledge of the Idea is absolutely essential, just as in

judging of human affairs one must have a conception of that which is

right and fitting. Else, indeed, as in so many histories of philosophy

there is presented to the vision devoid of idea, only a disarranged

collection of opinions. To make you acquainted with this Idea, and

consequently to explain the manifestations, is the business of the

history of philosophy […] Since the observer must bring with him the

concept of the subject in order to see it in its phenomenal aspect and

in order to expose the object faithfully to view, we need not wonder at

there being so many dull histories of philosophy in which the

succession of its systems are represented simply as a number of

opinions, error and freaks of thought. They are freaks of thought

which, indeed, have been devised with a great pretension of acuteness

and of mental exertion, and with everything else which can be said in

admiration of what is merely formal. But, considering the absence of

philosophic mind in such historians as these, how should they be able

to comprehend and represent the content, which is reasoned thought?

(LHP I 30-1)

Here we have perhaps the first expression of the Hermeneutic Circle of

doing history of philosophy and, indeed, doing philosophy itself. For,

according to Hegel, one must know one’s mind in order to understand the

history of philosophy, but one must study the history of philosophy in order

to know one’s mind. Stated differently, if one does not know one’s mind as a

self-developing organic system, then one will be unable to recognize the

various historical philosophies as successive expressions of the moments of

that system. Yet, it is only through studying the history of philosophy that

one comes to recognize that the mind is a self-developing system whose

various moments are expressed in the various philosophies. Stated

differently, again, one must possess the Idea of philosophy in order to

profitably study the history of philosophy (i.e. not dismiss it as a haphazard

succession of freaks), and the Idea of philosophy is grasped only insofar as

the mind grasps itself as a self-developing organic system. Yet, recognizing

that the mind is a self-developing organic system requires profitably

studying the history of philosophy. Needless to say, the Hermeneutic

Circle of learning philosophy very closely approximates to the previously

discussed Paradox of Learning in the Meno. For, it would seem that one

must already know what philosophy is if one is to learn what philosophy is,

thus making learning philosophy impossible. Also needless to say, just like

the Paradox of Learning, the Hermeneutic Circle of philosophy is insoluble

from the viewpoint of Representation. While space does not permit

providing a detailed account of Hegel’s response to the Hermeneutic Circle

in this precise context, suffice it to say that, in a very real sense, the PhG just

is Hegel’s response. This comes out in Hegel’s famous

discussion of the Problem of the Criterion in the Introduction in which he

specifies that learning is a self-mediating and thus self-correcting process in

which the criterion is immanent to the mind itself (PhG 52-56). Hence, in

Hegel’s phenomenology of Perception, for example, in which the problem of

error is treated, Hegel is keen to emphasize that, in the case of error, it is the

mind itself which convicts itself of error. In other words, the mind discovers

the very problem of error, not by finding that its “representations” fail to

correspond to their putative objects, but rather insofar as the object fails to

correspond to the immanent rational criterion of absoluteness that just is the

mind itself (PhG 70ff.).

This Hermeneutic Circle, which affects the very core of studying the

history of philosophy and philosophy itself, along with Hegel’s explicit

awareness of it, helps to show, furthermore, the misguidedness of Forster’s

argument as to why there are apparently so few explicit historical references

in the Consciousness through Reason chapters. For, far from seriously

interfering with any effort on the part of Hegel to reveal the preservation of

earlier forms of the mind within the modern mind, making explicit historical

references to the philosophies which express the viewpoint of Sense-

certainty, for example, could only aid in the quest for self-knowledge (or

knowledge of the strata of the modern mind) which the PhG is intended to

mediate within the reader. For, in order properly to understand the strata or

moments of one’s mind, one must understand how these strata or moments,

when explicitly expressed, give rise to determinate historical philosophical

positions. In other words, Forster’s argument in this instance suggests that

the effort to understand the history of philosophy and the effort to

understand the strata or moments of one’s mind are opposed and that

engaging in one risks interfering with engaging in the other, when, for

Hegel, these two activities are complementary and, in fact, ultimately

identical.

Thus, it can be further noticed that Forster’s attempted clarification of

the relation between the history of philosophy and the PhG actually serves to

obscure an important fact which is that all references to viewpoints or

philosophies referenced in the PhG that are not ultimately Hegel’s are

“historical” in the sense that Forster uses the term in contrast to the

supposedly “ahistorical” strata of the modern mind. In other words, no

viewpoint or philosophy discussed in the PhG other than Hegel’s own,

which comes at the very end, preserves the viewpoints or philosophies that

went before it in the manner in which they are preserved within the strata of

the modern mind.

To illustrate this point, take the example provided by Forster

regarding the relation between Greek rationalism and Newtonian science

supposedly indicated in the Force and Understanding chapter. According to

Forster, in terms of its chronology, Force and Understanding corresponds to

Greek rationalism which, for Forster, culminates in Plato. Thus, on Forster’s

reading, the copious clear references to Newtonian science in the Force and

Understanding chapter are inserted there merely to illuminate for the modern

reader the way in which the Greek rationalist/Platonic viewpoint has been

preserved, albeit in modified or sublated form, in the modern mind.

Yet, for Hegel, the Newtonian viewpoint is itself no more preserved in

the modern mind, which is to say, the mind that has reached Hegel’s

viewpoint, in an unmodified or unsublated form than the Greek rationalist

viewpoint. This is precisely the point of the sections of Force and

Understanding that move beyond Newtonian mechanism to an organicist

viewpoint. For Hegel, his own Idealist philosophy of nature has already

sublated the Newtonian viewpoint by the time the PhG is written. In other

words, both Greek rationalism and Newtonian science have been sublated

into the modern – Hegelian – mind. It is thus highly misleading to suggest

that the reference to

Plato in the Force and Understanding chapter are “historical” while the

references to Newton are not.

There are actually further problems with Forster’s discussion of the

relation between Greek rationalism and Newtoianism in Force and

Understanding as well as with his larger discussion of the relation of the

PhG to the history of philosophy. In order to address these problems,

however, it will first be necessary to address an even deeper problem with

Forster’s understanding of certain basic elements of Hegel’s effort in the

PhG.

3.3.2 Forster’s Neglect of Both Basic Elements of Hegel’s Dialectic of

Development and Their Relation to the History of Philosophy

In order to begin addressing this deeper problem with Forster’s overall

understanding of Hegel’s effort in the PhG, it will be helpful first to show

how and why Forster establishes some of the chronological order which he

purports to find within the PhG. Thus, to take the first chronological

instance, Forster claims that the historical reference of Sense-certainty is to

ancient Persian religion. The sole piece of evidence that he cites in favor of

his interpretation is Hegel’s reference to Sense-certainty in the part of the

Religion chapter in which Hegel is discussing ancient Persian religion. Thus,

Forster states,

[I]n the Religion chapter, which is generally recognized to be

chronologically historical in design, he explicitly associates Sense-

certainty with the historically first and most primitive of religion, God

as Light. He associates this form of religion with the Zoroastrian

tradition of ancient Persia. It is therefore reasonable to infer that his

considered view of Sense-certainty is that it too has its source in

ancient Persia. (Hegel’s Idea 305)

There are multiple problems with Forster’s interpretation in this context.

In order best to clarify the problems with Forster’s interpretation, it will

be helpful to recall certain of the basic principles which govern the entire

dialectal development of the mind as delineated in the PhG. To begin with,

it should be recalled that the mind will determine itself, its object and its

relation to its object according to the level of development it has reached.

Next, it should be recalled that the development of the mind is also

dialectical, and part of that dialectic involves the mind’s repeated forgetting

of its own development and its reversion to lower viewpoints.

Thus, it may happen that in the course of its development, the mind

posits a highly developed object but nevertheless forgets the very

development in and through which it was posited and consequently reverts

to a lower viewpoint. Insofar as the mind reverts to a lower viewpoint it will

determine its relation to its object on the basis of that lower viewpoint

despite the fact that the object itself corresponds to a higher viewpoint.

For example, as has been repeatedly discussed, the object posited by the

Kantian viewpoint is the object of Reason, which is to say, the ‘I’ or self-

consciousness itself qua category. Yet, within the Kantian philosophy one

also detects a reversion to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty and Perception.

Thus, despite the fact that the object determined by Kantian philosophy – the

category – is highly developed and mediated, in the Kantian philosophy the

relation between the mind and its object is determined by the mind to be one

of sensuous immediacy or intuition.

Precisely the same phenomenon as this unfolds in Hegel’s treatment

of the God of Light to which Forster appeals in order to make his case

regarding the historical reference of Sense-certainty. In the case of the God

of Light section, the PhG has moved past Reason into Spirit or mind. Thus,

the object of this form of the mind is even more developed than that of

Kantian philosophy, for example. As Hegel states, the object of the

viewpoint of the God of Light is “filled with Spirit [or mind]” (PhG 419).

Still, the God of Light viewpoint has reverted to the viewpoint of immediate

consciousness, or Sense-certainty, in terms of its relation to its object.

Interestingly, the God of Light viewpoint has also reverted to the viewpoint

of immediate self-consciousness, or Lordship and Bondage, in its relation to

its object. As a result of its thus having reverted to these lower viewpoints in

terms of its relation to its object, the object of the God of Light viewpoint,

that is to say, the object filled not just with Reason but with Spirit or mind, is

experienced by this viewpoint as an uncanny or sublime, but still sensuous,

spectacle of light and dark which lords over it. As Hegel states, for the

viewpoint of God of Light, its object is “torrents of light [and] streams of

fire destructive of [all] form” from which the mind slavishly “retreats” rather

than identifies with and recognizes as itself (PhG 419).

The larger point to be noted here with respect to Forster’s effort to

establish Persian religion as the historical reference of Sense-certainty, and,

indeed, with his entire effort to establish the chronological order of the PhG,

is that the mind repeatedly reverts back to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty

throughout the course of PhG. Thus, the fact that mind does this at a stage in

which the object corresponds to that present in “prehistoric” Persian religion

bears no especial significance for the putative chronological order of the

viewpoints meant to be exemplified in the Consciousness chapter or beyond.

Indeed, on the basis of Forster’s argument one could just as easily say that

the chronological reference of Sense-certainty is to Kantian philosophy or

early modern science (i.e. the viewpoint of Observing Reason), both of

which also revert to the viewpoint of Sensecertainty.

In fact, the only place in the history of philosophy in which we see the

viewpoint of Sense-certainty expressed, as it were, in its purity is the

positive side of Schulze’s skepticism discussed in Chapter Two. For, not

only does Schulze determine the mind to relate to its object in terms of

immediate sensuousness, the object itself lacks all spiritual or mental

determinations or mediations; it just is. By contrast, the object for the God of

Light viewpoint is at least spirit or mind-filled. Thus, in the strictest sense,

the God of Light viewpoint is more advanced than the viewpoint expressed

in Schulze and, as such, cannot be considered the prime historical reference

of the viewpoint of Sense-certainty. For, as far as Hegel informs us, the only

historical philosophy which has expressed that viewpoint in its purity would

be the positive side of Schulze’s skepticism.

It should be noted further that this kind of reversion of the mind to a

lower viewpoint in terms of the manner in which it determines itself relation

to its object just is the “atavism” of the mind to which Forster provided only

the most fleeting reference but which is, in fact, central to the entire dialectic

of the mind’s development. It will be recalled, of course, that Forster

restricted the total possible ways in which the mind can determine its

relation to its object to a single one, namely, representation. This fact would,

in part, explain his highly misleading treatment of the relation between

Sensecertainty and the God of Light viewpoint since the notion that the mind

might determine its relation to its object in multiple ways is peremptorily

ruled out by Forster’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of the structure of the

mind.

Another example of Forster’s problematic rendition of the

chronological order of the PhG concerns the previously mentioned instance

regarding the putative relation between Greek rationalism and Newton in the

Force and Understanding chapter. It will be recalled that, according to

Forster, the point of the copious references to Newton in

Force and Understanding is to alert the reader to the manner in which the

viewpoint of Greek rationalism, which is the true historical reference of

Force and Understanding, has been preserved – albeit in modified or

sublated form – among the strata of the modern mind. Even a cursory

inspection of Hegel’s relative estimation of the viewpoint of Greek

rationalism, culminating as it does in Plato, compared to that of Newton,

however, shows that this is decidedly not what Hegel is up to in Force and

Understanding.

To begin with, it is clear that, for Hegel, the value of Plato’s

philosophy lies in the fact of “its elevation of consciousness into the realm of

Spirit” and that mind itself is grasped as relating to its object primarily

through thought (LHP II 2ff.). Thus, for Hegel, Plato succeeds in

determining the mind to relate to its object through thought, or Noesis, and

this kind of relation would ultimately correspond to the viewpoint of Spirit.

By contrast, Hegel ruthlessly criticizes Newton for determining the mind to

relate to its object according to the viewpoint of Sense-certainty. As Hegel

states, “Newton treated concepts like sensuous things, and dealt with them

just as men deal with wood and stone” (LHP III 325).

In the Force and Understanding section Hegel shows that he, of

course, recognizes that the object developed and posited by Newtonian

science was, in many respects, much more advanced than the object of

Plato’s philosophy. Indeed, as Hegel states, “The philosophical culture of

Plato, like the general culture of his time, was not yet ripe for truly scientific

work” (LHP II 17). Still the manner in which Plato determines the mind’s

relation to its object is decidedly not preserved in the Newtonian viewpoint.

Thus, it is highly misleading to say that the point of the references to the

Newtonian viewpoint in Force and Understanding is merely to show how the

Platonic viewpoint has been preserved among the strata of the modern mind.

For, the object of the Newtonian viewpoint which is analyzed in Force and

Understanding is qualitatively more advanced than anything in Plato’s

science; yet, the manner in which the Newtonian viewpoint determines its

relation to its object is, in fact, significantly impoverished compared to that

of Plato. Also, as previously noted, if there is any historical reference in

terms of actual chronology in Force and Understanding, it is to that of the

transition of Newtonian mechanics to the German Idealist philosophy of

nature.

Thus, there are myriad problems with Forster’s attempt to relate the

supposed historical references to the putative strata of modern mind, and

these problems themselves are grounded in still further problems with

Forster’s basic understanding of central elements of Hegel’s effort in the

PhG. It is now time to turn to showing how the overall argument of the

present dissertation provides the means for a better response to the set of

problematics which Forster attempts to address.

4. A Better Way to Approach the Relation between the PhG and the

History of Philosophy and Philosophical Multiplicity and Conflict

According to the basic argument of this dissertatin, the PhG provides an

account of the structure of mind in its development from potency to act.

Thus, forms of the mind analyzed earlier in the PhG correspond to forms of

the mind which are not yet fully actualized or whose actualization is not yet

adequate to the concept of the mind as such. Recognizing that the PhG

provides an idealized or phenomenologically purified account of the

development of the mind from potency to act is crucial to understanding the

relation between the PhG and the history of philosophy, including, of

course, the history of philosophical conflict.

In order to clarify this point further, it is first necessary to recognize

that different individual minds can be differently actualized. Thus, in most

general terms, insofar as two individuals have attained to different degrees

of actualization of their respective minds, they are liable to fall into

fundamental philosophical disagreement. Moreover, different individual

minds can be less actualized even though they come historically later. Thus,

modern minds might find themselves in disagreement with Aristotle, not

because they have superseded his viewpoint, but because they have fallen

short of it. Indeed, Hegel famously maintains that Aristotle’s theory of

rational Nous far surpasses that of the so-called “rational psychology” or

“empirical psychology” of Hegel’s time. Still, there are conditions for the

emergence and actualization of any given individual mind and, therefore, of

all minds of any given epoch. As we have seen, Hegel maintains that

previous achievement is necessary in order to make the time ripe for still

further advancement.292 This phenomenon is generically accounted for in the

notion of “vertical teleology” discussed in Chapter One of this dissertation.

There it was pointed out that, for Hegel, previous actualizations and

objectifications of the mind provide the proximate potency for a subsequent

stage of actualization. Thus, even though later individuals can fall beneath

the level of previous viewpoint insofar as they fail adequately to actualize

their minds, certain higher types of actualization are simply impossible for

individuals within earlier periods. Thus, as we have seen, even the

actualization of the mind of Plato himself was restricted by the lack of

previous actualizations of the mind. The larger point is that insofar as one

recognizes that the history of philosophy and, indeed, of all culture is the

self-actualization of the mind, one can thereby understand the source of the

multiplicity of philosophies along with their various conflicts. Thus, in the

case of Sense-certainty, insofar as one grasps this viewpoint as a stage in the

mind’s development, one can grasp why the philosophy of Schulze emerged

even at the relatively late date that it did. For, Schulze’s philosophy simply

expresses a form of the mind at a very primitive stage of development. Yet,

insofar as Schulze is operating at a viewpoint which is less developed than,

say, Fichte, who, for Hegel, clearly inhabits a higher viewpoint given that

his philosophy has at least moved to the viewpoint of Self-consciousness,

then it becomes explicable – as opposed to merely haphazard – as to why

Schulze and Fichte would have fallen into the disagreement which they

famously did.

There is thus no reason to insist upon any kind of strict chronological

order to the PhG. There will be a rough correlation between the succession

of viewpoints in the PhG and the succession of historical philosophy since

certain higher forms of the mind simply could not emerge until previous

historical philosophies, and the minds which expressed them, were

actualized. Thus, in the history of philosophy, higher viewpoints tend to

come historically later.

Yet, the development of the mind is dialectical, with various

advancements but also various forgettings of advancements and consequent

reversions to lower viewpoints, both on an individual and historically

epochal level. Thus, Hegel maintains that there is a degree of contingency

operative within the history of philosophy which is not present in the ideal

structure of the mind’s development delineated in the PhG. As Hegel notes,

there is a distinction to be drawn between the “sequence in time of history

[of philosophy] and […] the […] succession in the order of ideas”, the

former of which is beset by a certain contingency - although, ultimately, the

history of philosophy, too, is governed by the necessary, in the sense of

ineluctable, providential direction of the mind itself (LHP I 30ff.).

As has been noted, the order of viewpoints delineated in the PhG

corresponds to a certain ideal order of the development of the mind. For, the

overall goal of the PhG as such is not to articulate a strict chronological

order of viewpoints in the history of philosophy. Rather, the goal is to

mediate the development of self-knowledge in the reader which will in turn

permit the reader to be able to discern the intelligible unity governing the

multiplicity of conflicting philosophies. For, that intelligible unity turns out

to be identical to the intelligible unity governing the mind itself.

5. Recovering an Aspect of Forster’s Interpretation of Hegel’s Theory of

Truth

As a final point of discussion, despite its misguidedness, it may still be

possible to recover a certain useful insight in Forster’s argument that Hegel

adopts an “enduring communal consensus” conception of truth. For, as has

been noted, higher actualizations of the mind presuppose previous

actualizations which serve as their proximate potency. Thus, the

actualization of any individual mind presupposes the actualization of other

minds. This point can perhaps be further exploited with respect to the later

parts of the PhG in which Hegel begins more explicitly referring to the

spiritual, or mental, community.

For, it would seem that, for Hegel, the truly full actualization of any

mind requires the full actualization of all minds and that the full

actualization of all minds would produce universal philosophical agreement,

or “enduring communal consensus”, among all minds. As Hegel states in the

Preface to the PhG “it is the nature of humanity to press onward to

agreement with other; human nature only really exists in an achieved

community of minds” (PhG 43). The human mind is only ever fully

achieved or actualized in a community of other fully actualized minds, and

this full actualization produces full agreement. Thus, the overcoming of

philosophical disagreement requires the universal actualization of the mind.

Still, this does not entail that Hegel views truth itself is a matter of

enduring communal consensus, as if mere agreement were enough to

generate truth. For, there may be communities in which agreement is

achieved but yet the minds in those communities are not fully actualized.

Rather, truth, for Hegel, is only achieved when existence is adequate to

concept, or object corresponds to mind. The point would be that, only in a

universal community of fully actualized, and thus agreeing, individual minds

would there be an existence that is indeed adequate to or corresponds to the

concept of mind itself.

Multiplicity Of Conflicting Philosophy Of Law

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