g In An Introduction to Biblical Ethics, McQuikin and Copan advance four primary
arguments against evolutionary ethics.[1] First, they claim that evolutionary
influences on ethics are not an argument against theism because God can
influence ethics through evolutionary processes. Second, they claim that human
dignity is best explained by God rather than evolution. Third, they claim that
people cannot trust their beliefs if their beliefs are simply the product “mindless,
valueless processes.”[2] Finally, they claim evolutionary processes can only
descriptive and cannot give people a sense of moral obligation.
g g g g g g g g g g Their first argument is the claim that evolutionary ethics does not truly
account for whether or not God is involved in the process. This argument is their
strongest, and almost unassailable, unless one is biased against theism as a
concept. While they frame it more as an argument against atheism than
evolutionary ethics as a whole, it serves as a reminder that evolutionary
processes and God are not by necessity mutually exclusive. It is also a potent
reminder that metaphysics and science do not have the same objectives and
often do not answer the same questions.[3]
g g g g g g g g g g g The remaining three arguments assume that God is not involved in the
process of evolutionary ethics, which is a frustrating contradiction from their first
argument. If the cornerstone of their argument is that God can be involved in the
process, McQuikin and Copan would be better served not to undercut their
argument by arguing against being able to trust these beliefs or have a sense of
obligation if ethics are evolved. Paul’s assertion that God writes his law on each
person’s heart and gives them their consciences as a guide is certainly something
that could be accomplished evolutionarily (Rom. 2:14-15).
g g g g g g g The fact that other primates engage in social values and behavior similar to
humans could also seem to undercut McQuikin and Copan’s arguments about
human dignity and the ability to trust evolutionary processes.[4] However, these
facts have also led occasional theologians, like John Wesley, g theorize in the
opposite direction and postulate that animals have souls.[5] If one does not
assume that evolutionary ethics automatically dismisses theism, the presence of
moral and social norms in other primates could be considered evidence that God
evolved animals to have higher and higher moral consciousness, with man having
the most highly evolved of all animals. It also must be noted here that the
causality of a thought and the merit of a thought are completely unrelated, and it
is difficult to make a cogent argument that evolutionary processes cannot
produce meaningful morality, especially if the first argument of God’s involvement
in the process is granted.[6]
g g g g g g g g g g McQuiken and Copan’s fourth argument, “naturalism can only describe
how humans actually do function or behave, not prescribe how they ought to act,”
is a much more powerful argument against evolutionary ethics than their second
and third arguments.[7] The intentionality and self-evaluation of morality are two
key aspects in which human morality seems to differ from that of other
primates.[8]
g g g g g g g g g g Ultimately, the problem with arguments for or against evolutionary ethics
are that they purport to be about science and not worldview. The naturalist often
refuses to accept any evidence other than scientific evidence as valid. All other
forms of evidence are simply ruled out “by fiat.”[9] When a theologian appeals to
God, then the theologian is appealing to a different form of evidence than the
evidence that a naturalist accepts as valid. While arguments against evolutionary
ethics may aid Christians, who are questioning these areas, they will rarely win
the naturalist. Christians, instead, would do better by helping the naturalist either
see that evolutionary ethics does not rule out theism or that their own worldview
rests upon preconceptions and beliefs that are not necessarily governed by the
scientific method.
Bibliography
Field, David N. “But Could They Tell Right From Wrong? Evolution, Moral
Responsibility, and Human Distinctiveness.” HSE Teologiese Studies/Theological
Studies (June 26, 2017): https://doi.org/ 10.4102/hts.v73i3.4505.
McQuikin, Robertson and Paul Copan. An Introduction to Biblical Ethics: Walking
the Way of Wisdom. Third edition. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2014.
Rozema, David. “Naturalism: Metaphysics, Mandate, or Myth?” Theology Today 75,
no. 3 (2018): 330-346.
[1]The discussion in this paragraph is drawn from Robertson McQuikin and Paul
Copan, An Introduction to Biblical Ethics: Walking in the Way of Wisdom, 3rd ed.
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2014), 180-183.
[2]Ibid., 181.
[3]David Rozema, “Naturalism: Metaphysics, Mandate, or Myth?” Theology Today
75, no. 3 (2018): 339.
[4]David N. Field, “But Could They Tell Right from Wrong? Evolution, Moral
Responsibility, and Human Distinctiveness,” HSE Teologiese Studies/Thological
Studies (Jun 26, 2017): https://doi.org/ 10.4102/hts.v73i3.4505, 2-3.
[5]Ibid., 5.
[6]Rozema, “Metaphysics, Mandate or Myth,” 332.
[7]McQuikin and Copan, Introduction to Biblical Ethics, 182.
[8]Field, “Tell Right from Wrong,” 3.
[9]Rozema, “Metaphysics, Mandate or Myth,” 338.
