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Resilient and Sustainable Electric Power and Communications InfrastructuresResilient and Sustainable Electric Power and Communications Infrastructures

Don'� Ge� Soaked: Inves� in Emergency Preparedness, Preven��on and M���ga��on Ac��v���es Unlisted

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Introduction: Energy, Water and Communication System Resilience and the Homeland In week 1 you were introduced to Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)- 21 -- Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. This document laid the foundation for this week’s lesson which explores energy, communication and water facility resilience and their relationship to homeland security. PPD-21 notes that, “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.” This week we move the discussion to a much more specific field of study. Specifically, resilience issues within our energy infrastructure, communication systems and water facilities. Collectively these three systems are backbones of our national economy.

From: https://fedvte.usalearning.gov/publiccourses/critical101/0090.htm

Let’s start with energy resilience in a homeland security context since it is beyond a doubt the most visible and whose disruption would have an immediate impact.

A good starting point for a discussion of energy system resilience was authored by the Department of Energy’s Sandia National Lab. The lab produced a power point entitled, “Energy Infrastructure Resilience” which looks at not only the issue of resilience but also metrics to measure it. From the study, a Power Point was developed that walks through the issues and some scenario discussion via looking at impacts of a major hurricane on the energy system.

What are the key takeaways from the power point? Are we a resilient nation is our power grid “antifragile” especially when impacted by a major hurricane?

Chuanyi, Wei, and Poor (2016) added to the body of knowledge on energy resilience by publishing “Resilience of Energy Infrastructure and Services: Modeling, Data Analytics and Metrics”. The authors stated, “Large scale power failures induced by severe weather have become frequent and damaging in recent years, causing millions of people to be without electricity service for days. Although the power industry has been battling weather-induced failures for years, it is largely unknown how resilient the energy infrastructure and services really are to severe weather disruptions.”

In December of 2017 perhaps the frankest discussion regarding resilience and the energy drive was published by an industry publication – Utility Dive. Sue Tierney, in a piece entitled “About that national conversation on resilience of the electric grid: The urgent need for guidance and action” noted that overall the US power system is reliable. This is a true statement. However, is a reliable system a resilient one…different story.

Tierney noted,

According to the July 2017 report of the National Academies of Sciences committee on enhancing the resilience of the nation’s electric system (of which I was a member), a resilient grid is one with the following characteristics: It is one where the grid planners, operators and regulators assume that they cannot foresee and avoid every type of event that could take out the system in a very big way; where they therefore plan for how they will ride through big-impact events with as much of the system still intact as possible: where they can mobilize the resources to restore the system safely and quickly, especially to support the provision of critical services; and where the industry players learn lessons from prior disruptions and plan for how to better handle the next hit on the grid.

The immediate analysis of these references and countless more is that the national energy grid is not resilient and is characterized by distinct vulnerabilities both generated by nature and by humans. Consider the impact that could occur from a breach of the security of our national nuclear plant system. There are environmental concerns and security

issues. Granted the security regime in these plants are significant, as the safeguards needed for operations, but are they resilient? Consider this real-world example.

On March 11, 2011 a 15-meter tsunami developed from the Great East Japan Earthquake (magnitude 9.0) and impacted the Japanese nuclear plant at Fukushima a nuclear accident resulted and people died. Could the plant have withstood this significant event if more resilient measures had been instilled? That specific question was addressed by Hollnagel and Fujita in a February 2013 article in Nuclear Engineering and Technology. The researchers came to some very interesting conclusions. One that stood out was their analysis of formal risk assessment:

The main conclusion is that formal risk assessments trust established methods and models more than they should. Established methods and models have become accepted in practice, because they seem to offer an acceptable trade-off between thoroughness and efficiency. In other words, they seem to offer the necessary thoroughness of analysis, meaning that they identify all the risks that are ‘necessary,’ but without being unnecessarily costly in time or resources. This happens in every field of activity, and examples can easily be found in finance, in engineering, in medicine, and in offshore exploration. Because severe accidents are very rare, we easily become overconfident in the analysis methods. The reasoning seems to go something like this: We have analyzed the possible risks; we have built the installation following the recommendations; and we have operated safely for n years – whatever n is. This reasoning is, however, fallacious, because the absence of a failure does not prove that the precautions were correct, or even sufficient. Resilience engineering advocates a constant sense of unease, which we should be mindful of what we do, to counteract the overconfidence that is a side effect of the relative safety of nuclear installations.

Large scale power failures, like Fukushima, induced by severe weather have become frequent and damaging in recent years, causing millions to be without power for days or longer. Although the industry has been battling weather- induced failures for years, it is largely unknown how resilient the energy infrastructure and services really are to severe weather disruptions.

The impact of the electric power grid was underscored in the DHS S&T “resilient Electric Grid” fact sheet added that, “In the US more than 60 percent of the gross domestic product is tied to electricity. Annual losses due to power estimated at more than 100 billion nationwide”. Talk about an impact!

It should be no surprise to anyone that the Department of Energy’s Laboratory system is working numerous projects supporting energy system resilience. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL is a national laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy). The lab’s web site is incredibly comprehensive!

NREL offers a wide range of services, including whole-community strategic energy planning, on-site technical assistance, energy-efficiency design and rebuilding strategies, and expert guidance in building a road map to

resilience for communities preparing for natural disasters and other potential threats. We draw on our extensive technology development and market expertise to analyze and promote resilience in energy systems and dependent services at the building, community, regional, and national levels. specialize in assisting remote communities in the United States and abroad with incorporating clean energy into disaster resiliency and recovery planning. (NREL.gov)

What is NRE researching regarding resilience to the electric system. These include:

Energy planning decision support for increased resilience and security, including integration with other services (e.g., water, transport, emergency response) Analysis, integration and application of microgrids Business model and valuation analysis for resilience Photovoltaic plus storage analysis and application Energy and water systems analysis and technology development Energy strategies for climate change mitigation and adaption.” (NREL.gov)

What about our national water systems – are they resilient?

To address that question, you need to consider what are the likely attacks. More publications look at two scenarios… first the introduction of a chemical or biological hazard, the second a cyber breach which could impact the operation and distribution system down to the end user. Additionally, and this is not threat related, the age and lack of renewal in the system itself will present a challenge to resilience.

The National Infrastructure Advisory Council has addressed portions this issue in a very blunt manner. The Council noted “Though U.S. water utilities are diverse in their technical capacity and financial resources, the council found three common risks. First, many water system pipes and facilities have reached or exceeded retirement age and need to be upgraded. It is an oft-repeated assessment, but the report notes that everyday failures - like water main breaks and sewage leaks that are a frequent occurrence in some cities - do not inspire confidence that the systems will survive more exacting pressures during a natural disaster. Second is the risk of cyberattack, which the council argues “is no longer hypothetical.”

(https://calmutuals.org/water-supplier-digital-divide-threatens-supply-resilience/)

Noted the California Association of Mutual Water Companies “The old adage that “one is only as good as the weakest link” is particularly true for the water industry and frames a growing threat to the water supply resiliency of entire regions in California. When the smallest public water suppliers lack the technology and data necessary to plan, fill supply gaps and safeguard security and water quality, unexpected system failure and disaster looms.”

Fortunately, there has been significant effort by the federal government to address the “non age related” issues of resilience in the national water system. The Environmental Protection Agency EPA) working with their Water and Wastewater partners have explored ways to assess and reduce vulnerabilities both physical (i.e. chemical) and cyber. The collective efforts have been codified in the EPA’s Sector Specific Plan (SSP), which was a similar document to the

energy SSP. Pages 9-11 identified this sectors risk and the ways that resilience could be enhanced. In 2021, the passage of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act brought another line of support for water system resilience. The Pacific Institute noted the following highlights:

The Act dedicates approximately $82.5 billion for a wide range of critical water investments. The largest water- related investments are for improvements in safe drinking water and sanitation. The new Infrastructure Act provides a shift away from the 20th century primary focus on building major dams and water diversions toward a more sustainable and resilient approach. The new legislation helps correct some of the historical inequities previous infrastructure bills have perpetuated on frontline communities, who are disproportionately impacted by water insecurity. The water system investments provided by this new Act are important steps in the right direction. They are not, however, enough—alone—–to prepare water systems to become fully resilient, as they need to be to withstand the stresses and shocks of climate change. (The U.S. Infrastructure Plan: Water Components - Pacific Institute (pacinst.org)

Let me leave you with an example of fragile nature of the national power system and our water distribution system. In September of 2013 a dam in New York was reported to be hacked by an Iranian hacktivist group called - SOBH Cyber Jihad. Numerous media outlets reported the attack, but the depth of the attacker’s activities and their goals were not disclosed. How does this underscore the fragile nature of both the water and power systems --- a successful remote attack could tamper with flood gates perhaps setting up a flooding situation or on the other end of the spectrum shut the water supply completely off. Power systems could fail…this regional infrastructure could be brought to its’ knees. This is just one example why resilience is so important to the national discussion.

How New York improved its electric grid after SandyHow New York improved its electric grid after Sandy