Please check the files I sent and pick a topic from the file and write an essay about 4-5 pages. Also I
sent the file where you will use as a resource. Also, here is the name of the book we're using in class so
you can use as resource too
St. Thomas Aquinas. Treatise on Divine Nature
Hacker, D. & Sommers, N. The Bedford Handbook: Bedford/ St. Martin’s .
Note: Please use good grammar and vocabulary and provide high quality work. It's really important to
have it well organized with clear nice thoughts.
PAPER FOR PHIL 201 SECOND PAPER
FOUR TO FIVE PAGES IN LENGTH
CHOSE EOTHER TOPIC OR SUBMIT AN ALTERNATIVE
1. Does God act from love? Present the arguments. What is love for God? What is its cause? Its
end? Its form? What does it produce? What are the virtues and perfections of His love? How is
love related to His justice, mercy providence and governance? Explain.
2. Does God create beings other that Himself? Can Thomas proves such an action by reason?
Present those proofs. Why does God create? How does He create? What does it mean to
create? How is action of creation different from the actions of motion and change as actions?
What does it mean to be a creature?
3. Given who or what God is and how we know, how can man come to speak properly of God’s
being and action?
4. Is God simple and yet perfect? Present the arguments of Thomas.
QUESTION
14
God’s
Knowledge
Having
considered
the
things
that
pertain
to
God’s
substance,
we
must
now
consider
the
things
that
pertain
to
His
operation
(questions
14-25).
Since
some
operations
remain
within
the
one
who
is
operating
and
others
proceed
to
an
outward
effect,
we
will
first
discuss
God’s
knowledge
(scientia)
(questions
14-18)
and
His
will
(voluntas)
(questions
19-24)—for
understanding
exists
within
the
knower,
and
willing
exists
within
the
one
who
wills—and
after
that
His
power
(question
25),
which
is
thought
of
as
a
principle
of
God’s
operation
as
it
proceeds
to
an
outward
effect.
Now
since
to
understand
is
to
be
alive
in
a
certain
way,
after
considering
the
divine
knowledge
(question
14),
we
will
have
to
consider
God’s
life
(question
18).
And
since
knowledge
is
of
truths,
we
will also
have
to
consider
truth
(question
16)
and
falsity
(question
17),
Again,
since
whatever
is
known
exists
in
the
knower,
and
since
the
natures
of
things
as
they
exist
in
God
as
a
knower
are
called
ideas,
a
consideration
of
God’s
ideas
(question
15)
will
have
to
be
adjoined
to
the
consideration
of
His
knowledge.
On
the
topic
of
God’s
knowledge
there
are
sixteen
questions:
(1) Is
there
knowledge
in
God?
(2)
Does
God
understand
Himself?
(3)
Does
God
comprehend
Himself?
(4)
Is
God’s
act
of
understanding
His
substance?
(5)
Does
God
understand
things
that
are
distinct
from
Himself?
(6)
Does
God
havea
proper
cognition
of
those
things?
(7)
Is
God’s
knowledge
discursive?
(8)
Is
God’s
knowledge
a
cause
of
things?
(9)
Does
God
have
knowledge
of
things
that
do
not
exist?
(10)
Does
God
have
knowledge
of
evils?
(11)
Does
God
have
knowledge
of
singular
things?
(12)
Does
God
have
knowledge
of
infinities?
(13)
Does
God
have
knowledge
of
future
contingents?
(14)
Does
God
know
propositions
(enuntiabilia)?
(15)
Is
God’s
knowledge
variable?
(16)
Is
God’s
knowledge
of
things
speculative
or
practical?
Article
1
Is
there
knowledge
in
God?
It
seems
that
there
is
no
knowledge
(non
sit
scientia)
in
God:
Objection
1:
Scientific
knowledge
(scientia)
is
a
habit.
But
habits
do
not
belong
to
God,
since
they
fall
in
between
potentiality
and
actuality.
Therefore,
there
is
no
knowledge
in
God.
Objection
2:
Since
scientific
knowledge
is
of
conclusions,
it
is
a
type
of
cognition
that
is
caused
by
something
else,
viz.,
by
the
cognition
of
the
principles.
But
there
is
nothing
caused
in
God.
Therefore,
there
is
no
knowledge
in
God.
Objection
3:
Every
instance
of
knowledge
is
either
universal
or
particular.
But,
as
was
shown
above
(q.
13,
a.
9),
the
universal
and
the
particular
do
not
exist
in
God.
Therefore,
there
is
no
knowledge
in
God.
But
contrary
to
this:
In
Romans
11:33
the
Apostle
says,
“O
the
depth
of
the
riches
of
the
wisdom
and
of
the
knowledge
of
God!”
Irespond:
Knowledge
exists
in
God
in
the
most
perfect
way.
To
see
this
clearly,
notice
that
things
with
cognition
differ
from
things
that
lack
cognition
by
the
fact
that
things
that
lack
cognition
have
nothing
except
their
own
form
alone,
whereas
things
with
cognition
are
capable
of
having
the
form
of
another
thing
as
well,
since
a
species
of
a
thing
of
which
there
is
cognition
exists
in
the
thing
that
has
the
cognition.
Hence,
it
is
clear
that
the
nature
of
a
thing
that
lacks
cognition
is
more
contracted
and
limited,
whereas
the
nature
of
a
thing
with
cognition
is
more
expansive
and
extensive.
This
is
why,
in
De
Anima
3,
the
Philosopher
says,
“The
soul
is
in
a
certain
way
Part
1,
Question
14
108
all
things.”
Now
form
is
contracted
by
matter.
That
is
why
we
said
above
(q.
7,
aa.
1-2)
that
the
more
immaterial
a
form
is,
the
closer
it
comes
to
being
in
some
sense
infinite.
Therefore,
it
is
clear
that
the
immateriality
of
a
given
thing
is
the
reason
that
it
is
capable
of
cognition,
and
its
mode
of
cognition
corresponds
to
its
mode
of
immateriality.
Hence,
De
Anima
2
says
that
itis
because
of
their
materiality
that
plants
do
not
have
cognition.
On
the
other
hand,
the
senses
are
capable
of
cognition
because
they
are
receptive
of
species
without
matter,
and
the
intellect
is
even
more
capable
of
cognition
because,
as
De
Anima
3
says,
it
is
more
separated
from
matter
and
unmixed
with
it.
So
because,
as
is
clear
from
what
wassaid
above
(q.
7,
a.
1),
God
is
at
the
summit
of
immateriality,
it
follows
that
He
is
at
the
summit
of
cognition.
Reply
to
objection
1:
Since,
as
was
explained
above
(q.
4,
a.
2),
the
perfections
that
proceed
from
God
to
creatures
exist
in
a
higher
mode
in
God
Himself,
it
follows
that
whenever
a
name
taken
from
some
perfection
of
a
creature
is
attributed
to
God,
it
is
necessary
to
exclude
from
its
signification
anything
that
pertains
to
the
imperfect
mode
which
belongs
to
the
creature.
Hence,
knowledge
is
not
a
quality
or
habit
in
God,
but
is
instead
His
substance
and
pure
actuality.
Reply
to
objection
2:
As
was
explained
above
(q.
13,
a.
4),
things
that
are
fragmented
and
multiplied
in
creatures
exist
in
God
in
a
simple
and
unified
way.
Now
a
man
has
diverse
cognitions
corresponding
to
the
diverse
things
that
he
has
cognition
of.
Insofar
as
he
has
cognition
of
principles,
he
is
said
to
have
understanding
(intelligentia);
insofar
as
he
has
cognition
of
conclusions,
he
is
said
to
have
scientific
knowledge
(scientia);
insofar
as
he
has
cognition
of
the
highest
cause,
he
is
said
to
have
wisdom
(sapientia);
and
insofar
as
he
has
cognition
of
things
to
be
done,
he
is
said
to
have
counsel
(consilium)
or
prudence
(prudentia).
Now,
as
will
be
explained
below
(a.
7),
God
has
cognition
of
all
these
things
by
a
unified
and
simple
cognition.
Hence,
God’s
simple
cognition
can
be
called
by
all
of
the
above
names,
but
in
such
a
way
that
when
these
names
are
used
in
predications
about
God,
whatever
involves
imperfection
is
excluded
from
them
and
whatever
involves
perfection
is
held
on
to.
And
this
is
in
accord
with
Job
12:13,
“With
Him
is
wisdom
and
strength,
He
has
counsel
and
understanding.”
Reply
to
objection
3:
Knowledge
exists
according
to
the
mode
of
the
knower,
since
what
is
known
exists
in
the
knower
according
to
the
mode
of
the
knower.
And
so
because
the
mode
of
God’s
essence
is
higher
than
the
mode
with
which
creatures
exist,
God’s
knowledge
does
not
have
the
mode
of
created
knowledge;
more
specifically,
it
does
not
have
the
mode
of
being
universal
or
particular,
or
of
existing
as
a
habit
or
in
potentiality,
or
of
being
disposed
in
accord
with
any
other
such
mode.
Article
2
Does
God
understand
Himself?
It
seems
that
God
does
not
understand
Himself
(non
intelligat
se):
Objection
1:
The
Liber
De
Causis
says,
“Every
knower
who
knows
his
own
essence
returns
to
his
essence
with
a
complete
return.”
But
God
does
not
exit
from
His
essence;
nor
is
He
in
any
way
moved.
And
so
it
does
not
belong
to
Him
to
return
to
His
essence.
Therefore,
He
does
not
know
His
own
essence.
Objection
2:
As
De
Anima
3
says,
to
understand
is
to
be
acted
upon
and
moved
in
a
certain
way;
again,
knowledge
is
an
assimilation
to
the
thing
that
is
known;
yet again,
the
knower
is
perfected
by
what
is
known.
But
nothing
is
moved
or
acted
upon
or
perfected
by
itself;
and,
as
Hilary
puts
it,
“nothing
is
a
Part
1,
Question
14
116
ot
individual
by
individual,
as
if
He
were
turning
His
sight
from
here
to
there
and
from
there
to
here;
rather,
He
sees
all
things
at
once.”
Irespond:
There
is
no
discursive
reasoning
in
God’s
knowledge
(in
divina
scientia
nullus
est
discursus).
This
is
clear
as
follows:
In
our
knowledge
there
are
two
types
of
discursive
reasoning,
The
one
type
involves
only
succession,
as
when,
after
having
an
act
of
intellective
understanding
with
respect
to
one
thing,
we
turn
to
consider
something
else.
The
second
type
involves
causality,
as
when
we
arrive
at
the
cognition
of
conclusions
through
their
principles.
The
first
type
of
discursive
reasoning
cannot
belong
to
God.
For
while
we
understand
many
things
successively
when
each
is
considered
in
itself,
we
understand
them
all
at
once
when
we
understand
them
in
some
one
thing—as,
for
example,
when
we
understand
the
parts
in
the
whole,
or
when
we
see
diverse
things
in
a
mirror.
But,
as
has
been
established
(a.
5),
God
sees
all
things
in
some
one
thing,
viz.,
in
Himself.
Hence,
He
sees
them
all
at
once
and
not
successively.
Similarly,
the
second
type
of
discursive
reasoning
cannot
belong
to
God.
For,
first
of
all,
the
second
type
presupposes
the
first
type,
since
those
who
are
proceeding
from
principles
to
conclusions
do
not
consider
both of
them
simultaneously.
Second,
this
sort
of
discursive
reasoning
is
had
by
one
who
is
proceeding
from
what
is
known
to
what
is
unknown.
Hence,
it
is
clear
that
while
he
is
considering
the
first,
he
is
still
ignorant
of
the
second,
and
so
the
second
is
being
discerned
not
in
the
first,
but
rather
on
the
basis
of
the
fitst
(non
in
primo
sed
ex
primo).
By
contrast,
the
terminus
of
discursive
reason
occurs
when
the
second
is
seen
in
the
first—after
the
effects
have
been
analyzed
into
their
causes—and
at
that
point
discursive
reasoning
ceases.
Hence,
since
God
sees
His
own
effects
in
Himself
as in
a
cause,
His
cognition
is
not
discursive.
Reply
to
objection
1:
Even
though
just
one
thing
at
atime
can
be
understood
in
itself,
nonetheless,
as
has
been
explained,
it
is
possible
to
understand
many
things
in
some
one
thing.
Reply
to
objection
2:
God
does
not
know
effects
through
a
cause
in
the
sense
that
the
cause
is
first
discerned
while
the
effects
are
still
unknown.
Rather,
he
knows
the
effects
in
the
cause.
Hence,
as
has
been
explained,
His
cognition
does
not
involve
discursive
reasoning.
Reply
to
objection
3:
God
sees
the
effects
of
created
causes
in
those
very
causes
much
better
than
we
do.
However,
He
does
not
see
the
effects
in
such
a
way
that
His
cognition
of
the
effects
is
caused
in
Him
by
His
cognition
of
their
created
causes—as
happens
with
us.
Hence,
His
knowledge
is
not
discursive.
Article
8
Is
God’s
knowledge
a
cause
of
things?
It
seems
that
God’s
knowledge
is
not
a
cause
of
things:
Objection
1:
In
his
commentary
on
the
Epistle
to
the
Romans,
Origen
says,
“It
is
not
the
case
that
something
will
occur
because
God
knows
that
it
will
occur;
rather,
itis
because
it
will
occur
that
it
is
known
by
God
before
it
occurs.”
Objection
2:
Once
a
cause
is
posited,
its
effect
is
posited.
But
God’s
knowledge
is
eternal.
Therefore,
if
God’s
knowledge
is
a
cause
of
created
things,
then
it
seems
that
creatures
exist
from
eternity.
Objection
3:
As
Metaphysics
10
says,
what
is
knowable
is
prior
to
the
knowledge
of
it
and
isa
measure
of
that
knowledge.
But
what
is
posterior
and
is
measured
cannot
be
a
cause
[of
what
is
prior
to
it
and
measures
it].
Therefore,
God’s
knowledge
is
not a
cause
of
things.
Part
1,
Question
14
117
But
contrary
to
this:
In
De
Trinitate
15
Augustine
says,
“It
is
not
because
they
exist
that
God
knows
all
creatures,
both
spiritual
and
corporeal.
Rather,
they
exist
because
He
knows
them.”
Irespond:
God’s
knowledge
is
a
cause
of
things.
For
God’s
knowledge
is
related
to
all
created
things
as
a
craftsman’s
knowledge
is
related
to
his
artifacts.
But
a
craftsman’s
knowledge
is
a
cause
of
the
artifacts,
because
the
crafisman
acts
through
his
understanding.
Hence,
the
form
of
his
act
of
intellective
understanding
must
be
a
principle
of
his
action,
in the
way
that
heat
is
a
principle
of
producing
warmth.
Notice,
however,
that
a
natural
form
does
not
denominate
a
principle
of
action
insofar
as
itis
a
form
that
remains
in
the
thing
to
which
it
gives
esse;
rather,
it
denominat
ion
i
i
inclination
toward
its
effect.
Similarly,
an
intelligible
form
does
not
dé
‘nsolar
a8
it
merely
exists
in
the
knower,
unless
it
is
joined
to
an
inclination
toward
its
effect—-an
inclination
that
comes
from
the
will.
For
because
an
intelligible
form
is
related
to
opposites
(since
the
same
knowledge
applies
to
opposites),
it
would
not
produce
a
determinate
effect
if
it
were
not
determined
by
a
desire
to
one
of
the
opposites,
as
Metaphysics
9
points
out.
Now
it
is
clear
that
God
causes
things
through
His
understanding,
since
His
very
esse
is
His
own
act
of
understanding.
Hence,
His
knowledge
must
be
a
cause
of
thingstinsofar
as
it
joined
to
His
act
of
will.
This
is
why
God’s
knowledge,
insofar
as
it
is
acause
of
things,
is
cusfomarily
called
His
knowledge
“Of
approbation
(scientia
approbationis).
Reply
to
objection
1:
Origen
was
invoking
the
nature
of
knowledge,
which,
as
has
been
explained,
does
not
involve
the
nature
of
causality
unless
it
is
adjoined
to
an
act
of
will.
However,
his
claim
that
God
foreknows
certain
things
because
they
will
exist
should
be
interpreted
as
referring
to
a
cause
of
inference,
and
not
to
a
cause
of
being.
For
if
anything
will
occur,
it
follows
that
God
foreknows
it—even
though
it
is
not
the
case
that
the
future
things
are
a
cause
of
God’s
knowing
them.
ree
rc
comnetuatmestttnatcusiinmntunitten
punish
nteam
oe
Reply
to
objection
2:
God’s
knowledge
is
a
cause
of
things
according
to
the
way
in
which
the
things
are
contained
in
His
knowledge.
But
it
was
not
part
of
God’s
knowledge
that
the
things
should
exist
from
eternity,
Hence,
even
though
God’s
knowledge
is
eternal,
it
nonetheless
does
not
follow
that
creatures
exist
from
eternity.
Reply
to
objection
3:
Natural
things
fall
in
between
God’s
knowledge
and
our
knowledge.
For
we
take
our
knowledge
from
the
natural
things
of
which
God
is
a
cause
through
His
knowledge.
Hence,
just
as
knowable
natural
things
are
prior
to.qur
knowledge
and
a
measure
of
that
knowledge,
so
God’s
knowledge
is
prior
to
natural
things
measure
of
those
things.
In
the
same
way,
a
house
falls
in
betwéen
the
knowledge
of
thé
craftsman
Ww
it
it
and
thé
knowledge had
of
it
by
someone
who
takes
his
cognition
from
the
house
after
it
has
already
been
built.
Article
9
Does
God
have
knowledge
of
non-beings?
It
seems
that
God
does
not
have
knowledge
of
non-beings
(Deus
non
habeat
scientiam
non
entium):
Objection
1:
God’s
knowledge
is
only
of
things
that
are
true.
But
érue
and
being
are
convertible.
Therefore,
God
does
not
have
knowledge
of
non-beings.
Objection
2:
Knowledge
requires
a
likeness
between
the
knower
and
the
thing
known.
But
things
that
do
not
exist
cannot
bear
any
likeness
to
God,
who
is
esse
itself.
Therefore,
things
that
do
not
exist
cannot
be
known
by
God.
Objection
3:
God’s
knowledge
is
a
cause
of
the
things
known
by
Him.
But
God’s
knowledge
is
Part
1,
Question
14
119
knowledge
of
evils.
Objection
3:
Everything
that
is
known
is
known
either
through
its
likeness
or
through
its
opposite.
Now,
as
is
clear
ftom
what
has
been
said
(aa.
2
and
5),
it
is
through
His
own
essence
that
God
has
cognition
of
whatever
He
has
cognition
of.
But
God’s
essence
is
not
a
likeness
of
evil;
nor
is
it
an
opposite
of
evil,
since,
as
Augustine
says
in
De
Civitate
Dei
12,
nothing
is
contrary
to
God’s
essence.
Therefore,
God
does
not
have
cognition
of
evils.
Objection
4:
What
is
known
through
another
and
not
through
itself
is
known
imperfectly.
But
evil
is
not
known
by
God
through
itself,
since
otherwise
evil
would
have
to
exist
in
God.
For
what
is
known
must
exist
in
the
knower.
Therefore,
if
evil
is
known
through
another,
viz.,
through
what
is
good,
then
it
will
be
known
imperfectly
by
God.
But
this
is
impossible,
since
there
is
no
imperfect
cognition
in
God.
Therefore,
God
does
not
have
knowledge
of
evils.
But
contrary
to
this:
Proverbs
15:11
says,
“Hell
and
destruction
are
before
the
Lord.”
Irespond:
In
order
to
know
something
perfectly,
one
must
know
all
the
things
that
can
happen
to
it,
But
there
are
some good
things
to
which
it
can
happen
that
they
are
corrupted
by
evils.
Hence,
God
would
not
know
goods
perfectly
if
He
did
not
also
know
evils.
Now
each
thing
is
knowable
insofar
as
it
exists.
Hence,
since
the
esse
of
an
evil
is
to
be
the
ptivation
of
a
good,
by
the
very
fact
that
God
knows
goods
He
also
knows
evils—just
as
shadows
are
known
through
light.
This
is
why,
in
De
Divinis
Nominibus,
chap.
7,
Dionysius
says,
“God
has
a
vision
of
shadows
through
His
very
self,
just
like
one
who
sees
shadows
because
of
the
light.”
Reply
to
objection
1:
The
Philosopher’s
words
should
be
taken
to
mean
that
an
intellect
that
is
not
in
potentiality
does
not
know
a
privation
through
any
privation
that
exists
within
itself.
This
fits
in
with
what
he
had
previously
said,
viz.,
that
points
and
all
other
indivisibles
are
known
[by
us]
through
a
privation
of
division.
This
is
because
simple
and
indivisible
forms
do
not
actually
exist
in
our
intellect,
but
exist
in
it
only
in
potentiality—since
if
they
actually
existed
in
our
intellect,
they
would
not
be
known
through
privations.
For
simple
things
are
known
by
separated
substances
without
recourse
to
privations.
Therefore,
God
does
not
know
an
evil
through
a
privation
that
exists
within
Himself,
but
instead
knows
it
through
the
opposite
good.
Reply
to
objection
2:
God’s
knowledge
is
a
cause
not
of
the
evil,
but
rather
of
the
good
through
which
the
evil
is
known.
Reply
to
objection
3:
Even
though
evil
is
not
opposed
to
God’s
essence,
which
is
not
corruptible
by
evil,
evil
is
nonetheless
opposed
to
God’s
effects.
He
knows
these
effects
through
His
essence,
and
in
knowing
them,
He
knows
the
opposite
evils.
Reply
to
objection
4:
To
know
something
just
through
another
is
to
have an
imperfect
cognition
as
long
as
the
thing
in
question
is
knowable
through
itself.
But
evil
is
not
knowable
through
itself,
since
it
is
part
of
the
concept
of
an
evil
that
it
is
the
privation
of
something
good.
And
so
it
cannot
be
either
defined
or
known
except
through
something
good.
Article
11
Does
God
have
cognition
of
singular
things
[as
singular]?
It
seems
that
God
does
not
have
cognition
singular
things
[as
singular]:
Objection
1:
God’s
intellect
is
more
immaterial
than
the
human
intellect.
But
because
of
its
immateriality,
the
human
intellect
does
not
have
cognition
of
singular
things
[as
singular];
instead,
as
De
Anima
2
puts
it,
“reason
is
of
universals,
whereas
sensation
is
of
singulars.”
Therefore,
God
does not
have
cognition
of
singular
things
[as
singular].
Part
1,
Question
14
120
Objection
2:
The
only
powers
in
us
that
have
cognition
of
singular
things
[as
singular]
are
those
that
receive
species
that
are
not
abstracted
from
material
conditions.
But
things
exist
in
God
in
such
a
way
that
they
are
maximally
abstracted
from
every
sort
of
materiality.
Therefore,
God
does
not
have
cognition
of
singular
things
[as
singular].
Objection
3:
Every
cognition
takes
place
through
a
likeness.
But
no
likeness
of
singular
things
as
singular
seems
to
exist
in
God.
For
the
principle
of
singularity
is
matter,
which,
since
it
is
merely
a
being
in
potentiality,
is
altogether dissimilar
from God,
who
is
pure
actuality.
Therefore,
God
cannot
have
cognition
of
singular
things
[as
singular].
But
contrary
to
this:
Proverbs
16:2
says,
“All
the
ways
of
a
man
are
open
to
His
eyes.”
Irespond:
God
knows
singular
things
[as
singular].
For,
as
is
clear
from what
has
been
said
(q.
4,
a,
2),
all
the
perfections
found
in
creatures
preexist
in
God
in
ahigher
way.
But
to
ha
gnition
of
singular
things
[as
singular]
pertains
to
our
perfection.
Hence,
it
is
necessary
that
God
should
know
singular
things
[as
singular].
For
even
the
Philosopher
considers
it
absurd
that
we
should
have
cognition
of
something
that
God
does
not
have
cognition
of.
Thus,
in
De
Anima
1
and
Metaphysics
3
he
argues
against
Empedocles
that
God
would
be
utterly
stupid
if
He
did
not
know
about
strife.
But
the
perfections
ivided
among
lower
beings
exist
in
God
in
a
simple
and
unified
way.
Hence,
‘even.
though
*
we
jave
cognition
of
that
which
is
universal
and
immaterial
by
one
[cognitive]
power
and
of
that
which
is
singular
and
material
by
another
power,
God
has
cognition
of
both
sorts
of
things
through
His
simple
intellective
understanding.
Now
some
writers,
wishing
to
show
how
this
is
possible,
have
claimed
that
God
knows
singular
things
through
universal
causes.
For
there
is
nothing
in
any
singular
thing
that
does
not
find
its
origin
in
some
universal
cause.
And
they
invoke
the
following
example:
If
an
astronomer
knew
all
the
universal
motions
of
the
heavens,
he
could
predict
every
future
eclipse.
But
this
is
not
enough.
For
singular
things
receive
from
their
universal
causes
certain
forms
and
powers
which,
in
whatever
way
they
might
be
connected
with
one
another,
are
individuated
only
by
individual
matter.
Hence,
someone
who
had
a
cognition
of
Socrates
insofar
as
he
is
white,
or
insofar as
he
is
the
son
of
Sophroniscus,
or
whatever
else
of
this
sort
might
be
said,
would
not
have
a
cognition
of
him
insofar
as
he
is
this
man.
Hence,
given
the
proposed
mode
of
cognition,
God
would
not
have
cognition
of
singular
things
in
their
singularity
(non
cognosceret
singularia
in
sua
singularitate).
Other
writers
have
claimed
that
God
knows
singular
things
by
virtue
of
the
fact
that
He
applies
universal
causes
to
particular
effects.
But
this
amounts
to
nothing.
For
no
one
can
apply
one
thing
to
another
unless
he
has
prior
knowledge
of
that
other
thing,
Hence,
the
application
in
question
cannot
be
the
explanation
for
the
cognition
of
particulars,
but
instead
presupposes
the
cognition
of
singular
things
[as
singulars].
And
so
we
must
respond
in
a
different
way:
Since,
as
has
been
explained
(a.
8),
God
is.a
cause
of
things
through
His
knowledge,
His
knowledge
extends
as
far
as
His
s
causality
does.
Hence,
since
God’s
active
power
extends
not
only
to
forms,
from
which
the
‘universal
concept
is
takéti;
but
also—as
will
be
shown
below
(q.
44,
a.
2)—to
matter,
God’s
knowledge
must
extend
to
the
singular
things
that
are
individuated
by
matter.
For
since
He
knows
things
distinct
from
Himself
through
His
own
essence
insofar
as
His
essence
is
a
likeness
of
things
and
their
active
principle,
His
essence
must
be
a
sufficient
principle
for
knowing
all
the
things
that
are
made
by
Him,
not
only
in
their
universal
features,
but
also
in
their
singularity.
The
same
would
be
true
of
a
craftsman’s
knowledge
if
the
craftsman’s
knowledge
produced
the
whole
of
a
thing
and
not
just
its
form.
Reply
to
objection
1:
Our
intellect
abstracts
an
intelligible
species
from
individuating
principles,
and
so
so.our
int
lect’s
intelligible
species
cannot
be
a
likeness
of
the
i
principles.
For
this
reason,
our
intellect
does
not
have
cognition
of
singular
thitigs.
”
“
However,
the
divine
intellect’s
intelligible
species,
which
is
God’s
essence,
is
immaterial
not
Part
1,
Question
14 121
through
abstraction
but
through
itself,
and
it
is
a
principle
of
all
the
principles
that
enter
into
the
composition
of
a
thing—regardless
of
whether
they
are
the
priticiples
of
the
species
or
the
principles
of
the
individual.
Hence,
through
His
essence
God
knows
not
only
universals,
but
also
singulars
[as
singulars].
Reply
to
objection
2:
Even
though
the
divine
intellect’s
[intelligible]
species
does
not
have
material
conditions
in
its
own
esse,
in
the
way
that
the
species
received
in
the
imagination
and
senses
do,
still,
as
has
been
explained,
by
its
power
it
extends
to
both
material
and
immaterial
things.
Reply
to
objection
3:
Even
though
matter
is
far
removed
from
a
likeness
of
God
because
of
its
potentiality,
still,
insofar
as
it
has
esse
even
of
this
sort,
it
retains
a
certain
likeness
to
God’s
esse.
Article
12
Does
God
have
cognition
of
infinities?
It
seems
that
God
cannot
have
cognition
of
infinities
(non
possit
cognoscere
infinita):
Objection
1:
The
infinite
qua
infinite
is
unknown,
since,
as
Physics
3
says,
“The
infinite
is
such
that
if
one
takes
a
quantity
of
it,
it
is
always
possible
to
take
something
else
outside
that
quantity.”
Also,
in
De
Civitate
Dei
12,
Augustine
says,
“Whatever
is
comprehended
by
knowledge
is
limited
by
the
comprehension
of
the
knower.”
But
infinities
cannot
be
limited,
Therefore,
they
cannot
be
comprehended
by
God’s
knowledge.
Objection
2:
Someone
might
reply
that
what
is
infinite
in
itself
is
finite
with
respect
to
God’s
knowledge.
Against
this:
As
Physics
3
says,
the
nature
of
the
infinite
is
such
that
it
cannot
be
traversed,
and
the
nature
of
the
finite
is
such
that
it
can
be
traversed.
But,
as
Physics
6
proves,
what
is
infinite
cannot
be
traversed
either
by
what
is
finite
or
by
what
is
infinite.
Therefore,
the
infinite
cannot
be
finite
either
with
respect
to
what
is
finite
or
even
with
respect
to
what
is
the
infinite.
And
so
what
is
infinite
cannot
be
finite
with
respect
to
God’s
knowledge,
which
is
infinite.
Objection
3:
God’s
knowledge
is
a
measure
of
the
things
known.
But
it
is
contrary
to
the
nature
of
the
infinite
that
it
should
be
measured.
Therefore,
infinities
cannot
be
known
by
God.
But
contrary
to
this:
In
De
Civitate
Dei
12
Augustine
says,
“Even
though
none
of
the
infinite
numbers
is
numbered,
the
infinite
is
nonetheless
not
incomprehensible
to
Him
whose
knowledge
is
not
numbered.”
Lrespond:
Since
(a)
God
knows
not
only
things
that
exist
in
actuality,
but
also,
as
has
been
shown
(a.
9),
things
that
exist
either
in
His
own
power
or
in
the
power
of
a
creature,
and
since
(b)
there
are
clearly
infinitely
many
of
the
latter,
one
must
claim
that
God
knows
infinities.
And
even
though
God’s
knowledge
of
vision,
which
is
only of
things
that
now
exist
or
will
exist
or
have
existed,
is
nota
knowledge
of
infinitely
many
things
in
the
way
that
some
claim—for
we
do
not
hold
that
the
world
has
existed
from
eternity,
or
that
generation
and
motion
will
continue
into
eternity,
so
that
individuals
are
multiplied
to
infinity—nonetheless,
if
we
consider
the
matter
more
carefully,
we
must
claim
that
God
knows
infinitely
many
things
even
by
His
knowledge
of
vision.
For
God
knows
even
the
thoughts
and
affections
of
the
heart,
which
will
be
multiplied
to
infinity,
since
rational
creatures
will
endure
without
end.
Now
this
is
because
each
knower’s
cognition
extends
to
things
in
accord
with
the
type
of
form
that
is
the
principle
of
cognition.
For
instance,
a
sensible
species
that
exists
in
the
senses
is
a
likeness
of
just
a
single
individual,
and
so
only
a
single
individual
can
be
known
through
it.
On
the
other
hand,
an
intelligible
species
of
our
intellect
is
a
likeness
of
a
thing
with
respect
to
the
nature
of
its
species,
which
Part
1,
Question
14
127
that
Christ
will
be
born.
But
this
opinion
is
false.
First,
a
diversity
in
the parts
of
a
sentence
makes
for
a
diversity
of
propositions.
Second,
it
would
follow
that
a
proposition
that
is
true
at
any
one
time
(semel)
would
always
be
true—which
is
contrary
to
the
Philosopher,
who
says
that
the
sentence
‘Socrates
is
sitting’
is
true
as
long
as
Socrates
is
sitting
and
is
false
once
he
gets
up.
And
so
one
should
concede
that
‘God
now
knows
everything
that
He
once
knew’
is
not
true,
if
we
are
talking
about
propositions,
But
from
this
it
does
not
follow
that
God’s
knowledge
is
variable.
For
just as
God’s
knowledge
does
not
vary
by
virtue
of
the
fact
that
He
knows
that
one
and
same
thing
exists
at
some
times
and
not
at
other
times,
so
too
God’s
knowledge
does
not
vary
by
virtue
of
the
fact
that
He
knows
that
a
given
proposition
is
true
at
some
times
and
false
at
other
times.
To
be
sure,
God’s
knowledge
would
be
variable
if
He
knew
propositions
through
the
mode
of
propositions
by
composing
and
dividing,
as
happens
with
our
intellect.
Hence,
our
cognition
varies
either
(a)
according
to
truth
and
falsity,
as,
e.g.,
when,
once
a
thing
has
changed,
we
maintain
the
same
opinion
about
that
thing,
or
(b)
according
to
diverse
opinions,
as
when
we
first
think
that
someone
is
sitting
and
afterwards
think
that
he
is
not
sitting.
But
neither
of
these
can
happen
with
God.
Article
16
Is
God’s
knowledge
of
things
speculative?
It
seems
that
God
does
not
have
speculative
knowledge
of
things (de
rebus
non
habet
scientiam
speculativam):
Objection
1:
As
was
shown
above
(a.
8),
God’s
knowledge
is
a
cause
of
things.
But
speculative
knowledge
is
not
a
cause
of
the
things
known
by
it.
Therefore,
God’s
knowledge
is
not
speculative.
Objection
2:
Speculative
knowledge
occurs
through
abstraction
from
things.
But
this
feature
does
not
belong
to
God’s
knowledge.
Therefore,
God’s
knowledge
is
not
speculative.
But
contrary
to
this:
Everything
that
is
more
noble
should
be
attributed
to
God.
But
as
is
clear
from
the
Philosopher
at
the
beginning
of
the
Metaphysics,
speculative
knowledge
is
more
noble
than
practical
knowledge.
Therefore,
God
has
speculative
knowledge
of
things.
Irespond:
Some
knowledge
is
purely
speculative
and
some
purely
practical,
but
some
knowledge
is
both
speculative
in
one
respect
and
practical
in
another
respect.
To
see
this
clearly,
notice
that
there
are
three
ways
in
which
knowledge
can
be
called
speculative:
First,
on
the
part
of
the
things
known,
when
they
are
not
things
that
can
be
effected
by
the
knower—as,
e.g.,
human
knowledge
about
natural
or
divine
things.
Second,
with
respect
to
the
mode
of
knowing—as,
¢.g.,
when
a
builder
thinks
about
a
house
by
defining,
distinguishing,
and
inquiring
into
its
universal
predicates.
For
here
a
thing
that
can
be
effected
is
being
considered
in
a
speculative
way
and
not
insofar
as
it
can
be
effected,
since
something
that
can
be
effected
exists
through
the
application
of
form
to
matter
and
not
through
the
analysis
of a
composite
into
its
universal
formal
principles.
Third,
with
respect
to
its
end
(finis).
For
as
De
Anima
3
says,
“Practical
understanding
differs
in
its
end
from
speculative
understanding.”
For
practical
understanding
is
ordered
toward
the
end
of
effecting
something,
whereas
the
end
of
speculative
understanding
is
the
consideration
of
truth.
Hence,
ifa
builder
is
thinking
about
how
a
given
house might
be
built,
and
he
is
ordering
his
thought
only
toward
knowing
it
and
not
toward
the
end
of
making
it,
then
his
inquiry
will
be
speculative
with
respect
to
its
end,
even
though
it
is
about
a
thing
that
can
be
effected.
Thus,
knowledge
that
is
speculative
by
reason
of
the
thing
known
is
purely
speculative.
On
the
Part
1,
Question
14
128
other
hand,
knowledge
that
is
speculative
by
reason
of
either
its
mode
or
its
end
is
speculative
in
one
respect
and
practical
in
another
respect.
And
when
knowledge
is
ordered
toward
the
end
of
effecting
something,
then
it
is
purely
practical.
So,
then,
one
should
claim
that
God
has
purely
speculative
knowledge
about
Himself,
since
He
is
not
a
thing
that
can
be
effected,
But
His
knowledge
of
all
other
things
is
both
speculative
and
practical.
It
is
speculative
with
respect
to
its
mode.
For
anything
that
we
ourselves
know
speculatively
about
things
by
defining
and
distinguishing
is
such
that
God
knows
all
of
it
much
more
perfectly.
On
the
other
hand,
as
regards
those
things
that
He
is
able
to
effect
but
does
not
effect
at
any
time,
He
does
not
have
practical
knowledge
of
them
in
the
sense
in
which
practical
knowledge
is
called
practical
because
of
its
end.
However,
He
does
have
practical
knowledge
of
those
things
which
He
does
effect
at
some
time.
On
the
other
hand,
even
though
He
cannot
effect
evils,
they,
like
goods,
nonetheless
fall
under
His
practical
cognition
insofar
as
He
permits
them
or
impedes
them
or
orders
them
[toward
some
end}—in
the
way
that
illnesses
fall
under
a
physician’s
practical
knowledge
insofar
as
he
cures
them
through
his
art.
Reply
to
objection
1:
God’s
knowledge
is
a
cause
not
of
Himself,
but
of
other
things.
It is
an
actual
cause
of
some
of
them,
viz.,
those
which
are
effected
at
some
time,
and
it
is
a
virtual
cause
of
others,
viz.,
those
which
God
is
able
to
effect
and
yet
which
are
never
effected.
Reply
to
objection
2:
The
fact
that
knowledge
is
taken
from
the
things
that
are
known
is
a
feature
that
belongs
to
speculative
knowledge
not
per
se,
but
per
accidents,
viz.,
insofar
as
it
is
human
knowledge.
Reply
to
argument
for
the
contrary:
Perfect
knowledge
is
had
of
things
that
are
able
to
be
effected
only
if
they
are
known
precisely
insofar
as
they
are
able
to
be
effected.
And
so
since
God’s
knowledge
is
perfect
in
every
way,
He
must
know
the
things
that
can
be
effected
by
Him
insofar
as
they
can
be
effected
by
Him
and
not
just
insofar
as
they
ate
knowable
speculatively.
Still,
this
does
not
fall
short
of
the
nobility
of
speculative
knowledge,
since
He
sees
all
things
that
are
distinct
from
Himself
in
Himself,
and
He
knows
Himself
speculatively.
And
so
in
His
speculative
knowledge
of
Himself
He
has
both
speculative
cognition
and
practical
cognition
of
all
other
things.
Part
1,
Question
18
153
Objection
3:
The
principle
of
life
in
the
living
things
that
surround
us
is
the
vegetative
soul,
which
exists
only
in
corporeal
things.
Therefore,
it
does
not
belong
to
incorporeal
things
to
live.
But
contrary
to
this:
Psalm
83:3
says,
“My
heart
and
my
flesh
have
rejoiced
in
the
living
God.”
Irespond:
Life
exists
in
God
in
an
especially
proper
way.
To
see
this
clearly,
consider
that
things
are
said
to
have
life
insofar
as
they
operate
by
themselves
and
not
as
moved
by
others.
The
more
perfectly
this
characteristic
belongs
to
a
thing,
the
more
perfectly
is
life
found
in
it.
Now
among
the
things
that
move
and
are
moved
we
find
three
elements
in
the
following
order:
First,
there
is
the
end
that
moves
the
agent,
whereas
a
principal
agent
is
one
that
acts
through
its
own
form;
and
a
principal
agent
sometimes
acts
through
an
instrument,
which
does
not
act
by
the
power
of
its
own
form
but
instead
acts
by
the
power
of
the
principal
agent,
so
that
it
is
only
the
execution
of
the
action
that
belongs
to
the
instrument.
Thus,
there
are
some
agents
that
move
themselves,
but
not
with
respect
to
either
the
form
or
the
end,
which
exist
in
them
by
nature.
Rather,
they
move
themselves
only
with
respect
to
the
execution
of
the
action,
whereas
the
form
through
which
they
act
and
the
end
for
the
sake
of
which
they
act
are
determined
for
them
by
their
nature.
Plants
are
agents
of
this
sort.
Given
the
form
imparted
to
them
by
nature,
they
move
themselves
with
respect
to
growth
and
diminution.
There
are
some
agents
that
move
themselves
in
a
further
way,
not
only
with
respect
to
the
execution
~-of
the
movement,
but
also
with
respect
to
the
form
that
is
the
principle
of
the
movement,
for
they
acquire
this
form
by
themselves.
Animals
are
agents
of
this
sort.
Their
principle
of
movement
is
a
form
that
is
received
through
the
senses
rather
than
imparted
to
them
by
nature.
Hence,
the
more
perfect
their
sensory
powers
are,
the
more
perfectly
they
move
themselves,
For
animals
that
have
only
the
sense
of
_
touch,
e.g.,
oysters,
move
themselves
only
by
movements
of
reaching
out
and
drawing
back,
hardly
surpassing
the
movement
of
a
plant.-On
the
other
hand,
animals
that
have
a
complete
sentient
power
to
know
not
only
things
conjoined
to
and
touching
them,
but
also
things
at
a
distance
from
them,
move
themselves
to
remote
places
by
a
progressive
movement.
However,
even
though
animals
of
this
sort
receive
through
the
senses
the
form
that
is
the
principle
of
action,
they
nonetheless
do
not
determine
for
themselves
the
end
of
their
action
or
movement;
instead,
this
end
is
imparted
to
them
by
nature,
so
that
it
is
through
natural
instinct
that
they
are
moved
to
do
something
by
the
form
apprehended
through
their
senses.
Hence,
in
addition
to
such
animals,
there
are
other
animals
that
move
themselves
even
with
respect
to
the
end,
which
they
determine
for
themselves.
This
happens
only
through
reason
and
understanding,
whose
function
it
is
to
know
the
relation
between
the
end and
the
means
to
that
end
and
to
order
the
one
to
the
other.
Hence,
a
more
perfect
mode
of
living
belongs
to
those
animals
that
have
understanding,
since
they
move
themselves
in
a
more
perfect
way.
An
indication
of
this
is
that
in
one
and
the
same
man
the
intellective
power
moves
the
sentient
powers,
and
the
sentient
powers
by
their
command
move
the
organs
that
execute
the
movement—just
as,-in
the
case
of
crafts,
we
see
that
the
craft
which
makes
use
of...--
a
ship,
viz.,
the
navigational
craft,
directs
the
craft
that
designs
the
ship,
and
the
latter
directs
the
craft
that executes
just
the
task
of
assembling
the
materials.
However,
even
though
our
intellect
moves
itself
with
respect
to
some
things,
there
are
nonetheless
~
other
things
that
are
determined
for
it
by
its
nature—e.g,,
its
first
principles,
with
respect
to
which
it
cannot
alter
itself,
and
the
ultimate
end,
which
it
is
unable
not
to
will.
Hence,
even
though
our
intellect
can
move
itself
with
respect
to
some
things,
it must
nonetheless
be
moved
by
another
with
respect
to
other
things.
Therefore,
the
highest
grade
of
life
is
had
by
that
which
by
its
nature
is
its
very
act
of
understanding
and
which
is
such
that
what
it
has
by
nature
is
not
determined
by
another.
But
God
is
such
being.
Hence,
life
exists
especially
in
God.
Thus,
in
Metaphysics
12
the
Philosopher,
having
shown
that
God
is
Part
1,
Question
18
154
intelligent,
concludes
that
He
has
the
most
perfect
and
everlasting
life,
since
His
intellect
is
the
most
perfect
and
is
always
in
act.
Reply
to
objection
1:
As
Metaphysics
9
says,
there
are
two
types
of
actions,
one
of
which
passes
into
an
exterior
matter,
e.g.,
heating
and
cutting,
and
the
other
of
which
remains
within
the
agent,
e.g.,
understanding,
sensing,
and
willing.
The
difference
between
them
is
that
the
first
type
of
action
is
a
perfection
of
the
thing
that
is
moved
and
not
of
the
agent
that
effects
the
motion,
whereas
the
second
type
of
action
is
a
perfection
of
the
agent.
Hence,
since
a
movement
is
an
act
of
a
movable
thing,
this
second
type
of
action,
insofar
as
it
is
an
act
of
the
agent’s,
is
called
the
agent’s
movement
on
the
basis
of
a
likeness.
For
just
as
a
movement
is
an
act
of
a
movable
thing,
so
an
action
of
the
second
type
is
an
act
of
the
agent’s—even
though,
as
De
Anima
3
says,
a
movement
is
the
act
of
something
imperfect,
viz.,
something
that
exists
in
potentiality,
whereas
an
action
of
the
second
type
is
the
act
of
something
perfect,
i.e.,
something
that
exists
in
actuality.
Therefore,
given
this
sense
in
which
an
act
of
understanding
is
a
movement,
that
which
understands
itself
is
said
to
move
itself.
And
it
is
in
this
sense
that
Plato
claimed
that
God
moves
Himself—and
not
in
the
sense
in
which
a
movement
is
the
act
of
something
imperfect.
Reply
to
objection
2:
Just as
God
is
His
own
esse
itself
and
His
own
act
of
understanding,
so
too
He
is
His
own
life.
And
because
of
this,
He
is
alive
in
such
a
way
that
He
has
no
principle
of
living.
~-
Reply
to
objection
3:
Among
lower
things
life
is
received
in
a
corruptible
nature
that
requires
generation
for
the
conservation
of
the
species
and
nourishment
for
the
conservation
of
the
individual.
Because
of
this,
in
lower
things
one
does
not
find
life
without
a
vegetative
soul.
But
this
does
not
hold
for the
case
of
incorruptible
things.
Article
4
Are
all
things
the
life
in
God?
It
seems
that
it
is
not
the
case
that
all
things
are
the
life
in
God
(non
omnia
sint
vita
in
Deo):
Objection
1:
Acts
17:28
says,
“In
Him we
live
and
move
and
have
our
being.”
But
it
is
not
the
case
that
all
things
are
the
movement
in
God,
Therefore,
it
is
not
the
case
that
all
things are the
life
in
God.
Objection
2:
All
things
exist
in
God
as
in
a
first
exemplar.
But
the
exemplifiers
should
be
conformed
to
their
exemplar.
Therefore,
since
it
is
not
the
case
that
all
things
are
alive
in
themselves,
it
seems
that
it
is
not
the
case
that
all
things
are
the
life
in
God.
Objection
3:
In
De
Vera
Religione
Augustine
says
that
a
living
substance
is
better
than
a
any
non-living
substance.
-Therefore,.if
things
that-are
not
alive
in
themselves
are
the
life
in
God,-then
it--—-
seems
that
things
exist
more
truly
in
God
than
in
themselves.
But
this
seems
to
be
false,
since
in
themselves
they
exist
in
actuality,
whereas
in
God
they
exist
in
potentiality.
___
Objection
4:
Just
as
good
things
are
known
by
God,
along
with
the things
that
are
made
at
some
“time
or
other,
so
too
evil
things
are
known
by God,
along
with
the
things
that
He
is
able
to
make
and
yet
are
never
made.
Therefore,
if
all
things
are
the
life
in
God
insofar
as
they
are
known
by
Him,
then
it
seems
that
even
evil
things
and
things
that
are
never
made
are
the
life
in
God
insofar
as
they
are
known
by
Him.
But
this
seems
absurd.
But
contrary
to
this:
John
1:3-4
says:
“What
was
made
...
was
life
in
Him.”
But
all
things
other
than
God
were
made.
Therefore,
all
things
are the
life
in
Him.
QUESTION
19
God’s
Will
Having
considered
the
things
that
pertain
to
God’s
knowledge,
we
must
now
consider
the
things
that
pertain
to
God’s
will.
First,
we
will
consider
God’s
will
itself
(question
19);
second,
we
will
consider
what
pertains
to
His
will
absolutely
speaking
(questions
20-21);
and,
third,
we
will
consider
what
pertains
to
His
intellect
in
relation
to
His
will
(questions
22-24).
On
the
topic
of
God’s
will
itself
there
are
twelve
questions:
(1)
Is
there
a
will
in
God?
(2)
Does
God
will
things
distinct
from
Himself?
(3)
Does
God
will
whatever
He
wills
by
necessity?
(4)
Is
God’s
will
a
cause
of
things?
(5)
Can
a
cause
be
assigned
for
God’s
act
of
willing?
(6)
Is
God’s
will
always
fulfilled?
(7)
Is
God’s
will
mutable?
(8)
Does
God’s
will
impose
necessity
on
the things
willed?
(9)
Does
God
will
evils?
(10)
Does
God
have
free
choice?
(11)
Should
signs
be
ascribed
to
God’s
will?
(12)
Is
it
appropriate
to
posit
five
signs
of
God’s
will?
Article
1
Vv
Ts
there
a
will
in
God?
It
seems
that
there
is
no
will
in
God:
Objection
1:
The
object
of
the
will
is
the
end and
the
good.
But
no
end
can
be
assigned
to
God.
Therefore,
there
is
no
will
in
God.
Objection
2:
The
will
is
a
certain
sort
of
desire
(appetitus
quidam).
But
since
a
desire
is
for a
thing
that
is
not
had,
it
indicates
an
imperfection—which
cannot
belong
to
God.
Therefore,
there
is
no
will
in
God.
Objection
3:
According
to
the
Philosopher
in
De
Anima
3,
the
will
is
a
moved
mover.
But
as
Physics
8
proves,
God
is
the
first
unmovable
mover.
Therefore,
in
God
there
is
no
will.
But
contrary
to
this:
Romans
12:2
says:
“.
. .
that
you
may
prove
what
is...
the
will
of
God.”
Irespond:
There
is
a
will in
God,
just
as
there
is
an
intellect
in
Him,
since
the
will
follows
upon
the
intellect.
For
just
as
a
natural
thing
has
esse
in
actuality
through
its
form,
so
an
intellect
understands
in
actuality
through
its
intelligible
form.
But
every
entity
is
related
to
a
form
that
is
natural
to
it
in
such
a
way
that
(a)
when
it
does
not
possess
it,
it
tends
toward
it,
and
(b)
when
it
does
possess
it,
it
comes
to
rest
in
it.
The
same
holds
for
every
natural
perfection
that
is
a
good
of
the
entity’s
nature.
And
this
relation
to
the
good
is
called
natural
appetite
in
things
that
lack
cognition.
Hence,
an
intellectual
nature
has
a
similar
relation
to
the
good
apprehended
through
an
intelligible
form,
so
that
(a)
when
it
possesses
that
good,
it
rests
in
it,
and
(b)
when
it
does
not
possess
it,
it
seeks
after
it.
And
both
of
these
points
pertain
to
the
will.
Hence,
in
anything
that
has
an
intellect
there
is
a
will,
just as
there
is
an
animal
appetite
in
anything
that
has
sensory
cognition.
-
And
so
there
has
to
be
a
will
in
God,
because
there
is
is
an
intellect
in
Him.
Hence,
just
as
His
act
of
understanding
is
His
esse,
so
too
is
His
act
of
will.
__Reply
to
objection
1:
Even
though
nothing
distinct
from
God
is
God’s
end,
nonetheless,
He
Himself
is
the
end
with
respect
to
all
the things
that
are
made
by
Him.
And
this
is
so
because
of
His
essence,
since,
as
was
shown
above
(q.
6,
a.
3),
He
is
good
through
His
essence.
For
the
end
has
the
nature
of
a
good.
Reply
to
objection
2:
In
us
the
will
pertains
to
the
appetitive
part
of
the
soul.
But
even
though
the
appetitive
part
gets
its
name
from
the
fact
that
it
desires,
it
is
not
the
case
that
its
only
act
is
to
desire
what
it
does
not
possess.
Rather,
it
also
has
the
act
of
loving
what
it
possesses,
and
the
act
of
delighting
Part
1,
Question
19
157
in
it,
And
it
is
with
respect
to
these
two
acts
that
a
will
is
posited
in
God.
For
God’s
will
always
possesses
the
good
that
is
its
object,
since,
as
has
been
explained,
it
does
not
differ
from
that
object
in
its
essence.
Reply
to
objection
3:
A
will
whose
principal
object
is
a
good
that
exists
outside
the
will
must
be
moved
by
something.
But
the object
of
God’s
will
is
His
own
goodness,
which
is
His
essence.
Hence,
since
God’s
will
is
His
essence,
it
is
moved
by
itself
alone
and
not
by
anything
distinct
from
it—in
the
sense
in
which
understanding
and
willing
are
called
movements.
(This
is
the
sense
in
which
Plato
claimed
that
the
first
mover
moves
itself.)
Article
2
Does
God
will
things
distinct
from
Himself?
It
seems
that
God
does
not
will
things
distinct
from
Himself:
Objection
1:
God’s
act
of
will
is
His
esse.
But
God
is
not
distinct
from
Himself.
Therefore,
He
does
not
will
anything
distinct
from
Himself.
Objection
2:
What
is
willed
moves
the
will
in
the
way
that
what
is
desirable
moves
the
appetite,
according
to
De
Anima
3.
Therefore,
if
God
willed
something
distinct
from
Himself,
His
will
would
be
moved
by
something
distinct
from
Himself—which
is
impossible.
Objection
3: If
the
thing
willed
is
sufficient
for
a
given
will,
then
it
does
not
seek
anything
else.
But
God’s
goodness
is
sufficient
for
Himself,
and
His
will
is
satisfied
by
it.
Therefore,
God
does
not
will
anything
distinct
from
Himself.
.
Objection
4:
Acts
of
will
are
multiplied
according
to
the
things
that
are
willed.
Therefore,
if
God
willed
both
Himself
and
things
distinct
from
Himself,
it
would
follow
that
His
act
of
will
is
multiplied,
and
as
a
result
His
esse,
which
is
His
act
of
will,
would
be
multiplied.
But
this
is
impossible.
Therefore,
He
does
not
will
things
distinct
from
Himself.
But
contrary
to
this:
In
1
Thessalonians
4:3
the
Apostle
says:
“This
is
the
will
of
God,
your
sanctification.”
Trespond:
God
wills
not
only
Himself,
but
also
things
distinct
from
Himself.
This
is
clear
from
the
comparison
introduced
above
(a.
1).
For
a
natural
thing
has
a
natural
inclination
toward
its
own
good—not
only
in
order
that
it
might
acquire
it
when
it
does
not
possess
it,
or
rest
in
it
when
it
does
possess
it,
but
also in
order
that
it
might
diffuse
its
own
good
to
others
as
much
as
possible.
Hence,
we
see
that
every
agent,
insofar
as
it
is
perfect
and
acting,
effects
what
is
similar
to
itself.
Hence,
it
likewise
pertains
to
the
nature
of
the
will
that
it
should,
to
the
extent
that
this
is
possible,
communicate
to
others
the
good
that
it
itself
possesses.
And
this
pertains
in
a
special-way
to
God’s
will,
from
which
every
perfection
is
derived
through
a
certain
likeness.
Hence,
if
natural
things
communicate
their
own
good
to
others
insofar
as
they
are
perfect,
then
a
fortiori
it
pertains
to
the
divine
will
that
it
should
communicate
its
own
good
to
others
through.a
likeness,
to
the
extent
that
this
is
possible.
So,
__.
then,
God
wills
both
that
He
Himself
should
exist
and
that
other
things
should
exist.
But
He
wills
Himself
as
an
end
and
other
things
as
ordered
to
that
end,
insofar
as
it
is
fitting
that
other
things
should
also
participate
in
the
divine
goodness.
Reply
to
objection
1:
Even
though
God’s
act
of
will
is
His
esse
in
reality,
nonetheless,
as
is
clear
from
what
was
said
above
(q.
13,
a.
4),
it
differs
conceptually
from
His
esse
according
to
different
modes
of
understanding
and
signifying.
For
when
I
say
‘God
exists’,
no
relation
to
anything
is
implied
in
the
Part
1,
Question
19
158
way
it
is
implied
when
I
say,
‘God
wills’.
And
so
even
though
God
is
not
something
distinct
from
Himself,
He
nonetheless
wills
something
distinct
from
Himself.
Reply
to
objection
2:
In
those
things
that
we
ourselves
will for
the
sake
of
an
end,
the
end
has
the
complete
nature
of a mover,
and
this
is
what
moves
the
will.
This
is
especially
clear
in
the
case
of
those
things
that
we
will
only
for
the
sake
of
an
end.
For
instance,
when
someone
wills
to
take
a
bitter
potion,
he
wills
nothing
in
it
except
health,
and
it
is
health
alone
that
moves
his
will.
It
is
otherwise
with
someone
who
takes
a
sweet
potion;
he
is
able
to
will
the
potion
not
only
for
the
sake
of
health,
but
also
for
its
own
sake.
Hence,
since,
as
has
been
explained,
God
wills
things
distinct
from
Himself
only
for
the
sake
of
that
end
which
is
His
own
goodness,
it
does
not
follow
that
something
other
than
His
goodness
moves
His
will.
And
so
just
as
He
understands
things
distinct
from
Himself
by
understanding
His
own
essence,
so
too
He
wills
things
distinct
from
Himself
by
willing
His
own
goodness.
Reply
to
objection
3:
From
the
fact
that
God’s
own
goodness
is
sufficient
for
the
divine
will
it
does
not
follow
that
He
wills
nothing
else;
instead,
all
that
follows
is
that
He
does
not
will
anything
else
except
because
of
His
own
goodness.
In
the
same
way, even
though
God’s
intellect
is
perfect
by
reason
of
the
fact
that
it
knows
the
divine
essence,
it
nonetheless
knows
other
things
in
that
essence.
Reply
to
objection
4:
Just
as
God’s
act
of
understanding
is
one
because
He
sees
many
things
in
only
one
thing,
so too
God’s
act
of
will
is
one
and
simple
because
He
wills
many
things
through
just
one
thing,
viz.,
His
own
goodness.
Article
3
Does
God
will
whatever
He
wills
by
necessity?
It
seems
that
God
wills
whatever
He
wills
by
necessity:
Objection
1:
Everything
eternal
is
necessary.
But
whatever
God
wills,
He
wills
from
eternity;
otherwise,
His
will
would
be
mutable.
Therefore,
whatever
God
wills,
He
wills
by
necessity.
Objection
2:
God
wills
things
distinct
from
Himself
insofar
as
He
wills
His
own
goodness.
But
God
wills
His
own
goodness
by
necessity.
Therefore,
He
wills
things
distinct
from
Himself
by
necessity,
Objection
3:
Whatever
is
natural
to
God
is
necessary,
since,
as
was
shown
above
(q.
2,
a.
3),
God
is
a
necessary
being
per
se
and
the
source
of
all
necessity.
But
it
is
natural
to
Him
to
will
whatever
He
wills,
since,
as
Metaphysics
5
says,
in
God
there
cannot
be
anything
besides
His
own
nature.
Therefore,
whatever
He
wills,
He
wills
of
necessity.
Objection
4:
Not
necessary
to
be
is
equivalent
to
possible not
to
be.
Therefore,
if
it
is
not
necessary
that
God
will
some
of
the
things
that
He
wills,
then
it
is
possible
that
He
not
will
those
things,
.-and
it
is
possible
that
He
will
something
that
He
does
not
in
fact
will.
Therefore,
the
divine
will
is
contingent
with
respect
to
two
opposites.
And
so
the
divine
will
is
imperfect,
since
everything
contingent
is
imperfect
and
mutable.
Objection
5:
As
the
Commentator
says
in
Physics
2,
no
action
follows
from
something
that
is
open
to
two
opposites,
unless
it
is
inclined
by
something
else to
one
of
the
opposites.
Therefore,
if
God’s
will
is
open
to
two
opposites
in
some
matters,
it
follows
that
He
is
determined
to
His
effect
by
something
else.
And
so
He
has
some
prior
cause.
Objection
6:
Whatever
God
knows,
He
knows
by
necessity.
But
just
as
God’s
knowledge
is
His
essence,
so too
is
His
act
of
will.
Therefore,
whatever
God
wills,
He
wills
by
necessity.
But
contrary
to
this:
Ephesians
1:11
says:
“He
who
works
all
things
according
to
the
counsel
of
Part
1,
Question
19
159
His
will.”
But
what
we
ourselves
do
according
to
the
counsel
of
our
will,
we
do
not
will
by
necessity.
Therefore,
it
is
not
the
case
that
whatever
God
wills,
He
wills
by
necessity.
Irespond:
‘Necessary’
is
predicated
in
two
ways,
viz.,
absolutely
(absolute)
and
conditionally
(ex
suppositione).
Something
is
judged
to
be
absolutely
necessary
because
of
the
relation
between
the
terms,
i.c.,
either
because
(a)
the
predicate
occurs
in
the
definition
(definitio)
of
the
subject,
as in
‘It
is
necessary
that
aman
is
an
animal’,
or
because
(b)
the
subject
is
part
of
the
nature
(ratio)
of
the
predicate,
as
in
‘It
is
necessary
that
a
number
is
either
even
or
odd.” In
this
sense
of
‘necessary’,
it
is
not
necessary
that
Socrates
is
sitting.
Hence,
this
is
not
absolutely
necessary,
though
it
can
be
called
conditionally
necessary.
For
once
it
is
assumed
that
Socrates
is
sitting,
then,
for as
long
as
he
is
sitting,
it
is
necessary
that
he
is
sitting.
As
for
the
things
willed
by
God,
one
must
take
into
account
that
(a)
it
is
absolutely
necessary
that
God
will
some
of
them,
but
that
(b)
this
is
not
true
of
all
the things
that
He
wills.
For
instance,
God’s
will
has
a
necessary
relation
to
His
own
goodness,
which
is
its
proper
object.
Hence,
God
wills
by
necessity
that
His
own
goodness
should
exist,
just
as
our
own
will
wills
happiness
by
necessity.
In
the
same
way,
every
other
power
has
a
necessary
relation
to
its
proper
and
principal
object,
e.g.,
sight
to
color.
For
it
is
part
of
its
nature
to
tend
toward
that
object.
However,
God
wills
things
distinct
from
Himself
insofar
as
they
are
ordered
toward
His goodness
~-as
an
end.
But
we
ourselves,
in
willing
an
end,
do
not
will
by
necessity
the things
that
are
ordered
to
that
end,
unless
they
are
such
that
the
end
cannot
exist
without
them—in
the
way
that
we
will
to
cat
food
because
we
will
to
conserve
our
life,
or
in
the
way
that
we
will
a
ship
because
we
will
to
cross
the
sea.
However,
we
do
not
will
by
necessity
things
without
which
the
end
can
exist.
For
instance,
we
do
not
by
necessity
will
to
have
a
horse
in
order
to
go
somewhere,
since
we
can
travel
without
a
horse.
And
the
same
line
of
reasoning
holds
for
other
cases.
Hence,
since
God’s
goodness
is
perfect
and
can
exist
without
other
things—for
no
perfection
i
is
added
to
Him
by
other
things—it
follows
that
things
distinct
from
Himself
are
such
that
it
is
not
absolutely
necessary
that
He
will
them.
And
yet
it
is
conditionally
necessary.
For
once
it
is
assumed
that
He
has
willed
something,
He
is
not
able
not
to
will
it,
since
His
will
cannot
change.
Reply
to
objection
1:
From
the
fact
that
God
wills
something
from
etemity,
it
does
not
follow
that
it
is
necessary
that
He
will
it,
except
conditionally.
Reply
to
objection
2:
Even
though
God
wills
His
own
goodness
by
necessity,
He
nonetheless
does
not
will
by
necessity
those
things
that
He
wills
for
the
sake
of
His
goodness,
since
His goodness
can
exist
without
those
other
things.
Reply
to
objection
3:
It
is
not
natural
to
God
to
will
any
of
the
other
things
that
He
does
not
will
by
necessity.
But
neither
is
it
unnatural
or
contrary
to
His
nature;
instead,
it
is
voluntary.
Reply
to
objection
4:
In
some
cases
a
necessary
cause
does
not
have
a
necessary
relation
to
any
effect,
and
this
happens
because
of
a
defect
in
the
effect
and
not
because
of
a
defect
in
the cause.
For
instance,
the
sun’s
power
does
not
have
a
necessary
relation
to
any
of
the things
that
happen
contingently
here
below—not
because
of
a
defect
in
the
sun’s
power,
but
because
of
a
defect
in
an
effect that
does
not
necessarily
issue
from
the
cause,
Similarly,
the
fact
that
God
does
not
will
by
necessity
certain
of
the
things
that
He
wills
stems
not
from
a
defect
in
the
divine
will,
but
from
a
defect
that
belongs
by
its
nature
to
the
thing
willed—more
specifically,
because
the
thing
is
such
that
God’s
perfect
goodness
can
exist
without
it.
Indeed,
this
defect
is
endemic
to
every
created
good.
Reply
to
objection
5:
A
cause
that
is
of
itself
contingent
must
be
determined
to
its
effect
by
something
external
to
it.
But
God’s
will,
which
has
necessity
of
itself,
determines
itself
to
what
it
wills
when
it
has
a
non-necessary
relation to
the
thing
willed.
Part
1,
Question
19
160
Reply
to
objection
6:
Just
as
God’s
esse
is
necessary
in
itself,
so
too
are
the
divine
act
of
willing
and
the
divine
act
of
knowing.
However,
God’s
act
of
knowing
has
a
necessary
relation
to
the things
known,
whereas
God’s
act
of
willing
does
not
have
a
necessary
relation
to
the
things
willed.
The
reason
for
this
is
that
an
act
of
knowing
is
had
of
things
insofar
as
they
exist
in
the
knower,
whereas
an
act
of
willing
is
related
to
things
insofar
as
they
exist
in
themselves.
Therefore,
all
things
distinct
from
God
have
necessary
esse
insofar
as
they
exist
in
God,
whereas
insofar
as
they
exist
in
themselves,
they
do
not
have
absolute
necessity
in
the
sense
of
being
necessary
through
themselves.
Because
of
this,
whatever
God
knows,
He
knows
by
necessity,
whereas
it
is
not
the
case
that
whatever
He
wills,
He
wills
by
necessity.
Article
4
Is
God’s
will
a cause
of
things?
It
seems
that
God’s
will
is
not a
cause
of
things:
Objection
1:
In
De
Divinis
Nominibus,
chap.
4,
Dionysius
says,
“Just
as
our
sun—neither
deliberating
nor
choosing,
but
through
its
very
being—illuminates
all
things
in
such
a
way
that
by
its
power
they
participate
in
its
light,
so
too
the divine
good—through
its
very
essence—sends
the
rays
of
its
goodness
into
all
the
things
that
exist.”
But
anything
that
acts
through
its
will
acts
with
deliberation
and
choice.
Therefore,
God
does
not
act
through
His
will.
Therefore,
God’s
will
is
not
a
cause
of
things.
Objection
2:
The
first
thing
in
any
ordering
is
that
which
is
such-and-such
through
its
essence.
For
instance,
in
the
ordering
of
things
that
are
on
fire,
the
first
thing
is
that
which
is
fire
through
its
essence.
But
God
is
the
first
agent.
Therefore,
He
is
an
agent
through
His
essence,
which
is
His
nature.
Therefore,
He
acts
through
His
nature
and
not
through
His
will.
Therefore,
God’s
will
is
not
a
cause
of
things.
Objection
3: If
something
is
a
cause
of
an
effect
by
virtue
of
its
being
what
it
is,
then
it
is
a
cause
through
its
nature
and
not
through
its
will.
For
instance,
fire
is
a
cause
of
warmth by
virtue
of
its
being
hot,
whereas,
by
contrast,
a
craftsman
is
a
cause
of
a
house
by
virtue
of
the
fact that
he
wills
to
make
it.
But
in
De
Doctrina
Christiana
1
Augustine
says,
“Because
God
is
good,
we
exist.”
Therefore,
it
is
through
His
nature
that
God
is
a
cause
of
things,
and
not
through
His
will.
Objection
4:
There
is
a
single
cause
for
a
single
thing.
But,
as
was
explained
above
(q.
14,
a.
8),
God’s
knowledge
is
a
cause
of
created
things.
Therefore,
God’s
will
should
not
be
posited
as
a
cause
of
those
things.
But
contrary
to
this:
Wisdom
11:26
says,
“How
could
anything
endure,
if
You
did
not
will
it?”
Lrespond:
One
must
assert
that
God’s
will
is
a
cause
of
things,
and
that
God
acts
through
His
will
and
not,-as
some
have
claimed,
by
a
necessity
of
nature.
This
can
be
made
clear
in
three
ways.
First,
from
the
very
ordering
of
agent
causes:
Since,
as
Physics
2
proves,
both
intellect
and
nature
act for
the
sake
of
an
end,
a
thing
that
acts
through
its
nature
must
have
both
its
end
and
the
necessary
means
to
that
end
predetermined
for
it
by
some
higher
intellect.
For
instance,
an arrow
has
its
end and
fixed
mode
of
acting
predetermined
for
it
by
the
archer.
Hence,
that
which
acts
through
its
intellect
and
will
must
be
prior
to
that
which
acts
through
its
nature.
Therefore,
since
God
is
first
in
the
ordering
of
agents,
He
must
act
through
His
intellect
and
will.
Second,
from
the
nature
of
a
natural
agent:
It
pertains
to
a
natural
agent
to
produce
a
single
sort
of
effect,
since
its
nature
acts in
one and
the
same
way
as
long
as
it
is
unimpeded.
This
is
because
it
acts
by
virtue
of
being
what
it
is.
Hence,
as
long
as
it
is
what
it
is,
it
produces
only
that
sort
of
effect.
For
Part
1,
Question
19
161
everything
that acts
through
its
nature
has
delimited
esse
(esse
determinatum).
Therefore,
since
God’s
esse
is
not
delimited
but
contains
within
itself
all
the
perfections
of
being,
it
is
impossible
that
God
should
act
by
a
necessity
of
nature,
unless
perhaps
He
were
to
effect
something
indeterminate
and
unlimited
in
being—which,
as
was
shown
above
(q,
7,
a.
2),
is
impossible.
Therefore,
He
does
not
act
by
a
necessity
of
nature;
instead,
determinate
effects
proceed
from
His
infinite
perfection
according
to
the
determination
of
His
will
and
intellect.
Third,
from
the
relation
of
effects
to
their
cause:
Effects
proceed
from
an
agent
cause
to
the extent
that
they
preexist
in
that
cause.
For
every
agent
effects
what
is
similar
to
itself.
Now
effects
preexist
in
a
cause
according
to
the
mode
of
that
cause.
Hence,
since
God’s
esse
is
His
very
act
of
understanding,
His
effects
preexist
in
Him
in
an
intelligible
mode.
Therefore,
they
also
proceed
from
Him
through
an
intelligible
mode.
And
so,
as
a
result,
they
proceed
from
Him
through
the
mode
of
an
act
of
willing.
For
His
inclination
to
effect
what
is
conceived
by
His
intellect
pertains
to
His
will.
Therefore,
God’s
will
is
a
cause
of
things.
Reply
to
objection
1:
In
this
passage
Dionysius
does
not
mean
to
deny
choice
to
God
absolutely
speaking,
but
only
in
a
certain
respect—viz.,
insofar
as
He
communicates
His
goodness
not
just
to
some
things,
but
to
all
things.
So
choice
is
denied
only
insofar
as
it
implies
a
certain
sort
of
selectivity.
Reply
to
objection
2:
Since
God’s
essence
is
His
act
of
understanding
and
His
act
of
willing,
from
the
fact
that
He
acts
through
His
essence,
it
follows
that
He
acts
through
the
mode
of
intellect
and
will.
Reply
to
objection
3:
The
good
is
the
object
of
the
will,
Therefore,
as
was
explained
above
(a.
2),
the
assertion,
“Because
God
is
good,
we
exist,”
is
made
because
God’s
goodness
is
the
reason
for
His
willing
ail
other
things.
Reply
to
objection
4:
Even
in
our
own
case,
one
and
the
same
effect
is
caused
both
(a)
by
the
guidance
of
knowledge,
by
which
the
form
of
the
work
is
conceived,
and
(b)
by
the
authority
of
the
will,
since
it
is
only
through
the
will
that
the
form
as
existing
just
in
the
intellect
is
ordered
toward
existing
or
not
existing
in
the
effect.
Hence,
the
term
‘speculative
intellect’
does
not
imply
anything
about
acting.
Instead,
power
is
the
cause
that
executes
the
action,
since
the
term
‘power’
denominates
the
immediate
principle
of
action.
But
these
things
are
all
one
in
God.
Article
5
Can
a
cause
be
assigned
for
God’s
act
of
willing?
It
seems
that
a
cause
can
be
assigned
for
God’s
act
of
willing:
Objection
1:
In
83
Quaestiones
Augustine
says,
“Who
would
dare
to
claim
that
God
has
created
all
things
without
reason?”
But
a
voluntary
agent’s
reason
for
acting
is
also
a
cause
of
his
act
of
willing.
Therefore,
God’s
act
of
willing
has
a
cause.
Objection
2:
When
things
are
effected
by
someone
who
wills
them
for
the
sake
of
no
cause
at
all,
one
should
not
assign
any
cause
to
them
except
the
will
of
the
one
who
wills
them,
But,
as
has
been
shown
(a.
4),
God’s
will
is
a
cause
of
all
things.
Therefore,
if
His
act
of
willing
does
not
have
a
cause,
then
in
all
natural
things
one
should
seek
no
cause
other
than
God’s
will
alone.
And
so
all
the
sciences,
which
try
to
assign
causes
to
various
effects,
would
be
in
vain—which
seems
absurd.
Therefore,
some
cause
can
be
assigned
to
God’s
act
of
willing.
Objection
3: If
something
is
effected
by
one
who
wills
it
for
the
sake
of
no
cause
at
all,
then
it
depends
on
his
simple
act
of
willing.
Therefore,
if
God’s
act
of
willing
has
no
cause,
it
follows
that
all
Part
1,
Question
19
162
the
things
that
are
effected
depend
on
His
simple
act
of
willing
and
do
not
have
any
other
cause—which
is
absurd.
But
contrary
to
this:
In
83
Quaestiones
Augustine
says,
“Every
efficient
cause
is
greater
than
that
which
is
effected
by
it;
but
nothing
is
greater
that
God’s
act
of
willing;
therefore,
no
cause
should
be
sought
for
it.”
Irespond:
There
is
no
way
in
which
God’s
act
of
willing
has
a
cause.
To
see
this
clearly,
notice
that
since
the
will
follows
the
intellect,
there
can
be
a
cause
of
one
who
wills
qua
willing
in
the
same
way
that
there
can be
a
cause
of
one
who
understands
qua
understanding.
Now
in
the
case
of
the
intellect,
things
are
such
that
if
someone
understands
a
principle
and
its
conclusion
separately
from
one
another,
then
the
understanding
of
the
principle
is
a
cause
of
the
knowledge
of
the
conclusion.
However,
if
some
intellect
were
to
discern
the
conclusion
in
the
principle
itself,
apprehending
both
of
them
in
a
single
thought,
then
in
that
intellect
the
knowledge
of
the
conclusion
would
not
be
caused
by
an
understanding
of
the
principles.
For
one and
the
same
thing
is
not
acause
of
itself,
Nonetheless,
that
intellect
would
still
understand
that
the
principles
are
a
cause
of
the
conclusion.
Something
similar
holds
in
the
case
of
the
will.
In
the
will,
an
end
is
related
to
the
means
to
that
end
in
the
same
way
that,
in
the
intellect,
principles
are
related
to
their
conclusions.
Hence,
if
someone
wills
the
end
by
one
act
and
the
means
to
that
end
by
a
separate
act,
then
the
act
of
willing
the
end
will
be
a
cause
of
the
act
of
willing
the
means
to
that
end.
However,
this
cannot
be
the
case
if
he
wills
both
the
end
and
the
means
to
that
end
in
a
single
act.
For
one
and
the
same
thing
cannot
be
a
cause
of
itself.
Yet
it
will
still
be
true
to
assert
that
he
wills
that
the
means
to
the
end
should
be
ordered
toward
that
end.
Now
just
as
God
understands
all
things
in
His
own
essence
by
a
single
act,
so
too
He
wills
all
things
in
His
goodness
by
a
single
act.
In
God’s
case,
His
understanding
a
cause
is
not
a
cause
of
His
understanding
its
effects;
instead,
He
understands
the
effects
in
the
cause.
In
exactly
the
same
way,
His
willing
an
end
is
not
a
cause
of
His
willing
the
means
to
that
end;
instead,
[by
one
act]
He
wills
that
the
means
to
an
end
should
be
ordered
to that
end.
Therefore,
He
wills
that
this
should
exist
because
of
that,
but
it
is
not
because
He
wills
that
that
He
wills
this.
Reply
to
objection
1:
God’s
will
is
reasonable
not
because
there
is
some
cause
of
God’s
act
of
willing,
but
because
He
wills
that
one
thing
should
exist
because
of
another.
Reply
to
objection
2:
Since
God
wills
effects
to
exist
in
such
a
way
that
they
issue
forth
from
various
causes,
so
that
a
certain
order
is
preserved
among
things,
it
is
not
vain
to
look
for
other
causes
along
with
God’s
will.
Still,
it
would
be
vain
if
these
other
causes
were
sought
after
as
if
they
were
first
causes
and
did not
depend
on
God’s
will.
This
is
why
Augustine
says
in
De
Trinitate
3,
“It
pleased
the
vanity
of
the
philosophers
to
attribute
contingent
effects
to
other
causes,
since
they
were
completely
incapable
of
seeing
a
cause
higher
than
all
the
rest,
viz.,
God’s
will.”
Reply
to
objection
3:
Since
God
wills
that
effects
should
exist
because
of
their
causes,
any
effects
that
presuppose
some
other
effect
do
not
depend
on
God’s
will
alone,
but
also
depend
on
some
other
thing.
However,
the
first
effects
depend
on
God’s
will
alone.
For
instance,
we
may
say
that
(a)
God
__
willed
that
man
should
have
hands
in
order
to
serve
his
intellect
in
carrying
out
various
tasks;
and
that
(b)
He
willed
that
he
should
have
an
intellect
in
order
that
he
would
be
a
man,
and
that
(c)
He
willed
him
to
be
a
man
in
order
that
he
might
enjoy
God
or
in
order
to
fill
out
the
universe—-which
effects
cannot
be
traced
back
to
further
created
ends.
Hence,
effects
of
this
last
sort
depend
on
God’s
simple
act
of
will,
whereas
the
other
effects
depend
as
well
on
the
order
of
causes
other
than
God.
Part
1,
Question
19
166
Reply
te
objection
3:
From
this
argument
it
does
not
follow
that
God
has
a
changeable
will;
what
follows
instead
is
that
He
wills
a
change.
Reply
to
objection
4:
As
was
explained
above
(a.
3),
even
if
something
is
such
that
it
is
not
absolutely
necessary
that
God
will
it,
it
is
nonetheless
conditionally
necessary
(ex
suppositione)
that
He
will
it—and
this
because
of
the
immutability
of
God’s
will.
Article
8
Does
God’s
will
impose
necessity
on
the
things
willed?
It
seems
that
God’s
will
imposes
necessity
on
the
things
willed:
Objection
1:
In
the
Enchiridion
Augustine
says,
“No
one
is
saved
unless
God
wills
that
he
be
saved.
And
so
he
should
implore
God
to
will
it,
since
if
He
wills
it,
it
will
necessarily
happen.”
Objection
2:
Every
unimpedible
cause
produces
its
effect
by
nécessity;
for,
as
Physics
2
explains,
nature
always
does
the
same
thing
unless
something
impedes
it.
But
God’s
will
is
unimpedible;
for
in
Romans
9:19
the
Apostle
asks,
“Who
resists
His
will?”
Therefore,
God’s
will
imposes
necessity
on
things.
Objection
3:
That
which
has
necessity
from
something
prior
to
it
is
absolutely
necessary;
for
instance,
it
is
necessary
for
an
animal
to
die
because
it
is
composed
of
contrary
parts.
But
a
thing
created
by
God
is
related
to
God’s
will
as
to
something
prior
to
it
by
virtue
of
which
it
has
necessity;
for
the
conditional,
‘If
God
wills
something,
it
exists’,
is
true,
and
every
true
conditional
is
necessary.
Thus,
it
follows
that
everything
that
God
wills
is
absolutely necessary.
But
contrary
to
this:
All
the
goods
that
are
effected
are
such
that
God
wills
that
they
be
effected.
Therefore,
if
His
will
imposed
necessity
on
the
things
that
are
willed,
it
would
follow
that
all
goods
occur
by
necessity.
And
so
that
would
be
the
end
of
free
choice,
deliberation,
and
all
other
such
things.
Lrespond:
God’s
will
imposes
necessity
on
some
of
the
things
willed,
but not
on
all
of
them.
Some
have
wanted
to
explain
this
by
appeal
to
the
mediating
causes,
claiming
that
the
things
God’s
will
produces
through
necessary
causes
are
necessary,
whereas
the
things
God’s
will
produces
through
contingent
causes
are
contingent.
But
this
explanation
seems
inadequate
on
two
counts:
First,
the
reason
why
the
effect
of
a
first
cause
is
contingent
in
virtue
of
a
secondary
cause
is
that
the
first
cause’s
effect
is
impeded
by
some
defect
in
the
secondary
cause—in
the
way,
for
instance,
that
the
sun’s
power
is
impeded
by
a
defect
in
a
plant.
But
no
defect
in
a
secondary
cause
can
prevent
God’s
will
from
producing
its
effect.
Second,
if
the
distinction
between
contingent
effects
and
necessary
effects
were
traceable
solely
to
the
secondary
causes,
it
would
follow
that
this
distinction
falls
outside
of
God’s
intention
and
will—which
is
false.
------
——
ee
ed
oe
nnn
And
so
a
better
explanation
is
that
this
distinction
occurs
because
of
the
efficacy
of
God’s
will.
For
when
a
cause
is
efficacious in
its
action,
the
effect
follows
upon
the
cause
not
only
with
respect
to
what
is
effected
but
also
with
respect
to
the
mode
in
which
it
is
effected
or
in
which
it
exists.
For
instance,
because
of
a
defect
in
the
active
power
of
the
semen,
it
is
possible
for
a
son
to
be born
who
is
dissimilar
to
his
father
in
various
accidents
that
pertain
to
a
thing’s
mode
of
existing.
Therefore,
since
God’s
will
is
absolutely
efficacious,
it
follows
not
only
that
the
things
God
wills
to
be
effected
are in
fact
effected,
but
also
that
they
are
effected
in
the
mode
in
which
God
wills
them
to
be
effected.
But
God
wills
some
things
to
be
effected
necessarily
and
others
contingently,
so
that
there
might
be
an
order
among
things
for
the
sake
of
the
completeness
of
the
universe.
And
so
for
some
effects
He
has
applied
necessary
causes
Part
1,
Question
19
167
which
cannot
fail
and
from
which
the
effects
issue
forth
by
necessity,
whereas
for
other
effects
He
has
applied
contingent
and
defectible
causes,
from
which
the
effects
issue
forth
contingently.
Therefore,
the
reason
why
effects
willed
by
God
come
about
contingently
is
not
that
their
proximate
causes
are
contingent,
but
rather
that
God
has
willed
them
to
come
about
contingently
and
has
prepared
contingent
causes
for
them.
Reply
to
objection
1:
In
this
passage
Augustine
should
be
understood
to
be
talking
about
a
conditional,
rather
than
absolute,
necessity
in
the
things
willed
by
God.
For
this
conditional
is
necessarily
true:
‘If
God
wills
this
thing,
then
it
exists.’
Reply
to
objection
2:
From
the
fact
that
nothing
resists
God’s
will
it
follows
not
only
that
what
God
wills
to
be
effected
is
in fact
effected,
but
also
that
what
He
wills
to
be
effected
contingently
or
wills
to
be
effected
necessarily
is
indeed
effected
in
that
way.
Reply
to
objection
3:
What
is
posterior
has
its
necessity
from
what
is
prior
according
to
the
mode
of
that
prior
thing.
Hence,
the
things
effected
by
God’s
will
have
necessity
of
the
sort
that
God
wills
them
to
have,
viz.,
either
absolute
necessity
or
merely
conditional
necessity.
And
so
not
all
of
them
are
absolutely
necessary.
Article
9
Does
God
will
evils?
It
seems
that
God
wills
evils:
Objection
1:
God
wills
every
good
that
is
effected.
But
it
is
good
that
evils
should
be
effected;
for
in the
Enchiridion
Augustine
says,
“Even
though
evils,
insofar
as
they
are
evil,
are
not
good,
nonetheless,
it
is
good
not
only
that
there
should
be
goods, but
also
that
there
should
be
evils.”
Therefore,
God
wills
evils.
Objection
2:
In
De
Divinis
Nominibus,
chap.
4,
Dionysius
says
that
evil
will
contribute
to
the
perfection
of
everything
(i.c.,
of
the
universe).
And
in
the
Enchiridion
Augustine
says,
“All
things
are
part
of
the
admirable
beauty
of
the
universe,
so
that
even
what
is
called
evil
makes
the
good
things
stand
out
more
prominently
when
it
is
correctly
ordered
and
put
in
its
proper
place.
For
the
good
things
are
more
pleasing
and
more
laudable
when
they
are
compared
to
the
evils.”
But
God
wills
everything
that
pertains
to
the
perfection
and
beauty
of
the
universe,
since
it
is
this
perfection
and
beauty
that
God
wills
most
of
all
in
creatures.
Therefore,
God
wills
evils.
Objection
3:
That
evils
be
effected
and
that
evils
not
be
effected
are
opposed
as
contradictories.
But
God
does
not
will
that
evils
not
be
effected;
for
since
some
evils
are
in fact
effected,
it
would
follow
that
God’s
will
is
not
always
fulfilled.
Therefore,
God
wills
that
evils
be
effected.
But
contrary
to
this:
In
83
Quaestiones
Augustine
says,
“A
man
becomes
worse
when
he
has
no
wise
man
to
guide
him.
But
God
is
more
excellent
than
any
wise
man.
Therefore,
when
God
is
guiding
him,
a
man
will
all
the
less
become
worse.
But
‘when
God
is
guiding’
is
equivalent
to
‘when
God
wills’.”
Therefore,
it
is
not
the
case
that
when
God
wills,
a
man
becomes
worse.
But
it
is
clear
that
something
is
made
worse
by
every
evil.
Therefore,
God
does
not
will
evils.
Lrespond:
Since,
as
was
explained
above
(q.
5,
a.
1),
the nature
of
the
good
is
the
nature
of
what
is
desirable,
whereas
evil
is
opposed
to
good,
it
is
impossible
that
any
evil,
as
such,
should
be
desired
either
by
a
natural
desire
or
by
an
animal
desire
or
by
an
intellective
desire,
ie,
by
the
will.
However,
an
evil
may
be
desired
per
accidens
to
the
extent
that
it
follows
upon
some
good.
This
is
evident
with
every
kind
of
desire.
For
a
natural
agent
does
not
desire
privation
or
corruption;
rather,
it
QUESTION
20
God’s
Love
Next
we
have
to
consider
those
things
that
pertain
to
God’s
will
absolutely
speaking.
Now
in
the
appetitive
part
of
our
soul
we
find
both
(a)
the
passions
of
the
soul,
e.g.,
joy,
love,
etc.,
and
also
(b)
the
habits
of
the
moral
virtues,
e.g.,
justice,
fortitude,
etc.
Hence,
we
will
first
consider
Gad’s
love
(question
20)
and,
second,
Gad’s
justice
and
His
mercy
(question
21).
On
the
topic
of
God’s
love
there
are
four
questions:
(1)
Is
there
love
in
God?
(2)
Does
God
love
all
things?
(3)
Does
God
love
one
thing
more
than
another?
(4)
Does
God
love
better
things
more?
Article
1
Is
there
love
in
God?
It
seems
that
there
is
no
love
(amor)
in
God:
Objection
1:
There
are
no
passions
in
God.
Love
is
a
passion.
Therefore,
there
is
no
love
in
God.
Objection
2:
Love,
anger,
sadness,
etc.,
fall
under
the
same
classification.
But
sadness
and
anger
ate
not
predicated
of
God
except
metaphorically.
Therefore,
neither
is
love
predicated
of
God
except
metaphorically.
Objection
3:
In
De
Divinis
Nominibus,
chap.
4,
Dionysius
says,
“Love
is
a
unitive
and
coalescent
force.”
But
there
cannot
be
any
place
for
this
in
God,
since
He
is
simple.
Therefore,
there
is
no
love
in
God.
But
contrary
to
this:
1
John
4:16
says,
“God
is
love
(Deus
caritas
est).”
I
respond:
Love
must be
posited
in
God.
For
love
is
the
first
movement
of
the
will
and
of
any
appetitive
power,
since
an
act
of
will
(or
of
any
appetitive
power)
tends
toward
good
and
evil
as
its
proper
objects.
Since
the
good
is
the
more
principal
and
per
se
object
of
will
and
appetite,
whereas
evil
is
the
secondary
and
per
aliud
object,
insofar
as
it
is
opposed
to
the
good,
it
follows
that
acts
of
will
and
appetite
that
have
to
do
with
the
good
must
be
naturally
prior to
those
that
have
to
do
with
evil.
For
instance,
joy
is
prior
to
sadness,
and
love
is
prior
to
hate.
For
it
is
always
the
case
that
what
is
per
se
is
ptior
to
what
is
per
aliud.
Again,
what
is
more
common
is
naturally
prior;
hence,
it
is
also
the
case
that
the
intellect
is
ordered
toward
truth
in
general
prior
to
being
ordered
to
certain
particular
truths.
Now
there
are
some
acts
of
will
and
appetite
that
have
to
do
with
the
good
under
some
special
condition;
for
instance,
joy
and
pleasure
have
to
do
with
a
good
that
is
present
and
possessed,
whereas
desire
and
hope
have
to
do
with
a
good
that
is
not
yet
possessed.
Love,
on
the
other
hand,
has
to
do
with
the
good
in
general
(bonum
in
communi),
whether
or
not
it
is
possessed.
Hence,
love
is
by
nature
the
first
act
of
will
and
appetite.
Because
of
this,
all
other
appetitive
movements
presuppose
love
as
their
primary
root,
For
no
one
desires
anything
except
a
good
that
is
loved,
and
no
one
takes
joy
in
anything
except
a
good
that
is
loved.
Hate,
too,
is
directed
only
toward
what
is
contrary
to
something
that
is
loved.
Similarly,
it
is
clear
that
sadness
and
the
other
passions
are
traced
back
to
love
as
their
first
source.
Hence,
there
must
be
love
in
any
being
that
has
will
or
appetite.
For
when
what
is
first
is
removed,
everything
else
is
removed
as
well.
Now
it
was
shown
above
(q.
19,
a.
1)
that
there
is
a
will in
God.
Hence,
it
is
necessary
to
posit
love
in
Him.
Reply
to
objection
1:
A
cognitive
power
effects
a
movement
only
by
the
mediation
of
an
appetitive
power.
And
just
as,
according
to
De
Anima
3,
a
universal
notion
effects
movement
in
us
by
the
mediation
of
a
particular
notion,
so
too
the
intellective
appetite,
which
is
called
the
will,
effects
Part
1,
Question
20
173
movement
in
us
by
the
mediation
of
the
sentient
appetite.
Hence,
the
sentient
appetite
is
the
proximate
mover
of
the
body
in
us.
Thus,
it
is
always
the
case
that
an
act
of
the
sentient
appetite
is
accompanied
by
some
bodily
change—especially
near
the
heart,
which
is
the
first
principle
of
movement
in
an
animal.
So,
then,
insofar
as
they
have
a
bodily
change
conjoined
to
them,
acts
of
the
sentient appetite
are
called
passions,
but
not
acts
of
willing.
Therefore,
love,
joy,
and
pleasure
are
passions
insofar
as
these
terms
signify
acts
of
the
sentient
appetite—but
not
insofar
as
they
signify
acts
of
the
intellective
appetite.
And
it
is
as
acts
of
the
intellective
appetite
that
they
are
posited
in
God.
Hence,
in
Ethics
7
the
Philosopher
says,
“God
rejoices
by
a
single
and
simple
operation.”
And,
for
the
same
reason,
He
loves
in
the
absence
of
any
passion.
Reply
to
objection
2:
In
the
passions
of
the
sentient
appetite
there
is,
as
it
were,
something
material
to
consider,
viz.,
the
bodily
change,
and
also,
as
it
were,
something
formal,
i.e.,
something
on
the
part
of
the
appetite.
For
instance,
as
De
Anima
|
says,
in
the
case
of
anger
the
material
element
is
the
heating
of
the
blood
around
the
heart
or
something
of
that
sort,
whereas
the
formal
element
is
the
desire
for
vindication.
‘Then
again,
some
of
the
passions
involve
an
imperfection
on
the
part
of
the
formal
element.
For
instance,
desire
has
to
do
with
a
good
that
is
not
yet
possessed,
and
sadness
has
to
do
with
an
evil
that
is
already
possessed.
And
the
same
holds
for
anger,
which
presupposes
sadness.
On
the
other
hand,
some
of
them,
e.g.,
love
and
joy,
involve
no
imperfection.
‘As
has
been
said,
none
of
them
belongs
to
God
with
respect
to
what
is
material
in
them.
Again,
as
was
explained
above
(q.
3,
a.
2
and
q,
19,
a.
11),
those
which
also
imply
an
imperfection
in
their
formal
element
cannot
belong
to
God
except
metaphorically,
because
of
a
likeness in
their
effects.
However,
those
that
do
not
imply
an
imperfection,
e.g.,
love
and
joy,
can
be
properly
predicated
of
God—though,
as
has
been
explained,
without
any
passion.
Reply
to
objection
3:
An
act
of
love
always
tends
toward
two
things,
viz.,
(a)
the
good
that
one
wills
for
someone
and
(b)
the
one
to
whom
he
wills
this
good.
For
to
love
someone,
properly
speaking,
is
to
will
the
good
for
him.
Hence,
for
someone
to
love
himself
is
for
him
to
will
a
good
for
himself,
and
thus
he
seeks
to
unite
that
good
to
himself
as
far
he
is
able
to.
It
is
for
this
reason
that
love
is
called
a
unitive
force
even
in
the
case
of
God—yet
without
composition.
For
the
good
that
He
wills
for
Himself
is
none
other
than
Himself,
who
is
good
through
His
essence,
as
was
shown
above
(q.
6,
a.
3).
Now
for
someone
to
love
another
is
for
him
to
will
a
good
for
that
other.
And
in
this
sense
he
treats
the
other
as
himself,
rendering
good
to
the
other
as
to
himself.
And
it
is
for
this
reason
that
love
is
called
a
coalescing
force.
For
he
gathers
the
other
to
himself,
rendering
to
the
other
as
he
renders
to
himself.
And
it
is
also
in
this
sense
that
God’s
love
is
a
coalescent
force,
existing
in
God
without
composition,
insofar
as
He
wills
goods
to
others.
Article
2
___
Does
God
love
all
things?
It
seems
that
God
does
not
love
all
things:
Objection
1:
According
to
Dionysius
in
De
Divinis
Nominibus,
chap.
4,
love
places
the
lover
outside
of
himself
and
in
a
sense
transports
him
into
what
he
loves.
But
it
is
absurd
to
claim
that
God
is
placed
outside
of
Himself
and
transported
into
other
things.
Therefore,
it
is
absurd
to
claim
that
God
loves
things
distinct
from
Himself.
Objection
2:
God’s
love
is
eternal.
But
things
distinct
from
God
do
not
exist
from
eternity
except
Part
1,
Question
20
174
within
God,
Therefore,
God
does
not
love
them
except
within
Himself.
But
insofar
as
they
exist
within
Him,
they
are
not
distinct
from
Him.
Therefore,
God
does
not
love
things
distinct
from
Himself.
Objection
3:
There
are
two
kinds
of
love,
love
of
concupiscence
(amor
concupiscentiae)
and
love
of
friendship
(amor
amicitiae).
But
God
does
not
love
non-rational
creatures
with
a
love
of
concupiscence,
since
He
does
not
need
anything
besides
Himself.
Nor
does
He
love
them
with
a
love
of
friendship,
since,
as
is
clear
from
the
Philosopher
in
Ethics
8,
such
love
cannot
be
had
for
non-rational
beings.
Therefore,
God
does
not
love
all
things.
Objection
4:
Psalm
5:7
says,
“You
hate
all
the
workers
of
iniquity.”
But
nothing
can
be
both
hated
and
loved
at
the
same
time..
Therefore,
God
does
not
love
all
things.
But
contrary
to
this:
Wisdom
11:25
says,
“For
You
love
all
things
that
are,
and
hate
none
of
the
things
which
You
have
made.”
Irespond:
God
loves
all
the
things
that
exist.
For
all
existing
things
are
good
insofar
as
they
exist,
since
the
very
esse
of
each
thing
is
a
certain
good,
as are
each
of
its
perfections.
Now
it
was
shown
above
(q.
19,
a.
4)
that
God’s
will
is
a
cause
of
all
things,
and
so
to
the
extent
that
a
thing
is
willed
by
God,
it
must
have
some
sort
of
esse
or
some
sort
of
goodness.
Therefore,
God
wills
some
good
to
each
thing
that
exists.
Thus,
since
to
love
is
nothing
other
than
to
will
some
good
to
some
existing
thing,
it
is
clear
that
God
loves
all
the
things
that
exist.
However,
He
does
not
love
them
in
the
same
way
that
we
ourselves
do.
For
since
our
own
will
is
not a
cause
of
the
goodness
of
things,
but
is
instead
moved
by
their
goodness
as
by
an
object,
it
follows
that
the
love
by
which
we
will
some
good
to
a
thing
is
not
a
cause
of
its
very
goodness.
To
the
contrary,
the
thing’s
goodness,
whether
real
or
apparent
(vel
vera
vel
aestimata),
induces
the
love
by
which
we
will
that
the
good
had
by
the
thing
should
be
preserved
and
that
the
good
lacked
by
it
should
be
added
to
it~and
we
act
accordingly.
God’s
love,
by
contrast,
is
a
love
that
pours
out
and
creates
the
goodness
in
things.
Reply
to
objection
1:
A
lover
is
transported
outside
of
himself
into
the
thing
that
is
loved
in
the
sense
that
he
wills
the
good
for
the
thing
loved
and
by
his
providence
cares for
that
thing
as
for
himself.
Hence,
in
De
Divinis
Nominibus,
chap.
4,
Dionysius
says,
“One
should
dare
to
say—and
take
as
the
truth—that
even
He
who
is
the
cause
of
all
things,
through
the
abundance
of
His
loving
goodness,
goes
outside
of
Himself
in
exercising
His
providence
over
all
the
things
that
exist.”
Reply
to
objection
2:
Even
though
creatures
did
not
exist
from
eternity
except
within
God,
nonetheless,
by
the
fact
that
things
existed
from
eternity
in
God,
God
knew
them
from
eternity
in
their
proper
natures
and
loved
them
in
the
same
way.
Similarly,
it
is
through
the
likenesses
of
things
existing
in
us
that
we
ourselves
likewise
know
the
things
that
exist
in
themselves.
Reply
to
objection
3:
Friendship
can
be
had
only
with
rational
creatures,
who
are
able
to
return
love
and
to
share
in
the
works
of
life,
and
for
whom
things
can
turn
out
well
or
badly
with
respect
to
fortune
and
happiness.
In
the
same
way,
it
is
to
such
creatures
that
benevolence,
properly
speaking,
is
~~
directed.
—
—_
-—-
--
—~
—
-
one
—
.
en
a
Non-rational
creatures,
on
the
other
hand,
cannot
attain
to
loving
God
or
to
sharing
the
intellectual
and
happy
life
that
God
lives.
So,
then,
God
does
not,
properly
speaking,
love
non-rational
creatures
with
a
love
of
friendship.
Rather,
He
loves
them
with
something
like
alove
of
concupiscence
to
the
extent
that
He
orders
them
toward
rational
creatures
as
well
as
toward
Himself—not
in
the
sense
that
He
needs
them,
but
for
the
sake
of His
own
goodness
and
for
our
advantage.
For
we
ourselves
desire
(concupiscimus)
things
for
others
as
well
as
for
ourselves.
Reply
to
objection
4:
Nothing
prevents
one and
the
same
thing
from
being
loved
in
one
respect
and
hated
in
another.
Now
God
loves
sinners
insofar
as
they
are
certain
natures;
for
as
such
they
exist
and
are
from
Himself.
On
the
other
hand,
insofar
as
they
are
sinners,
they
do
not
exist
but
instead
are
Part
1,
Question
20
175
deficient
in
esse—a
condition
that
is
not
in
them
because
of
God.
Hence,
in
this
respect
He
hates
them.
Article
3
Does
God
love
one
thing
more
than
another?
It
seems
that
God
loves
all
things
equally:
Objection
1:
Wisdom
6:8
says,
“
He
cares
equally
for
all
things.”
But
the
providence
that
God
has
for
things
stems
from
the
love
by
which
He
loves
them.
Therefore,
God
loves
all
things
equally.
Objection
2:
God’s
love
is
His
essence.
But
God’s
essence
does
not
admit
of
more
and
less.
Therefore,
neither
does
His
love.
Therefore,
it
is
not
the
case
that
He
loves
some
things
more
than
others.
Objection
3:
God’s
love
reaches
out
to
created
things
in
the
same
way
that
His
knowledge
and
will
do.
But
God
is
not
said
to
know
or
to
will
some
things
more
than
others.
Therefore,
neither
does
He
love
some
things
more
than
others.
But
contrary
to
this:
In
Super
Ioannem
Augustine
says,
“God
loves
all
the
things
that
He
has
made;
and
among
these
things
He
loves
rational
creatures
more;
and
among
rational
creatures
He
loves
more
fully
those
who
are
members
of
His
only-begotten;
and
He
loves
His
only-begotten
much
more.”
Lrespond:
Since
to
love
is
to
will
a
good
for
something,
there
are
two
ways
in
which
a
thing
can
be
loved
to
a
greater
or
lesser
degree:
First,
on
the
part
of
the
very
act
of
the
will,
which
can be
more
or
less
intense.
And
in
this
sense
God
does
not
love
some
things
more
than
others,
since
He
loves
all
things
by
the
single
and
simple
act
of
His
will,
which
always
remains
the
same
(semper
eodem
modo
se
habente).
.
.
Second,
on
the
part
of
the
good
that
one
wills
for
the
thing
loved.
Thus,
we
are
said
to
love
someone
more
than
another
because
we
will
him
a
greater
good—even
if
we
do
not
love
him
with
a
more
intense
act
of
will.
And
in
this
sense
one
must
claim
that
God
loves
some
things
more
than
others.
For
since,
as
has
been
explained
(a.
2),
God’s
love
is
the
cause
of
goodness
in
things,
one
thing
would
not
be
better
than
another
if
God
did
not
will
a
greater
good
to
the
one
than
to
the
other.
Reply
to
objection
1:
God
is
said
to
care
equally
for
all
things
not
because
He
gives
equal
goods
to
all
things
in
exercising
His
care
for
them,
but
because
He
administers
all
things
with
equal
wisdom
and
goodness.
Reply
to
objection
2:
This
argument
has
to
do
with
the
intensity
of
love
on
the
part
of
the
act
of
will,
which
is
God’s
essence.
However,
the
good
that
God
wills
for
a
creature
is
not
the
divine
essence.
Hence,
nothing
prevents
that
good from
being
greater
or
less.
Reply
to
objection
3:
‘To
understand’
and
‘to
will’
signify
only
the
acts
and
do
not
include
in
their
signification
any
objects
in
virtue
of
whose
differences
God
might
be
said
to
know
them
or
to
will
them
to
a
greater
or
lesser
degree.
By
contrast,
as
has
been
explained,
this
is
indeed
the
case
with
love.
——
Article
4
_
_
—
—
nee
Does
God
love
better
things
more?
It
seems
that
God
does
not
always
love
better
things
more:
Objection
1:
It is
clear
that
Christ
is
better
than
the
whole
human
race,
since
He
is
God
and
man.
But
God
loves
the
human
race
more
than
Christ;
for
Romans
8:32
says,
“He
spared
not
even
His
own
Part
1,
Question
20 176
Son,
but
delivered
Him
up
for
us
all.”
Therefore,
God
does
not
always
love
better
things
more.
Objection
2:
An
angel
is
better
than
a
man;
thus,
Psalm
8:6
says,
“You
have
made
him
little
less
than
the
angels.”
But
God
loves
men
more
than
angels;
for
Hebrews
2:16
says,
“Nowhere
does
He
take
hold
of
the
angels,
but
of
the
seed of
Abraham
He
takes
hold.”
Therefore,
God
does
not
always
love
better
things
more.
Objection
3:
Peter
was
better
than
John, since
he
loved
Christ
more.
Hence,
the
Lord,
knowing
that
this
was
true,
asked
Peter,
“Simon
son
of
John,
do
you
love
me
more
than
these?”
(John
21:15).
Yet
Christ
loved
John
more
than
Peter;
for
as
Augustine
says
in
commenting
on John
21:15
(“Simon,
son
of
John,
do
you
love
me?”),
“John
was
set
off
from
the
other
disciples
not
because
Christ
loved
him
alone,
but
because
he
loved
him
more
than
the
others.”
Therefore,
it
is
not
the
case
that
God
always
loves
better
things
more.
Objection
4:
Someone
who
is
blameless
is
better
than
someone
who
repents
(melior
est
innocens
poenitente);
for,
as
Jerome
says,
“Repentance
is
the
second
plank,
after
the
shipwreck.”
But
God
loves
the
one
who
repents
more
than
the
blameless,
since
He
rejoices
more
over
him;
for
as
Luke
15:7
says,
“T
say
to
you
that
even
so
there
shall
be
joy
in
heaven
upon
one
sinner
that
repents,
more
than
upon
ninety-nine
just
who
need
not
repentance.”
Therefore,
God
does
not
always
love
better
things
more.
Objection
5:
A
just
man
who
is
such
that
it
is
foreknown
that
he
will
be
damned
(praescitus)
is
now
better
than
a
sinner
who
is
predestined
to
glory
(praedestinatus).
But
God
loves
the
predestined
sinner
more,
since
He
wills
him
a
greater
good,
viz.,
eternal
life.
Therefore,
God
does
not
always
love
better
things
more.
But
contrary
to
this:
Each
thing
loves
what
is
similar
to
itself;
for
as
Ecclesiasticus
13:19
says,
“Every
beast
loves
its
like.”
But
the
more
similar
a
thing
is
to
God,
the
better
it
is.
Therefore,
better
things
are
loved
more
by
God.
..
respond:
On
the
basis
of
what
was
said
above
(a.
3),
one
must
claim
that
God
loves
better
things
more.
For
it
was
explained
that
for
God
to
love
a
thing
more
is
nothing
other
than
for
Him
to
will
that
thing
a
greater
good,
since
God’s
will
is
the
cause
of
goodness
in
things.
And
so
the
reason
why
some
things
are
better
is
that
God
wills
a
greater
good
for
them,
And
from
this
it
follows
that
He
loves
them
more.
Reply
to
objection
1:
God
loves
Christ
not
only
more
than
the
whole
human
race,
but
even
more
than
the
whole
universe
of
creatures.
For
He
willed
him
a
greater
good,
since
He
gave
him
the
name
that
is
above
every
name,
so
that
he
was
true
God.
Nor
does
it
diminish
his
excellence
that
God
gave
him
over
to
death
for
the
salvation
of
the
human
race.
To
the
contrary,
by
this
very
fact
he
became
a
glorious
victor.
For
as
Isaiah
9:6
says,
“The
government
is
upon
his
shoulder.”
Reply
to
objection
2:
According
to
what
has
been
said,
God
loves
the
human
nature
assumed
by
the
Word
of
God
in
the
person
of
Christ
more
than
all
the
angels,
and
that
human
nature
is
better
than
all
the
angels,
especially
because
of
its
union
with
God.
However,
if
we
are
talking
about
human
nature
in
general
and
comparing
it
to
the
nature
of
an
angel,
then
they
are
equal
in
the
order
of
grace
and
glory,
since,
as
Apocalypse
21:17
says,
the
measure
of
man
is
the
same
as
the
measure
of
an
angel—though
in
such
a
way
that
some
angels
are
better
than
__
some
men
and
some
men
are
better
than
some
angels.
—
.
-
a
On
the
other
hand,
as
far
as
the
status
of
the
natures
is
concerned,
an
angel
is
better
than
aman.
For
God
assumed
a
human
nature
not
because
He
loved
man
more,
absolutely
speaking,
but
because
man
needed
it
more.
In
the
same
way,
a
good
father
of
a
household
might
give
something
very
costly
to
a
sick
servant
that
he
does
not
give
to
his
healthy
son.
Reply
to
objection
3:
This
question
about
Peter
and
John
has
been
answered
in
many
ways.
Augustine
calls
it
a
mystery.
He
claims
that
the
active
life,
signified
by
Peter,
loves
God
more
than
Part
1,
Question
20
177
the
contemplative
life,
signified
by
John,
since
the
active
life
is
more
aware
of
the
tribulations
of
the
ptesent
life
and
desires
more
ardently
to
be
liberated
from
them
and
to
go
to
God.
However,
God
loves
the
contemplative
life
more,
since
He
conserves
it
for
a
longer
time;
for
it
does
not
end
with
the
end
of
our
bodily
life
in
the
way
that
the
active
life
does.
On
the
other
hand,
there
are
those
who
claim
that
Peter
loved
Christ
more
in
His
members,
and
in
this
regard
he
was
also
loved
more by
Christ,
who
for
this
reason
entrusted
the
Church
to
him.
By
contrast,
John
loved
Christ
more
in
Himself,
and
in
this
regard
he
was
also
loved
more
by
Christ,
who
for
this
reason
entrusted
His
mother
to
him.
Others
claim
that
(a)
it
is
uncertain
which
of
the
two
loved
Christ
more
with
the
love
of
charity
and,
similarly,
that
(b)
it
is
uncertain
which
one
God
loved
more
as
regards
a
greater
degree
of
the
glory
of
eternal
life.
However,
Peter
is
said
to
have
loved
Christ
more
because
of
his
promptitude
or
fervor,
whereas
John
is
said
to
have
been
loved
more
because
of
the
signs
of
familiarity
that
Christ
showed
to
him
in
virtue
of
his
youthfulness
and
purity.
Still
others
claim
that
Christ
loved
Peter
more
because
of
his
more
excellent
gift
of
charity,
but
that
He
loved
John
more
because
of
his
more
excellent
gift
of
understanding.
Hence,
Peter
was
better
and
more
loved
absolutely
speaking,
whereas
John
was
better
and
more
loved
in
a
certain
respect.
However,
it
seems
presumptuous
to
adjudicate
this
matter,
since,
as
Proverbs
16:2
says,
the
Lord,
and
no
other,
is
the
weigher
of
spirits.
Reply
to
objection
4:
The
penitents
and
the
blameless
are
related
as that
which
exceeds
and
that
which
is
exceeded.
For
the
ones
who
are
better
and
more
loved
are
those
who
have
more
grace,
regardless
of
whether
they
are
righteous
or
repentant,
However,
all
other
things
being
equal,
blamelessness
is
more
worthy
and
more
loved.
Yet
God
is
said
to
rejoice
more
over
the
one
who
repents
than
the
one
who
is
blameless
because
oftentimes
when
those
who
repent
come
back,
they
are
more
circumspect,
more
humble,
and
more
fervent.
Hence,
in
commenting
on
this
passage,
Gregory
says,
“In
battle
the
commander
has
a
greater
love
for
the
soldier
who
turned
back
after
fleeing
and
bravely
fought
the
enemy
than
for
the
soldier
who
never
fled
but
also
never
acted
courageously.”
An
alternative
explanation
is
that
an
equal
gift
of
grace
counts
for more
in
relation
to
the
penitent,
who
deserved
punishment,
than
in
relation
to
the
blameless,
who
did
not
merit
punishment—just
as
a
hundred
pieces
of
gold
constitute
a
greater
gift
when
given
to
a
poor
man
than
when
given
to
a
king.
Reply
to
objection
5:
Since
God’s
will
is
the
cause
of
the
goodness
in
things,
one
has
to
measure
the
goodness
of
someone
loved
by
God
with
reference
to
the
time
at
which
a
relevant
good
is
to
be
given
to
him
by
God’s
goodness.
Therefore,
at
the
time
at
which
the
predestined
sinner
is
to
be
given
a
greater
good
by
God’s
will,
he
is
better,
even
though
he
might
be
worse
at
some
other
time.
For
there
is
also
a
time
at
which
he
is
neither
good
nor
bad.
QUESTION
21
God’s
Justice
and
Mercy
Now
that
we
have
considered
God’s
love,
we
have
to
discuss
His
justice
and
mercy.
On
this
topic
there
are
four
questions:
(1)
Is
there
justice
in
God?
(2)
Can
God’s
justice
be
called
truth?
(3)
Is
there
mercy
in
God?
(4)
Do
justice
and
mercy
exist
in
every
work
of
God?
Article
1
Is
there
justice
in
God?
It
seems
that
there
is
no
justice
in
God
(in
Deo
non
sit
iustitia):
Objection
1:
Justice
and
temperance
fall
under
the
same
classification.
But
temperance
does
not
exist
in
God,
Therefore,
neither
does
justice.
Objection
2:
If
someone
does
all
things
at
the
pleasure
of
his
own
will
(facit
omnia
pro
libito
suae
voluntatis),
then
he
does
not
act
in
accord
with
justice.
But
in
Ephesians
1:11
the
Apostle
says
that
God
“works
all
things
according
to
the
counsel
of
His
will”
Therefore,
justice
should
not
be
attributed
to
God.
Objection
3:
The
act
of
justice
is
to
render
a
debt.
But
God
is
a
debtor
to
no
one.
Therefore,
justice
does
not
belong
to
God.
Objection
4:
Whatever
exists
in
God
is
His
essence.
But
justice
cannot
be
God’s
essence;
for
in
De
Hebdomadibus
Boethius
says,
“The
good
has
to
do
with
essence,
whereas
the
just
has
to
do
with
action.”
Therefore,
justice
does
not
belong
to
God.
But
contrary
to
this:
Psalm
10:8
says,
“The
Lord
is
just,
and
has
loved
justice.”
T
respond:
There
are
two
types
of
justice.
The
first
has
to
do
with
mutual
giving
and
receiving—as,
for
instance,
the
giving
and
receiving
involved
in
buying
and
selling
and
in
other
types
of
trades
or
exchanges.
In
Ethics
5the
Philosopher
calls this
commutative
justice,
ie.,
justice
that
directs
exchanges
or
trades.
This
type
of
justice
does
not
belong
to
God,
since
as
the
Apostle
says
in
Romans
11:35,
“Who
has
first
given
to
Him,
and
recompense
shall
be
made
him?”
The
second
type,
which
consists
in
distribution,
is
called
distributive
justice,
whereby
a
ruler
or
manager
gives
to
each
according
to
his
deserts.
Therefore,
just
as
the
appropriate
ordering
of
a
family—or
of
any
governed
group
of
people—exhibits
this
sort
of
justice
in
the
one
who
has
authority
over
it,
so
too
the
order
of
the
universe,
which
is
apparent
in
both
natural
effects
and
voluntary
effects,
exhibits
God’s
justice.
Hence
in
De
Divinis
Nominibus,
chap.
8,
Dionysius,
says,
“God’s
true
justice
must
be
seen
in
the
fact
that
(a)
He
gives
what
is
appropriate
to
all
things
according
to
the
worthiness
of
each
of
the
things
that
exist,
and
that
(b)
He
preserves
the
nature
of each
thing
in
its
own
proper
order
and
with
its
own
proper
powers.”
~
oon
_
.
a
Reply
to
objection
1:
Some
of
the
moral
virtues
have
to
do
with
the
passions.
For
instance,
temperance
(temperantia)
has
to
do
with
sentient
desires,
fortitude
(fortitudo)
has
to
do
with
fear
and
daring,
and
gentleness
(mansuetudo)
has
to
do
with
anger.
Virtues
of
this
sort
cannot belong
to
God
except
metaphorically,
since,
as
was
explained
above
(q.
20,
a.
1),
in
God
there
are
no
passions;
moreover,
in
God
there
is
no
sentient
appetite,
which,
according
to
the
Philosopher
in
Ethics
3,
is
the
subject
in
which
virtues
of
this
sort
exist.
On
the
other
hand,
some
moral
virtues
have
to
do
with
actions;
for
instance,
justice
and
generosity
(liberalitas)
and
magnificence
(magnificentia)
have
to
do
with
giving
and
taking.
These
virtues
exist
not
in
the
sentient
part
of
the
soul,
but
in
the
will,
Hence,
nothing
prevents
virtues
of
this
sort
from
being
Part
1,
Question
21
posited
in
God—yet
not
with
respect
to
civic
actions,
but
rather
with
respect
to
actions
that
are
appropriate
for
God.
For,
as
the
Philosopher
says
in
Ethics
10,
it
would
be
ridiculous
to
praise
God
for
His
political
virtues.
Reply
to
objection
2:
Since
the
object
of
the
will
is
the
good
as
understood,
God
cannot
will
anything
other
than
what
conforms
to
the
measure
of
His
wisdom.
For
the
measure
of
His
wisdom
is,
as
it
were,
the
law
of
justice,
in
accord
with
which
His
will
is
upright
and
just.
Hence,
God
does
justly
whatever
He
does
in
accord
with
His
will,
just
as
we
ourselves
do
justly
whatever
we
do
in
accord
with
the
law.
But
we
act
in
accord
with
a
law
that
is
given
to
us
by
a
superior,
whereas
God
is
alaw
unto
Himself
(Deus
sibi
ipsi
est
lex).
Reply
to
objection
3:
What
is
due
to
each
thing
is
what
is
its
own;
and
what
is
its
own
is
that
which
is
ordered
toward
it,
For
instance,
a
servant
is
his
master’s
own,
and
not
vice
versa,
since
what
is
free
is
master
of
itself.
Therefore,
the
term
‘debt’
implies
that
the
thing
toward
which
the
debt
is
ordered
has
a
certain
need
or
requirement.
Now
we
have
to
take
into
account
two
types
of
orderings
among
things.
The
first
is
that
by
which
one
created
thing
is
ordered
toward
another
created
thing—in
the
way
that
the
parts
are
ordered
toward
the
whole,
and
accidents
toward
substances,
and
each
thing
toward
its
proper
end.
The
second
type
of
ordering
is
that
by
which
all
created
things
are
ordered
toward
God.
Thus,
there
are
two
types
of
debt
that
have
to
be
considered
in
the
case
of
God’s
action:
(a)
what
is
owed
to
God
and
(b)
what
is
owed
to
a
created
thing,
And
God
renders
a
debt
in
both
cases,
For
it
is
owed
to
God
that
what
belongs
to
His
wisdom
and
will,
along
with
what
manifests
His
goodness,
should
be
fulfilled
in
things.
In
this
sense,
God’s
justice
has
to
do
with
His
own
uprightness,
in
accord
with
which
He
renders
to
Himself
what
is
owed
to
Himself.
Moreover,
it
is
owed
to
each
created
thing
that
it
should
have
that
which
is
ordered
toward
it.
For
instance,
it
is
owed
to
man
that
he
should
have
hands
and
that
the
other
animals
should
serve
him.
And
so
God
also
enacts
His
justice
when
He
gives
to
each
thing
what
is
owed
to
it
by
reason
of
its
nature
and
status.
However,
this
second
debt
depends
upon
the
first,
since
each
thing
is
owed
what
is
ordained
for
it
in
the
order
of
God’s
wisdom.
And
even though
God
in
this
sense
renders
a
debt
to
another
thing,
He
is
nonetheless
not
Himself
a
debtor.
For
it
is
not
the
case
that
He
Himself
is
ordered
toward
other
things;
just
the
opposite,
the
other
things
are
ordered
toward
Him.
And
so
justice
in
God
is
sometimes
called
His
conformity
with
His
own
goodness,
whereas
at
other
times
it
is
called
His
recompense
for
what
is
deserved.
Anselm
touches
on
both
these
modes
when
he
says,
“It
is
just
when
You
punish
evildoers,
because
it
corresponds
to
what
they
deserve;
and
it
is
just
when
You
spare
evildoers,
because
it
befits
your
goodness.”
Reply
to
objection
4:
Even
though
justice
has
to
do
with
acts,
it
is
not
thereby
excluded
from
being
God’s
essence.
For
what
belongs
to
a
thing’s
essence
can
also
be
a
principle
of
action.
However,
it
is
not
always
the
case
that
the
good
has
to
do
with
action.
For
something
is
said
to
be
good
not
only
insofar
as
it
acts,
but
also
insofar
as
it
is
perfected
in
its
essence.
This
is
why
Boethius
says
in
the
same
place
that
goodness
is
related
to
justice
as
the
generic
is
related
to
the
specific.
“Artide
2
Can
God’s
justice
be
called
truth?
It
seems
that
God’s
justice
is
not
truth:
Objection
1:
Justice
exists
in
the
will;
for
as
Anselm
says,
justice
is
rectitude
of
the will
But
according
to
the
Philosopher
in
Metaphysics
6
and
Ethics
6,
truth
exists
in
the
intellect.
Therefore,
179
Part
1,
Question
21
180
justice
does
not
pertain
to
truth.
Objection
2:
According
to
the
Philosopher
in
Ethics
4,
truth
(veritas)
is
a
certain
virtue
distinct
from
justice.
Therefore,
truth
does
not
pertain
to
the
nature
of
justice.
But
contrary
to
this:
Psalm
84:11
says,
“Mercy
and
truth
have
met
each
other.”
And
‘truth’
is
here
being
used
for
justice.
I
respond:
As
was
explained
above
(q.
16,
a.
1),
truth
consists
in
a
correspondence
between
the
intellect
and
reality
(veritas
consistit
in
adaequatione
intellectus
et
rei).
Now
an
intellect
that
is
acause
of
the
relevant
real
thing
is
related
to
it
as
a
rule
and
measure,
whereas
the
converse
holds
in
the
case
of
an
intellect
that
takes
its
scientific
knowledge
from
the
things.
Thus,
when,
as
happens
with
us,
the
things
are
the
measure
and
rule
of
the
intellect,
then
truth
consists
in
the
intellect’s
corresponding
to
the
thing.
For
it
is
because
reality
is
or
is
not
such-and-such
that
our
opinions
and
statements
are
true
or
false.
By
contrast,
when
the
intellect
is
the
rule
or
measure
of
the
things,
then
truth
consists
in
the
thing’s
corresponding
to
the
intellect.
So,
for
instance,
the
craftsman
is
said
to
produce
a
true
work
when
that
work
agtees
with
his
craft,
Now
just
actions
are
related
to
the
law
with
which
they
accord
as
artifacts
are
related
to
their
craft,
Therefore,
God’s
justice,
which
establishes
among
things
the
order
that
conforms
to
the
measure
of
His
wisdom,
i.e.,
His
law,
is
appropriately
called
‘truth’.
And
this
is
why,
even
among
us,
one
speaks
of
the
truth
of
justice.
Reply
to
objection
1:
With
respect
to
the
/aw
that
regulates,
justice
exists
in
reason
or
in
the
intellect,
but
with
respect
to
the
command
by
which
actions
are
regulated
in
accord
with
the
law,
justice
exists
in
the
will.
Reply
to
objection
2:
The
‘truth’
of
which
the
Philosopher
is
speaking
here
is
a
certain
virtue
by
which
someone’s
words
and
deeds
reveal
what
he
is
really
like.
And
so
it
consists
in
the
conformity
of
a
sign
to
the
thing
signified—and
not,
as
has
been
said
about
the
truth
of
justice,
in
the
conformity
of
an
effect
to
its
cause
and
its
rule.
Article
3
Is
there
mercy
in
God?
It
seems
that
mercy
or
pity
(misericordia)
does
not
belong
to
God:
Objection
1:
As
Damascene
says,
mercy
is
a
species
of
sadness.
But
sadness
does
not
exist
in
God.
Therefore,
neither
does
mercy.
Objection
2:
Mercy
is
a
relaxation
of
justice.
But
God
cannot
omit
what
pertains
to
His
justice.
For
as
2
Timothy
2:13
says,
“If
we
believe
not,
He
continues
faithful,
He
cannot
deny
Himself,”
and
as
a
Gloss
says
in
the
same
place,
He
would
be
denying
Himself
if
He
denied
His
own
dictates.
Therefore,
-
mercy
does
not
belong
to
God.
But
contrary
to
this:
Psalm
110:4
says,
“He
is
a
merciful
and
gracious
Lord.”
L
respond:
Mercy
must
especially
be
attributed
to
God—though
according
to
its
effect
and
not
according
to
the
affective
element
in
the
passion.
To
see
this
clearly,
note
that
someone
is
called
merciful
(misericors)
when
he
has,
as
it
were, a
saddened
heart
(miserum
cor)—viz.,
because
he
is
affected
with
sadness
at
the
misery
(miseria)
of
another
as
if
it
were
his
own
misery.
And
from
this
it
follows
that
he
acts
to
dispel
the
other’s
misery
as
his
own
misery,
and
this
is
the
effect
of
mercy.
Thus,
to
be
saddened
at
the
misery
of
another
does
not
belong
to
God,
but
it
does
especially
belong
Part
1,
Question
21
181
to
Him
to
dispel
another’s
misery,
insofar
as
we
mean
by
‘misery’
any
sort
of
defect.
But
defects
are
removed
only
through
the
perfection
of
some
type
of
goodness,
and,
as
was
shown
above
(q.
6.,
a.
4),
the
first
source
of
goodness
is
God.
Note,
however,
that
the
distribution
of
perfections
to
things
pertains—though
under
different
concepts—to
God’s
goodness
and
to
His
justice
and
to
His
generosity
(Jiberalitas)
and
to
His
mercy.
For,
as
was
shown
above
(a.
6,
a.
1
and
4),
the
communication
of
perfections,
considered
absolutely,
pertains
to
God’s
goodness.
However,
as
was
noted
just
above
(a,
1),
it
pertains
to
God’s
justice
that
perfections
are
given
to
things
by
God
in
a
way
that
is
appropriate
to
them.
On
the
other
hand,
it
pertains
to
His
generosity
that
He
grants
perfections
to
things
not
for
His
own
advantage,
but
solely
because
of
His
goodness.
Finally,
it
pertains
to
God’s mercy
that
the
perfections
given
by
Him
to
things
expel
every
sort
of
defect.
Reply
to
objection
1:
This
objection
argues
from
mercy’s
affective
element
as
a
passion
Reply
to
objection
2:
God
acts
mercifully
not
by
doing
anything
contrary
to
His
justice,
but
by
doing
something
that
goes
beyond
His
justice,
In
the
same
way,
if
one
gives
two
hundred
denarii
of
his
own
money
to
someone
who
is
owed
one
hundred
denarii,
then
he
is
acting
generously
or
mercifully
and
not
contrary
to
justice.
The
same
thing
holds
if
someone
forgives
an
offense
committed
against
himself.
For
in
forgiving
this
debt,
he
is
in
a
certain
sense
making
a
gift
of
it;
hence,
in
Ephesians
4:32
the
Apostle
calls
forgiveness
a
‘gift’:
“Make
a
gift
to
one
another,
just
as
Christ
has
made
a
gift
to
you.”
From
this
it
is
clear
that
mercy,
far
from
destroying
justice,
is
a
certain
fullness
of
justice.
Hence,
James
2:13
says,
“Mercy
is
exalted
above
judgment.”
Article
4
Do
both
mercy
and
justice
both
exist
in
every
work
of
God?
It
seems
that
mercy
and
justice
do
not
both
exist
in
every
work
of
God:
Objection
1:
Some
of
God’s
works,
¢.g.,
the
justification
of
the
wicked,
are
attributed
to
His
mercy,
whereas
others,
e.g.,
the
damnation
of
the
wicked,
are
attributed
to
His
justice;
hence,
James
2:13
says:
“Judgment
will
come
without
mercy
to
him
that
has
not
done
mercy.”
Therefore,
mercy
and
justice
do
not
both
appear
in
every
work
of
God.
Objection
2:
In
Romans
15:8-9
the
Apostle
attributes
the
conversion
of
the
Jews
to
justice
and
truth,
whereas
he
attributes
the
conversion
of
the
Gentiles
to
mercy.
Therefore,
justice
and
mercy
do
not
both
exist
in
every
work
of
God.
Objection
3:
Many
just
men
are
afflicted
in
this
world.
But
this
is
unjust.
Therefore,
justice
and
mercy
do
not
both
exist
in
every
work
of
God.
Objection
4:
To
render
a
debt
belongs
to
justice,
whereas
to
alleviate
misery
belongs
to
mercy.
And
so
acts
of
both
justice
and
mercy
presuppose
something.
But
creation
does
not
presuppose
anything.
Therefore,
in
the
act
of
creation
there
is
neither
mercy
nor
justice.
But
contrary
to
this:
Psalm
24:10
says:
“All
the
ways
of
the
Lord
are
mercy
and
truth.”
I
respond:
It
is
necessary
for
both
mercy
and
truth
to
be
found
in
every
work
of
God—as
long
as
mercy
is
understood
as
the
removal
of
any
sort
of
defect.
(However,
not
every
defect
can
be
properly
called
‘misery’
(miseria),
since
this
applies
only
to
defects
in
a
rational
nature,
which
is
able
to
be
happy.
For
misery
is
opposed
to
happiness
(felicitas).)
The
reason
for
this
necessity
is
that
since
the
debt
rendered
by
God’s
justice
is
either
a
debt
owed
to
God
or
a
debt
owed
to
some
creature,
neither
of
these
can
be
overlooked
in
any
of
God’s
works.
For
Part
1,
Question
21
182
God
cannot
do
anything
that
conflicts
with
His
wisdom
and
goodness—which
is
the
sense
in
which,
as
we
explained
above
(a. 1),
something
is
owed
to
God.
Similarly,
whatever
God
does
among
created
things,
He
does
with
a
fitting
order
and
proportion—which
is
what
the
nature
of
justice
consists
in.
And
so
it
is
necessary
that
justice
should
exist
in
every
work
of
God.
Moreover,
a
work
of
God’s
justice
always
presupposes,
and
is
founded
upon,
a
work
of
His
mercy.
For
a
creature
is
not
owed
anything
except
because
of
something
that
preexists
or
is
preconceived
in
it.
Again,
if
anything
is
owed
to
a
creature,
this
will
be
because
of
something
prior.
And
since
an
infinite
regress
is
impossible
here,
we
finally
come
down
to
something
which
depends
solely
on
the
goodness
of
God’s
will,
which
is
the
ultimate
end.
So,
for
instance,
we
say
that
having
hands
is
owed
to
man
because
of
his
rational
soul,
and
having
a
rational
soul
is
owed
to
him
because
he
is
man;
but
that
man
should
exist
at
all
is
due
to
God’s
goodness.
And
so
mercy
appears
in
every
work
of
God
as
its
first
source.
For
the
force
of
mercy
is
preserved
in
each
of
the
consequent
things,
and
it
operates
even
more
powerfully
in
them,
in
just
the
way
that
a
first
cause
has
a
more
powerful
influence
than
a
secondary
cause.
For
this
reason,
even
the
things
that
are
owed
to
a
given
creature
are
such
that
God,
out
of
the
abundance
of
His
goodness,
dispenses
them
more
generously
than
is
demanded
by
what
is
fitting
for
the
thing’s
nature.
For
what
would
be
sufficient
to
preserve
the
order
of
justice
is
less
than
what
is
in
fact
conferred
by
God’s
goodness,
which
exceeds
what
is
merely
fitting
for
each
creature.
Reply
to
objection
1:
Some
works
are
attributed
to
God’s
justice
and
others
to
His
mercy
because
justice
appears
more
forcefully
in
some
and
mercy
appears
more
forcefully
in
others.
Yet
mercy
is
apparent
even
in
the
damnation
of
the
reprobate—anot
in
the
sense
that
it
totally
relaxes
justice,
but
in
the
sense
that
it
slackens
it
in
some
way
by
making
the
punishment
less
than
what
is
deserved.
Again,
justice
is
apparent
even
in
the
justification
of
the
wicked,
when
it
remits
sins
because
of
the
love
which
God
Himself
has
mercifully
infused
into
the
sinner—as
we
read
in
Luke
7:47
about
Mary
Magdalene:
“Many
sins
are
forgiven
her,
because
she
has
loved
much.”
Reply
to
objection
2:
Justice
and
mercy
are
apparent
in
the
conversion
of
both
the
Jews
and
the
Gentiles.
However,
in
the
conversion
of
the
Jews
there
is
a
certain
element
of
justice
that
is
not
present
in
the
conversion
of
the
Gentiles,
since
the
Jews
are
saved
because
of
the
promises
made
to
their
fathers.
Reply
to
objection
3:
Justice
and
mercy
both
appear
in
the
fact
that
the
just
are
punished
in
this
world,
For
through
these
afflictions
certain
of
their
inconstancies
are
purged,
and
they
are
instead
directed
away
from
love
for
earthly
things
toward
God.
Accordingly,
Gregory
says,
“The
evils
that
oppress
us
in
this
world
impel
us
to
go
toward
God.”
Reply
to
objection
4:
Even
though
creation
presupposes
nothing
in
the
nature
of
things,
it
nonetheless
presupposes
something
in
God’s
cognition.
Accordingly,
even
in
this
case
the
nature
of
justice
is
preserved,
since
a
thing
is
brought
into
being
insofar
as
this
accords
with
God’s
wisdom
and
goodness.
Likewise,
the
nature
of
mercy
is
in
some
way
preserved
insofar
as
a
thing
passes
from
..
non-being
into
being,
—
oo
co
ee
=
—
QUESTION
22
God’s
Providence
Now
that
we
have
considered
what
pertains
to
God’s
will
absolutely
speaking,
we
must
proceed
to
those
things
that
are
related
to
both
His
intellect
and
will
together.
These
include
providence,
which
is
had
with
respect
to
all
things
(question
22),
as
well
as
predestination
and
reprobation
and
what
follows
upon
them
in
the
order
of
salvation—especially
with
respect
to
human
beings
(questions
23-24).
For
in
moral
science
prudence,
which
clearly
pertains
to
providence,
is
considered
after
the
moral
virtues.
On
the
topic
of
providence
there
are
four
questions:
(1)
Does
providence
exist
in
God?
(2)
Are
all
things
subject
to
God’s
providence?
(3)
Is
God’s
providence
immediate
with
respect
to
all
things?
(4)
Does
God’s
providence
impose
necessity
on
the
things
it
provides
for?
Article
1
Dees
providence
exist
in
God?
It
seems
that
providence
(providentia)
does
not
exist
in
God:
Objection
1:
According
to
Tully,
providence
is
a
part
of
prudence
(pars
prudentiae).
But
since,
according
to
the
Philosopher
in
Ethics
6,
prudence
involves
good
deliberation,
it
cannot
belong
to
God;
for
there
is
nothing
which
God
is
not
sure
about
and
which
He
would
thus
need
to
deliberate
about
(qui
nullum
dubium
habet,
unde
eum
consiliari
oporteat).
Therefore,
providence
does
not
belong
to
God.
Objection
2:
Whatever
exists
in
God
is
eternal.
But
providence
is
not
eternal,
since,
according
to
Damascene,
providence
has
to
do
with
existing
things
that
are
not
themselves
eternal.
Therefore,
providence
does
not
exist
in
God.
Objection
3:
Nothing
composite
exists
in
God.
But
providence
seems
to
be
something
composite,
since
it
includes
within
itself
both
the
will
and
the
intellect.
Therefore,
providence
does
not
exist
in
God.
But
contrary
to
this:
Wisdom
14:3
says,
“But
Your
providence,
O
Father,
governs
all
things.”
Irespond:
It
is
necessary
for
providence
to
be
posited
in
God.
For,
as
has
been
shown
(q.
6,
a.
4),
all
the
good
that
exists
in
things
is
created
by
God.
But
good
is
found
in
things
not
only
with
respect
to
their
substance,
but
also
with
respect
to
their
being
ordered
toward
their
end,
and
most
especially
toward
their
ultimate
end,
which,
as
was
established
above
(q.
21,
a.
4),
is
God’s
goodness.
Therefore,
this
good
of
ordering
that
exists
among
created
things
is
itself
created
by
God.
However,
since
God
is
a
cause
of
things
through
His
intellect,
and
since,
as
is
clear
from
what
was
said
above
(q.
15,
a.
2
and
q.
19,
a.
4),
the
idea
of
each
of
His
effects
must
thus
preexist
in
Him,
it
is
necessary
that
a
plan
for
the
ordering
of
things
to
their
end
should
preexist
in
God’s
mind
(necesse
est
quod
ratio
ordinis
rerum
in
finem
in
mente
divina
praeexistat).
And
this
plan
for
ordering
things
to
their
end
is
providence,
properly
speaking.
For
providence
is
the
principal
part
of
prudence,
and
the
other
two
parts—viz.,
memory
of
what
is
past
and
understanding
of
what
is
present
(memoria
praeteritorum
et
intelligentia
praesentium)—are
ordered
toward
it.
For
it
is
from
the
past
as
remembered
and
the
present
as
understood
that
we
make
inferences
about
future
things
that
have
to
be
provided
for
(coniectamus
de
futuris
providendis).
Now
according
to
the
Philosopher
in
Ethics
6,
it
is
the
role
of
prudence
to
order
other
things
toward
their
end—whether
this
be
(a)
with
respect
to
one’s
own
self,
and
in
this
sense a
prudent
man
is
one
who
skillfully
orders
his
acts
toward
the
goal
of
his
life,
or
(b)
with
respect
to
the
end
of
others
who
are
subject
to
one
in
the
family
or
in
the
city
or
in
the
kingdom,
and
it
is
in
this
sense
that
Matthew
24:45
says,
“...
the
faithful
and
prudent
servant,
whom
his
lord
has
appointed
over
his
family.”
It
is
in
this
second
way
that
prudence
or
providence
can belong
to
God.
For
in
God
Himself
there
is
nothing
that
can
be
ordered
toward
an
end,
since
He
Himself
is
the
ultimate
end.
Part
1,
Question
22
184
Therefore,
it is
this
plan
for
ordering
things
toward
their
end
that
is
called
providence
in
God.
Accordingly,
in
De
Consolatione
Philosophiae
4,
Boethius
says,
“Providence
is
divine
reason
itself,
grounded
in
the
ultimate
ruler
of
all
things,
which
disposes
all
things.”
Now
‘disposition’
can
refer
either
to
a
plan
for
ordering
things
toward
their
end
or
a
plan
for
ordering
the
parts
in
a
whole.
Reply
to
objection
1:
According
to
the
Philosopher
in
Ethics
6,
prudence,
properly
speaking,
gives
commands
about
matters
which
good
deliberation
(euboulia)
has
correctly
inquired
into
and
which
sound
judgment
(sunesis)
has
correctly
passed
judgment
on.
Hence,
even
though
deliberating
does
not
belong
to
God,
given
that
deliberation
involves
inquiry
into
matters
that
one
is
not
sure
about,
nonetheless,
it
does
belong
to
God
that
He
should
issue
commands
about
the
ordering
of
things
toward
their
end,
concerning
which
He
has
‘right
reason’
(recta
ratio)—this,
according
to
Psalm
148:6
(“He
has
made
a
decree,
and
it
shall
not
pass
away.”)
And
this
is
the
sense
in
which
the
nature
of
prudence
and
providence
belongs
to
God.
Moreover,
even
though
one
can
claim
that
the
plan
for
things
to
be
done
may
itself
be
called
‘deliberation’
or
‘counsel’
(consilium)
in
God,
this
will
not
be
because
of
any
sort
of
inquiry
in
God;
instead,
it
will
be
because
of
the
cognitional
certitude
that
all
those
who
deliberate
aim
to
arrive
at
by
means
of
their
inquiry.
Hence,
Ephesians
1:11
says,
“Who
works
all
things
according
to
the
counsel
of
His
will.”
Reply
to
objection
2:
Two
things
are
pertinent
to
care
(pertinent
ad
curam),
viz.,
(a)
the
plan of
the
ordering,
which
is
called
providence
and
disposition,
and
(b)
the
execution
of
that
ordering,
which
is
called
governance.
The
first
of
these
is
eternal,
and
the
second
is
temporal.
Reply
to
objection
3:
Providence
exists
in
the
intellect
but
presupposes
the
willing
of
the
end.
For
one
does
not
give
commands
concerning
what
is
to
be
done
for
the
sake
of an
end
unless
he
has
willed
the
end,
Hence,
prudence
also
presupposes
the
moral
virtues,
through
which
the
appetite
is
ordered
toward
the
good,
as
Ethics
6
says.
Still,
even
if
providence
were
related
equally
to
God’s
will
and
to
His
intellect,
this
would
still
not
compromise
God’s
simplicity.
For,
as
was
explained
above
(q.
19,
a.
1
and
a.
4),
in
God
the
will
and
the
intellect
are
the
same.
.
Article
2
Are
all
things
subject
to
God's
providence?
It
seems
that
not
all
things
are
subject
to
God’s
providence:
Objection
1:
Nothing
that
is
provided
for
is
fortuitous.
Therefore,
if
all
things
are
provided
for
by
God,
then
nothing
will
be
fortuitous,
and
so
there
will
be
no
such
thing
as
chance
or
fortune.
But
this
is
contrary
to
common
opinion.
.-----
~
-
—
—
a
Objection
2:
Every
wise
provider
eliminates
defects
and
evils
as
much
as
possible
from
the
things
that
he
takes
care
of.
But
we
see
that
many
evils
exist
among
things.
Therefore,
either
God
is
unable
to
prevent
them
and
so
is
not
omnipotent,
or
else
He
does
not
have
care
of
all
of
them.
.
Objection
3:
What
happens
by
necessity
does
not
require
providence,
i.e.,
prudence.
Hence,
according
to
the
Philosopher
in
Ethics
6,
prudence
is
right
reason
with
respect
to
contingent
things
that
are
open
to
deliberation
and
choice.
Therefore,
since
many
things
in
the
world
happen
by
necessity,
not
everything
is
subject
to
providence.
Objection
4:
Whoever
is
left
to
himself
is
not
subject
to
the
providence
of
any
ruler,
But
men
are
left
to
themselves
by
God,
according
to
Ecclesiasticus
15:14
(“God
made
man
from
the
beginning,
and
Part
1,
Question
22
185
left
him
in
the
hand
of
his
own
counsel”),
And
this
holds
especially
for
evil
men,
according
to
Psalm
80:13
(“So
He
let
them
go
according
to
the
desires
of
their
heart”).
Therefore,
not
all
things
are
subject
to
God’s
providence.
Objection
5:
In
1
Corinthians
9:9
the
Apostle
says,
“God
is
not
concerned
about
oxen,”
or,
for
the
same
reason,
about
other
non-rational
creatures.
Therefore,
not
all
things
are
subject
to
God’s
providence.
But
contrary
to
this:
Wisdom
8:1
says
of
God’s
wisdom,
“She
reaches,
therefore,
from
end
to
end
mightily,
and
orders
all
things
sweetly.”
Irespond:
Some
thinkers,
e.g.,
Democritus
and
Epicurus,
have
completely
denied
providence,
claiming
that
the
world
came
about
by
chance.
Others
have
claimed
that
only
incorruptible
things
are
subject
to
providence,
and
that
corruptible
things
are
subject
to
providence
not
as
individuals
but
only
according
to
their
species,
since
in
this
respect
they
are
incorruptible.
In
the
person
of
these
thinkers
Job
22:14
says,
“The
clouds
are
His
hiding
place,
and
He
does
not
consider
our
things,
and
He
walks
about
the
poles
of
heaven.”
Rabbi
Moses
separated
men
off
from
the
general
run
of
corruptible
things
because
of
the
splendor
of
the
intellect
they
participate
in,
but
he
followed
the
opinion
of
the
others
in
the
case
of
other
corruptible
individuals.
Nonetheless,
it
is
necessary
to
claim
that
all
things
are
subject
to
divine
providence—not
only
in
general,
but
also
as
individuals.
This
is
made
clear
as
follows:
Since
every
agent
acts
for
the
sake
of
an
end,
the
ordering
of
effects
toward
their
end
extends
as
far
as
the
first
agent’s
causality
does.
For
in
the
works
of
any
given
agent,
the
reason
why
an
effect
occurs
that
is
not
ordered
toward
the
end
is
that
this
effect
follows
from
some
other
cause
and
falls
outside
the
intention
of
the
relevant
agent.
But
the
causality
of
God,
who
is
the
first
agent,
extends
to
all
beings—not
only
with
respect
to
the
principles
of
their
species,
but
also
with
respect
to
their
individual
principles,
and
not
only
with
respect
to
the
principles
of
incorruptible
things,
but
also
with
respect
to
the
principles
of
corruptible
things.
Hence,
everything
that
has
esse
in
any
way
must
be
ordered
by
God
toward
its
end—this
according
to
the
Apostle
in
Romans
13:1
(“The
things
that
are
from
God
are
ordered
by
God”).
Therefore,
since,
as
has
been
explained
(a.
1),
God’s
providence
is
nothing
other
than
a
plan
for
ordering
things
toward
their
end,
it
must
be
the
case
that
all
things,
insofar
as
they
participate
in
esse,
are
to
that
extent
subject
to
God’s
providence.
Similarly,
it
was
shown
above
(q.
14,
a.
11)
that
God
knows
all
things,
both
universals
and
particulars.
And
since,
as
was
explained
above
(q.
14,
a.
8),
God’s
cognition
is
related
to
things
as
a
craftsman’s
cognition
is
related
to
his
artifacts,
it
must
be
the
case
that
all
things
are
subject
to
God’s
ordering
in
the
way
that
all
of
a
craftsman’s
artifacts
are
subject
to
his
ordering.
Reply
to
objection
1:
Universal
causes
differ
from
particular
causes,
since
something
can
elude
a
particular
causes’s
ordering,
but
not a
universal
cause’s
ordering.
For
something
eludes
a
particular
cause’s
ordering
only
because
of
some
other
particular
cause
that
impedes
that
ordering;
for
instance,
a
piece
of
wood
is
prevented
from
bursting
into
flame
by
the
action
of
water...Hence,
since
all
the
particular
causes
are
included
under
the
universal
cause,
it
is
impossible
for
any
effect to
escape
the
universal
cause’s
ordering.
__
Therefore,
insofar
as
a
given
effect
escapes
the
ordering
of
some
particular
cause,
it
is
called
a
chance
effect
or
fortuitous
effect
with
respect
to
that
particular
cause.
However,
with
respect
to
the
universal
cause,
whose
ordering
it
cannot
be
released
from,
it
is
said
to
be
provided
for.
Similarly,
it
might
happen
that
two
servants
of
the
same
master
meet
one
another,
and
that
even
though
the
meeting
is
a
chance
event
from
their
perspective,
it
was
nonetheless
provided
for
by
their
master,
who
knowingly
dispatched
them
to
the
same
place
in
such
a
way
that
neither
knew
about
the
other.
Reply
to
objection
2:
Someone
who
has
care
of
a
particular
thing
differs
here
from
someone
who
Part
1,
Question
22
186
is
a
universal
provider.
For
a
particular
provider
eliminates
defects
as
much
as
possible
from
that
which
is
subject
to
his
care,
whereas
a
universal
provider
permits
defects
to
occur
in
particular
cases
in
order
not
to
impede
the
good
of
the
whole.
Hence,
the
corruptions
and
defects
in
natural
things
are
said
to
be
contrary
to
a
particular
nature,
but
they
nonetheless
fall
within
the
intention
of
nature
as
a
whole,
insofar
as
a
defect
in
one
thing
works
to
the
good
of
some
other
thing
or
to
the
good
of
the
universe
as
a
whole.
For
instance,
the
corruption
of
one
thing
is
the
generation
of
some
other
thing,
and
through
this
generation
a
species
is
preserved.
Therefore,
since
God
is
the
universal
provider
for
the
totality
of
being,
it
pertains
to
His
providence
that
He
should
permit
certain
defects
to
exist
in
some
particular
things
in
order
that
the
complete
good
of
the
universe
not
be
impeded.
For
if
all
evils
were
prevented,
then
many
goods
would
be
absent
from
the
universe.
For
instance,
the
life
of
a
lion
would
not
exist
if
there
were
no
killing
of
animals;
again,
the
patience
of
the
martyrs
would
not
exist
if
it
were
not
for
the
tyrants’
persecution.
Hence,
in
the
Enchiridion
Augustine
says,
“Almighty
God
would
never
allow
any
evil
to
exist
among
His
works
if
He
were
not
good
and
powerful
enough
to
do
well
even
given
the
evil.”
Now
these
first
two
objections
that
we
have
just
answered
seem
to
have
influenced
those
who
excluded
corruptible
things
from
God’s
providence,
since
it
is
among
corruptible
things
that
chance
events
and
evils
occur.
Reply
to
objection
3:
Man
did
not
institute
nature,
but
instead
uses
natural
entities
to
his
own
advantage
in
his
works
of
art
and
virtue.
Hence,
human
providence
does
not
extend
to
the
necessary
things
that
happen
by
nature.
However,
the
providence
of
God,
who
is
the
author
of
nature,
does
indeed
extend
to
these
things.
This
third
objection
seems
to
have
influenced
those
who
removed
the
course
of
natural
things
from
God’s
providence
and
attributed
it
to
the
necessity
of
matter—e.g.,
Democritus
and
other
ancient
natural
philosophers.
-
Reply
to
objection
4:
Man
is
not
excluded
from
God’s
providence
by
the
statement
that
“God
left
man
to
himself.”
Instead,
what
this
statement
shows
is
that
an
operative
power
determined
to
a
single
effect
is
not
fixed
for
man
ahead
of
time,
as
it
is
for
natural
things.
For
natural
things
act
only
as
if
they
are
directed
by
another
toward
their
end,
and
they
do
not
act
as
if
they
are
directing
themselves
toward
the
end,
in
the
way
that
rational
creatures
do
through
the
power
of
free
choice
by
which
they
deliberate
and
choose.
Hence,
rational
creatures
are
explicitly
said
to
be
“in
the
hand
of
their
own
counsel.”
However,
since
the
very
act
of
free
choice
is
traced
back
to
God
as
a
cause,
the
things
that
are
done
by
free
choice
must
be
subject
to
God’s
providence.
For
human
providence
is
contained
under
God’s
providence
in
the
way
that
a
particular
cause
is
contained
under
a
universal
cause.
Moreover,
God
has
providence
over
just
men
in
a
more
excellent
way
than
over
wicked
men,
since
He
does
not
permit
anything
to
happen
to
just
men
that
would
definitively
undermine
their
salvation.
For
as
Romans
8:28
says,
“To
them
that
love
God
all
things
work
together
unto
good.”
On
the
other
hand,
_from
the
fact
that
He
does
not
restrain
the
wicked
from
the
evil
of
sin,
He
is
said
to
send
them
—
away—not,
however,
in
the
sense
that
they
are
totally
excluded
from
His
providence.
For
they
would
fall
into
nothingness
if
He
did
not
conserve
them
through
His
providence.
The
present
objection
seems
to
have
influenced
Tully,
whe
removed
from
God’s
providence
human
affairs
of
the
sort
we
deliberate
about.
Reply
to
objection
5:
Since,
as
has
been
explained,
a
rational
creature
has
dominion
over
his
own
acts
through
free
choice,
he
is
subject
to
God’s
providence
in
a
special
way,
so
that
guilt
and
merit
are
imputed
to
him
and
punishment
and
reward
are
rendered
to
him.
And
it
is
in
this
respect
that
the
Apostle
denies
that
God
cares
about
oxen.
However,
he
does
not
mean
that
individual
non-rational
creatures
do
not
fall
under
God’s
providence,
as
Rabbi
Moses
thought.
Part
1,
Question
22
187
Article
3
Is
God’s
providence
immediate
with
respect
to
all
things?
It
seems
that
God
does
not
have
immediate
providence
with
respect
to
all
things:
Objection
1:
Whatever
is
dignified
must
be
attributed
to
God.
But
it
is
part
of
a
king’s
dignity
that
he
has
ministers
through
the
mediation
of
whom
he
provides
for
the
things
subject
to
him.
Therefore,
a
fortiori
God
does
not
provide
immediately
for
all
things.
Objection
2:
It
pertains
to
providence
to
order
things
toward
their
end,
and
the
end
of
each
thing
is
its
perfection
and
its
good.
But
it
pertains
to
a
cause
that
it
should
lead
its
own
effect
to
the
good.
Therefore,
every
agent
cause
is
a
cause
of
an
effect
of
providence.
Therefore,
if
God
provided
immediately
for
all
things,
then
all
secondary
causes
would
be
eliminated.
Objection
3:
In
the
Enchiridion
Augustine
says,
“There
are
some
things
it
is
better
not
to
know
about
than
to
know
about,
e.g.,
vile
things.”
And
the
Philosopher
says
the
same
thing
in
Metaphysics
12.
But
everything
that
is
better
should
be
attributed
to
God.
Therefore,
God
does
not
have
immediate
providence
with
respect
to
things
that
are
vile
and
evil.
But
contrary
to
this:
Job
34:13
says,
“What
other
has
He
appointed
over
the
earth?
Or
whom
has
He
set
over
the
world
which
He
made?”
Commenting
on
this,
Gregory
says,
“He
rules
by
Himself
the
world
which
He
created
by
Himself.”
Irespond:
Two
things
are
relevant
to
providence:
(a)
a
plan
for
ordering
the
things
provided
for
toward
their
end
(ratio
ordinis
rerum
provisarum
in
finem);
and
(b)
the
execution
of
this
ordering,
which
is
called
governance
(gubernatio).
As
regards
the
first
of
these,
God
immediately
provides
for
all
things.
For
in
His
intellect
He
has
a
plan
for
all
things,
even
the
very
least
things,
and
He
has
given
the
power
to
produce
given
effects
to
every
cause
that
He
has
preordained
for
those
effects.
Hence,
He
had
to
have
had
the
order
of
those
effects
in
His
plan
beforehand
(oportet
quod
ordinem
illorum
effectuum
in
sua
ratione
praehabuerit).
As
regards
the
second,
there
are
certain
mediators
of
God’s
providence.
For
God’s
providence
governs
lower
things
by
means
of
higher
things—not
because
of
any
defect
in
His
power,
but
rather
because
of
the
abundance
of
His
goodness,
so
that
He
might
communicate
the
dignity
of
causal
activity
even
to
His
creatures.
This
rules
out
an
opinion
of
Plato’s
that
is
reported
by
Gregory
of
Nyssa.
According
to
this
opinion,
there
are
three
kinds
of
providence.
The
first
kind
belongs
to
the
highest
God,
who
provides
primarily
and
principally
for
spiritual
things
and,
as
a
result,
for
the
whole
world
with
respect
to
its
genera,
species,
and
universal
causes.
The
second
kind
of
providence
is
that
by
which
generable
and
corruptible
individuals
are
provided
for,
and
this
kind
of
providence
he
attributes
to
the
gods
who
circle
the
heavens,
i.c.,
to
the
separated
substances
that
move
the
celestial
bodies
in
circles.
Lastly,
the
third
_kind
of
providence
has
to
do
with
human
affairs,
and
this
kind
of
providence
he
attributes
to
the
daimons
(attribuebat
daemonibus),
whom
the
Platonists
posited
between
us
and
the
gods,
as
reported
by
Augustine
in
De
Civitate
Dei
9.
Reply
to
objection
1:
It
is
indeed
part
of
a
king’s
dignity
to
have
ministers
who
execute
his
providence,
but
it
is
a
defect
for
him
not
to
have
a
plan
for
those
things
that
are
to
be
done
through
his
ministers.
For
all
operational
knowledge
(scientia
operativa)
is
more
perfect
to
the
extent
that
it
considers
things
that
are
more
particular,
since
acts
have
to
do
with
particulars.
Reply
to
objection
2: As
is
clear
from
what
has
been
said,
the
fact
that
God
has
immediate
providence
with
respect
to
all
things
does
not
rule
out
secondary
causes
insofar
as
they
execute
this
ordering.
Part
1,
Question
22
188
Reply
to
objection
3:
For
us
it
is
better
not
to
know
evil
and
vile
things
because
(a)
they
keep
us
from
considering
better
things,
since
we
are
unable
to
hold
many
things
in
our
understanding
at
the
same
time,
and
also
because
(b)
thinking
about
evil
things
sometimes
perverts
our
will
toward
evil.
However,
these
considerations
have
no
place
in
God,
who
sees
all
things
at
once
with
a
single
act
of
vision
and
whose
will
cannot
be
turned
to
evil.
Article
4
Does
God’s
providence
impose
necessity
on
the
things
it
provides
for?
It
seems
that
God’s
providence
imposes
necessity
on
the
things
it
provides
for:
Objection
1:
As
the
Philosopher
proves
in
Metaphysics
6,
every
effect
that
has
a
per
se
cause
which
now
exists
or
has
already
existed
and
from
which
that
effect
follows
by
necessity
is
such
that
it
has
issued
forth
by
necessity.
But
since
God’s
providence
is
eternal,
it
has
already
existed;
and
an
effect
follows
from
it
by
necessity,
since
God’s
providence
cannot
be
frustrated.
Therefore,
God’s
providence
imposes
necessity
on
the
things
it
provides
for.
Objection
2:
Every
provider
makes
what
he
produces
as
stable
as
possible,
lest
it
perish.
But
God
is
maximally
powerful.
Therefore,
to
the
things
He
provides
for
He
gives
the
firmness
of
necessity.
Objection
3:
In
De
Consolatione
Philosophiae
4
Boethius
says
that
fate,
“proceeding
from
the
sources
of
immutable
providence,
constrains
men’s
acts
and
fortunes
with
an
indissoluble
series
of
causes.”
Therefore,
it
seems
that
providence
imposes
necessity
on
the
things
provided
for.
But
contrary
to
this:
In
De
Divinis
Nominibus,
chap.
4,
Dionysius
says,
“It
is
not
part
of
providence
to
corrupt
nature.”
But
the
nature
of
certain
things
is
such
that
they
are
contingent.
Therefore,
divine
providence
does
not
impose
necessity
on
things
in
a
way
that
excludes
contingency.
Irespond:
God’s
providence
imposes
necessity
on
some
things,
but
not—as
some
have
held—on
all
things.
For
it
pertains
to
providence
to
order
things
toward
their
end.
But
after
God’s
own
goodness,
which
is
an
end
that
is
separated
from
things,
the
principal
good
that
exists
in
the
things
themselves
is
the
perfection
of
the
universe,
which
would
not
exist
if
there
were
not
many
grades
of
being
found
among
things.
Hence,
it
pertains
to
God’s
providence
to
produce
all
the
grades
of
beings.
And
so
God
has
prepared
necessary
causes
for
certain
effects,
so
that
those
effects
occur
necessarily,
whereas
for
other
effects
He
has
prepared
contingent
causes,
so
that
they
occur
contingently
in
accord
with
the
status
of
their
proximate
causes.
Reply
to
objection
1:
The
effect
of
God’s
providence
is
not
just
that
something
should
occur
in
some
way
or
other,
but
that
something
should
occur
contingently
or
that
it
should
occur
necessarily.
And
so
if
God’s
providence
disposes
a
thing
to
occur
infallibly
and
necessarily,
then
it
occurs
infallibly
and
necessarily,
whereas
if
the
plan
of
God’s
providence
decrees
that
a
thing
should
occur
contingently,
then
it
occurs
contingently.
__
Reply
to
objection
2:
The
ordering
of
God’s
providence
is
unshakable
and
certain in
the
sense
that
the
things
that
are
provided
for
by
God
all
occur
in
the
mode
which
He
Himself
has
provided
for
them,
i.e.,
either
necessarily
or
contingently.
Reply
to
objection
3:
The
indissolubility
and
immutability
that
Boethius
mentions
pertain
to
the
certitude
of
providence
itself,
which
cannot
fail
either
in
its
effect
or
in
the
mode
of
occurrence
that
it
has
provided
for.
Nonetheless,
indissolubility
and
immutability
do
not
pertain
to
the
necessity
of
the
effects
themselves.
Part
1,
Question
22
189
Also,
notice
that
necessary
and
contingent
follow
upon
being
as such.
Hence,
the
modes
of
contingency
and
necessity
fall
under
the
oversight
of
God,
who
is
the
universal
provider
for
all
of
being,
and
not
just
under
the
oversight
of
certain
particular
providers.
QUESTION
25
God’s
Power
Now
that
we
have
considered
God’s
intellect
and
will
and
the
things
pertaining
to
them,
we
must
next
consider
God’s
power.
On
this
topic
there
are
six
questions:
(1)
Is
there
power
in
God?
(2)
Is
God’s
power
infinite?
(3)
Is
God
omnipotent?
(4)
Can
God
bring
it
about
that
past
things
have
never
existed?
(5)
Is
God
able
to
do
things
which
He
does
not
in
fact
do,
or
able
not
to
do
things
which
He
in
fact
does?
(6)
As
regards
the
things
He
makes,
could
God
make
them
better
than
He
does?
Article
1
Is
there
power
in
God?
It
seems
that
there
is
no
power
(potentia)
in
God:
Objection
1:
God,
who
is
the
first
agent,
is
related
to
actuality
as
primary
matter
is
related
to
potentiality
(potentia).
But
primary
matter,
considered
in
itself,
lacks
all
actuality.
Therefore,
the
first
agent,
which
is
God,
lacks
potentiality.
Objection
2:
According
to
the
Philosopher
in
Metaphysics
9,
the
actuality
of
a
thing
is
better
than
any
potentiality;
for
instance,
form
is
better
than
matter,
and
action
is
better
than
active
power,
since
it
is
the
latter’s
purpose.
But
nothing
is
better
than
that
which
exists in
God,
since,
as
was
shown
above
(q,
3,
a.
3),
whatever
exists
in
God
is
God.
Therefore,
there
is
no
power
in
God.
Objection
3:
Power
is
a
principle
of
action.
But
God’s
action
is
His
essence,
since
there
are
no
accidents
in
God,
and
nothing
is
a
principle
of
God’s
essence.
Therefore,
the
concept
of
power
does
not
apply
to
God
(Deo
non
convenit).
Objection
4:
As
was
shown
above
(q.
14,
a.
8
and
q.
19,
a.
4),
God’s
knowledge
and
His
will
are
a
cause
of
things.
But
a
cause
is
the same
as
a
principle.
Therefore,
one
should
ascribe
only
knowledge
and
will
to
God—and
not
power.
But
contrary
to
this:
Psalm
88:9
says,
“You
are
powerful,
O
Lord,
and
Your
truth
is
round
about
You.”
Lrespond:
There
are
two
kinds
of
power
or
potentiality
(potentia),
viz.,
(a)
passive
power,
which
in
no
way
exists
in
God, and
(b)
active
power,
which
one
must
especially
posit
n
God.
For
it
is
clear that
each
thing,
insofar
as
it
has
actuality
and
perfection,
is
an
active
principle
of
something,
whereas
each
thing
is
acted
upon
insofar
as
it
is
deficient
and
imperfect.
Now
it
was
shown
above
(q.
3,
a.
1
and
q.
4,
a.
1-2)
that
God
is
pure
actuality,
and
that
He
is
perfect
absolutely
speaking
and
in
every
way,
and
that
imperfection
has
no
place
in
Him.
Hence,
it
especially
belongs
to
Him
to
be
an
active
principle
and
in
no
way
to
be
acted
upon.
But
the nature
of
an
active
principle
belongs
to
an
active
power.
For
as
the
Philosopher
says
in
Metaphysics
5,
an
active
power
is
a
principle
of
acting
upon
another,
whereas
a
passive
power
is
a
principle
of
being
acted
upon
by
another.
Therefore,
it
follows
that
active
power
exists
especially
in
God.
Reply
to
objection
1:
Active
power,
far
from
being
contrasted
with
actuality,
is
instead
grounded
in
actuality.
For
each
thing
acts
insofar
as
it
is
actual
Passive
power,
on
the
other
hand,
is
indeed
contrasted
with
actuality,
since
a
thing
is
acted
upon
insofar
as
it
is
in
potentiality.
Hence,
passive
power
is
excluded
from
God—but
not
active
power.
Reply
to
objection
2:
Whenever
an
actuality
is
distinct
from
a
power,
the
actuality
must
be
more
noble
than
the
power.
But
God’s
action
is
not
distinct
from
His
power;
instead,
both
of
them
are
God’s
essence,
since His
esse
is
not
distinct
from
His
essence.
Hence,
it
is
not
the
case
that
something
has
to
be
more
noble
than
God’s
power.
Part
1,
Question
25
208
Reply
to
objection
3:
The
power
in
created
things
is
a
principle
not
only
of
the
action,
but
also
of
the
effect.
Therefore,
the
nature
of
power
is
salvaged
in
God
with
respect
to
its
being
a
principle
of
the
effect,
though
not
with
respect
to
its
being
a
principle
of
the
action,
since
God’s
action
is
just
the
divine
essence,
Perhaps,
though,
God’s
power
can
be
thought
of
as
a
principle
of
action
according
to
our
mode
of
understanding.
For
God’s
essence,
which
in
itself
possesses
in
a
simple
way
whatever
perfections
exist
in
created
things,
can
be
thought
of
by
us
both
under
the
concept
of
action
and
under
the
concept
of
power,
just
as
He
is
also
thought
of
by
us
both
under
the
concept
of
a
suppositum
that
has
a
nature
and
under
the
concept
of
a
nature.
.
Reply
to
objection
4:
Power
is
posited
in
God
as
something
that
differs
from
His
knowledge and
will
not
in
reality,
but
only
conceptually—viz.,
insofar
as
‘power’
implies
the
nature
of
a
principle
that
executes
what
the
will
commands
it
to
do
and
what
the
knowledge
directs
it
to
do.
All
three
of
these
coincide
in
God.
An
alternative
reply
is
that
God’s
knowledge
or
will
itself,
insofar
it
is
an
efficient
principle,
has
the
nature
of
power.
This
is
why
a
consideration
of
God’s knowledge
and
will
precedes
a
consideration
of
His
power,
in
the
way
that
a
cause
precedes
its
action
and
its
effect.
Article
2
Is
God’s
power
infinite?
It
seems
that
God’s
power
is
not
infinite:
Objection
1:
According
to
the
Philosopher
in
Physics
3,
everything
infinite
is
imperfect.
But
God’s
power
is
not
imperfect.
Therefore,
it
is
not
finite.
Objection
2:
Every
power
is
manifested
by
its
effect;
otherwise,
it
would
be
useless.
Therefore,
if
God’s
power
were
infinite,
then
He
could
bring
about
an
infinite
effect.
But
this
is
impossible.
Objection
3:
In
Physics
8
the
Philosopher
proves
that
if
a
body
had
infinite
power,
it
would
effect
an
instantaneous
movement.
But
God
does
not
effect
an
instantaneous
movement;
instead,
“He
moves
a
spiritual
creature
through
time
and
a
corporeal
creature
through
space
and
time,”
as
Augustine
puts
it
in
Super
Genesim
ad
Litteram
8.
Therefore,
His
power
is
not
infinite.
But
contrary
to
this:
In
De
Trinitate
8
Hilary
says
that God
“is
of
immense
power,
living,
and
powerful.”
But
everything
immense
is
infinite.
Therefore,
God’s
power
is
infinite.
I
respond:
As
has
already
been
explained
(a. 1),
active
power
is
found
in
God
insofar
as
He
is
actual.
But
His
esse
is
infinite,
since
it
is
not
limited
by
anything
receiving
it.
This
is
clear
from
what
was
said
above
(q.
7)
when
we
were
discussing
the
infinity
of
God’s
essence.
Hence,
it
must
be
the
case
that
God’s
active
power
is
infinite.
For
with
all
agents
we
find
that
the
more
perfectly
the
agent
has
the
-..-
form
through
which
it
acts,
the
more
power
it
has
in
acting.
For
instance,
the
hotter
something
is,
the
more
power
it
has
to
produce
heat;
and
it
would
have an
infinite
power
to
produce
heat
if
its
own
heat
_were
infinite.
Hence,
since,
as
was
shown
above
(q..7,
a. 1),
the
divine
essence,
through
which
God
acts,
is
infinite,
it
follows
that
His
power
is
infmite.
Reply
to
objection
1:
The
Philosopher
is
talking
about
an
infmity
that
exists
on
the
part
of
a
matter
which
is
not
terminated
by
a
form,
ie.,
an
infinity
that
has
to
do
with
quantity.
But,
as
has
been
shown
(q,
7,
a. 1),
God’s
essence
is
not
infinite
i
this
sense—and,
consequently,
neither
is
His
power
infinite
in
this
sense.
Hence,
it
does
not
follow
that
God’s
power
is
imperfect.
Reply
to
objection
2:
The
entire
power
of
a
univocal
agent
is
manifested
in
its
effect.
For
Part
1,
Question
25
209
instance,
the
generative
power
of
a
man
can
do no
more
than
generate
a
man.
However,
the
power
of
a
non-univocal
agent
is
not
wholly
manifested
in
the
production
of
its
effect.
For
instance,
the
sun’s
power
is
not
wholly
manifested
in
the
production
of
an
animal
that
is
generated
by
putrefaction.
Now
it
is
clear that
God
is
not
a
univocal
agent,
since, as
was
shown
above
(q.
3,
a.
5),
nothing
can
agree
with
him
in
either
species or
genus.
Hence,
it
follows
that
His
effect
is
always
such
that
it
falls
short
of
His
power.
Therefore,
God’s
infinite
power
does
not
have
to
be
manifested
by
His
producing
an
infinite
effect.
And
yet
even
if
God
were
to
produce
no
effect
at
all,
His
power
would
not
be
useless.
For
a
power
is
useless
when
it
does
not
attain
the
end
toward
which
it
is
ordered.
But
God’s
power
is
not
ordered
toward
any
effect
as
an
end;
rather,
it
itself
is
the
end
of
its
own
effect.
Reply
to
objection
3:
In
Physics
8 the
Philosopher
proves
that
if
a
body
had
infinite
power,
then
it
would
effect
a
movement
that
takes
no
time
at
all.
And
yet
he
shows
that
the
power
of
the
mover
of
a
celestial
body
is
infinite
because
it
can
effect
movement
through
an
infinite
stretch
of
time.
It
follows,
then,
that
he
intends
to
show
that
if
there
were
an
infinite
corporeal
power,
it
would
effect
movement
that
took
no
time
at
all,
but
that
this
does
not
hold
for
the
power
of
an
incorporeal
mover.
The
reason
is
that
a
body
which
moves
another
body
is
a
univocal
agent,
and
thus
all
the
agent’s
power
would
be
manifested
in
the
motion.
Therefore,
since
the
more
power
had
by
a
body
that
effects
movement,
the
faster
the
movement
it
effects,
it
has
to
be
the
case
that
if
its
power
were
infinite,
then
it
would
effect
an
immeasurably
fast
movement,
which
is
just
to
effect
a
movement
that
takes
no
time
at
all.
However, an
incorporeal
mover
is
a
non-univocal
agent.
Hence,
its
entire
power
need
not
be
manifested
in
the
movement
in
such
a
way
that
it
effects
a
movement
that
takes
no
time
at
all—especially
in
light
of
the
fact
that
it
effects
movement
according
to
the
disposition
of
its
will.
Article
3
Is
God
omnipotent?
It
seems
that
God
is
not
omnipotent
(non
sit
omnipotens):
Objection
1:
To
be
moved
and
acted
upon
is
counted
among
all
things
(aliquid
omnium
est).
But
God
is
not
able
to
be
moved
and
acted
upon,
because,
as
was
shown
above
(q.
9,
a.
1),
He
is
immutable.
Therefore,
He
is
not
omnipotent.
Objection
2:
To
sin
is
to
do
something.
But
God
cannot
sin
or
“deny
Himself,”
as
2
Timothy
2:13
puts
it.
Therefore,
God
is
not
omnipotent.
Objection
3:
[In
the
Collect
for
the
Tenth
Sunday
after
Pentecost]
it
is
said
of
God
that
“He
manifests
His
omnipotence
especially
in
pardoning
and showing
mercy.”
Therefore,
the
ultimate
effect
of
which
God’s
power
is
capable
is
to
pardon and
to
show
mercy.
.But
there
are
things
much
greater
than
pardoning
and
showing
mercy,
e.g.,
creating
another
world,
or
something
of
that
sort.
Therefore,
God
is
not
omnipotent.
Objection
4:
A
Gloss
on
1
Corinthians
1:20
(“Has
not
God
made
foolish
the
wisdom
of
this
world?”)
says,
“God
made
the
wisdom
of
this
world
foolish
by
showing
to
be
possible
what
the
wisdom
of
this
world
judged
to
be
impossible.”
Hence,
it
seems
that
one
should
judge
something
to
be
possible
or
impossible
not
according
to
lower
causes,
in
the
way
that
the
wisdom
of
this
world
judges,
but
according
to
God’s
power.
Therefore,
if
God
is
omnipotent,
then
all
things
will
be
possible.
Therefore,
nothing
is
impossible.
But
if
the
impossible
is
eliminated,
then
so
too
is
the
necessary,
since
necessary
to
be
is
the
same
as
impossible
not
to
be.
Therefore,
if
God
is
omnipotent,
then
nothing
will
be
necessary
Part
1,
Question
25
210
among
things.
But
this
is
impossible.
Therefore,
God
is
not
omnipotent.
But
contrary
to
this:
Luke
1:37
says,
“No
word
shall
be
impossible
with
God.”
Irespond:
Everyone
commonly
confesses
that
God
is
omnipotent.
But
it
seems
difficult
to
formulate
an
account
of
omnipotence,
since
there
can
be
doubts
about
what
is
included
under
the
distribution
of
‘all’
when
one
says
that
God
is
capable
of
all
things
(cum
dicitur
omnia
posse
Deum).
However,
if
one
considers
the
matter
correctly,
then
since
power
is
said
in
relation
to
possible
things,
it
follows
that
when
God
is
said to
be
capable
of
all
things,
the
right
way
to
understand
this
is
that
God
is
capable
of
all
possible
things
and
that
this
is
why
He
is
called
omnipotent.
Now
according
to
the
Philosopher
in
Metaphysics
5,
there
are
two
senses
of
‘possible’:
In
the
first
sense,
‘possible’
is
said
with
respect
to
some
power,
in
the
way
that
what
is
subject
to
human
power
is
said to
be
‘possible
for
man’.
However,
one
cannot
claim
that
the
reason
why
God
is
called
omnipotent
is
that
He
is
capable
of
all
the
things
that
are
possible
for
a
created
nature.
For
God’s
power
extends
to
more
things.
On
the
other
hand,
if
one
claims
that
the
reason
why
God
is
omnipotent
is
that
He
is
capable
of
all
the
things
that
are
possible
for His
own
power,
then
there
will
be
a
circularity
in
the
explication
of
omnipotence.
For
this
will
be
just to
say
that
the
reason
why
God
is
omnipotent
is
that
He
is
capable
of
all
the
things
that
He
is
capable
of.
It
follows,
then,
that
the
reason
why
God
is
called
omnipotent
is
that
He
is
capable
of
all
the
things
that
are
possible
absolutely
speaking—which
is
the
second
sense
of
‘possible’.
Now
something
is
said to
be
absolutely
possible
or
absolutely
impossible
because
of
the
relation
between
the
terms.
More
specifically,
something
is
called
possible
because
the
predicate
is
compatible
with
the
subject,
as
with
‘Socrates
is
sitting’,
whereas
something
is
called
absolutely
impossible
because
the
predicate
is
incompatible
with
the
subject,
as
with
‘A
man
is
a
donkey’.
Now
notice
that
since
each
agent
effects
what
is
similar
to
itself,
there
is
something
possible
that
corresponds
as
a proper
object
to
each
active
power,
in
keeping
with
the
nature
of
the
actuality
in
which
that
active
power
is
grounded.
For
instance,
the
power
to
produce
heat
has
possibly-heated
esse
(esse
calfactibile)
as
its
proper
object.
Now
divine
esse,
in
which
the nature
of
God’s
power
is
grounded,
is
infinite
esse—i.e.,
esse
which
is
not
limited
to
any
particular
genus
of
being,
but
which
contains
within
itself
the
perfection
of
the
totality
of
esse.
Hence,
whatever
can
have
the
nature
of
being
is
included
among
the
things
which
are
absolutely
possible
and
with
respect
to
which
God
is
called
omnipotent.
Now
nothing
except
non-being
is
opposed
to
the
nature
of
being.
Therefore,
that
which
implies
within
itself
both
being
and
non-being
at
the
same
time
is
incompatible
with
the
nature
of
the
absolutely
possible,
which
is
subject
to
God’s
omnipotence.
For
it
is
not
because
of
a
defect
in
God’s
power
that
this
sort
of
thing
is
not
subject
to
omnipotence;
rather,
it
is
because
it
cannot
have
the nature
of
something
that
is
possible
or
able
to
be
effected.
Therefore,
whatever
does
not
imply a
contradiction
is
included
among
those
possible
things
with
respect
to
which
God
is
called
omnipotent.
But
those
things
that
do
imply
a
contradiction
are
not
-contained
under
God’s
omnipotence,
since
they
cannot
have
the
nature
of
something
possible,
Hence,
it
is
more
fitting
to
say
that
they
cannot
be
effected
than
to
say
that
God
cannot
effect
them.
Nor
is
this
contrary
to
what
the
angel
asserted
when
he
said,
“No
word
shall
be
impossible
with
God.”
For
that
which
implies
a
contradiction
cannot
be a
‘word’,
since
no
intellect
can
conceive
it.
Reply
to
objection
1:
As
has
been
explained
(a. 1),
God
is
called
omnipotent
because
of
His
active
power
and
not
because
of
any
passive
power.
Hence,
it
is
not
incompatible
with
His
omnipotence
that
He
cannot
be
moved
or
acted
upon.
Reply
to
objection
2:
To
sin
is
to
lapse
from
a
perfect
action;
hence,
to
be
able to
sin
is
to
be
able
to
be
defective
in
one’s
acting—which
is
incompatible
with
omnipotence.
Because
of
this,
God,
who
is
omnipotent,
cannot
sin.
To
be
sure,
in
Topics
4
the
Philosopher
says
that God
is
able
and
eager
to
do
evil
things.
But
this
Part
1,
Question
25
211
has
to
be
understood
in
one
of
three
ways:
Either
(a)
it
is
to
be
understood
as
a
conditional,
the
antecedent
of
which
is
impossible,
as
if
it
meant
‘God
can
do
evil
things
if
He
wills
to’.
For
nothing
prevents
a
conditional
from
being
true
if
both
its
antecedent
and
its
consequent
are
impossible.
In
the
same
way,
one
may
assert
‘If
a
man
is
a
donkey,
then
he
has
four
feet’.
Or
else
(b)
it
should
be
taken
to
mean
that
God
can
do
certain
things
that
now
appear
evil
but
are
such
that
if
He
were
to
do
them,
then they
would
be
good.
Or
else (c)
the
Philosopher
is
speaking
in
accord
with
the
common
opinion
of
the
Gentiles,
who
claimed
that
men
are
transformed
into
gods,
¢.g.,
Jupiter
and
Mercury.
Reply
to
objection
3:
The
reason
why
God’s
omnipotence
is
manifested
especially
in
pardoning
and
showing
mercy
is
that
the
fact
that
He
freely
forgives
sins
shows
that
He
has
the
greatest
power.
For
someone
who
is
bound
by
a
higher
law
may
not
freely
forgive
sins.
An
alternative
reply
is
that
in
forgiving
men
and
showing
them
mercy,
God
leads
them
to
participate
in
an
infinite
good,
which
is
the
ultimate
effect
of
the
divine
power.
Yet
another
reply
is
that,
as
was
explained
above
(q.
21,
a.
4),
the
effect
of
God’s
mercy
is
the
foundation
for
all
of
God’s
works.
For
nothing
is
owed
to
anything
except
in
virtue
of
what
has
been
given
to
it
by
God
without
being
owed
to
it.
And
God’s
omnipotence
is
especially
manifested
in
the
fact
that
it
is
responsible
for
the
initial
creation
of
all
goods.
Reply
to
objection
4:
It
is
with
respect
to
itself—and
not
with
respect
to
either
higher
or
lower
causes—that
something
is
called
absolutely
possible.
On
the
other
hand,
something
that
is
called
possible
with
respect
to
a
given
power
is
called
possible
with
respect
to
its
proximate
causes.
Hence,
those
things
that
are apt
to
be
effected
immediately
by
God
alone—e.g.,
creating,
justifying,
etc—are
called
possible
with
respect
to
a
higher cause,
whereas
those
things
that
are
apt
to
be
effected
by
lower
causes
are
called
possible
with
respect
to
lower
causes.
For
as
was
explained
above
(q.
14,
a.
13),
effects
have
contingency
or
necessity
according
to
the
status
of
their
proximate
causes.
Now
the
wisdom
of
the
world
is
counted
as
foolish
because
it
judges
that
things
which
are
impossible
for
nature
are
also
impossible
for
God.
And
so
it
is
clear
that
God’s
omnipotence
excludes
neither
impossibility
nor
necessity
from
things.
Article
4
Can
God
bring
it
about
that past
things
have
never
existed?
It
seems
that
God
can
bring
it
about
that
past
things
have
never
existed:
Objection
1:
That
which
is
impossible
per
se
is
more
impossible
than
that
which
is
impossible
per
accidens,
But
God
can do
that
which
is
impossible
per
se,.e.g.,
give
sight
to
the
blind
or
resuscitate
the
-......
dead.
Therefore,
a
fortiori,
He
can
do
that
which
is
impossible
per
accidens.
But
it
is
impossible
per
accidens
for
past
things
not
to
have
existed;
for
instance,
Socrates’s
not
having
run
is
impossible
per
_accidens,
because
Socrates’s
running
is
past.
Therefore,
God
can
bring
it
about
that
past
things
have
not
existed.
Objection
2:
Whatever
God
was
able
to
effect,
He
is
even
now
able
to
effect;
for His
power
does
not
diminish.
But
before
Socrates
ran,
God
was
able
to
bring
it
about
that
he
would
not
run.
Therefore,
after
he
has
run,
God
can
bring
it
about
that
he
has not
run.
Objection
3:
Charity
is
a
greater
virtue
than
virginity.
But
God
can
restore
lost
charity.
Therefore,
He
can
also
restore
lost
virginity.
Therefore,
He
can
bring
it
about
that
what
was
corrupted
Running head: THE LOVE OF GOD 1
The Love of God
Institution of Affiliation
Date
THE LOVE OF GOD 2
The Love of God
Love is an aspect that people display because of different reasons. It could be because
they expect a person to reciprocate positively, or they might be having some hidden agenda.
According to Aquinas (2016), people display love because they expect to benefit. This kind of
love is driven by passion. Unlike human love, God loves His creations and does not expect
anything in return. He loves His creations because that is His nature. This type of love is referred
by Aquinas (2016) as intellective love, and it exists because a person knows that it is the best
thing to do. This paper is the study of God’s love and how God wills His love for His creation.
How God Acts from Love
God is synonymous with love. Therefore, God acts from love. According to Aquinas
(2006), love is an essential aspect, and it arises because of will. Love exists because a person has
choices to make to either be good or bad. But good is the primary character of a person, while
evil comes later as a secondary character. This implies that before a person becomes evil, they
have already experienced good. That is, good is experienced before evil. Aquinas (2006) posits
that people experience joy before sadness, and in the same manner, love is experienced before
hate. According to Aquinas (2006), human intellect is programmed towards good. Other
tendencies that people might have are acquired along the way. Naturally, people are willed to do
good things. There are some aspects of good that are done with the expectations of some good
things which are expected to be the results of good actions. True love involves doing things
without hopes of some good things ahead. All people desire good things that are loveable, and
nobody loves other things contrary to love. Without love, hate is nonexistent since hate is there
THE LOVE OF GOD 3
to oppose things that are loved. Since God’s has since the beginning willed to doing what is
good, it, therefore, implies that acts from love.
Another argument for the fact that God acts from love is that God does not need a
motivation to love. Some people claim that God does not act from love since He is not carried.
This argument implies that anything God does has some motivations behind it. According to
Aquinas (2006), this is not the case since God is not controlled by sentient appetite. The actions
that are a result of sentient desires are passions. These actions are done because there is a
promise of some good outcome on completing the actions. These actions are, however, not
driven by will and desire. Aquinas (2006) affirms that pleasure, love, and joy are passions if they
are a result of sentient appetites. If these actions are done as a result of an intellective appetite,
then they are from God. According to Glenn (n.d.), intellective appetite refers to intellectually
desirable actions. The actions of God have always been intellectually desirable, and therefore
God acts from love.
Love of God and its Origin
Aquinas (2006) says that love is about willing good to another person. That is, doing
good for another person. This is such that when a person loves themselves, then they will do well
for themselves. Loving another person implies that a person treats another person the way they
would like to be treated. Aquinas (2006) says that it is for this reason of willing to other people
that love is referred to as a coalescing force. This is the love of God. God renders His love to
people unreservedly. God loves all his creation without bias. According to Aquinas (2006), God
loves all his creations despite their imperfections. Whereas humans will because they anticipate
some excellent results, the love of God is unreserved, and it creates good in things instead of
THE LOVE OF GOD 4
looking for the good in them. The creations that exist are due to the will of God. What God is
willed is always good, and therefore God loves them. Aquinas (2006) uses the analogy of a lover
to explain the love of God. According to Aquinas (2006), the way a lover goes out of his way to
love another person is the same way God loves his creation. God's love extends beyond himself
to other beings, both rational and non-rational creatures. Humans will know their love for
rational people whom they can share their joy and tribulations. Aquinas (2006) says that God
loves even non-rational beings not because they are beneficial to Him but for the benefit of
humans. This love of God involves desiring for other people apart from Himself. The love of
God is a complicated matter since He can love and hate in equal measure. For instance, God
loves sinners because they are his creation, and they exist for him. He also hates them because
they have gone astray and are possess some aspects that are not His.
Even though God loves all that He created, Aquinas (2006) says that He loves rational
beings more than irrational ones. On the rational creatures, Aquinas (2006) affirms that God
loves those who act according to his will more than sinners. Sometimes, humans love some
things more than others. This way, they will do greater good to other people than others. The
love of God operates in such a manner. There are those rational beings that God wills more than
others. This is the reason why there is goodness in things, and not all creations have the same
goodness. Those that God wills greater good than others are the best. The fact that God loves all
things should not, however, be misconstrued to imply that God gives the same providence to all
His creations. God uses His wisdom to provide for His creations according to their own needs.
According to Aquinas (2006), Christ is the only person that God loves more than all other
creations. His love for Christ is demonstrated by the fact that He gave Christ a name above other
names. He also gave him victory over death so that He can redeem the human race.
THE LOVE OF GOD 5
Virtues and Perfections of Love
The love of God makes other creations good compared to others. According to Aquinas
(2006), some creations are good compared to others because God loves them more than others.
For instance, Christ is powerful than humans and angels because God loves Him more. God’s
love for Christ is shown by the fact that He gave Christ victory over death, and He also gave Him
a name above all names. Aquinas (2006) also says that God loves His faithful more than others.
Even though God loves rational beings more than irrational ones, His love for those who please
Him is more than his love for sinners. The love of God operates mysteriously. Those that God
loves most, such as Christ, have undergone trials due to God’s love. God loved Christ to the
extent that He sent him to die so that humans can be redeemed. Another feature of the love of
God is that it is not equal for all creations. God loves those faithful to him more than those who
are sinners. God also loves those who were sinners but repented and changed their ways more
than those who have been committed to him without sinning.
How Love is Related To Justice, Mercy, Providence, And Governance
According to Aquinas (2006), there is evidence of God’s justice in the universe. This is
because God gives al things according to his powers. God’s justice is not a debt to be repaid, but
He renders it because that is His nature. Aquinas (2006) further affirms that God’s justice is the
truth. God’s mercy is evident from the way He treats His creation. God is affected by the
misery of his people as if it were his own, and therefore God always works towards alleviating
the pain of his people, and consequently, He is merciful. Every action performed by God is
filled with justice and mercy since He does not owe anyone, but He provides to all people
unreservedly. According to Aquinas (2006), moral beings are subject to providence. Since God
THE LOVE OF GOD 6
is not corruptible, therefore, what He provides to His people is subject to providence. God is the
universal provider of all living things and will, therefore, not let His creations suffer. God cares
for His people since He provides and serves them with justice. All these are possible because
God loves his people. Therefore, mercy, providence, governance, and justice are a result of
God’s love for humanity.
Conclusion
God is synonymous with love. His actions demonstrate the love He has for his people.
According to Aquinas (2006), God’s love is not a result of anticipated benefits, but it is because
that is His nature. Unlike humans who love because they are expecting some good results, God’s
love is unconditional. This love, Aquinas (2006) says, is equivalent to that of a lover who goes
beyond his interests to show love to another person. God loves both rational and irrational
beings, but his love for rational beings is greater. Those that God loves more than others display
some goodness that others don’t possess. Even though God loves rational beings, His love for
those faithful to him is more than His love for sinners. God loved Christ above all his other
creations, and that is why He gave him a name above all names, and He also sent Him to die in
the cross for the redemption of humans. God is also merciful. This is why God provides for his
creation irrespective of whether they have sinned or not. Through His love for humanity, God
provides His creations to their daily needs, and He does so with justice. God also governs the
whole universe with justice because of his will for his creation.
THE LOVE OF GOD 7
References
Aquinas, T. (2006). The treatise on the divine nature: Summa Theologiae I 1-13. Hackett
Publishing.
Glenn, P. Tour of the Summa | Precis of the Summa Theological of St Thomas Aquinas | Msgr P
Glenn. Retrieved 6 November 2019, from http://www.catholictheology.info/summa-
theologica/summa-part1.php?q=532
The love of God
Thesis statement: This paper is the study of God’s love and how God wills His love for His
creation.
I. Introduction
1. Love is an aspect that people display because of different reasons.
2. It could be because they expect a person to reciprocate positively or they might be
having their hidden agenda.
3. Unlike human love, God loves His creations and does not expect anything in return.
4. Thesis statement
II. How God acts from love
1. It is an essential aspect, and it arises because of will.
2. Love exists because a person has choices to make to either be good or bad. But good
is the primary character of a person, while evil comes later as a secondary character.
3. This implies that before a person becomes evil, they have already experienced good.
4. There are some aspects of good that are done with the expectations of some good
things which are expected to be the results of good actions.
5. True love involves doing things without hopes of some good stuff ahead.
6. Another argument for the fact that God acts from love is that God does not need a
motivation to love.
7. This argument implies that anything God does has some motivations behind it.
III. Love of God and its origin
1. That love is about willing good to another person.
2. This is such that when a person loves themselves, then they will do well for
themselves.
3. Loving another person implies that a person treats another person the way they would
like to be treated.
4. God renders His love to people unreservedly. God loves all his creation without bias.
5. Whereas humans will because they anticipate some excellent results, the love of God
is unreserved, and it creates good in things instead of looking for good in them.
IV. Virtues and perfections of love
1. The love of God makes other creations good compared to others.
2. Some creations are good compared to others because God loves them more than
others.
3. For instance, Christ is powerful than humans and angels because God loves Him
more.
4. God’s love for Christ is shown by the fact that He gave Christ victory over death, and
He also gave Him a name above all names.
V. How love is related to justice, mercy, providence, and governance
1. There is evidence of God’s justice in the universe.
2. God’s justice is not a debt to be repaid, but He renders it because that is His nature.
3. God’s mercy is evident from the way He treats His creation.
4. God is affected by the misery of his people as if it were his own, and therefore god
always works towards alleviating the pain of his people and consequently, He is
merciful.
5. Every God’s work is filled with justice and mercy since He does not owe anybody,
but He provides to all people unreservedly.
6. Since God is not corruptible, therefore, what He provides to His people is subject to
providence.
7. God is the universal provider of all living things and will therefore not let His
creations suffer.
VI. Conclusion
Summary of the paper
