Modeling Water System Services and Seismic Resilience - Craig Davis 1. Modeling Water System Services and Seismic Resilience 2013 EERI Annual Meeting February 14, 2013 Craig A. Davis, Ph.D., P.E., G.E. Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 2. WATER SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AND SERVICES Provision of water services and the protection of life and property are arguably the most important performances a water system can achieve Performance Description Category Water Services Provision of water services identified in following slides. Life Safety Preventing injuries and casualties from direct or indirect damages to water system facilities; includes safety matters related to response and restoration activities. Property Protection Preventing property damage as a result of damage to water system components; also includes preventing water system damage. This presentation will not address expected performance levels. 3. WATER SYSTEM RELATION TO COMMUNITY RESILIENCE Resilience requires us to look beyond system damages and reduced ability to perform We must clearly understand how system damages and operational losses directly impact customers. What are the parameters we need to understand in order to model water system resilience? System Operation_ Typical Resilience Model (e.g., McDaniels et al., 2008; Bruneau et al, 2003) Time 4. WATER SYSTEM RELATION TO COMMUNITY RESILIENCE Lets start by examining the actual water services provided and how their recoveries may be quantified Show how these apply to actual earthquake damages in a water system Relate to resilience concepts Community resilience Water system resilience Formulate basis for modeling water system resilience Relate to other lifeline networks 5. WATER SERVICES Service restoration will be presented in the following categories: Service Category Description Water Delivery Able to distribute water to customers, but the water delivered may not meet water quality standards (requires water purification notice), pre-disaster volumes (requires water rationing), fire flow requirements (impacting fire fighting capabilities), or pre-disaster functionality (inhibiting system operations). Quality Water to customers meets health standards (water purification notices removed). This includes minimum pressure requirements. Quantity Water flow to customers meets pre-disaster volumes (water rationing removed). Fire Protection Able to provide pressure and flow of suitable magnitude and duration to fight fires. In many water distribution systems the minimum pressure required for fire protection is 20 psi (140 kPa), with flow quantities varying by neighborhood. Functionality The system functions are performed at pre-disaster reliability, including pressure (operational constraints resulting from the disaster have been removed/resolved). 6. QUANTIFYING SERVICES Services can be quantified by the ratio: number of customers with service a�er the earthquake number of customers having the service before the earthquake Calculation Methodology Take area(s) where services are not being met Count number of services (or people, businesses, etc) in area Calculation is relatively independent of system layout and operations (except for Functionality) Functionality service estimates require full understanding of systemic capabilities Restoration curves are plots of this quantification over time 7. CASE STUDY: Los Angeles Water System 1994 Northridge Earthquake 8. LADWP OVERVIEW � Largest Municipal Utility in USA Founded 1902 Serves 4.1-million people 712,000 water service connections 1214-square kilometer service area Receives water from: 4 aqueducts Local wells LADWP owns and operates the water and power systems 9. 1994 NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE January 17, 1994 Magnitude 6.7 (Mw) Thrust Fault (blind/buried) Epicenter in Northern Los Angeles Urban San Fernando Valley Millions of people impacted by strong shaking ~670,000 residents in LA without water Another 180,000 people in LA had reduced pressure 10. Fault rupture area Primary damage area 11. LA WATER SYSTEM DAMAGES (damage @ 2 locations) (damaged influent (damage @ 3 locations) (power loss, damage to south half) 14 repairs to raw water pipes 60 repairs transmission pipes and e�luent lines) (power loss) GHT (roof collapse) 1013 repairs distribution Area shown in Figure 2 Desoto Reservoir STL RTL pipes (power loss) GTL RoTL 200 service connection TT ZT repairs CCT 7 damaged reservoirs BGT Damaged Tanks 1/2 treatment plant out of BGT = Beverly Glen Tank CCT = Coldwater Canyon Tank service Van Norman Complex GHT = Granada High Tank TT = Topanga Tank Additional Damage -High Speed Channel Lost power up to 27 hrs ZT = Zelzah Tank - Bypass Channel - Power Plant Tailrace - LA25 (MWD connection) No outage at pump and - LA35T (MWD connection) - VNPS I Discharge Line chlorine stations - VNPS II Discharge Line 12. 1994 NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE L.A. WATER RESTORATIONS 100 Normal Service Level Quantity Fire Protection Delivery _ Los Angeles Water Service (%) 80 Northridge Earthquake Quality 60 Functionality 40 20 0 -1 t0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 Time (days) 13. (damage @ 2 locations) 1994 L.A. DELIVERY (damage @ 3 locations) (damaged influent (power loss, damage to south half) and e�luent lines) (power loss) GHT (roof collapse) Area shown in Figure 2 Desoto Reservoir STL SERVICES RTL (power loss) RoTL GTL TT ZT CCT BGT Damaged Tanks BGT = Beverly Glen Tank CCT = Coldwater Canyon Tank Van Norman Complex GHT = Granada High Tank Additional Damage TT = Topanga Tank -High Speed Channel ZT = Zelzah Tank - Bypass Channel - Power Plant Tailrace - LA25 (MWD connection) - LA35T (MWD connection) - VNPS I Discharge Line - VNPS II Discharge Line 100 Normal Service Level Quantity Fire Protection Delivery _ Los Angeles Water Service (%) 80 Northridge Earthquake Quality 60 Functionality 7 DAYS 159,434 service connection outages 40 22% of all services 20 ~670,000 residents 0 -1 t0 1 3 5 Time (days) 7 9 11 13 All delivery service restored in 7 days Pipe repairs completed several weeks later 14. (damage @ 2 locations) (damage @ 3 locations) 1994 L.A. QUANTITY AND (damaged influent (power loss, damage to south half) and e�luent lines) (power loss) GHT (roof collapse) Area shown in Figure 2 Desoto Reservoir STL FIRE SERVICE RoTL RTL (power loss) GTL TT ZT CCT BGT Damaged Tanks BGT = Beverly Glen Tank CCT = Coldwater Canyon Tank Van Norman Complex GHT = Granada High Tank Additional Damage TT = Topanga Tank -High Speed Channel ZT = Zelzah Tank F - Bypass Channel - Power Plant Tailrace - LA25 (MWD connection) - LA35T (MWD connection) - VNPS I Discharge Line - VNPS II Discharge Line 100 Normal Service Level Quantity Fire Protection Delivery _ Los Angeles Water Service (%) 80 Northridge Earthquake Quality 60 Functionality 8.5-9 203,164 service connection outages DAYS 40 28% of all services 20 ~850,000 residents 0 -1 t0 1 3 5 Time (days) 7 9 11 13 All quantity restored in 8.5 days All fire flow restored in 9 days

Ebook

Notes on Instrumentatio… G. J. Roy

4.5 / 5

Ebook

Introduction to Power System… Dr. Hedaya Alasooly

0 / 5

Ebook

Voltage Regulator Circuit Manual Bozzano G Luisa

3 / 5

Ebook

Introduction to Power System… Dr. Hidaia Mahmood…

0 / 5

Ebook

Marine Electrical Practice: Marin… G. O. Watson

4 / 5

Ebook

Strength of Materials and… John Case

4 / 5

Ebook

Electronics And Circuit Design… Kerwin Mathew

3 / 5

https://www.scribd.com/book/282577013/Notes-on-Instrumentation-and-Control?utm_medium=cpc&utm_source=slideshare&utm_campaign=pmp_recs-v1

https://www.scribd.com/book/575061138/Introduction-to-Power-System-Protection?utm_medium=cpc&utm_source=slideshare&utm_campaign=pmp_recs-v1

https://www.scribd.com/book/282564590/Voltage-Regulator-Circuit-Manual?utm_medium=cpc&utm_source=slideshare&utm_campaign=pmp_recs-v1

https://www.scribd.com/book/571991600/Introduction-to-Power-System-Protection?utm_medium=cpc&utm_source=slideshare&utm_campaign=pmp_recs-v1

https://www.scribd.com/book/282611450/Marine-Electrical-Practice-Marine-Engineering-Series?utm_medium=cpc&utm_source=slideshare&utm_campaign=pmp_recs-v1

https://www.scribd.com/book/282610822/Strength-of-Materials-and-Structures-An-Introduction-to-the-Mechanics-of-Solids-and-Structures?utm_medium=cpc&utm_source=slideshare&utm_campaign=pmp_recs-v1

https://www.scribd.com/book/230383787/Electronics-And-Circuit-Design-Made-Easy?utm_medium=cpc&utm_source=slideshare&utm_campaign=pmp_recs-v1

15. 1994 L.A. QUALITY RESTORATION January 17 January 18 January 21 January 21 January 17 8 PM 10 PM 10 AM 6:30 PM 100 Normal Service Level Quantity Fire Protection Delivery _ Los Angeles Water Service (%) 80 Northridge Earthquake Quality 60 Functionality 40 12 DAYS January 22 January 23 January 26 20 January 27 2:46 PM 10 PM 3 PM 0 -1 t0 1 3 5 4:30 PM 7 9 11 13 Time (days) 16. 1994 L.A. FUNCTIONALITY RESTORATION Normal Service Level Functionality (normalized) 100 _ Los Angeles Water Service (%) Final E�ectively 80 Fully Improvements Restored Northridge Earthquake System Restored Completed Improvements (6 years) (9 years) (18 years) initiated 100 Normal Service Level Quantity 60 (3 years) Fire Protection Delivery _ Los Angeles Water Service (%) 80 Northridge Earthquake Quality Functionality 40 60 Delivery 40 Quality 20 Quantity 20 Fire Protection 0 -1 t0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 Time (days) 0 t0 -1 1000 2001 3002 4003 5004 6005 Time (days) 17. OPERABILITY VS FUNCTIONALITY � Operability is achieved once water delivery, quality, quantity, and fire protection services are restored System is able to completely service customers at pre-disaster levels However, system may not be fully functional e.g., LA Water restored operability in 12 days a�er repairing 8 of 60 transmission line leaks. Functionality services describe the ability of a system to reliably perform. A highly functional system can provide water delivery, quality, quantity, and fire protection services prior to completing all water infrastructure repairs Damage imposes constraints that do not allow the system to function with its pre-earthquake performance and reliability e.g., LA Water restored functionality in 9 years a�er repairing all necessary damaged facilities (some remaining damage deemed acceptable). 18. OPERABILITY VS FUNCTIONALITY 100 Normal Service Level Quantity Fire Protection 12 DAYS Delivery _ Los Angeles Water Service (%) 80 Operability Northridge Earthquake Quality 60 Functionality Normal Service Level Functionality (normalized) 100 _ Los Angeles Water Service (%) Final E�ectively 40 80 Restored Fully Improvements Northridge Earthquake System Restored Completed Improvements (6 years) (9 years) (18 years) initiated 60 (3 years) 40 6 to 9 YEARS 20 20 Delivery Quality Functionality Quantity Fire Protection recovery 0 t0 -1 1000 2001 3002 4003 5004 6005 Time (days) 0 -1 t0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 Time (days) 19. FUNCTIONALITY DEFINITIONS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS Some accepted Functionality Definitions: Recovery time as the period necessary to restore water supply system functionality to a desired level that can operate or function the same, close to, or better than the original one Cimellaro et al. (2010) Restoration as the time when the infrastructure is completely repaired Bruneau et al., (2003). Many have, and still do, incorrectly describe Functionality restoration for water systems as 1 of the other services. e.g., LA has been noted to restore functionality in 7 days a�er Northridge earthquake (Incorrectly defined) This was the Delivery Service and the system was not actually fully operable until 12 days. Functionality per above definitions was not restored until 6 to 9 years This misunderstanding is also applied to all types of systems, including building systems This is not just a issue of semantics It is a core understanding needed to help define community and system resilience 20. WATER SYSTEM AND COMMUNITY RESILIENCE Community Resilience Directly related to system Operability restoration Community recovery can accelerate once system operability is restored (not limited to water systems) Even when functional recovery trails by many years and results in periodic outages Water System Resilience (or other systems) Directly related to Functionality restoration Systems remain vulnerable to outage until full functional recovery is made E.g. Christchurch water and sewer systems Functionality recovery is critical for ensuring the community recovery is complete and sustainable 21. ACTUAL SERVICE RESTORATION AND ASSUMED SYSTEM RESILIENCE Water service restoration is generally assumed to meet only one category (incorrect), to the contrary Water system resilience cannot be characterized by any single water service category It is dictated by all five service categories and how they interact with the regional community This illustrates how water system resilience modeling is more complex than previously recognized To engineer a resilient community, this complexity must be understood and implemented into the proper models Normal Service Level Quantity System Operation_ 100 Fire Protection Delivery _ Los Angeles Water Service (%) 80 Operability Northridge Earthquake Quality 60 Functionality 40 20 0 Time -1 t0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 Time (days) 22. FRAMEWORK FOR WATER SYSTEM RESILIENCE MODELING Assess seismic hazards Model system hydraulic performance Identify system losses Estimate service category restoration Assess community impacts Model community resilience Estimate economic Business Interruption from water system operability loss Identify, prioritize, implement seismic improvement measures Quantify service category improvements using resilience model Helps to justify and prioritize mitigation measures 23. ASSESSING SHAKEOUT SCENARIO IMPACTS TO LA WATER SUPPLY Facility Damage GIRAFFE Los Angeles Fault rupture and shaking; Aqueducts 18+ months to restore Cornell Colorado River Fault rupture and shaking; University Aqueduct 15 months to restore California Fault rupture and shaking; 4 Calif ornia California Aqueduct months West Branch, 12 Aqueduct s Los Angeles months East Branch Aqueduct s Transmission main 150 repairs Elizabet h Tunnel Color ado R. Colorado Aqueduct (Trunk Line) Distribution pipe 2,700 repairs Los Angeles 24. SHAKEOUT SCENARIO, L.A. EXAMPLE WATER RESTORATIONS Delivery Fire 100 Normal Service Level ShakeOut Scenario Event H I Quality (%) Los Angeles Water Service _ 80 Quantity A 30% Rationing (11 months) G 60 Functionality 18 MONTHS F 50% Rationing (3 months) C A. Immediately a�er event (System Serviceability (SS) = 76%) 40 B. 1-day a�er event SS declines from pipe leaks (SS = 34%) B C. 2-days a�er event, open emergency storage reservoirs (SS = 42%) D. SS declines for 1-week due to pipe leaks and fire fighting demand (SS = 20%) E E. 1 to 4-weeks: improvement from pipe repairs and ground water pumping (SS = 25-30%) 20 D F. 1-month: Regional supplies are delivered (SS = 50%) G. 4-months: California Aqueduct West Branch returned to service (SS = 70%) H. 15-months: Colorado RiverAqueduct returned to service (SS = 100%) I. 18-months: Los Angeles Aqueducts returned to service 0 -1 t0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 Time (months) 25. SHAKEOUT SCENARIO, L.A. EXAMPLE WATER RESTORATIONS 100 ShakeOut Scenario Event Normal Service Level Los Angeles Water Service (%) Fire _ Quality 80 A 3 WEEKS 60 F Quantity C 40 Delivery B Functionality E 20 D 0 -0.25 t0 0.5 1.25 2 Time (months) 26. FURTHERING MODEL DEVELOPMENTS Characteristics and inter-relations of the service categories can be used to better manage and engineer resilience Case studies provide valuable information useful for improving water system and community resilience models Strategies used to return services Service loss impacts on customers How water systems can restore operability in advance of functionality services The information will allow restoration models to be developed that will improve predictive capabilities for water service restorations Leads to improves community resilience models Useful for other infrastructure systems Further work needed to quantify this 27. PRACTICAL RESILIENCE APPLICATIONS There are many practical measures that help lead to resilient water systems. 2 on-going programs are highlighted here. There are many other examples from numerous agencies LADWP is implementing a pilot project to implement a Japanese designed Earthquake Resistant Joint Ductile Iron Pipe. LADWP is installing an HDPE pipe inside the Los Angeles Aqueduct Tunnel where it crosses the San Andreas Fault These are innovative solutions that improve Community Resilience through improved water system operability and functionality. 28. LADWP – Kubota Earthquake Resistant Joint Ductile Iron Pipe Pilot Project 29. Comparison of Joint Structure General Joint General Joint Earthquake-Resistant Joint Earthquake-Resistant Joint （ Flexible （ Chain structure Joint ） Joint ） Rubber Gasket Rubber Gasket Lock Ring Spigot Projection T-type NS-type Expand No Expansion if Expand / Contract lock joint used Deflect Deflect Lock 30. Earthquake Resistant Ductile Iron Pipe LADWP Installation, January 2013 31. Los Angeles Aqueduct Elizabeth Lake Tunnel Real Time Monitoring & HDPE Pipe Installation GPS & Seismographs each side SAF Real-time information CISN Display Rapid assessment of water supply damage W = 9.5ʼ Enhances regional seismic monitoring Slip: 3.5 m = 11.5ʼ 32. Los Angeles Aqueduct Elizabeth Lake Tunnel HDPE Pipe Installation HDPE Pipe to allow water flow a�er fault rupture 33. Questions?

Editor's Notes 1. These photos show the comparison of joint structure between standard joint and earthquake-resistant joint. As you know, standard joint has some flexibility against expansion and

deflection. On the other hand, earthquake-resistant joint can contract or expand and deflect much more, and has lock mechanism. The spigot projection hooks on the lock ring and stops the spigot from slipping-out. The leak tightness structure is the same as that of a standard Push-on joint or Mechanical joint.

About Support Terms Privacy Copyright Cookie Preferences Do not sell or share my personal information

English 

https://www.slideshare.net/about

https://support.scribd.com/hc/en/categories/360004792932-SlideShare?userType=SlideShare

https://support.scribd.com/hc/en/articles/210129326-General-Terms-of-Use

https://support.scribd.com/hc/en/articles/210129366-Privacy-policy

https://www.slideshare.net/copyright-policy

https://support.scribd.com/hc/en-us/articles/360038016931-Privacy-Rights-Request-Form

https://twitter.com/slideshare

https://www.slideshare.net/rss/latest