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Herbert Robinson
JURI 515
Week One: Case Briefs Assignments
The Law Offices of Patrick, Wayne, and Swayze
Cases examined:
Derby v. Derby
378 S.E.2d 74 (Va. Ct. App. 1989)
Galloway v. Galloway
622 S.E.2d 267 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)
Sims v. Sims
55 Va. App. 340 (2009)
Chaplain v. Chaplain
682 S.E.2d 108 (Va. Ct. App. 2009)
Derby v. Derby
378 S.E.2d 74 (Va. Ct. App. 1989)
Facts:
After getting married in April 1961, George and Sandra Derby spent twenty-two years together.
The marriage yielded two children.
On July 9, 1984, Mrs. Derby and Mr. Derby discussed and signed a separation agreement without
the presence of counsel and before Mr. Derby had a chance to discuss the terms with his lawyer.
Their property would be divided equally under the terms of the agreement. However, Mrs. Derby
struck out the paragraph that stated this divide and wrote that Mr. Derby would give up his share
of the property located at 1824 Ocean View Avenue. The agreement was signed by both of them.
The property's deed was obtained by Mrs. Derby at 4 p.m. that day, and Mr. Derby signed it in
front of a notary public. Additionally, Mr. Derby did this without first speaking with his lawyer.
According to Mr. Derby, Mrs. Derby manipulated him into signing the stipulation agreement that
applied to their property by implying that she would come home if he did.
Procedural History:
On October 6, 1983, Mrs. Derby filed for divorce, claiming cruelty. On June 26, 1984, Mrs.
Derby changed her complaint to claim a one-year separation. On July 9, 1984 Mr. and Mrs.
Derby signed a separation agreement which stated that Mr. Derby would relinquish his portion of
the property location at 1824 Ocean View Avenue. Mr. Derby filed a cross-bill on October 14,
1985, accusing his wife of adultery on multiple specific occasions.
Trial court: Mr. Derby's divorce was granted due to adultery. A separation agreement pertaining
to the disputed property was declared void. Since the agreement was gained through constructive
fraud or duress and was unconscionable, the judge declared it to be unlawful.
Issue:
Can an unconscionable separation agreement that was obtained through coercion or constructive
fraud still be enforceable?
Rule of Law:
●“A bargain was unconscionable in an action at law if it was ‘such as no man in his senses
and not under delusion would make on the one hand . and no honest and fair man would
accept on the other’.” The trial court found evidence that supports a gross disparity
existed between the value of the properties that parties would receive. As Sandra Derby
becomes the sole owner of the majority of the parties' marital property, which is valued at
$260,000 in apartments or $423,00 if converted into condominiums, the appellate court
found the stark difference in the value of the property each party received under the
separation agreement to be startling.
Holdings:
●The trial court was correct to deny the recrimination defense and to grant George Derby a
divorce on the grounds of adultery.
●An agreement that seems legitimate on the surface and whose legality is not contested by
the parties does not require the trial court to carry out a further investigation into its
validity.
●Mrs. Derby did not commit any act that could be considered fraud, nor did she mislead or
hide the conditions or implications of the agreement.
●There was proof that the value of the properties that the parties would receive differed
significantly. The conditions of the resulting agreement were unethical, and the process
was unjust.
●The evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the case was unconscionable.
The Court’s Order:
The trial court's ruling was maintained.
Reasoning:
When determining whether an agreement is unconscionable and should be deemed void, courts
must consider other relevant elements in addition to the seeming inequality. Particularly in
separation agreements, unconscionability might be more significant. Divorce and marriage
produce a partnership that is especially vulnerable to injustice and excess. The psychiatrist's
testimony described Mr. Derby's mental state as one that was intent on mending his marriage.
Despite being aware of Mr. Derby's mental fragile state, the court found that Mrs. Derby had
given him instructions to sign the separation agreement. The court ruled that it was
unconscionable for Mr. Derby to sign the contract.
Galloway v. Galloway
622 S.E.2d 267 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)
Facts:
Mr. Galloway purchased and titled in his own name the marital home property located on a
3.5-acre tract. Mr. and Mrs. Galloway was married in June of 1984. As a wedding gift, Mrs.
Galloway gifted Mr. Galloway with a contiguous parcel continuing .9 acre. Mr. Galloway
started his own company (Cassenvey Heating, Air Conditioning and Refrigeration, Ltd) in 1988.
In 1993, Mrs. Galloway began working for the company as a secretary. A third contiguous 2-
acre parcel was purchased by Mr. Galloway in 1994 or 1995. In 2000, Mrs. Galloway inherited
her father’s debt-free residence valued at $275,000 and $30,000 in cash. In September of 2001,
Mr. Galloway presented Mrs. Galloway with a property settlement agreement prepared by his
attorney that granted him all of the interest in the marital residence and the business. Mrs.
Galloway would receive a 1999 GMC Chevy pickup truck (valued at $11,000). Spousal support
and interest in the other party's pension accounts were waived. Both parties would receive some
personal property. Additionally, Mr. Galloway would pay Mrs. Galloway $400 per week and her
hospitalization as an employee for as long as the parties remain married. Both parties worked to
expand the business and had gross receipts for 2002 reaching over $1 million. After separating,
Mr. Galloway sold the 2-acre parcel for $80,000, netting $18,000.
Procedural History:
The commissioner in chancery concluded that the property settlement agreement was
unconscionable due to a "gross disparity" in the value of the property that each would receive. To
the commissioner's conclusion of unconscionability, Mr. Galloway submitted exceptions. The
trial court accepted his arguments and found that the property settlement arrangement was not
unconscionable.
Issue(s):
●Was it the wife's refusal to pay spousal support that created the unfair situation and
glaring inequality that rendered the separation agreement unconscionable?
●Was it wrong for the trial court to rule that the property settlement agreement was not
unconscionable?
Rule of Law:
●Unless their illegality is obvious and apparent, the law favors marital property settlements
made by competent parties for legitimate reasons and with fair consideration.
●The court will assess whether a [marriage] agreement is unconscionable as a matter of
law. A prima facie assumption that they are factually correct will be established by their
recitation in the agreement. Code Section 20-151(B).
●The underlying facts must be established by the fact finder, and on appeal, we assess
whether there is enough evidence to support the factual findings, even though the
question of unconscionability is a legal one. Regardless of whether there is evidence to
support a different conclusion, we are bound by the factual conclusions reached by the
fact finder of fact if there is reliable evidence in the record to support those conclusions.
Holdings:
Nothing in the record—including the wife's testimony—indicates that the husband deceived,
pressured, or acted in ill faith. She was given the chance to seek legal advice, but she chose not
to. Thus, the trial court's conclusion that the arrangement was a legitimate contract is supported
by the record. The wife's unconscionability was not demonstrated by unambiguous and
compelling evidence.
The Court’s Order:
The trial court's ruling has been upheld.
Reasoning:
●In the worst case scenario, Mrs. Galloway struck a horrible deal, but she read the contract
and had the option—as stated in the contract—to speak with an attorney about it, but she
decided against it. She hasn't provided "clear and convincing evidence" that the
agreement's conditions are unethical.
●In Derby v. Derby, the Court of Appeals applied stare decisis. The disparity in asset
distribution and the presence of any oppressive or overbearing influences are the two
areas in which the court may evaluate this issue. Based on her experience, which the
court determined was a cause of oppression, Mrs. Galloway had appropriate channels for
obtaining work. Additionally, before she signed the document, Mrs. Galloway was
permitted to have Mr. Galloway's agreement amended in front of a lawyer. However,
Mrs. Galloway participated in the signing of the deal.
●Mrs. Galloway wasn't without money. She received a $30,000 inheritance and a $275,000
debt-free house. In addition, she received a pension for her 20 years of employment at
Eastern State Hospital.
●The commissioner's recommendations are not binding on the trial court.
Sims v. Sims
55 Va. App. 340 (2009)
Facts:
Barbara and Marvin Sims were married in 1968 and separated after 38 years of marriage. On
August 11, 2006. Mrs. Sims requested half of everything from her husband. Since he was living
in the home and raising the couples grandson, Mr. Sims did not want to sell the residence. As a
result, he offered to pay Mrs. Sims $2,000 per month “until she had received half of everything
that [they] owned.” This agreement was drafted between late 2006 and early 2007 by Mr. Sim’s
attorney and sent to Mrs. Sims for her review.
Unable to retain an attorney, Mrs. Sims proceeded pro se. When presented with the agreement,
Mrs. Sims didn’t sign it due to Mr. Sims’ retirement or deferred compensation not being
included. Later, Mrs. Sims stated to others that she didn’t want anything, “just wanted a divorce
and how fast [she could] get one.” A revised agreement was drafted by Mr. Sims’ attorney and
Mrs. Sims signed the document on April 11, 2007.
Each party waived the right to spousal support and equitable distribution. Mr. Sims received the
marital residence. Additionally, each party received the automobile and other tangible personal
property in his or her possession. The agreement didn’t mention Mr. Sims’ deferred profit-
sharing account and retirement benefits. Mrs. Sims received only the 1999 pickup truck and
‘yard sale’ personal property in her possession, and was harmless on the debt secured by the
marital residence.
Procedural History:
Mr. and Mrs. Sims consulted with an attorney after separating on August 11, 2006. Mr. Sims’
attorney prepared a property settlement agreement that was sent to Mrs. Sims for review. Unable
to afford an attorney, Mrs. Sims represented herself and refused to sign the first property
settlement agreement. Mr. Sims’ attorney prepared a second agreement in March 2007, as Mrs.
Sims stated she just wanted a divorce and nothing else from the marriage. On April 11, 2007,
Mrs. Sims signed the second property settlement agreement. On May 9, 2007, Mrs. Sims
retained counsel and filed an answer and cross-bill, which alleged that the agreement was
unconscionable. At the April 17, 2008 hearing, Mrs. Sims alleged that due to mental illness and
medications, she was incapable of understanding the document when she signed it. Mr. Sims
filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the trial court. Mrs. Sims filed a motion
asking the court to retain jurisdiction to divide omitted property. The trial court entered the final
decree incorporating the agreement and denied Mrs. Sims’ motion to retain jurisdiction.
Issue:
Is it unconscionable to create a contract that grants the husband practically all of the marital
assets while leaving the wife destitute and dependent on food stamps from the state?
Rule of Law:
●"Any issue of unconscionability of a premarital agreement shall be decided by the court
as a matter of law. Recitations in the agreement shall create a prima facie presumption
that they are factually correct."
●The underlying facts must be established by the fact finder, and on appeal, we assess
whether there is enough evidence to support the factual findings, even though the
question of unconscionability is a legal one. Regardless of whether there is evidence to
support a different conclusion, we are bound by the factual conclusions reached by the
fact finder of fact if there is reliable evidence in the record to support those conclusions.
●stare decisis to examine whether the agreement was unconscionable.
○ Galloway v. Galloway (2005)
○ Derby v. Derby (1989
Holdings:
The agreement was deemed legal since Mrs. Sims was not judged to be mentally incompetent.
The Court’s Order:
The trial court’s judgment was affirmed.
Reasoning:
The arrangement was first declared unconscionable by the trial court, but Mrs. Sims was unable
to provide evidence of Mr. Sims' overreach. Even though Mrs. Sims stated that she signed the
contract in order to quickly dissolve the marriage, she was unaware of the practical implications
of doing so.
Chaplain v. Chaplain
682 S.E.2d 108 (Va. Ct. App. 2009)
Facts:
In 1996, Rabha Chaplain moved to the United States from Morocco. She met Billy Chaplain
shortly after moving. After that, the two began dating, became engaged, and soon began talking
about getting married. Mrs. Chaplain looked over and signed the prenuptial agreement without
question after Mr. Chaplain hired a lawyer to create it prior to the marriage being consummated.
In 1997, the couple tied the knot.
According to the agreement, neither party claimed any of the other's assets. However, there was
discussion of other topics like assets, life insurance, pensions, spousal support, inheritance rights,
equitable division, and divorce expenses. Under the terms of the prenuptial agreement, Mrs.
Chaplain was entitled to $100,000.
Procedural History:
On June 17, 2008, the trial court conducted a hearing to discuss the premarital agreement's
legality.
After determining that the premarital agreement was enforceable and not inherently
unconscionable, the trial court granted the husband's request to strike.
The trial court's decision that the parties' premarital agreement was lawful and enforceable and
not unconscionable is being appealed by Rabha Chaplain, the wife.
Issue:
Is the agreement unconscionable because the husband failed to get the wife's written consent to
disclose his property or make a financial disclosure?
Rule of Law:
●A bargain was unconscionable in an action at law if it was "'such as no man in his senses
and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other.'"
●When assessing whether an agreement is unconscionable, courts must use a two-step test:
"1) a gross disparity existed in the division of assets and 2) overreaching or oppressive
influences."
●In order to warrant equitable remedies, the situation must be extremely severe if price
insufficiency or value disparity are the sole signs of unconscionability.
●A premarital agreement is unenforceable under the Premarital Agreement Act if, in
addition to being deemed unconscionable at the time of execution, the party contesting its
enforceability can show that either (1) she did not execute the agreement voluntarily or
(2) she was not given "a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial
obligations of the other party; and did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any
right to disclosure of the property."
Holdings:
This Court has issued an interlocutory order that is appealable. The trial court erred in allowing
the husband's request to strike and concluding that the wife had not proven a prima facie
evidence that the agreement was invalid under the Premarital Agreement Act.
The Court’s Order:
We agree with this opinion and reverse the matter, sending it back to the trial court for additional
proceedings.
Reasoning:
●In addition to proving that the husband failed to give her the required disclosures before
the agreement was executed and that she failed to "voluntarily and expressly waive, in
writing, any right to disclosure of the property," the wife also established prima facie that
the agreement was unenforceable by presenting evidence that it was unconscionable.
●According to the statute, he must tell his wife about his assets and responsibilities before
she signs the contract.
●The Virginia prenuptial Agreement Act does not address whether the lack of independent
legal advice from counsel may be taken into account when evaluating whether a
prenuptial agreement is unconscionable. However, according to the Uniform prenuptial
Agreement Act's Comment to Section 6, "Nothing in [this section] renders the lack of
independent legal counsel's aid a need for a prenuptial agreement to be unenforceable.
But whether or not the [unconscionability] circumstances listed in [this section] may have
prevailed may depend in part on the absence of that help."
