EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES THROUGH EFFECTIVE TSUNAMI
RISK COMMUNICATION CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS LEARNED
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
COM 415 - RISK COMMUNICATION
WEEK 3
A.
Risk Communication Strategies in the Face of Tsunami Natural Disaster:
There are three general approaches to perspectives on risk according to Ortwin Renn's
theory. The first perspective can be called the scientific approach to risk. The second
perspective can be labeled the psychological approach to risk. The third approach can be
called the cultural approach to risk. Based on the author's findings in the field, risk
communication in dealing with tsunami natural disasters focuses on two perspectives on risk,
namely the psychological approach and the cultural approach to risk. This can be seen from
the diverse perceptions of risk when the author sought out the meaning of tsunami disaster
risk and related to the community's awareness of the potential tsunami that could occur.
There are different stigmas in understanding risk itself, so there are various perceptions
regarding public awareness in terms of participation in tsunami preparedness socialization. In
fact, not only the community but also This is the case for entrepreneurs working in tourism in
tsunami-prone areas. They still think that communicating externally to the public that their
location is a tsunami-prone area is a disgrace. Therefore, risk communication cannot be done
maximally and simultaneously.
Talking about risk communication, of course, the hope is that the community can
understand what is called risk, which raises awareness, understanding and creates a discipline
and compliance to carry it out. Especially in the case of tsunamis, it is actually very hopeful
that the community understands the risks because the problem of tsunamis compared to other
disasters is a relatively unpredictable disaster. Looking at the Sunda Strait tsunami incident in
2018, it was phenomenal because it was not caused by an earthquake, so what BNPB did was
to build efforts, especially what is called Destana or an abbreviation for Disaster Resilient
Village. Communication through Destana is the most ideal because the community can grow
in a community, for example a village or village. So when talking about things that are only
for socialization, it basically does not have a settling effect on the community.
One way to build public awareness about tsunamis is for BMKG to create a tsunami
ready board game. When we play, we act as a community leader and must have the power to
how to achieve the twelve indicators of the Tsunami Recognition Requirements Ready is
fulfilled. The game is like a puzzle, whoever can quickly fulfill the twelve indicators will be
the winner. Just like in Tanjung Benoa, not just approaching BPBD, the Governor and
Deputy Governor, but behind the preparedness they have likes and dislikes, so those who are
approached are the elders, and those who are approached are the Tanjung Benoa traditional
village and the Tengkulu traditional village. This is different from the village government, so
this is a traditional village. The head of an adat village is different from the village head. The
village head is part of the government bureaucracy, but the customary village head is not
related to the bureaucracy.
B.
The Role of Bureaucracy in Preparing for a Tsunami Natural Disaster:
Developing and maintaining a level of preparedness is not an easy task. It takes effort and
consistency from all elements involved in the preparedness process. In accordance with the
nature of preparedness that can change, it needs support from various parties. In the
Guidelines for Community-Based Earthquake and Tsunami Preparedness. In developing the
preparedness of a community, there are several aspects that require attention, namely:
1.
Planning and organization: the existence of directives and policies, appropriate and
updated emergency management plans (not lagging), adequate disaster management
organizational structure.
2.
Resources: a complete inventory of all organizational resources and a clear division of
duties and responsibilities.
3.
Coordination: strengthening coordination among institutions/organizations and
eliminating friction and enhancing cooperation among relevant institutions/organizations.
4.
Readiness: the disaster management organizational unit should take full responsibility
for monitoring and maintaining the readiness standards of all elements.
5.
Training and Public Awareness: there is a need for adequate training and public
awareness as well as the availability of adequate and accurate information.
To support efforts to increase preparedness, the following elements are needed:
1.
Adequate policies and regulations (legal products)
2.
A permanent, specialized Disaster Management Agency/Unit to monitor and maintain
preparedness levels.
3.
Identification, assessment and monitoring of disaster threat forms (sources, possible
victims, losses, service disruptions, disruption of economic/social activities)
4.
Emergency planning / contingency planning, involving various resource organizations,
clarity of duties and responsibilities
5.
Resource utilization (an up-to-date inventory of all available resources is required).
Early warning and risk reduction are the responsibility of the government. Therefore,
effective governance structures and strong institutional arrangements are required. Strong
legislative frameworks, planning and adequate funding as well as political commitment at all
levels are essential foundation of an effective early warning system. This refers to
organizational communication with Max Weber's bureaucracy theory which talks about the
principles of bureaucracy, one of which is about Rules with its implementation is to carry out
procedures set by the organization or management by individuals. In relation to the behavior
of individuals in the organization to carry out the rules or procedures set by management in
the implementation of the risk communication model, the theory of planned behavior is used
to be able to change people's behavior to want to carry out risk communication. Individual
understanding in addition to demographic and segmentation factors that must be considered,
there is an element of experience that is faced variously in each individual, especially in
tsunami disasters that cause trauma. This communication behavior among stakeholders
influences the actions of individuals to be willing or unwilling to make invitations to
understand tsunami risks and also to actively participate in risk communication activities.
Behavior change to become a risk community that is aware and resilient to disasters is a
manifestation of successful risk communication.
Vertical and horizontal exchange of information and coordination among stakeholders in
InaTEWS early warning is an important step to build a consistent and sustainable warning
system. Early warning systems are complex and require interconnected relationships between
many disciplines, such as natural and social sciences, engineering, governance and public
services, disaster management arrangements, mass media, and mentoring society. As such,
the development and maintenance of a warning system demands the contribution and
coordination of a wide range of individuals and institutions. Without the involvement of all
stakeholders, such as government authorities and agencies in various sectors at all levels,
communities at risk of disasters, community organizations (CSOs) or non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and the private sector, the early warning system will not be effective.
Whether or not warnings reach communities in disaster risk areas depends on the awareness
and ability to carry out the roles and responsibilities of all actors in the communication chain.
Based on worldwide experience with early warning, international disaster academics and
practitioners, who have attended three global early warning conferences (in 1998, 2003 and
2006), agree that the requirement for a complete and effective people-centered early warning
system is the fulfillment of four separate but interwoven components: risk knowledge, hazard
monitoring and warning services, dissemination and communication, and response capability
(UNISDR, 2006).
The communication chain enables timely and effective dissemination of tsunami early
warning news and guidance. The news and guidance are issued by authorized and recognized
institutions using agreed communication channels, so that communities at risk of tsunami
threats can respond in time to leave risk areas and save themselves before the tsunami reaches
the coast. This communication chain links the National Tsunami Early Warning Center with
at-risk communities along Indonesia's tsunami-prone coastline.
Parties who play a role in chain InaTEWS tsunami early warning communication chain
include:
1.
Meteorology Climatology and Geophysics Agency (BMKG),
2.
Local governments (pemda) at provincial, district and city levels,
3.
National and regional television (TV) and radio stations (government and private),
4.
National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB),
5.
Indonesian National Army (TNI),
6.
Indonesian National Police (POLRI),
7.
Communities at risk of disaster,
8.
Cellular service providers, and
9.
Hotel/tourist center manager
Institutions that play a role in this early warning chain are obliged to immediately
confirm (manually) that they have received the early warning message sent by BMKG. This
confirmation is practiced through receiving earthquake news.
The parties in the tsunami early warning communication chain have their respective roles
and responsibilities.
1.
BMKG:
It is the provider of tsunami early warning news in Indonesia. BMKG conveys
earthquake news, tsunami early warning news and advice for follow-up in tsunami
threatened areas to other parties in the tsunami early warning communication chain.
Currently, BMKG is not able to provide all handled in conducting risk communication
through stakeholder engagement because of the vast area at risk. The only safe areas are
between Kalimantan and Sumatra, Kalimantan and Central Java, but the north coast,
West Java, and the north coast of East Java need to be watched. So nationally, the
BMKG is still working hard. The BMKG has a program package of earthquake and
tsunami field school activities to prepare stakeholders, the community related to the
preparation for earthquakes and tsunamis. However, some of the points mentioned earlier
have been well realized, such as the presence of warning devices in BPBDs, sirens, but
because they are quite expensive, they cannot be sufficient for all beaches.
Then also how the BMKG realizes earthquake-resistant zones because it is not easy
for people to build earthquake-resistant buildings. Private companies can still be directed
so that buildings must be earthquake resistant in order to gain trust. However, the
community cannot, so they are still weak and vulnerable, but educationally the BMKG
continues to work by traveling around cities, districts, provinces to educate the
community and related leaders and stakeholders as well as BPBDs. Stakeholder
engagement in building risk communication is very important. It is necessary to involve
BMKG, BPBD, local government, SAR, police, TNI, health department.
Stakeholder mapping in risk communication carried out by BMKG, talking about the
focus on earthquake and tsunami, BMKG, BNPB, PVMBG, then there is support for
news broadcasting such as involving national media such as RRI and TVRI. For example
This has been done several years ago with a stop press on TVRI when there is a tsunami
or a big earthquake, but in fact there are 8 national TV stations not simultaneously and
the format is different. Upstream, the information goes to each local government and
there are BPBD, TNI Polri, SAR, Health Office, Social Office, NGOs, PHRI, PMI, and
so on. The most important thing should be that if the local government is able to pass on
this hazard information to the community, it is good. In the 12 indicators of tsunami
preparedness, the bottom two mention that the local government or community receives
information in the PDT and the community disseminates it.
2.
BNPB:
BNPB is obliged to follow up on earthquake news and tsunami early warnings and
advice delivered by BMKG. The BNPB helps disseminate tsunami early warnings and
advice to the Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD). In addition, BNPB is
obliged to immediately prepare an emergency response, namely search and rescue
activities and emergency assistance, after the tsunami threat has ended.
Disasters are the nation's business, and BNPB cannot handle them alone. The ideal is
how to create champions from the community itself. BNPB's role as a stakeholder in
disaster management from 2004 until now has done a lot and is recognized by the world.
The development is clear and quite significant. For example, SPAB (Disaster Safe
Education Unit) is a program that imitates what has been done by Japan related to
disaster management. There are three pillars that must be built to build a safe education
unit, but obviously the consistency is not like in Japan, and if there is a break in this risk
communication and then start again, it will be difficult.
3.
Local Government:
Local governments are obliged to follow up on earthquake and tsunami early
warning information and advice provided by the BMKG. The local government is the
only party in the tsunami early warning communication chain that has the authority and
responsibility to decide and officially announce the evacuation status based on
information from the BMKG. Based on Law 24/2007 articles 46 and 47; Government
Regulation 21/2008 article 19 and BNPB Regulation 3/2008, especially in Chapter 2, it is
the responsibility of the local government to immediately and widely announce clear and
instructive directions to assist residents and visitors in the area to act quickly and
appropriately against the tsunami threat.
4.
BASARNAS:
There are many stakeholders involved according to Basarnas, starting from the TNI,
Polri, and local governments, but indeed for the evacuation cluster disaster it is Basarnas.
Because Basarnas is the leader for evacuation even though there are from the TNI, Polri
from the Regional Government or those outside the Regional Government. When
implementing SAR and having SAR certification, they still report to the local Basarnas.
Basarnas collects data, divides search points, lest there be further victims. Like the
incident on Mount Merapi Jogja, it was not recorded and did not report to Basarnas. SAR
post when the evacuation was carried out then the victim died. Finally, one person died
because he did not coordinate during the evacuation. It happened in 2010. In accordance
with Law No.29 of 2014, it is stated regarding its regulations and also in Law No.24 of
2007 related to disaster, it is stated that during emergency response evacuation, the
leading sector is SAR, in this case Basarnas.
5.
TNI:
The TNI is obliged to follow up on earthquake news and tsunami early warnings and
advice provided by the BMKG. The TNI takes part in efforts to disseminate earthquake
news or tsunami early warning news, especially at the regional level. If an evacuation
status is announced, the TNI can support the evacuation process of the community. The
TNI is obliged to immediately prepare an emergency response, namely search and rescue
activities and emergency assistance, after the tsunami threat has ended.
6.
POLRI:
The Indonesian National Police is obliged to follow up on earthquake news and
tsunami early warnings and advice provided by the BMKG. The police take part in
efforts to disseminate news of an earthquake or tsunami early warning, especially at the
regional level. If an evacuation status is announced, the police can support the evacuation
of the community. POLRI is obliged to immediately prepare an emergency response, i.e.
search and rescue activities and emergency assistance, after the tsunami threat has ended.
7.
TV and radio stations:
TV and radio stations at the national or local level (public and private) are obliged to
broadcast earthquake news and tsunami early warnings and advice from the BMKG. This
is based on Law 31/2009 article 34 and Minister of Communication and Information
Regulation 20/2006 articles 1-5. TV and radio stations are parties in the tsunami early
warning communication chain that have direct and quick access to the public. TV and
radio stations are obliged to immediately suspend ongoing broadcasts and broadcast
tsunami early warnings and advice received from the BMKG to viewers and listeners.
8.
People at Risk:
Communities at risk are entitled to information about tsunami threats as well as
instructive guidance that enables people at risk to act appropriately and quickly.
Communities are responsible for being prepared to save themselves from the threat of
earthquakes and tsunamis. Individuals and community institutions are obliged to pass on
correct information and guidance to others. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
such as the Indonesian Amateur Radio Organization (ORARI), Radio Antar Penduduk
Indonesia (RAPI) and Search and Rescue (SAR) play a role in disseminating earthquake
news, tsunami early warning news and advice provided by BMKG.
9.
Mobile Service Providers:
Mobile service providers are one part of the chain of earthquake news and tsunami
early warning dissemination via SMS. These service providers are obliged to forward
earthquake news and tsunami early warning messages from the BMKG to registered
mobile phone users. Internally, the service provider should also give higher priority to the
delivery of SMS from the BMKG than general SMS, such as individual SMS. Thus, in
situations where the flow of SMS is heavy, SMS from the BMKG will take precedence in
the queue to reach users. They are also required to keep the server for this service
operating continuously and in good condition, all of which are free of charge.
10.
Hotel and Restaurant Association of Indonesia (PHRI):
PHRI is a forum to voice hotel and restaurant entrepreneurs on the coast. So far, the
concern of the community, the central and local governments and related agencies also
feel the need to provide more information and education. Not long ago, a meeting was
held with BMKG, all government officials, village heads, and tourism players on the
coast about the latest conditions. Training on seismic information is more frequent now
than in the past because in the past people were less concerned.
The creation of tsunami mitigation is currently left to each tourist actor
independently. For mitigation programs as a whole, PHRI had invited disaster experts
and the participants were tourism players to try to build awareness. BMKG said that they
can do their own mitigation and follow the existing regulations. For example, by not
building less than 100 meters of beach frontage in the future.
11.
Hotel Manager:
Hotel managers are obliged to rescue guests staying at the hotel, visiting the hotel,
and the community in the vicinity of the hotel. Hotel managers are responsible for
preparing all procedures and action plans for earthquake and tsunami emergencies
through the following steps: establish a mechanism for receiving early warnings from the
BMKG or Pusdalops or BPBD; provide complete information to guests on the steps to be
taken during a tsunami emergency; and prepare temporary evacuation sites and
evacuation signs both inside the hotel building and outside the building (evacuation
within the hotel building must meet the requirements of earthquake and tsunami resistant
buildings and have a height exceeding the estimated tsunami height in the area). If hotel
guests have to evacuate outside the hotel, the hotel management is obliged to provide
complete information to guests on the location of temporary evacuation sites and guide
guests to the evacuation sites in the event of a tsunami emergency.
12.
Health Center:
The role of puskesmas in terms of health-related disaster mitigation is to prepare a
work plan on how to deal with disasters. Socialization involves cross-sectors in the sub-
district, then to villages. Usually for tsunami-prone areas, there is an SOP for tsunami
disaster services.
BMKG provides earthquake news and tsunami early warning news as well as advice
to be followed up by the government regional government (pemda). Local governments
have the authority to officially decide if their region is in "tsunami evacuation status" or
not. In the Guidelines for Simulation of Community Preparedness for Earthquake and
Tsunami Threats, there are three main tasks of local governments in tsunami early
warning services. To fulfill their roles and responsibilities in tsunami early warning
services, local governments are expected to be able to carry out the following three (3)
tasks: Receive earthquake information and tsunami early warnings as well as advice from
the BMKG appropriately and continuously (24/7) through various communication
channels; Make decisions quickly and in a timely manner to determine local reactions
(e.g. whether people need to evacuate or not), based on earthquake information, tsunami
early warnings and advice from the BMKG through standard operating procedures;
Disseminate earthquake information and tsunami early warnings widely and provide
clear and instructive directions to the community and local institutions widely, directly
and in a timely manner using various means and communication channels that enable all
tsunami threatened communities to receive them. To fulfill these three roles and tasks,
local governments have to fulfill various institutional, legal, personnel, procedural and
technical requirements of a building in OSH science. So that local governments must
learn more about the requirements that have been set by experts.
C.
Media and Risk Communication Activities in Facing Tsunami Natural Disasters with
Stakeholders:
1.
Understanding Messages in Creating Tsunami Risk Communication:
In processing risk communication messages, we must first understand the function of
communication. As Harold D. Lasswell suggests that the functions of communication include
controlling the environment, in order to adapt to the environment in which they are located,
transforming social heritage to the next generation.
Sources of data or information to be used as a message to the public or community must
also be considered. Sources of data can be obtained from government agencies related to
disaster either through websites, press statements and other sources that have been formally
approved by institutions related to this matter to be published. In addition, data sources can
also be obtained from literacy books, academic journals and also disaster-related seminar or
symposium activities that can be accounted for the content of the information. This is
important to know in order to avoid any misinformation in forming a risk communication
message itself.
Deep understanding, not just knowing the recipient of the message is a must for anyone
who will create risk communication messages. When the message is created, this element will
determine whether the message will be delivered properly to the intended target. So
understanding the audience is very important in shaping risk communication messages.
After the basic understanding is mastered and understood correctly, the next step is to
determine the key facts or issues that will be conveyed in the message. Then determine and
select the most important benefits that will be conveyed in the content of the message. And
finally, determine the key message points that will be conveyed in all messages that will be
conveyed in all risk communication activities. All of that must be done consistently and
nothing is left behind so that awareness and behavior change are expected from the message
delivered.
Based on the Guidelines for Simulation of Community Preparedness Facing the Threat of
Earthquakes and Tsunamis, BMKG will issue 4 (four) stages of seismic-related news, starting
from the occurrence of an earthquake until the end of the tsunami threat, namely:
1.
News 1: disseminated earthquake parameters and tsunami impact estimates described in
three threat states (AWAS, SIAGA and WASPADA) for each potentially tsunami-
affected area.
2.
News 2: contains improvements to the earthquake parameters and in addition to the
threat status in News 1. It also contains the estimated arrival time of the tsunami at the
coast.
3.
News 3: contains tsunami observation results and threat status improvements that can be
disseminated several times depending on the tsunami observation results at tide gauge
stations, buoys, CCTV and tsunami radar.
4.
News 4: is a statement that the tsunami early warning has ended (the threat has ended).
The following is an explanation of the order in which tsunami early warnings were
issued and the expected actions of local governments and communities at risk:
T0 - T1: When an earthquake occurs (T0), all earthquake recording sensors located at
seismic stations around the earthquake source will record earthquake data and send it to the
processing center at BMKG Headquarters for processing. For earthquakes in Indonesia, it
takes less than 5 minutes (T0-T1).
The automated seismic data processing system at BMKG Headquarters outputs the
earthquake parameters, and the SeisComP3 officer checks the results of the automated
processing and corrects them interactively until the appropriate earthquake parameters are
obtained. If there is a potential tsunami, the operator can determine the potentially affected
areas and the threat status using the DSS.
The earthquake parameters are sent to the dissemination system and also to the DSS. The
DSS then processes them and provides an overview of the proposals that are ready to
proceed, for which the DSS officer must press a button to obtain a proposal from the DSS.
The end result of the DSS is an early warning news proposal or an earthquake news proposal
that will be sent to the dissemination system at the discretion of the DSS officer.
If the earthquake is large and felt very strongly or the earthquake is not strong but felt for
a long time, people in disaster risk areas should take immediate action self-rescue without
having to wait for early warning news from BMKG.
T1: Transmission of earthquake news or tsunami early warning news (T1 ≤ 5 minutes).
Earthquake news with a magnitude above 5.0 SR will be disseminated simultaneously via
SMS, e-mail and fax to local governments, relevant officials and mobile phone numbers that
have been registered in the BMKG's list of earthquake information recipients. If the
earthquake parameters indicate a tsunami threat (tectonic earthquake with a magnitude >7 SR
and depth <100 km and epicenter located at sea or on land near the sea), then News 1 is
disseminated based on the output of the DSS using the tsunami model in the tsunami
database. News 1 contains the parameters of the earthquake and/or, if available, information
on the estimated tsunami impact described in three threat statuses (AWAS, SIAGA or
WASPADA) for each potentially affected area.
T2: Depending on the respective threat status, the local government should immediately
react to News 1 by deciding whether evacuation is necessary and announce it to the public
using existing facilities, such as sounding sirens, mosque loudspeakers, drums, or other aids.
The public should be able to understand the alert and follow the direction of the local
government to evacuate to the designated safe place.
T3: News 2 contains improvements to the earthquake parameters and threat status. It also
contains the estimated arrival time of the tsunami at the coast.
T4: News 3 contains tsunami observation results and threat status improvements that can
be disseminated several times depending on the tsunami observation results at tide gauge and
buoy stations.
T5 - T6: BMKG continues to monitor the spread of the tsunami and provides tsunami
information updates via News 3 (can be multiple).
T7: News 4 contains the announcement "tsunami threat has ended" and is issued after
receiving supporting data from tide gauges and/or the public has confirmed that the tsunami is
no longer visible. News 4 is issued at the earliest 2 hours after News 1 (T1) has been
disseminated.
The impact of a tsunami can be estimated through tsunami scenarios. Currently, the
BMKG has a database containing hundreds of thousands of precalculated tsunami scenarios.
The DSS uses a simulation system to quickly select the appropriate tsunami scenario in order
to estimate the tsunami impact. Estimated arrival times and tsunami heights at the coast are
also available in these scenarios. These predictions are updated every time earthquake and
sensor data are updated.
Tsunami heights based on the results of this calculation are divided into three tsunami
threat statuses, namely:
1.
Tsunami height ≥ 3 meters presents threat status STAND BY!
2.
Tsunami heights ≥ 0.5 and < 3 meters present status alert threat
3.
Tsunami height < 0.5 meters presents a WARNING threat status.
Tsunami heights greater than 3 meters will have widespread impacts and may extend
hundreds of meters to several kilometers from the coastline inland, for example during the
tsunami in Aceh in 2004 the inundation length was up to 5 kilometers inland. This will
depend on the height of the tsunami and the topographic shape of the coast.
Tsunamis between 0.5 and 3 meters in height have a smaller impact, ranging from a few
tens of meters to a hundred meters depending on the topography of the coast, such as the
tsunami in Pangandaran, West Java, in 2006. This type of tsunami only damages the area
around the coast.
Tsunamis with a height of less than 0.5 meters will only have an impact around the
coastline, for example the tsunami that occurred in southern West Java during the
Tasikmalaya earthquake in 2009. In this case the tsunami did not cause much damage far
from the coastline inland. However, tsunami waves as high as 40 centimeters can cause
fatalities if they hit people or the tsunami current carries hard or sharp materials.
BNPB gave the most ideal example in risk communication is prototyping. Piloting a
place is trying to become a disaster resilient tourism village and create a different mindset in
order to influence the surroundings. If an area is very religious, then find a different approach
who are religious. Many of them think that it precedes destiny, so why did Noah build a ship
to save his people. From the story, risk communication can be done for some people with a
religious approach to understanding. In Islam, we are taught to have faith, so the most
important thing is to capture the local character first, learn its characteristics.
The closest example at this time is when many people still wear masks even though there
has been an announcement from Mr. Jokowi that it is permissible to remove masks in the
open air, and that is also an example that people already have their own "belief" awareness.
And they already feel comfortable wearing masks because they are safe.
Starting from "believe" then needs to be packaged how the Campaign and must be
strengthened from a detailed knowledge perspective, so the most important thing is how to
create the "believe" first and in some cases it must be simultaneous because this is a process.
There are records in Dutch catalogs from 1699, 1708 to 1901 of three earthquakes whose
sources were not in Jakarta but outside Jakarta but damaged Jakarta. It was told that in the
past in Jakarta there were still many swamps so that in the past buffaloes could still be found
in Jakarta, and at that time most elements of garden workers experienced shaking, fish ponds
were also destroyed, so it was not just shaking but triggering casualties in 1699 and that was
the first data and it was caused by pure tectonic plate shifts and not because of Krakatoa.
Unlike the Krakatoa incident in 1883, Jakarta was much darker, with dust and smoke.
Currently, if you enter this year, then also enter the latest research data at least maybe 5 years
back what the research is. For example, from 2021 or 2020, the ITB research team combined
with various researchers from the ministry made a seismic gap map that in South
Pangandaran or West Java in 2006 it had already broken and it was not felt like it was
swinging. In 1994, in the south of Banyuwangi, it had also ruptured and in the south of
Jogjakarta it had not and in the south of the Sunda Strait it had not. These are areas that often
have large earthquakes but have not had an earthquake for a long time, it is commonly
referred to as a seismic gap.
Likewise in Sumatra, 2004 broke in the Banda Aceh area, 2005 in Nias, 2007 in
Bengkulu, and not yet in the Mentawai and west coastal areas of Lampung. This data should
be included. The year 1861 had occurred in Sibolga, North Sumatra, so that we know that
earthquakes are recurrent. There is something unique that happened in Palu, you can still
meet an old man who experienced three tsunamis, this old man has lived since the 1920s and
the first tsunami he felt was in 1938 then the second tsunami in 1968 and the third tsunami in
2018. This grandfather is around 90 years old and his memory is still good. This grandfather
was included in our research called Preserving Past Tsunami Formation for Future
Preparedness, making research in Flores in 1992, Banyuwangi in 1994, Palu in 1996 and Biak
in 1996 and this year we are working on Banggai, Central Sulawesi with the case of the
tsunami. The tsunami of 2000. Tsunamis that in ancient times were explored based on
eyewitness findings. Tsunamis are repetitive, they come at unexpected times but their form is
more or less the same. All the characteristics that occurred shortly before the tsunami in the
three places were tectonic earthquakes and the source was also the same on the Palu Koro
fault and it was on land and at sea, then the strength of the earthquake was at least 7 SR,
therefore a trace hold was made when an earthquake of 7 SR occurred, it was required to
evacuate. In the past, when talking about Central Sulawesi, the most advanced was Poso, so
the capital of Central Sulawesi was in Poso when it was newly independent, but for some
reason the political situation continued to be turbulent. When before 1968 it was to be moved
to Palu. Geologist John Ario Katili was a professor who was very concerned to say that Palu
should not be made the capital city because it was passed by the fault, if Poso was okay
because there was no fault, but because the political situation in the country required moving
to Palu then an earthquake occurred in 1968 which was followed by a tsunami. The epicenter
of the earthquake was in Tambu Bay, still included in Donggala district and directly
neighboring the city of Palu. In 2018, if you look at the epicenter, it was also in Donggala, but
because of the submarine land slide, there was a very local landslide around the shore of Palu
Bay, which triggered a tsunami with the highest height on the shore of Palu Bay, not on its
left and right sides, around 13 meters.
In Ende they call a tsunami airmesinuka which means that the sea water rises, in
Maumere they call it waertahilema, in Larantuka they call it ojokgere, and in Andonara they
call it Oyokgere, so there are different words and differences. This is proof that the source of
the Flores northern back arc earthquake is real. They also have their own ways of
communicating the danger to the community, on the one hand some prefer the kentongan and
on the other hand some like the gong and some also ring the electric pole, they think it is the
most effective communication and according to them there is a myth that was born from long
ago in Maumere since the ancestors passed down, they have a belief that if there is a shake
then they hit the priuk or frying pan as a sign that if there is a shake the inhabitants are poured
or called gods, they test whether there are still people on this earth so they have such beliefs
from generation to generation.
They hit the priuk while saying "Ami noran". Ami noran is Maumere language which
means "We exist". They all shout from end to end saying Ami noran to tell the inhabitants of
the earth that we exist ... we exist ... After they hit the priuk while shouting "Ami noran" they
believe it will then be silent or the shaking subsides is their belief. In fact, if it is related to the
success of Simelu Island, they can reduce the number of tsunami victims it is the same as
"Semong". They shouted Semong as a sign when a tsunami occurred. Semong is the language
of Simelu Island which means that there is a kind of tsunami or high wave so they run to the
hills. If Amioran is made as a succession of the success of Semong, it should also be able to
shout while going up the mountain, because along the Sika district it is easy to find high land.
So they shout Ami noran like the semong on Simelu Island actually can. They hit the priuk
while shouting Ami noran inside the house not moving out or to the hill and when the shaking
has subsided then they continue their activities again.
From several years before 1992, the last tsunami earthquake was probably about 90 years
without a tsunami. Even if it was from the same source, the tsunami was in Sumbawa and the
earthquake was still from the source in Flores but the earthquake was in Sumbawa. The year
1815 was a long time ago about 200 years ago in Sreret Buleleng. Because the north of Bali
to the north of Alor has the same Flores back-arc fault. In Banten, they call it Caah Laut
which means sea water rises. So first the data must be sought because it will guide in making
future milestones. So far, it is considered that disasters hinder development, earthquakes then
collapse and always repeat. In fact, this is the fault of humans; earthquakes should be part of
development. Disaster risk should be included in development planning. Every building
should be equipped with the carrying capacity of the soil acceleration in the area, and this is
made by the planner. Planners need to know how many gal, gal is meters per second squared
after an earthquake and it can be obtained from BMKG, also from the national earthquake
study center. So, it is now too late to have the capacity to include disaster risk in planning. In
the future, for sustainable development, it is expected to include disaster risk in development
planning.
For example, during the Mamuju earthquake, Jakarta saw that Mamuju was tense two
days after the earthquake, the atmosphere was tense. It was as if Mamuju was paralyzed.
Expectations when landing and then entering the city, by looking at the news that will see like
the Padang earthquake, but it turns out that only one block of houses was destroyed, even the
right side of the left side was not destroyed. In a situation like that, there is actually an
emergency response using Crisis communication. When crisis communication must calm
people down. There are news that should not reach the public but the government. For
example, whether the Mamuju earthquake has the potential to happen again, then whether this
next earthquake will have the potential for a tsunami. But the government must be able to
assure that they are in a controlled condition, not a safe condition. The problem at that time
was trying to accommodate all parties, and giving time for people to speak, for institutions to
speak, because there were 12 clusters, social, infrastructure, and others. When someone said
that the public should be careful that there was still the potential for the next earthquake to be
even bigger, this would cause a potential tsunami, that was where the message was
inaccurate. Where crisis communication should have played a role, risk communication
sentences were delivered, resulting in the spread of hoaxes through social media, in this case
through whatsapp groups. One thing that must be understood is that handling social problems
during a disaster is much more complicated than handling the physical damage. Physical
damage can be calculated and then resolved, but the social problem rotates tremendously,
once it has rotated in the community's whatsapp group, it cannot be retracted and cannot be
controlled because it enters 1 group of 100, enters the group of 1000 again. Communicating
risk during a crisis is not appropriate. Because during a crisis what must be done is calming
the people, handling the situation, making sure that everyone is in control. As a result,
initially coordinated at one point only about 17,000 people can be overcome, the logistics can
be dropped and can handle the situation.
People's houses were fine but they were located very close to the beach and there was
information that there was another earthquake that had the potential to cause a tsunami, but
they all ran to the mountain in blue tents that were all tarpaulins. And this is very difficult for
BNPB to distribute logistical assistance, so that social problems increase again, because it
should be centralized in the public kitchen GOR.
The number of refugees skyrocketed to 90,000 from only 18,000 previously. BNPB has
difficulty distributing masks or other necessities to the top of the hill with around 15 thousand
points. From the initial 500 points to 15 thousand points. Then 14 days after that the Covid
case peaked. So the complexity of the disaster multiplied just because there was one message
that was not right to inform the public.
2.
Tsunami Evacuation Signs as Information Media:
According to BNPB's Tsunami Evacuation Routes and Signs Planning Guidelines,
tsunami evacuation signs are signs or information placed or installed in tsunami-prone areas
and tsunami safe zones. Made clearly, easy to understand in the form of symbols, letters,
numbers, sentences and / or combination. Signs serve to explain or provide instructions,
warnings, and arrangements for everyone in tsunami prone areas and tsunami safe zones.
Signs are an integrated part of the tsunami risk management system, an effective mechanism
for community education to sensitize people to tsunami risks and events, and to assist in
evacuation planning for communities in tsunami prone areas. Tsunami evacuation signs guide
people to evacuate to Temporary Evacuation Sites (TES) and Final Evacuation Sites (TEA).
Evacuation signs are placed within the tsunami hazard zone and along the road to the
tsunami safety zone. Signs should be placed at road intersections to prevent people from
going in the wrong direction, and where there are obstacles or barriers along the way such as
climbing roads. These signs must follow the following requirements:
a.
Distribution of tsunami hazard zones (inundation zones) and tsunami safety zones.
b.
The distance of the tsunami safety zone from the coast is the distance of the inundation
zone plus the distance of the buffer or transition zone.
c.
Number and length of primary and secondary evacuation routes.
d.
Number of intersection areas along evacuation routes, both primary and secondary and
neighborhood roads.
e.
Physical barriers that may exist along the evacuation route such as inclines, declines, and
so on.
f.
Number and distribution of TES, both in the form of buildings, natural hills and artificial
hills.
g.
Number and distribution of TEAs, both in the form of buildings, natural hills and
artificial hills.
Tsunami evacuation signs consist of several signs. There are five (5) categories of signs
that have technical standards to support public education and tsunami response (TWGSS,
2007).
a.
Tsunami Danger Zone Signs:
These signs indicate areas that may be prone to tsunami hazards and build awareness
among the public, both local residents and migrants or tourists that they are in a tsunami
prone zone. People should know that they need to evacuate in the event of natural signs
of a tsunami (such as strong earthquake tremors, unusual sound of ocean waves, low tide
at the shore) and/or the sound of tsunami sirens. There are two types of tsunami hazard
zone signs: signs inside the hazard zone and signs entering and leaving the tsunami
hazard zone.
b.
Signs within the tsunami hazard zone:
This sign only informs the general public that the area is prone to tsunamis and that
people should flee in the event of an earthquake. Example: "in case of an earthquake, run
to higher ground". Some evacuation zone signs will include more specific instructions for
responding to the hazard. These signs can be supplemented with specific written
descriptions that are already integrated into the local tsunami evacuation plan. Example:
"in case of an earthquake, run to higher ground, wait until the government announces it is
safe".
c.
Signs for entering and leaving tsunami danger zones:
In large areas where the road network tends to extend parallel to the coastline, the
appropriate tsunami hazard warning signs are those for entering and leaving the tsunami
hazard zone. Such signs are also suitable for regional roadways (connecting one or
several cities) in coastal areas. Signs for entering the tsunami hazard zone are placed at
the beginning of the tsunami hazard zone, and signs for leaving the tsunami hazard zone
are placed at the end of the tsunami hazard zone, entering the buffer/transition zone or
tsunami safe zone.15
d.
Tsunami Evacuation Orientation Map:
The Tsunami Evacuation Orientation Map is an information board that contains
information and instructions to the public on the location of Temporary Evacuation Sites
(TES) and Final Evacuation Sites (TEA), as well as evacuation routes that can be
traveled to reach the TES and TEA. The Orientation Map is placed in strategic locations
in tsunami prone areas, such as markets, road intersections, public facilities and social
facilities. This map is expected to increase public awareness that they live in a tsunami-
prone area, as well as help people to more easily recognize and remember evacuation
routes and the location of TES and TEAs in the event of a tsunami.
e.
Evacuation Direction Signs:
Evacuation directional signs are signs that contain information on the direction and
distance to the TES or TEA. This sign directs people to evacuate from the neighborhood
to the TES or TEA via designated evacuation routes. There are two versions of
evacuation direction signs:
1) Pedestrian evacuation direction signs:
This sign is used only for evacuation directions for pedestrians or provides an
evacuation direction where walking is the most suitable way to leave tsunami prone
areas. Especially in urban and densely populated areas, people are expected to
evacuate by walking and/or running, evacuation by vehicle is not recommended in
order to avoid traffic congestion that may hinder evacuation time.
2) Evacuation direction signs for car/motorcycle/and other drivers:
This sign was developed for evacuation routes by vehicle, where riding a vehicle is
the most suitable means of leaving the tsunami hazard zone due to time constraints
and the fact that high and safe places for tsunamis are quite far away, such as rural or
remote areas. This sign is only for sparsely populated rural areas, so that evacuation
by vehicle will not cause traffic congestion.
f.
Tsunami Safe Zone Signs:
These signs indicate that the location is safe from tsunami hazards, so that people can
gather or no longer need to evacuate. These signs can also be placed on natural or man-
made hills and buildings that serve as Final Evacuation Areas (TEAs).
g.
Tsunami Event Warning Information:
This category refers to information provided to the public to inform and remind them
of tsunamis that have occurred in the area, and to raise awareness that such tsunamis can
occur again in the future. The information provided includes, among other things, the
time of the tsunami, the height of the inundation, the magnitude of the earthquake, the
amount of physical damage, the number of fatalities, pictures of physical damage, and so
on. Signs can be in the form of simple information boards or columns or other markers
such as monuments. The message on the sign should be simple, the statement of the
event clearly described. These signs are expected to motivate people to prepare
themselves for future tsunami hazards.
Cities in coastal Indonesia require planning of evacuation routes and signs as part of
tsunami mitigation. Tsunami evacuation signs in Indonesia are regulated in SNI
7743:2011. However, prior to this SNI, tsunami evacuation signs in Indonesia varied
from region to region. These different signs are still maintained to this day, so there is no
uniformity between signs in one city/district and another.
Here are the types of evacuation signs that exist in several regions in Indonesia:
1) Blue evacuation directional signs in Ciamis, West Java, with the name of the
evacuation site and estimated distance, some in the form of orange boards, placed at
the same height as traffic directional signs, can be found in Banda Aceh,
2) Tsunami hazard information signs are rhombus-shaped with a yellow base and the
symbol and text "Tsunami Direct Impact Zone" in black. This type of sign can be
found in Pangandaran Regency, West Java.
3) Tsunami evacuation information board sign showing a map of the location around the
sign and the direction of the nearest tsunami evacuation. These signs also contain
information on signs of tsunami occurrence, guidelines for evacuation during a
tsunami disaster and examples of tsunami evacuation signs. This type of sign was
installed before the issuance of the SNI, so the examples of evacuation signs included
are not in accordance with the SNI. This type of sign can be found in Banda Aceh.
Tsunami evacuation signs as stipulated in the SNI indicate the direction of
evacuation, the name of the gathering place (open space or building) and the estimated
distance. The signs are orange in color (Red: 255 Green: 102 Blue: 0) with white writing,
so that they can be seen at night. The orange color was chosen to distinguish tsunami
evacuation signs from fire hazard (red), nuclear (yellow), and traffic direction (green)
signs. After the Minister of Transportation Regulation No. 13/2014 on traffic signs, the
standard colors of tsunami evacuation signs in this guideline were adjusted to blue and
green.
It should be noted that the assembly point signs are not applicable for tsunami
evacuation. This sign is only suitable for earthquake and fire evacuation needs, because
in the event of an earthquake and fire a gathering place is needed in the form of an open
field (not inside or on top of a building). This is different for tsunamis, where the
evacuation time is very short and precious, to quickly escape to a safe place (TES and
TEA), and people will no longer have time to gather.
As for evacuation routes, the few cities that have evacuation route maps are mostly
supported by non-governmental organizations. Although SNI 7755:2012 on Tsunami
Evacuation Routes has been published, it only covers technical requirements and stages
of evacuation route design activities. In addition, there is no standardization for tsunami
evacuation route maps (level of accuracy, symbology, what information should be
included, etc.).
In addition to tsunami evacuation signage, there is also a monument in Banda Aceh
that contains the height of the tsunami inundation at that location, especially for the 2004
tsunami. The information on the monument includes the height of the tsunami
inundation, the distance from the coast and the time of arrival of the waves. There are 67
monuments scattered throughout Banda Aceh.
3.
Stakeholder and Community Engagement in Disaster Signage:
As lessons learned from the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami, according to BNPB's
Tsunami Evacuation Route Planning and Signage Guidelines, one of the key factors in
achieving a high level of safety is community involvement in planning, socialization and
training use of tsunami evacuation routes.
4.
Types and Characteristics of Media in Tsunami Risk Communication:
BMKG operates Indonesia's National Tsunami Early Warning Center and is the only
official government institution designated and responsible for issuing tsunami warnings.
These warnings serve two purposes, namely: to trigger evacuations in the event of a tsunami
threat, and to prepare emergency assistance for BNPB, if needed.
According to the 2012 edition of the InaTews Tsunami Early Warning Service
Guidebook, the BMKG issues tsunami warnings from its headquarters in Jakarta to
intermediary institutions such as the media, local governments, BNPB, police, military, SAR,
and other institutions at the national and regional levels, through a communication network
known as 6 in 1. These tsunami warning messages can be accessed by the public through the
mass media, the BMKG website, or social networks such as Facebook and Twitter.
All information about earthquakes and tsunami warnings is distributed from BMKG
using six different communication channels and will only be sent when an earthquake with a
magnitude greater than 5 SR occurs. Smaller magnitudes will be displayed on the BMKG
website.
The dissemination of tsunami early warning news to the public is the responsibility of
institutions or agencies related to disaster management. The BMKG is only responsible for
preparing and issuing warnings to the public through intermediary institutions. As per In
accordance with a Presidential Instruction issued at a press conference at the Marbela Anyer
Hotel on July 20, 2006, BMKG was tasked with preparing and issuing a tsunami warning
within five minutes of an earthquake. The next phase was the responsibility of various
intermediary institutions to disseminate the tsunami early warning to communities at risk of
being affected. A brief description of the tsunami early warning dissemination process used
by the National Center for Tsunami Early Warning at the BMKG headquarters can help
provide an overview of the key issues involved.
The risk communication media used by BNPB is mostly outdoor media such as signage.
Press conferences are also a medium in risk communication. In addition, there are also more
educational media such as daily reports, disaster releases anywhere for the next 3 days, there
are predictions like what then there are appeals carried out every day. Information in print,
electronic, outdoor media, social media, is optimized, then the nature of going to the field is
also carried out, which is in the nature of a show such as a disaster-aware cultural
performance is also actually risk communication, which explores the foclots in the regions to
revive the community, because actually Indonesia is rich in it but lacks the space to present it
to the community. That's also an optimized mode of communication. And there is also an
inarisk in the form of an application, but it is static, it is not the source that speaks but the
person who digs, this is also one of the products of risk communication, but it is actually a bit
more difficult to quantify the response because you cannot see or record what kind of
feedback you get from the community.
5.
Tsunami Risk Communication Flow:
Referring to Law No.24 of 2007 on Disaster Management that states "Everyone is
obliged to provide correct information to the general public on disaster management.", the
dissemination of early warnings and guidance in the regions must be done as quickly as
possible. To avoid the failure of one communication channel, the dissemination system must
have a backup, i.e. there must be as many effective communication channels as possible to
reach all people threatened by a tsunami.
According to the 2014 review of the Tsunami Disaster Risk Reduction Masterplan, in the
event of April 11, 2012, in less than five minutes the BMKG had succeeded in issuing a PD-1
that was disseminated to interested parties through various modes of communication, issuing
further warnings in accordance with applicable formats and procedures, and taking the
necessary steps. However, in the dissemination of these early warnings there were still some
obstacles that needed to be overcome, such as:
a.
PD-1-PD-4 issued by the BMKG were not received by several interested parties due to
various technical communication constraints such as the WRS device being installed not
functioning, lack of electricity, fax not being received, SMS being received late; as well
as non-technical constraints such as the institution's official email address and/or mobile
phone number not being registered with the BMKG, email and/or SMS messages being
received at personnel's personal addresses/phone numbers, emails not being opened, and
so on;
b.
The BMKG website, which serves as one of the sources of early warning information,
experienced a bottleneck on April 11, 2012 because the number of visitors trying to
access the BMKG website increased dramatically and caused a crash.
c.
The long-format PD-1-PD-4 messages issued by BMKG are not used and/or not
understood by the main warning chain actors at the national, regional and media levels.
Based on its complexity, the Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System (InaTEWS) has
many requirements. These requirements include the need for good cooperation between
experts, personnel and practitioners from different levels and backgrounds, in order to make
the warning system work. Therefore, building a common understanding of the whole system
is necessary.
All parties involved in the preparedness of communities at risk of disaster need to
understand the warning process produced and issued by BMKG. Conversely, the designers of
the warning dissemination mechanism and the formulation of the Message warning need to
know the public at risk. The initial requirement for a warning system to be effective is that all
parties must share knowledge, carry out their respective responsibilities, and know the roles
of other parties. Important things that must be conveyed to the community in disaster
awareness socialization activities are are information basic information about basic
information about the principles of disaster management, general knowledge about the
dangers of earthquakes and tsunamis, an understanding and recognition of the community's
their region, knowledge about InaTEWS, the origin of warnings and how people receive them
(warning chain), the establishment of systems and procedures for disseminating warnings and
guidance in the region, reaction schemes, siren sounds and meanings, message content
directions, and evacuation plans in the area itself.
Almost all BPBDs in Banten have installed a new generation WRS (Warning Receiver
System), which is an earthquake detection tool, in the form of a display monitor that will
inform the epicenter of the earthquake and its strength and whether or not there is the
potential for a tsunami. This tool is internet-based and must be monitored 24 hours. Every
BPBD in both districts and provinces has been fitted with WRS by the BMKG. From there
there is already information about whether a tsunami will occur or not. The three sirens that
have been installed in Pasauran, Panimbang and Labuan are located at the provincial BPBD
outside the center. When the WRS states that there is an earthquake above 5 on the Richter
scale or a small earthquake but it is felt, the WRS will sound, and they will then communicate
to the central BMKG whether the earthquake has the potential to cause a tsunami or not. So it
is the BPBD that presses the button when the community should evacuate, but the central
BMKG can also remote like that. For example, some time ago there was also an earthquake
around 6 on the Richter scale, but because there was no tsunami potential, the button was not
pressed.
Disaster warning information can reach the community through a channel called the
operation control center or abbreviated as Pusdalop. The center works 24 hours to provide
system information that is connected to the BMKG via WhatsApp and Instagram, in addition
to disseminating information through WhatsApp groups. So if there is information, it is
immediately informed to the community through the sub-district head, village head in the
whatsapp group and also volunteers. Information is given in both directions, not only does the
BMKG provide information, but the community or volunteers in the whatsapp group also
provide information if there is a disaster or event. The community is a satellite of the BMKG
because they have started to care that when there is disaster information they immediately
inform them through the whatsapp group.
