In order to complete this assignment, you need to first:
watch the presentation “What Is Truth?”
read the section on Pragmatic views of truth in chapter 4 of Dew & Foreman
read “Some Problems with Pragmatism” by Douglas Groothuis
For your thread, compare the three items in terms of their critiques of Pragmatism by addressing all of
the following questions:
1. Which criticism of Pragmatism is repeated in all three items?
2. Which single criticism of Pragmatism is strongest in your view? (Give your reasons.)
3. Which single criticism of Pragmatism is weakest or least clear? (Give your reasons.)
Your thread should demonstrate that you have reviewed all three items, in a minimum of 350 words.
https://www.bethinking.org/truth/some-problems-with-pragmatism
4What Is Truth, and How Do We Find It?
So far we have considered our understanding of what knowledge is and where we get our
knowledge. In this chapter, we turn our attention to the question of truth. What is truth, and
how do we find it? As beings who long for knowledge, this is a vital question for us.
Additionally, today there is a raging debate about whether or not there is such a thing as
absolute truth or if truth is relative. Questions like these have bearing on almost all matters of
human life. Christians, for example, proclaim a message they believe to be not just rational but
also true. If, however, nothing is actually true, then all such beliefs are foolish. Likewise, if
nothing is actually true, then modern science is an enormous waste of time and energy. In
short, all the beliefs that matter the most to us as human beings assume that something really
is true. Questions about truth cannot be avoided or dismissed as unimportant. In what follows,
we will explore several important questions about truth: Is anything really true, how should we
define truth, and how we can know when something is in fact true?
Is Anything Really True?
As human beings, we assume that certain things are true about the world we live in. For
example, we believe the things we see really do exist and are the way they seem to us. Unless
we assume this, it would be incredibly difficult for human beings to function. Nevertheless,
some philosophers and intellectuals contend that no statements or ideas are true. For example,
postmodern thinkers take an antirealist perspective that holds all truth claims to be subjective.
In other words, they think it is impossible for a person to view reality as it actually is. For them,
all of our perceptions come to us through the subjective filters of our minds. They suggest that
truth claims fail to appreciate the various ways that our ideas and understanding of reality are
shaped and influenced by the world in which we live. Because of this, they contend that
absolute truth does not exist.
Before we consider what is truth, we must first consider the postmodern rejection of
objectivity. Is there any reason to think that the postmodern antirealists are right in saying that
all truth claims are naïvely subjective and fully incapable of making truthful comments about
the way things really are? This issue will be treated in much greater detail in a later chapter, but
a few comments or observations are in order at this point. In short, the idea that nothing is
really true or actually true about reality is a gross overstatement that leads to absurdity. It is
one thing for us to have limitations in our ability to grasp fully the details and nature of reality.
It is quite another thing, however, to say that we cannot make any true statements about
reality and that nothing is objectively true. Those who claim that there is no such thing as truth
are met with several significant problems.
First, it is commonly noted that this statement is contradictory. To say that nothing is actually
true is to make a statement that something is actually true. Those who make this statement
obviously believe that it is true, and, by doing so, they contradict themselves.
Second, this position is challenged by the nature of reality itself. If something exists, then
something must actually be true about that reality. If nothing else, it would be true to say that
the world exists, I exist or something exists. And so, if these things really do exist, then
something is true of them.
Third, intuitively speaking, each of us has an overwhelming sense that something is actually
true of the world we live in. We may debate what propositions are actually true and at times
have difficulty identifying them, but the vast majority of human beings throughout history have
had an overwhelming conviction that there is such a thing as truth and that we can know it, at
least in part.
Fourth, consider the advancements and accomplishments of modern science. In the past few
hundred years, we have gone from horse and buggy to rocket ships that send people into outer
space and place people on the moon. We have gained the ability to open a person's body and
perform organ transplants, developed medicines to cure many forms of cancer and invented
devices that allow deaf people to hear. Likewise, we have created technologies that allow us to
speak with people around the world in real time. These are all amazing developments that have
come to us through the progress of modern science. If it is impossible to know if something is
true or false, then one wonders how such advancements are possible. These developments
require us to understand the world properly and accurately. Consider flying to the moon.
Having never been to the moon, physicists relied heavily on their measurements and
calculations of the physical world to map the trajectory of the rocket. Unless their
representations were actually true, landing on the moon would have been impossible. And yet,
as we are well aware, they have been successful in doing this numerous times. So, given the
success of modern science, it looks like it is possible to speak of truth, search for truth and
make truth claims. As Benjamin Myers notes, "postmodern thinkers have typically failed to
reckon seriously with the explanatory successes of the natural sciences."1
So Then, What Is Truth?
Now we turn to the most important question of this chapter: What is truth? Before we begin, it
is important to make a distinction between definitions for truth and tests for truth. In the
section below, we will consider various ways that truth has been defined and argue that two of
these definitions are insufficient. In the next section, however, we will look at tests for truth
and will argue that each of these has an important role to play. So then, let us consider the
distinction between a definition and a test. A definition describes the nature of an object,
concept or event. As we try to define truth, we are particularly interested in comprehending its
nature. By contrast, a test for something is a means by which we identify or locate it. When it
comes to truth claims, tests are used to see which ones are right and which ones are wrong.
Generally speaking, there are three different definitions given for truth: the correspondence
theory of truth, coherentism and pragmatism. Although the correspondence theory of truth has
been the dominant position throughout most of history, we will consider coherentism and
pragmatism first. According to coherentists, a proposition is true if it coheres with, or is
consistent with, everything else that a person believes. In this approach, the metaphor of a web
is often used to illustrate how this will work. In a web, for example, there are many points of
intersection where one strand crosses over another strand of the web. Given the overlap of
these strands, the web itself is strengthened and is able to function. According to coherentists,
a person's belief system is similar to this web and is judged on how well the individual beliefs fit
with each other and work together. Each point in the web represents a particular belief held by
the individual. If a particular idea or claim fits within the larger web of beliefs and is consistent
with them, then we could say the belief is true. So then, what is most important for the
coherence model of truth is that claims must relate to each other in a consistent and
harmonious fashion. As Doug Groothuis summarizes,
Coherence theories of truth argue that what makes a statement or belief true is its coherence
or consistency with one's other beliefs. If my "web of belief" is large and internally consistent—
that is, if none of my beliefs contradict each other—my beliefs are true. A belief is false if it fails
to cohere with the rest of my beliefs. In other words, truth is simply defined as logical
coherence.2
As we will see, coherentism offers a helpful although incomplete way of identifying truth
claims. As a definition, however, it seems to be woefully inadequate. As Groothuis goes on to
say, "The main problem with this view is that a set of beliefs held by fallible human beings may
be coherent, but false."3 Groothuis raises a legitimate concern with the coherentist
understanding of truth. We can think of all kinds of stories to tell which are consistent with
each other but are still objectively false. For example, consider a childhood classic, the
Berenstain Bears stories. In these stories, we are told of a bear family that live in an oak tree
and have rather humanlike lives. Papa bear goes off to work, Mama bear works in the kitchen,
and Sister and Brother bear go off to school and play outside. These bears face problems, learn
lessons, make jokes and show love to each other. All things considered, we would have to grant
that the stories themselves are consistent with each other internally. In any given episode or
book of the series, we encounter a story that is well crafted and internally consistent with itself.
Plenty of other examples like this could be cited. Consider most fiction movies or novels. When
I (Dew) was a child, I was a huge Superman fan. When one of these movies came on television, I
dressed up in my Superman pajamas and sat with my eyes glued to the set, soaking in every
detail of my great superhero. Even now when these movies come on television, I find myself
reliving the joy of my childhood memories. And now that I consider the story itself, it seems to
be told in a consistent and coherent fashion. Or, consider a more modern example: the Bourne
trilogy, in which Jason Bourne fights to regain his personal identity while struggling against the
Central Intelligence Agency, which is trying to eliminate his existence. The story is told in such a
way that it does not contradict itself and is consistent.
Yet, in the case of the Berenstain Bears, Superman, Jason Bourne, and almost any other type of
fiction, there is a glaring problem: it is fiction, and therefore not actually true. No matter how
consistent and coherent the stories might be, the fact is, little bears do not live in trees and
speak English, men do not fly around in red capes and lift falling helicopters from the sky, and
Jason Bourne is a mere creation of Robert Ludlum for the sake of entertainment. None of these
fictional characters are real. Therefore, it looks like coherentism is an insufficient way of
defining truth, because it is possible for stories and beliefs to be consistent while being
objectively false.
Other contemporary postmodern epistemologists have taken a pragmatic view of truth. At the
risk of being overly general, we might say that pragmatism defines truth as a set of beliefs that
works for a particular person or group in dealing with reality or accomplishing particular tasks.
So then, if a belief helps a person cope with hardship or reach a particular goal, then that belief
is counted as true. As Stewart Kelly puts it, "The ballpark idea is that truth is to be construed
instrumentally, such that beliefs always prove useful or expedient to those who believe them."4
There are many different pragmatists we could look at here, such as Charles Sanders Peirce,
John Dewey or Richard Rorty. But none captures the spirit of pragmatism better than the
American philosopher William James (1842-1910). James pinpoints the pragmatic view of truth
when he says, "The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to
an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events."5 Or put a different way, "The truth is the
name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite
assignable reasons."6 He argues that "the whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out
what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instances of our life, if this
world-formula or that world-formula be the true one."7 So, in short, for pragmatists truth is
what works.
As with the coherentist perspective on truth, pragmatism can be helpful in identifying or testing
for truth claims, and this benefit will be considered shortly. Yet, like coherentism, pragmatism
seems problematic as a definition for truth. Just because a particular idea or belief may work
for a person, or bring about a particular outcome, does not mean that the idea or belief is true.
As Paul Horwich has noted, "True beliefs tend to foster success. But it happens regularly that
actions based on true beliefs lead to disaster, while false assumptions, by pure chance, produce
beneficial results."8 In other words, sometimes true beliefs lead us to act in ways that bring
about chaos and heartache. At other times, false beliefs may help us cope with undesirable
situations. For example, imagine a little boy named Peter who is dreadfully afraid of the dark
and creates an imaginary big brother who sleeps in his room and keeps the monsters away.
Even though this imaginary brother is fictional, the belief in the brother helps Peter deal with
his fear of darkness. Here we have identified a fictional belief that is helpful for a particular
person. But because this particular belief works for Peter, it should, according to pragmatist
criteria for truth, be considered true. Despite the utility of this belief, however, Peter's belief in
an imaginary brother is clearly false. And so, just because the belief is helpful or useful to a
person does not mean that the belief is true.
But this is not the only problem with a pragmatic view of truth. It seems as though this view
would also lead to relativism and be implausible. Consider the example of Peter, who creates
an imaginary brother to help him with his fear of darkness. In this case, Peter's belief is helpful
for him and thus, according to pragmatists, is true for him. Now consider a different child,
Alexa, who creates an imaginary big sister to fight off the monsters in her room, in hopes that
this will help her deal with her fear of darkness. In the case of Alexa, however, this belief is not
helpful, does not take away her fear and would therefore be, according to pragmatists, false.
What we find here is that any given belief may work for one person but not for another.
Although some postmodern thinkers may be comfortable with this kind of relativism, it is
problematic and difficult for most human beings to accept. As Kelly notes, this understanding of
truth "makes a shambles of our intuitive understanding of what it is for something to be true."9
Additionally, this view would violate the law of noncontradiction. According to this law, it is
impossible for something to be true while its exact opposite is also true at the same time. More
formally, it states that both A and non-A cannot be true at the same time, in the same place
and in the same way. Now, if we take the pragmatic view of truth to its logical conclusion, then
we must be willing to affirm such contradictions. Again, Kelly notes, "If we suppose that P is
useful for Dave, but not-P is useful for Susan, then P and not-P would be simultaneously true, a
serious problem for any viable theory of truth."10 And so, whatever benefits pragmatism might
hold for testing truth claims, it is an insufficient way of defining what truth is.
This brings us to our consideration of the correspondence theory of truth. In this approach,
truth is defined as that which corresponds to reality. In other words, true propositions or
statements are required to fit with, or line up with, what we find in the world. The following
statement is an example: "Tina is wearing a blue sweater." In a coherentist perspective, the
statement would be counted as true if it was consistent with everything else that a person
believed. Yet, as we have seen, it seems that there are some significant problems with this
definition of truth. In the pragmatic view, this statement would be judged true because it was
helpful to a particular person or group. Here again, there seem to be some problems with this
perspective. With the correspondence theory of truth, however, statements like "Tina is
wearing a blue sweater" are judged by one simple question: Is it the case that Tina is wearing a
blue sweater? If, in fact, Tina is currently wearing a blue sweater, then the statement "Tina is
wearing a blue sweater" is true. Notice, what makes this statement true is the fact that the
statement corresponds to a real state of affairs in the world. If it had not been the case that
Tina was wearing a blue sweater, then this statement would be false. So then, in a
correspondence view of truth, truth is defined as that which fits with reality itself.
This theory of truth enjoys a very long and dominant legacy in the history of humankind. Even
in the ancient world, philosophers like Plato and Aristotle assumed this perspective. While
speaking about the nature of true and false beliefs, for example, Plato says, "A false belief will
be a matter of believing things that are contrary to those which are."11 Even more specifically,
Aristotle says, while discussing the nature of truth and falsity, "To say of what is that it is not, or
of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and what is not that it is not, is
true; so that he says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is
false; but neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be."12 Additionally, this
perspective has been adopted by the vast majority of philosophers and thinkers throughout the
medieval and modern period and is still the dominant view today.
Unlike the coherentist and pragmatic definitions for truth, the correspondence theory of truth
seems to be much less problematic. For most people, the intuitive appeal of this perspective
seems so strong and established by common sense that it is absurd to think any differently. As
David Clark has noted,
Since virtually all people, including those who have never studied epistemology, typically
assume something like this notion of truth, it is a pretheoretic intuition regarding truth.... This is
pretheoretic in that it is not an idea that results from complex theory building about the nature
of truth but a belief that people bring to their theorizing about truth. It is a basic assumption,
rooted in experience. It is something people philosophize with, not something they
philosophize to.13
In other words, this perspective seems to be foundational and essential to all of our thinking,
dialogue and theorizing about the world in which we live. Without it, it seems as though
knowledge of any kind would be impossible. Philosopher John Searle seems to agree with this
assessment, noting that this is a default position without which we could not think or talk.
Calling the correspondence theory of truth a prereflective idea, he argues that "any departure
from [this] requires a conscious effort in a convincing argument."14
This view of truth also enjoys a strong position in the religious tradition of Christianity and in
modern science. Groothuis explains the vital importance of this view for Christianity. He says,
"Without the correspondence view of truth, these resounding affirmations can only ring hollow.
Therefore, the correspondence view of truth is not simply one of many options for Christians. It
is the only biblically and logically grounded view of truth available and allowable. We neglect or
deny it to our peril and disgrace. Truth decay will not be dispelled without it."15 Alister
McGrath thinks that the same can be said for modern science. While talking about the
epistemological commitments of the natural sciences, he says, "Despite all the qualifications
that must be entered against our broad statement that theory must be grounded in or
consistent with experimental observations, the general principle holds: scientific theories must
be grounded in the real world. They are accountable to the reality they purport to represent.
Ontological finality thus rests with nature itself."16
Nevertheless, some postmodern philosophers have taken great exception to this perspective of
truth. At the heart of their objection is the concern that our mental representation and
comprehension of the world may be impossible to verify and show to be accurate. As they see
it, it is always possible that there is a strong disconnect between what we believe about the
world and the world itself.
So, what should we make of this concern? We will get to this question and a much more
lengthy discussion and treatment in chapter 6 when we deal with the issue of perception. For
now, however, a brief reply is in order. To be clear, these postmodern philosophers do raise a
legitimate concern. Perhaps we have all experienced situations where we thought one thing
about the world, only to find out that we were not quite seeing things the way they really are.
Despite this concern, however, it looks like the postmodern philosophers are overstating their
case and drawing illogical conclusions. Although it is always possible that our statements about
the world may not be perfectly accurate, it is foolish to say that there can be no
correspondence whatsoever between statements and reality. If so, then we should continue
thinking that truth statements are those that correspond to the world itself.
How Do We Identify Truth?
So far we have considered two big questions: Is anything really true? And, what is truth? Now
we turn to another important question: How do we identify truth, or test truth claims? In the
last section we considered three rival definitions for truth: coherence, pragmatism and
correspondence. And, as we saw, coherentism and pragmatism seem to have major problems if
they are regarded as definitions for truth. What these problems show is that these theories are
insufficient ways of describing the nature of truth. This does not mean, however, that
coherentism and pragmatism are of no value when it comes to testing truth claims. In fact, it
can be argued that each of these is a necessary condition for truth.
The distinction between a necessary and sufficient condition was discussed in chapter 2, where
we considered the Gettier problem. There we saw that a necessary condition is a condition that
must be met in order for something else to exist or happen. Yet, just because necessary
conditions are met does not guarantee that a given state of affairs or event will follow. A
sufficient condition, by contrast, is a condition that if met will guarantee that something exists
or that an event will happen. With this quick refresher on necessary and sufficient conditions,
we can now better evaluate pragmatism and coherentism as tests for truth. With both of these,
we saw that they identified critical aspects of truth—truth works, and truth is consistent—but
ultimately failed as complete sets of criteria for truth. As such, we might think of both
coherentism and pragmatism as necessary conditions for truth but not sufficient conditions for
truth. In other words, for a statement to be true, it is necessary for the statement to be
consistent with other things that are true and have a particular utility. But these conditions
alone do not guarantee that something is true. Some examples might help make this even
clearer.
Most people take it for granted that, for our beliefs to be true, they must be consistent and
coherent with each other. As Groothuis notes, "For any worldview to be true, its essential
tenets must be consistent with one another logically, in accordance with the laws of
noncontradiction."17 If we discover that a particular set of beliefs is not consistent or somehow
contradictory, then we intuitively recognize that either one or all of the beliefs are false. Take,
for example, people who claim that there are no moral standards for judging behaviors.
According to them, it is foolish, arrogant or manipulative to say there is such a thing as right
and wrong in an objective sense. Yet, we are surprised to find that these persons are offended
and grow hostile when they are being wronged or mistreated. They object to such behavior,
protest the treatment and appeal to a particular authority to have things set in order. There
seems to be a glaring inconsistency between these persons' claimed beliefs and their obvious
behavior. On the one hand, they claim that there is no such thing as right and wrong. On the
other hand, they revolt when wronged. Their beliefs are betrayed by their responses to another
person's misdeeds. Either their belief that there is no such thing as right and wrong or their
response to the misdeeds of another must be misguided and wrong. They must choose one or
the other. They cannot have their cake and eat it too.
Consider solipsism as one other example of incoherence. Solipsists believe that nothing exists
other than themselves. In other words, they deny the existence of all physical reality—all
persons and everything outside of their own mental existence. So, consider the inconsistency
that arises when solipsists try to convince another person that solipsism is true. If solipsism is
true, then what good is it to argue with another person? According to solipsism, that person
does not exist. The argument itself suggests a belief in the reality of other persons.
Other examples could be given here, but these two should be sufficient to make the point.
Coherence of ideas may not guarantee that a particular set of ideas is true. Nevertheless, for a
particular set of beliefs to be true, they must be consistent with themselves. If they fail to be
consistent, then either one or all of the beliefs are false. So, coherence does appear to be a
necessary condition for truth.
The same point can also be made about pragmatism. If a particular belief is true, then it will, at
minimum, prove to be useful. Consider an easy and obvious example. In science we tend to
favor explanations that allow us to predict a particular outcome and thus perform a particular
task. Newton's laws of motion, for example, help us to predict what will happen when energy is
exerted on a particular object. Because these predictions come true, we can now develop
weapons, create aircraft and do many other extraordinary things. Why do we think some of
Newton's theories are true? We think this for one simple reason: they work! Like coherentism,
pragmatism may offer us a helpful way of testing truth claims even if it is an inadequate
definition for truth.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have maintained that, despite what some postmodern thinkers have argued,
there is such a thing as objective truth and it is therefore possible to have knowledge of this
truth. We have also argued that a correspondence theory of truth is the only sufficient way of
defining the nature of truth. This does not mean, however, that coherentism and pragmatism
have no value when it comes to truth claims. As we have shown, they are necessary conditions
for truth and are, therefore, vitally important as tests for truth.
Discussion Questions
What reason is there to think that something is true?
What are the various ways that truth has been defined, and how do they compare?
Even if we adopt a correspondence theory of truth, do coherentist and pragmatic approaches
have any value for us? [James K. Dew Jr. (2014). (p. 57). How Do We Know?. InterVarsity Press.
Retrieved from https://app.wordsearchbible.com]
PHIL 201
Page 1 of 5
WHAT IS TRUTH? TRANSCRIPT
S1:
Hello, and welcome to another presentation for PHIL 201: Philosophy and Contemporary Ideas.
I’m Dr. Mark Foreman.
I want to continue our discussion of epistemology by looking at the elements of our definition of
knowledge. Remember, we defined knowledge as “justified true belief.” Now I am looking at
each of those elements. We already talked about belief and examined where beliefs come from in
our last discussion. Here I want to discuss truth. What do we mean when we say a proposition is
true? What is truth? There are three basic theories of truth. Let’s look at them.
S2:
Our first theory for determining whether a proposition is true is called the correspondence
theory. It simply states that a proposition is true if it corresponds with the facts of reality. Let’s
take a proposition, for example, my car is blue. That proposition is true according to this theory
if, in fact, my car really is blue. If my car is another color (say, red), then the proposition “my car
is blue” is, of course, false. So what makes the proposition true or false is that it corresponds
with the actual facts of reality.
This is the oldest theory out there. Plato and Aristotle both held this theory. In fact, there was a
rather famous saying by Aristotle that expresses this theory, which goes:
To say that “what is” is not or that “what is not” is, is false; but to say “what is” is and
“what is not” is not is true.
There are two strengths to this theory. First of all, it accords with our most basic intuitions about
truth. It is simply what most of us mean when we say a proposition is true or false. It corresponds
with what is actually real.
A second strength of this theory is that it links truth with reality, which provides us with a
reliable check on the truthfulness of propositions. We have criteria for determining whether a
proposition is true or not. We simply check with reality to see if a particular proposition
accurately corresponds with the facts. If it corresponds with the facts, then the proposition is true.
If it doesn’t, then the proposition is false.
S3:
While the correspondence theory is a very old theory and a very popular theory, it has come
under several criticisms. Let’s look at a few.
Some say we may not see reality equally or accurately. We may see it differently. Therefore,
how can we say that truth corresponds with reality? Let’s use an example. Suppose you and I go
outside. We both look up and see something fly across the sky way up high, to where we can
barely make it out. I say, “I think it’s a plane.” And you say, “I think it’s a bird.” (We will
PHIL 201
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assume, by the way, that those are the only two options. We are not going to assume that
Superman is flying across the sky here.) The question is who is right? There is a good possibility
that we will never know which of us is right. But what does that have to do with the truth claims
of our propositions?
The point is this, and it’s a very important point: there is an important difference between a
proposition being true and knowing that a proposition is true. We may never know if I was the
one that was right or if you were the one that was right. But one thing we can know is that one of
those propositions is true and one is false (assuming of course that those are the only two
possibilities or options there). Just because you don’t know a proposition is true doesn’t mean
that the proposition isn’t true, that it doesn’t correspond with reality. We just simply may not
know it.
Another criticism concerns non-factual claims. Some people will make claims that really do not
involve facts. For example, a person might say something like this: “I saw a movie last night, and
I thought it was really good.” That’s not really a factual claim. That’s the person’s opinion about
the movie. One thing we recognize is that truth applies only to factual claims. It doesn’t apply to
other kinds of claims, like subjective value claims. So we really don’t have to worry about those
when it comes to our definition of knowledge.
Another criticism is that the idea of correspondence is kind of a vague idea. What exactly do we
mean that a proposition corresponds to reality? I understand there is a certain amount of
vagueness here, but I think we just need to clarify it. What we mean is that propositions are
really truth bearers. They bear the truth within them. They represent the truth in content so that
we can place epistemologically what we see metaphysically. That’s what we mean by
correspondence.
Finally, some people argue that the correspondence theory doesn’t account for the liar’s paradox.
What is the liar’s paradox? It deals with the universal claim “I always lie.” Think about that. If I
make that statement, “I always lie,” and if we ask whether the statement is true or false, then if
the statement is true—“I always lie”—that means I’m lying right there. Which means the
statement isn’t true. It’s false. So if it’s true, then it’s false. And if it’s false, then it’s true. It’s a
paradox. The way we answer this criticism is to recognize that a paradox doesn’t count as a
legitimate truth claim at all. They are just paradoxes, and they don’t count for anything because
they don’t mean anything. They aren’t making any claims at all—they are contradictions, and
contradictions can’t make claims. So we don’t really have to worry about that as a criticism for
the correspondence theory of truth.
I think the correspondence theory holds up pretty well to the criticisms concerning it, but it’s not
the only theory out there. Let’s look at another theory.
S4:
A second theory about what makes a proposition true is called the coherence theory. It basically
states that a proposition is true if it coheres with other true propositions. In other words, what
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makes a proposition true is if it fits together will all these other propositions that we have already
accepted as true.
There is a very important point here that this theory points out: we should reject as false
propositions that do not cohere with established truths. If we have a collection of beliefs that we
know are true, and a propositions comes across that goes against that established system, we
know there is a good chance that the proposition is going to be false.
There are two strengths with the coherence theory. First, it does help to establish truths in an area
where we don’t know all the facts, and sometimes that happens. Maybe you have a collection of
facts, like in science for example, but we don’t know everything. A new idea comes across that
we are not sure about, but it fits in with the collected facts we do know. So, therefore, we accept
that as being true because it fits in with the collection of facts.
A second strength is that many systems and non-factual areas work this way: ethics, politics,
math. They all seem to work with this idea that, if it fits in well with our theory, then, in fact, that
probably makes it true. For example, value claims often cohere together with other sets of values,
and that’s what we mean here. So there are some good strengths to this theory.
S5:
However, there are some serious problems with the coherence theory—some criticisms of it.
First of all, while coherence is a necessary condition for truth—in other words, I don’t think
something is true if it doesn’t cohere with established truths—it’s not a sufficient condition for
truth. It’s simply not enough. Consistency is not adequate to determine truth. Just because
something coheres and fits within a system doesn’t make it true; it simply means it doesn’t
contradict. But that’s not necessarily the same thing as being true.
Also, how does one judge the truthfulness of the systems themselves? Take, for example, a belief
that we Christians have: the incarnation of God—that God became a man. That fits in well with
Christianity, but it doesn’t fit in with Buddhism. How do I know which of the two systems is
correct? The coherence theory doesn’t help me with that.
Another problem is the question, “How does one start a system going?” If the way to determine
whether or not a proposition is true is if it fits within a system, well what if I’m just starting off?
I have no system with which to compare the value of that first proposition.
Finally, I think a big problem with the coherence theory is that it’s not linked at all with the real
world. It’s only linked with systems of beliefs. We don’t really know if it corresponds with the
world or not because we are not using our correspondence theory here. We are only using
systems of beliefs. Since we have no way of really testing the systems themselves, it doesn’t
really tell us about the real world.
So I think the coherence theory is inadequate as a theory for truth. I think, again, that coherence
is important in having a proposition being true. But I don’t think it is adequate in determining
whether the proposition is true or not.
PHIL 201
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S6:
Our third theory is called the pragmatic theory. It basically says that a proposition is true if it is
successful in explaining phenomena or in achieving desired consequences. This theory was
developed by the philosopher William James, who is famous for saying, “Truth is expedience.”
Or, basically, truth is what works. Now, again, there is some value in this theory of truth.
It is often used, for example, in explaining scientific theories (for example: quantum mechanics
or cosmological speculation). In quantum mechanics, for example, there is a theory called
“Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle.” This has to do with how things work on a subatomic level.
We can’t really see the subatomic level, so we come up with this idea of how things work as a
theory. It seems to be successful in explaining things. And because it is successful in explaining
things, we say Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle is true.
Also, this area of truth is appealed to in areas of morality, politics, or religion. For example,
some people say that if religion gives me meaning, then it’s true. It’s successful in giving me
purpose and meaning, so that religion is true for me.
Finally, this recognizes the relativity of truth claims. Sometimes different perspectives are going
to look at things differently and come out with different truth claims. And sometimes there are
degrees of truth. Some can be more or less true.
S7:
However, I think the pragmatic theory is the most problematic theory of truth. First of all, there
simply is no logical connection between what works and what is true. Just because something
works or is successful in some way doesn’t make it true. Under this conception, slavery was the
true form of economics because it was successful. But most of us see a real problem with that
kind of thinking.
Also, we need to establish criteria for determining exactly what we mean by “successful.” The
pragmatic theory holds that, if something is successful, it is true. But what does it mean for
something to be successful? For example, take a character like Mugwump. Mugwump, for
example, may feel better because of a particular belief, but what does that have to do with the
belief being true? Let’s suppose Mugwump believes in astrology because it gives his life
meaning. Does that mean astrology is true because it gives his life meaning? What does it mean
for something to be successful? This needs further exploration before we can accept it as a
criteria for determining what makes something true.
And finally, this theory makes truth very tentative and changeable. What was true yesterday is
not true today if it doesn’t work today. Many people feel like this is the death knell for the
pragmatic theory, and it has very serious problems with it.
Of these three theories, I think the one that works the best is the correspondence theory. I think
coherence is important for truth—if something doesn’t cohere, then that is a sign of falsehood—
PHIL 201
Page 5 of 5
but it’s not sufficient for truth. Finally, as far as the pragmatic theory is concerned, I don’t think
it has to do so much with what’s true; it has more to do with what works.
Running Head: PRAGMATISM AND TRUTH 1
Pragmatism & Truth.
Student name.
Institution name.
Course name.
PRAGMATISM AND TRUTH 2
Pragmatism & Truth.
Question 1.
Pragmatism is defined as a set of truths that helps a particular person to accomplish a set of
desired goals. The theory holds that if something is successful then it is true. The three items
criticizes the aspect of truth corresponding with reality. Just because something is happening
doesn’t mean it is the truth. However, in the three items Pragmatism is displayed as a
problematic theory rather than a theory of truth that helps people to achieve their desired goals.
Notably, it is quite difficult to determine how a belief will be useful to us. This limits the use of
pragmatism in the three items based on the context that we cannot know the time ahead of us in
order to determine the usefulness of the belief. If something works and leads to the desired goal
it cannot be determined as the truth because there is no logical connection between work and
truth.
Question 2.
We may not see reality equally or accurately. This is the strongest criticism because the truth
cannot be determined by our own limits. For instance, an agreement between two people does
not make their agreement to be the truth. They might have been limited to some factors that
made them to agree. For example, just because slaves can work and deliver what is required in a
firm does not make slavery to be justifiable. An agreement between two people that slavery is
one of the best tactics to achieve the organization goals cannot be justifiable that their statement
is true and slavery is good. Therefore, just because we don’t know whether a preposition is true
doesn’t mean that the preposition is not true. For instance, we simply may not know the reality.
Question 3.
In my view the weakest criticism is non-factual claims. For instance, we cannot determine
whether a person is telling the truth or not. Therefore this theory cannot be used as a measure of
the truth towards people’s opinions. For example, when a person says that he experienced an
earthquake in the previous night. It cannot be justifiable whether it’s true or not because there is
no proof of the incident. Therefore, it has no influence on our knowledge.
