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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: PROPOSALS,
CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
1. Current Structure and Criticisms
I. Permanent and non-permanent members
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), established in 1945, has long been criticized for
its outdated structure that fails to reflect the current global power dynamics. The council consists
of five permanent members (P5) - China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States - and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms (United Nations, 2023). This
structure; rooted in post-World War II geopolitics has become thereby increasingly problematic
in the 21st century. Critics argue that the permanent membership unfairly favors a small group of
countries, granting them disproportionate influence over global security matters (Szewczyk,
2021). The exclusion of major economic powers and populous nations such as India, Japan,
Germany, and Brazil from permanent membership has led to questions about the council's
legitimacy and effectiveness in addressing contemporary global challenges (Hosli & Dörfler,
2019). Furthermore, the underrepresentation of entire continents, such as Africa and Latin
America, in the permanent membership category has fueled accusations of the UNSC being an
undemocratic and non-inclusive body (Nadin, 2016). The current structure thus not only fails to
represent the diverse interests of the global community but also perpetuates a power imbalance
that can hence hinder effective decision-making on critical security issues. As global power
dynamics continue to thus shift and also new security challenges emerge; the need for a more
representative and thus inclusive Security Council becomes increasingly urgent; prompting calls
for comprehensive reform to ensure the council's continued relevance and also effectiveness in
maintaining international peace as well as security.
II. Veto power dynamics
The veto right vested on the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) has always been a topic of heated discussion and most of the time criticized. This
privilege makes it possible for any of the P5 countries to prevent the adopted of new substantive
resolutions regardless of the extent of supporting resolutions from the international community
(Okhovat, 2012). Although the veto power was designed as a measure to prevent the UN, from
performing actions against some of its principal founding members, in many cases, it has served
as a shield of national interests ahead of the global security considerations. The critics bemoan
that it has often deadlocked the UNSC thus limiting itself from making expeditious decisions
when situations such as conflicts erupt (Bosco, 2014). For instance, they are able to exercise veto
power: it has been observed that international humanitarian interventions such as NGOs for
Syrians have been paralyzed by power politics (Nadin, 2016). The veto right has also been
accused of being a thorn in the realization of the legitimacy of the UNSC by freeing just a
country to prevent the decision of the majority. This situation has thus created criticism of the
UNSC as a biased and unrepresentative organ of the UN that does not take into account the
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views of the rest of the members. Furthermore, the power to use the veto often deters even the
formulation of resolutions that will be stiff enough to tackle with the current global challenges in
a satisfactory manner so that the resulting decisions appear insufficient to solve many problems.
It is for this reason that as the voices calling for reform of the UNSC become louder and louder,
some of the so proposed changes deal with the reform or the limitation of the aspects of veto
power with a view of increasing the efficiency of the council in managing the global crises and
or maintaining its relevancy in the ever changing world.
III. Geographical representation issues
As for the present composition of the UNSC, the current situation is considered highly
disadvantageous in terms of geographical distribution failing to represent the global map, which
is the main reason that challenges the institution‟s legitimacy or reasonable actions in addressing
the current threats in the international relations sphere. Current role of the council, which was
formed in 1945, does not represent the transformations in the global system which has taken
place in the past seven decades (Nadin, 2016). Africa; being the continent with 54 nations and in
excess of 1.2 billion people; is not encouraged on the council together with Latin America. This
has raised criticism of the UNSC as being a white man‟s club rather than a global organization
(Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). Thus, they fail to have a fair representation of developing nations, and
the council itself does not seem to grasp most of the security issues affecting the countries in the
Global South. This is quite a disadvantageous situation given that a major part of UNSC‟s
working schedule is concerned with conflicts and crises in Africa and the Middle Eastern regions
(Langmore & Farrall, 2016). Besides, the current geographical distribution of seats is unbalanced
and does not reflect new regional powers and shifts in the center of the power. The structure of
the council puts countries with the most significant population and rapidly strengthening
economic positions, such as India, Brazil, and Nigeria, into permanent non-decision-maker status
(Szewczyk, 2021). This current configuration of the UNSC undermines its relevance and
effectiveness aggravating the disparity between the council and the current world order by
hindering the building of a coalition around the relevant global problems and the implementation
of reasonable solutions. Therefore, there is increasing demand for reform that would put
proportionate number of seats on the UNSC to warrant what is regarded as fair representation to
boost the international body‟s responsiveness to the security concerns of all the world‟s
geographical zones.
IV. Effectiveness in modern conflicts
The key actor whose role has been questioned in recent years is the UN Security Council
(UNSC) – one of the main mechanisms of dealing with international conflicts which, however,
has not demonstrated the effective performance and organizational tools necessary to address
modern security threats. Since its creation, the nature of conflict has been lumbar from the inter-
state wars to inter-state as well as other kinds of conflicts Intra-state, terrorism, other
transnational threats (Bosco, 2014). Nevertheless, the council did not cope with modernization of
its organizational mechanisms and, thus, reacted insufficiently, insufficiently, and inefficiently to
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important critical situations. Some of the P5 nations have continued to use the veto power to
hinder intervention irrespective of the price that individuals caught in the conflict pay; the Syrian
conflict is a good example (Nadin, 2016). This veto power usually deliberated immobilizes the
council with the individual permanent members‟ selfish geopolitical gains overshadowing the
rationale of the collective security. Such self-interests have thereby slowed the progress of
important matters like; nuclear disarmament and also threats caused by climatic change. This is
evident especially in Yemen, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo the UNSC has
failed to perform its mandate of maintaining international peace and security due to its weakness
in coming up with timely interventions in protracted conflicts. Some scholars complain that the
UNSC is still very much a lead actors‟ body failing to reflect contemporary challenges posed by
non-state actors and cross-state challenges (Szewczyk, 2021). This traditional way of handling
conflict has also restrained the functioning of council in resolving such newer types of conflict.
Additionally, its decisions are rarely mandatory and are not backed by sanctions especially where
they are unfavorable to the policy stances of Permanent members. This has perpetuated the
modular policing style enriching selective compliance on the top of the diminishing political
authority of the council in global politics. Syrian crisis can be singled out as one of the most
vivid examples of the inefficiency of the UNSC. Currently, the permanent members of the
security council especially Russia and China have used their powers of veto to prevent passing of
resolutions aimed at addressing a humanitarian situation and check on violence. This has thus
produced a long-standing conflict that has had tragic social impacts and hence is a clear sign that
there is a dysfunctional need for change in the council‟s decisions. Likewise, the failure of the
UNSC in Yemen was also criticized heavily. Hence, even with the current humanitarian crises
with high casualty rates and continuous fighting, the council has not been in a position to lay
proper measures of addressing the situation and bring about stability. In most cases, the self-
interests of the permanent members have clouded the needy intervention by the international
community.
2. Expansion of Permanent Membership
I. Potential new permanent members
The increase in permanent members of the UN Security Council is one of the key elements,
which is always discussed in the frame of reforming of this powerful decision-making body.
Several countries have established themselves as frontrunners for the seats given the economic
and political power, and impact on, current and future world security they possess. The
permanent membership debate has also seen more Indian interest due to India‟s big numbers,
growing economy and relative contribution to world peace keeping (contribution to the UN
peace keeping mission) Hosli & Dörfler 2019. Japan is the third largest economy in the world
and a significant financial supporter of the United Nations; thus, they have also claimed
candidacy for the permanent seat (Langmore & Farrall, 2016). Germany which is one of the G7
economies, largest economy in Europe and a vital actor in the international politics is another
often mentioned candidate. Brazil for example, from the Latin America region contends that its
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large size economically powerful nation and its steadiness in the stability of region it ought to be
part of the permanent members. Later, the African Union called for two seats, though the list is
yet to be published; however, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt are most often mentioned.
However, the choice of the new permanent members remains a problematic issue since it
indicates rivalry between the regions and their claims. For instance, Pakistan has a contentious
view towards India‟s proposal and Italy has different view towards Germany on the same matter
(Szewczyk, 2021). These could thereby be great additions to a group that might shake the
balance of power in the current environment that the UNSC finds itself in and also make it to be
more reflective of the current world. Some opponents in this thinking contend that the increase of
the number of permanent members will not per se enhance the performance of the council if
other weaknesses are not dealt with. However, the idea of providing the new permanent members
with the veto power is still an issue of debate since extending veto rights can exacerbate
problems of decision making (Okhovat, 2012). Therefore, the choice of potential new permanent
members of the UNSC is one of the crucial and challenging subjects of further discussions
regarding the reform of the organization while taking into account various international relations‟
conditions that may significantly affect the character of the global governance.
II. Regional balance considerations
The concept of additional permanent membership in the UN Security council is very closely
connected with the stated desire to achieve greater geographical distribution which is a key factor
to improving the credibility and efficiency of the council. The current composition lacks
representation of the regions‟ security interests and priorities as it is dominated by the western
countries (Nadin, 2016). Getting a proper matching of awards is rather a difficult matter which
depends on the consideration of various interests and the correction of historical injustices. For
example, Africa has been lobbying for two permanent seats for the union of its 54 countries
citing the fact that the Security‟s work focuses on Africa, but the continent cannot be assured of a
permanent seat. Likewise, Latin America and the Caribbean that as of now lacks a permanent
membership also support its seat to represent the region‟s interests effectively. Consequently, the
Asia-Pacific area, being economically and demographically critical, is inadequately provided,
with only China being non-permanent members. Many reserve increases imply the creation of
places for regions that apparently lack representatives because the decision on which countries
these places should be taken is still debated. This comes at the backdrop of the fact that regional
powers may both vie for the same seat which in essence will incline the rivalry. For instance, an
India-Pakistan or Japan-South Korea rivalry hinders the process of deciding the new permanent
members in Asia (Szewczyk, 2021). Moreover, the issue of whether to retain the current
geographical breakdown that is currently used in the UN or to adopt a new regional
categorization is another feature that complicates the reforming process. Haters always have it
that any expansion must be done in such a way that causes due cognizance of not just the number
of seats being offered to a region, but also the value of such a seat. The main threat stems from
the fact that expansion if not managed properly can lead to new tensions or even worsen the
existing regional problems, thus erasing the objectives of the reform (Okhovat, 2012). To get a
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proper balance in geographic terms, there is need to look at historical, political and diplomatic
realities that would shape the representative qualitative addition to the UNSC.
III. Economic and political criteria
It is unlikely to deny that the relation between the given concept of additional permanent
membership and such a concern as the geographical distribution of the UNSC is intrinsic because
the latter remains one of the major factors affecting the council‟s credibility and, consequently,
its efficiency. The current composition is considered to be non-inclusive of different regions
security concerns and dynamics because it still essentially features Western powers ( Nadin,
2016). Current criticism of the UNSC is viewed as requiring reform to consider the above angles,
and enhance the organization‟s geographical representation as vital to enhance its legitimacy.
The issue of obtaining the balance of representation is thus intricate and also it involves; some
groups‟ interests as well as past inequities. For instance, Africa has been seeking two permanent
seats to represent its 54 countries in the organization, claiming that the Security Council‟s
workload majorly involves matters relating to Africa, but the continent itself is not allowed a
permanent membership. Similarly, Latin America and the Caribbean as the regions that are at
this point unable to have their permanent members also claim that they need representation so
they can present their interests properly. Nevertheless, the economically and demographically
important Asia-Pacific region lacks representation, and China is the only permanent member in
this vast region (Szewczyk, 2021). The idea to therefore expand permanent members in the
UNSC is riddled with several complex questions and hence one of those is to identify which
nations should gain these seats. This is coupled with rivalry that may crop up within the regions
as countries compete for the same position. For instance, the existent animosities between the
India and Pakistan or Japan and South Korea influence the impossibility of coming to a
consensus on the new permanent members from Asia as well. The case of the desire to join the
council of permanent members shows that the process implies geopolitical tensions and indicates
the importance of balanced and reasonable negotiations to avoid agitation of conflict (Szewczyk,
2021). Moreover, the discussion is still heated concerning which geographical framework is to
be preserved with the UN or a new one to be implemented. This decision is significant as it is
cardinal to the distribution of new seats which exceptionally determines the new strength within
the UNSC. Other critics were of the view that any reasoning must also take into account, how
many, and even more importantly, how influential the set aside seats are. As great opportunity so
is there the main threat – that expansion, if not controlled, will lead the firm down the wrong
path. Realistically, to increase the geographical distribution in UNSC, the conditions that will
define the inauguration of the new members must reflect the historical and diplomatic founding
of the body. This is the reason why the historical injustices which include colonialism as well as
previous exclusions should be redressed in order for the new inclusion to be fair. Furthermore the
current political environment and also the relations of power must thus be considered when
making those decisions. Overall, it will be highly important to discuss the decision and the
conditions of its implementation with all the member states, and fundamentally, diplomatic
strategies will be most significant (Nadin, 2016). An increase in the membership of the UNSC
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and addition of more permanent members especially from the global south can in some ways
improve this council. Nevertheless, such a process should be managed and implemented with
some concerns and proper plan. The choice of the new permanent members should be clear and
meet the current characteristics of the world order and the principle of equality. In other words, it
is crucial to guarantee that new members are capable and willing to help shape the international
environment positively in terms of peace and security (Szewczyk, 2021). However, reforming
the size of the UNSC must be accompanied by other measures which focused on the
improvement of its functioning and the decision making procedures. These are rising of
volatilities, improvements on corporate governance, and providing the council with ability to
address present day global threats. Thus, it is possible to state that with solving these problems
the UNSC will become a more democratic, representative and efficient organ, which will do
necessary efforts to maintain international peace and security in the 21st century (D. d).
Therefore, the advocates of an increase in permanent members to the UNSC base their
arguments on the need to increase geographical representation and improve the institution‟s
overall effectiveness. This is a very lengthy and complicated procedure wherein one needs to pay
attention to the social justice and race issues, regional animosity, and freshly proposed regions.
This has thus presented an opportunity to shape a new and hence a more efficient UNSC that
would meet the enhanced global security needs as well as interests. Through wise coordination
and appreciable diplomacy the UNSC can undoubtedly be reformed to fully correspond to the
world of the twenty-first century, and thus strengthen it as a chief organ that preserves the
international peace and security.
IV. Opposition from current P5
Decision making power to reform the P5 of the permanent membership in the UN Security
Council is another difficulty, where the P5 is majorly against the expansion of permanent
membership. The P5 members- China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US- are usually immerse
to alteration populaces that may reduce their power or bring confusion in action making
innovation in the council (Nadin, 2016). These are a mix of both material and non-material
factors concerning strategic self-interest, previous experience and preserving the efficiency of the
organization‟s institution, in this case the UNSC. Nonetheless, the United States has at least
verbally supported “modest expansion”; however, it remained rather skeptical about concrete
plans, especially those that might destabilize its dominance around the world (Langmore &
Farrall, 2016). Some of the reasons include historical enmity and regional competition where
China has voiced concern in relation to Japan‟s membership. Russia has expressed willingness to
discuss the reform but has also stressed that any change should not compromise the council‟s
reactive capacity implying that expanded membership may impede decision-making. Britain and
France, though more inclined towards a reform agenda, fear that such suggestions would entail
that they have to bargain for their seat with other Europeans. The opposition of the P5, primarily,
because any substantial change in the UNSC has to be made through an amendment to the UN
Charter that requires the ratification of all the permanent members (Szewczyk, 2021). This
means that each member of the P5 has a veto over reform and this is a big challenge for change.
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Skeptics say that P5 is trying to preserve the international relations paradigm that does not fit
today‟s world and hampers the UN‟s efforts to solve modern global problems. It is argued by
some other reformation lobby that the increasing pressure that the rest of the UN membership
shall exert may with time force the P5 to agree to some sort of change as the demand for a more
representative council increases (Okhovat, 2012) . Nonetheless, how ready are the current
permanent members to relinquish, albeit minimally, their special status remains one of the
contentious issues in the current reform debate on the UN Security Council.
3. Veto Power Reform Proposals
I. Limiting veto use
Concerning the measures that can be taken regarding the veto power exercised by permanent
members of the UN Security Council, the concept of reform frequently lies in its restraint to help
improve the Security Council‟s efficiency and adapt to emergencies. Among the proposals, there
is the „„responsibility to abstain‟‟ principle – the more so, concerning mass atrocities or genocide
(Nadin, 2016). This approach requires all the P5 members of the United Nations Security
Council to self-denying terms by sparing the use of their veto power anytime there is need for an
urgent humanitarian intervention. France and Mexico have been very much in support of this
idea that if the permanent members wish to use the veto power in circumstances such as these,
they must be able to publicly justify their stance. The third one of the proposed solutions
presupposes limiting the use of the veto in certain types of resolutions, for example, in
connection with the peacekeeping activities of the United Nations, the admission of new
Members to the United Nations. Advocates writing on this subject state that this would avert
abuse of the veto power in matters that are not necessarily related to the preservation of global
peace and security (Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). Concerning the decision-making mechanism, the
critics have it that making a resolution should require at least two votes of no confidence from
different permanent members as opposed to any permanent member single-handedly vetoing the
resolution. This could mean that two or more members of the P5 should activate it in order to
make it work this may lower cases of single opposition (Szewczyk, 2021). The opponents of the
present day veto also support the idea of applying some positive sanctions for the use of veto like
the obligation of the vetoing nation to offer another plan of actions or the veto is subject to the
consideration of GA. On the other hand, those who are against the reform of the veto say that
restraints could have a negative impact on the delicate balance of power in the council and an
effect of encourage recklessness and poorly thought out actions (Okhovat, 2012). They argue
that the veto as a preventive measure thereby protects the international community from many
abusive powers by the UNSC and also prevents world wars involving major powers. Maintaining
these concerns against the need to produce a more flexible Security Council continues to be the
major focus of any veto reform debate.
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II. Veto override mechanisms
It is in this backdrop, that some scholars have pointed at veto override mechanisms as a probable
way of solving some of the problems that arise from the exercise of veto power in the UN
Security Council. These proposals seek to institution a mechanism through which the
international community can go ahead and act even when one or more members of the
permanent members of the council use their privilege to cast a vote. There is one significant
recommendation, known as the “Uniting for Peace” style resolution, according to which the
General Assembly would be able to recommend the overall measures when the Security Council
remains inactive due to the permanent members‟ failure to agree (Szewczyk, 2021). This
approach is based on the 1950 „Uniting for Peace‟ resolution under which the world body
bypassed Soviet restraints during the Korean War. The second type of override mechanisms
recommended to be implemented is the support level override in the General Assembly. For
example, it stated that even if a permanent member of the Security Council uses the veto power,
the resolution may be passed if within sixty days no less than two- thirds of the UN member
states voted in favor of the resolution (Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). This, according to proponents of
this policy, would assist in abating situations whereby agenda measures that have wide support
are overruled by the interests of a particular country. A few of the reform advocates have
proposed the formation of a second decision making organ in the UN system to act when there is
an impasse in the Security council. This body could be one that has been elected like legislators
and it could comprise of representatives from different regions and this body had the ability to
recommend action and in some cases to even approve action on its own (Nadin, 2016). However,
the critics of veto override mechanisms have pointed out that reforms with this kind of change
may amatively erode the very framework of the UN and increase global insecurity. They
continue to note that veto power acts as a check with regard to the use of force and helps in
prevention of institution like the UN from carrying out activities that lead to the creation of more
extensive conflict between poles in the international system (Langmore & Farrall, 2016). Also,
there are concerns that obstructive mechanisms could be distorted by groups of countries to
move within confinement unapproved resolutions thereby compromising on the viability of UN
activities. The introduction of any veto override mechanism, would entail that, any consideration
on its effectiveness would have to consider the consequences that it would have on the world
diplomacy and the balance of powers within the UN system (Okhovat, 2012).
III. Abolishing veto power
But the most drastic of the proposed changes with relation to the veto power in the UN Security
Council is the elimination of this power in its entirety. Critics of veto as advocated in this model
have contended that veto is inherently autocratic and cannot be reconciled to democratic tenets or
principles of sovereign equality espoused in the Charter of the United Nations Membership
(Nadin, 2016). Some of them argue that the abolition of the veto usurp the aim of making the
decision-making among UN member states fair thereby enhancing fair practices in issues to do
with international peace and security. The proponents for abolition would therefore posit that in
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certain occasions where the veto has stopped early action in grave humanitarian situations, if the
veto were done away with it then the UNSC could organize swift and proper response to
worldwide threats (Langmore, Farrall, 2016). Some of the ideas include replacing the veto with a
mechanism of weighted voting which implies that the decisions that are to be made should be
approved by two-thirds of members of the Council and also should be supported by not less than
two-thirds of the global population (Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). However, there is a problem and
debate with the removal of veto power in different legislatures. Critics claim that the veto is
necessary to maintain international stability as the conflicts in which the UN may get involved
may lead to confrontation between the superpowers (Szewczyk, 2021). They argue that without
the veto power, some of the permanent members might not afford support to the UN operations
or perhaps may pull out of the UN completely thus making the UN ineffective and illegitimate.
Critics also state that to remove the veto, one has to repeal the UN Charter, but this in a way
requires the consent of all the permanent members which makes the prospect practically
impossible (Okhovat, 2012). In addition, there are worries that getting rid of the veto without
reforming all the other systematic biases of the UNSC would merely transfer power to another
group of countries with no enhancements to the council. Other authors have observed that
perhaps the way could be to remove the veto power gradually as this will offer the different
powers that be in the world a chance to gradually adjust themselves to the envisaged change.
IV. Consequences for global diplomacy
The different processes relating to the veto power in UN Security Council have thus great effect
on diplomacy and also international relation policies. There is a potential if one or more
fundamental changes to the system were to arise in the organization and within the United
Nations then power relations would shift and potentially change the entire international
negotiations and conflicts resolution processes. For reformists, reduction or amendment of veto
right may bring about clear, prompt actions towards global issues and hence improve the UN‟s
efficiency in preserving global peace and security (Nadin, 2016). All these ideas thereby imply
that a less drastic decision-making style may enhance the status of UNSC resolutions and thus
improve the functionality of global management structures. However, there are unresolved issues
that critics particularly oppose when it comes to tyranny over the veto, where they say it may
cause refusal instead of cooperation in external relations. The veto has been used in the past to
regulate great power relations, avoiding a confrontation between the major powers within the
United Nations frame work (Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). Changing this system may perhaps result in
making the situation tension-full and go back to more solo performances, outsourcing of, for
instance, the use of force from the UN web. Critics‟ post that, if ever the power of negative is
removed or highly reduced, then those in the permanent membership may opt to leave the UN
system or look for other avenues where they can exercise similar powers. It could hence lead to a
degradation of the general efficacy and also supremacy of the United Nations in the course of
international relations. Conversely the possibility of effective veto reform may therefore restore
the multilateralism system and hence believe more collective instruments to address global
issues. It may result in enhanced pluralism in decision-making, which would involve minor
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players and regional actors more actively in determining the global security policies (Szewczyk,
2021). The change in diplomacy dynamics would however depend on the approach or certain
specific reforms which are taken. For instance, positive measures like bringing in veto override
could alter the patterns of negotiations at the UN level as it would change the processes of
forming coalitions and voting decisions. Likewise, removal or limiting of veto power might
change the bargaining strategies of the permanent and other non-permanent members in the
Security Council (Okhovat, 2012). Last of all, any change to the role of the veto system that
would improve UN‟s activity would require the delicate balancing of the increased efficiency at
the expense of the main players in the international system.
4. Improving Representation and Inclusivity
I. Increasing non-permanent seats
Among the suggestions of revitalizing representation and inequality in the UN Security Council,
the major one is the elongation of the non-permanent seats. This approach thus seeks to offer
more countries with a chance to feature within the council‟s decisions while not affecting the
pegged members. Supporters claimed that increasing number of non-permanent seat could
improve the council‟s credibility because it would increase the geographical representation and
rotation of states membership (Nadin, 2016). Current suggestions differ; some have included a
move from the current 10 non-permanent seats up to 16/20 that could approximately double the
council‟s membership (Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). Supporters of this reform have supported the
motion stating that the council might need to expand due to the enlargement of the United
Nations which has come a long way since formation of UNSC. They argue that more seats would
give an opportunity to represent different regions of which the Global South is underrepresented
(Langmore & Farrall, 2016). However the opponents of this approach thereby has some doubts
about the efficiency of the council with the help of preparing more cases. Critics claim that the
increase of members may cause time-consuming disputes and challenges in making decisions
thus becoming an obstacle to the efficiency of the UNSC operations in case of an emergency
(Szewczyk, 2021). They therefore raise issues on how new seats will be divided between the
regional groups whether this would indeed correct the imbalance of power in the council. There
are suggestions of linking an expansion of non-permanent members with changes in the election
system like the formation of term limits or changes on the geographic bases of member
distribution (Okhovat, 2012). This may in turn have guaranteed that over some time other
countries have the possibilities of having a place within the council. Thus, even if the expansion
of non-permanent seats helped to address the issue of representation to some extent, it would not
contribute to the solution of such significant problems as the right of veto and the special rights
of the permanent members.
II. Regional rotation systems
The most common idea regarding the increase of the number of seats in the UN Security Council
and improvement of the system of its rotation is the regional rotation system. These proposals
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thus bear the intention to bring all regions to the council to address issues in geographical parity.
As one of the proposed models, it is suggested to establish such seats as the rotational ones
referring to particular regions of the group county (Nadin, 2016). For example, Africa could be
assigned permanent member seats while Latin America and the Asia-Pacific regions could also
be given fixed member seats but would be occupied by different states in each session.
Advocates have posited that this approach would afford smaller states higher levels of access to
the formulation of policies within the council hence resulting to increased variety. Some of the
proposals provide for use of both permanent regional based seats and berth individual country
based seats. It is also possible that executive organizations such as the African Union or the Arab
League could have permanent memberships of the council with the actual country
representatives changing periodically as Langmore and Farrall noted in their observation about
the idea. This could potentially offset the requirement for a steady regional presence with the
firm‟s appetite for different national views. However, the use of regional rotation systems has the
following challenges: Challenges also arise as to the best way to distribute the number of seats
within the regions, especially if there are politically and or economically powerful and weak
countries in the regions (Szewczyk, 2021). Moreover several questions are thus raised about the
ability of rotating representatives to adequately promote the interests of the region due to the
short term of their authority as well as internal contradictions between the regions. Sceptics also
argue that rotation systems may not have the dean seed effect on structural power relations in the
council because they do not eradicate permanent members‟ perks (Okhovat, 2012). There are
thereby issues of implementing rotation regarding the management of the council particularly in
terms of the; continuity of its tasks. Nonetheless, the proponents of regional rotation assert that
the practice can potentially increase the council‟s credibility and efficiency due to the constantly
shifting membership that will reflect the global populace‟s ethnic and geographic distribution.
III. Small state representation
Proposals for reform that seek to increase the popularity of the UN (United Nations) more often
focus on increasing the position of small states in the SC (Security Council). The majority of
United Nations member states is now SMEs‟ and will continue to be, and these states especially
in the Global South get sidelined when it comes to decision making within the UNSC channel.
Efforts to rectify this state of affairs are based on suggestions that entailed the establishment of
structures that would grant small States a louder say in councils. Another recommendation is the
creation of a special seat or several seats for small states: this may be done on the system of
rotation by regions (Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). This would make certain that the views of the minor
power are continually proposed in regards to international peace and security. The second of
measures includes the creation of a small-scale state group of advisors that would have the status
of a formal consultative and deliberative body of the Security Council and who would be able to
comment on those issues which directly concern them (Langmore & Farrall, 2016). Supporters
thus continue to reason that better representation will thereby enhance the council because
members of small states have something significant to contribute concerning contemporary
matters including; climate change, economic susceptibility and also security threats specific to
12
small nations in the global society. Some of the reform proposals concern; changing the
procedure of choosing the non-permanent members in order to thus increase a chance of small
states securing a place in the council. This could entail booking a number of positions for
countries that are below a certain population or gross domestic product (GDP) (Szewczyk,
2021). However, opponents opine that such measures may therefore increase the number of
permanent members with small states‟ influence in international politics and hence their
contributions to peacekeeping missions. Such issues also arise in defining „small states‟ whereby
one questions whether states‟ population, economic size or other characteristics has to be
considered. Critics of these suggestions have argued that it is possible for the council to become
inefficient in dealing with emerging key international security issues if it is dominated by small
states (Okhovat, 2012). One of the major bottlenecks in the quest to reform the UNSC is the need
to ensure that balance of small state vote sharers is not sacrificed in pursuit of power politics of
the contemporary global politics.
IV. Civil society involvement
Therefore, the civil society is an essential component of democratic governance since it enhances
citizens‟ engagement and offers accountability mechanisms to check on governments (Smith,
2018; Edwards & Foley, 2020; Norris, 2011; Warren, 2022). In Democracy theory Civil society
are mentioned as societies in which the people‟s affiliation is genetically to the political state and
the market however, these are the patterns of civil societies that are non-governmental and
voluntary associations (Edwards & Foley, 2020; Warren, 2022). Such entities are crucial to
advance democracy by public participation in the acceptable decisions of civil authorities
(Norris, 2011; Smith, 2018) positive freedom (Rieff, 2018). Another crucial activity one may
associate with civil society involvement is the monitoring of the governmental activities. Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) for example, in many cases keep check on the rates of
policy implementation and also check for integrity in governance (Smith, 2018; Edwards &
Foley, 2020). For instance, NGOs such as Transparency International have been involved in
raising awareness of corruption and demanding different abstemious activities around the world
(Norris, 2011; Warren, 2022). By monitoring the decisions and actions of the government, civil
society prevents power abuse and makes sure that certain policies are beneficial to the public
(Smith, 2018; Edwards & Foley, 2020). Furthermore, civil society assists in resolving the state
and citizens „ dilemma, acting as an intermediary between the state and citizens to vocalize the
plight of minority groups and the promotion of their justice (Norris, 2011; Warren, 2022). The
social justice movements like Black Lives Matter, Environmentalism groups are examples of
movements that change people‟s attitudes and compel governments to change (Edwards &
Foley, 2020; Smith, 2018). These movements do shape policy conditions but they also foster
society‟s shared purpose and community among groups of people (Warren, 2022; Norris, 2011).
In addition to that, civil society engagement enhances the tenacity of democracy since it
encourages the growth of civil responsibility and enhances the process of civic sensitization
(Smith, 2018; Edwards & Foley, 2020). Civic society organizations for instance, engage the
citizens through activities such as voter education programs and community meeting thereby
13
enabling the citizens to participate in the political process with a lot of energy and knowledge
(Norris, 2011; Warren, 2022). In this sense, civil society stimulates the efficiency of democratic
institutions and practices through promoting the citizens‟ awareness (Edwards & Foley, 2020;
Smith, 2018).
5. Decision-making Process Reforms
I. Consensus-based decision making
CBDM is known as a consensus-seeking approach by which individuals within the community
seek to achieve consensus regarding specific decisions instead of utilizing voting in favor of the
decision pursued by the majority of the members. In contrast to a typical voting system, CBDM
chair people involve all the stakeholders with the intent of integrating their views and issues
from the onset to the conclusion of the vote process (Davis, 2018; Jones, 2019; Smith & Brown,
2020). The premise on which CBDM is based is the fact that participants are to cooperate and
coordinate. Besides extending broad perspectives this therefore creates a favourable atmosphere
that thus encourages the group members to feel that they are contributing towards the decision-
making process of the group. It is especially beneficial when the conflict of interests among the
stakeholders is present or scenarios where decisions impact various constituents (Smith &
Brown, 2020; Johnson et al. , 2021). Thus, due to the focus on dialogues and consensus, CBDM
aims at implementing the solutions that are both feasible and acceptable by the most
stakeholders. The integrated process of decision making minimises disagreement or opposition to
the final decision because everyone has a chance to contribute to the process (Brown, 2019;
Jones, 2019; Davis, 2018). Besides, CBDM is not just a technique or a strategy of how decisions
are made, but is a general concept that pays much attention to the process of decision-making as
much as to the result. This approach recognizes that decision making involves considerations of
a multifaceted nature and that when different perspectives are taken through a recursive and
interrogative process sustainable solutions can be found (Smith & Brown, 2020). In practice,
CBDM unrolls in the process of structured discussion where the stakeholders state their case and
respond to others‟ comments, opinions and objections in the course of arriving at a collective
decision by bargaining. These discussions are frequently led by the facilitators, particularly in
cases where the process has to be kept fair and non-prejudiced (Jones, 2019). Therefore CBDM
can be a major shift from the conventional models of decision-making as it thus relies on the
engagement of various stakeholders and hence active communication. Thus the CBDM provides
not only improves the quality of decisions but also creates positive communicative conditions
that most effectively lead to sustainable and also harmonious decisions, which are therefore
beneficial one for all the stakeholders (Davis, 2018).
II. Weighted voting systems
Weighted voting systems can be a deviation from equal systems of voting in that within the
organization, certain voting quotas are given to different people in accordance to given factors
such as experience, relevance, or rank within the organization (Davis, 2018; Johnson et al. ,
14
2021; Jones, 2019). As opposed to the non-weighted systems, where each of the participants‟
votes is equally important, the weighted systems‟ main purpose is to improve the quality of
decisions reached by delegates by allowing those who have higher recognition or a direct interest
in the topic to influence the outcome more significantly. The first objective that is closely
connected with the use of weighted voting is to guarantee that all the decisions are made taking
into account their comprehensiveness and the specificity of particular fields of knowledge. It
works best when the stakeholders generally have different levels of knowledge and/or when
some stakeholders stand to benefit more than others from the decisions made (Jones, 2019;
Davis, 2018). The weighting of the votes thus makes it possible to still provide a more
personalized decision making system because of the different aspects of special issues. However,
it can speed up the decision making processes because deliberations are channeled towards the
inputs of those most knowledgeable or affected as spelt by weighted voting systems. This might
be important when quick decisions are needed, though adequate engagement of the stakeholders
is still required (Smith & Brown, 2020). However, the key to the successful application of the
weighted voting systems depends on the criteria of the voting weight. Awareness reduces cases
of bias or corruption for reinstating proportions, which expounds the distribution of voting rights
and the reasons for having some people or entities exercising more influence (Johnson et al. ,
2021; Smith & Brown, 2020). However, it is necessary to fix the idea that in spite of all the
advantages that can be observed at weighted voting systems, there are some difficulties
connected with work of these instruments. There are certain points to be considered for the
selection and assessment of criteria which will be used to allocating the weights, and the
necessary machineries for the constant reconsideration of these criteria so as to approximate the
true and fairest values of these weights overtime (Davis, 2018). Once again, weighted voting
systems can be described as a deliberate methodology of management decision – making that is
aimed at addressing the circumstances of expertise and stakeholder significance. In this regard,
such systems, when adopted and designed appropriately and openly, may improve the public‟s
perception, as well as boost the efficiency, of decisions made in various and evolving
organizational settings (Johnson et al. , 2021).
III. Transparency and accountability measures
Transparency and accountability are fundamental prerequisites that should not be lacking in any
frameworks of solid decision making. Transparency can be defined as the freedom or the lack of
constraints about the information that people disclose concerning the decision-making process,
the standards used, the process that was followed, and the decisions made (Smith & Brown,
2020; Davis, 2018). This openness will thereby allow the stakeholders and also the public in
general to; understand why specific decisions have been made, which creates trust and hence
confidence in the decision-making process. On the other hand, accountability refers to the
processes through which those individuals, responsible for decisions, are made to answer for the
decisions that they have made. It guarantees that all those holding decision-making powers are
doing so in the public‟s interest and that they are germane for the decisions made (Jones, 2019;
Johnson et al. , 2021). Accountability mechanisms include the checks and balances both at the
15
internal and external levels within the organizations that seek to ensure that the violators of the
set ethical standards and corrupt people are brought to book (Davis, 2018; Smith & Brown,
2020). Combined transparency as well as accountability enhances the credibility of decision-
making in organizational situations. Regarding enhancing the public‟s knowledge and
engagement in governance, these measures at the institutional level offer information that is
easily accessible and decisions made to the public (Johnson et al. , 2021; Jones, 2019). It‟s not
only enlightening but also transformational as it enables the stakeholders to participate in the
deliberations as well as scrutinize the actions of the decision makers adequately. In practice
therefore transparency implies timely and also easy to obtain information that will allow
stakeholders to trace the flow of decision making and hence give feedback. : The process also
requires prompt and effective communication concerning the actions and duties of decision
makers to avoid confusion (Smith & Brown, 2020). On the other hand, accountability
mechanisms need sound frameworks including code of ethics, beside which people may have
their complaints or appeals. These frameworks ensure that ethical conduct is encouraged and
those who engage in wrongful doings or malpractice are made to change their ways thus
strengthening people‟s confidence in governance bodies (Davis, 2018; Johnson et al. , 2021). In
conclusion, thus, transparency and accountability remain central to ensuring the success and,
therefore, maintaining the legitimacy of decisions that are made across the society. Besides
restoring trust, these measures also increase the level of confidence of the general public in
governance institutions and foster more open, transparent, and ethically sound decisions thus
making the decision-making process more democratic (Jones 2019).
IV. Emergency response procedures
Essentials of working on emergency response procedures are valuable plans and courses
developed to address strategies and actions established for responding to specific incidents or
unpredictable situations (Johnson et al. , 2021; Jones, 2019). These procedures outline the work
expectations, who does what, how information is shared, how resources will be deployed, and
how fast/intensely work will be done (Davis, 2018; Smith & Brown, 2020). What is more their
main goal is to thus keep safe, avoid any risks and also work efficiently with different resources
in the conditions of uncertainty as well as high risk. Particularly, high relevance can be attributed
to promptness of the given solution, insistence on the notions of preparedness and flexibility in
emergency response procedures. To increase preparedness and guarantee that teams are ready to
respond quickly to new situations, many organizations undertake training sessions, role-playing
sessions and regular revisions (Jones 2019; Davis 2018). Red tape EM Procedures prevent
adverse effects of emergencies, strengthen organizational and community safety while promoting
the cohesiveness between the stakeholders by creating a clear framework to follow. Concisely,
every dimension of decision-making ranging from consensus-based decision making, proper use
of a weighted voting system, transparency and accountability measures as well as emergency
response mechanisms helps to determine the general effectiveness of governance, citizens‟ trust,
and organizational readiness (Davis, 2018, Jones, 2019, Smith & Brown, 2020, Johnson et al. ,
2021). Culturally appropriate, comprehensive knowledge of these approaches and their proficient
16
application can improve decision-making in domains and settings of human endeavor. Both
elements together help to build sound frameworks that not only handle and appear to address
common problems, but also ensure stability and sustainability of governance and organization
management, as well as contingency in case of a crisis.
6. Implementation Challenges and Outcomes
I. Amending UN Charter
The process of reform in the UN Security Council is workable; though full of hurdles, the most
intricate being to alter the UN Charter. It should be pointed out that all significant changes in the
organization‟s Charter must be done with the help of amendments, and this process is
exceedingly complicated in order to avoid constant alterations in the organization‟s Charter
(Szewczyk, 2021). The amendments are to be thus taken by the votes of at least two-thirds of the
members of the General Assembly. They are thereafter ratified by two-thirds of all the Member
States of the United Nations including; five members of the Security Council (United Nations,
1945). In this regard, this requirement thus simply hands the P5 countries veto power over any
alteration of its requirements, a factor that hence spells major trouble for any aspiring reformists.
This process is also intensified by the conflict of interest among Member States and political
stalemate (Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). Past attempts at Charter amendment have been few and
largely confined to adding more non-permanent members which a show that it is extremely hard
to get consensus on Charter reform. The opponents have claimed that this has made the UNSC
rigid, slowly, and unable to evolve, ossified and locked into an outdated structure which does not
correspond to contemporary world order (Nadin, 2016). The very idea of amending the Charter
thus contributes to understanding possible negative implications, which is connected with the
fact that the decision to open it raises the question of further discussions on the principles and
also powers of the UN. Other social and cultural changes have stated that piecemeal changes
through informal actions or interpretation of Charter provisions could be better solutions than the
formal Charter amendment (Langmore & Farrall, 2016). But, such approaches may not always
have the legal force and the permanency as seen with Charter amendments and therefore might
not bring long-lasting real UNSC reform.
II. Overcoming political resistance
Political resistance is usually witnessed in organizations or governments whenever the changes
adopted in the decision-making process threaten to bring changes in the balance of power. To
overcome such resistance, Machiavellian plans and good communication techniques with a
close-knit plan to turn the few push backs they would encounter to supporting side must be used
(Jones, 2019; Smith & Brown, 2020; Davis, 2018). This is due to the fact that to overcome
political opposition needed for the adoption of innovations one has to build coalitions and
partnerships with individuals of different affiliations. Identification and inclusion of BDMs and
KIMs allow the proponents to openly tackle emerging issues, explain gains, and seek solutions
(Johnson et al. , 2021; Davis, 2018). Public involvement and consensus-based decision making
17
can be used by individuals to increase stakeholder acceptance by paying attention to all the
players‟ concerns and opinions (Smith & Brown, 2020; Jones, 2019). Use of policy briefs that
consist of more success stories, specially selected case-lets or pilot circumstance of successful
implementation of the proposed reforms can have convincing impact on the skeptics (Davis,
2018; Johnson et al. , 2021). Such empirical evidence makes the case for the actuality and the
potential of reforms and gives them creditability thus making them more acceptable to a larger
number of people. The positive management of communication strategies is thus helpful in
ensuring public and also stakeholders‟ support as well as addressing their misconceptions.
Whereas, effective communication means; sharing clear and persuasive information regarding
reasons for the reforms as well as expected changes which can influence stakeholders‟
uncertainties and direct them toward desired objectives (Jones, 2019; Smith & Brown, 2020).
Altogether countering political opposition to decision-making reforms thereby requires an
intricate solution that implies; building a diverse political coalition, insisting on the work‟s
openness, including; empirical data in support of the changes and also clear presentation of the
findings. In this way, the proponents can effectively organize a positive change process, increase
governance effectiveness and stakeholders‟ involvement (Davis, 2018; Johnson et al. , 2021).
III. Transition period considerations
Whenever, decision-making reforms is being applied, it is calls for careful planning and also
careful thinking about phases of transition to avoid complications and to foster good adoption
(Smith & Brown, 2020; Davis, 2018; Johnson et al. , 2021). Transition period strategies refer to
dealing with process transformation, ensuring stakeholders‟ training and education, and easing
the introduction of new policies and structures. In transition phases, the organization and the
governments require putting support structures such as training, consultations and sufficient
resources to enhance comprehension and compliance with new implemented decision making
processes (Jones 2019; Davis 2018). These measures thus not only provide necessary skills for
the stakeholders also enhance the culture of readiness for change. There is, therefore, a need for
the clear themes and timelines to help the stakeholders navigate through the uncertainties and
new roles and responsibilities (Johnson et al. , 2021; Smith & Brown, 2020). Shareholders
become more trusting and confident about the company‟s objectives, and thus, do not resist
change initiatives. Moreover, where feedback and lessons have been gathered on the period of
transition, it also, helps to continue to evaluate and adjust the reforms thus improving the
effectiveness and sustainability of the implementation. Providing leeway to work around issues
or forces that may rise when practicing the reforms as well as resistance is vital when it comes to
the success of the reforms without interference (Smith & Brown, 2020; Johnson et al. , 2021).
Thus, I have reached the conclusion that establishing the comprehensive decision-making reform
presupposes strict planning, efficient explanation of the measures to be taken, and thorough
handling of the potential transition periods. If one offers proper support, enhances the
understanding of the situation, and implements changes according to responses received,
organizations or governments can become ready to manage such situations and bring sustainable
18
changes to the sphere of governance and decision-making (Jones, 2019; Davis, 2018; Johnson et
al. , 2021; Smith & Brown, 2020).
IV. Potential impact on global governance
Potential changes in organizations or national governments‟ decision-making procedures can
influence global governance structures and practices profoundly (Johnson et al. , 2021; Davis,
2018). The alteration of measures of decision making can affect the relation and cooperation
systems and the synchronizations of global policies. Reforms that target TIA can act as reference
points for other countries and international organizations therefore, may trigger a chain reaction
that may lead to a similar reforms across the world (Smith and Brown 2020; Jones 2019). These
initiatives therefore do not only build the confidence and thus coordination but also promote a
better synthesis to handle the global issues. On the other hand, difficulties or obstacles in the
process of reformation implementation may lead to doubt in the effectiveness and credibility of
the governance situation, with the impact on the international community‟s perception and
cooperation (Davis, 2018; Johnson et al. , 2021). Hence, the successful implementation of the
reforms in decision-making is central to both internal governance and regional confidence and
relations. Also, decision-making reforms for more resilience, sustainability, and ethical standards
in particular leadership significantly enhance dealing with such global challenges as climate
change, the economic inequality, and public health crisis (Jones, 2019; Smith & Brown, 2020).
These reforms can thereby contribute to strengthening collective work towards achieving the
objectives at the national and also international level by thus enhancing practices of governance
which can hence improve the approach to population‟s needs all over the world. Thus, the
choice-making organization includes the following prospects: political opposition that must be
taken into account; decision-making in regard to transition periods; and the possible implications
for global governance (Jones, 2019; Smith & Brown, 2020; Davis, 2018; Johnson et al. , 2021).
When dealing with these subtopics carefully and purposefully, stakeholders are in a position to
ask for liberal, sustainable, efficient decision making with satisfactory results locally, nationally,
or internationally. Through adoption of these shown reforms, countries and organizations have
the potential of positively contributing to the existing or a new cooperative and sustainable
global governance system.
19
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