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References.pdf
Introduction_TheHumanSideofPortSecurity.pdf
Conclusion.pdf
VesselorShipsSecurityOfficer.pdf
FacilitySecurityOfficer.pdf
NavigationErrors_PoorDecisionMaking.pdf
569815MinutesofShipCollisionsMistakes-YouTube.pdf
Week5_TheHumanSideofPortSecurity.pdf
5698ISPSCodeRegulations-YouTube.pdf
5698Trade-COVID-19anditsimpactonthemaritimesector-YouTube.pdf
5698COVID-19andmaritimetransport_Impactandresponses-YouTube.pdf
HowaremaritimecareersexpectedtochangeafterCovid-19_-ShipTechnology.pdf
AnAssessmentoftheU.S.MarineTransportationSystem_ReporttoCongress2022.pdf
Safety_CriticalTool.com.pdf
SuezCanalblockedbymassiveshipbringsbillionsintradetoastandstill.pdf
Whyshippingneedstotaketheleadindiversityandinclusion-SAFETY4SEA.pdf
WhatAreTheDutiesOfShipSecurityOfficerSSO_.pdf
5ProblemsAffectingSeafarersToday1.pdf
5ProblemsAffectingSeafarersToday.pdf
Relationshipbetweenhumanfactorsandasafeperformanceofvesseltrafficserviceoperators_Asystematicqualitative-basedreviewinmaritimesafety.pdf
s13437-022-00277-z.pdf
WhatisShipSecurityAssessmentSSA_.pdf
SolvingtheMaritimeTalentShortageIntroducesNewChallenges.pdf
RAND_RRA1687-1.pdf

References.pdf

References

Wignaraja, G., Vickers, B., & Ali, S. (2021). Harnessing Maritime Trade for Post-COVID Recovery and Resilience-Building in the Commonwealth.

International Trade Working Paper 2021/11. Commonwealth Secretariat, London.

https://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/�les/inline/ITWP%202021_11%20Maritime%20Trade.pdf

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) (Pub.L. 107–295)

46 U.S. Code § 70103 - Maritime transportation security plans

SAFE Port Act, Pub.L. 109–347.

Stevens, P. (2022, April 9). Massive ship blocking the Suez Canal brings billions of dollars in trade to a standstill.

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/25/suez-canal-blocked-ship-billions-trade-standstill.html

APUS does not maintain or control third-party websites and is not responsible for the accuracy or accessibility of their content.

FacilitySecurityOfficer.pdf

Facility Security Officer

The primary documents that are maintained as part of this security regime within the ports include:

The Vessel Security Assessment: A vessel security assessment is a detailed process that identi�es weaknesses in personnel protection systems, physical

structures, or other areas that may lead to a security breach. (Note: Detailed guidance concerning methodologies for risk-based security assessment is

provided in Part B of the ISPS Code). Onboard vessel personnel with speci�c security duties may be called upon to assist in these evaluations.

There are checklists to perform security assessments in day-to-day operations that should therefore be discussed, noting the inclusion of categories

such as the following: ¾ General layout of the vessel. ¾ Location of areas that should have restricted access, such as the bridge, engine room, radio

room, etc. ¾ Location and function of each actual or potential access point to the vessel. ¾ Open deck arrangement, including the height of the deck

above water. ¾ Emergency and stand-by equipment are available to maintain essential services. ¾ Numerical strength, reliability, and security duties

of the vessel’s crew. ¾ Existing security and safety equipment for protecting the passengers and crew. ¾ Existing agreements with private security

companies for vessel and waterside security services. These percentages provide a solid indication of what is held most and least important.

What are the speci�c Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) about the Transportation Worker Identi�cation Credential (TWIC)? This is the question that

many students ask routinely.

These are the key ones:

46 CFR § 10.203 is the federal mandate that requires holders of a Merchant Mariner Credential (MMC) to hold a TWIC.

Failure to obtain or hold a valid TWIC serves as a basis for denying an application for an original, renewal, new endorsement, duplicate, or raise of

grade of a mariner's credential. It may serve as a basis for suspension and revocation under 46 United States Code 7702 and 7703.

The TWIC must be produced to verify identity when required by an authorized o�cial as identi�ed in 33 CFR 101.515(d).

These laws and acts, combined with the speci�c duties, requirements, and processes, have established a security regime throughout the country. In

fairness, are there gaps and vulnerabilities? The short answer is yes…but this is a wonderful start.

The Vessel Security Plan has particular components, preparation, and submission requirements. These are de�ned in 33 CFR Part 104 and the

ISPS Code, Part A, Section 2.1. The VSP is a critical component of maintaining and enhancing vessel and facility security.

•

-The Transportation Worker Identi�cation Card or TWIC is another key component of the security regime for personnel operating within a port.

The program is conducted by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). It is a formal credential for all personnel requiring unescorted

access to secure areas of regulated facilities and vessels. Additionally, all mariners holding United States Coast Guard-issued credentials are

required to have a TWIC. Individuals who meet TWIC eligibility requirements are issued a tamper-resistant credential containing the biometric

data in the form of a �ngerprint template.

•

NavigationErrors_PoorDecisionMaking.pdf

Navigation Errors/Poor Decision Making Throughout history, there have been several cases where judgment errors in Navigation or ship handling have underscored the human factor in the

operation of the global Maritime Transportation System. Think about the following four events in history and the impact of the “Human Factor”:

Let's consider each of these….in the case of the TITANIC, “human error” issues were at play in this tragedy. First, Captain Edward J. Smith decided to

INCREASE speed since he wanted to get to New York faster than the published record. This was a terrible decision as a sister ship, the CALIFORNIA,

had sent word that they had come to a stop as they were surrounded by ice. The human factors in the sinking of TITANIC started in the shipyard with a

poor decision on the number of lifeboats aboard and the poorly designed water-tight compartment system. The ship sank on April 15, 1912.

In the case of the EXXON VALDEZ, the huge oil tanker ran aground on March 24, 1989, in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The result was over 11 million

gallons spilled. It is one of the single largest oil spills in world history—the reason is poor decision-making by the crew, especially Captain Joseph

Hazelwood. The ship hit a KNOWN Navigation hazard – the Bligh Reef.

The collision between the HMAS Melbourne and USS Frank E. Evans in June of 1969 occurred due to terrible decision-making highlighting the human

factor. EVANS was steaming in a “dark Condition,” Participating in a multi-national exercise called “Sea Spirit.” The Australian Aircra� carrier

MELBOURNE was involved. The two ships were involved in “station keeping” exercises. The resulting bad decisions on both vessels ended with the

EVANS being cut in two and 74 sailors losing their lives.

To best understand the poor decision-making involved in this collision, please review this video:

The Melbourne-Evans Incident (released 1975)The Melbourne-Evans Incident (released 1975)

This is the link to the declassi�ed and publicly released Navy report:

https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/HMAS%20EVANS%20AND%20MELBOURNE%203%20JUN%2069.pdf

Finally, the M/V EVER GIVEN is getting “stuck” in the Suez Canal, one of the single busiest waterways in the world and a signi�cant source of

commerce movement for countless countries within the global Maritime Transportation System. The event occurred on March 23rd, 2021, when one

of the largest container ships in the world got “stuck” blocking the channel. Ultimately, the vessel had to unload nearly 10% of its cargo to be

re�oated. The Suez Canal averages 20,600 transits annually. The EVER GIVEN event blocked up over 300 vessels. There is a legal battle ongoing for

compensation with the Suez Canal Authority.

1. HMS TITANIC hits an iceberg 1500 people die

2. The EXXON VALDEZ runs aground and spills 11 million gallons into the water

3. HMAS MELBOURNE and USS Frank. E. EVANS collide, splitting the EVANS in two

4. The M/V EVER GIVEN gets “stuck in the Suez Canal.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cK0kolfwUw