THEORIES OF AUTHORITARIAN
Authoritarianism Revisited
In the previous chapter, we grappled with the definition of authoritarianism, and
struggled with whether it is good enough to simply think about these states as “non-
democratic.” While it is true that there is something qualitatively different between non-
democratic regimes and democratic regimes, it is often quite difficult to pinpoint. The
strategies an authoritarian government uses to stay in power are sometimes not
altogether different than strategies used in democracies such as clientelism and
patronage. Democracies often send additional funds to the districts of politicians that
support the regime. All states engage in some sort of security and surveillance of their
citizens. Democracies are not immune to engaging the services of private military
contractors, which are not entirely different from paramilitaries. Democracies also
engage in their own style of propaganda, which is evidenced by the so-called “military-
cinema” complex in the US (Wasson & Grieveson, 2018).
Perhaps the biggest difference, and even this is debatable, is that these
strategies, when used by democracies, are meant to legitimize the state, whereas in
an authoritarian regime, it is meant to legitimize the government. Again, the difference
is subtle. But democracies try to sustain their state as an idea and institution in which
the content of the government can and should change. While authoritarian regimes try
to sustain the particular occupants of the government, whether it be a person, a party,
a monarch, or a military. Democracy is seen as a threat to authoritarian states because
the very idea of a regular rotation of government, while sustaining the central core of
the state itself, is antithetical to their rule. However, because the differences in
legitimation strategies are similar, classifying a democratic and autocratic regime
becomes an exercise in grey areas in many cases. After reading this text, it is the hope
of the editor that students can thoughtfully utilize the typology of authoritarianism /
democracy not to simply classify entire states, but to understand that elements of
democracy can exist in authoritarian regimes, and vice versa. In light of the theories
of democratization that we considered in Chapter 5: Theories of State Emergence that
make strong predictions that states will eventually democratize, we might wonder why
and how authoritarian states not only maintain power in the short-term, but how they
can sustain their rule over decades or more. Finally, and most importantly, the
implication of this nuance between authoritarian and democratic states is that one can
shift from one category to another. In this chapter, we will consider theories of
authoritarian persistence as well as democratic backsliding.
Theories of authoritarian persistence
Historical Institutional theories
Historical institutionalism broadly refers to a theory that looks for important
moments in which institutions, broadly defined, take shape. Therefore, simply, an
historical institutionalist perspective would focus on critical junctures in which an
authoritarian regime solidified rather than embarking on a path of democratization.
While those of us who grew up in democratic states might assume that most or all
people have an interest in supporting democracy, this is certainly not the case
universally. Many groups may not have an interest in democratization such as those
that receive patronage from the state or those that stand to lose power. Historical
institutionalist perspectives often come in two main varieties: one that focuses on the
class coalitions that help support the persistence of the regime (see for example
Moore, 1993), or that authoritarian states persist simply due to inertia.
Economic theories of authoritarian persistence
Modernization theory posits that economic development will lead to
democratization. The flip side of this argument is that in conditions of economic
underdevelopment, democracy will be less likely to develop and can even support
authoritarian persistence. There are a few variations of this argument. First, in extreme
poverty, citizens have far more to be worried about than advocating for their rights to
be heard and instead are focused on providing for their families. As long as the regime
is not making life even more difficult, there is simply no incentive to rebel or insist on
democratic reforms in these conditions. The other side of this theory is that in
conditions of extreme poverty, citizens have little to lose and therefore may have an
incentive to rebel against a regime that is keeping them poor, especially if the elites
are living lavishly. Another more nuanced version of this theory is not that absolute
poverty will lead to authoritarian persistence, but that income inequality will. Large
gaps between the rich and the poor will create divisions in society that an authoritarian
regime can exploit to stay in power. They can promise to keep the wealthy in their
positions of power, while continuing to make promises to the poor that the regime is
the only avenue out of poverty.
Cultural theories of authoritarian persistence
If certain cultural characteristics are more amenable to democratic government,
than the reverse must also be true: cultural values will lead to more authoritarian
governments. Various interpretations have emerged out of this general line of thought.
Some have argued that Asian values are less democratic, others have argued that
Islamic values are antithetical to democracy. Still others have argued that a centralist
Latin American culture leads to more authoritarianism. As we have noted in previous
chapters, however, these arguments are difficult to support and there are plenty of
exceptions to seriously question this hypothesis. Furthermore, it treats culture as
essentialist, meaning it is unchangeable and destined for certain outcomes. What is
perhaps more convincing is that cultural traditions or symbols are used effectively and
strategically to legitimize an authoritarian government, thus giving it staying-power. If
a leader can appeal to broad cultural traditions and convince the population that he or
she is the natural successor to carry out these cultural traditions, this can go a long
way towards institutionalizing authoritarianism. Because culture is often seen as
inherited and therefore passed on by blood, a leader that argues that he is the
embodiment of culture can also argue that a rejection of his leadership is a rejection
of culture.
Postcolonial theories of authoritarian persistence
In short, a postcolonial perspective would argue that colonization and
subsequent decolonization are at loggerheads with democratization, and further,
create the structure under which authoritarian regimes are able to stay in power over
long periods of time. In Citizen and Subject, Mamdani (2018) argues that not only is
the postcolonial state in a disadvantaged state to democratize, but the legacy of
colonization left a power vacuum that was easily filled by authoritarianism. In some
cases, rulers appeal to colonial-style governance and argue that this model must
continue for the sake of continuity and stability. In other cases, rulers argue that a
clean and profound break from colonial-era politics is necessary to resist neo-
colonization and to forge a true postcolonial identity and culture. (Schneider, 2006).
Either way, colonization leaves a structure that is particularly prone to authoritarianism,
and continued support from major global powers can further consolidate authoritarian
rule.
Student Feature: Equatorial Guinea
Full Country Name: Republic of Equatorial Guinea
Head(s) of State: President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo
Head of Government: Prime Minister Manuela Roka
Government: Authoritarian constitutional republic
Official Languages: Spanish, French, Portuguese
Economic System: Market-based economy
Location: Central Africa
Capital: Malabo; Ciudad de la Paz under construction to replace it
Total land size: 28,051 sq km, 10,830 sq mi
Population: 1,737,695 GDP: $12.27 Billion GDP per capita: $7,506.70 Currency:
Central African CFA franc
The Republic of Equatorial Guinea, often referred to as Equatorial Guinea or
EQG, has an intimate relationship with authoritarian rule. First, it was under Spanish
colonization (unusual in Africa) until 1963. Upon independence, inhabitants of the
island Bioko and inhabitants of the mainland (called Rio Muni) engaged in a debate
over whether to remain unified or to separate. Under its first president, Francisco
Macias Nguema (1968 - 1979), EQG saw totalitarian rule in which torture, ethic
violence, and the killing of political dissidents was commonplace. The current
president, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, has served as the country’s leader
since usurping his uncle in a 1979 coup. While EQG has become slightly less
totalitarian since the regime change, it remains concretely authoritarian under Obiang.
Even today, the country serves as a representative case in which all theories of
authoritarianism and its persistence are applicable, indicating that no one theory is
perfect.
EQG demonstrates the overlap between historical institutionalism and
postcolonialism, as well as its weaknesses. The former focuses on the formation of a
coalition of elites at a particular moment in time; the latter focuses on the particular
moments in the postcolonial era that also produce authoritarian elites. To observe this
in EQG, we need to go back to the time of its independence in 1968. Backed by the
Spanish government under Francisco Franco, Francisco Marcias Nguema initially
presented himself as loyal to the government that was in the process of decolonizing
the country. The belief was that he would maintain their established status quo, and
the elite Spanish landowners would keep their power. In the country’s only free and
fair election, Nguema found himself legitimized by this Spanish support. But it was not
the Spanish coalition that held on to institutional power. Almost immediately upon
assuming power, the newly elected president consolidated power and painted himself
as the one who had pushed out the Spanish colonizers. In doing so, he kept control of
the institutions previously held by the Spanish and began to move toward more
authoritarian rule.
Looking at the theories on economic development, we would expect Equatorial
Guinea to be a very poor nation in which the citizens allow authoritarian rule because
they are more focused on economic security for themselves. Surprisingly, EQG is
economically strong on paper, at least at first glance. Between just 1995 and 2021, the
GDP per capita of EQG has gone from approximately $253 to an estimated $7,506,
according to the World Bank. This, however, is where the good news ends. Other
indicators of economic development show a different picture. One issue is that a
majority of the country’s GDP can be attributed to oil and natural gas, which has been
its biggest commodity by far following the discovery of the resources in 1995. This
reliance on oil and gas has negatively impacted EQG’s economic development, as
their economy is very volatile and fluctuates with the price of oil. Also, due to the tight
control of Obiang’s government over major institutions, much of the wealth has gone
directly to him and those close to him. As a result, there is a high degree of income
inequality between the rich and poor of the country. Based on our theories on
economic development and poverty, we can predict that such inequality and lack of
development has stifled the formation of a strong middle class, and people are simply
unable to fight for greater democracy.
Another explanation for authoritarian persistence in EQG has to do with there
being a barrier to collective action. This perspective would suggest that any action
against Obiang’s regime is met with some form of repression, and therefore people do
not see it to be in their best interest to act against the government. This, if anything, is
an understatement in the case of Equatorial Guinea. Strict media control, exile,
imprisonment, torture, and executions are common tools of the former and current
regimes. News comes primarily from the state-run RTVGE, with the only other source
being run by Obiang’s son and Vice President. Independent journalists and political
dissidents are frequently subject to imprisonment, freedom of assembly is almost
nonexistent, and all other political parties work as a coalition with the dominant PDGE.
Least applicable but still worth noting are political culture theories, which
suggests there are certain values that contribute to the emergence and persistence of
authoritarian regimes. In the case of EQG, this can be seen in the form of tribalism,
where the majority ethnic Fang population see the regime as a triumph of their people
over the other ethnic groups (namely the Bubi). Institutional weakness is another easily
observed issue in Equatorial Guinea, with 15 of the 70 seats of the legislature directly
appointed by the president and the other 55 almost completely dominated by the
dominant PDGE party. The body that appoints judges is overseen by the president,
and he is often consulted directly on rulings. Needless to say, the elections of the
executive are widely regarded as rigged, and Obiang has served as president for
nearly 44 years. All other institutions are in some way influenced by the regime, and
are therefore able to function in a way that could effectively combat the efforts of said
regime to maintain its control.
The case of Equatorial Guinea is a demonstration of the complexity of theory in
comparative politics. It seems that all the major explanations for authoritarian
persistence apply quite well to this state. The fact that so many variables go into a
state remaining authoritarian also demonstrates how difficult it is to unravel an
entrenched non-democracy, even if there is domestic or international will to do so. If
there are cases that effectively demonstrate all major explanations of authoritarian
persistence, then we can expect to see one case embodying all leading explanations
of democratic breakdown. After considering theories of democratic backsliding, some
of which are clearly rooted in authoritarian persistence, we will consider the case of
the United States.
