BELLICIST THEORY

BELLICIST THEORY

Now that we have explored the definition of modern statehood, as well as some

of the ingredients that, at least theoretically, distinguish states from previous forms of

political organization, we must now ask how did the state emerge and become the

dominant source of legitimate authority today? To answer this question, scholars have

developed several theories, which we will explore below.

Perhaps the most popular set of theories for the emergence of the modern state

is that “war made the state, and the state made war” (Tilly, 1985, p. 170). This is a

famous quote from the foremost scholar from this tradition, Charles Tilly. The argument

to strong states. This is called the bellicist theory since the main explanatory variable

is bellicosity, or warfare. Clearly, this is rooted in the traditional story of the thirty-year

stalemate in 17th century Europe. Bellicist theorists have an answer to the puzzle

discussed above that questions whether the state is truly a European phenomenon:

China and other societies such as those in Latin America and Africa did not experience

as much external conflict with other empires (Centeno, 2002; Herbst, 1990; Hui, 2005).

Therefore, European powers had the need to consolidate their societies into more

efficient war-fighting machines. Fighting wars meant rulers needed a more

sophisticated bureaucracy, a more streamlined taxation system, and a consistent

source of willing fighters. The state, specifically the European state, solves these

the nation, and whether nationalism is necessary for a state to emerge. Furthermore,

in order to shield itself from charges of Eurocentrism, one would have to show how the

European wars of the 17th century were sufficiently unique from most of the previous

wars as well as those outside of Europe to have led to state creation that centuries of

other wars did not have. Indeed, to make this claim, one would have to be clear about

what constitutes an “external conflict.”

The Iroquois Confederacy arguably fought several external wars not only with

neighboring Indigenous peoples of North America but also with further-flung foes such

as the Dutch and the French. Known colloquially as the “Beaver Wars,” this series of

conflicts also took place during the same period as the so-called birth of sovereignty

in Europe and resulted in the defeat of several rival communities such as the Hurons

and the Mahicans (Starna & Brandao, 2004). In fact, one could argue that “external

peculiar cases of state-building in the Global South: Lesotho and Afghanistan. In both

cases, war certainly played a central role, but other factors also point to the

weaknesses of the bellicist position.

Snapshot Case Study: Afghanistan

Full Country Name : Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

Head of State : Hibatullah Akhundzada

Government : Theocracy

Official Language : Afghan Persian or Dari

Economic System : Informal

Currency : Afghani

Rubin (2002, p. 19) describes Afghanistan as “a borderland between empires.”

Indeed, it has been the subject of invasion and division by Arab, Persian and Moghuls

empires over several centuries, before being caught between the British and the

Russian empires in the 19th century. It achieved full independence after World War I

but had the basic vestiges of a state prior to this. Already, the thesis that non-European

civilizations didn’t evolve into states due to a lack of external warfare should be called

into question considering this case. Thus, Afghanistan could be considered a

representative case in the Global South of warfare weakening the state.

During the Soviet occupation from 1979-1989, despite having a common

enemy, the government was unable to unify the various linguistic, ethnic, and religious

groups into a centralized bureaucracy capable of efficiently extracting resources and

After September 11th, 2001, the US demanded that the Taliban surrender

Osama bin Laden. When the Taliban refused, the US led an invasion along with NATO

which quickly toppled the Taliban government; but the Taliban continued an insurgency

against the US-backed government from Pakistan during which they consolidated

power perhaps more considerably than when they controlled the government directly.

From 2001-2021, the United States, despite considerable economic, political, and

military resources, also struggled to establish the basic elements of statehood, most

significantly the monopoly on the use of force and legitimacy.

When the US abruptly left Afghanistan in August of 2021, once again the Taliban

found it rather easy to take over the country, perhaps because of the war-fighting and

the country is now enduring a humanitarian and economic catastrophe due to the

sudden withdraw of billions of dollars of foreign aid upon the Taliban’s takeover.

While there is some evidence that the Taliban may be trying to be more “state

like” now than they were prior to 2001, it is still far from a strong state, despite having

the so-called advantages of interstate warfare throughout much of its history. In fact,

war has had the opposite effect: war has made Afghanistan weaker. On the one hand,

this case serves as a counter point to Tilly’s original hypothesis; on the other hand, it

might bolster his hypothesis by teaching us lessons about the struggles that failed

European states experienced, such as the incompatibility between statehood and

religious authority and the challenges of an ethnically and linguistically diverse

population (Taylor & Botea, 2008). Ultimately, war did not make Afghanistan a strong

Official Language : Sesotho, English

Government : Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy

Economic System : Informal

Location : Southern Africa

Capital : Maseru

Total land size : 30,355 sq km; 11,720 sq miles

Population : 2,210,646

GDP : $5.236 billion

GDP per capita : $2,300

Currency : Loti

circumstances that led to Lesotho’s formation are difficult to replicate and some

aspects are very specific to the era of colonialism.

What would eventually become the Kingdom of Lesotho was originally known

as Basuto, born out of the Mfecane in the 1820s. Moshoeshoe, the first king of Basuto,

was able to consolidate many neighboring chiefdoms into his nation-state during this

period of mass unrest, famine, and war (Mofuoa, 2016). This was in large part due to

the mountainous and defensible geography Basuto was founded upon, and

willingness to adapt to the times; Moshoeshoe eventually acquired what is thought to

be “more horses and firearms than any other chief in South Africa,” with guns

becoming a critical and reoccurring part of their history (Atmore & Sanders, 1971, p.

536). After a series of wars with the Boers in the late 1850s and 1860s, most of the

from what would eventually become the Republic of South Africa and would be a

separately administered Crown Colony until its independence in 1966.

For a state to exist, it must have the sufficient means to maintain its internal as

well as external sovereignty. Otherwise, it simply won’t be seen as legitimate by the

people within its borders or other entities abroad. Bellicist theory provides a simple

explanation as to how states were able to come upon said means; conflict fueled the

need for a more organized state as it was more effective at maintaining and preserving

itself than older empires. Parts of this theory do match with Lesotho’s history well; the

gun culture of Lesotho was absolutely born out of its long history of conflict in the

region. As Eldredge (2007, p. 71) points out, in reference to the eventual Gun War:

history of conflict. This history of conflict simultaneously worked as an incentive to fight

when the Cape Colony attempted to enforce the Peace Preservation Act (with the goal

of disarming the general public), and as a means to fight, as their inclination and

procurement of firearms obviously aided them during the Gun War.

The problem, however, is that warfare theories don’t adequately explain the

persistence of the Lesotho state and its enclaved nature. To be fair, it had the means

and some notable geographical advantages, but it was almost completely annexed by

the Boers in the 1860s. It also would make sense that Lesotho, as it didn’t expand,

would have likely been reintegrated into the Cape Colony especially after the Cape

Colony’s successes against the Boers and the creation of the Union of South Africa.

At that point it would have been a much weaker state by comparison and having a

spread thin and relied on indirect rule over chiefs as it couldn’t afford to send more

colonial magistrates. After the British loss at Isandlwana, there was also a fear of a

mass loss of confidence in British rule and open, organized rebellion. The Peace

Preservation Act of 1878 enabled the “preemptive disarmament of any group where

rebellion had occurred or was feared”; it was a last-ditch effort to maintain internal

sovereignty in the region as indirect rule failed and the threat of rebellions grew

(Eldredge, 2007, p. 55). This weak, indirect rule echoes the problems empires had in

general, and was the perfect stage for Lesotho independence.

The most important factor, though, and one that’s extremely difficult to replicate,

is the fact that Lesotho (Or then, Basutoland) remained a British colony after its dis-

with colonial powers that allowed Lesotho to become an enclave and persist as one.

While some of these factors may not be inherently unique, their combination is rare;

Lesotho is an extremely rare state that is largely a relic of its colonial past. Thus, while

bellicist theories help to explain the curious case of Lesotho, other factors such as

culture, economy, nationalism, and colonization are also important. We will consider

these in subsequent sections.