§ 1983 Text and Introductory Questions
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities . . . .
State action
Actor’s identity (“Every person”)
o Categories of state actors eligible for § 1983 liability (Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New York): (1)
State, local, and municipal officials; (2) Local and municipal agencies; (3) Municipalities; (4) States and counties (for
declaratory and injunctive relief only)
Actor’s role
o AFFIRMATIVE ACT RULE ( ): for there to be state action, the plaintiff must allege that his or her alleged DeShaney
deprivation results from the actor’s specific affirmative act
8 th
Amendment Inmate-on-Inmate Violence
Giroux v. Somerset County: Plaintiff contended that an assault by another inmate violated the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. A jury could have concluded that defendants were aware of the
substantial risk of serious harm that plaintiff faced and that defendants failed to take reasonable measures to abate it.
Specifically, plaintiff contended that defendants had violated his right to be protected against attacks by other inmates. A
material fact existed as to whether defendants were aware of the substantial risk that plaintiff faced. The court vacated the
summary judgment granted in favor of defendants on plaintiff's claims of cruel and unusual punishment violations when
another inmate assaulted plaintiff. A reasonable jury could have concluded that defendants knew that plaintiff faced a
substantial risk of serious harm and failed to take reasonable measures to abate it.
“When a supervisory official is placed on actual notice of a prisoner’s need for physical protection or medical care,
administrative negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for a prisoner’s safety.”
EXCEPTION: even if prison officials know of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety but fail to prevent the harm, they
“may be found free from liability if they respond reasonably to the risk.”
Miller v. McBride: Appellant inmate sued appellee prison officials under § 1983 for failing to protect the inmate from other
prisoners. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. The inmate appealed.
The appellate court ruled that to survive summary judgment, the inmate needed to show that he was incarcerated under
conditions of substantial risk of serious harm and that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that danger.
Ordinary, or even gross, negligence was not enough, and officials who actually knew of a risk to inmate safety were free from
liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm was not averted. Here, the administrator responded
reasonably by transferring the inmate to protective custody. There was no evidence that any of the prison officials knew that
the attacker posed a threat to the inmate. The inmate failed to show that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to
his safety.
Dissent for Nicini v. Morra , 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000) – Special Relationship Doctrine
Nicini, 212 F.3d at 816: I dissent because I believe that more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the facts,
including an inference of deliberate indifference that shocks the conscience, making it inappropriate to dispose of Nicini's
case on summary judgment. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per
curiam). Having used Nicini's case as a vehicle to explore and analyze a particularly complicated legal standard, have we
given short shrift to, and failed to appreciate the complexities of, applying the legal standard to the facts of the case itself? I
suggest that we have. Nicini's story as chronicled by the majority leads neatly to its conclusion that Cyrus was, at most,
merely negligent. But there is more than one way to view or perceive what Cyrus did, or failed to do, in furtherance of his
duty to Nicini, who, although not of “tender years” as the majority notes, was a suicidal and “high risk” adolescent in need of
hospitalization or intensive outpatient care. Due process is contextual and due process rules should not be applied
mechanically. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). Although mere negligence is not sufficient to be a substantive
due process violation, “culpability falling within the middle range, falling from something more than negligence but ‘less than
intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence’ ... is a matter for closer calls.” 523 U.S. at 849, 118 S.Ct. Lewis,
1708 (citation omitted). “[T]he fact that there can be instances where glaring negligence may not constitute deliberate
indifference does not mean that a fact finder is barred from equating negligence of a certain dimension with deliberate
indifference.” Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 143 (2d Cir.1981). Considering the facts in the light
most favorable to Nicini, the non-movant, as we are required to do on summary judgment, it certainly appears possible that
Cyrus’s conduct might cry out “indifference” to a reasonable jury. Indeed, whether or not a defendant’s conduct amounts to
deliberate indifference has been described as a “classic issue for the fact finder” and “a factual mainstay of actions under §
1983.” Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 577 (7th Cir.1998).
Parental Liberty Interest
Generally, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in their relationship with their children
Parents with Minor Children: when dealing with minor children-due process must be afforded to all parents during child
welfare proceedings when determining the fitness of the parent and for all termination hearings
SW’s however have absolute immunity comparable to a prosecutor (when acting as an advocate, including testifying, but
not including administrative acts)
Parents with Adult Children: the line is blurry – the courts analyzed the relationship as fundamental even for adult children;
SCOTUS has recognized violations of due process liberty interest in the parent-child relationship only where the state took
action specifically aimed at interfering with that relationship
Dissent to Barna v. City of Perth Amboy , 42 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 1994)
Issue: The issue is whether the Barnas stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Relevant rules of law:
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Const. and laws of the U.S.,
and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
RULE: an off-duty police officer’s purely private acts are under color of law when they are furthered by either actual or
purported state authority
Conclusion: the majority coalesces the correct rule for when an off-duty police officer’s acts are under color of law, but the
analysis is misplaced.
Municipal Liability
Monnell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv.: municipality liable when execution of the government’s policy or custom causes the injury. If
not a written policy or law, the practice must be so permanent and well settled that it has the force of law.
Four theories of municipal liability:
(1) Formal Policy-Based Liability: liable when a policy or law is written, and employee carries it out (e.g., -Monnell
unconstitutional maternity leave policy)
(2) Custom-Based Liability: employees acted according to well-settled custom that has the force of law, even if not
written; says that custom must be attributable to municipality and so widespread that policymakers should Bordanaro
have actual or constructive knowledge of the custom
(3) Training/Supervision-Based Liability: liable if two elements are met: (A) failure to train or supervise must be so
deficient that it shows deliberate indifference to the rights of those who will interact with employee; and (B) failure must
have caused the wrongdoing to occur (e.g., Canton-custom of failing to train officers led to city liability; -a lack Bordanaro
of training, supervision and discipline could be gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference)
(4) Hiring-Based Liability: liable if city fails to adequately screen new hires; only a § 1983 violation if the deprivation of a
third-party’s rights would be plainly obvious to a reasonable policymaker on adequate scrutiny of an applicant’s
background
Property Interest in Public Employment
GENERAL RULE: there is a property interest when a statute or a contract creates a right
Roth: to have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it; he
must have more than a unilateral expectation of it; he must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it
Loudermill: the root requirement of the Due Process Clause is that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing
BEFORE he is deprived of any significant property interest; requires some kind of hearing prior to the discharge of an
employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment
Must be some type of pretermination hearing; need not be elaborate but simply an initial check against mistaken
decisions by providing the employee oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer’s evidence,
and an opportunity for the employee to tell his side of the story
Mathews balancing test: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail
