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Home > Reports & Testimonies > Biodefense: The Nation Faces Multiple Challenges in Building and Maintaining Biodefense and Biosurveillance
Biodefense: The Nation Faces Multiple Challenges in Building and Maintaining Biodefense and Biosurveillance
GAO-16-547T
Published: Apr 14, 2016. Publicly Released: Apr 14, 2016.
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Highlights
What GAO Found The biodefense enterprise is fragmented and does not have strategic oversight to promote efficiency and
accountability. Specifically, the biodefense enterprise lacks institutionalized leadership enterprise-wide
to provide strategic oversight and coordination. In 2011, GAO reported, there are more than two dozen
presidentially appointed individuals with biodefense responsibilities and numerous federal agencies with
mission responsibilities for supporting biodefense activities, but no individual or entity with
responsibility for overseeing the entire biodefense enterprise. In 2011, GAO reported that the
Homeland Security Council (HSC) should consider establishing a focal point for federal biodefense
coordination. In December 2014, National Security Council (NSC) staff, which supports the HSC, told
GAO that two of its directorates work together as the focal point for federal biodefense efforts. This is
an important step in promoting a comprehensive and coordinated approach to biodefense, but strategic
leadership issues persist. In October 2015, a report by the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense stated
strategic leadership issues persist and called for a focal point to provide strategic leadership, noting that
elevating authority above the agency-level can help overcome the challenges faced by the biodefense
enterprise. The Study Panel found that White House councils and offices generally only become involved
when a specific biodefense issue affects a prominent ongoing responsibility—a method which is not
consistent with our call for a strategic approach.
In 2011, GAO also reported that while some high-level biodefense strategies have been developed, there
is no broad, integrated national strategy that encompasses all stakeholders with biodefense
responsibilities that can be used to guide the systematic identification of risk; assess resources needed
to address those risks; and prioritize and allocate investment across the entire biodefense enterprise.
GAO reported that the overarching biodefense enterprise would benefit from strategic oversight
mechanisms, including a national strategy, to help ensure efficient, effective, and accountable results,
and suggested the HSC take action. However, as of February 2016, such a strategy had not been
developed.
Biosurveillance, an aspect of biodefense, also faces key challenges at all levels of government that
transcend what any one agency can address on its own, and our more recent and ongoing work continues
to highlight these challenges. In 2010, GAO recommended the HSC establish a focal point to lead the
development of a national biosurveillance strategy that clarifies roles and responsibilities, provides goals
and performance measures, and identifies resource and investment needs, among other elements.
However, the recommendations have not been fully implemented. Since 2009 GAO's has also identified
challenges with specific biosurveillance capabilities. Specifically, GAO has identified biosurveillance
capability challenges with, among other topics, (1) state and local public heath capabilities, (2) animal
health surveillance capabilities, and (3) two Department of Homeland Security biosurveillance efforts—
the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) and the BioWatch Program (which aims to
provide early indication of an aerosolized biological weapon attack). However, not all recommendations
have been implemented.
Why GAO Did This Study The nation's biodefense enterprise is the whole combination of systems at every level of government and
the private sector that can contribute to protecting the nation and its citizens from potentially
catastrophic effects of a biological event. It is composed of a complex collection of resources, programs,
and initiatives, designed for different purposes and dedicated to mitigating various risks, both natural
and intentional.
In an era of rapid transit and global trade, the public health and agricultural industries, as well as natural
ecosystems including native plants and wildlife, face increased threats of naturally occurring outbreaks
of infectious disease and accidental exposure to biological threats. Also, threats of bioterrorism, such as
anthrax attacks, highlight the continued need for biosurveillance systems that provide early detection
and warning about biological threats to humans.
This statement summarizes GAO's work on challenges to building and maintaining the nation's
biodefense and biosurveillance. This statement is based on GAO work issued from December 2009
through March 2016 on various biodefense and biosurveillance efforts. GAO also reviewed the 2015
report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense for updates, but has not independently assessed
the entirety of the conclusions, recommendations or methods. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed
relevant laws, presidential directives, policies, strategic plans, and other reports; surveyed states; and
interviewed federal, state, and industry officials, among others.
For more information, contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or [email protected].
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GAO Contacts
Christopher P. Currie
Director
(404) 679-1875
Office of Public Affairs
Chuck Young
Managing Director
(202) 512-4800
Topics
Homeland Security Biological research Biological warfare Biological weapons Bioterrorism Disease detection or diagnosis
Emergency preparedness Emerging infectious diseases Epidemics Homeland security Infectious diseases Public health Strategic planning
Biosurveillance
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