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An Expanded Panama Canal

The expansion of the Panama Canal fostered an increase in the Neo-Panamax and Post-Panamax ship use. Cargo volumes were directly increased for

intraregional ports and ports within the United States Gulf of Mexico and east coast [Note the Panama Canal Tra�c Chart below]. Further, using these

signi�cantly larger vessels doubled the maximum container ship size. The economics favored the shipping companies as this reduced the overall

vessel cost per day for transported containers. This is the primary “plus”. However, there are signi�cant downsides to operating these increasingly

larger vessels; at some points, ports will simply not be able to handle multiple Panamax ships in port at the same time based on infrastructure. The lack

of a quali�ed workforce adds to this issue.

(Miller, K., & Hyodo, T. (2021, July 8).

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COVID-19 and Resiliency

The resilience of this system and its workforce has never been important. During the height of the COVID-19 crisis, the impact of sick workers and

quarantines could not be underestimated. The same implications apply to ports working to diversify their workforce. Ensuring the safety of the

workforce became prominent. Berti (2020) noted, “Global trade depends on maritime workers, but the pandemic has thrust them into ‘humanitarian

and economic crisis.”

Taylor Telford and Jacob Bogage (2021) re-enforced the impact of COVID on the MTS,

Roughly 400,000 seafarers were stranded on ships around the globe at the peak of the “crew-change crisis” in late 2020, according to the

International Maritime Organization; now, about 200,000 are stuck. Some have been at sea for as long as 20 months, though 11 months is the

maximum time allowed by the ILO Maritime Labour Convention.

The situation worsened in 2020 through today as COVID-19 impacted the ability to unload cargo at ports worldwide. The inability to hire and retire

dockworkers remains an issue in 2023.

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Economic Dependency on Maritime Transportation

When we measure the economic dependency on Maritime Transportation, it is simple to see that every person in the United States has been touched

in one form or another by shipping and ocean trade. Goods and raw materials, such as electronics from China, crude oil from Valdez, and bananas

from Ecuador, ship via ocean carriers. Millions of people within the United States rely on shipped products daily. Grocery stores, shopping malls,

retailers, and gas stations are all in business due to one signi�cant factor: the ability for goods to be imported and exported safely on a timely basis. In

addition, over 11 million people last year looked to the MTS for recreation by taking a cruise, while over 31 million owned recreational boats. Have you

ever seen pictures of the waters o� Los Angeles or Port Alexander, NY, during the summer? The number of recreational boats is signi�cant. In fact,

during the height of COVID-19, the number grew exponentially. Used recreational boats became extremely di�cult to �nd.

However, the economic impact extends as far as the consumer. Still, those receiving direct bene�ts from maritime transportation also include land-

based transportation services, warehouses and distribution centers, and even banks and investment �rms that provide the capital to make trade

possible. The disruption e�ect on shipping has been previously seen as evident by 9/11, the Japanese Tsunami of 2011, the West Coast labor strikes of

2002, and Hurricane Ike. As shipping grows yearly, the chain reaction that a security disruption could cause only multiplies.

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How It's Connected

During this �rst week, we will explore three critical aspects of Port Security that play a signi�cant role in securing and protecting a system that moves

goods and services worldwide. This system is called the maritime transportation system or MTS.

The Marine Transportation System (MTS). MTS generates nearly $750 billion of the US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and handles 95% of all overseas

trade (DHS, 2005). Within the United States, the MTS includes;

• 25,000 miles of navigable channels

• 250 locks

• 3,500 marine terminals

• thousands of recreational marinas

• and the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway (USDOT, 2021)

Why use the water to move material? The reason is simple --- economics. Compare what a typical container ship can move vs a large airplane, train, or

�eet of trucks.

The world operates in a "just in time" system of logistics. Most companies have a week or less of "parts and materials" at their immediate disposal. An

excess supply in one area and a high demand in another promotes this exchange. However, today’s global trade scheme no longer exists as a means

for simply attaining cheaper-priced goods from another part of the world. Global commerce is now necessary for many countries, where the

disruption of such trade could cause harm to the U.S. and other nations. The fact that container tra�c and petroleum trade have dramatically increased

over the last decade alone is a tribute to the commercial interdependency between worldwide trading partners. This interdependency is primarily

facilitated through maritime transportation, where approximately 90% of the world’s goods move through shipping containers (Christopher, 2009, p.

24).

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References

Berti, A. (2020). The Impact of COVID-19 on Global Shipping: Part 1, System Shock. Ship Technology. https://www.ship-

technology.com/features/impact-of-covid-19-on-shipping/

Bondare�, J. & O’Neil, P. (2013, July 2013) Are our Ports Safe?: A Hodgepodge of Maritime Security Laws come into Question. Maritime Reporter.

https://www.blankrome.com/publications/are-our-ports-safe-hodgepodge-maritime-security-laws-come-question

Christopher, K. (2014). Port Security Management, 2nd ed. CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group: Boca Raton, FL (ISBN # 13: 978-1-4200-6893-1) e-book.

Department of Homeland Security. (2002). Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. http://www.aapa-

ports.org/�les/PDFs/mtsa_press_kit.pdf

Miller, K., & Hyodo, T. (2021, July 8). Impact of the Panama Canal expansion on Latin American and Caribbean Ports: Di�erence in di�erence (DID)

method - journal of shipping and trade. SpringerOpen. https://jshippingandtrade.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s41072-021-00091-5

Petta, M. (2021, Jan). The IMO 2021 Cyber Guidelines and the Need to Secure Seaports. https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/the-imo-

2021-cyber-guidelines-and-the-need-to-secure-seaports

Telford, T. & Bogage, J. (2021, APR). Business Essential, invisible: Covid has 200,000 merchant sailors stuck at sea.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2021/04/09/maritime-workers-pandemic-global-trade/

U.S. Congress (2006, October 13). Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act. http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/security-accountability-

everysafe-port act/p11878

USDOT. (2021, January 8). Maritime Administration. USDOT: Maritime Administration: https://www.maritime.dot.gov/outreach/maritime-

transportation-system-mts/maritime-transportation-system-mts

APUS does not maintain or control third-party websites and is not responsible for the accuracy or accessibility of their content.

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Port Geography

One of the biggest challenges of keeping the nation’s ports secure is the geographic distinctions between every single port in the country. None of the

ports in the U.S. are exactly alike, no matter how hard one might try to analyze their similarities. The saying is, "You see one port, you have seen one

port." There may be a few smaller, low-volume ports, which could be of similar size and geographic location, such as Savannah, GA, and Charleston,

SC. Yet, when determining the security requirements, one must consider the infrastructure and surrounding transportation factors (Christopher, 2009,

p. 13). One geographic roadblock that we face is ‘sprawl.’ Ports like Houston, New Orleans, and the Puget Sound area are very spread out. This

creates concern about keeping every facility safe and providing equal protection for those miles from the rest. Distance between the main operation

points can equate to vulnerability for the tertiary facilities. A compounding factor has been who owns what within each port and how it impacts its

resilience. The visual below shows major merchant shipping routes.

Credit: The Port of Los Angeles

As a result of the geographic variances for ports experienced across the country, another major challenge is that there is no such thing as a one-size-

�ts-all security strategy. Every port facility must undergo a complete security and force protection analysis to determine the best method of approach

for that individual complex. Of course, most ports can employ the same strategies across the board, such as the mandated use of the card and code.

However, many facets of a security plan must be determined based on unique factors inherent to a particular port’s total volume, types of cargo, dock

layout, facilities, and access to the open ocean. The ability to recognize these factors and create tailored strategies unique to an individual port is the

basis for satisfactorily meeting these challenges. Failing to individualize when examining characteristics and weaknesses can lead to over-

compensating in some areas and implementing inadequate measures. Retired Coast Guard Rear Admiral Mike Parks had a saying that applied, “When

you have seen one port…you have seen one port”. Each port is unique.

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International Maritime Organization

Even in the early 1980s, the International Maritime Organization knew that the security of the Maritime Transportation System, because of its' critical

place as a "center of gravity" for economies around the world, adopted several resolutions and conventions to this end. For example, the IMO enacted

Resolution A.545(13)--Measures To Prevent Acts Of Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships in 1983. Two years later, IMO Resolution A.584 (14)--

Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Which Threaten Safety Of Ships And Security Of Passengers. Then, three years later, the IMO approved MSC/Circ.

443 -- Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers And Crew On Board Ships.

Following 9/11, to protect this giant system, legislation about port security must include items such as the Secure Freight Initiative, Security and

Accountability for Every (S.A.F.E) Port Act, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO)'s International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

(ISPS), which has over 150 signatory countries including Russia, China, and even Iraq. However, the largest and most important legislation in recent

years has been the Homeland Security Act of 2002. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, this Act began a new era in domestic security.

It established the Department of Homeland Security, which consolidated 22 federal agencies under one comprehensive organizational structure,

including the U.S. Coast Guard (Christopher, 2008, p. 103). was the �rst cabinet-level department of its kind, created with the ultimate responsibility

of domestic protection.

Other legislation, such as the S.A.F.E. Port Act of 2006, also works to further the security of the nation’s ports. Over the last several years, this newer

endeavor is where the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code are rolled into one. This joint e�ort

between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Energy seeks to equip several foreign ports with X-ray scanners, radiation

portal monitors, and communication equipment to continue the e�orts globally.

In 2021, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) made a major step forward regarding maritime cybersecurity. The Maritime Executive noted

(2021, Jan) added:

The ISM Code is the foundation upon which the IMO Member States have built the 2021 guidelines for cyber risk management. The guidelines

were consigned in 2017 via three key declarations. First, in Resolution MSC.429(98), Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management

Systems, the IMO a�rmed a view that the ISM Code already requires mitigation of cyber risks. Per this view, cyber risk management is already

encompassed in the code’s general requirement that companies establish safeguards against all risks to ships, personnel, and the environment.

As a risk management regime, the ISM Code is expected to adapt well to managing and mitigating cyber risks. Government o�cials and maritime

industry leaders, experienced from roughly 18 years of ISM Code practice, are expected to rise to the challenge of applying the code in the emerging

cyber arena. Moreover, by identifying a preexisting, albeit seemingly dormant, cyber requirement in the ISM Code and then complementing that

requirement with non-binding industry guidelines, Member States avoided the lengthy process of amending SOLAS 1974 and the ISM Code (Maritime

Executive, 2021).

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Chaired By

Nick Childs

Speaker

Rear Admiral Chris Parry CBE PhD

The maritime domain is becoming more complex, competitive, and congested. Emerging and re-emerging naval powers such as China and Russia pose increasing challenges to the established maritime order and traditional maritime nations, like the United States and the main naval powers of

Europe. Enduring and evolving non-state threats, and the development and proliferation of potentially game-changing technologies, add further complications. Creating the right strategy, plans, concepts and capabilities in response is a challenge for political as well as naval leaderships.

Dr Chris Parry considers these challenges, but also the opportunities for maritime strategy, in the context of the renewed focus on the strategic signi�cance of maritime power.

Dr Chris Parry served as a seaman o�cer in the Royal Navy from 1972 to 2008, rising to the rank of rear admiral. His senior appointments included MoD Director of Operational Capability, Commander Amphibious Task Group, and Director-General of MoD Development, Doctrine, and Concepts. Since

Statesmen and sea power: challenges for 21st century maritime strategy

E V E N T H A S TA K E N P L A C E

Monday 22 January 2018

Arundel House

2008, he has been a prominent commentator on and analyst of strategic and maritime a�airs. He is the author of the in�uential study Super Highway: Sea Power in the 21st Century and Down South, a diary of his operational experience in the 1982 Falklands War and the signi�cant lessons of that campaign. He has a PhD from the University of Reading and is a Visiting Fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge.

Statesmen and sea power: challenges for 21st centurStatesmen and sea power: challenges for 21st centur……

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