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Political Discussion and Disagreement: Seeking Validation Through News
Media
I. Introduction
Individuals have conversations about a variety of political topics, such as gun control and
abortion (Adamic & Glance, 2005). When conversations about these controversial topics occur,
the results of those discussions can become complicated. For politics, people prefer to discuss it
with those they agree with significantly more than people they disagree with (Cowan &
Baldassarri, 2018). One of the reasons for this is that people want to avoid “social controversy”
(Hopmann, 2012).
In his study, Hopmann (2012) indicates that individuals want to avoid uncomfortable
situations, such as being stuck in the middle of an argument between two people in the same
group and thinking of it as a no-win situation (Green, Visser, & Tetlock, 2002) that can come
with disagreeing about politics. When faced with disagreements, individuals may turn to news
media because they prefer to reinforce their political predispositions instead of changing them
(Kim, 2017).
Individuals use specific media, news included, in order to fulfill a specific gratification
(Katz, 1974). In this approach to media consumption, the audience is aware of their needs and is
active in satisfying them (Ruggerio, 2009). Lee (2013) noted that individuals use the news for
one of four motivations. The four motivations for using news is to seek out information, to be
entertained, to socialize with others about it, or to have their opinions validated. When it comes
to the opinion-validation motivation, people prefer news media that align with their own beliefs
(Lee, 2013).
This research is important because while individuals avoid disagreements about it,
researchers state that political discussion needs to remain a major part of American public
discourse (Scheufele, 2000). If individuals refuse to communicate their political differences with
each other, then democracy is unable to function (Conover, Searing & Crewe, 2002). The most
recent example is the discourse that emerged following hundreds of Trump supporters storming
the U.S. capitol (Barrett, Raju, & Nickeas, 2021).
Political disagreement has direct effects on different aspects of individuals’ political
participation. Hopmann (2012) found that individuals who face political disagreement find it
more difficult to determine who to vote for. Following political disagreement, individuals’
positive perception of their preferred presidential candidate decreased (Parsons, 2010). Parsons
also found that individuals’ negative perception of the opposing candidate also decreased. These
changes lead to depressed turnout in presidential elections (Nir, 2011). What these studies have
in common is that political disagreement affects political attitudes. What these studies do not
examine is how political disagreement is related to individuals’ news-consumption habits
afterwards.
PEW Research Center (2018) conducted a national survey about political discussion and
disagreement. Specifically, they surveyed individuals about discussing politics with those they
disagree with in March 2016 (prior to Trump’s presidency) and in October 2018 (two years into
Trump’s presidency). In March 2016, 46% of individuals stated that discussing politics with
those they disagree with was stressful and frustrating; this number increased to 53% in October
2018. The percentage of Republicans who feel stressed and frustrated discussing politics with
people they disagree with was mostly unchanged, from 48% in 2016 to 49% in 2018. The
percentage of Democrats who feel stressed and frustrated discussing politics with people they
disagree with saw a sharp increase, from 45% in 2016 to 57% in 2018.
Within that same survey, Pew Research Center asked individuals in 2018 how much they
have in common with those they disagree with politically. When discussing politics with
someone they disagree with, 63% of people had less in common with the other person than they
thought. Breaking it down by political affiliation, this number is nearly the same for both
Democrats and Republicans. When discussing politics with someone they disagree with, 64% of
Democrats and 63% of Republicans found that they had less in common with the other person
than they thought.
The focus of my research is that the disagreements people have about politics and the
news media they choose to consume afterwards are connected. My hypothesis is that how often
individuals are exposed to political disagreement, moderated through how they choose to
respond to that disagreement, influences how often they use political commentary from news
outlets for opinion validation. This thesis will be conducted through a uses and gratifications
perspective.
II. Literature Review
A. Interpersonal Communication
i. General Overview
Interpersonal communication is when at least two individuals are engaged in a
conversation (Cathcart & Gumpert, 1983). One key element is the roles individuals play in the
conversation (Fearing, 1962). The roles Fearing (1962) described in his research are
communicator and interpreter. Communicators are those who send information with the intent to
begin conversation. Interpreters are those who receive information with the intent to provide a
response (Fearing, 1962). As the conversation goes on, individuals can serve as both
communicator and interpreter.
Larrosa-Fuentes (2020) broadly defines interpersonal communication as the practice of
exchanging information and symbolic forms between two or more individuals. Muslicha et al.
(2022) states that the nature of interpersonal communication is spontaneous, individuals receive
mutual feedback, and participants play a flexible role in the discussion. Laksana and Fadhilah
(2021) conceptualize interpersonal communication as communication that occurs in various
systems or contexts that affect what is happening and the meaning in the interaction. What
separates interpersonal and group communication is that while group communication involves
one person speaking to a group of people at the same time, interpersonal involves one person
addressing each person individually (Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020). Interpersonal communication also
differs from organizational communication in that individuals conduct interpersonal
communication for a myriad of goals (Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020) while individuals conduct
organizational communication for the specific goal of benefiting the business they work for
(Apine & Sunday, 2021).
One factor of interpersonal communication is the social context the conversation takes
place in. The context is split into two categories: the public sphere and the private sphere
(Brennan, 2017). The public sphere is the sphere of community, complex arenas where
individuals, who may not be related with each other, interact with each other (Johansen &
Andrews, 2016). The private sphere is the sphere of the household, the domain of an individual’s
family and/or intimate life (Johansen & Andrews, 2016). Individuals consider certain topics to be
specific to the public sphere and other topics specific to the private sphere. For example, Wyatt,
Katz, and Kim (2000) conducted a nationwide survey to ask individuals what topics they
consider public and what topics they consider private. Individuals consider topics such as
government and the economy to be public matters and topics such as family matters and religion
to be private matters (Wyatt et al., 2000).
The political topics that individuals discuss in the public or private sphere depend on how
individuals feel about the topic themselves. For example, Lobera and Portos (2022) analyzed
what spheres left-wing and right-wing individuals feel comfortable revealing their political
preferences. Left-wing individuals feel comfortable revealing their political preferences in both
public and private spheres; right-wing individuals more comfortable doing so in the private
sphere than the public (Lobera & Portos, 2022). This indicates that there are certain topics, such
as politics, that are discussed in both the public and private spheres. The sphere that discussion
occurs in is not the only factor of interpersonal communication.
Another factor of interpersonal communication is the strength of the relationship the
individual has with their discussion partner. The strength of the relationship can be separated into
two categories: strong tie and weak tie (Croes & Antheunis, 2021). In their study on relationship
intimacy, Croes & Antheunis (2021) asked participants who they have a strong relationship with
and who they have a weak relationship with. Friends, family, and romantic partners are
considered to be strong-tie relationships; acquaintances and colleagues are considered to be
weak-tie relationships (Croes & Antheunis, 2021). In that same study, Croes & Antheunis (2021)
also asked participants how often they discussed with others. Individuals have discussions more
frequently with those they have a strong-tie relationship with than those they have a weak-tie
relationship with (Croes & Antheunis, 2021).
The type of relationships people have can affect how willing they are to have
conversations about various topics. Researchers often group friends and family together as strong
relationships individuals are willing to have conversations with (Ai & Zhang, 2021; Walgrave &
Ketelaars, 2019). For example, Ojala and Bengtsson (2019) examined the types of conversations
have about climate change with those they have a strong relationship with. Individuals are
willing to discuss both the positive and negative aspects of climate change with friends and
parents (Ojala & Bengtsson, 2019). Morey and Yamamoto (2020) examined what motivates
individuals to discuss politics with friends and family. Individuals discuss politics with friends
and family primarily to educate themselves, express their opinions, or to influence others (Morey
& Yamamoto, 2020). Therefore, individuals are willing to discuss politics if their discussion
partner is a friend or family member.
One more aspect of interpersonal communication is the type of conversation that
individuals engage in. The two types of interpersonal communication that will be focused on
here is informal and deliberative. Informal interpersonal communication is spontaneous
(Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020) conversation that occurs between friends, family, and peers (Andersen
& Hopmann, 2018). Andersen and Hopmann (2018) conducted a survey about individuals who
use informal communication to discuss politics. Informal political talk is used as a means to learn
new information by those who do not frequently consume news media (Andersen & Hopmann,
2018). In deliberative interpersonal communication, on the other hand, individuals go into the
conversation expecting to, and willing to, discuss arguments (Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020). This
suggests that individuals enter deliberative conversations expecting to disagree with the
discussion partner.
What people learn from media can affect the content of the conversations they take part
in. For example, Vu and Gehrau (2010) conducted a field study on how an article in a community
magazine can affect what people talk about. The results of that study indicate that people are
more likely to talk about a certain issue after reading about it than those who do not (Vu &
Gejrau, 2010). Another example is an analysis Scheuffle (2002) conducted on an American
Citizen Participation survey about political participation. The survey was focused on the
relationship between hard news and political participation. Results from that survey indicate that
interpersonal communication is a significant mediator between processing hard news and
considering political participation (Scheuffle, 2002). Hwang (2010) analyzed a Legacy Media
Tracking Survey about the effects of “The Truth'' campaign. The survey in question was about
how the advertising campaign affected conversations about smoking behavior. The results of the
survey indicate that the amount of conversations about smoking behavior increased in areas
where “The Truth'' advertisements aired (Hwang, 2010). These studies show that media may not
change what people think, but media can change what people discuss about.
The type of relationships people have can affect how willing they are to have
conversations about politics. For example, Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers (2009) analyzed a
University of Michigan study about political socialization within families. The survey is about
discussing politics in families across three generations. The results show that people are more
willing to discuss politics if their parents talked to them about it (Jennings et al, 2009). Another
example is when Östman (2015) conducted a field study about instances where adolescents
discuss politics. He found that adolescents are more willing to talk about politics publically if
they already discuss it privately with family (Östman, 2015). This shows that the family
environment plays a role in how willing people are to discuss politics.
People are selective in who they discuss politics with because they want to avoid
disagreements (Cowan & Baldassarri, 2018). This is because political disagreements in
interpersonal communication can have a negative effect on those who participated. For example,
Hopmann (2012) compared two surveys in order to find the effects these disagreements have on
voters. The results of this analysis are that disagreements increase ambivalence in political
attitudes. The reason for this is so that future confrontations about those topics can be avoided
(Hopmann, 2012). This leads to a question of how political disagreements can survive in
interpersonal communication. Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2002) answered this by
examining a survey about political discussion during the 1996 presidential election. The results
of that study indicate that people are willing to disagree because they have other social networks
that agree with them (Huckfeldt et al, 2002). This shows that when faced with disagreement,
people seek other avenues for validation.
ii. Types of Interpersonal Communication
Fearing (1953) also described another key element of interpersonal communication is that
those involved are meeting face-to-face. In face-to-face communication, the content of the
conversation can be adjusted based on the responses of those involved. For example, Nelson
(2016) performed an experiment on the effect that positive moods can have on interpersonal
communication. She found that people with a positive mood, such as feeling enthusiastic or
inspired, communicated more than people with a neutral mood (Nelson, 2016). Another example
of conversation content being impacted by response can be seen in Burgers and Buekeboom’s
(2016) study that compared instances of literal statements being used in conversations to
instances of ironic statements being used. They found that people find literal comments to be
more appropriate for conversations than ironic comments (Burgers & Buekeboom, 2016).
Interpersonal communication does not always have to be face-to-face; it can be mediated
as well. Cathcart and Gumpert (1983) define mediated interpersonal communication as any
instance where technology is introduced into face-to-face interaction. What separates mediated
from face-to-face is knowledge of the medium used for conversation. Phone calls, texting, email
and social media are some of the mediums used for interpersonal mediated communication
(Petrič, Petrovčič, and Vehovar 2011). Whether it be face-to-face or mediated however, the
medium of conversation can impact the extent of participation in political discussions (Herrig et
al., 2020).
iii. Political Communication, Discussion, and Disagreement
Raekstad (2021) compares the works of two different political theorists, Bernard
Williams and Raymond Geuss, and how they define politics. Both theorists agree that politics
involves social organization, coordination, and carrying out of actions (Raekstad, 2021). Where
the theorists differ is the scope in what they consider as politics. Williams suggests that politics is
limited to the actions of the state/government, whereas Guess indicates that politics should also
encompass matters between family/families and friends. This article examines politics in a broad,
philosophical sense instead of which topics and subjects are considered political.
Görtz and Dahl (2021) examine how the breadth of what individuals consider to be
politics affects political participation. Their results suggest that individuals with a wide breadth
of topics they consider to be politics are more likely to participate in politics than those with a
narrow perception of politics. Some concepts Görtz and Dahl present include one way of
thinking where politics is “limited to what governments and related central institutions do” and
another where politics goes beyond governments and other central institutions. Görtz and Dahl
not only discuss a broad definition of politics, but they also provide topics that individuals
consider to be political as well. In their survey, the topics that many participants selected as being
political include elections, housing, taxes, childcare, and income inequality (Görtz & Dahl,
2021).
Eveland, Morey and Hutchens (2011) utilize past literature to reflect on how politics and
political conversation should be defined. In the article, Eveland et al. are critical of researchers
who do not provide a definition of politics for participants to consider, instead letting participants
think of their own definition. Eveland et al. (2011) define political conversation, on an
interpersonal level, as a form of small talk about shared public information. With this definition,
they imply that political conversation does not need to be, but can be, deliberative. Eveland et al.
state that the most common political conversation partners are those that individuals have a
strong tie to: spouses, family members, and close friends. Eveland et al. also note four common
strategies for responding to disagreement: dominating the conversation, avoiding disagreement,
yielding to the conversation partner, and compromise.
Political communication can be conceptualized as individuals or groups of political
influence speaking about issues salient to the public (Walton, 1990). This type of communication
is most common during election years, but it can occur at any time (Eveland, 2004). During
election years, opposing political parties engage in contests, debates as one example, where
candidates allocate their resources strategically (Amorós & Puy, 2013). For example, when
speaking on the same subjects, candidates try to highlight where their opponent(s) fall short on
the issue (Amorós & Puy, 2013). As a result, the manner and tone of political communication
often ends up being negative (Druckman, Kifer, & Parkin, 2010). This suggests that, since
debates between political candidates are frequently negative, individuals often expect discussions
about politics to potentially turn out negative as well.
In order to spread their message to as many people as possible, politicians and political
parties launch campaigns. Some of the mediums used for campaigns include newspapers,
television, and the Internet. For example, Stier, Belier, Lietz, and Strohmaier (2018) studied how
campaigns utilize different social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. For Facebook,
political campaigns use the platform to accumulate support, via likes, on their messages (Stier et
al., 2018). For Twitter, political campaigns use posts to encourage discussion between users in
their replies (Stier et al., 2018). This suggests that the goals that political campaigns want to
achieve depend on the medium they elect to use. The overarching message, however, is the same
regardless of the platform used. Druckman et al. (2010) found that political campaigns design
their messages with the mass audience in mind. This suggests that individuals are not given the
opportunity to respond to politicians or political parties, regardless of whether or not they
disagree with them.
Political discussions are conversations that focus on matters of public concern and issues
dealing with the common good (Conover, Searing, & Crewe, 2002). Some examples of topics
mentioned in these discussions include abortion, gun control, impeachment, and COVID-19
(Adamic & Glance, 2005; ANES, 2020). Research has focused on political discussions during
election years, but these types of conversations can occur at any time (Eveland, 2004). The
contents and outcomes of these conversations can differ whether the conversation occurs in
public or in private (Conover et al., 2002). This suggests that where the discussion happens can
play a role in how the discussion plays out.
Political discussion can occur through a variety of mediums, face-to-face, phone calls,
texting, and email (Petrič, Petrovčič, & Vehovar, 2011). The medium of discussion can influence
the extent of participation in political discussion (Herrig, Vultee, Prough, & Sweet-Cushmanm,
2020). Research has also been conducted to examine the influence political sophistication, or the
level of political awareness, has on how individuals choose to respond to disagreement. Political
sophistication does not influence individuals’ responses to political disagreement (Parsons,
2010). This indicates that while how aware individuals are of politics may not affect their
participation in political discussion, how the discussion is conducted can affect that participation
in political discussion.
However, the type of relationships individuals have influences who they share their
political opinions with. Through their survey, Morey, Eveland and Hutchens (2012) found that
individuals are more likely to share political opinions with someone they have a strong tie to than
someone they have a weak tie to. Individuals have a strong tie with family and friends; they have
a weak tie with co-workers and acquaintances (Morey et al., 2012). Likewise, people are more
willing to discuss politics if their parents talked to them about it (Jennings et al., 2009). For
instance, adolescents are more willing to talk about politics with others if they have previously
discussed it with family (Östman, 2015). This indicates that individuals choose who to discuss
politics with by what their relationship is with them. One way these conversations can end is
with the participants agreeing with each other, but these discussions can end with the participants
disagreeing with each other as well.
Political disagreement refers to conversations individuals participate in where they are
exposed to viewpoints that differ from their own (Klofstad, Sokhey & McClurg, 2013).
Individuals are exposed to these viewpoints when they face opposition from the person they are
engaging in discussion with (Valenzuela & Bachmann, 2015). These political disagreements can
occur for a variety of reasons. For instance, Valenzuela and Bachmann (2015) found that these
disagreements can occur due to a difference in their preferred presidential candidate. Differences
in preferred political party is another way that disagreement can occur (Feldman & Price, 2008).
These disagreements can also occur because of a difference in opinion on a political issue, such
as immigration (Valenzuela & Bachmann, 2015). This shows that political disagreement can
occur regardless of the subject discussed.
Research has found that how frequently individuals discuss politics with others is
influenced by how likely they are to disagree with others. Individuals will discuss politics with
others less frequently if they think they are likely to disagree with them (Gerber, Huber, Doherty,
& Dowling, 2012). For example, Cowan and Baldassarri (2018) found that some individuals
avoid political disagreements because they do not want to face conflict with the person they are
speaking with. As a result, individuals may feel inclined to share political opinions primarily
with others they are unlikely to disagree with (Cowan & Baldassarri, 2018). This would suggest
that individuals avoid engaging in discussions with people they expect to disagree with
politically.
This does not mean that individuals never discuss politics with those they disagree with.
Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn (2004) analyzed the 2000 National Election Study to examine
how frequently individuals discuss politics with those they disagree with. More than half of
respondents indicated that they disagreed with at least one person they discussed politics with
(Huckfeldt et al., 2004). This shows that political disagreement occurs more frequently than
expected.
iv. Responding to Disagreement
Testa, Hibbing, and Ritchie (2014) state that the individual’s orientation toward conflict
should be considered when examining the effects of disagreement on political knowledge,
tolerance toward those with differing views, and participation. Testa et al. (2014) separate
conflict orientation into two categories, positive (i.e. the individual considers disagreement as a
positive experience and something worth engaging in) and negative (i.e. the individual considers
disagreement as a negative experience and something that should be avoided). For exposure to
disagreement, Testa et al. (2014) found that the type of orientation does not affect the
individual’s amount of exposure to disagreement. When exposed to disagreement, individuals
with a positive orientation were more likely to be knowledgeable about politics, more likely to
show tolerance, and more likely to engage in political participation (Testa et al., 2014). When
exposed to disagreement, individuals with a negative orientation had no change in likelihood of
being knowledgeable about politics, less likely to show tolerance, and less likely to engage in
political participation (Testa et al., 2014).
Coffé and Bolzendahl (2017) analyze a survey conducted in Britain to study the effect
gender differences have on avoiding conflict and how that difference impacts political
participation. In their analysis, they found that women are more likely to avoid conflict than men.
Coffé and Bolzendahl (2017) also found that women are less likely to participate in politics than
men. There was no significant gender difference in how conflict avoidance impacts political
participation (Coffé & Bolzendahl, 2017). This shows that while gender is a factor in both
responding to conflict and political participation individually, it’s not a factor in one impacting
the other.
When faced with political disagreement, regardless of the subject discussed, individuals
will respond in different ways. Eveland et al. (2011) and Hopmann, Bjarnøe and Wonneberger
(2019) and identified four strategies individuals use to respond to this kind of disagreement.
When faced with opposition, individuals may try to dominate, which involves taking control of
the conversation and shutting down the other person from making their arguments. Individuals
may also try to compromise, which involves hearing out the other person and finding common
ground. To avoid an uncomfortable situation, individuals may try to avoid having disagreement
emerge in the conversation. If it is considered the path of least resistance, individuals may also
yield, or concede the conversation (Hopmann et al., 2019). Hopmann et al. (2019) found that
these four categories of responses are based on the individual’s level of political disagreement.
Hopmann et al. (2019) examined these four categories of response strategies through the
framework of Dual Concern Theory. Dual Concern Theory states that individuals manage
conflict based on two factors, a concern for self and a concern of others (Musenero, Baroudi, &
Gunawan, 2021). This theory suggests that individuals respond to disagreement based on how
concerned they are for both their own well-being and the well-being of others. For example,
individuals may dominate if they have a high level of self-concern but a low level of concern for
others (Hopmann et al., 2019).
To dominate during disagreement means to force control of the conversation away from
the other person (Hopmann et al., 2019). Individuals try to dominate the conversation through a
variety of means. Speaking more frequently and for longer than the other person during a
disagreement are two examples of how individuals try to dominate the conversation (Palmer,
1989). Herring et al. (2020) studied how the medium of communication, face-to-face and
mediated, affects how likely someone is to dominate during disagreement. The medium of
communication does not affect how likely individuals are to dominate the conversation (Herring
et al., 2020). While some individuals may insist on dominating the discussion, others may try to
compromise with the person they disagree with.
Compromise is when the individuals that disagree with each other come to an agreement
(O’Flynn & Setälä, 2020). In order to reach this agreement, each person has to concede one
aspect of their argument. The reason for this is that while both individuals still feel that they are
in the right, they feel that it’s better to compromise than to stay at a standstill (O’Flynn & Setälä,
2020). For example, Renwick (1975) surveyed office workers on how the source of disagreement
affects the strategy used to respond to disagreement. Compromise was the most common
response type when the individuals in disagreement differ in personality. Compromise was also
the most common response type when individuals differ in attitudes or opinions (Renwick,
1975). While some individuals may concede just one aspect of their argument, others may decide
to concede their argument altogether.
To yield during disagreement means to concede the discussion to the other person
(Hopmann et al., 2019). Research has been done on the different reasons individuals choose to
yield the disagreement. For example, Sharma (2012) examined how students responded to
disagreement during group discussions. One reason individuals yield the disagreement is because
they feel they do not have enough information on the subject being discussed (Sharma, 2012).
One other example is that Kotoff (1993) examined multiple interactions between students and
lecturers. Individuals yield the disagreement because they see it as a means of ending the
discussion (Kotoff, 1993). What these two studies have in common is that individuals show
reluctance in conceding the discussion. This suggests that while it’s used to end discussion,
yielding is not considered the preferred means of responding to disagreement.
While some individuals have different strategies for responding to disagreement, others
try to avoid it altogether. Individuals avoid disagreement for a variety of reasons such as their
lack of information on the subject, their lack of interest in politics, or the subject’s lack of
personal importance (Hayes, 2007). Individuals also avoid disagreement because they feel that if
they spoke up on a certain subject, their opinion would be in the minority (Hayes, 2007).
Paramasivam (2007) studied the effects of avoiding disagreement. Avoiding disagreement results
in emotions being pent-up, decrease of personal integrity, and relationships becoming more
uncomfortable (Paramasivam, 2007).
One of the goals of my research is to examine how often individuals are exposed to
political disagreement and how they choose to respond to it. To this end, the following research
questions are proposed.
RQ1abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) yield response strategies, c)
compromise response strategies, and d) avoid response strategies?
RQ2abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political disagreement with weak-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) compromise response strategies, c)
yield response strategies, and d) avoid response strategies?
RQ3abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political discussion with strong-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) compromise response strategies, c)
yield response strategies, and d) yield response strategies?
RQ4abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political discussion with weak-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) compromise response strategies, c)
yield response strategies, and d) avoid response strategies?
B. Uses and Gratifications
i. General Overview
Uses and Gratifications is the theory that people seek out media to have specific needs
met. For example, Lazarsfeld (1939) did a meta-analysis of research done on the effects of
listening to radio. What these pieces of early research have in common was that they were
entirely focused on the gratifications of listening to radio (Lazarsfeld, 1939). There was not
enough focus on the needs that would lead people to seek out media. Eventually, Katz (1974)
formed a definition that provided a foundation for how Uses and Gratifications should be
studied. Katz (1974) conceptualized uses and gratifications as social and psychological origin of
needs generates expectations of media, leading to different patterns of media exposure, resulting
in needs satisfied and other effects.
One key element that makes research utilizing Uses and Gratifications stand out is
audience activity. The purpose of audience activity is to examine the role people play in the
media they consume regularly (Ruggerio, 2009). Audience activity examines whether people are
active or passive in the selection of media (Gunter, 1988). According to Rubin (1993), audience
activity can be examined by breaking it down into a set number of categories.
The three main categories that Rubin (1993) provided are utility, intention, and
selectivity. Utility is what motivates the audience, such as in Gerlich’s, Drumheller’s, and
Sollosy’s (2012) study on motivations of readers. They found that, of the motivations prior to
reading, desire to relax was the most common (Gerlich et al, 2012). Intention is what the
audience plans to use the media for, such as in Perse’s (1990) study on television-viewing
motives. Her results showed that people watched TV with the intent of talking about it with
others (Perse, 1990). Selectivity is how the audience chooses their media, such as in Levy’s
(1987) study on how people used VCRs. He found that VCR owners were selective in what TV
programs VCR owners decided to record (Levy, 1987).
The issue with audience activity is thinking that the audience is either purely active or
purely passive. This is why Rubin (1993) also brought up examining audience activity through
levels of involvement. Levels of involvement indicate that there is a scale that ranges from being
passive to being active. For example, in an experimental study examining news talk shows,
Edgerly, Gotlieb, and Vraga (2016) argue that audience activity should also be measured on
behavioral utility and cognitive involvement. The results of that experiment indicate that if the
audience finds a piece of programming to be relevant, then they will be more involved with its
content (Edgerly et al, 2016).
ii. Uses and Gratifications in Media Research
Another key component that makes Uses and Gratifications research stand out is media
selection. In order to conduct research on motivations for selecting media, a typology needs to be
developed. For example, Blumler (1979) conducted a meta-analysis of typologies utilized in
Uses and Gratifications studies. He noticed that motivations commonly included in research are
surveillance, curiosity, diversion, and personal identity (Blumler, 1979). Typology can be
modified for the medium chosen as the focus of research. For example, Ruggerio (2009)
examined why people select the Internet as their medium of choice. He found that people prefer
the Internet because it is interactive, asynchronous, and its ability to demassify content
(Ruggerio, 2009). Motivations for selecting media are varied, but people share similar
motivations.
Television is unique because of its ability to use a combination of visuals and audio to
spread a message to a wide variety of people simultaneously. Entertainment is a category utilized
for TV uses and gratifications. Rubin (2009) notes that entertainment was first included as a part
of uses and gratifications research during the 60s. Research of TV uses and gratifications has
been done without including entertainment in the typology. For example, Weaver (2003)
examined television viewing motives in relation to personality traits. The typology utilized in
this research includes pass time, companionship, relaxation, information, and stimulation
(Weaver, 2003). Of these motivations, pass time and relaxation can be noted as explicitly
passive. Information, on the other hand, is a motivation that can be noted as explicitly active.
Companionship and stimulation are motivations that are not on either end of the passive-active
spectrum. What this demonstrates is that audiences can be active in seeking gratifications from
television.
The gratifications that people seek from television can vary depending on the type of
program watched. For example, Brown, Lauricella, Douai, and Zaidi (2012) surveyed people
about why they watch shows in the crime drama genre. They found that satisfying curiosity was
the most prevalent motivation (Brown et al, 2012). Gratifications can differ not just by the genre,
but by the programs that make up the genre as well. Barton (2009) distributed a survey to people
who watched different shows in the competitive reality show genre about their motivations for
watching them. The results of the survey show that different motivations were prevalent for
different shows (Barton, 2009).
The Newspaper can be defined as a print medium distributed by news organizations to
send information to a wide audience (Park, 1923). Elliot and Rosenberg (1987) conducted a
survey about the different motivations individuals use newspapers for. Study findings revealed
that surveillance and seeking information were the most common motivations for reading
newspapers (Elliot & Rosenberg, 1987). Other gratifications that Elliot and Rosenberg (1987)
found for reading newspapers were killing time and reading advertisements. News websites are
treated as an extension of newspapers (Chyi & Lasorsa, 2002).
News websites are a medium, owned and operated by news organizations, that spread
news to a wide audience (Himelboim & McCreery, 2012). Himelboim and McCreery (2012) also
noted the multimedia nature of news websites, the combination of text, audio, and video for the
purpose of sharing information. Chyi and Lasorsa (2002) found that there is considerable overlap
between newspaper readership and news website readership. Newspapers and news websites also
share the same gratifications (Payne, Dozier, Nomal & Yagade, 2010). The gratifications that
Payne et al. (2010) identified for both newspapers and news websites were surveillance,
interaction, and diversion.
Radio can be conceptualized as a purely auditory medium that can spread messages to a
wide audience simultaneously (Dunn, 2003). Towers (1987) conducted a telephone survey asking
participants about the different gratifications they use radio for. The various gratifications could
be grouped into two major categories, information and entertainment (Towers, 1987).
Information gratifications studied include to understand what is going on, to get information to
pass on to other people, and to find issues affecting people like myself (Towers, 1987).
Entertainment gratifications examined include to pass the time and to feel happy (Towers, 1987).
Albarran et al. (2007) distributed a questionnaire asking individuals about their use of radio in
comparison to new media technologies, such as satellite radio, mp3 players, and internet radio.
Radio was used more than these media technologies for access to news and information.
However, in terms of overall use, radio was used less than new media technologies (Albarran et
al., 2007). Therefore, research reveals that while individuals still use the radio to learn about the
news, use of radio overall has decreased over time.
One example of a new media technology is social media. Social media, like other
mediums, fulfill a variety of gratifications, such as information seeking, expression of opinion,
and convenience (Whiting & Williams, 2013) that people use them for. Research has been
conducted on both specific social media platforms and social media as a whole. For example,
Krause, North, and Heritage (2014) distributed an online questionnaire to find out what
motivates individuals to use Facebook. The most common motivations found were to
communicate with others, to be entertained, and to distract people from their problems (Krause et
al., 2014). Sundar and Limperos (2013) however, surveyed university students on what motivates
them to use social media regardless of platform. Among the gratifications found are activity,
interaction with others, and control over what they see (Sundar & Limperos, 2013). Studies done
on these mediums indicate that the gratifications that people seek depend on not only the
medium itself, but the content of the medium as well.
These mediums are not used alone; each medium is used in conjunction with other media
in order to have gratifications met. For example, Yuan (2011) examined what media people use
in order to build their media repertoire. She found that people utilized combinations that include
Internet, mobile phone, television, and radio (Yuan, 2011). The reason for this combination is
because some media provide content not seen on other platforms. Another example comes from a
survey Wolf and Schnauber (2015) distributed to mobile phone users about the mediums they use
to seek out information. They found that people build a news repertoire consisting of mobile
phones, computers, radio, and television (Wolf & Schnauber, 2015). These studies indicate that
people utilize multiple mediums to have their needs satisfied.
While these media share general content, the presentation is unique to each medium. An
example of this is a study Cheong and Park (2015) conducted on media habits of social media
users. Cheong and Park (2015) examined what traditional media users paired with social media
for the purpose of information consumption. Their results showed that magazines, newspapers,
radio, and television are the media most paired with social media (Cheong & Park, 2015). When
it came to reliance for information, television scored the highest among their survey participants.
This reliance may be a factor when it comes to political media.
Typologies are developed not only for individual mediums, but types of media shared
across mediums as well. For example, Lariscy, Tinkham, and Sweetster (2011) examined the
uses and gratifications people of voting age have of political media. The typology they utilized
include surveillance, excitement, and political reasons. (Lariscy et al, 2011). Excitement refers to
the competitive aspect of political elections, seeing which party will be victorious. Political
reasons include reinforcement of beliefs (Lariscy et al, 2011). Social media is appealing to
political campaigns because of the interactive nature of the medium. For example, Freelon
(2017) examined how the Obama and Romney Facebook pages were handled during the 2012
presidential election. He found that the campaigns encourage users to discuss on those pages, but
controlled what could be seen (Freelon, 2017). This allows political campaigns to organize
supporters through mediated communication.
Boulianne and Theocharis (2020) conducted a meta-analysis to examine how young
people’s use of digital media impacts their political and civic participation. Their primary
conclusion is that use of digital media (e.g. following politicians on social media, reading the
news) is positively related with political and civic participation. This suggests that use of digital
media results in offline political activity. Boulianne and Theocharis (2020) also note that some
studies suggest the reverse; participation in political and civic life causes digital media use. This
suggests that offline activity, such as chatting about politics, results in use of media, such as the
news. Their definition of political use of media includes consuming news about politics or
current affairs, election information, e-mailing or chatting about politics, and following political
candidates or elected officials.
iii. Psychological and Social Factor of the Audience
The psychological aspect involves the personality traits of those who choose to consume
media. Weaver (2003) developed three categories for personality traits when comparing them to
tv watching motivations. These categories are extraversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism
(Weaver, 2003). Extraversion is associated with an individual’s level of sociability. Neuroticism
is connected to shyness and anxiety. Psychoticism is related to autonomy and egocentricity
(Weaver, 2003). Rubin (2009) describes other factors than can make up one’s psychological
state. Other factors that can determine media behavior include life satisfaction, mobility,
loneliness, and mood (Rubin, 2009). It is because of these psychological traits that people can
become dependent on media. These aspects can be affected by the social circumstances of
audience members.
The social environment people are a part of influences their motivation for media
selection. In instances with a lack of social environment, people may turn to media for
interpersonal communication. Rubin (2009) provides an example of how someone can use radio
to fulfill that need. Someone can telephone a talk-radio host in order to have a conversation with
them (Rubin, 2009). Another example Rubin suggests is people using the Internet in order to
engage in conversation. The needs that some people depend on media for may be connected to
interpersonal communication they want to partake in.
iv. Opinion Validation
Individuals have different motivations for why they select and use their preferred news
outlets. Lee (2013) conducted a survey to find out what the most common motivations were for
selecting news. The most common motivations were to acquire information, to be entertained,
other individuals watch the same news outlets, and opinion validation (Lee, 2013). This opinion
validation comes from a desire to reinforce pre-existing attitudes (Slater, 2009). Iyengar and
Hahn (2009) conducted research on why individuals choose news outlets for reinforcing
attitudes. Individuals choose certain news outlets because they anticipate political agreement
from these outlets (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). This suggests that people select certain news media if
they expect it to fulfill their need for validation.
Individuals choose certain news outlets that are likely to reinforce their opinions and
avoid other news outlets that are likely to challenge their opinions (Garrett, 2009). For example,
Knobloch-Westerwick and Lavis (2017) studied how political affiliation influenced use of
political and satirical news. Liberals preferred political and satirical news that provided liberal
opinions and conservatives preferred political and satirical news that provided conservative
opinions (Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis, 2017). As for challenge avoidance, Jamal and Melkote
(2008) distributed a survey to find out why some individuals avoid certain television news
outlets. Individuals avoid specific outlets because they feature individuals who hold beliefs they
disagree with (Jamal & Melkote, 2008). Garrett (2009b) does note that opinion reinforcement
and challenge avoidance should be treated as different motivations.
The reason those two behaviors are considered separate is because individuals who use
news for opinion reinforcement may not avoid news that challenges their opinions. For example,
Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch (2013) found that individuals who seek out opinion-reinforcing
news outlets do not explicitly avoid opinion-challenging news outlets. However, individuals’
interactions with others may encourage challenge-avoiding behavior. One of the motivations for
an individual’s opinion challenge avoidance is political disagreement (Skoric, Zhu, & Lin, 2018).
For example, Skoric et al. found that individuals unfriend and unfollow others on social media
because of political disagreement. Individuals do this to avoid future disagreements with those
people.
Individuals are more likely to select articles that appeared to reinforce their opinions than
articles that challenged them (Garrett, 2009a). Garrett noticed this when he had participants
choose different news articles to read about political topics. Garrett (2009a) also found that even
if individuals select articles that challenge their opinions, they will spend less time reading them
than articles that reinforce their opinion. The variety of options for obtaining news the Internet
provides has only encouraged this desire to select news for opinion reinforcement (Jang, 2014).
While this increased variety has also encouraged opinion challenge avoidance, it is less
significant than the desire for opinion reinforcement (Jang, 2014).
Individuals select news media that aligns with their attitudes regardless of the political
subject of discussion. For example, Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009) studied how
individuals use news media for the topics of minimum wage, abortion, health care, and gun
control. For all four of these subjects, individuals selected news stories that they perceive to be
similar to their beliefs (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009). Individuals also select news
media that aligns with their attitudes regardless of the medium used. For example, Stroud (2008)
found that individuals prefer newspapers, political talk radio, cable news, and political websites
that align with their beliefs. These two studies show that regardless of the subject or medium,
individuals prefer news media that reinforces their opinions.
Individuals who receive opinion validation from specific news media will continue to get
their news from them. For example, Feldman, Myers, Hmielowski, and Leiserowitz (2014)
studied how attitudes toward global warming affect news media use. Individuals continued to use
news media that reinforced their beliefs on climate change (Feldman et al., 2014). This suggests
that if people have their beliefs validated through specific news media, they will continue to use
that media to keep receiving that validation. Opinion validation from news media also affects
political participation. Exposure to news media that provides like-minded commentary increases
political participation (Dilliplane, 2011). Conversely, exposure to news media that provides
counter-attitudinal commentary decreases political participation (Dilliplane, 2011).
The other goal of this research is to examine how exposure to and response strategies for
political disagreement is related to the use of news media for like-minded commentary. To this
end, the following research questions are proposed.
RQ5: What are the relationships between types of response strategies and news media use for
political opinion validation?
RQ6: What is the relationship between strength of political party affiliation and news media use
for political opinion validation?
RQ7: What is the relationship between level of political interest and news media use for political
opinion validation?
RQ8: What is the relationship between level of political knowledge and news media use for
political opinion validation?
III. Method
For this choice of topic, quantitative methods were utilized in order to conduct the
research. The reasoning for this was to have a sample that can consist of a wide variety of
individuals. Specifically, the type of research method that was utilized for this study was a
questionnaire. The survey was effective because of its ability to have a wide sample respond to
the same set of questions.
A. Survey
The survey itself was split into four sections; each focusing on a different aspect of the
research topic. Section one focused on conversations involving politics; respondents answered
questions on who they discuss politics with, how frequently they discuss politics with those
individuals, and how frequently they disagreed with those individuals. Section two asked
participants how likely they are to use different strategies for responding to political
disagreement. Section three focused on respondents’ use of different news mediums for like-
minded commentary. Lastly, section four was entirely questions pertaining to demographic data.
Based on Qualtrics’s estimations, the average completion time of the questionnaire was eight
minutes.
The survey was split into five pages. Section one was split into two pages. This is because
page one asked about strong-tie relationships (friends/family) that participants discuss politics
with, while page two will ask participants the same questions about weak-tie relationships
(acquaintances). Sections two, three, and four of the survey each had their own page.
Respondents were encouraged, but not forced, to answer all of the questions on each page before
moving to the next. By doing this, the goal was to ensure that none of the questions were left
blank. Before moving on from the fifth page, participants could go back to any of the previous
sections to change their answers if they wished to do so. Respondents were also encouraged, but
not required, to complete the survey in one sitting. The survey was designed to save their
progress, so participants could fill out the rest of the questions later if they chose not to complete
it in one sitting.
Prior to distribution of this survey, a pilot test was conducted at a large southwestern
university. A class of eight students participated in the pilot test, which was conducted on
November 18, 2021. Following the pilot test, additional changes were made prior to the proper
distribution of the survey. In response to the students’ feedback, the changes were mainly to the
demographics portion of the survey. For example, in the question about religious affiliation, one
of the answer choices was changed from “Christian” to “Christian/Protestant”.
B. Participants and Distribution
Selecting possible participants for this survey was done through random sampling. The
sample size was 150 individuals from the website Prolific. All participants were at least 18 years
of age and based in the United States. Prolific was selected because, due to its pool of potential
participants, would allow the results of the survey to be generalizable to the wider public.
Recruitment was done via a recruitment message potential participants received in their inbox on
the Prolific website.
Prolific users that received the study recruitment message were under no obligation to
participate in the survey. They were incentivized, however, by receiving monetary payment upon
completing the survey. Participants received their payment through Prolific, via the funds the
researcher added to their account. Survey responses are kept entirely anonymous, as to avoid the
possibility of responses being traced back to specific individuals. Those who filled out the survey
were identified by a number instead.
Data were collected on February 14, 2022 through a web-based survey on Qualtrics. A
total of 150 valid responses were collected through Prolific. Respondents were paid $1 for the
completion of the questionnaire. After reading the informed consent form, which was approved
by the university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB), participants answered a series of questions
measuring predictor and outcome variables. Results of the online questionnaire were analyzed
through SPSS.
Of the 150 participants, 56% were female (n = 84), 40% were male (n = 60), 3.3% were
nonbinary (n = 5), and 0.7% chose not to disclose (n = 1). The average age of the participants
was 36.13 years old (SD = 13.49). Racial background of the participants is as follows: 87.3%
were White/Caucasian (n = 131), 6% were Black/African-American (n = 9), 6% were Asian (n =
9), and 4% were Hispanic/Latino (n = 6). For highest level of education completed: 33.3% were
4-year university (n = 50), 24.7% were graduate college (n = 37), 16.7% were some college (n =
25), 9.3% were high school/GED (n = 14), 9.3% were 2-year college (n = 14), and 6.7% were
some graduate college (n = 10). Employment status of the participants is as follows: 73.3% were
employed (n = 110), 22% were unemployed (n = 33), and 4.7% were in an internship (n = 7).
Annual income of the participants is as follows: 21.3% were between $35,000 and $49,999 (n =
32), 20.7% were less than $15,000 (n = 31), 14.7% were between $15,000 and $34,999 (n = 22),
20% were between $50,000 and $74,999 (n = 30), 10% were between $100,000 and $149,999 (n
= 15), 7.3% were between $75,000 and $99,999 (n = 11), and 6% were $150,000 or more (n = 9).
For marital status: 36.7% were married (n = 55), 34% were single (n = 51), 21.3% were in a
relationship, but not married (n = 32), 7.3% were divorced (n = 11), and 0.7% was widowed (n =
1). For religious affiliation: 38% were Christian/Protestant (n = 57), 36% were other (n = 54),
15.3% preferred not to say (n = 23), 8.7% were Catholic (n = 13), and 2% were Jewish (n = 3).
Of the 150 participants, 54% were Liberal (n = 81), 27.3% were Moderate (n = 41),
14.7% were Conservative/Right (n = 22), and 4% were Other (n = 6). Of the 6 participants that
selected Other: 33.3% were Libertarian (n = 2), 16.6% were Anarchist (n = 1), 16.6% were
Mutualist (n = 1), and 16.6% were Independent (n = 1). For affiliation with a political party,
56.7% were Democrat (n = 85), 18.7% were Republican (n = 28), 13.3% were
Independent/Other (n = 20), and 11.3% were no affiliation (n = 17). Among the 20 participants
that selected Independent/Other: 10% were Socialist (n = 2), 10% were Libertarian (n = 2), and
10% were Green (n = 2). For strength of party affiliation, of the 85 participants that selected
Democrat, 31.7% were somewhat strongly (n = 27), 22.3% were neither strong nor weak (n =
19), 21.1% were somewhat weak (n = 18), 20% were very strongly (n = 20), and 4.7% were very
weak (n = 4). For strength of party affiliation, of the 28 participants that selected Republican,
35.7% were very strongly (n = 10), 21.4% was somewhat weak (n = 6), 28.5% were somewhat
strongly (n = 8), 10.7% were neither strong nor weak (n = 3), and 3.5% was very weak (n = 1).
The total sample indicated that the participants were somewhat interested in politics (M = 2.89,
SD = 0.853), they sometimes engage in politics (M = 2.98, SD = 0.893), and they consider
themselves fairly knowledgeable about politics (M = 3.25, SD = 1.082).
C. Measures
Frequency of Political Discussion and Disagreement. Adapted from Feldman & Price
(2008), this 12-item measure asks participants to name, using only their initials, two
friends/family members (strong-tie relationships) and two acquaintances (weak-tie relationships)
that they discuss politics with. For each person, participants will be asked to state how many
days in a typical week they discuss politics with them (responses range from zero to seven);
[strong-tie relationships (M = 3.12, SD = 1.19) and weak-tie relationships (M = 2.36, SD = 1.04)]
and how often they disagree with that person’s point of view (almost never = 1, almost all the time
= 5); [strong-tie relationships (M = 2.68, SD = .80) and weak-tie relationships (M = 2.69, SD =
.78)].
Strategy for Responding to Political Disagreement. Adapted from Hoppman et al. (2019),
this 16-item measure asks participants to state how likely they are to use different strategies to
respond to political disagreement. These items will be gauged on a five-point likert scale (very
likely = 1, very unlikely= 5). Sample item: When faced with disagreement during those political
discussions, I emphasize that we should find common ground. Strong-tie (family and friends)
and weak-tie (acquaintances) relationships were combined to form a composite variable for each
response strategy: Compromise (α = .88, M = 2.82, SD = .93), Avoid (α = .83, M = 2.31, SD =
.87), Dominate (α = .78, M = 2.96, SD = .89), and Yield (α = .76, M = 3.61, SD = .77).
Using News for Opinion Validation. Modified from Lee (2013), this 8-item measure asks
participants to state how often they use news from different mediums for opinions from like-
minded commentators. The mediums that will be asked about are newspapers/news websites,
television, radio, and social media. The purpose of this measure is to see which news mediums
individuals use as a means of opinion validation. These items will be gauged on a four-point
likert scale (never = 1, often = 4). Sample item: How often do you watch television news to
expose yourself to opinions that are similar to your own? (α = .85, M = 2.11, SD = .64).
Demographics This 9-item measure asks participants to select the options that best reflect
who they are. Characteristics participants were asked about include political affiliation, race,
gender, and age group.
IV. Results
Research question 1a inquired about what the relationship is, if there is one, between
frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie relationships and dominate response
strategies. A Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated for the relationship between
frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners and the response strategies, which
is presented by table one. Frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners was not
found to be significantly correlated with dominate response strategies, r(150) = -.098, p = n.s.
Research question 1b asked about the relationship between frequency of political
disagreement with strong-tie relationships and yield response strategies. As shown by table one,
frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly
correlated with yield response strategies, r(150) = .023, p = n.s.
Research question 1c examined what the relationship is, if there is one, between
frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie relationships and compromise response
strategies. As shown by table one, frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners
was not found to be significantly correlated with compromise response strategies, r(150) = -.083,
p = n.s.
Research question 1d looked at the relationship, if there is one, between frequency of
political disagreement with strong-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. As shown by
table one, frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners was not found to be
significantly correlated with avoid response strategies, r(150) = .047, p = n.s. The above findings
imply that frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners may not be
related with any of the response strategies.
Research question 2a inquired about what relationship there is, if any, between frequency
of disagreement with weak-tie relationships and dominate response strategies. A Pearson
correlation coefficient was calculated for the relationship between frequency of disagreement
with weak-tie discussion partners and the response strategies, which is presented by table one.
Frequency of disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly
correlated with dominate response strategies, r(149) = -.032, p = n.s.
Research question 2b asked about the possible relationship between frequency of
disagreement with weak-tie relationships and compromise response strategies. As shown in table
one, frequency of disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be
significantly correlated to compromise response strategies, r(149) = -.025, p = n.s.
Research question 2c examined what relationship there might be between frequency of
disagreement with weak-tie relationships and yield response strategies. Table one shows that
frequency of disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly
correlated to yield response strategies, r(149) = -.022, p = n.s.
Research question 2d inquired about what relationship there is, if any, between frequency
of disagreement with weak-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. Frequency of
disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly correlated to
avoid response strategies, r(149) = .011, p = n.s. Similar to the first research question, this and
the above findings implies that frequency of political disagreement with weak-tie discussion
partners may not be related with any of the response strategies.
Research question 3a asked what the relationship is between frequency of political
discussion with strong-tie relationships and dominate response strategies. A Pearson correlation
coefficient was calculated for the relationship between frequency of political discussion with
strong-tie discussion partners and the response strategies, the results of which is presented in
table one. A moderate negative correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with
strong-tie discussion partners and dominate response strategies, r(150) = -.185, p < .05. This
finding suggests that the more often individuals talk about politics with friends and family, the
less likely they may be to use the dominate response strategy.
Research question 3b inquired about the relationship between frequency of political
discussion with strong-tie relationships will be positively related to compromise response
strategies. Frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners was not found to
be significantly correlated to compromise response strategies, r(150 = .020, p = n.s. This finding
suggests that frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners may not be
related to the compromise response strategy.
Research question 3c asked what the relationship is between frequency of political
discussion with strong-tie relationships and the yield response strategies. A moderate positive
correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners
and yield response strategies, r(150) = .167, p < .05. This finding suggests that the more often
individuals talk about politics with friends and family, the more likely they may be to use the
yield response strategy.
Research question 3d examined what relationship, if any, there is between frequency of
political discussion with strong-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. Frequency of
political discussion with strong-tie relationships was not found to be significantly correlated to
avoid response strategies, r(150) = .044, p = n.s. Similar to research question 3b, this finding
implies frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners may not be related to
the avoid response strategy.
Research question 4a looked at what relationship there is, if any, between frequency of
political discussion with weak-tie relationships and dominate response strategies. A Pearson
correlation coefficient was calculated for the relationship between frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie discussion partners and the response strategies. A strong negative
correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners and
dominate response strategies, r(149) = -.221, p < .01. Similar to research question 3a, this finding
suggests that the more often individuals talk about politics with acquaintances, the less likely
they may be to use the dominate response strategy.
Research question 4b examined what the relationship is, if any, between frequency of
political discussion with weak-tie relationships and compromise response strategies. Frequency
of political discussion with weak-tie relationships was not found to be significantly correlated to
compromise response strategies, r(149) = .081, p = n.s. Like with research questions 3b and 3d,
this finding suggests that frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners may
not be related to the compromise response strategy.
Research question 4c inquired about the relationship between frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie relationships and yield response strategies. A moderate positive
correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners and
yield response strategies, r(149) = .178, p < .05. Like with research question 3c, this finding
suggests that the more often individuals talk about politics with acquaintances, the more likely
they may be to use the yield response strategy.
Research question 4d asked what the relationship is between frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. Frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly correlated to avoid
response strategies, r(149) = .134, p = n.s. This finding implies frequency of political discussion
with weak-tie discussion partners may not be related to the avoid response strategy. This finding
is similar to the results of research questions 3b, 3d, and 4b.
To examine RQ5, which examined the relationship between types of response strategies
and news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were conducted. Results for
RQ5 showed that there was a significant relationship between news media use and dominate
response strategies, r(150) = -.328, p < .001. This finding suggests that those with dominate
response strategies are less likely to use news media to validate their political opinions. For
yielding (r(150) = .085, p = n.s.), avoiding (r(150) = -.007, p = n.s.), and compromising (r(150)
= .001, p = n.s.) response strategies, no significant relationships were found.
To examine RQ6, which examined the relationship between strength of affiliation with
preferred political party and news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were
conducted. Results for RQ6 showed that news media use and strength of party affiliation are
negatively related with each other, r(150) = -.223, p < .01. This finding suggests that if an
individual strongly affiliates with their preferred political party, they are unlikely to use news
media to validate their political opinions.
To examine RQ7, which examined the relationship between level of political interest and
news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were conducted. Results for RQ7
showed that there was a significant relationship between news media use and political interest,
r(150) = .291, p < .01. This finding suggests that the more interested an individual is in politics,
the more likely they are to use news media to validate their political opinions.
To examine RQ8, which examined the relationship between level of political knowledge
and news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were conducted. Results for
RQ8 showed that there was a significant relationship between news media use and political
knowledge, r(150) = .214, p < .01. This finding suggests that the more knowledgeable an
individual considers themselves to be about politics, the more likely they are to use news media
to validate their political opinions.
Table 1
Pearson’s Correlation
Disagree
strong-tie
Disagree
weak-tie
Discussion
strong-tie
Discussion
weak-tie
Avoid
Compromise
Dominate
News
Media
Disagree
strong-tie
1
.247**
.086
.096
.047
-.083
-.098
.043
Disagree
weak-tie
.247**
1
.126
.024
.011
-.025
-.032
-.083
Discussion
strong-tie
.086
.126
1
.399**
.044
.020
-.185*
.191*
Discussion
weak-tie
.096
.024
.399**
1
.134
.081
-.221**
.353**
Avoid
.047
.011
.044
.134
1
.227**
-.434**
-.007
Yield
.023
-.022
.167*
.178*
.173*
.532**
-.290**
.085
Compromise
-.083
-.025
.020
.081
.227**
1
-.191*
.001
Dominate
-.098
-.032
-.185
-.221**
-.434**
-.191*
1
-.328**
News Media
.043
-.083
.191*
.353**
-.007
.001
-.328**
1
Note: * indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** indicates correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
39
Table 2
Pearson’s Correlation
News
Media
Political
Association
Political
Party
Strength of
Party
Affiliation
Political
Interest
Political
Engagement
Political
Knowledge
News Media
1
-.098
-.124
-.223**
.291**
.135
.214**
Political
Association
-.098
1
.409**
.173*
-.074
.080
-.141
Political
Party
-.124
.409**
1
.234**
-.075
-.030
.024
Strength of
Party
Affiliation
-.223**
.173*
.234**
1
-.294**
-.158
-.209*
Political
Interest
.291**
-.074
-.075
-.294**
1
.535**
.641**
Political
Engagement
.135
.080
-.030
-.158
.535**
1
.512**
Political
Knowledge
.214**
-.141
.024
-.209*
.641**
.512**
1
Note: * indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** indicates correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
40
V. Discussion
The current study examines how often individuals discuss politics with others, how often
individuals are exposed to disagreement during those political discussions, what response
strategies individuals use when faced with that disagreement, and the use of news media for
opinion validation following those political discussions. This study also examined what the
difference, if any, was if the discussion partner for those political discussions was someone the
individual had a strong-tie relationship (friends/family) with or a weak-tie relationship
(acquaintance) with. This study is a valuable addition to the literature because it shows how the
political discussions and disagreements that people engage in impacts their motivation for
checking news media.
A major factor of interpersonal communication is the strength of the relationship between
an individual and their conversation partner (Croes & Antheunis, 2021). The types of
relationships individuals have can affect how willing they are to discuss various subjects (Ojala
& Bengtsson, 2019), including politics (Jennings et al., 2009; Morey & Yamamoto, 2020). If
individuals think they are likely to disagree with their discussion partners on politics, then they
may discuss politics less frequently (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2012); but that does
not mean individuals never discuss politics with those they disagree with (Huckfeldt et al.,
2004). When faced with disagreement, individuals may use one of four response strategies,
dominate, compromise, yield, and avoid (Eveland et al., 2011; Hopmann et al., 2019).
Individuals use news media for a variety of motivations (Lee, 2013), including opinion
validation (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Slater, 2009).
The present study found that there may not be a significant relationship between the
frequency of disagreement and the dominate, compromise, yield, and avoid response strategies.
The lack of relationship between frequency of disagreement and the avoid response strategy is
consistent with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) finding for that specific strategy. Hopmann’s suggestion
for this specific finding is that individuals avoid political disagreement not due to the frequency
of said disagreement, but due to a lack of interest in politics. However, the findings for the other
three response strategies (i.e., dominate, compromise, yield) are not consistent with Hopmann et
al.’s (2019) results. A plausible explanation for this is that how often individuals are exposed to
disagreement is not a factor in how they choose to respond to it. For example, Carlson (2020)
examined the different factors that play into how individuals respond to political disagreement.
The factors of a disagreement that Carlson (2020) found are its scope, domain, genealogy, and
consequence. For example, Carlson (2020) notes that the wider the scope of a political
disagreement is, the less likely an individual may be to conciliate, or pacify, their discussion
partner. This suggests that while there are multiple aspects of political disagreement that affect
how individuals respond, the frequency of disagreement may not be one of them.
Another finding from this study is that frequency of political discussion both strong-tie
and weak-tie relationships and the dominate response strategy were negatively related with each
other. This finding is not consistent with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) observation that the more often
individuals discuss politics, the more willing they are to dominate. One reason why this might be
the case is that if an individual frequently discusses politics with someone, then it means they
might agree with that person often. This would suggest that the more often an individual talks
about politics with someone they agree with, the less likely they may be to try to dominate the
conversation. An example of this is Cowan’s and Baldassarri’s (2018) study on who individuals
choose to discuss politics with. Individuals speak more frequently with those they are likely to
agree with than those they expect to disagree with (Cowan & Baldassarri, 2018).
A surprising finding is that the relationships between frequency of disagreement and each
of the response strategies (i.e. dominate, compromise, yield, avoid) was the same for both strong-
tie (i.e. family and friends) and weak-tie (i.e. acquaintances) relationships. Not only that, but
when it came to frequency of political discussion and each of the response strategies, the
relationships were the same for strong-tie and weak-tie as well. This finding is not consistent
with Croes’ and Antheunis’s (2021) finding that individuals talk more frequently with those they
have a strong-tie relationship with than those with a weak-tie relationship. One possible
explanation for this inconsistency is that how individuals communicate with others has changed.
To provide an example, a Pew Research Center study conducted by Hampton, Goulet, and
Purcell (2011) shows that the average American has 636 social ties on social networking services
(i.e. Facebook and Twitter). Hampton et al.’s (2011) also shows that these ties consist of strong-
tie and weak-tie relationships. Since SNS users are aware that their followers see their posts, this
could suggest that individuals may feel comfortable responding to strong-tie and weak-tie
relationships the same way.
Another noteworthy finding for this study was that there was a positive between
frequency of political discussion and the yield response strategy. This finding is not consistent
with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) observation that the more often an individual discusses politics
with someone, the less likely they are to use yield response strategies. A plausible explanation for
why frequency of discussion and the yield strategy are positively related with each other is that
many people have stopped talking about politics. One example of this is a Pew Research
Center study, conducted by Jurkowitz and Mitchell (2020), on that subject. 45% of adults in the
U.S. have stopped talking about politics with someone because of something the other person
said (Jurkowitz & Mitchell, 2020). This suggests that if one person said something (during a
political discussion) that the other person did not like, they may choose to yield the conversation
just to end the discussion.
Also, the present study found that there was no significant relationship between
frequency of political discussion and the dominate or avoid response strategies. This finding is
not consistent with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) observation of the dominate and avoid response
strategies. One explanation for why this is the case is that if an individual discusses politics
frequently with someone, then they might frequently agree with them as well. If that is the case,
they may not feel the need to respond to their discussion partner by trying to dominate the
conversation nor avoid the subject of politics. This idea is supported by Cowan’s and
Baldassarri’s (2018) finding that individuals frequently discuss politics with those they expect to
agree with. This suggests that if an individual frequently discusses politics with someone, then
they likely enjoy talking politics with them. This then implies that if individuals enjoy discussing
politics with each other, they may not feel the need to dominate or avoid.
Looking at the use of news media for opinion validation, it and the dominate response
strategy are negatively related with each other. One explanation for this finding is that if an
individual feels the need to dominate the conversation, then they may feel confident about, or a
sense of superiority in, what they believe in. This would suggest that, since they feel that sense of
superiority about their opinions, individuals may not feel the need to use the news for opinion
validation. An example of this can be seen in Hall’s and Raimi’s (2018) study on belief
superiority. Individuals with a greater sense of superiority in their political beliefs select news
outlets that aligns with their views; they do this because they feel that the information those
outlets provide is superior than news outlets of differing beliefs (Hall & Raimi, 2018). This
suggests that while individuals do select news media whose beliefs align with their own, their
motivation to do so may not be out of a need for opinion validation.
Continuing with the use of news media for opinion validation, there is a positive
correlation between it and the frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion
partners. That same type of correlation was also found for the use of news media for opinion
validation and the frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners. This
shows that there may be a significant relationship between using news media for opinion
validation and discussing politics with both strong-tie and weak-tie relationships. Morey’s and
Yamamoto’s (2020) findings in their study on the different motivations for political talk support
this notion. What this suggests is that the more often individuals talk about politics with others,
the more often they might use the news to hear from like-minded commentators. It’s possible that
if individuals regularly agree with those they frequently discuss politics with (Cowan &
Baldassarri, 2018), then they might want that same type of agreement from news media as well.
In terms of results from correlations that looked at the use of news media for opinion
validation and certain demographic questions, the use of news media for opinion validation and
strength of affiliation with a political party are positively related with each other. This suggests
that the more an individual associates with their preferred political party, the more likely they
may be to use news media to validate their political beliefs. This finding is consistent with
Knobloch-Westerwick’s and Lavis’ (2017) study on partisan alignment and partisan news. The
more an individual leans Republican, the more likely they are to select partisan media that
reflects conservative beliefs (Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis, 2017). The more an individual
leans Democrat, the more likely they are to select partisan media that reflects liberal beliefs
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis, 2017). What this may imply is news media that present
information with a clear ideological slant appeals to people that strongly identify with a specific
political party.
Another finding from correlations that looked at the use of news media for opinion
validation and certain demographic questions, the use of news media for opinion validation and
level of interest in politics are also positively related to each other. This suggests that the greater
an individual’s interest in politics is, the more likely they might be to use news media to validate
their political beliefs. Knobloch-Westerwick’s and Lavis’ (2017) study is consistent with this
finding as well. The higher an individual’s level of political interest is, the more often they
selected partisan news that reinforced their political attitudes (Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis,
2017). This observation suggests that people who are highly interested in politics may select
news media that matches that level of interest.
One more observation from the correlations between the use of news media for opinion
validation and certain demographic questions, the use of news media for opinion validation and
the level of political knowledge are positively related with each other. This suggests that the
more an individual considers themself knowledgeable about politics, the more likely they may be
to use news media to validate their political opinions. This finding is consistent with Feldman’s,
Wojcieszak’s, Stroud’s, and Bimber’s (2018) study on what influences media selectivity. In that
study, Feldman et al. (2018) found that political knowledge predicted a preference for pro-
attitudinal media. This finding suggests that people who feel that they know a lot about politics
might select news media that supports what they know.
VI. Conclusion
People have conversations about a variety of topics for a variety of reasons. These topics
can range from movies and music to food and fashion. These conversations are usually light-
hearted; people feel free to agree or disagree in these situations. This light-hearted feeling
extends to the media people choose about those topics (Krause et al., 2014). When it comes to
controversial topics, politics specifically, that light-hearted feeling is not present. If people
discuss politics with someone who disagrees with them, they feel unsatisfied afterwards
(Hopmann, 2012). Following this, people choose news media that validates their beliefs (Kim,
2017). This study aims to explore how the discussions and disagreements people have about
politics can affect their motivations for using certain news media and makes significant
contributions in the areas of interpersonal communication and media use.
This subject of news media as a means of opinion validation was studied from a uses and
gratifications perspective. Uses and Gratifications theory states that individuals select specific
media depending on what needs they want fulfilled (Ruggerio, 2009). The needs individuals
want to be satisfied can change depending on the medium they use (Rubin, 2009). The topics
individuals have conversations about, such as government, the economy, and religion (Wyatt et
al., 2000), can change depending on the relationships they have with those they converse.
Conversations, and their outcomes, can vary between family, friends, and acquaintances. This
research examined the role of politics in the conversations people have and how it affects why
they choose their preferred news media.
While political discussions are common during election years, they can occur at any time
(Eveland, 2004). Individuals may talk about politics with others less often if they expect to
disagree with them (Gerber et al., 2012). As for responding to political disagreement, it can be
separated into four categories: dominate, compromise, yield, and avoid (Eveland et al., 2011).
Dominate means to take control of the conversation, compromise involves the discussion
partners reaching some kind of middle ground, yielding means conceding the disagreement to the
other person, and avoid involves making sure political disagreement does not come up
(Hopmann et al., 2019).
The results from this study showed no significant relationship between the frequency of
political disagreement and the response strategies. This means that how often people are exposed
to political disagreement may not be a factor in how they respond to it. In contrast, the frequency
of political discussion is negatively related with the dominate strategy and positively related with
the yield strategy. Of the four response strategies, only dominate had any significant relationship
with the use of news media for opinion validation, there being a negative correlation between the
two. This suggests that the more likely individuals are to try to dominate the political
disagreement, the less likely they are to use the news to validate their beliefs.
These results contradict Hopmann et al.’s (2019) findings about the relationships between
frequency of disagreement and each of the four response strategies. An explanation for this is
that while there are a myriad of factors that influence how people respond to political
disagreement (Carlson, 2020), how often people are exposed to disagreement may not be one of
them. Study findings have practical implications for interpersonal communication and news
media use. Its implications for interpersonal communication is that it may allow people to be
more conscious of how they respond to others during a political disagreement and how others
respond to them. This study’s implications for news media use is that it provides a possible
answer for why so many news outlets are partisan in presenting information; some people want
sources of news that validates what they believe in.
Something to note, while dual concern theory was mentioned in the literature review for
this study, it was not used as a framework for this research. The reason why is because dual
concern theory assumes that individuals are conscious of both the concern for self and others
when they decide how to manage conflict (Hopmann et al., 2019; Musenero et al., 2021).
Individuals might not consider these concerns when responding to political disagreement; this is
why the decision was made not to utilize this theory. With that said, it is a valid theory for
studying conflict management and can be used as a framework to guide future research on this
subject.
As mentioned in the ‘participants and distribution’ portion of the methods section, the
survey was distributed on February 14, 2022. This is not a limitation of the survey, this period of
time was selected intentionally. To reiterate Eveland’s (2004) point, while conversations about
politics are most common during election years, those types of conversations can happen at any
time. This period of time was selected in order to examine how often individuals discuss politics
with others when politics were not at the forefront of public discourse. Aside from the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic, there were no major political events occurring when the survey was
distributed and responses were collected (Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and President Biden’s
nomination of Judge Ketanji Jackson for the Supreme Court did not occur until 14 and 15 days
later, respectively).
Some limitations to the present study need to be noted here. One such limitation is the
size of the sample, consisting of only 150 individuals. A wider sample in future research could
allow for stronger correlations between frequency of political disagreement and the response
strategies. Another limitation is the use of the word “talk” in the scenarios within the survey
itself. Individuals may have a narrow view of the word “talk”; they may treat it as just verbal
communication, occurring only through in-person, phone calls, and video chats. Changing the
verbage could give participants reason to consider conversations that occur through non-verbal
means, such as texting, email, and social media threads (i.e. Twitter, Reddit, Facebook).
Although a national sample was utilized for data collection, White individuals were over-
represented in the sample, consisting of 87.3% of all respondents. A more representative sample
could provide better insight into the discussions and disagreements people have about politics
and how that affects why they choose certain news media.
A possible idea for future research is to include additional measures into the survey. One
way this could be done is to include a question about how fatigued individuals are with political
discourse. Pew Research Center found that, in 2020, 55% of all social media users are worn out
by the amount of political posts and conversations they see (Anderson & Auxier, 2020). Another
possible idea for future research is to revise the definition of politics included in the scenario
within the survey. With the definition provided, participants may infer politics to only mean
national politics. By modifying the definition to list state, national, and foreign politics, it could
allow participants to consider other types of politics when answering the questions. One more
idea for future research is to distribute this survey in the days or weeks leading up to a major
election (either Presidential or midterm). As there is greater attention given to politics during
these time periods, it could result in greater frequency of political discussion, greater frequency
of disagreement, and possibly changes in which strategies individuals prefer in responding to
disagreement.
I. Introduction
Individuals have conversations about a variety of political topics, such as gun control and
abortion (Adamic & Glance, 2005). When conversations about these controversial topics occur,
the results of those discussions can become complicated. For politics, people prefer to discuss it
with those they agree with significantly more than people they disagree with (Cowan &
Baldassarri, 2018). One of the reasons for this is that people want to avoid “social controversy”
(Hopmann, 2012).
In his study, Hopmann (2012) indicates that individuals want to avoid uncomfortable
situations, such as being stuck in the middle of an argument between two people in the same
group and thinking of it as a no-win situation (Green, Visser, & Tetlock, 2002) that can come
with disagreeing about politics. When faced with disagreements, individuals may turn to news
media because they prefer to reinforce their political predispositions instead of changing them
(Kim, 2017).
Individuals use specific media, news included, in order to fulfill a specific gratification
(Katz, 1974). In this approach to media consumption, the audience is aware of their needs and is
active in satisfying them (Ruggerio, 2009). Lee (2013) noted that individuals use the news for
one of four motivations. The four motivations for using news is to seek out information, to be
entertained, to socialize with others about it, or to have their opinions validated. When it comes
to the opinion-validation motivation, people prefer news media that align with their own beliefs
(Lee, 2013).
This research is important because while individuals avoid disagreements about it,
researchers state that political discussion needs to remain a major part of American public
discourse (Scheufele, 2000). If individuals refuse to communicate their political differences with
each other, then democracy is unable to function (Conover, Searing & Crewe, 2002). The most
recent example is the discourse that emerged following hundreds of Trump supporters storming
the U.S. capitol (Barrett, Raju, & Nickeas, 2021).
Political disagreement has direct effects on different aspects of individuals’ political
participation. Hopmann (2012) found that individuals who face political disagreement find it
more difficult to determine who to vote for. Following political disagreement, individuals’
positive perception of their preferred presidential candidate decreased (Parsons, 2010). Parsons
also found that individuals’ negative perception of the opposing candidate also decreased. These
changes lead to depressed turnout in presidential elections (Nir, 2011). What these studies have
in common is that political disagreement affects political attitudes. What these studies do not
examine is how political disagreement is related to individuals’ news-consumption habits
afterwards.
PEW Research Center (2018) conducted a national survey about political discussion and
disagreement. Specifically, they surveyed individuals about discussing politics with those they
disagree with in March 2016 (prior to Trump’s presidency) and in October 2018 (two years into
Trump’s presidency). In March 2016, 46% of individuals stated that discussing politics with
those they disagree with was stressful and frustrating; this number increased to 53% in October
2018. The percentage of Republicans who feel stressed and frustrated discussing politics with
people they disagree with was mostly unchanged, from 48% in 2016 to 49% in 2018. The
percentage of Democrats who feel stressed and frustrated discussing politics with people they
disagree with saw a sharp increase, from 45% in 2016 to 57% in 2018.
Within that same survey, Pew Research Center asked individuals in 2018 how much they
have in common with those they disagree with politically. When discussing politics with
someone they disagree with, 63% of people had less in common with the other person than they
thought. Breaking it down by political affiliation, this number is nearly the same for both
Democrats and Republicans. When discussing politics with someone they disagree with, 64% of
Democrats and 63% of Republicans found that they had less in common with the other person
than they thought.
The focus of my research is that the disagreements people have about politics and the
news media they choose to consume afterwards are connected. My hypothesis is that how often
individuals are exposed to political disagreement, moderated through how they choose to
respond to that disagreement, influences how often they use political commentary from news
outlets for opinion validation. This thesis will be conducted through a uses and gratifications
perspective.
II. Literature Review
A. Interpersonal Communication
i. General Overview
Interpersonal communication is when at least two individuals are engaged in a
conversation (Cathcart & Gumpert, 1983). One key element is the roles individuals play in the
conversation (Fearing, 1962). The roles Fearing (1962) described in his research are
communicator and interpreter. Communicators are those who send information with the intent to
begin conversation. Interpreters are those who receive information with the intent to provide a
response (Fearing, 1962). As the conversation goes on, individuals can serve as both
communicator and interpreter.
Larrosa-Fuentes (2020) broadly defines interpersonal communication as the practice of
exchanging information and symbolic forms between two or more individuals. Muslicha et al.
(2022) states that the nature of interpersonal communication is spontaneous, individuals receive
mutual feedback, and participants play a flexible role in the discussion. Laksana and Fadhilah
(2021) conceptualize interpersonal communication as communication that occurs in various
systems or contexts that affect what is happening and the meaning in the interaction. What
separates interpersonal and group communication is that while group communication involves
one person speaking to a group of people at the same time, interpersonal involves one person
addressing each person individually (Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020). Interpersonal communication also
differs from organizational communication in that individuals conduct interpersonal
communication for a myriad of goals (Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020) while individuals conduct
organizational communication for the specific goal of benefiting the business they work for
(Apine & Sunday, 2021).
One factor of interpersonal communication is the social context the conversation takes
place in. The context is split into two categories: the public sphere and the private sphere
(Brennan, 2017). The public sphere is the sphere of community, complex arenas where
individuals, who may not be related with each other, interact with each other (Johansen &
Andrews, 2016). The private sphere is the sphere of the household, the domain of an individual’s
family and/or intimate life (Johansen & Andrews, 2016). Individuals consider certain topics to be
specific to the public sphere and other topics specific to the private sphere. For example, Wyatt,
Katz, and Kim (2000) conducted a nationwide survey to ask individuals what topics they
consider public and what topics they consider private. Individuals consider topics such as
government and the economy to be public matters and topics such as family matters and religion
to be private matters (Wyatt et al., 2000).
The political topics that individuals discuss in the public or private sphere depend on how
individuals feel about the topic themselves. For example, Lobera and Portos (2022) analyzed
what spheres left-wing and right-wing individuals feel comfortable revealing their political
preferences. Left-wing individuals feel comfortable revealing their political preferences in both
public and private spheres; right-wing individuals more comfortable doing so in the private
sphere than the public (Lobera & Portos, 2022). This indicates that there are certain topics, such
as politics, that are discussed in both the public and private spheres. The sphere that discussion
occurs in is not the only factor of interpersonal communication.
Another factor of interpersonal communication is the strength of the relationship the
individual has with their discussion partner. The strength of the relationship can be separated into
two categories: strong tie and weak tie (Croes & Antheunis, 2021). In their study on relationship
intimacy, Croes & Antheunis (2021) asked participants who they have a strong relationship with
and who they have a weak relationship with. Friends, family, and romantic partners are
considered to be strong-tie relationships; acquaintances and colleagues are considered to be
weak-tie relationships (Croes & Antheunis, 2021). In that same study, Croes & Antheunis (2021)
also asked participants how often they discussed with others. Individuals have discussions more
frequently with those they have a strong-tie relationship with than those they have a weak-tie
relationship with (Croes & Antheunis, 2021).
The type of relationships people have can affect how willing they are to have
conversations about various topics. Researchers often group friends and family together as strong
relationships individuals are willing to have conversations with (Ai & Zhang, 2021; Walgrave &
Ketelaars, 2019). For example, Ojala and Bengtsson (2019) examined the types of conversations
have about climate change with those they have a strong relationship with. Individuals are
willing to discuss both the positive and negative aspects of climate change with friends and
parents (Ojala & Bengtsson, 2019). Morey and Yamamoto (2020) examined what motivates
individuals to discuss politics with friends and family. Individuals discuss politics with friends
and family primarily to educate themselves, express their opinions, or to influence others (Morey
& Yamamoto, 2020). Therefore, individuals are willing to discuss politics if their discussion
partner is a friend or family member.
One more aspect of interpersonal communication is the type of conversation that
individuals engage in. The two types of interpersonal communication that will be focused on
here is informal and deliberative. Informal interpersonal communication is spontaneous
(Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020) conversation that occurs between friends, family, and peers (Andersen
& Hopmann, 2018). Andersen and Hopmann (2018) conducted a survey about individuals who
use informal communication to discuss politics. Informal political talk is used as a means to learn
new information by those who do not frequently consume news media (Andersen & Hopmann,
2018). In deliberative interpersonal communication, on the other hand, individuals go into the
conversation expecting to, and willing to, discuss arguments (Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020). This
suggests that individuals enter deliberative conversations expecting to disagree with the
discussion partner.
What people learn from media can affect the content of the conversations they take part
in. For example, Vu and Gehrau (2010) conducted a field study on how an article in a community
magazine can affect what people talk about. The results of that study indicate that people are
more likely to talk about a certain issue after reading about it than those who do not (Vu &
Gejrau, 2010). Another example is an analysis Scheuffle (2002) conducted on an American
Citizen Participation survey about political participation. The survey was focused on the
relationship between hard news and political participation. Results from that survey indicate that
interpersonal communication is a significant mediator between processing hard news and
considering political participation (Scheuffle, 2002). Hwang (2010) analyzed a Legacy Media
Tracking Survey about the effects of “The Truth'' campaign. The survey in question was about
how the advertising campaign affected conversations about smoking behavior. The results of the
survey indicate that the amount of conversations about smoking behavior increased in areas
where “The Truth'' advertisements aired (Hwang, 2010). These studies show that media may not
change what people think, but media can change what people discuss about.
The type of relationships people have can affect how willing they are to have
conversations about politics. For example, Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers (2009) analyzed a
University of Michigan study about political socialization within families. The survey is about
discussing politics in families across three generations. The results show that people are more
willing to discuss politics if their parents talked to them about it (Jennings et al, 2009). Another
example is when Östman (2015) conducted a field study about instances where adolescents
discuss politics. He found that adolescents are more willing to talk about politics publically if
they already discuss it privately with family (Östman, 2015). This shows that the family
environment plays a role in how willing people are to discuss politics.
People are selective in who they discuss politics with because they want to avoid
disagreements (Cowan & Baldassarri, 2018). This is because political disagreements in
interpersonal communication can have a negative effect on those who participated. For example,
Hopmann (2012) compared two surveys in order to find the effects these disagreements have on
voters. The results of this analysis are that disagreements increase ambivalence in political
attitudes. The reason for this is so that future confrontations about those topics can be avoided
(Hopmann, 2012). This leads to a question of how political disagreements can survive in
interpersonal communication. Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2002) answered this by
examining a survey about political discussion during the 1996 presidential election. The results
of that study indicate that people are willing to disagree because they have other social networks
that agree with them (Huckfeldt et al, 2002). This shows that when faced with disagreement,
people seek other avenues for validation.
ii. Types of Interpersonal Communication
Fearing (1953) also described another key element of interpersonal communication is that
those involved are meeting face-to-face. In face-to-face communication, the content of the
conversation can be adjusted based on the responses of those involved. For example, Nelson
(2016) performed an experiment on the effect that positive moods can have on interpersonal
communication. She found that people with a positive mood, such as feeling enthusiastic or
inspired, communicated more than people with a neutral mood (Nelson, 2016). Another example
of conversation content being impacted by response can be seen in Burgers and Buekeboom’s
(2016) study that compared instances of literal statements being used in conversations to
instances of ironic statements being used. They found that people find literal comments to be
more appropriate for conversations than ironic comments (Burgers & Buekeboom, 2016).
Interpersonal communication does not always have to be face-to-face; it can be mediated
as well. Cathcart and Gumpert (1983) define mediated interpersonal communication as any
instance where technology is introduced into face-to-face interaction. What separates mediated
from face-to-face is knowledge of the medium used for conversation. Phone calls, texting, email
and social media are some of the mediums used for interpersonal mediated communication
(Petrič, Petrovčič, and Vehovar 2011). Whether it be face-to-face or mediated however, the
medium of conversation can impact the extent of participation in political discussions (Herrig et
al., 2020).
iii. Political Communication, Discussion, and Disagreement
Raekstad (2021) compares the works of two different political theorists, Bernard
Williams and Raymond Geuss, and how they define politics. Both theorists agree that politics
involves social organization, coordination, and carrying out of actions (Raekstad, 2021). Where
the theorists differ is the scope in what they consider as politics. Williams suggests that politics is
limited to the actions of the state/government, whereas Guess indicates that politics should also
encompass matters between family/families and friends. This article examines politics in a broad,
philosophical sense instead of which topics and subjects are considered political.
Görtz and Dahl (2021) examine how the breadth of what individuals consider to be
politics affects political participation. Their results suggest that individuals with a wide breadth
of topics they consider to be politics are more likely to participate in politics than those with a
narrow perception of politics. Some concepts Görtz and Dahl present include one way of
thinking where politics is “limited to what governments and related central institutions do” and
another where politics goes beyond governments and other central institutions. Görtz and Dahl
not only discuss a broad definition of politics, but they also provide topics that individuals
consider to be political as well. In their survey, the topics that many participants selected as being
political include elections, housing, taxes, childcare, and income inequality (Görtz & Dahl,
2021).
Eveland, Morey and Hutchens (2011) utilize past literature to reflect on how politics and
political conversation should be defined. In the article, Eveland et al. are critical of researchers
who do not provide a definition of politics for participants to consider, instead letting participants
think of their own definition. Eveland et al. (2011) define political conversation, on an
interpersonal level, as a form of small talk about shared public information. With this definition,
they imply that political conversation does not need to be, but can be, deliberative. Eveland et al.
state that the most common political conversation partners are those that individuals have a
strong tie to: spouses, family members, and close friends. Eveland et al. also note four common
strategies for responding to disagreement: dominating the conversation, avoiding disagreement,
yielding to the conversation partner, and compromise.
Political communication can be conceptualized as individuals or groups of political
influence speaking about issues salient to the public (Walton, 1990). This type of communication
is most common during election years, but it can occur at any time (Eveland, 2004). During
election years, opposing political parties engage in contests, debates as one example, where
candidates allocate their resources strategically (Amorós & Puy, 2013). For example, when
speaking on the same subjects, candidates try to highlight where their opponent(s) fall short on
the issue (Amorós & Puy, 2013). As a result, the manner and tone of political communication
often ends up being negative (Druckman, Kifer, & Parkin, 2010). This suggests that, since
debates between political candidates are frequently negative, individuals often expect discussions
about politics to potentially turn out negative as well.
In order to spread their message to as many people as possible, politicians and political
parties launch campaigns. Some of the mediums used for campaigns include newspapers,
television, and the Internet. For example, Stier, Belier, Lietz, and Strohmaier (2018) studied how
campaigns utilize different social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. For Facebook,
political campaigns use the platform to accumulate support, via likes, on their messages (Stier et
al., 2018). For Twitter, political campaigns use posts to encourage discussion between users in
their replies (Stier et al., 2018). This suggests that the goals that political campaigns want to
achieve depend on the medium they elect to use. The overarching message, however, is the same
regardless of the platform used. Druckman et al. (2010) found that political campaigns design
their messages with the mass audience in mind. This suggests that individuals are not given the
opportunity to respond to politicians or political parties, regardless of whether or not they
disagree with them.
Political discussions are conversations that focus on matters of public concern and issues
dealing with the common good (Conover, Searing, & Crewe, 2002). Some examples of topics
mentioned in these discussions include abortion, gun control, impeachment, and COVID-19
(Adamic & Glance, 2005; ANES, 2020). Research has focused on political discussions during
election years, but these types of conversations can occur at any time (Eveland, 2004). The
contents and outcomes of these conversations can differ whether the conversation occurs in
public or in private (Conover et al., 2002). This suggests that where the discussion happens can
play a role in how the discussion plays out.
Political discussion can occur through a variety of mediums, face-to-face, phone calls,
texting, and email (Petrič, Petrovčič, & Vehovar, 2011). The medium of discussion can influence
the extent of participation in political discussion (Herrig, Vultee, Prough, & Sweet-Cushmanm,
2020). Research has also been conducted to examine the influence political sophistication, or the
level of political awareness, has on how individuals choose to respond to disagreement. Political
sophistication does not influence individuals’ responses to political disagreement (Parsons,
2010). This indicates that while how aware individuals are of politics may not affect their
participation in political discussion, how the discussion is conducted can affect that participation
in political discussion.
However, the type of relationships individuals have influences who they share their
political opinions with. Through their survey, Morey, Eveland and Hutchens (2012) found that
individuals are more likely to share political opinions with someone they have a strong tie to than
someone they have a weak tie to. Individuals have a strong tie with family and friends; they have
a weak tie with co-workers and acquaintances (Morey et al., 2012). Likewise, people are more
willing to discuss politics if their parents talked to them about it (Jennings et al., 2009). For
instance, adolescents are more willing to talk about politics with others if they have previously
discussed it with family (Östman, 2015). This indicates that individuals choose who to discuss
politics with by what their relationship is with them. One way these conversations can end is
with the participants agreeing with each other, but these discussions can end with the participants
disagreeing with each other as well.
Political disagreement refers to conversations individuals participate in where they are
exposed to viewpoints that differ from their own (Klofstad, Sokhey & McClurg, 2013).
Individuals are exposed to these viewpoints when they face opposition from the person they are
engaging in discussion with (Valenzuela & Bachmann, 2015). These political disagreements can
occur for a variety of reasons. For instance, Valenzuela and Bachmann (2015) found that these
disagreements can occur due to a difference in their preferred presidential candidate. Differences
in preferred political party is another way that disagreement can occur (Feldman & Price, 2008).
These disagreements can also occur because of a difference in opinion on a political issue, such
as immigration (Valenzuela & Bachmann, 2015). This shows that political disagreement can
occur regardless of the subject discussed.
Research has found that how frequently individuals discuss politics with others is
influenced by how likely they are to disagree with others. Individuals will discuss politics with
others less frequently if they think they are likely to disagree with them (Gerber, Huber, Doherty,
& Dowling, 2012). For example, Cowan and Baldassarri (2018) found that some individuals
avoid political disagreements because they do not want to face conflict with the person they are
speaking with. As a result, individuals may feel inclined to share political opinions primarily
with others they are unlikely to disagree with (Cowan & Baldassarri, 2018). This would suggest
that individuals avoid engaging in discussions with people they expect to disagree with
politically.
This does not mean that individuals never discuss politics with those they disagree with.
Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn (2004) analyzed the 2000 National Election Study to examine
how frequently individuals discuss politics with those they disagree with. More than half of
respondents indicated that they disagreed with at least one person they discussed politics with
(Huckfeldt et al., 2004). This shows that political disagreement occurs more frequently than
expected.
iv. Responding to Disagreement
Testa, Hibbing, and Ritchie (2014) state that the individual’s orientation toward conflict
should be considered when examining the effects of disagreement on political knowledge,
tolerance toward those with differing views, and participation. Testa et al. (2014) separate
conflict orientation into two categories, positive (i.e. the individual considers disagreement as a
positive experience and something worth engaging in) and negative (i.e. the individual considers
disagreement as a negative experience and something that should be avoided). For exposure to
disagreement, Testa et al. (2014) found that the type of orientation does not affect the
individual’s amount of exposure to disagreement. When exposed to disagreement, individuals
with a positive orientation were more likely to be knowledgeable about politics, more likely to
show tolerance, and more likely to engage in political participation (Testa et al., 2014). When
exposed to disagreement, individuals with a negative orientation had no change in likelihood of
being knowledgeable about politics, less likely to show tolerance, and less likely to engage in
political participation (Testa et al., 2014).
Coffé and Bolzendahl (2017) analyze a survey conducted in Britain to study the effect
gender differences have on avoiding conflict and how that difference impacts political
participation. In their analysis, they found that women are more likely to avoid conflict than men.
Coffé and Bolzendahl (2017) also found that women are less likely to participate in politics than
men. There was no significant gender difference in how conflict avoidance impacts political
participation (Coffé & Bolzendahl, 2017). This shows that while gender is a factor in both
responding to conflict and political participation individually, it’s not a factor in one impacting
the other.
When faced with political disagreement, regardless of the subject discussed, individuals
will respond in different ways. Eveland et al. (2011) and Hopmann, Bjarnøe and Wonneberger
(2019) and identified four strategies individuals use to respond to this kind of disagreement.
When faced with opposition, individuals may try to dominate, which involves taking control of
the conversation and shutting down the other person from making their arguments. Individuals
may also try to compromise, which involves hearing out the other person and finding common
ground. To avoid an uncomfortable situation, individuals may try to avoid having disagreement
emerge in the conversation. If it is considered the path of least resistance, individuals may also
yield, or concede the conversation (Hopmann et al., 2019). Hopmann et al. (2019) found that
these four categories of responses are based on the individual’s level of political disagreement.
Hopmann et al. (2019) examined these four categories of response strategies through the
framework of Dual Concern Theory. Dual Concern Theory states that individuals manage
conflict based on two factors, a concern for self and a concern of others (Musenero, Baroudi, &
Gunawan, 2021). This theory suggests that individuals respond to disagreement based on how
concerned they are for both their own well-being and the well-being of others. For example,
individuals may dominate if they have a high level of self-concern but a low level of concern for
others (Hopmann et al., 2019).
To dominate during disagreement means to force control of the conversation away from
the other person (Hopmann et al., 2019). Individuals try to dominate the conversation through a
variety of means. Speaking more frequently and for longer than the other person during a
disagreement are two examples of how individuals try to dominate the conversation (Palmer,
1989). Herring et al. (2020) studied how the medium of communication, face-to-face and
mediated, affects how likely someone is to dominate during disagreement. The medium of
communication does not affect how likely individuals are to dominate the conversation (Herring
et al., 2020). While some individuals may insist on dominating the discussion, others may try to
compromise with the person they disagree with.
Compromise is when the individuals that disagree with each other come to an agreement
(O’Flynn & Setälä, 2020). In order to reach this agreement, each person has to concede one
aspect of their argument. The reason for this is that while both individuals still feel that they are
in the right, they feel that it’s better to compromise than to stay at a standstill (O’Flynn & Setälä,
2020). For example, Renwick (1975) surveyed office workers on how the source of disagreement
affects the strategy used to respond to disagreement. Compromise was the most common
response type when the individuals in disagreement differ in personality. Compromise was also
the most common response type when individuals differ in attitudes or opinions (Renwick,
1975). While some individuals may concede just one aspect of their argument, others may decide
to concede their argument altogether.
To yield during disagreement means to concede the discussion to the other person
(Hopmann et al., 2019). Research has been done on the different reasons individuals choose to
yield the disagreement. For example, Sharma (2012) examined how students responded to
disagreement during group discussions. One reason individuals yield the disagreement is because
they feel they do not have enough information on the subject being discussed (Sharma, 2012).
One other example is that Kotoff (1993) examined multiple interactions between students and
lecturers. Individuals yield the disagreement because they see it as a means of ending the
discussion (Kotoff, 1993). What these two studies have in common is that individuals show
reluctance in conceding the discussion. This suggests that while it’s used to end discussion,
yielding is not considered the preferred means of responding to disagreement.
While some individuals have different strategies for responding to disagreement, others
try to avoid it altogether. Individuals avoid disagreement for a variety of reasons such as their
lack of information on the subject, their lack of interest in politics, or the subject’s lack of
personal importance (Hayes, 2007). Individuals also avoid disagreement because they feel that if
they spoke up on a certain subject, their opinion would be in the minority (Hayes, 2007).
Paramasivam (2007) studied the effects of avoiding disagreement. Avoiding disagreement results
in emotions being pent-up, decrease of personal integrity, and relationships becoming more
uncomfortable (Paramasivam, 2007).
One of the goals of my research is to examine how often individuals are exposed to
political disagreement and how they choose to respond to it. To this end, the following research
questions are proposed.
RQ1abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) yield response strategies, c)
compromise response strategies, and d) avoid response strategies?
RQ2abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political disagreement with weak-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) compromise response strategies, c)
yield response strategies, and d) avoid response strategies?
RQ3abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political discussion with strong-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) compromise response strategies, c)
yield response strategies, and d) yield response strategies?
RQ4abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political discussion with weak-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) compromise response strategies, c)
yield response strategies, and d) avoid response strategies?
B. Uses and Gratifications
i. General Overview
Uses and Gratifications is the theory that people seek out media to have specific needs
met. For example, Lazarsfeld (1939) did a meta-analysis of research done on the effects of
listening to radio. What these pieces of early research have in common was that they were
entirely focused on the gratifications of listening to radio (Lazarsfeld, 1939). There was not
enough focus on the needs that would lead people to seek out media. Eventually, Katz (1974)
formed a definition that provided a foundation for how Uses and Gratifications should be
studied. Katz (1974) conceptualized uses and gratifications as social and psychological origin of
needs generates expectations of media, leading to different patterns of media exposure, resulting
in needs satisfied and other effects.
One key element that makes research utilizing Uses and Gratifications stand out is
audience activity. The purpose of audience activity is to examine the role people play in the
media they consume regularly (Ruggerio, 2009). Audience activity examines whether people are
active or passive in the selection of media (Gunter, 1988). According to Rubin (1993), audience
activity can be examined by breaking it down into a set number of categories.
The three main categories that Rubin (1993) provided are utility, intention, and
selectivity. Utility is what motivates the audience, such as in Gerlich’s, Drumheller’s, and
Sollosy’s (2012) study on motivations of readers. They found that, of the motivations prior to
reading, desire to relax was the most common (Gerlich et al, 2012). Intention is what the
audience plans to use the media for, such as in Perse’s (1990) study on television-viewing
motives. Her results showed that people watched TV with the intent of talking about it with
others (Perse, 1990). Selectivity is how the audience chooses their media, such as in Levy’s
(1987) study on how people used VCRs. He found that VCR owners were selective in what TV
programs VCR owners decided to record (Levy, 1987).
The issue with audience activity is thinking that the audience is either purely active or
purely passive. This is why Rubin (1993) also brought up examining audience activity through
levels of involvement. Levels of involvement indicate that there is a scale that ranges from being
passive to being active. For example, in an experimental study examining news talk shows,
Edgerly, Gotlieb, and Vraga (2016) argue that audience activity should also be measured on
behavioral utility and cognitive involvement. The results of that experiment indicate that if the
audience finds a piece of programming to be relevant, then they will be more involved with its
content (Edgerly et al, 2016).
ii. Uses and Gratifications in Media Research
Another key component that makes Uses and Gratifications research stand out is media
selection. In order to conduct research on motivations for selecting media, a typology needs to be
developed. For example, Blumler (1979) conducted a meta-analysis of typologies utilized in
Uses and Gratifications studies. He noticed that motivations commonly included in research are
surveillance, curiosity, diversion, and personal identity (Blumler, 1979). Typology can be
modified for the medium chosen as the focus of research. For example, Ruggerio (2009)
examined why people select the Internet as their medium of choice. He found that people prefer
the Internet because it is interactive, asynchronous, and its ability to demassify content
(Ruggerio, 2009). Motivations for selecting media are varied, but people share similar
motivations.
Television is unique because of its ability to use a combination of visuals and audio to
spread a message to a wide variety of people simultaneously. Entertainment is a category utilized
for TV uses and gratifications. Rubin (2009) notes that entertainment was first included as a part
of uses and gratifications research during the 60s. Research of TV uses and gratifications has
been done without including entertainment in the typology. For example, Weaver (2003)
examined television viewing motives in relation to personality traits. The typology utilized in
this research includes pass time, companionship, relaxation, information, and stimulation
(Weaver, 2003). Of these motivations, pass time and relaxation can be noted as explicitly
passive. Information, on the other hand, is a motivation that can be noted as explicitly active.
Companionship and stimulation are motivations that are not on either end of the passive-active
spectrum. What this demonstrates is that audiences can be active in seeking gratifications from
television.
The gratifications that people seek from television can vary depending on the type of
program watched. For example, Brown, Lauricella, Douai, and Zaidi (2012) surveyed people
about why they watch shows in the crime drama genre. They found that satisfying curiosity was
the most prevalent motivation (Brown et al, 2012). Gratifications can differ not just by the genre,
but by the programs that make up the genre as well. Barton (2009) distributed a survey to people
who watched different shows in the competitive reality show genre about their motivations for
watching them. The results of the survey show that different motivations were prevalent for
different shows (Barton, 2009).
The Newspaper can be defined as a print medium distributed by news organizations to
send information to a wide audience (Park, 1923). Elliot and Rosenberg (1987) conducted a
survey about the different motivations individuals use newspapers for. Study findings revealed
that surveillance and seeking information were the most common motivations for reading
newspapers (Elliot & Rosenberg, 1987). Other gratifications that Elliot and Rosenberg (1987)
found for reading newspapers were killing time and reading advertisements. News websites are
treated as an extension of newspapers (Chyi & Lasorsa, 2002).
News websites are a medium, owned and operated by news organizations, that spread
news to a wide audience (Himelboim & McCreery, 2012). Himelboim and McCreery (2012) also
noted the multimedia nature of news websites, the combination of text, audio, and video for the
purpose of sharing information. Chyi and Lasorsa (2002) found that there is considerable overlap
between newspaper readership and news website readership. Newspapers and news websites also
share the same gratifications (Payne, Dozier, Nomal & Yagade, 2010). The gratifications that
Payne et al. (2010) identified for both newspapers and news websites were surveillance,
interaction, and diversion.
Radio can be conceptualized as a purely auditory medium that can spread messages to a
wide audience simultaneously (Dunn, 2003). Towers (1987) conducted a telephone survey asking
participants about the different gratifications they use radio for. The various gratifications could
be grouped into two major categories, information and entertainment (Towers, 1987).
Information gratifications studied include to understand what is going on, to get information to
pass on to other people, and to find issues affecting people like myself (Towers, 1987).
Entertainment gratifications examined include to pass the time and to feel happy (Towers, 1987).
Albarran et al. (2007) distributed a questionnaire asking individuals about their use of radio in
comparison to new media technologies, such as satellite radio, mp3 players, and internet radio.
Radio was used more than these media technologies for access to news and information.
However, in terms of overall use, radio was used less than new media technologies (Albarran et
al., 2007). Therefore, research reveals that while individuals still use the radio to learn about the
news, use of radio overall has decreased over time.
One example of a new media technology is social media. Social media, like other
mediums, fulfill a variety of gratifications, such as information seeking, expression of opinion,
and convenience (Whiting & Williams, 2013) that people use them for. Research has been
conducted on both specific social media platforms and social media as a whole. For example,
Krause, North, and Heritage (2014) distributed an online questionnaire to find out what
motivates individuals to use Facebook. The most common motivations found were to
communicate with others, to be entertained, and to distract people from their problems (Krause et
al., 2014). Sundar and Limperos (2013) however, surveyed university students on what motivates
them to use social media regardless of platform. Among the gratifications found are activity,
interaction with others, and control over what they see (Sundar & Limperos, 2013). Studies done
on these mediums indicate that the gratifications that people seek depend on not only the
medium itself, but the content of the medium as well.
These mediums are not used alone; each medium is used in conjunction with other media
in order to have gratifications met. For example, Yuan (2011) examined what media people use
in order to build their media repertoire. She found that people utilized combinations that include
Internet, mobile phone, television, and radio (Yuan, 2011). The reason for this combination is
because some media provide content not seen on other platforms. Another example comes from a
survey Wolf and Schnauber (2015) distributed to mobile phone users about the mediums they use
to seek out information. They found that people build a news repertoire consisting of mobile
phones, computers, radio, and television (Wolf & Schnauber, 2015). These studies indicate that
people utilize multiple mediums to have their needs satisfied.
While these media share general content, the presentation is unique to each medium. An
example of this is a study Cheong and Park (2015) conducted on media habits of social media
users. Cheong and Park (2015) examined what traditional media users paired with social media
for the purpose of information consumption. Their results showed that magazines, newspapers,
radio, and television are the media most paired with social media (Cheong & Park, 2015). When
it came to reliance for information, television scored the highest among their survey participants.
This reliance may be a factor when it comes to political media.
Typologies are developed not only for individual mediums, but types of media shared
across mediums as well. For example, Lariscy, Tinkham, and Sweetster (2011) examined the
uses and gratifications people of voting age have of political media. The typology they utilized
include surveillance, excitement, and political reasons. (Lariscy et al, 2011). Excitement refers to
the competitive aspect of political elections, seeing which party will be victorious. Political
reasons include reinforcement of beliefs (Lariscy et al, 2011). Social media is appealing to
political campaigns because of the interactive nature of the medium. For example, Freelon
(2017) examined how the Obama and Romney Facebook pages were handled during the 2012
presidential election. He found that the campaigns encourage users to discuss on those pages, but
controlled what could be seen (Freelon, 2017). This allows political campaigns to organize
supporters through mediated communication.
Boulianne and Theocharis (2020) conducted a meta-analysis to examine how young
people’s use of digital media impacts their political and civic participation. Their primary
conclusion is that use of digital media (e.g. following politicians on social media, reading the
news) is positively related with political and civic participation. This suggests that use of digital
media results in offline political activity. Boulianne and Theocharis (2020) also note that some
studies suggest the reverse; participation in political and civic life causes digital media use. This
suggests that offline activity, such as chatting about politics, results in use of media, such as the
news. Their definition of political use of media includes consuming news about politics or
current affairs, election information, e-mailing or chatting about politics, and following political
candidates or elected officials.
iii. Psychological and Social Factor of the Audience
The psychological aspect involves the personality traits of those who choose to consume
media. Weaver (2003) developed three categories for personality traits when comparing them to
tv watching motivations. These categories are extraversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism
(Weaver, 2003). Extraversion is associated with an individual’s level of sociability. Neuroticism
is connected to shyness and anxiety. Psychoticism is related to autonomy and egocentricity
(Weaver, 2003). Rubin (2009) describes other factors than can make up one’s psychological
state. Other factors that can determine media behavior include life satisfaction, mobility,
loneliness, and mood (Rubin, 2009). It is because of these psychological traits that people can
become dependent on media. These aspects can be affected by the social circumstances of
audience members.
The social environment people are a part of influences their motivation for media
selection. In instances with a lack of social environment, people may turn to media for
interpersonal communication. Rubin (2009) provides an example of how someone can use radio
to fulfill that need. Someone can telephone a talk-radio host in order to have a conversation with
them (Rubin, 2009). Another example Rubin suggests is people using the Internet in order to
engage in conversation. The needs that some people depend on media for may be connected to
interpersonal communication they want to partake in.
iv. Opinion Validation
Individuals have different motivations for why they select and use their preferred news
outlets. Lee (2013) conducted a survey to find out what the most common motivations were for
selecting news. The most common motivations were to acquire information, to be entertained,
other individuals watch the same news outlets, and opinion validation (Lee, 2013). This opinion
validation comes from a desire to reinforce pre-existing attitudes (Slater, 2009). Iyengar and
Hahn (2009) conducted research on why individuals choose news outlets for reinforcing
attitudes. Individuals choose certain news outlets because they anticipate political agreement
from these outlets (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). This suggests that people select certain news media if
they expect it to fulfill their need for validation.
Individuals choose certain news outlets that are likely to reinforce their opinions and
avoid other news outlets that are likely to challenge their opinions (Garrett, 2009). For example,
Knobloch-Westerwick and Lavis (2017) studied how political affiliation influenced use of
political and satirical news. Liberals preferred political and satirical news that provided liberal
opinions and conservatives preferred political and satirical news that provided conservative
opinions (Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis, 2017). As for challenge avoidance, Jamal and Melkote
(2008) distributed a survey to find out why some individuals avoid certain television news
outlets. Individuals avoid specific outlets because they feature individuals who hold beliefs they
disagree with (Jamal & Melkote, 2008). Garrett (2009b) does note that opinion reinforcement
and challenge avoidance should be treated as different motivations.
The reason those two behaviors are considered separate is because individuals who use
news for opinion reinforcement may not avoid news that challenges their opinions. For example,
Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch (2013) found that individuals who seek out opinion-reinforcing
news outlets do not explicitly avoid opinion-challenging news outlets. However, individuals’
interactions with others may encourage challenge-avoiding behavior. One of the motivations for
an individual’s opinion challenge avoidance is political disagreement (Skoric, Zhu, & Lin, 2018).
For example, Skoric et al. found that individuals unfriend and unfollow others on social media
because of political disagreement. Individuals do this to avoid future disagreements with those
people.
Individuals are more likely to select articles that appeared to reinforce their opinions than
articles that challenged them (Garrett, 2009a). Garrett noticed this when he had participants
choose different news articles to read about political topics. Garrett (2009a) also found that even
if individuals select articles that challenge their opinions, they will spend less time reading them
than articles that reinforce their opinion. The variety of options for obtaining news the Internet
provides has only encouraged this desire to select news for opinion reinforcement (Jang, 2014).
While this increased variety has also encouraged opinion challenge avoidance, it is less
significant than the desire for opinion reinforcement (Jang, 2014).
Individuals select news media that aligns with their attitudes regardless of the political
subject of discussion. For example, Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009) studied how
individuals use news media for the topics of minimum wage, abortion, health care, and gun
control. For all four of these subjects, individuals selected news stories that they perceive to be
similar to their beliefs (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009). Individuals also select news
media that aligns with their attitudes regardless of the medium used. For example, Stroud (2008)
found that individuals prefer newspapers, political talk radio, cable news, and political websites
that align with their beliefs. These two studies show that regardless of the subject or medium,
individuals prefer news media that reinforces their opinions.
Individuals who receive opinion validation from specific news media will continue to get
their news from them. For example, Feldman, Myers, Hmielowski, and Leiserowitz (2014)
studied how attitudes toward global warming affect news media use. Individuals continued to use
news media that reinforced their beliefs on climate change (Feldman et al., 2014). This suggests
that if people have their beliefs validated through specific news media, they will continue to use
that media to keep receiving that validation. Opinion validation from news media also affects
political participation. Exposure to news media that provides like-minded commentary increases
political participation (Dilliplane, 2011). Conversely, exposure to news media that provides
counter-attitudinal commentary decreases political participation (Dilliplane, 2011).
The other goal of this research is to examine how exposure to and response strategies for
political disagreement is related to the use of news media for like-minded commentary. To this
end, the following research questions are proposed.
RQ5: What are the relationships between types of response strategies and news media use for
political opinion validation?
RQ6: What is the relationship between strength of political party affiliation and news media use
for political opinion validation?
RQ7: What is the relationship between level of political interest and news media use for political
opinion validation?
RQ8: What is the relationship between level of political knowledge and news media use for
political opinion validation?
III. Method
For this choice of topic, quantitative methods were utilized in order to conduct the
research. The reasoning for this was to have a sample that can consist of a wide variety of
individuals. Specifically, the type of research method that was utilized for this study was a
questionnaire. The survey was effective because of its ability to have a wide sample respond to
the same set of questions.
A. Survey
The survey itself was split into four sections; each focusing on a different aspect of the
research topic. Section one focused on conversations involving politics; respondents answered
questions on who they discuss politics with, how frequently they discuss politics with those
individuals, and how frequently they disagreed with those individuals. Section two asked
participants how likely they are to use different strategies for responding to political
disagreement. Section three focused on respondents’ use of different news mediums for like-
minded commentary. Lastly, section four was entirely questions pertaining to demographic data.
Based on Qualtrics’s estimations, the average completion time of the questionnaire was eight
minutes.
The survey was split into five pages. Section one was split into two pages. This is because
page one asked about strong-tie relationships (friends/family) that participants discuss politics
with, while page two will ask participants the same questions about weak-tie relationships
(acquaintances). Sections two, three, and four of the survey each had their own page.
Respondents were encouraged, but not forced, to answer all of the questions on each page before
moving to the next. By doing this, the goal was to ensure that none of the questions were left
blank. Before moving on from the fifth page, participants could go back to any of the previous
sections to change their answers if they wished to do so. Respondents were also encouraged, but
not required, to complete the survey in one sitting. The survey was designed to save their
progress, so participants could fill out the rest of the questions later if they chose not to complete
it in one sitting.
Prior to distribution of this survey, a pilot test was conducted at a large southwestern
university. A class of eight students participated in the pilot test, which was conducted on
November 18, 2021. Following the pilot test, additional changes were made prior to the proper
distribution of the survey. In response to the students’ feedback, the changes were mainly to the
demographics portion of the survey. For example, in the question about religious affiliation, one
of the answer choices was changed from “Christian” to “Christian/Protestant”.
B. Participants and Distribution
Selecting possible participants for this survey was done through random sampling. The
sample size was 150 individuals from the website Prolific. All participants were at least 18 years
of age and based in the United States. Prolific was selected because, due to its pool of potential
participants, would allow the results of the survey to be generalizable to the wider public.
Recruitment was done via a recruitment message potential participants received in their inbox on
the Prolific website.
Prolific users that received the study recruitment message were under no obligation to
participate in the survey. They were incentivized, however, by receiving monetary payment upon
completing the survey. Participants received their payment through Prolific, via the funds the
researcher added to their account. Survey responses are kept entirely anonymous, as to avoid the
possibility of responses being traced back to specific individuals. Those who filled out the survey
were identified by a number instead.
Data were collected on February 14, 2022 through a web-based survey on Qualtrics. A
total of 150 valid responses were collected through Prolific. Respondents were paid $1 for the
completion of the questionnaire. After reading the informed consent form, which was approved
by the university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB), participants answered a series of questions
measuring predictor and outcome variables. Results of the online questionnaire were analyzed
through SPSS.
Of the 150 participants, 56% were female (n = 84), 40% were male (n = 60), 3.3% were
nonbinary (n = 5), and 0.7% chose not to disclose (n = 1). The average age of the participants
was 36.13 years old (SD = 13.49). Racial background of the participants is as follows: 87.3%
were White/Caucasian (n = 131), 6% were Black/African-American (n = 9), 6% were Asian (n =
9), and 4% were Hispanic/Latino (n = 6). For highest level of education completed: 33.3% were
4-year university (n = 50), 24.7% were graduate college (n = 37), 16.7% were some college (n =
25), 9.3% were high school/GED (n = 14), 9.3% were 2-year college (n = 14), and 6.7% were
some graduate college (n = 10). Employment status of the participants is as follows: 73.3% were
employed (n = 110), 22% were unemployed (n = 33), and 4.7% were in an internship (n = 7).
Annual income of the participants is as follows: 21.3% were between $35,000 and $49,999 (n =
32), 20.7% were less than $15,000 (n = 31), 14.7% were between $15,000 and $34,999 (n = 22),
20% were between $50,000 and $74,999 (n = 30), 10% were between $100,000 and $149,999 (n
= 15), 7.3% were between $75,000 and $99,999 (n = 11), and 6% were $150,000 or more (n = 9).
For marital status: 36.7% were married (n = 55), 34% were single (n = 51), 21.3% were in a
relationship, but not married (n = 32), 7.3% were divorced (n = 11), and 0.7% was widowed (n =
1). For religious affiliation: 38% were Christian/Protestant (n = 57), 36% were other (n = 54),
15.3% preferred not to say (n = 23), 8.7% were Catholic (n = 13), and 2% were Jewish (n = 3).
Of the 150 participants, 54% were Liberal (n = 81), 27.3% were Moderate (n = 41),
14.7% were Conservative/Right (n = 22), and 4% were Other (n = 6). Of the 6 participants that
selected Other: 33.3% were Libertarian (n = 2), 16.6% were Anarchist (n = 1), 16.6% were
Mutualist (n = 1), and 16.6% were Independent (n = 1). For affiliation with a political party,
56.7% were Democrat (n = 85), 18.7% were Republican (n = 28), 13.3% were
Independent/Other (n = 20), and 11.3% were no affiliation (n = 17). Among the 20 participants
that selected Independent/Other: 10% were Socialist (n = 2), 10% were Libertarian (n = 2), and
10% were Green (n = 2). For strength of party affiliation, of the 85 participants that selected
Democrat, 31.7% were somewhat strongly (n = 27), 22.3% were neither strong nor weak (n =
19), 21.1% were somewhat weak (n = 18), 20% were very strongly (n = 20), and 4.7% were very
weak (n = 4). For strength of party affiliation, of the 28 participants that selected Republican,
35.7% were very strongly (n = 10), 21.4% was somewhat weak (n = 6), 28.5% were somewhat
strongly (n = 8), 10.7% were neither strong nor weak (n = 3), and 3.5% was very weak (n = 1).
The total sample indicated that the participants were somewhat interested in politics (M = 2.89,
SD = 0.853), they sometimes engage in politics (M = 2.98, SD = 0.893), and they consider
themselves fairly knowledgeable about politics (M = 3.25, SD = 1.082).
C. Measures
Frequency of Political Discussion and Disagreement. Adapted from Feldman & Price
(2008), this 12-item measure asks participants to name, using only their initials, two
friends/family members (strong-tie relationships) and two acquaintances (weak-tie relationships)
that they discuss politics with. For each person, participants will be asked to state how many
days in a typical week they discuss politics with them (responses range from zero to seven);
[strong-tie relationships (M = 3.12, SD = 1.19) and weak-tie relationships (M = 2.36, SD = 1.04)]
and how often they disagree with that person’s point of view (almost never = 1, almost all the time
= 5); [strong-tie relationships (M = 2.68, SD = .80) and weak-tie relationships (M = 2.69, SD =
.78)].
Strategy for Responding to Political Disagreement. Adapted from Hoppman et al. (2019),
this 16-item measure asks participants to state how likely they are to use different strategies to
respond to political disagreement. These items will be gauged on a five-point likert scale (very
likely = 1, very unlikely= 5). Sample item: When faced with disagreement during those political
discussions, I emphasize that we should find common ground. Strong-tie (family and friends)
and weak-tie (acquaintances) relationships were combined to form a composite variable for each
response strategy: Compromise (α = .88, M = 2.82, SD = .93), Avoid (α = .83, M = 2.31, SD =
.87), Dominate (α = .78, M = 2.96, SD = .89), and Yield (α = .76, M = 3.61, SD = .77).
Using News for Opinion Validation. Modified from Lee (2013), this 8-item measure asks
participants to state how often they use news from different mediums for opinions from like-
minded commentators. The mediums that will be asked about are newspapers/news websites,
television, radio, and social media. The purpose of this measure is to see which news mediums
individuals use as a means of opinion validation. These items will be gauged on a four-point
likert scale (never = 1, often = 4). Sample item: How often do you watch television news to
expose yourself to opinions that are similar to your own? (α = .85, M = 2.11, SD = .64).
Demographics This 9-item measure asks participants to select the options that best reflect
who they are. Characteristics participants were asked about include political affiliation, race,
gender, and age group.
IV. Results
Research question 1a inquired about what the relationship is, if there is one, between
frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie relationships and dominate response
strategies. A Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated for the relationship between
frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners and the response strategies, which
is presented by table one. Frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners was not
found to be significantly correlated with dominate response strategies, r(150) = -.098, p = n.s.
Research question 1b asked about the relationship between frequency of political
disagreement with strong-tie relationships and yield response strategies. As shown by table one,
frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly
correlated with yield response strategies, r(150) = .023, p = n.s.
Research question 1c examined what the relationship is, if there is one, between
frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie relationships and compromise response
strategies. As shown by table one, frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners
was not found to be significantly correlated with compromise response strategies, r(150) = -.083,
p = n.s.
Research question 1d looked at the relationship, if there is one, between frequency of
political disagreement with strong-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. As shown by
table one, frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners was not found to be
significantly correlated with avoid response strategies, r(150) = .047, p = n.s. The above findings
imply that frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners may not be
related with any of the response strategies.
Research question 2a inquired about what relationship there is, if any, between frequency
of disagreement with weak-tie relationships and dominate response strategies. A Pearson
correlation coefficient was calculated for the relationship between frequency of disagreement
with weak-tie discussion partners and the response strategies, which is presented by table one.
Frequency of disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly
correlated with dominate response strategies, r(149) = -.032, p = n.s.
Research question 2b asked about the possible relationship between frequency of
disagreement with weak-tie relationships and compromise response strategies. As shown in table
one, frequency of disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be
significantly correlated to compromise response strategies, r(149) = -.025, p = n.s.
Research question 2c examined what relationship there might be between frequency of
disagreement with weak-tie relationships and yield response strategies. Table one shows that
frequency of disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly
correlated to yield response strategies, r(149) = -.022, p = n.s.
Research question 2d inquired about what relationship there is, if any, between frequency
of disagreement with weak-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. Frequency of
disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly correlated to
avoid response strategies, r(149) = .011, p = n.s. Similar to the first research question, this and
the above findings implies that frequency of political disagreement with weak-tie discussion
partners may not be related with any of the response strategies.
Research question 3a asked what the relationship is between frequency of political
discussion with strong-tie relationships and dominate response strategies. A Pearson correlation
coefficient was calculated for the relationship between frequency of political discussion with
strong-tie discussion partners and the response strategies, the results of which is presented in
table one. A moderate negative correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with
strong-tie discussion partners and dominate response strategies, r(150) = -.185, p < .05. This
finding suggests that the more often individuals talk about politics with friends and family, the
less likely they may be to use the dominate response strategy.
Research question 3b inquired about the relationship between frequency of political
discussion with strong-tie relationships will be positively related to compromise response
strategies. Frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners was not found to
be significantly correlated to compromise response strategies, r(150 = .020, p = n.s. This finding
suggests that frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners may not be
related to the compromise response strategy.
Research question 3c asked what the relationship is between frequency of political
discussion with strong-tie relationships and the yield response strategies. A moderate positive
correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners
and yield response strategies, r(150) = .167, p < .05. This finding suggests that the more often
individuals talk about politics with friends and family, the more likely they may be to use the
yield response strategy.
Research question 3d examined what relationship, if any, there is between frequency of
political discussion with strong-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. Frequency of
political discussion with strong-tie relationships was not found to be significantly correlated to
avoid response strategies, r(150) = .044, p = n.s. Similar to research question 3b, this finding
implies frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners may not be related to
the avoid response strategy.
Research question 4a looked at what relationship there is, if any, between frequency of
political discussion with weak-tie relationships and dominate response strategies. A Pearson
correlation coefficient was calculated for the relationship between frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie discussion partners and the response strategies. A strong negative
correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners and
dominate response strategies, r(149) = -.221, p < .01. Similar to research question 3a, this finding
suggests that the more often individuals talk about politics with acquaintances, the less likely
they may be to use the dominate response strategy.
Research question 4b examined what the relationship is, if any, between frequency of
political discussion with weak-tie relationships and compromise response strategies. Frequency
of political discussion with weak-tie relationships was not found to be significantly correlated to
compromise response strategies, r(149) = .081, p = n.s. Like with research questions 3b and 3d,
this finding suggests that frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners may
not be related to the compromise response strategy.
Research question 4c inquired about the relationship between frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie relationships and yield response strategies. A moderate positive
correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners and
yield response strategies, r(149) = .178, p < .05. Like with research question 3c, this finding
suggests that the more often individuals talk about politics with acquaintances, the more likely
they may be to use the yield response strategy.
Research question 4d asked what the relationship is between frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. Frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly correlated to avoid
response strategies, r(149) = .134, p = n.s. This finding implies frequency of political discussion
with weak-tie discussion partners may not be related to the avoid response strategy. This finding
is similar to the results of research questions 3b, 3d, and 4b.
To examine RQ5, which examined the relationship between types of response strategies
and news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were conducted. Results for
RQ5 showed that there was a significant relationship between news media use and dominate
response strategies, r(150) = -.328, p < .001. This finding suggests that those with dominate
response strategies are less likely to use news media to validate their political opinions. For
yielding (r(150) = .085, p = n.s.), avoiding (r(150) = -.007, p = n.s.), and compromising (r(150)
= .001, p = n.s.) response strategies, no significant relationships were found.
To examine RQ6, which examined the relationship between strength of affiliation with
preferred political party and news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were
conducted. Results for RQ6 showed that news media use and strength of party affiliation are
negatively related with each other, r(150) = -.223, p < .01. This finding suggests that if an
individual strongly affiliates with their preferred political party, they are unlikely to use news
media to validate their political opinions.
To examine RQ7, which examined the relationship between level of political interest and
news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were conducted. Results for RQ7
showed that there was a significant relationship between news media use and political interest,
r(150) = .291, p < .01. This finding suggests that the more interested an individual is in politics,
the more likely they are to use news media to validate their political opinions.
To examine RQ8, which examined the relationship between level of political knowledge
and news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were conducted. Results for
RQ8 showed that there was a significant relationship between news media use and political
knowledge, r(150) = .214, p < .01. This finding suggests that the more knowledgeable an
individual considers themselves to be about politics, the more likely they are to use news media
to validate their political opinions.
Table 1
Pearson’s Correlation
Disagree
strong-tie
Disagree
weak-tie
Discussion
strong-tie
Discussion
weak-tie
Avoid
Compromise
Dominate
News
Media
Disagree
strong-tie
1
.247**
.086
.096
.047
-.083
-.098
.043
Disagree
weak-tie
.247**
1
.126
.024
.011
-.025
-.032
-.083
Discussion
strong-tie
.086
.126
1
.399**
.044
.020
-.185*
.191*
Discussion
weak-tie
.096
.024
.399**
1
.134
.081
-.221**
.353**
Avoid
.047
.011
.044
.134
1
.227**
-.434**
-.007
Yield
.023
-.022
.167*
.178*
.173*
.532**
-.290**
.085
Compromise
-.083
-.025
.020
.081
.227**
1
-.191*
.001
Dominate
-.098
-.032
-.185
-.221**
-.434**
-.191*
1
-.328**
News Media
.043
-.083
.191*
.353**
-.007
.001
-.328**
1
Note: * indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** indicates correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
39
Table 2
Pearson’s Correlation
News
Media
Political
Association
Political
Party
Strength of
Party
Affiliation
Political
Interest
Political
Engagement
Political
Knowledge
News Media
1
-.098
-.124
-.223**
.291**
.135
.214**
Political
Association
-.098
1
.409**
.173*
-.074
.080
-.141
Political
Party
-.124
.409**
1
.234**
-.075
-.030
.024
Strength of
Party
Affiliation
-.223**
.173*
.234**
1
-.294**
-.158
-.209*
Political
Interest
.291**
-.074
-.075
-.294**
1
.535**
.641**
Political
Engagement
.135
.080
-.030
-.158
.535**
1
.512**
Political
Knowledge
.214**
-.141
.024
-.209*
.641**
.512**
1
Note: * indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** indicates correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
40
V. Discussion
The current study examines how often individuals discuss politics with others, how often
individuals are exposed to disagreement during those political discussions, what response
strategies individuals use when faced with that disagreement, and the use of news media for
opinion validation following those political discussions. This study also examined what the
difference, if any, was if the discussion partner for those political discussions was someone the
individual had a strong-tie relationship (friends/family) with or a weak-tie relationship
(acquaintance) with. This study is a valuable addition to the literature because it shows how the
political discussions and disagreements that people engage in impacts their motivation for
checking news media.
A major factor of interpersonal communication is the strength of the relationship between
an individual and their conversation partner (Croes & Antheunis, 2021). The types of
relationships individuals have can affect how willing they are to discuss various subjects (Ojala
& Bengtsson, 2019), including politics (Jennings et al., 2009; Morey & Yamamoto, 2020). If
individuals think they are likely to disagree with their discussion partners on politics, then they
may discuss politics less frequently (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2012); but that does
not mean individuals never discuss politics with those they disagree with (Huckfeldt et al.,
2004). When faced with disagreement, individuals may use one of four response strategies,
dominate, compromise, yield, and avoid (Eveland et al., 2011; Hopmann et al., 2019).
Individuals use news media for a variety of motivations (Lee, 2013), including opinion
validation (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Slater, 2009).
The present study found that there may not be a significant relationship between the
frequency of disagreement and the dominate, compromise, yield, and avoid response strategies.
The lack of relationship between frequency of disagreement and the avoid response strategy is
consistent with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) finding for that specific strategy. Hopmann’s suggestion
for this specific finding is that individuals avoid political disagreement not due to the frequency
of said disagreement, but due to a lack of interest in politics. However, the findings for the other
three response strategies (i.e., dominate, compromise, yield) are not consistent with Hopmann et
al.’s (2019) results. A plausible explanation for this is that how often individuals are exposed to
disagreement is not a factor in how they choose to respond to it. For example, Carlson (2020)
examined the different factors that play into how individuals respond to political disagreement.
The factors of a disagreement that Carlson (2020) found are its scope, domain, genealogy, and
consequence. For example, Carlson (2020) notes that the wider the scope of a political
disagreement is, the less likely an individual may be to conciliate, or pacify, their discussion
partner. This suggests that while there are multiple aspects of political disagreement that affect
how individuals respond, the frequency of disagreement may not be one of them.
Another finding from this study is that frequency of political discussion both strong-tie
and weak-tie relationships and the dominate response strategy were negatively related with each
other. This finding is not consistent with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) observation that the more often
individuals discuss politics, the more willing they are to dominate. One reason why this might be
the case is that if an individual frequently discusses politics with someone, then it means they
might agree with that person often. This would suggest that the more often an individual talks
about politics with someone they agree with, the less likely they may be to try to dominate the
conversation. An example of this is Cowan’s and Baldassarri’s (2018) study on who individuals
choose to discuss politics with. Individuals speak more frequently with those they are likely to
agree with than those they expect to disagree with (Cowan & Baldassarri, 2018).
A surprising finding is that the relationships between frequency of disagreement and each
of the response strategies (i.e. dominate, compromise, yield, avoid) was the same for both strong-
tie (i.e. family and friends) and weak-tie (i.e. acquaintances) relationships. Not only that, but
when it came to frequency of political discussion and each of the response strategies, the
relationships were the same for strong-tie and weak-tie as well. This finding is not consistent
with Croes’ and Antheunis’s (2021) finding that individuals talk more frequently with those they
have a strong-tie relationship with than those with a weak-tie relationship. One possible
explanation for this inconsistency is that how individuals communicate with others has changed.
To provide an example, a Pew Research Center study conducted by Hampton, Goulet, and
Purcell (2011) shows that the average American has 636 social ties on social networking services
(i.e. Facebook and Twitter). Hampton et al.’s (2011) also shows that these ties consist of strong-
tie and weak-tie relationships. Since SNS users are aware that their followers see their posts, this
could suggest that individuals may feel comfortable responding to strong-tie and weak-tie
relationships the same way.
Another noteworthy finding for this study was that there was a positive between
frequency of political discussion and the yield response strategy. This finding is not consistent
with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) observation that the more often an individual discusses politics
with someone, the less likely they are to use yield response strategies. A plausible explanation for
why frequency of discussion and the yield strategy are positively related with each other is that
many people have stopped talking about politics. One example of this is a Pew Research
Center study, conducted by Jurkowitz and Mitchell (2020), on that subject. 45% of adults in the
U.S. have stopped talking about politics with someone because of something the other person
said (Jurkowitz & Mitchell, 2020). This suggests that if one person said something (during a
political discussion) that the other person did not like, they may choose to yield the conversation
just to end the discussion.
Also, the present study found that there was no significant relationship between
frequency of political discussion and the dominate or avoid response strategies. This finding is
not consistent with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) observation of the dominate and avoid response
strategies. One explanation for why this is the case is that if an individual discusses politics
frequently with someone, then they might frequently agree with them as well. If that is the case,
they may not feel the need to respond to their discussion partner by trying to dominate the
conversation nor avoid the subject of politics. This idea is supported by Cowan’s and
Baldassarri’s (2018) finding that individuals frequently discuss politics with those they expect to
agree with. This suggests that if an individual frequently discusses politics with someone, then
they likely enjoy talking politics with them. This then implies that if individuals enjoy discussing
politics with each other, they may not feel the need to dominate or avoid.
Looking at the use of news media for opinion validation, it and the dominate response
strategy are negatively related with each other. One explanation for this finding is that if an
individual feels the need to dominate the conversation, then they may feel confident about, or a
sense of superiority in, what they believe in. This would suggest that, since they feel that sense of
superiority about their opinions, individuals may not feel the need to use the news for opinion
validation. An example of this can be seen in Hall’s and Raimi’s (2018) study on belief
superiority. Individuals with a greater sense of superiority in their political beliefs select news
outlets that aligns with their views; they do this because they feel that the information those
outlets provide is superior than news outlets of differing beliefs (Hall & Raimi, 2018). This
suggests that while individuals do select news media whose beliefs align with their own, their
motivation to do so may not be out of a need for opinion validation.
Continuing with the use of news media for opinion validation, there is a positive
correlation between it and the frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion
partners. That same type of correlation was also found for the use of news media for opinion
validation and the frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners. This
shows that there may be a significant relationship between using news media for opinion
validation and discussing politics with both strong-tie and weak-tie relationships. Morey’s and
Yamamoto’s (2020) findings in their study on the different motivations for political talk support
this notion. What this suggests is that the more often individuals talk about politics with others,
the more often they might use the news to hear from like-minded commentators. It’s possible that
if individuals regularly agree with those they frequently discuss politics with (Cowan &
Baldassarri, 2018), then they might want that same type of agreement from news media as well.
In terms of results from correlations that looked at the use of news media for opinion
validation and certain demographic questions, the use of news media for opinion validation and
strength of affiliation with a political party are positively related with each other. This suggests
that the more an individual associates with their preferred political party, the more likely they
may be to use news media to validate their political beliefs. This finding is consistent with
Knobloch-Westerwick’s and Lavis’ (2017) study on partisan alignment and partisan news. The
more an individual leans Republican, the more likely they are to select partisan media that
reflects conservative beliefs (Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis, 2017). The more an individual
leans Democrat, the more likely they are to select partisan media that reflects liberal beliefs
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis, 2017). What this may imply is news media that present
information with a clear ideological slant appeals to people that strongly identify with a specific
political party.
Another finding from correlations that looked at the use of news media for opinion
validation and certain demographic questions, the use of news media for opinion validation and
level of interest in politics are also positively related to each other. This suggests that the greater
an individual’s interest in politics is, the more likely they might be to use news media to validate
their political beliefs. Knobloch-Westerwick’s and Lavis’ (2017) study is consistent with this
finding as well. The higher an individual’s level of political interest is, the more often they
selected partisan news that reinforced their political attitudes (Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis,
2017). This observation suggests that people who are highly interested in politics may select
news media that matches that level of interest.
One more observation from the correlations between the use of news media for opinion
validation and certain demographic questions, the use of news media for opinion validation and
the level of political knowledge are positively related with each other. This suggests that the
more an individual considers themself knowledgeable about politics, the more likely they may be
to use news media to validate their political opinions. This finding is consistent with Feldman’s,
Wojcieszak’s, Stroud’s, and Bimber’s (2018) study on what influences media selectivity. In that
study, Feldman et al. (2018) found that political knowledge predicted a preference for pro-
attitudinal media. This finding suggests that people who feel that they know a lot about politics
might select news media that supports what they know.
VI. Conclusion
People have conversations about a variety of topics for a variety of reasons. These topics
can range from movies and music to food and fashion. These conversations are usually light-
hearted; people feel free to agree or disagree in these situations. This light-hearted feeling
extends to the media people choose about those topics (Krause et al., 2014). When it comes to
controversial topics, politics specifically, that light-hearted feeling is not present. If people
discuss politics with someone who disagrees with them, they feel unsatisfied afterwards
(Hopmann, 2012). Following this, people choose news media that validates their beliefs (Kim,
2017). This study aims to explore how the discussions and disagreements people have about
politics can affect their motivations for using certain news media and makes significant
contributions in the areas of interpersonal communication and media use.
This subject of news media as a means of opinion validation was studied from a uses and
gratifications perspective. Uses and Gratifications theory states that individuals select specific
media depending on what needs they want fulfilled (Ruggerio, 2009). The needs individuals
want to be satisfied can change depending on the medium they use (Rubin, 2009). The topics
individuals have conversations about, such as government, the economy, and religion (Wyatt et
al., 2000), can change depending on the relationships they have with those they converse.
Conversations, and their outcomes, can vary between family, friends, and acquaintances. This
research examined the role of politics in the conversations people have and how it affects why
they choose their preferred news media.
While political discussions are common during election years, they can occur at any time
(Eveland, 2004). Individuals may talk about politics with others less often if they expect to
disagree with them (Gerber et al., 2012). As for responding to political disagreement, it can be
separated into four categories: dominate, compromise, yield, and avoid (Eveland et al., 2011).
Dominate means to take control of the conversation, compromise involves the discussion
partners reaching some kind of middle ground, yielding means conceding the disagreement to the
other person, and avoid involves making sure political disagreement does not come up
(Hopmann et al., 2019).
The results from this study showed no significant relationship between the frequency of
political disagreement and the response strategies. This means that how often people are exposed
to political disagreement may not be a factor in how they respond to it. In contrast, the frequency
of political discussion is negatively related with the dominate strategy and positively related with
the yield strategy. Of the four response strategies, only dominate had any significant relationship
with the use of news media for opinion validation, there being a negative correlation between the
two. This suggests that the more likely individuals are to try to dominate the political
disagreement, the less likely they are to use the news to validate their beliefs.
These results contradict Hopmann et al.’s (2019) findings about the relationships between
frequency of disagreement and each of the four response strategies. An explanation for this is
that while there are a myriad of factors that influence how people respond to political
disagreement (Carlson, 2020), how often people are exposed to disagreement may not be one of
them. Study findings have practical implications for interpersonal communication and news
media use. Its implications for interpersonal communication is that it may allow people to be
more conscious of how they respond to others during a political disagreement and how others
respond to them. This study’s implications for news media use is that it provides a possible
answer for why so many news outlets are partisan in presenting information; some people want
sources of news that validates what they believe in.
Something to note, while dual concern theory was mentioned in the literature review for
this study, it was not used as a framework for this research. The reason why is because dual
concern theory assumes that individuals are conscious of both the concern for self and others
when they decide how to manage conflict (Hopmann et al., 2019; Musenero et al., 2021).
Individuals might not consider these concerns when responding to political disagreement; this is
why the decision was made not to utilize this theory. With that said, it is a valid theory for
studying conflict management and can be used as a framework to guide future research on this
subject.
As mentioned in the ‘participants and distribution’ portion of the methods section, the
survey was distributed on February 14, 2022. This is not a limitation of the survey, this period of
time was selected intentionally. To reiterate Eveland’s (2004) point, while conversations about
politics are most common during election years, those types of conversations can happen at any
time. This period of time was selected in order to examine how often individuals discuss politics
with others when politics were not at the forefront of public discourse. Aside from the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic, there were no major political events occurring when the survey was
distributed and responses were collected (Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and President Biden’s
nomination of Judge Ketanji Jackson for the Supreme Court did not occur until 14 and 15 days
later, respectively).
Some limitations to the present study need to be noted here. One such limitation is the
size of the sample, consisting of only 150 individuals. A wider sample in future research could
allow for stronger correlations between frequency of political disagreement and the response
strategies. Another limitation is the use of the word “talk” in the scenarios within the survey
itself. Individuals may have a narrow view of the word “talk”; they may treat it as just verbal
communication, occurring only through in-person, phone calls, and video chats. Changing the
verbage could give participants reason to consider conversations that occur through non-verbal
means, such as texting, email, and social media threads (i.e. Twitter, Reddit, Facebook).
Although a national sample was utilized for data collection, White individuals were over-
represented in the sample, consisting of 87.3% of all respondents. A more representative sample
could provide better insight into the discussions and disagreements people have about politics
and how that affects why they choose certain news media.
A possible idea for future research is to include additional measures into the survey. One
way this could be done is to include a question about how fatigued individuals are with political
discourse. Pew Research Center found that, in 2020, 55% of all social media users are worn out
by the amount of political posts and conversations they see (Anderson & Auxier, 2020). Another
possible idea for future research is to revise the definition of politics included in the scenario
within the survey. With the definition provided, participants may infer politics to only mean
national politics. By modifying the definition to list state, national, and foreign politics, it could
allow participants to consider other types of politics when answering the questions. One more
idea for future research is to distribute this survey in the days or weeks leading up to a major
election (either Presidential or midterm). As there is greater attention given to politics during
these time periods, it could result in greater frequency of political discussion, greater frequency
of disagreement, and possibly changes in which strategies individuals prefer in responding to
disagreement.
I. Introduction
Individuals have conversations about a variety of political topics, such as gun control and
abortion (Adamic & Glance, 2005). When conversations about these controversial topics occur,
the results of those discussions can become complicated. For politics, people prefer to discuss it
with those they agree with significantly more than people they disagree with (Cowan &
Baldassarri, 2018). One of the reasons for this is that people want to avoid “social controversy”
(Hopmann, 2012).
In his study, Hopmann (2012) indicates that individuals want to avoid uncomfortable
situations, such as being stuck in the middle of an argument between two people in the same
group and thinking of it as a no-win situation (Green, Visser, & Tetlock, 2002) that can come
with disagreeing about politics. When faced with disagreements, individuals may turn to news
media because they prefer to reinforce their political predispositions instead of changing them
(Kim, 2017).
Individuals use specific media, news included, in order to fulfill a specific gratification
(Katz, 1974). In this approach to media consumption, the audience is aware of their needs and is
active in satisfying them (Ruggerio, 2009). Lee (2013) noted that individuals use the news for
one of four motivations. The four motivations for using news is to seek out information, to be
entertained, to socialize with others about it, or to have their opinions validated. When it comes
to the opinion-validation motivation, people prefer news media that align with their own beliefs
(Lee, 2013).
This research is important because while individuals avoid disagreements about it,
researchers state that political discussion needs to remain a major part of American public
discourse (Scheufele, 2000). If individuals refuse to communicate their political differences with
each other, then democracy is unable to function (Conover, Searing & Crewe, 2002). The most
recent example is the discourse that emerged following hundreds of Trump supporters storming
the U.S. capitol (Barrett, Raju, & Nickeas, 2021).
Political disagreement has direct effects on different aspects of individuals’ political
participation. Hopmann (2012) found that individuals who face political disagreement find it
more difficult to determine who to vote for. Following political disagreement, individuals’
positive perception of their preferred presidential candidate decreased (Parsons, 2010). Parsons
also found that individuals’ negative perception of the opposing candidate also decreased. These
changes lead to depressed turnout in presidential elections (Nir, 2011). What these studies have
in common is that political disagreement affects political attitudes. What these studies do not
examine is how political disagreement is related to individuals’ news-consumption habits
afterwards.
PEW Research Center (2018) conducted a national survey about political discussion and
disagreement. Specifically, they surveyed individuals about discussing politics with those they
disagree with in March 2016 (prior to Trump’s presidency) and in October 2018 (two years into
Trump’s presidency). In March 2016, 46% of individuals stated that discussing politics with
those they disagree with was stressful and frustrating; this number increased to 53% in October
2018. The percentage of Republicans who feel stressed and frustrated discussing politics with
people they disagree with was mostly unchanged, from 48% in 2016 to 49% in 2018. The
percentage of Democrats who feel stressed and frustrated discussing politics with people they
disagree with saw a sharp increase, from 45% in 2016 to 57% in 2018.
Within that same survey, Pew Research Center asked individuals in 2018 how much they
have in common with those they disagree with politically. When discussing politics with
someone they disagree with, 63% of people had less in common with the other person than they
thought. Breaking it down by political affiliation, this number is nearly the same for both
Democrats and Republicans. When discussing politics with someone they disagree with, 64% of
Democrats and 63% of Republicans found that they had less in common with the other person
than they thought.
The focus of my research is that the disagreements people have about politics and the
news media they choose to consume afterwards are connected. My hypothesis is that how often
individuals are exposed to political disagreement, moderated through how they choose to
respond to that disagreement, influences how often they use political commentary from news
outlets for opinion validation. This thesis will be conducted through a uses and gratifications
perspective.
II. Literature Review
A. Interpersonal Communication
i. General Overview
Interpersonal communication is when at least two individuals are engaged in a
conversation (Cathcart & Gumpert, 1983). One key element is the roles individuals play in the
conversation (Fearing, 1962). The roles Fearing (1962) described in his research are
communicator and interpreter. Communicators are those who send information with the intent to
begin conversation. Interpreters are those who receive information with the intent to provide a
response (Fearing, 1962). As the conversation goes on, individuals can serve as both
communicator and interpreter.
Larrosa-Fuentes (2020) broadly defines interpersonal communication as the practice of
exchanging information and symbolic forms between two or more individuals. Muslicha et al.
(2022) states that the nature of interpersonal communication is spontaneous, individuals receive
mutual feedback, and participants play a flexible role in the discussion. Laksana and Fadhilah
(2021) conceptualize interpersonal communication as communication that occurs in various
systems or contexts that affect what is happening and the meaning in the interaction. What
separates interpersonal and group communication is that while group communication involves
one person speaking to a group of people at the same time, interpersonal involves one person
addressing each person individually (Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020). Interpersonal communication also
differs from organizational communication in that individuals conduct interpersonal
communication for a myriad of goals (Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020) while individuals conduct
organizational communication for the specific goal of benefiting the business they work for
(Apine & Sunday, 2021).
One factor of interpersonal communication is the social context the conversation takes
place in. The context is split into two categories: the public sphere and the private sphere
(Brennan, 2017). The public sphere is the sphere of community, complex arenas where
individuals, who may not be related with each other, interact with each other (Johansen &
Andrews, 2016). The private sphere is the sphere of the household, the domain of an individual’s
family and/or intimate life (Johansen & Andrews, 2016). Individuals consider certain topics to be
specific to the public sphere and other topics specific to the private sphere. For example, Wyatt,
Katz, and Kim (2000) conducted a nationwide survey to ask individuals what topics they
consider public and what topics they consider private. Individuals consider topics such as
government and the economy to be public matters and topics such as family matters and religion
to be private matters (Wyatt et al., 2000).
The political topics that individuals discuss in the public or private sphere depend on how
individuals feel about the topic themselves. For example, Lobera and Portos (2022) analyzed
what spheres left-wing and right-wing individuals feel comfortable revealing their political
preferences. Left-wing individuals feel comfortable revealing their political preferences in both
public and private spheres; right-wing individuals more comfortable doing so in the private
sphere than the public (Lobera & Portos, 2022). This indicates that there are certain topics, such
as politics, that are discussed in both the public and private spheres. The sphere that discussion
occurs in is not the only factor of interpersonal communication.
Another factor of interpersonal communication is the strength of the relationship the
individual has with their discussion partner. The strength of the relationship can be separated into
two categories: strong tie and weak tie (Croes & Antheunis, 2021). In their study on relationship
intimacy, Croes & Antheunis (2021) asked participants who they have a strong relationship with
and who they have a weak relationship with. Friends, family, and romantic partners are
considered to be strong-tie relationships; acquaintances and colleagues are considered to be
weak-tie relationships (Croes & Antheunis, 2021). In that same study, Croes & Antheunis (2021)
also asked participants how often they discussed with others. Individuals have discussions more
frequently with those they have a strong-tie relationship with than those they have a weak-tie
relationship with (Croes & Antheunis, 2021).
The type of relationships people have can affect how willing they are to have
conversations about various topics. Researchers often group friends and family together as strong
relationships individuals are willing to have conversations with (Ai & Zhang, 2021; Walgrave &
Ketelaars, 2019). For example, Ojala and Bengtsson (2019) examined the types of conversations
have about climate change with those they have a strong relationship with. Individuals are
willing to discuss both the positive and negative aspects of climate change with friends and
parents (Ojala & Bengtsson, 2019). Morey and Yamamoto (2020) examined what motivates
individuals to discuss politics with friends and family. Individuals discuss politics with friends
and family primarily to educate themselves, express their opinions, or to influence others (Morey
& Yamamoto, 2020). Therefore, individuals are willing to discuss politics if their discussion
partner is a friend or family member.
One more aspect of interpersonal communication is the type of conversation that
individuals engage in. The two types of interpersonal communication that will be focused on
here is informal and deliberative. Informal interpersonal communication is spontaneous
(Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020) conversation that occurs between friends, family, and peers (Andersen
& Hopmann, 2018). Andersen and Hopmann (2018) conducted a survey about individuals who
use informal communication to discuss politics. Informal political talk is used as a means to learn
new information by those who do not frequently consume news media (Andersen & Hopmann,
2018). In deliberative interpersonal communication, on the other hand, individuals go into the
conversation expecting to, and willing to, discuss arguments (Larrosa-Fuentes, 2020). This
suggests that individuals enter deliberative conversations expecting to disagree with the
discussion partner.
What people learn from media can affect the content of the conversations they take part
in. For example, Vu and Gehrau (2010) conducted a field study on how an article in a community
magazine can affect what people talk about. The results of that study indicate that people are
more likely to talk about a certain issue after reading about it than those who do not (Vu &
Gejrau, 2010). Another example is an analysis Scheuffle (2002) conducted on an American
Citizen Participation survey about political participation. The survey was focused on the
relationship between hard news and political participation. Results from that survey indicate that
interpersonal communication is a significant mediator between processing hard news and
considering political participation (Scheuffle, 2002). Hwang (2010) analyzed a Legacy Media
Tracking Survey about the effects of “The Truth'' campaign. The survey in question was about
how the advertising campaign affected conversations about smoking behavior. The results of the
survey indicate that the amount of conversations about smoking behavior increased in areas
where “The Truth'' advertisements aired (Hwang, 2010). These studies show that media may not
change what people think, but media can change what people discuss about.
The type of relationships people have can affect how willing they are to have
conversations about politics. For example, Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers (2009) analyzed a
University of Michigan study about political socialization within families. The survey is about
discussing politics in families across three generations. The results show that people are more
willing to discuss politics if their parents talked to them about it (Jennings et al, 2009). Another
example is when Östman (2015) conducted a field study about instances where adolescents
discuss politics. He found that adolescents are more willing to talk about politics publically if
they already discuss it privately with family (Östman, 2015). This shows that the family
environment plays a role in how willing people are to discuss politics.
People are selective in who they discuss politics with because they want to avoid
disagreements (Cowan & Baldassarri, 2018). This is because political disagreements in
interpersonal communication can have a negative effect on those who participated. For example,
Hopmann (2012) compared two surveys in order to find the effects these disagreements have on
voters. The results of this analysis are that disagreements increase ambivalence in political
attitudes. The reason for this is so that future confrontations about those topics can be avoided
(Hopmann, 2012). This leads to a question of how political disagreements can survive in
interpersonal communication. Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2002) answered this by
examining a survey about political discussion during the 1996 presidential election. The results
of that study indicate that people are willing to disagree because they have other social networks
that agree with them (Huckfeldt et al, 2002). This shows that when faced with disagreement,
people seek other avenues for validation.
ii. Types of Interpersonal Communication
Fearing (1953) also described another key element of interpersonal communication is that
those involved are meeting face-to-face. In face-to-face communication, the content of the
conversation can be adjusted based on the responses of those involved. For example, Nelson
(2016) performed an experiment on the effect that positive moods can have on interpersonal
communication. She found that people with a positive mood, such as feeling enthusiastic or
inspired, communicated more than people with a neutral mood (Nelson, 2016). Another example
of conversation content being impacted by response can be seen in Burgers and Buekeboom’s
(2016) study that compared instances of literal statements being used in conversations to
instances of ironic statements being used. They found that people find literal comments to be
more appropriate for conversations than ironic comments (Burgers & Buekeboom, 2016).
Interpersonal communication does not always have to be face-to-face; it can be mediated
as well. Cathcart and Gumpert (1983) define mediated interpersonal communication as any
instance where technology is introduced into face-to-face interaction. What separates mediated
from face-to-face is knowledge of the medium used for conversation. Phone calls, texting, email
and social media are some of the mediums used for interpersonal mediated communication
(Petrič, Petrovčič, and Vehovar 2011). Whether it be face-to-face or mediated however, the
medium of conversation can impact the extent of participation in political discussions (Herrig et
al., 2020).
iii. Political Communication, Discussion, and Disagreement
Raekstad (2021) compares the works of two different political theorists, Bernard
Williams and Raymond Geuss, and how they define politics. Both theorists agree that politics
involves social organization, coordination, and carrying out of actions (Raekstad, 2021). Where
the theorists differ is the scope in what they consider as politics. Williams suggests that politics is
limited to the actions of the state/government, whereas Guess indicates that politics should also
encompass matters between family/families and friends. This article examines politics in a broad,
philosophical sense instead of which topics and subjects are considered political.
Görtz and Dahl (2021) examine how the breadth of what individuals consider to be
politics affects political participation. Their results suggest that individuals with a wide breadth
of topics they consider to be politics are more likely to participate in politics than those with a
narrow perception of politics. Some concepts Görtz and Dahl present include one way of
thinking where politics is “limited to what governments and related central institutions do” and
another where politics goes beyond governments and other central institutions. Görtz and Dahl
not only discuss a broad definition of politics, but they also provide topics that individuals
consider to be political as well. In their survey, the topics that many participants selected as being
political include elections, housing, taxes, childcare, and income inequality (Görtz & Dahl,
2021).
Eveland, Morey and Hutchens (2011) utilize past literature to reflect on how politics and
political conversation should be defined. In the article, Eveland et al. are critical of researchers
who do not provide a definition of politics for participants to consider, instead letting participants
think of their own definition. Eveland et al. (2011) define political conversation, on an
interpersonal level, as a form of small talk about shared public information. With this definition,
they imply that political conversation does not need to be, but can be, deliberative. Eveland et al.
state that the most common political conversation partners are those that individuals have a
strong tie to: spouses, family members, and close friends. Eveland et al. also note four common
strategies for responding to disagreement: dominating the conversation, avoiding disagreement,
yielding to the conversation partner, and compromise.
Political communication can be conceptualized as individuals or groups of political
influence speaking about issues salient to the public (Walton, 1990). This type of communication
is most common during election years, but it can occur at any time (Eveland, 2004). During
election years, opposing political parties engage in contests, debates as one example, where
candidates allocate their resources strategically (Amorós & Puy, 2013). For example, when
speaking on the same subjects, candidates try to highlight where their opponent(s) fall short on
the issue (Amorós & Puy, 2013). As a result, the manner and tone of political communication
often ends up being negative (Druckman, Kifer, & Parkin, 2010). This suggests that, since
debates between political candidates are frequently negative, individuals often expect discussions
about politics to potentially turn out negative as well.
In order to spread their message to as many people as possible, politicians and political
parties launch campaigns. Some of the mediums used for campaigns include newspapers,
television, and the Internet. For example, Stier, Belier, Lietz, and Strohmaier (2018) studied how
campaigns utilize different social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. For Facebook,
political campaigns use the platform to accumulate support, via likes, on their messages (Stier et
al., 2018). For Twitter, political campaigns use posts to encourage discussion between users in
their replies (Stier et al., 2018). This suggests that the goals that political campaigns want to
achieve depend on the medium they elect to use. The overarching message, however, is the same
regardless of the platform used. Druckman et al. (2010) found that political campaigns design
their messages with the mass audience in mind. This suggests that individuals are not given the
opportunity to respond to politicians or political parties, regardless of whether or not they
disagree with them.
Political discussions are conversations that focus on matters of public concern and issues
dealing with the common good (Conover, Searing, & Crewe, 2002). Some examples of topics
mentioned in these discussions include abortion, gun control, impeachment, and COVID-19
(Adamic & Glance, 2005; ANES, 2020). Research has focused on political discussions during
election years, but these types of conversations can occur at any time (Eveland, 2004). The
contents and outcomes of these conversations can differ whether the conversation occurs in
public or in private (Conover et al., 2002). This suggests that where the discussion happens can
play a role in how the discussion plays out.
Political discussion can occur through a variety of mediums, face-to-face, phone calls,
texting, and email (Petrič, Petrovčič, & Vehovar, 2011). The medium of discussion can influence
the extent of participation in political discussion (Herrig, Vultee, Prough, & Sweet-Cushmanm,
2020). Research has also been conducted to examine the influence political sophistication, or the
level of political awareness, has on how individuals choose to respond to disagreement. Political
sophistication does not influence individuals’ responses to political disagreement (Parsons,
2010). This indicates that while how aware individuals are of politics may not affect their
participation in political discussion, how the discussion is conducted can affect that participation
in political discussion.
However, the type of relationships individuals have influences who they share their
political opinions with. Through their survey, Morey, Eveland and Hutchens (2012) found that
individuals are more likely to share political opinions with someone they have a strong tie to than
someone they have a weak tie to. Individuals have a strong tie with family and friends; they have
a weak tie with co-workers and acquaintances (Morey et al., 2012). Likewise, people are more
willing to discuss politics if their parents talked to them about it (Jennings et al., 2009). For
instance, adolescents are more willing to talk about politics with others if they have previously
discussed it with family (Östman, 2015). This indicates that individuals choose who to discuss
politics with by what their relationship is with them. One way these conversations can end is
with the participants agreeing with each other, but these discussions can end with the participants
disagreeing with each other as well.
Political disagreement refers to conversations individuals participate in where they are
exposed to viewpoints that differ from their own (Klofstad, Sokhey & McClurg, 2013).
Individuals are exposed to these viewpoints when they face opposition from the person they are
engaging in discussion with (Valenzuela & Bachmann, 2015). These political disagreements can
occur for a variety of reasons. For instance, Valenzuela and Bachmann (2015) found that these
disagreements can occur due to a difference in their preferred presidential candidate. Differences
in preferred political party is another way that disagreement can occur (Feldman & Price, 2008).
These disagreements can also occur because of a difference in opinion on a political issue, such
as immigration (Valenzuela & Bachmann, 2015). This shows that political disagreement can
occur regardless of the subject discussed.
Research has found that how frequently individuals discuss politics with others is
influenced by how likely they are to disagree with others. Individuals will discuss politics with
others less frequently if they think they are likely to disagree with them (Gerber, Huber, Doherty,
& Dowling, 2012). For example, Cowan and Baldassarri (2018) found that some individuals
avoid political disagreements because they do not want to face conflict with the person they are
speaking with. As a result, individuals may feel inclined to share political opinions primarily
with others they are unlikely to disagree with (Cowan & Baldassarri, 2018). This would suggest
that individuals avoid engaging in discussions with people they expect to disagree with
politically.
This does not mean that individuals never discuss politics with those they disagree with.
Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn (2004) analyzed the 2000 National Election Study to examine
how frequently individuals discuss politics with those they disagree with. More than half of
respondents indicated that they disagreed with at least one person they discussed politics with
(Huckfeldt et al., 2004). This shows that political disagreement occurs more frequently than
expected.
iv. Responding to Disagreement
Testa, Hibbing, and Ritchie (2014) state that the individual’s orientation toward conflict
should be considered when examining the effects of disagreement on political knowledge,
tolerance toward those with differing views, and participation. Testa et al. (2014) separate
conflict orientation into two categories, positive (i.e. the individual considers disagreement as a
positive experience and something worth engaging in) and negative (i.e. the individual considers
disagreement as a negative experience and something that should be avoided). For exposure to
disagreement, Testa et al. (2014) found that the type of orientation does not affect the
individual’s amount of exposure to disagreement. When exposed to disagreement, individuals
with a positive orientation were more likely to be knowledgeable about politics, more likely to
show tolerance, and more likely to engage in political participation (Testa et al., 2014). When
exposed to disagreement, individuals with a negative orientation had no change in likelihood of
being knowledgeable about politics, less likely to show tolerance, and less likely to engage in
political participation (Testa et al., 2014).
Coffé and Bolzendahl (2017) analyze a survey conducted in Britain to study the effect
gender differences have on avoiding conflict and how that difference impacts political
participation. In their analysis, they found that women are more likely to avoid conflict than men.
Coffé and Bolzendahl (2017) also found that women are less likely to participate in politics than
men. There was no significant gender difference in how conflict avoidance impacts political
participation (Coffé & Bolzendahl, 2017). This shows that while gender is a factor in both
responding to conflict and political participation individually, it’s not a factor in one impacting
the other.
When faced with political disagreement, regardless of the subject discussed, individuals
will respond in different ways. Eveland et al. (2011) and Hopmann, Bjarnøe and Wonneberger
(2019) and identified four strategies individuals use to respond to this kind of disagreement.
When faced with opposition, individuals may try to dominate, which involves taking control of
the conversation and shutting down the other person from making their arguments. Individuals
may also try to compromise, which involves hearing out the other person and finding common
ground. To avoid an uncomfortable situation, individuals may try to avoid having disagreement
emerge in the conversation. If it is considered the path of least resistance, individuals may also
yield, or concede the conversation (Hopmann et al., 2019). Hopmann et al. (2019) found that
these four categories of responses are based on the individual’s level of political disagreement.
Hopmann et al. (2019) examined these four categories of response strategies through the
framework of Dual Concern Theory. Dual Concern Theory states that individuals manage
conflict based on two factors, a concern for self and a concern of others (Musenero, Baroudi, &
Gunawan, 2021). This theory suggests that individuals respond to disagreement based on how
concerned they are for both their own well-being and the well-being of others. For example,
individuals may dominate if they have a high level of self-concern but a low level of concern for
others (Hopmann et al., 2019).
To dominate during disagreement means to force control of the conversation away from
the other person (Hopmann et al., 2019). Individuals try to dominate the conversation through a
variety of means. Speaking more frequently and for longer than the other person during a
disagreement are two examples of how individuals try to dominate the conversation (Palmer,
1989). Herring et al. (2020) studied how the medium of communication, face-to-face and
mediated, affects how likely someone is to dominate during disagreement. The medium of
communication does not affect how likely individuals are to dominate the conversation (Herring
et al., 2020). While some individuals may insist on dominating the discussion, others may try to
compromise with the person they disagree with.
Compromise is when the individuals that disagree with each other come to an agreement
(O’Flynn & Setälä, 2020). In order to reach this agreement, each person has to concede one
aspect of their argument. The reason for this is that while both individuals still feel that they are
in the right, they feel that it’s better to compromise than to stay at a standstill (O’Flynn & Setälä,
2020). For example, Renwick (1975) surveyed office workers on how the source of disagreement
affects the strategy used to respond to disagreement. Compromise was the most common
response type when the individuals in disagreement differ in personality. Compromise was also
the most common response type when individuals differ in attitudes or opinions (Renwick,
1975). While some individuals may concede just one aspect of their argument, others may decide
to concede their argument altogether.
To yield during disagreement means to concede the discussion to the other person
(Hopmann et al., 2019). Research has been done on the different reasons individuals choose to
yield the disagreement. For example, Sharma (2012) examined how students responded to
disagreement during group discussions. One reason individuals yield the disagreement is because
they feel they do not have enough information on the subject being discussed (Sharma, 2012).
One other example is that Kotoff (1993) examined multiple interactions between students and
lecturers. Individuals yield the disagreement because they see it as a means of ending the
discussion (Kotoff, 1993). What these two studies have in common is that individuals show
reluctance in conceding the discussion. This suggests that while it’s used to end discussion,
yielding is not considered the preferred means of responding to disagreement.
While some individuals have different strategies for responding to disagreement, others
try to avoid it altogether. Individuals avoid disagreement for a variety of reasons such as their
lack of information on the subject, their lack of interest in politics, or the subject’s lack of
personal importance (Hayes, 2007). Individuals also avoid disagreement because they feel that if
they spoke up on a certain subject, their opinion would be in the minority (Hayes, 2007).
Paramasivam (2007) studied the effects of avoiding disagreement. Avoiding disagreement results
in emotions being pent-up, decrease of personal integrity, and relationships becoming more
uncomfortable (Paramasivam, 2007).
One of the goals of my research is to examine how often individuals are exposed to
political disagreement and how they choose to respond to it. To this end, the following research
questions are proposed.
RQ1abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) yield response strategies, c)
compromise response strategies, and d) avoid response strategies?
RQ2abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political disagreement with weak-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) compromise response strategies, c)
yield response strategies, and d) avoid response strategies?
RQ3abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political discussion with strong-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) compromise response strategies, c)
yield response strategies, and d) yield response strategies?
RQ4abcd: What is the relationship between frequency of political discussion with weak-tie
relationships and a) dominate response strategies, b) compromise response strategies, c)
yield response strategies, and d) avoid response strategies?
B. Uses and Gratifications
i. General Overview
Uses and Gratifications is the theory that people seek out media to have specific needs
met. For example, Lazarsfeld (1939) did a meta-analysis of research done on the effects of
listening to radio. What these pieces of early research have in common was that they were
entirely focused on the gratifications of listening to radio (Lazarsfeld, 1939). There was not
enough focus on the needs that would lead people to seek out media. Eventually, Katz (1974)
formed a definition that provided a foundation for how Uses and Gratifications should be
studied. Katz (1974) conceptualized uses and gratifications as social and psychological origin of
needs generates expectations of media, leading to different patterns of media exposure, resulting
in needs satisfied and other effects.
One key element that makes research utilizing Uses and Gratifications stand out is
audience activity. The purpose of audience activity is to examine the role people play in the
media they consume regularly (Ruggerio, 2009). Audience activity examines whether people are
active or passive in the selection of media (Gunter, 1988). According to Rubin (1993), audience
activity can be examined by breaking it down into a set number of categories.
The three main categories that Rubin (1993) provided are utility, intention, and
selectivity. Utility is what motivates the audience, such as in Gerlich’s, Drumheller’s, and
Sollosy’s (2012) study on motivations of readers. They found that, of the motivations prior to
reading, desire to relax was the most common (Gerlich et al, 2012). Intention is what the
audience plans to use the media for, such as in Perse’s (1990) study on television-viewing
motives. Her results showed that people watched TV with the intent of talking about it with
others (Perse, 1990). Selectivity is how the audience chooses their media, such as in Levy’s
(1987) study on how people used VCRs. He found that VCR owners were selective in what TV
programs VCR owners decided to record (Levy, 1987).
The issue with audience activity is thinking that the audience is either purely active or
purely passive. This is why Rubin (1993) also brought up examining audience activity through
levels of involvement. Levels of involvement indicate that there is a scale that ranges from being
passive to being active. For example, in an experimental study examining news talk shows,
Edgerly, Gotlieb, and Vraga (2016) argue that audience activity should also be measured on
behavioral utility and cognitive involvement. The results of that experiment indicate that if the
audience finds a piece of programming to be relevant, then they will be more involved with its
content (Edgerly et al, 2016).
ii. Uses and Gratifications in Media Research
Another key component that makes Uses and Gratifications research stand out is media
selection. In order to conduct research on motivations for selecting media, a typology needs to be
developed. For example, Blumler (1979) conducted a meta-analysis of typologies utilized in
Uses and Gratifications studies. He noticed that motivations commonly included in research are
surveillance, curiosity, diversion, and personal identity (Blumler, 1979). Typology can be
modified for the medium chosen as the focus of research. For example, Ruggerio (2009)
examined why people select the Internet as their medium of choice. He found that people prefer
the Internet because it is interactive, asynchronous, and its ability to demassify content
(Ruggerio, 2009). Motivations for selecting media are varied, but people share similar
motivations.
Television is unique because of its ability to use a combination of visuals and audio to
spread a message to a wide variety of people simultaneously. Entertainment is a category utilized
for TV uses and gratifications. Rubin (2009) notes that entertainment was first included as a part
of uses and gratifications research during the 60s. Research of TV uses and gratifications has
been done without including entertainment in the typology. For example, Weaver (2003)
examined television viewing motives in relation to personality traits. The typology utilized in
this research includes pass time, companionship, relaxation, information, and stimulation
(Weaver, 2003). Of these motivations, pass time and relaxation can be noted as explicitly
passive. Information, on the other hand, is a motivation that can be noted as explicitly active.
Companionship and stimulation are motivations that are not on either end of the passive-active
spectrum. What this demonstrates is that audiences can be active in seeking gratifications from
television.
The gratifications that people seek from television can vary depending on the type of
program watched. For example, Brown, Lauricella, Douai, and Zaidi (2012) surveyed people
about why they watch shows in the crime drama genre. They found that satisfying curiosity was
the most prevalent motivation (Brown et al, 2012). Gratifications can differ not just by the genre,
but by the programs that make up the genre as well. Barton (2009) distributed a survey to people
who watched different shows in the competitive reality show genre about their motivations for
watching them. The results of the survey show that different motivations were prevalent for
different shows (Barton, 2009).
The Newspaper can be defined as a print medium distributed by news organizations to
send information to a wide audience (Park, 1923). Elliot and Rosenberg (1987) conducted a
survey about the different motivations individuals use newspapers for. Study findings revealed
that surveillance and seeking information were the most common motivations for reading
newspapers (Elliot & Rosenberg, 1987). Other gratifications that Elliot and Rosenberg (1987)
found for reading newspapers were killing time and reading advertisements. News websites are
treated as an extension of newspapers (Chyi & Lasorsa, 2002).
News websites are a medium, owned and operated by news organizations, that spread
news to a wide audience (Himelboim & McCreery, 2012). Himelboim and McCreery (2012) also
noted the multimedia nature of news websites, the combination of text, audio, and video for the
purpose of sharing information. Chyi and Lasorsa (2002) found that there is considerable overlap
between newspaper readership and news website readership. Newspapers and news websites also
share the same gratifications (Payne, Dozier, Nomal & Yagade, 2010). The gratifications that
Payne et al. (2010) identified for both newspapers and news websites were surveillance,
interaction, and diversion.
Radio can be conceptualized as a purely auditory medium that can spread messages to a
wide audience simultaneously (Dunn, 2003). Towers (1987) conducted a telephone survey asking
participants about the different gratifications they use radio for. The various gratifications could
be grouped into two major categories, information and entertainment (Towers, 1987).
Information gratifications studied include to understand what is going on, to get information to
pass on to other people, and to find issues affecting people like myself (Towers, 1987).
Entertainment gratifications examined include to pass the time and to feel happy (Towers, 1987).
Albarran et al. (2007) distributed a questionnaire asking individuals about their use of radio in
comparison to new media technologies, such as satellite radio, mp3 players, and internet radio.
Radio was used more than these media technologies for access to news and information.
However, in terms of overall use, radio was used less than new media technologies (Albarran et
al., 2007). Therefore, research reveals that while individuals still use the radio to learn about the
news, use of radio overall has decreased over time.
One example of a new media technology is social media. Social media, like other
mediums, fulfill a variety of gratifications, such as information seeking, expression of opinion,
and convenience (Whiting & Williams, 2013) that people use them for. Research has been
conducted on both specific social media platforms and social media as a whole. For example,
Krause, North, and Heritage (2014) distributed an online questionnaire to find out what
motivates individuals to use Facebook. The most common motivations found were to
communicate with others, to be entertained, and to distract people from their problems (Krause et
al., 2014). Sundar and Limperos (2013) however, surveyed university students on what motivates
them to use social media regardless of platform. Among the gratifications found are activity,
interaction with others, and control over what they see (Sundar & Limperos, 2013). Studies done
on these mediums indicate that the gratifications that people seek depend on not only the
medium itself, but the content of the medium as well.
These mediums are not used alone; each medium is used in conjunction with other media
in order to have gratifications met. For example, Yuan (2011) examined what media people use
in order to build their media repertoire. She found that people utilized combinations that include
Internet, mobile phone, television, and radio (Yuan, 2011). The reason for this combination is
because some media provide content not seen on other platforms. Another example comes from a
survey Wolf and Schnauber (2015) distributed to mobile phone users about the mediums they use
to seek out information. They found that people build a news repertoire consisting of mobile
phones, computers, radio, and television (Wolf & Schnauber, 2015). These studies indicate that
people utilize multiple mediums to have their needs satisfied.
While these media share general content, the presentation is unique to each medium. An
example of this is a study Cheong and Park (2015) conducted on media habits of social media
users. Cheong and Park (2015) examined what traditional media users paired with social media
for the purpose of information consumption. Their results showed that magazines, newspapers,
radio, and television are the media most paired with social media (Cheong & Park, 2015). When
it came to reliance for information, television scored the highest among their survey participants.
This reliance may be a factor when it comes to political media.
Typologies are developed not only for individual mediums, but types of media shared
across mediums as well. For example, Lariscy, Tinkham, and Sweetster (2011) examined the
uses and gratifications people of voting age have of political media. The typology they utilized
include surveillance, excitement, and political reasons. (Lariscy et al, 2011). Excitement refers to
the competitive aspect of political elections, seeing which party will be victorious. Political
reasons include reinforcement of beliefs (Lariscy et al, 2011). Social media is appealing to
political campaigns because of the interactive nature of the medium. For example, Freelon
(2017) examined how the Obama and Romney Facebook pages were handled during the 2012
presidential election. He found that the campaigns encourage users to discuss on those pages, but
controlled what could be seen (Freelon, 2017). This allows political campaigns to organize
supporters through mediated communication.
Boulianne and Theocharis (2020) conducted a meta-analysis to examine how young
people’s use of digital media impacts their political and civic participation. Their primary
conclusion is that use of digital media (e.g. following politicians on social media, reading the
news) is positively related with political and civic participation. This suggests that use of digital
media results in offline political activity. Boulianne and Theocharis (2020) also note that some
studies suggest the reverse; participation in political and civic life causes digital media use. This
suggests that offline activity, such as chatting about politics, results in use of media, such as the
news. Their definition of political use of media includes consuming news about politics or
current affairs, election information, e-mailing or chatting about politics, and following political
candidates or elected officials.
iii. Psychological and Social Factor of the Audience
The psychological aspect involves the personality traits of those who choose to consume
media. Weaver (2003) developed three categories for personality traits when comparing them to
tv watching motivations. These categories are extraversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism
(Weaver, 2003). Extraversion is associated with an individual’s level of sociability. Neuroticism
is connected to shyness and anxiety. Psychoticism is related to autonomy and egocentricity
(Weaver, 2003). Rubin (2009) describes other factors than can make up one’s psychological
state. Other factors that can determine media behavior include life satisfaction, mobility,
loneliness, and mood (Rubin, 2009). It is because of these psychological traits that people can
become dependent on media. These aspects can be affected by the social circumstances of
audience members.
The social environment people are a part of influences their motivation for media
selection. In instances with a lack of social environment, people may turn to media for
interpersonal communication. Rubin (2009) provides an example of how someone can use radio
to fulfill that need. Someone can telephone a talk-radio host in order to have a conversation with
them (Rubin, 2009). Another example Rubin suggests is people using the Internet in order to
engage in conversation. The needs that some people depend on media for may be connected to
interpersonal communication they want to partake in.
iv. Opinion Validation
Individuals have different motivations for why they select and use their preferred news
outlets. Lee (2013) conducted a survey to find out what the most common motivations were for
selecting news. The most common motivations were to acquire information, to be entertained,
other individuals watch the same news outlets, and opinion validation (Lee, 2013). This opinion
validation comes from a desire to reinforce pre-existing attitudes (Slater, 2009). Iyengar and
Hahn (2009) conducted research on why individuals choose news outlets for reinforcing
attitudes. Individuals choose certain news outlets because they anticipate political agreement
from these outlets (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). This suggests that people select certain news media if
they expect it to fulfill their need for validation.
Individuals choose certain news outlets that are likely to reinforce their opinions and
avoid other news outlets that are likely to challenge their opinions (Garrett, 2009). For example,
Knobloch-Westerwick and Lavis (2017) studied how political affiliation influenced use of
political and satirical news. Liberals preferred political and satirical news that provided liberal
opinions and conservatives preferred political and satirical news that provided conservative
opinions (Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis, 2017). As for challenge avoidance, Jamal and Melkote
(2008) distributed a survey to find out why some individuals avoid certain television news
outlets. Individuals avoid specific outlets because they feature individuals who hold beliefs they
disagree with (Jamal & Melkote, 2008). Garrett (2009b) does note that opinion reinforcement
and challenge avoidance should be treated as different motivations.
The reason those two behaviors are considered separate is because individuals who use
news for opinion reinforcement may not avoid news that challenges their opinions. For example,
Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch (2013) found that individuals who seek out opinion-reinforcing
news outlets do not explicitly avoid opinion-challenging news outlets. However, individuals’
interactions with others may encourage challenge-avoiding behavior. One of the motivations for
an individual’s opinion challenge avoidance is political disagreement (Skoric, Zhu, & Lin, 2018).
For example, Skoric et al. found that individuals unfriend and unfollow others on social media
because of political disagreement. Individuals do this to avoid future disagreements with those
people.
Individuals are more likely to select articles that appeared to reinforce their opinions than
articles that challenged them (Garrett, 2009a). Garrett noticed this when he had participants
choose different news articles to read about political topics. Garrett (2009a) also found that even
if individuals select articles that challenge their opinions, they will spend less time reading them
than articles that reinforce their opinion. The variety of options for obtaining news the Internet
provides has only encouraged this desire to select news for opinion reinforcement (Jang, 2014).
While this increased variety has also encouraged opinion challenge avoidance, it is less
significant than the desire for opinion reinforcement (Jang, 2014).
Individuals select news media that aligns with their attitudes regardless of the political
subject of discussion. For example, Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng (2009) studied how
individuals use news media for the topics of minimum wage, abortion, health care, and gun
control. For all four of these subjects, individuals selected news stories that they perceive to be
similar to their beliefs (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009). Individuals also select news
media that aligns with their attitudes regardless of the medium used. For example, Stroud (2008)
found that individuals prefer newspapers, political talk radio, cable news, and political websites
that align with their beliefs. These two studies show that regardless of the subject or medium,
individuals prefer news media that reinforces their opinions.
Individuals who receive opinion validation from specific news media will continue to get
their news from them. For example, Feldman, Myers, Hmielowski, and Leiserowitz (2014)
studied how attitudes toward global warming affect news media use. Individuals continued to use
news media that reinforced their beliefs on climate change (Feldman et al., 2014). This suggests
that if people have their beliefs validated through specific news media, they will continue to use
that media to keep receiving that validation. Opinion validation from news media also affects
political participation. Exposure to news media that provides like-minded commentary increases
political participation (Dilliplane, 2011). Conversely, exposure to news media that provides
counter-attitudinal commentary decreases political participation (Dilliplane, 2011).
The other goal of this research is to examine how exposure to and response strategies for
political disagreement is related to the use of news media for like-minded commentary. To this
end, the following research questions are proposed.
RQ5: What are the relationships between types of response strategies and news media use for
political opinion validation?
RQ6: What is the relationship between strength of political party affiliation and news media use
for political opinion validation?
RQ7: What is the relationship between level of political interest and news media use for political
opinion validation?
RQ8: What is the relationship between level of political knowledge and news media use for
political opinion validation?
III. Method
For this choice of topic, quantitative methods were utilized in order to conduct the
research. The reasoning for this was to have a sample that can consist of a wide variety of
individuals. Specifically, the type of research method that was utilized for this study was a
questionnaire. The survey was effective because of its ability to have a wide sample respond to
the same set of questions.
A. Survey
The survey itself was split into four sections; each focusing on a different aspect of the
research topic. Section one focused on conversations involving politics; respondents answered
questions on who they discuss politics with, how frequently they discuss politics with those
individuals, and how frequently they disagreed with those individuals. Section two asked
participants how likely they are to use different strategies for responding to political
disagreement. Section three focused on respondents’ use of different news mediums for like-
minded commentary. Lastly, section four was entirely questions pertaining to demographic data.
Based on Qualtrics’s estimations, the average completion time of the questionnaire was eight
minutes.
The survey was split into five pages. Section one was split into two pages. This is because
page one asked about strong-tie relationships (friends/family) that participants discuss politics
with, while page two will ask participants the same questions about weak-tie relationships
(acquaintances). Sections two, three, and four of the survey each had their own page.
Respondents were encouraged, but not forced, to answer all of the questions on each page before
moving to the next. By doing this, the goal was to ensure that none of the questions were left
blank. Before moving on from the fifth page, participants could go back to any of the previous
sections to change their answers if they wished to do so. Respondents were also encouraged, but
not required, to complete the survey in one sitting. The survey was designed to save their
progress, so participants could fill out the rest of the questions later if they chose not to complete
it in one sitting.
Prior to distribution of this survey, a pilot test was conducted at a large southwestern
university. A class of eight students participated in the pilot test, which was conducted on
November 18, 2021. Following the pilot test, additional changes were made prior to the proper
distribution of the survey. In response to the students’ feedback, the changes were mainly to the
demographics portion of the survey. For example, in the question about religious affiliation, one
of the answer choices was changed from “Christian” to “Christian/Protestant”.
B. Participants and Distribution
Selecting possible participants for this survey was done through random sampling. The
sample size was 150 individuals from the website Prolific. All participants were at least 18 years
of age and based in the United States. Prolific was selected because, due to its pool of potential
participants, would allow the results of the survey to be generalizable to the wider public.
Recruitment was done via a recruitment message potential participants received in their inbox on
the Prolific website.
Prolific users that received the study recruitment message were under no obligation to
participate in the survey. They were incentivized, however, by receiving monetary payment upon
completing the survey. Participants received their payment through Prolific, via the funds the
researcher added to their account. Survey responses are kept entirely anonymous, as to avoid the
possibility of responses being traced back to specific individuals. Those who filled out the survey
were identified by a number instead.
Data were collected on February 14, 2022 through a web-based survey on Qualtrics. A
total of 150 valid responses were collected through Prolific. Respondents were paid $1 for the
completion of the questionnaire. After reading the informed consent form, which was approved
by the university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB), participants answered a series of questions
measuring predictor and outcome variables. Results of the online questionnaire were analyzed
through SPSS.
Of the 150 participants, 56% were female (n = 84), 40% were male (n = 60), 3.3% were
nonbinary (n = 5), and 0.7% chose not to disclose (n = 1). The average age of the participants
was 36.13 years old (SD = 13.49). Racial background of the participants is as follows: 87.3%
were White/Caucasian (n = 131), 6% were Black/African-American (n = 9), 6% were Asian (n =
9), and 4% were Hispanic/Latino (n = 6). For highest level of education completed: 33.3% were
4-year university (n = 50), 24.7% were graduate college (n = 37), 16.7% were some college (n =
25), 9.3% were high school/GED (n = 14), 9.3% were 2-year college (n = 14), and 6.7% were
some graduate college (n = 10). Employment status of the participants is as follows: 73.3% were
employed (n = 110), 22% were unemployed (n = 33), and 4.7% were in an internship (n = 7).
Annual income of the participants is as follows: 21.3% were between $35,000 and $49,999 (n =
32), 20.7% were less than $15,000 (n = 31), 14.7% were between $15,000 and $34,999 (n = 22),
20% were between $50,000 and $74,999 (n = 30), 10% were between $100,000 and $149,999 (n
= 15), 7.3% were between $75,000 and $99,999 (n = 11), and 6% were $150,000 or more (n = 9).
For marital status: 36.7% were married (n = 55), 34% were single (n = 51), 21.3% were in a
relationship, but not married (n = 32), 7.3% were divorced (n = 11), and 0.7% was widowed (n =
1). For religious affiliation: 38% were Christian/Protestant (n = 57), 36% were other (n = 54),
15.3% preferred not to say (n = 23), 8.7% were Catholic (n = 13), and 2% were Jewish (n = 3).
Of the 150 participants, 54% were Liberal (n = 81), 27.3% were Moderate (n = 41),
14.7% were Conservative/Right (n = 22), and 4% were Other (n = 6). Of the 6 participants that
selected Other: 33.3% were Libertarian (n = 2), 16.6% were Anarchist (n = 1), 16.6% were
Mutualist (n = 1), and 16.6% were Independent (n = 1). For affiliation with a political party,
56.7% were Democrat (n = 85), 18.7% were Republican (n = 28), 13.3% were
Independent/Other (n = 20), and 11.3% were no affiliation (n = 17). Among the 20 participants
that selected Independent/Other: 10% were Socialist (n = 2), 10% were Libertarian (n = 2), and
10% were Green (n = 2). For strength of party affiliation, of the 85 participants that selected
Democrat, 31.7% were somewhat strongly (n = 27), 22.3% were neither strong nor weak (n =
19), 21.1% were somewhat weak (n = 18), 20% were very strongly (n = 20), and 4.7% were very
weak (n = 4). For strength of party affiliation, of the 28 participants that selected Republican,
35.7% were very strongly (n = 10), 21.4% was somewhat weak (n = 6), 28.5% were somewhat
strongly (n = 8), 10.7% were neither strong nor weak (n = 3), and 3.5% was very weak (n = 1).
The total sample indicated that the participants were somewhat interested in politics (M = 2.89,
SD = 0.853), they sometimes engage in politics (M = 2.98, SD = 0.893), and they consider
themselves fairly knowledgeable about politics (M = 3.25, SD = 1.082).
C. Measures
Frequency of Political Discussion and Disagreement. Adapted from Feldman & Price
(2008), this 12-item measure asks participants to name, using only their initials, two
friends/family members (strong-tie relationships) and two acquaintances (weak-tie relationships)
that they discuss politics with. For each person, participants will be asked to state how many
days in a typical week they discuss politics with them (responses range from zero to seven);
[strong-tie relationships (M = 3.12, SD = 1.19) and weak-tie relationships (M = 2.36, SD = 1.04)]
and how often they disagree with that person’s point of view (almost never = 1, almost all the time
= 5); [strong-tie relationships (M = 2.68, SD = .80) and weak-tie relationships (M = 2.69, SD =
.78)].
Strategy for Responding to Political Disagreement. Adapted from Hoppman et al. (2019),
this 16-item measure asks participants to state how likely they are to use different strategies to
respond to political disagreement. These items will be gauged on a five-point likert scale (very
likely = 1, very unlikely= 5). Sample item: When faced with disagreement during those political
discussions, I emphasize that we should find common ground. Strong-tie (family and friends)
and weak-tie (acquaintances) relationships were combined to form a composite variable for each
response strategy: Compromise (α = .88, M = 2.82, SD = .93), Avoid (α = .83, M = 2.31, SD =
.87), Dominate (α = .78, M = 2.96, SD = .89), and Yield (α = .76, M = 3.61, SD = .77).
Using News for Opinion Validation. Modified from Lee (2013), this 8-item measure asks
participants to state how often they use news from different mediums for opinions from like-
minded commentators. The mediums that will be asked about are newspapers/news websites,
television, radio, and social media. The purpose of this measure is to see which news mediums
individuals use as a means of opinion validation. These items will be gauged on a four-point
likert scale (never = 1, often = 4). Sample item: How often do you watch television news to
expose yourself to opinions that are similar to your own? (α = .85, M = 2.11, SD = .64).
Demographics This 9-item measure asks participants to select the options that best reflect
who they are. Characteristics participants were asked about include political affiliation, race,
gender, and age group.
IV. Results
Research question 1a inquired about what the relationship is, if there is one, between
frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie relationships and dominate response
strategies. A Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated for the relationship between
frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners and the response strategies, which
is presented by table one. Frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners was not
found to be significantly correlated with dominate response strategies, r(150) = -.098, p = n.s.
Research question 1b asked about the relationship between frequency of political
disagreement with strong-tie relationships and yield response strategies. As shown by table one,
frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly
correlated with yield response strategies, r(150) = .023, p = n.s.
Research question 1c examined what the relationship is, if there is one, between
frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie relationships and compromise response
strategies. As shown by table one, frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners
was not found to be significantly correlated with compromise response strategies, r(150) = -.083,
p = n.s.
Research question 1d looked at the relationship, if there is one, between frequency of
political disagreement with strong-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. As shown by
table one, frequency of disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners was not found to be
significantly correlated with avoid response strategies, r(150) = .047, p = n.s. The above findings
imply that frequency of political disagreement with strong-tie discussion partners may not be
related with any of the response strategies.
Research question 2a inquired about what relationship there is, if any, between frequency
of disagreement with weak-tie relationships and dominate response strategies. A Pearson
correlation coefficient was calculated for the relationship between frequency of disagreement
with weak-tie discussion partners and the response strategies, which is presented by table one.
Frequency of disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly
correlated with dominate response strategies, r(149) = -.032, p = n.s.
Research question 2b asked about the possible relationship between frequency of
disagreement with weak-tie relationships and compromise response strategies. As shown in table
one, frequency of disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be
significantly correlated to compromise response strategies, r(149) = -.025, p = n.s.
Research question 2c examined what relationship there might be between frequency of
disagreement with weak-tie relationships and yield response strategies. Table one shows that
frequency of disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly
correlated to yield response strategies, r(149) = -.022, p = n.s.
Research question 2d inquired about what relationship there is, if any, between frequency
of disagreement with weak-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. Frequency of
disagreement with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly correlated to
avoid response strategies, r(149) = .011, p = n.s. Similar to the first research question, this and
the above findings implies that frequency of political disagreement with weak-tie discussion
partners may not be related with any of the response strategies.
Research question 3a asked what the relationship is between frequency of political
discussion with strong-tie relationships and dominate response strategies. A Pearson correlation
coefficient was calculated for the relationship between frequency of political discussion with
strong-tie discussion partners and the response strategies, the results of which is presented in
table one. A moderate negative correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with
strong-tie discussion partners and dominate response strategies, r(150) = -.185, p < .05. This
finding suggests that the more often individuals talk about politics with friends and family, the
less likely they may be to use the dominate response strategy.
Research question 3b inquired about the relationship between frequency of political
discussion with strong-tie relationships will be positively related to compromise response
strategies. Frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners was not found to
be significantly correlated to compromise response strategies, r(150 = .020, p = n.s. This finding
suggests that frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners may not be
related to the compromise response strategy.
Research question 3c asked what the relationship is between frequency of political
discussion with strong-tie relationships and the yield response strategies. A moderate positive
correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners
and yield response strategies, r(150) = .167, p < .05. This finding suggests that the more often
individuals talk about politics with friends and family, the more likely they may be to use the
yield response strategy.
Research question 3d examined what relationship, if any, there is between frequency of
political discussion with strong-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. Frequency of
political discussion with strong-tie relationships was not found to be significantly correlated to
avoid response strategies, r(150) = .044, p = n.s. Similar to research question 3b, this finding
implies frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion partners may not be related to
the avoid response strategy.
Research question 4a looked at what relationship there is, if any, between frequency of
political discussion with weak-tie relationships and dominate response strategies. A Pearson
correlation coefficient was calculated for the relationship between frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie discussion partners and the response strategies. A strong negative
correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners and
dominate response strategies, r(149) = -.221, p < .01. Similar to research question 3a, this finding
suggests that the more often individuals talk about politics with acquaintances, the less likely
they may be to use the dominate response strategy.
Research question 4b examined what the relationship is, if any, between frequency of
political discussion with weak-tie relationships and compromise response strategies. Frequency
of political discussion with weak-tie relationships was not found to be significantly correlated to
compromise response strategies, r(149) = .081, p = n.s. Like with research questions 3b and 3d,
this finding suggests that frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners may
not be related to the compromise response strategy.
Research question 4c inquired about the relationship between frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie relationships and yield response strategies. A moderate positive
correlation was found for frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners and
yield response strategies, r(149) = .178, p < .05. Like with research question 3c, this finding
suggests that the more often individuals talk about politics with acquaintances, the more likely
they may be to use the yield response strategy.
Research question 4d asked what the relationship is between frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie relationships and avoid response strategies. Frequency of political
discussion with weak-tie discussion partners was not found to be significantly correlated to avoid
response strategies, r(149) = .134, p = n.s. This finding implies frequency of political discussion
with weak-tie discussion partners may not be related to the avoid response strategy. This finding
is similar to the results of research questions 3b, 3d, and 4b.
To examine RQ5, which examined the relationship between types of response strategies
and news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were conducted. Results for
RQ5 showed that there was a significant relationship between news media use and dominate
response strategies, r(150) = -.328, p < .001. This finding suggests that those with dominate
response strategies are less likely to use news media to validate their political opinions. For
yielding (r(150) = .085, p = n.s.), avoiding (r(150) = -.007, p = n.s.), and compromising (r(150)
= .001, p = n.s.) response strategies, no significant relationships were found.
To examine RQ6, which examined the relationship between strength of affiliation with
preferred political party and news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were
conducted. Results for RQ6 showed that news media use and strength of party affiliation are
negatively related with each other, r(150) = -.223, p < .01. This finding suggests that if an
individual strongly affiliates with their preferred political party, they are unlikely to use news
media to validate their political opinions.
To examine RQ7, which examined the relationship between level of political interest and
news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were conducted. Results for RQ7
showed that there was a significant relationship between news media use and political interest,
r(150) = .291, p < .01. This finding suggests that the more interested an individual is in politics,
the more likely they are to use news media to validate their political opinions.
To examine RQ8, which examined the relationship between level of political knowledge
and news media use for political opinion validation, correlations were conducted. Results for
RQ8 showed that there was a significant relationship between news media use and political
knowledge, r(150) = .214, p < .01. This finding suggests that the more knowledgeable an
individual considers themselves to be about politics, the more likely they are to use news media
to validate their political opinions.
Table 1
Pearson’s Correlation
Disagree
strong-tie
Disagree
weak-tie
Discussion
strong-tie
Discussion
weak-tie
Avoid
Compromise
Dominate
News
Media
Disagree
strong-tie
1
.247**
.086
.096
.047
-.083
-.098
.043
Disagree
weak-tie
.247**
1
.126
.024
.011
-.025
-.032
-.083
Discussion
strong-tie
.086
.126
1
.399**
.044
.020
-.185*
.191*
Discussion
weak-tie
.096
.024
.399**
1
.134
.081
-.221**
.353**
Avoid
.047
.011
.044
.134
1
.227**
-.434**
-.007
Yield
.023
-.022
.167*
.178*
.173*
.532**
-.290**
.085
Compromise
-.083
-.025
.020
.081
.227**
1
-.191*
.001
Dominate
-.098
-.032
-.185
-.221**
-.434**
-.191*
1
-.328**
News Media
.043
-.083
.191*
.353**
-.007
.001
-.328**
1
Note: * indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** indicates correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
39
Table 2
Pearson’s Correlation
News
Media
Political
Association
Political
Party
Strength of
Party
Affiliation
Political
Interest
Political
Engagement
Political
Knowledge
News Media
1
-.098
-.124
-.223**
.291**
.135
.214**
Political
Association
-.098
1
.409**
.173*
-.074
.080
-.141
Political
Party
-.124
.409**
1
.234**
-.075
-.030
.024
Strength of
Party
Affiliation
-.223**
.173*
.234**
1
-.294**
-.158
-.209*
Political
Interest
.291**
-.074
-.075
-.294**
1
.535**
.641**
Political
Engagement
.135
.080
-.030
-.158
.535**
1
.512**
Political
Knowledge
.214**
-.141
.024
-.209*
.641**
.512**
1
Note: * indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** indicates correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
40
V. Discussion
The current study examines how often individuals discuss politics with others, how often
individuals are exposed to disagreement during those political discussions, what response
strategies individuals use when faced with that disagreement, and the use of news media for
opinion validation following those political discussions. This study also examined what the
difference, if any, was if the discussion partner for those political discussions was someone the
individual had a strong-tie relationship (friends/family) with or a weak-tie relationship
(acquaintance) with. This study is a valuable addition to the literature because it shows how the
political discussions and disagreements that people engage in impacts their motivation for
checking news media.
A major factor of interpersonal communication is the strength of the relationship between
an individual and their conversation partner (Croes & Antheunis, 2021). The types of
relationships individuals have can affect how willing they are to discuss various subjects (Ojala
& Bengtsson, 2019), including politics (Jennings et al., 2009; Morey & Yamamoto, 2020). If
individuals think they are likely to disagree with their discussion partners on politics, then they
may discuss politics less frequently (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2012); but that does
not mean individuals never discuss politics with those they disagree with (Huckfeldt et al.,
2004). When faced with disagreement, individuals may use one of four response strategies,
dominate, compromise, yield, and avoid (Eveland et al., 2011; Hopmann et al., 2019).
Individuals use news media for a variety of motivations (Lee, 2013), including opinion
validation (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Slater, 2009).
The present study found that there may not be a significant relationship between the
frequency of disagreement and the dominate, compromise, yield, and avoid response strategies.
The lack of relationship between frequency of disagreement and the avoid response strategy is
consistent with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) finding for that specific strategy. Hopmann’s suggestion
for this specific finding is that individuals avoid political disagreement not due to the frequency
of said disagreement, but due to a lack of interest in politics. However, the findings for the other
three response strategies (i.e., dominate, compromise, yield) are not consistent with Hopmann et
al.’s (2019) results. A plausible explanation for this is that how often individuals are exposed to
disagreement is not a factor in how they choose to respond to it. For example, Carlson (2020)
examined the different factors that play into how individuals respond to political disagreement.
The factors of a disagreement that Carlson (2020) found are its scope, domain, genealogy, and
consequence. For example, Carlson (2020) notes that the wider the scope of a political
disagreement is, the less likely an individual may be to conciliate, or pacify, their discussion
partner. This suggests that while there are multiple aspects of political disagreement that affect
how individuals respond, the frequency of disagreement may not be one of them.
Another finding from this study is that frequency of political discussion both strong-tie
and weak-tie relationships and the dominate response strategy were negatively related with each
other. This finding is not consistent with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) observation that the more often
individuals discuss politics, the more willing they are to dominate. One reason why this might be
the case is that if an individual frequently discusses politics with someone, then it means they
might agree with that person often. This would suggest that the more often an individual talks
about politics with someone they agree with, the less likely they may be to try to dominate the
conversation. An example of this is Cowan’s and Baldassarri’s (2018) study on who individuals
choose to discuss politics with. Individuals speak more frequently with those they are likely to
agree with than those they expect to disagree with (Cowan & Baldassarri, 2018).
A surprising finding is that the relationships between frequency of disagreement and each
of the response strategies (i.e. dominate, compromise, yield, avoid) was the same for both strong-
tie (i.e. family and friends) and weak-tie (i.e. acquaintances) relationships. Not only that, but
when it came to frequency of political discussion and each of the response strategies, the
relationships were the same for strong-tie and weak-tie as well. This finding is not consistent
with Croes’ and Antheunis’s (2021) finding that individuals talk more frequently with those they
have a strong-tie relationship with than those with a weak-tie relationship. One possible
explanation for this inconsistency is that how individuals communicate with others has changed.
To provide an example, a Pew Research Center study conducted by Hampton, Goulet, and
Purcell (2011) shows that the average American has 636 social ties on social networking services
(i.e. Facebook and Twitter). Hampton et al.’s (2011) also shows that these ties consist of strong-
tie and weak-tie relationships. Since SNS users are aware that their followers see their posts, this
could suggest that individuals may feel comfortable responding to strong-tie and weak-tie
relationships the same way.
Another noteworthy finding for this study was that there was a positive between
frequency of political discussion and the yield response strategy. This finding is not consistent
with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) observation that the more often an individual discusses politics
with someone, the less likely they are to use yield response strategies. A plausible explanation for
why frequency of discussion and the yield strategy are positively related with each other is that
many people have stopped talking about politics. One example of this is a Pew Research
Center study, conducted by Jurkowitz and Mitchell (2020), on that subject. 45% of adults in the
U.S. have stopped talking about politics with someone because of something the other person
said (Jurkowitz & Mitchell, 2020). This suggests that if one person said something (during a
political discussion) that the other person did not like, they may choose to yield the conversation
just to end the discussion.
Also, the present study found that there was no significant relationship between
frequency of political discussion and the dominate or avoid response strategies. This finding is
not consistent with Hopmann et al.’s (2019) observation of the dominate and avoid response
strategies. One explanation for why this is the case is that if an individual discusses politics
frequently with someone, then they might frequently agree with them as well. If that is the case,
they may not feel the need to respond to their discussion partner by trying to dominate the
conversation nor avoid the subject of politics. This idea is supported by Cowan’s and
Baldassarri’s (2018) finding that individuals frequently discuss politics with those they expect to
agree with. This suggests that if an individual frequently discusses politics with someone, then
they likely enjoy talking politics with them. This then implies that if individuals enjoy discussing
politics with each other, they may not feel the need to dominate or avoid.
Looking at the use of news media for opinion validation, it and the dominate response
strategy are negatively related with each other. One explanation for this finding is that if an
individual feels the need to dominate the conversation, then they may feel confident about, or a
sense of superiority in, what they believe in. This would suggest that, since they feel that sense of
superiority about their opinions, individuals may not feel the need to use the news for opinion
validation. An example of this can be seen in Hall’s and Raimi’s (2018) study on belief
superiority. Individuals with a greater sense of superiority in their political beliefs select news
outlets that aligns with their views; they do this because they feel that the information those
outlets provide is superior than news outlets of differing beliefs (Hall & Raimi, 2018). This
suggests that while individuals do select news media whose beliefs align with their own, their
motivation to do so may not be out of a need for opinion validation.
Continuing with the use of news media for opinion validation, there is a positive
correlation between it and the frequency of political discussion with strong-tie discussion
partners. That same type of correlation was also found for the use of news media for opinion
validation and the frequency of political discussion with weak-tie discussion partners. This
shows that there may be a significant relationship between using news media for opinion
validation and discussing politics with both strong-tie and weak-tie relationships. Morey’s and
Yamamoto’s (2020) findings in their study on the different motivations for political talk support
this notion. What this suggests is that the more often individuals talk about politics with others,
the more often they might use the news to hear from like-minded commentators. It’s possible that
if individuals regularly agree with those they frequently discuss politics with (Cowan &
Baldassarri, 2018), then they might want that same type of agreement from news media as well.
In terms of results from correlations that looked at the use of news media for opinion
validation and certain demographic questions, the use of news media for opinion validation and
strength of affiliation with a political party are positively related with each other. This suggests
that the more an individual associates with their preferred political party, the more likely they
may be to use news media to validate their political beliefs. This finding is consistent with
Knobloch-Westerwick’s and Lavis’ (2017) study on partisan alignment and partisan news. The
more an individual leans Republican, the more likely they are to select partisan media that
reflects conservative beliefs (Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis, 2017). The more an individual
leans Democrat, the more likely they are to select partisan media that reflects liberal beliefs
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis, 2017). What this may imply is news media that present
information with a clear ideological slant appeals to people that strongly identify with a specific
political party.
Another finding from correlations that looked at the use of news media for opinion
validation and certain demographic questions, the use of news media for opinion validation and
level of interest in politics are also positively related to each other. This suggests that the greater
an individual’s interest in politics is, the more likely they might be to use news media to validate
their political beliefs. Knobloch-Westerwick’s and Lavis’ (2017) study is consistent with this
finding as well. The higher an individual’s level of political interest is, the more often they
selected partisan news that reinforced their political attitudes (Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis,
2017). This observation suggests that people who are highly interested in politics may select
news media that matches that level of interest.
One more observation from the correlations between the use of news media for opinion
validation and certain demographic questions, the use of news media for opinion validation and
the level of political knowledge are positively related with each other. This suggests that the
more an individual considers themself knowledgeable about politics, the more likely they may be
to use news media to validate their political opinions. This finding is consistent with Feldman’s,
Wojcieszak’s, Stroud’s, and Bimber’s (2018) study on what influences media selectivity. In that
study, Feldman et al. (2018) found that political knowledge predicted a preference for pro-
attitudinal media. This finding suggests that people who feel that they know a lot about politics
might select news media that supports what they know.
VI. Conclusion
People have conversations about a variety of topics for a variety of reasons. These topics
can range from movies and music to food and fashion. These conversations are usually light-
hearted; people feel free to agree or disagree in these situations. This light-hearted feeling
extends to the media people choose about those topics (Krause et al., 2014). When it comes to
controversial topics, politics specifically, that light-hearted feeling is not present. If people
discuss politics with someone who disagrees with them, they feel unsatisfied afterwards
(Hopmann, 2012). Following this, people choose news media that validates their beliefs (Kim,
2017). This study aims to explore how the discussions and disagreements people have about
politics can affect their motivations for using certain news media and makes significant
contributions in the areas of interpersonal communication and media use.
This subject of news media as a means of opinion validation was studied from a uses and
gratifications perspective. Uses and Gratifications theory states that individuals select specific
media depending on what needs they want fulfilled (Ruggerio, 2009). The needs individuals
want to be satisfied can change depending on the medium they use (Rubin, 2009). The topics
individuals have conversations about, such as government, the economy, and religion (Wyatt et
al., 2000), can change depending on the relationships they have with those they converse.
Conversations, and their outcomes, can vary between family, friends, and acquaintances. This
research examined the role of politics in the conversations people have and how it affects why
they choose their preferred news media.
While political discussions are common during election years, they can occur at any time
(Eveland, 2004). Individuals may talk about politics with others less often if they expect to
disagree with them (Gerber et al., 2012). As for responding to political disagreement, it can be
separated into four categories: dominate, compromise, yield, and avoid (Eveland et al., 2011).
Dominate means to take control of the conversation, compromise involves the discussion
partners reaching some kind of middle ground, yielding means conceding the disagreement to the
other person, and avoid involves making sure political disagreement does not come up
(Hopmann et al., 2019).
The results from this study showed no significant relationship between the frequency of
political disagreement and the response strategies. This means that how often people are exposed
to political disagreement may not be a factor in how they respond to it. In contrast, the frequency
of political discussion is negatively related with the dominate strategy and positively related with
the yield strategy. Of the four response strategies, only dominate had any significant relationship
with the use of news media for opinion validation, there being a negative correlation between the
two. This suggests that the more likely individuals are to try to dominate the political
disagreement, the less likely they are to use the news to validate their beliefs.
These results contradict Hopmann et al.’s (2019) findings about the relationships between
frequency of disagreement and each of the four response strategies. An explanation for this is
that while there are a myriad of factors that influence how people respond to political
disagreement (Carlson, 2020), how often people are exposed to disagreement may not be one of
them. Study findings have practical implications for interpersonal communication and news
media use. Its implications for interpersonal communication is that it may allow people to be
more conscious of how they respond to others during a political disagreement and how others
respond to them. This study’s implications for news media use is that it provides a possible
answer for why so many news outlets are partisan in presenting information; some people want
sources of news that validates what they believe in.
Something to note, while dual concern theory was mentioned in the literature review for
this study, it was not used as a framework for this research. The reason why is because dual
concern theory assumes that individuals are conscious of both the concern for self and others
when they decide how to manage conflict (Hopmann et al., 2019; Musenero et al., 2021).
Individuals might not consider these concerns when responding to political disagreement; this is
why the decision was made not to utilize this theory. With that said, it is a valid theory for
studying conflict management and can be used as a framework to guide future research on this
subject.
As mentioned in the ‘participants and distribution’ portion of the methods section, the
survey was distributed on February 14, 2022. This is not a limitation of the survey, this period of
time was selected intentionally. To reiterate Eveland’s (2004) point, while conversations about
politics are most common during election years, those types of conversations can happen at any
time. This period of time was selected in order to examine how often individuals discuss politics
with others when politics were not at the forefront of public discourse. Aside from the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic, there were no major political events occurring when the survey was
distributed and responses were collected (Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and President Biden’s
nomination of Judge Ketanji Jackson for the Supreme Court did not occur until 14 and 15 days
later, respectively).
Some limitations to the present study need to be noted here. One such limitation is the
size of the sample, consisting of only 150 individuals. A wider sample in future research could
allow for stronger correlations between frequency of political disagreement and the response
strategies. Another limitation is the use of the word “talk” in the scenarios within the survey
itself. Individuals may have a narrow view of the word “talk”; they may treat it as just verbal
communication, occurring only through in-person, phone calls, and video chats. Changing the
verbage could give participants reason to consider conversations that occur through non-verbal
means, such as texting, email, and social media threads (i.e. Twitter, Reddit, Facebook).
Although a national sample was utilized for data collection, White individuals were over-
represented in the sample, consisting of 87.3% of all respondents. A more representative sample
could provide better insight into the discussions and disagreements people have about politics
and how that affects why they choose certain news media.
A possible idea for future research is to include additional measures into the survey. One
way this could be done is to include a question about how fatigued individuals are with political
discourse. Pew Research Center found that, in 2020, 55% of all social media users are worn out
by the amount of political posts and conversations they see (Anderson & Auxier, 2020). Another
possible idea for future research is to revise the definition of politics included in the scenario
within the survey. With the definition provided, participants may infer politics to only mean
national politics. By modifying the definition to list state, national, and foreign politics, it could
allow participants to consider other types of politics when answering the questions. One more
idea for future research is to distribute this survey in the days or weeks leading up to a major
election (either Presidential or midterm). As there is greater attention given to politics during
these time periods, it could result in greater frequency of political discussion, greater frequency
of disagreement, and possibly changes in which strategies individuals prefer in responding to
disagreement.
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