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References

Joint Task Force Civil Support. (2022). Fact sheet. h�ps://www.j�cs.northcom.mil/About/Factsheets/Ar�cle/1199952/joint-task-force-civil-support-fact-sheet/

Monke, J. (2004). Agroterrorism: Threats and preparedness. Congressional Research Service. h�ps://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32521.pdf

Olson, D. (2012). Agroterrorism: Threats to America’s economy and food supply. FBI Law Enforcement Bulle�n. h�ps://leb.�i.gov/2012/february/agroterrorism-threats-to-americas-economy-and-food-supply

The CBRN Enterprise and Counter-WMD Intelligence

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) enterprise is a term used to describe the response capabili�es of the United States during a WMD event. There are many agencies with a role to play, and the military with USNORTHCOM specifically stood up Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS) with CBRN in mind. The mission of JTF-CS is:

Joint Task Force Civil Support conducts chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response and all-hazards defense support of civil authori�es opera�ons in support of the lead federal agency in order to save lives, mi�gate human suffering, and prevent further injury. When directed, JTF-CS deploys within 24 hours of no�fica�on to command and control DOD forces in support of civil authority response opera�ons in order to save lives, prevent further injury, and provide temporary cri�cal support to enable community recovery (JTF-CS Factsheet, 2022, p. 1).

There are many other federal agencies that have a role to play in response to a CBRN event. The FBI has the Hazardous Materials Response Unit; the Department of Energy has the Radiological Assessment Program; the Department of Health and Human Services has the Metropolitan Medical Response System, and the CDC has the Strategic Na�onal Stockpile (among other capabili�es). These are just a very few of the many, many government agencies that would respond to a CBRN event and do not include the local and state responders who would be first on the scene. While the threat is real, the U.S. is not completely unprepared. However, the role of the intelligence community to collect on all threats to the na�on and provide warning and intelligence assessments to head off threats before they manifest themselves here in the homeland. This is a challenging task, especially as some CNRN threats can be manufactured here at home and not just smuggled in from abroad. Terrorist groups such as the so- called Islamic State have used WMDs against their enemies in the Middle East and would have no moral limita�ons in using them against our innocent civilians at home if given the opportunity.

Agro-Terrorism

While the threat of Agro-terrorism is real, it is not something that many people, both across the United States and abroad, have a major concern about. However, conduc�ng a terrorist strike against our na�on’s ‘so�’ heartland could have drama�c impact across our na�on, involving not only the farmers, but also local law enforcement, which, as we know, is already financially and very o�en strategically unprepared to respond to such an a�ack.

Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism, and is defined as the deliberate introduc�on of an animal or plant disease with the goal of genera�ng fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining stability. A�acks against agriculture are not new, and have been conducted or considered by both na�on-states and substate organiza�ons throughout history (Monke, 2004, p. 2).

Experts in the agricultural field con�nue to have concerns that an inten�onal introduc�on of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) could be deadly. FMD is more than twenty �mes infec�ons than smallpox, a disease that we eradicated in the 1970s. FMD causes painful blisters on tongues, hooves, and teats of cloven-hoofed animals, such as cows, pigs, goats, and deer. This renders them unable to walk, be milked, eat, and drink. While humans cannot easily contract FMD, we can carry it in our lungs for up to 48 hours and pass it to animals. Addi�onally, the animal- to-animal airborne-transmission range of FMD is 50 miles! If FMD was introduced into the Unites States, there would be a vast number of farms, fields, and feedlots that would need protec�on. When FMD was in the United Kingdom in 2001, over 2,000 cases resul�ng in over six million cows and sheep being killed in the eventually successful a�empt to halt the disease. Addi�onally, countries across mainland Europe closed their borders to not only individuals from England, but also simple basic travel across a country’s border. Unlike hardened government facili�es or even the heightened security measures used at spor�ng events or concerts, America’s agriculture and food produc�on capabili�es are wide open.

Food supply is among the most vulnerable and least protected of all poten�al targets of a�ack. When American and allied forces overran al Qaeda sanctuaries in the caves of eastern Afghanistan in 2002, among the thousands of documents they discovered were U.S. agricultural documents and al Qaeda training manuals targe�ng agriculture (Olson, 2012, para. 2).

To protect crops and livestock both government agencies and the private sector have increased security measures to protect against agro-terrorism.

Since the terrorist a�acks of 2001, biosecurity is an increasing priority among food manufacturers, merchandisers, retailers, and commercial farmers na�onwide.. Building and maintaining a climate of informa�on sharing between [United States Department of Agriculture] (USDA), DHS, and the intelligence community is necessary, especially so that agriculture is not overlooked compared to other infrastructure and human targets (Monke, 2004, p. 29).

If FMD were to strike the United States, could we even a�empt to shut down the borders between states as was done against the island country of Great Britain?

Emergency Preparedness and Response

Video: "The History of Bioterrorism"

This video describes the Category A diseases: smallpox, anthrax, botulism, plague, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers. If these germs were used to intentionally infect people, they would cause the most illness and death. Watch this video to learn how some of these agents have been or can be used as bioterrorist weapons.

Watch the Complete Program “The History of Bioterroism” (26 min 38 sec)

Watch Speci�c Segments of the Program

Note: Parts of this video were adapted from “Biological Warfare and Terrorism: The Military and Public Health Response,” co-produced by the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 1999.

Archived: This Page Is No Longer Being Updated

This information is for historic and reference purposes only.  Content has not been updated since the last reviewed date at the bottom of this page.

Overview

Anthrax

Plague

Smallpox

Botulism

Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers

Tularemia

Page last reviewed: April 4, 2018 (archived document) Content source: Center for Preparedness and Response (CPR)

HEALTH SECURITY

Pandemic simulation exercise spotlights massive preparedness gap Event 201, hosted by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, envisions a fast-spreading

coronavirus with a devastating impact

Katie Pearce /  Nov 6, 2019

Back in 2001, it was a smallpox outbreak, set off by terrorists in U.S. shopping malls. This fall, it was a SARS-like virus, germinating quietly among pig farms in Brazil before spreading to every country in the world.

With each fictional pandemic Johns Hopkins experts have designed, the takeaway lesson is the same: We are nowhere near prepared.

"Once you're in the midst of a severe pandemic, your options are very limited," says Eric Toner, a senior scholar at the Center for Health Security at Johns Hopkins University. "The greatest good can happen with pre-planning."

"ONCE YOU'RE IN THE MIDST OF A SEVERE PANDEMIC, YOUR OPTIONS

ARE VERY LIMITED. THE GREATEST GOOD CAN HAPPEN WITH PRE-

PLANNING."

—Eric Toner Senior scholar, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security

That center's latest pandemic simulation, Event 201, dropped participants right in the midst of an uncontrolled coronavirus outbreak that was spreading like wildfire out of South America to wreak worldwide havoc. As fictional newscasters from "GNN" narrated, the immune-resistant virus (nicknamed CAPS) was crippling trade and travel, sending the global economy into freefall. Social media was rampant with rumors and misinformation, governments were collapsing, and citizens were revolting.

For those participating in New York City on Oct. 18—a heavyweight group of policymakers, business leaders, and health officials—Event 201 was a chance to see how much catch-up work is needed to bolster our disaster response systems. Full videos of the discussion are available online.

"It really does shake up assumptions and change thinking about how we can prepare for a global pandemic," says Tom Inglesby, director of the Center for Health Security.

Event 201 is the fourth such exercise hosted by the Johns Hopkins center, which works to prepare communities for biological threats, pandemics, and other disasters. The simulations started with 2001's Dark Winter, which gathered national security experts for its simulated smallpox outbreak. The groundbreaking event turned out to be influential in shaping U.S. efforts around pandemic preparedness—particularly due to its timing, right before 9/11.

"Dark Winter resulted in more than a dozen congressional hearings, was briefed to the White House, and ultimately influenced the decision to stockpile enough smallpox vaccine for all Americans," Inglesby says.

That simulation and its two successors—Atlantic Storm, conducted in 2005, and last summer's Clade X—have also demonstrated lasting value as educational and advocacy tools, with reenactments or modified versions taking place in settings including universities, the CDC, and Capitol Hill, according to Inglesby. "These exercises have a long fuse," he says.

VIDEO : JOHNS HOPKINS CENTER FOR HEALTH SECURITY

For Event 201, hosted in collaboration with the World Economic Forum and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the experts added a new layer of realism by reaching beyond government and NGOs to leaders in the private sector and business community. Participants included representatives from NBCUniversal, UPS, and Johnson & Johnson.

"Very few people have included the private sector in pandemic preparedness, but that's where most of the resources are," Toner says.

That's particularly true when it comes to vaccine development. The CAPS virus—which Toner describes as a cousin of SARS, "but slightly more transmissible, like the flu, and slightly more lethal"—was presented as resistant to any existing vaccine, as scientists scrambled to come up with one. Citizens, meanwhile, were rioting over scarce access to the next best thing: a fictional antiviral known to treat some CAPS symptoms.

That scenario, Toner says, is utterly realistic. "We don't have a vaccine for SARS, or MERS, or various avian flu viruses that have come up in the past decade," he notes. "That's because vaccine development is slow and difficult if there isn't an immediate market for it."

In the simulation, CAPS resulted in a death toll of 65 million people within 18 months—surpassing the deadliest pandemic in history, the 1918 Spanish flu.

From the discussions Event 201 inspired, the Center for Health Security plans to release a set of formal recommendations within the coming weeks.

Shortly after the simulation, the center released the Global Health Security Index, the first-ever comprehensive ranking of countries on their pandemic preparedness. All in all, the picture was discouraging: The average score, across 195 countries, was 40 out of a possible 100.

"It's our hope," Inglesby says, "that countries will use this to consider where they are strong and where they are weak."

Posted in Health, Politics+Society

Tagged disaster response, pandemics, center for health security, coronavirus

HSINT and CBRNE/Agro-Terrorism

The nexus of weapons of mass destruc�on (WMDs) and terrorism is the nightmare scenario of every intelligence and homeland security professional. The use of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or highly explosive weapon against domes�c targets within the homeland would be catastrophic and poten�ally destabilizing. Even the limited use of a WMD against civilian targets could cause widespread panic among our highly digitally connected ci�zenry. Therefore, this serves as a significant driver of homeland defense and homeland security planning, preparedness and intelligence support.