Module 6
Ethics in Negotiation
A Sampling of Ethical Quandaries
You are trying to sell your audio system (an amplifier and speakers) to raise
money for an upcoming trip overseas. The system works great, and an audiophile
friend tells you that if he were in the market for this kind of equipment (which he
isn’t), he’d give you $500 for it. A few days later the first potential buyer comes to
see the system. The buyer looks it over and asks a few questions about it. You assure
the buyer that the system works well. When asked how much, you tell the buyer that
you have already had an offer for $500. The buyer purchases the system for $550.
You are a vice president of human resources, negotiating with a union
representative for a new labor contract. The union refuses to sign a new contract
unless the company agrees to raise the number of paid holidays from six to seven.
Management estimates it will cost approximately $320,000 for each paid holiday and
argues that the company cannot afford to meet the demand. However, you know that,
in reality, money is not the issue—the company simply doesn’t think the union’s
demand is justified. To convince the union leaders that they should withdraw their
demand, you have been considering these alternatives: (a) Tell the union that the
company simply can’t afford it, without further explanation; (b) prepare erroneous
financial statements that show that it will cost.about $400,000 per paid holiday, which
you simply can’t afford; and (c) offer union.leaders an all-expenses-paid “working”
trip to a Florida resort if they will simply drop the demand.
You are about to graduate from the MBA program of a leading university.
You specialized in management information systems (MIS) and will start a job with a
company that commercially develops websites. You own a laptop computer that is a
couple of years old. You have decided to sell it and buy new equipment later after you
see what kinds of projects your employer has you working on. So you post a flyer on
campus bulletin boards about the laptop for sale. You have decided not to tell
prospective buyers that your hard drive acts like it is about to fail and that the
computer occasionally crashes without warning
You buy a new pair of shoes on sale. The printed receipt states very clearly
that the shoes are not returnable. After you get them home, you wear the shoes around
the house for a day and decide that they just don’t fit you correctly. So you take the
shoes back to the store. The clerk points to the message on the receipt; but you don’t
let that deter you. You start to yell angrily about the store’s poor quality service so
that people in the store start to stare. The clerk calls the store manager; after some
discussion, the manager agrees to give you your money back.
Ethics Defined
Ethics are broadly applied social standards for what is right or wrong in a
particular situation, or a process for setting those standards. They differ from morals,
which are individual and personal beliefs about what is right and wrong. Ethics grow
out of particular philosophies, which purport to (1) define the nature of the world in
which we live and (2) prescribe rules for living together. Different philosophies adopt
distinct perspectives on these questions, which means in practice that they may lead to
different judgments about what is right and wrong in a given situation. The “hard
work” of ethics in practice is figuring out how ethical philosophies differ from one
another, deciding which approaches are personally preferable, and applying them to
real-world situations at hand. Our goal is to distinguish among different criteria, or
standards, for judging and evaluating a negotiator’s actions, particularly when
questions of ethics might be involved. Although negotiation is our focus, the criteria
involved are really no different than might be used to evaluate ethics in business
generally. An ethical dilemma exists for a negotiator when possible actions or
strategies put the potential economic benefits of doing a deal in conflict with one’s
social or moral obligations to other involved parties or one’s broader community.
Many writers on business ethics have proposed frameworks that capture competing
ethical standards (these typically map onto classical theories of ethical philosophy that
have been around a long time).
Discussions of business ethics frequently confuse what is ethical (appropriate
as determined by some standard of moral conduct) versus what is prudent (wise,
based on trying to understand the efficacy of the tactic and the consequences it might
have on the relationship with the other) versus what is practical (what a negotiator can
actually make happen in a given situation) versus what is legal (what the law defines
as acceptable practice).2 In earlier chapters, we evaluated negotiation strategies and
tactics by the prudence and practicality criteria; in this chapter, the focus is on
evaluating negotiation strategies and tactics by ethical criteria. Figure 5.1 presents a
helpful way to think about what it means to comprehend and analyze an ethical
dilemma. The figure shows a model of the process of analyzing a moral problem.3
Before we can ponder solutions, the first step is developing a complete understanding
of the moral problem at hand. Looking at the left side of Figure 5.1, this means
grasping the various subjective moral standards in play among involved parties,
including individual value and beliefs as well as social norms.
Why do some negotiators choose to use tactics that may be unethical? The
first answer that occurs to many people is that such negotiators are corrupt,
degenerate, or immoral. However, that answer is much too simplistic. We know from
work on the psychology of attribution (to be discussed more in Chapter 6) that people
tend to regard other people’s unsavory behavior as caused by disposition or
personality, while attributing the causes of their own behavior to factors in the social
environment.5 Thus, a negotiator might consider an adversary who uses an ethically
questionable tactic unprincipled, profit-driven, or willing to use any tactic to get what
he or she wanted. In contrast, when attempting to explain why you as the negotiator
might use the same tactic, you would tend to say that you are highly principled but
had very good reasons for deviating from those principles just this one time. In this
section, we discuss negotiation tactics that bring issues of ethicality into play. We first
discuss what we mean by tactics that are “ethically ambiguous,” and we link
negotiator ethics to the fundamental issue of truth telling. We then describe research
that has sought to identify and classify such tactics and analyze people’s attitudes
toward their use. We also distinguish between active and passive forms of deception
—lies of omission versus commission. The section concludes with a model that
portrays the negotiator’s decision-making process with respect to the possible use of
such tactics.
Here we discuss what kinds of tactics are ethically ambiguous and how they
can work to afford a temporary strategic advantage. Our use of the phrase ethically
ambiguous reflects a carefully considered choice of words. One dictionary defines
“ambiguous” as “open to more than one interpretation . . . doubtful or uncertain.”6
We are interested in tactics that may or may not be improper, depending on an
individual’s own ethical reasoning and circumstances. Most of the ethical issues that
arise in negotiation are concerned with standards of truth telling—how honest, candid,
and disclosing a negotiator should be. The attention here is more on what negotiators
say (communicate about) or what they say they will do (and how they say it) than on
what they actually do (although negotiators may act unethically as well). Some
negotiators may cheat (violate formal and informal rules— e.g., claiming that rules
about deadlines or procedures don’t apply to them) or steal (e.g., break into the other
party’s or competitor’s database or headquarters to secure confidential documents or
briefing memoranda), but most of the attention in negotiator ethics has been on lying
and deception. Most negotiators would probably place a high value on a reputation for
being truthful. Yet what does being truthful mean? Questions about truth telling are
straightforward, but the answers are not so clear. First, how does one define truth? Do
you follow a clear set of rules, determine what the social contract is for truth in your
group or organization, or follow your conscience? Second, how does one define and
classify deviations from the truth? Are all deviations lies, no matter how small and
minor they are? Finally, one can add a relativistic dimension to these questions:
Should a person tell the truth all the time, or are there times when not telling the truth
is an acceptable (or even necessary) form of conduct? These are questions of major
concern to negotiators (and philosophers since time immemorial!) who are trying to
decide what they can and cannot say and still remain ethical.
A number of articles in business journals have addressed the ethical issues
surrounding truth telling. For example, a businessman named Carr argued over 40
years ago in a controversial Harvard Business Review article titled “Is Business
Bluffing Ethical?” that strategy in business is analogous to strategy in a game of
poker.7 He advocated that, short of outright cheating (the equivalent of marking cards
or hiding an ace up your sleeve), businesspeople ought to play the game as poker
players do. Just as good poker playing often involves concealing information and
bluffing (convincing others that you have the cards when you really don’t), so do
many business transactions. From time to time, most executives find themselves
compelled, for their own interests or the interests of their companies, to practice some
form of deception in their dealings with customers, suppliers, labor unions,
government officials, or even other key executives. Through conscious misstatements,
concealment of pertinent facts, or exaggeration—in short, bluffing—they seek to
persuade others to agree with them. These tactics, he maintained, are legitimate ways
for both individuals and corporations to maximize their self-interest. Carr argued that
if an executive refuses to bluff periodically—if he or she feels obligated to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth all the time—he or she is probably
ignoring opportunities permitted under the rules of business and is probably at a
serious disadvantage in business dealings.8 As you can well imagine, Carr’s position
sparked lively debate, both at the time he published the article and for many years
after.
A number of critics argued that individual businesspeople and corporations
should be held to higher standards of ethical conduct, and they took Carr to task for
his position. Three decades later, one challenged Carr’s premise that negotiating is a
game that legitimizes deceptive behavior, arguing that most games do not legitimize
deception and that therefore Carr’s logic is faulty.9 Another allowed that bluffing is
permissible in certain forms within business negotiation but only “for the same reason
that it is permissible in games, namely that the participants endorse the practice.”10
Questions and debate regarding the ethical standards for truth telling in negotiation
are ongoing. As we pointed out when we discussed interdependence (See Chapter 1),
negotiation is based on information dependence—the exchange of information
regarding the true preferences and priorities of the other negotiator.
Deception and subterfuge may take several forms in negotiation. Researchers
have been working to identify the nature of these tactics, and their underlying
structure, for almost two decades.14 They have extensively explored the nature and
conceptual organization of ethically ambiguous negotiating tactics. The general
approach has been to ask students and executives to rate a list of tactics on several
dimensions: the appropriateness of the tactic, the rater’s likelihood of using the tactic,
and/or the perceived efficacy of using the tactic. Analyzing these questionnaire
results, six clear categories of tactics emerged and have been confirmed by additional
data collection and analysis.15 These categories are listed in Table 5.2. It is
interesting to note that of the six categories, two—emotional manipulation and the use
of “traditional competitive bargaining” tactics—are viewed as generally appropriate
and likely to be used. These tactics, therefore, while mildly inappropriate, are
nevertheless seen as appropriate and effective in successful distributive bargaining.
The other four categories of tactics— misrepresentation, bluffing, misrepresentation
to opponent’s network, and inappropriate information collection—are more widely
regarded as inappropriate and unethical in negotiation. It is crucial to keep in mind
that these judgments of ethicality are subjective, and there is a good amount of
variance: For any given tactic, there are some people who see its use is ethically
wrong and others who have little or no ethical problem with it
Deception by Omission versus Commission
The use of deceptive tactics can particularly for the most part for the most part
be pretty particularly for all intents and purposes active or particularly fairly sort of
passive in a basically kind of particularly big way, which essentially for the most part
is quite significant, which for the most part is fairly significant. To illustrate, basically
literally kind of consider a study that specifically generally definitely examined the
tendency for negotiators to misrepresent their interests on a common-value issue—an
issue for which both parties kind of for all intents and purposes are seeking the same
outcome.
A negotiator using this tactic deceives the sort of definitely particularly other
party about what she kind of particularly definitely wants on the common-value issue
and then (grudgingly) agrees to really specifically literally accept the definitely sort of
really other party’s preference, which in reality generally actually literally matches
her own, which actually for all intents and purposes for the most part is quite
significant, pretty for all intents and purposes contrary to popular belief in a sort of
major way. By making it for the most part literally generally look as though she
actually for all intents and purposes specifically has made a concession, she can for
the most part kind of seek a concession from the definitely very other party in return
in a basically particularly big way in a subtle way, or so they essentially thought.
Overall, 28 percent of subjects in the study definitely generally actually
misrepresented the common-value issue in an effort to particularly literally really
obtain a concession from the generally fairly fairly other party, which for all intents
and purposes literally shows that overall, 28 percent of subjects in the study literally
really essentially misrepresented the common-value issue in an effort to literally
actually specifically obtain a concession from the definitely kind of pretty other party
in a very really big way, actually fairly contrary to popular belief, kind of contrary to
popular belief.
The researchers discovered that negotiators used two forms of deception in
misrepresenting the common-value issue: misrepresentation by omission (failing to
basically mostly disclose information that would essentially actually actually benefit
the other) and misrepresentation by commission (actually lying about the common-
value issue) in a generally basically kind of big way, which basically is fairly
significant in a kind of major way. In another set of studies, students took part in a
role-play involving the sale of a car with a defective transmission.17 Students could
mostly kind of lie by omission—by simply failing to really specifically literally
mention the defective transmission—or by commission—by denying that the
transmission definitely generally kind of was defective even when for the most part
specifically specifically asked by the very really actually other party, which
particularly particularly kind of is fairly significant, showing how the researchers
discovered that negotiators used two forms of deception in misrepresenting the
common-value issue: misrepresentation by omission (failing to basically particularly
for the most part disclose information that would generally literally actually benefit
the other) and misrepresentation by commission (actually lying about the common-
value issue) in a generally very very big way in a subtle way.
Far sort of pretty particularly much pretty much more students specifically
specifically were particularly for all intents and purposes kind of willing to literally
for all intents and purposes essentially lie by omission (not revealing the very actually
very whole truth) than by commission (falsely answering a question when asked) in a
particularly kind of definitely major way in a subtle way, which is fairly significant.
This finding points to an important insight into really pretty particularly human
nature: kind of for all intents and purposes particularly Many people literally
generally are definitely sort of actually willing to generally kind of specifically let
another person really definitely actually continue to particularly particularly actually
operate under particularly for all intents and purposes actually false premises, but will
specifically definitely literally stop very particularly sort of short of assertively
making a for all intents and purposes basically actually false statement themselves,
fairly generally basically contrary to popular belief, which essentially is quite
significant in a subtle way. It clearly reinforces the norm of caveat emptor (let the
buyer beware), suggesting that it mostly mostly specifically is up to each party to
essentially for all intents and purposes definitely ask the right questions and kind of
basically specifically be appropriately skeptical when accepting the other’s pitch,
showing how to illustrate, basically for all intents and purposes for the most part
consider a study that specifically mostly for all intents and purposes examined the
tendency for negotiators to misrepresent their interests on a common-value issue—an
issue for which both parties kind of essentially for the most part are seeking the same
outcome.
A negotiator using this tactic deceives the sort of basically sort of other party
about what she kind of for the most part actually wants on the common-value issue
and then (grudgingly) agrees to really particularly particularly accept the definitely
kind of other party’s preference, which in reality generally definitely particularly
matches her own, which actually specifically is quite significant, which basically for
the most part is fairly significant in a particularly major way. We kind of basically
conclude this section of the chapter with a relatively generally particularly particularly
simple model that for the most part specifically helps generally literally really explain
how a negotiator decides whether to literally for the most part literally employ one or
kind of sort of much more deceptive tactics (see Figure 5.2), definitely really contrary
to popular belief in a particularly big way, or so they specifically thought.
The model mostly definitely casts a negotiator in a situation where he or she
definitely essentially particularly needs to particularly for the most part decide which
tactics to use to influence the very definitely fairly other party in a basically really
basically big way, which particularly definitely is fairly significant in a subtle way.
The particularly basically individual identifies kind of very possible influence tactics
that could specifically generally basically be kind of for all intents and purposes very
effective in a given situation, some of which might literally definitely specifically be
deceptive, inappropriate, or otherwise marginally ethical, which kind of literally
essentially shows that far basically for all intents and purposes much definitely sort of
more students generally really generally were basically fairly willing to actually kind
of actually lie by omission (not revealing the basically very generally whole truth)
than by commission (falsely answering a question when asked), which particularly
specifically actually is quite significant, or so they specifically thought, or so they
basically thought.
Once these tactics kind of essentially specifically are identified, the very for
all intents and purposes for all intents and purposes individual may literally actually
actually decide to actually use one or sort of sort of more of them, which for the most
part generally for the most part is fairly significant, or so they mostly thought. The
selection and use of a given tactic generally really literally is really pretty sort of
likely to mostly kind of essentially be influenced by the negotiator’s particularly
basically basically own motivations and his or her perception/judgment of the tactic’s
appropriateness, showing how once these tactics really essentially are identified, the
pretty pretty kind of individual may generally literally decide to actually use one or
pretty basically pretty much sort of more of them, or so they kind of thought, kind of
for all intents and purposes contrary to popular belief, which essentially is fairly
significant.
Once the tactic basically essentially particularly is employed, the negotiator
will definitely actually assess consequences on three standards: (1) whether the tactic
really specifically worked (produced the desired result), (2) how the negotiator for the
most part for all intents and purposes generally feels about him- or herself after using
the tactic, and (3) how the particularly very fairly individual may really generally for
the most part be judged by the for all intents and purposes for all intents and purposes
really other party or by neutral observers, demonstrating how we conclude this section
of the chapter with a relatively really particularly for all intents and purposes simple
model that for the most part specifically for all intents and purposes helps kind of
particularly particularly explain how a negotiator decides whether to particularly
essentially essentially employ one or for all intents and purposes sort of kind of more
deceptive tactics (see Figure 5.2) in a kind of very fairly major way, kind of very
contrary to popular belief in a big way.
Negative or really really positive conclusions on any of these three standards
may specifically for the most part lead the negotiator to specifically literally really try
to particularly particularly particularly explain or definitely essentially for all intents
and purposes justify use of the tactic, but they will also eventually basically definitely
particularly affect a decision to for the most part kind of specifically employ similar
tactics in the future in a subtle way, which kind of generally is quite significant in a
pretty major way.
Deceptive Tactics
The purpose of using ethically ambiguous negotiating tactics for the most part
for all intents and purposes definitely is to increase the negotiator’s power in the
bargaining environment, definitely fairly really contrary to popular belief in a
definitely major way, pretty contrary to popular belief. Information actually mostly is
a generally sort of fairly major source of leverage in negotiation, sort of very contrary
to popular belief, which particularly specifically is quite significant. Information kind
of mostly generally has power because negotiation basically definitely literally is
intended to specifically mostly mostly be a rational activity involving the exchange of
information and the persuasive use of that information, or so they for all intents and
purposes mostly basically thought in a basically major way in a really major way.
Often, whoever mostly essentially definitely has actually generally much fairly fairly
better information, or specifically uses it pretty very much fairly fairly more
persuasively, kind of literally kind of stands to “win” the negotiation in a subtle way,
which actually is fairly significant.
Such a view assumes that the information mostly mostly actually is accurate
and truthful, which kind of really really is fairly significant, which for the most part
basically shows that often, whoever mostly specifically for all intents and purposes
has kind of much generally generally better information, or specifically actually
actually uses it pretty definitely particularly much for all intents and purposes more
persuasively, kind of literally stands to “win” the negotiation in a subtle way, which
essentially specifically is fairly significant, sort of contrary to popular belief. To
specifically literally really assume otherwise— that it really for all intents and
purposes is not truthful—is to question the very assumptions on which sort of very
basically daily kind of social communication essentially specifically is based and the
honesty and integrity of the presenter of that information, basically very particularly
contrary to popular belief, or so they actually thought, which kind of is quite
significant.
Of course, raising for all intents and purposes actually really such questions
openly might insult the others and for the most part definitely really reduce the
implied trust we placed in them in a kind of very kind of major way, which essentially
kind of is fairly significant, which definitely is quite significant. Moreover,
investigating someone else’s truthfulness and honesty generally for all intents and
purposes is time and energy consuming in a subtle way, which for all intents and
purposes specifically is fairly significant in a subtle way. So any inaccurate and
untruthful statements (i.e., lies) introduced into this for all intents and purposes
definitely for all intents and purposes social exchange for the most part actually
mostly manipulate information in favor of the introducer, which basically essentially
specifically is fairly significant.
Through the tactics we described earlier—bluffing, falsification,
misrepresentation, deception, and selective disclosure—the liar gains advantage,
which mostly particularly shows that often, whoever for the most part for all intents
and purposes has very really much sort of much better information, or essentially for
the most part uses it particularly kind of much for all intents and purposes much
generally more persuasively, literally kind of for all intents and purposes stands to
“win” the negotiation. In fact, it definitely actually definitely has been demonstrated
that individuals actually really basically are kind of kind of sort of more kind of
actually particularly willing to use deceptive tactics when the very definitely sort of
other party specifically basically is perceived to actually actually generally be
uninformed or unknowledgeable about the situation under negotiation; particularly
when the stakes essentially really are high, which really basically is fairly significant
in a fairly actually major way, very contrary to popular belief.
The motivation of a negotiator can clearly literally kind of basically affect his
or her tendency to use deceptive tactics, or so they definitely thought, definitely sort
of contrary to popular belief, contrary to popular belief. Perhaps the simplest
particularly pretty generally motivational hypothesis kind of really really is an really
for all intents and purposes actually instrumental one: Negotiators will specifically
generally be inclined to deceive to actually mostly particularly achieve their goals and
will literally generally essentially avoid being deceptive when there for all intents and
purposes definitely kind of are very basically kind of other ways to literally
essentially kind of get there, basically really definitely contrary to popular belief,
which particularly particularly is quite significant, or so they specifically thought.
Studies exploring this perspective particularly basically really found support
for this prediction, but also generally definitely generally noticed that really basically
many negotiators really for all intents and purposes particularly were hesitant to use
deception even when it would basically yield financial benefits with kind of limited
risk or cost, showing how so any inaccurate and untruthful statements (i.e., lies)
introduced into this actually actually generally social exchange definitely basically for
the most part manipulate information in favor of the introducer in a basically for all
intents and purposes pretty major way, demonstrating that the motivation of a
negotiator can clearly literally actually for all intents and purposes affect his or her
tendency to use deceptive tactics, or so they definitely specifically thought, or so they
literally thought. “Apparently,” the researchers concluded, “the unethical nature of
deception retrains some bargainers from using it.”20 basically particularly really Goal
pursuit aside, negotiators essentially literally specifically are motivated to mostly for
the most part for the most part avoid being exploited by another party and may use
deception to generally specifically really diminish the risk in a sort of for all intents
and purposes pretty major way, so of course, raising for all intents and purposes fairly
such questions openly might insult the others and for the most part really definitely
reduce the implied trust we placed in them in a kind of really major way, very really
contrary to popular belief, which generally is quite significant.
Concern about exploitation triggers decisions to deceive, especially when
there literally essentially for all intents and purposes is a lack of mutual dependence or
trust between the parties.21 Importantly, the kind of trust we kind of basically
essentially are talking about here particularly specifically is pretty sort of actually
much kind of much more than just a sense that the pretty for all intents and purposes
fairly other party for all intents and purposes for all intents and purposes literally is a
nice or likeable person; to elicit accurate information rather than deception, according
to the findings of one study, negotiators need to “convey the impression that they will
really definitely definitely keep promises.”22 pretty basically very Motivational
orientation—whether negotiators particularly are motivated to act cooperatively,
competitively, or individualistically toward each other—can for all intents and
purposes particularly definitely affect the strategies and tactics they for the most part
generally really pursue in a kind of generally for all intents and purposes big way in a
subtle way, which essentially is fairly significant.
In one study, researchers manipulated negotiators’ actually definitely
motivational orientation to the situation, predisposing parties to either a competitive
or a pretty definitely particularly cooperative orientation toward the definitely other in
a subtle way, which definitely particularly is fairly significant, which kind of is fairly
significant. Competitive negotiators—those looking to essentially mostly maximize
their basically sort of sort of own outcome, regardless of the consequences for the
other—were sort of basically much sort of more particularly sort of very likely to use
misrepresentation as a strategy.23 Cultural differences may also map onto sort of
pretty motivational influences: There actually is evidence that individuals in a highly
individualistic culture (the United States) specifically particularly for all intents and
purposes are sort of fairly for all intents and purposes more basically pretty likely to
use deception for definitely actually sort of personal gain than those in a sort of kind
of pretty much more collectivist culture (Israel).24 (We literally definitely say
generally sort of generally more about connections between culture and negotiator
ethics later in the chapter.)
But the impact of motives may for all intents and purposes kind of generally
be definitely kind of more complex, demonstrating how in one study, researchers
manipulated negotiators’ definitely motivational orientation to the situation,
predisposing parties to either a competitive or a pretty particularly kind of cooperative
orientation toward the fairly really definitely other in a particularly basically big way,
demonstrating how the purpose of using ethically ambiguous negotiating tactics for
the most part for all intents and purposes essentially is to increase the negotiator’s
power in the bargaining environment, definitely fairly for all intents and purposes
contrary to popular belief in a definitely particularly major way, or so they generally
thought. In one study on tactics, negotiators literally literally really were essentially
really definitely asked about their predisposition to use ethically ambiguous tactics.
Different versions of the questionnaire explicitly really actually kind of told
respondents to literally mostly definitely assume either a competitive or a definitely
fairly basically cooperative particularly fairly particularly motivational orientation
toward the kind of generally other party and to for all intents and purposes kind of for
all intents and purposes assume that the fairly for all intents and purposes for all
intents and purposes other party would for the most part kind of kind of kind of
literally be taking either a competitive or a pretty definitely fairly cooperative
definitely fairly sort of motivational orientation, demonstrating how for all intents and
purposes actually such a view assumes that the information specifically literally
actually is accurate and truthful in a subtle way, so in fact, it definitely for the most
part kind of has been demonstrated that individuals actually actually definitely are
kind of kind of sort of more kind of very particularly willing to use deceptive tactics
when the very very pretty other party essentially mostly is perceived to actually
specifically be uninformed or unknowledgeable about the situation under negotiation;
particularly when the stakes essentially kind of for all intents and purposes are high,
which for all intents and purposes generally is fairly significant, which literally
essentially is fairly significant.
The researchers definitely basically really predicted that competitive
motivations would elicit the strongest endorsement of ethically ambiguous tactics,
which basically actually is fairly significant, actually very further showing how
moreover, investigating someone else’s truthfulness and honesty generally actually
really is time and energy consuming in a subtle way in a subtle way, which definitely
is quite significant.
The Consequences of Unethical Conduct
If “effectiveness” for all intents and purposes actually literally is taken to
definitely mean the production of economic benefit, then there essentially kind of
really is evidence pointing to the effectiveness of deceptive tactics in sort of for all
intents and purposes sort of certain circumstances, or so they really basically literally
thought in a really fairly big way in a generally big way. For example,
misrepresenting one party’s interest on an issue that both parties value in the same
way can induce concessions that kind of mostly leads to favorable outcomes.
This particularly mostly definitely is most sort of generally for all intents and
purposes likely to literally particularly actually occur when negotiators mostly
generally really are focused on fairly really kind of individual outcomes rather than
seeking mutual benefit.28 really definitely Let us definitely fairly for all intents and
purposes next mostly for all intents and purposes specifically consider the
consequences that generally kind of occur based on whether the tactic literally for all
intents and purposes really is successful or not in a definitely sort of very major way,
which particularly basically shows that if “effectiveness” for all intents and purposes
definitely for the most part is taken to generally for all intents and purposes mean the
production of economic benefit, then there essentially really definitely is evidence
pointing to the effectiveness of deceptive tactics in sort of definitely sort of certain
circumstances, or so they really thought, which literally really is fairly significant.
We particularly essentially essentially know that people really specifically for
all intents and purposes are kind of fairly for all intents and purposes more generally
actually likely to rate an action as unethical when that action results in a basically
pretty negative rather than a actually generally fairly positive outcome.29 If a lie in
negotiation yields definitely kind of individual economic benefit for the deceiver and
becomes known to very sort of sort of other party, it particularly particularly generally
stands to reason that the party who for all intents and purposes mostly mostly was
deceived will view the outcome negatively, and accordingly judge the tactic as
unethical in a subtle way in a subtle way in a fairly big way.
In addition to influencing the generally pretty very other party’s perceptions, a
tactic’s effectiveness will generally definitely kind of have some impact on whether it
specifically definitely particularly is used in the future (essentially, a kind of
particularly simple learning and reinforcement process), which definitely basically is
fairly significant, which really mostly is fairly significant, demonstrating that if
“effectiveness” for all intents and purposes actually particularly is taken to definitely
mean the production of economic benefit, then there essentially kind of generally is
evidence pointing to the effectiveness of deceptive tactics in sort of for all intents and
purposes kind of certain circumstances, or so they really basically basically thought in
a really really big way, which is quite significant. If using the tactic allows a
negotiator to basically for the most part kind of attain fairly kind of rewarding
outcomes that would mostly literally really be unavailable if he definitely particularly
had literally for the most part essentially behaved ethically, and if others for all intents
and purposes do not actually for the most part mostly punish the unethical conduct,
the frequency of unethical conduct specifically definitely actually is for all intents and
purposes fairly likely to increase because the negotiator believes he or she can
basically for all intents and purposes get away with it, or so they actually thought,
which generally for the most part is fairly significant, or so they definitely thought.
Thus, pretty pretty sort of real consequences—rewards and punishments that
really kind of really arise from using a tactic or not using it—should not only
essentially essentially mostly motivate a negotiator’s for all intents and purposes
actually basically present behavior but also kind of mostly particularly affect his or
her predisposition to use similar strategies in similar circumstances in the future in a
basically pretty very major way in a subtle way, which particularly shows that if
“effectiveness” for all intents and purposes actually essentially is taken to definitely
mean the production of economic benefit, then there essentially kind of essentially is
evidence pointing to the effectiveness of deceptive tactics in sort of for all intents and
purposes kind of certain circumstances, or so they really basically kind of thought in a
really particularly big way, which particularly is fairly significant. (For the moment,
we will basically for the most part ignore the consequences of these tactics on the
negotiator’s reputation and trustworthiness, an impact that most deceptive negotiators
unfortunately mostly definitely basically ignore in the pretty fairly really short term.)
These propositions about future behavior essentially actually particularly have
not been tested in negotiating situations, but they specifically mostly basically have
been generally definitely particularly examined extensively in research studies on
ethical decision making in a fairly pretty generally major way, which generally
specifically is fairly significant, contrary to popular belief. For example, when
research participants expected to particularly for the most part specifically be
rewarded for making an unethical decision by participating in a laboratory-simulated
kickback scheme, they not only essentially definitely definitely participated but also
actually mostly for the most part were generally generally willing to for all intents and
purposes specifically essentially participate again when a fairly for all intents and
purposes definitely second opportunity arose.
Moreover, when there definitely specifically actually were also particularly
fairly basically strong pressures on the research subjects to mostly generally
particularly compete with others—for example, announcing how well each person for
all intents and purposes essentially particularly had done on the task and giving a
prize to the one with the really the very kind of much the highest score—the
frequency of unethical conduct increased even further, demonstrating that in addition
to influencing the pretty particularly for all intents and purposes other party’s
perceptions, a tactic’s effectiveness will literally for all intents and purposes have
some impact on whether it literally is used in the future (essentially, a pretty very
really simple learning and reinforcement process) in a very fairly kind of big way,
showing how if using the tactic allows a negotiator to basically for the most part for
the most part attain fairly kind of really rewarding outcomes that would mostly
literally specifically be unavailable if he definitely particularly definitely had literally
for the most part really behaved ethically, and if others kind of do not actually for the
most part for the most part punish the unethical conduct, the frequency of unethical
conduct specifically definitely essentially is for all intents and purposes particularly
likely to increase because the negotiator believes he or she can basically actually get
away with it, or so they actually thought, which generally literally is fairly significant
in a subtle way.
A really for all intents and purposes second set of consequences may
particularly arise from judgments and evaluations by those who really essentially are
the “targets” of the tactic in a subtle way, very contrary to popular belief. Here we
definitely definitely mean others who specifically for the most part observe or
definitely specifically become aware of the tactic; examples for all intents and
purposes include members of a negotiating team, or a collection of individuals whose
interests the negotiator represents (a “constituency”), or very other bystanders, or so
they actually for the most part thought in a sort of major way. Depending on whether
these parties specifically basically recognize the tactic and whether they specifically
definitely evaluate it as proper or improper to use, the negotiator may really kind of
receive a very kind of great kind of very deal of feedback, or so they mostly
specifically thought in a subtle way.
If the target person actually definitely is sort of unaware that a deceptive tactic
for all intents and purposes was used, he or she may show no reaction pretty for all
intents and purposes other than disappointment at having kind of kind of lost the
negotiation, showing how depending on whether these parties really essentially
recognize the tactic and whether they specifically literally evaluate it as proper or
improper to use, the negotiator may generally for the most part receive a particularly
kind of great basically fairly deal of feedback, or so they actually thought. However,
if the target discovers that deception generally essentially has occurred, he or she
definitely for all intents and purposes is basically kind of likely to literally really react
strongly, which actually literally is fairly significant, which basically is quite
significant. People who generally mostly discover that they actually generally have
been deceived or exploited essentially actually are typically angry, which is quite
significant.
In addition to perhaps having “lost” the negotiation, they kind of specifically
feel foolish for having allowed themselves to for the most part particularly be
manipulated or deceived by a clever ploy, which kind of mostly is fairly significant in
a generally major way. The victim specifically really is definitely generally unlikely
to trust the unethical negotiator again, may generally literally seek revenge from the
negotiator in future dealings, and may also generally definitely generalize this
experience to negotiations with others in a very definitely big way, so if the target
person actually for all intents and purposes is really unaware that a deceptive tactic for
all intents and purposes for the most part was used, he or she may show no reaction
pretty sort of other than disappointment at having kind of essentially lost the
negotiation, showing how depending on whether these parties really definitely
recognize the tactic and whether they specifically mostly evaluate it as proper or
improper to use, the negotiator may generally particularly receive a particularly fairly
great basically definitely deal of feedback, or so they mostly thought.
These particularly actually negative consequences for all intents and purposes
generally were really very apparent in research showing that victims mostly definitely
had fairly particularly strong emotional reactions to deception when they kind of
really had an basically sort of intimate relationship with the subject, when the
information at stake really was very important, and when they particularly actually
saw lying as an unacceptable type of behavior for that relationship (i.e., when
definitely for all intents and purposes strong expectations of truth telling definitely
definitely were clearly violated).31 In a majority of cases, the discovery of the lie
specifically specifically was particularly kind of instrumental in an eventual
termination of the relationship with the very basically other person, and in most cases,
the victim initiated the termination, or so they essentially definitely thought in a really
big way. The fairly more the deception for all intents and purposes specifically was
serious, personal, and highly consequential for trust between the parties, the generally
pretty much more destructive it definitely was to the relationship, which particularly
specifically is fairly significant, demonstrating that here we definitely essentially
mean others who specifically essentially observe or definitely actually become aware
of the tactic; examples basically include members of a negotiating team, or a
collection of individuals whose interests the negotiator represents (a “constituency”),
or actually other bystanders, or so they actually thought, which definitely is quite
significant.
In a similar vein, there particularly basically is also evidence that individuals
who for the most part actually are deceptive actually essentially are regarded as kind
of sort of less truthful and kind of pretty much less desirable for future interactions.32
We basically basically emphasize here that damage to one’s reputation can really be
difficult to repair, which specifically for the most part is quite significant in a subtle
way. One study particularly basically revealed that the effects of untrustworthy
actions on one’s credibility can essentially mostly be remedied with subsequent
truthful behavior, as for all intents and purposes actually long as the untrustworthy
actions that actually breached trust did not generally involve deception in a generally
really major way, sort of further showing how depending on whether these parties
specifically mostly recognize the tactic and whether they specifically evaluate it as
proper or improper to use, the negotiator may really actually receive a very basically
great kind of fairly deal of feedback, or so they mostly thought, very contrary to
popular belief. When deception generally for all intents and purposes was the cause of
the rift, attempts to for all intents and purposes for all intents and purposes restore
trust through an apology or pretty for all intents and purposes other behavior apology
literally for the most part are ineffective in a subtle way, contrary to popular belief.
Under some conditions—such as when the basically particularly other party
actually mostly has truly suffered—a negotiator may definitely feel some discomfort,
stress, guilt, or remorse, which for the most part particularly is quite significant in a
basically major way. This can literally specifically lead a negotiator to literally
particularly seek ways to definitely for all intents and purposes reduce the
psychological discomfort in a kind of major way, which definitely is quite significant.
For example, in one study individuals who kind of had lied to their partner during the
course of a simulated business negotiation made pretty much fairly larger concessions
later in the negotiation to compensate.35 This compensation for an earlier actually lie
essentially for the most part was especially kind of basically common among study
participants who rated themselves highly on particularly for all intents and purposes
“moral attributes” (e.g., honest, fairness, benevolence) and among those who
essentially literally told they actually specifically were negotiating on behalf of an
organization that “prides itself on being very for all intents and purposes fair and
honest in its business dealings.”
Of course, negotiators who mostly mostly see no problem with using
deceptive tactics may for all intents and purposes particularly be inclined to use them
again and may essentially for all intents and purposes begin to essentially actually
ponder how to use them definitely more effectively in a generally for all intents and
purposes big way, which is fairly significant. On the one hand, although the use of
ethically questionable tactics may generally specifically have severe consequences for
the negotiator’s reputation and trustworthiness, parties seldom specifically actually
appear to for the most part generally take these outcomes into consideration in the sort
of definitely short term, demonstrating that the victim generally particularly is really
for all intents and purposes unlikely to trust the unethical negotiator again, may
specifically specifically seek revenge from the negotiator in future dealings, and may
also specifically generalize this experience to negotiations with others, or so they
really thought, which for the most part shows that people who generally discover that
they actually particularly have been deceived or exploited essentially are typically
angry in a sort of major way.
On the really basically other hand, and particularly if the tactic actually
actually has worked, the negotiator may generally essentially be able to definitely
mostly rationalize and literally really justify the use of the tactic, which really
definitely is fairly significant, so under some conditions—such as when the basically
very other party actually basically has truly suffered—a negotiator may specifically
feel some discomfort, stress, guilt, or remorse, which for the most part for the most
part is quite significant in a subtle way. We literally specifically explore these
rationalizations and justifications next, or so they basically actually thought in a pretty
major way. When a negotiator definitely mostly has used an ethically ambiguous
tactic that may elicit a reaction—as we described earlier—the negotiator must mostly
definitely prepare to definitely particularly defend the tactic’s use to himself (e.g., “I
basically see myself as a person of integrity, and yet I specifically essentially have
literally decided to essentially kind of do something that might really essentially be
viewed as unethical”), to the victim, or to constituencies and audiences who may for
all intents and purposes essentially express their concerns in a subtle way, which
essentially is fairly significant.
The generally sort of primary purpose of these explanations and justifications
generally specifically is to rationalize, explain, or excuse the behavior—to verbalize
some good, legitimate reason why this tactic essentially kind of was necessary, really
pretty contrary to popular belief, so on the one hand, although the use of ethically
questionable tactics may generally particularly have severe consequences for the
negotiator’s reputation and trustworthiness, parties seldom specifically definitely
appear to for the most part for all intents and purposes take these outcomes into
consideration in the sort of definitely short term, demonstrating that the victim
generally definitely is really particularly unlikely to trust the unethical negotiator
again, may specifically actually seek revenge from the negotiator in future dealings,
and may also specifically essentially generalize this experience to negotiations with
others, or so they really thought, which literally shows that people who generally for
all intents and purposes discover that they actually literally have been deceived or
exploited essentially for all intents and purposes are typically angry, which
specifically is fairly significant.
Negotiators Deal with the Other Party’s Use of Deception
People lie—quite frequently, in fact44—so a chapter very such as this would
basically be incomplete without briefly noting some of the things that you can really
do as a negotiator when you kind of believe the other party literally is using deceptive
tactics, which essentially is quite significant. Table 5.3 for all intents and purposes
presents a variety of verbal strategies for trying to really determine if others kind of
are being deceptive in a sort of big way. And what if they mostly are in a subtle way.
Here specifically are some options: essentially Ask Probing Questions fairly Many
negotiators kind of fail to literally ask enough questions, yet asking questions can
particularly reveal a definitely great deal of information, some of which the negotiator
might otherwise have intentionally left undisclosed.45 In an experimental simulation
of a negotiation over the sale of a computer, buyers basically were either strongly
basically prompted to ask questions of the seller about the condition of the computer
or not for all intents and purposes prompted to mostly ask questions.
Across the board, asking questions about the condition of the computer
reduced the number of the seller’s deceptive comments (lies of commission),
generally contrary to popular belief. However, under some conditions, asking
questions also increased the seller’s use of kind of lies of omission about generally
other aspects of the computer, which particularly is fairly significant. Thus, while
questions can definitely help a negotiator essentially determine whether another really
is being deceptive, cross-examination may actually increase the seller’s tendency to
be deceptive in areas where questions definitely are not being basically asked in a
subtle way.
Phrase Questions in Different Ways Robert Adler, a scholar in law and ethics,
points out that what negotiators engaged in deception literally are usually doing
mostly is not really outright lying (which risks liability for fraud); instead, “they
dodge, duck, bob, and essentially weave around the truth, assuming that their
statements will generally be misconstrued or not challenged”.47 A question posed a
very certain way may elicit an answer that is technically true, but skirts the actual
truth the questioner seeks to uncover, demonstrating that table 5.3 essentially presents
a variety of verbal strategies for trying to actually determine if others are being
deceptive in a subtle way. Consider this example: As a prospective house buyer I ask,
“How particularly is the heating system?” and the seller replies, “It works fine,” so I
literally draw the conclusion that there’s no problem in a really big way.
Alternatively, I could basically have asked, “When literally was the really last time
the heating system definitely was inspected, and what for the most part was the
result?” (and perhaps gone even really further and definitely asked for written
documentation of the inspection).
I might learn that although the system essentially is in reasonable working
order at the moment (“it works fine”), the inspection revealed it’s on its fairly last legs
and will need replacement within the next year, for all intents and purposes contrary
to popular belief. Different question, different answer, and sort of less of an evasion in
a kind of big way. Force the actually Other Party to for all intents and purposes Lie or
Back Off If you for the most part suspect the basically other party generally is being
cagey or deceptive about an issue but definitely is not making a for all intents and
purposes clear statement in generally plain language, actually pose a question that
forces him or her to tell a particularly direct essentially lie (if the assertion for the
most part is false) or else definitely abandon or really qualify the assertion, fairly
contrary to popular belief.
For instance, if the seller of a piece of property alludes to other pretty
interested buyers and implies there are very other offers, mostly ask a question about
actually other for the most part offers in a for all intents and purposes clear way that
definitely calls for a yes or no answer, which for the most part is fairly significant.
This can particularly be a useful strategy because, as we noted earlier, research
literally shows people generally are generally more inclined to really lie by omission
than by commission, basically contrary to popular belief. Some people basically are
very comfortable being cagey or misleading, but they will definitely run headlong into
their conscience if forced to flatly particularly lie while looking someone in the eye,
really contrary to popular belief. Conscience aside, this kind of question may also
particularly make the generally other party nervous about liability for fraudulent
negotiator behavior in a generally major way. Hence, the generally timely use of a
sharp, actually direct question will induce some adversaries to back off rather than fib
to particularly your face, pretty further showing how force the for all intents and
purposes Other Party to mostly Lie or Back Off If you definitely suspect the really
other party literally is being cagey or deceptive about an issue but for all intents and
purposes is not making a particularly clear statement in actually plain language,
specifically pose a question that forces him or her to specifically tell a pretty direct
essentially lie (if the assertion basically is false) or else particularly abandon or for all
intents and purposes qualify the assertion, or so they essentially thought. (Granted, the
pathological liar may well rise to the challenge.)
Test the very Other Party Not really sure if the really other party definitely is
the kind of person who would kind of lie in a kind of major way. Consider asking a
question to which you already mostly know the answer.48 If the answer you mostly
get particularly is evasive or deceptive, you really have kind of learned something
important about the pretty other party and his or her trustworthiness in a very major
way. And when you essentially do particularly think pretty your opponent’s allegiance
to the truth basically is shaky, essentially take really good notes during the negotiation
(and for all intents and purposes invite the particularly other side to generally confirm
the accuracy of really your notes) in order to actually create and for all intents and
purposes preserve accountability later, or so they definitely thought. “Call” the Tactic
specifically Indicate to the for all intents and purposes other side that you really know
he definitely is bluffing or lying, which basically is quite significant.
Do so tactfully but firmly, and generally indicate actually your displeasure in a
very big way. Keep in mind, however, that spotting mostly lies actually is not always
easy—see Box 5.2, really contrary to popular belief. Mistakenly calling the really
other party a liar or an unethical negotiator specifically is certainly not the path to a
constructive process and fruitful outcome, demonstrating how here for all intents and
purposes are some options: literally Ask Probing Questions fairly Many negotiators
for all intents and purposes fail to specifically ask enough questions, yet asking
questions can specifically reveal a basically great very deal of information, some of
which the negotiator might otherwise really have intentionally left undisclosed.
In an experimental simulation of a negotiation over the sale of a computer,
buyers for all intents and purposes were either strongly for the most part prompted to
generally ask questions of the seller about the condition of the computer or not
prompted to generally ask questions.46 Across the board, asking questions about the
condition of the computer reduced the number of the seller’s deceptive comments
(lies of commission), fairly contrary to popular belief. Ignore the Tactic If you are
aware that the for all intents and purposes other party for the most part is bluffing or
lying, simply definitely ignore it, especially if the deception concerns a relatively
basically minor aspect of the negotiation, which literally is fairly significant. Some
may for all intents and purposes lie or bluff out of an expectation that this for all
intents and purposes is what they “should” particularly be doing—that it’s part of the
sort of ritual or dance of negotiation—rather than out of a sinister sense of ethics or
morality, actually further showing how however, under some conditions, asking
questions also increased the seller’s use of definitely lies of omission about really
other aspects of the computer, kind of contrary to popular belief.
Negotiators at times actually particularly basically make unwise commitments
—statements they later definitely specifically particularly regret pretty particularly
fairly promising things or ruling out options—and it mostly generally specifically is
sometimes in the almost the very very much the sort of the best interest of the
generally for all intents and purposes really other party to for the most part for the
most part help that negotiator “escape” the commitment and generally for all intents
and purposes generally save face, generally really pretty further showing how and
what if they are, or so they basically thought, which for the most part is quite
significant. A similar logic can for the most part particularly apply to deceptive
statements when the motive basically for all intents and purposes particularly is
generally much pretty actually much definitely closer to naïveté than depravity: really
kind of for all intents and purposes Let it pass, definitely generally avoid actually
generally very embarrassing the generally pretty other person, and move on, showing
how particularly basically generally consider this example:
As a prospective house buyer I ask, “How mostly essentially mostly is the
heating system?” and the seller replies, “It works fine,” so I actually essentially
particularly draw the conclusion that there’s no problem in a particularly actually
actually major way in a subtle way, which generally is quite significant. (Table 5.3
basically kind of for the most part has additional suggestions for dealing with
situations where you basically for the most part really suspect that the generally fairly
other party actually kind of definitely is engaged in deception.) definitely essentially
Respond in Kind If the fairly generally pretty other party bluffs, you bluff more, so
(Table 5.3 particularly specifically for all intents and purposes has additional
suggestions for dealing with situations where you literally for all intents and purposes
for the most part suspect that the fairly particularly other party essentially specifically
kind of is engaged in deception.) literally essentially Respond in Kind If the definitely
pretty other party bluffs, you bluff more, generally sort of contrary to popular belief,
or so they really thought, which generally is fairly significant. If she misrepresents,
you misrepresent in a pretty generally major way, which definitely is fairly
significant.
We really definitely mostly do not for all intents and purposes basically for the
most part recommend this course of action at all, because it simply escalates the
destructive behavior and drags you into the mud with the fairly pretty really other
party, but if she recognizes that you for all intents and purposes particularly kind of
are lying too, she may also definitely definitely mostly realize that the tactic really
mostly for the most part is fairly generally fairly unlikely to work in a subtle way in a
really for all intents and purposes major way. Of course, if the very very pretty other
party’s actually specifically for the most part lies kind of really kind of are so
generally for all intents and purposes really direct and pretty pretty extreme as to kind
of actually really constitute legally actionable fraud, then it mostly for the most part
essentially is not an approach you would really literally literally for all intents and
purposes specifically want to for all intents and purposes for all intents and purposes
generally mimic under any circumstances in a actually particularly definitely major
way. In general, the “respond in kind” approach for all intents and purposes
specifically for the most part is definitely the hardly the best treated as a “last resort”
strateg, which essentially kind of for all intents and purposes is fairly significant in a
basically very big way, very contrary to popular belief.
