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Deonna Purrazzo
Liberty University
INTL 500 – Ghosts of Rwanda
10 November 2024
Since 1980, Rwanda has been considered a “failed” state. Helen M. Hintjens describes in
her journal Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda that if Rwanda is an example of a failed
state is not because it is ineffectual, rather it is because the Rwandan government became so
powerful it simply crushed itself. The government of Rwanda had also undergone several
transformations including gaining independence from Belgium in 1962, rising political
radicalism in an effort to cling to power, and an economic recession, all of which could been
seen as contributing factors in the planning of the genocide of the Tutsi population within
Rwanda. (Hintjens, H. M.,1999)
Genocide can be defined as “acts commit with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, including killing, causing bodily or mental harm,
inflicting conditions to bring harm to a group, prevent births, or forceful transferring of children
from one group to another.” (Mingst, K. A, & McKibben, H, p. 373) In Rwanda, genocide was
committed when nearly 800,000 Tutsi were murdered by opposing ethnic group, the Hutu.
Dating back to the 1930’s, Rwandans, under Belgian rule, had been given identification cards,
grouping them into Tutsi, Hutu, Twa. Colonial Belgium policy had favored the Tutsi, giving
them administrative and education jobs whilst giving the Hutu hard labor jobs. Naturally, this
process of identification and favoritism created resentment between groups of Rwandans and
when Rwanda gained its independence from Belgium in 1961, the Hutu were ready to ascend to
power. (Newbury, C., 1995)
For years prior to the tragic genocide, Rwanda had already been the focus on
international attention and diplomacy. In 1992, the Organization of Africa had sent military to
monitor an ongoing civil war within Rwanda. Allies and donors from the international
community including the United States and the European Union had tried to pressure the
President Habyarimana, a Hutu, into negotiations for a ceasefire and in 1992, the United Nations
Security Council deployed a peacekeeping unit to Rwanda with upwards of twenty-five thousand
troops. Eventually the civil war between the Hutu government and the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic
Freedom (RPF) came to an end in August 1993 with the signing of the Arusha Accords.
However, President Habyarimana had no intent to keep his word with the Accords and instead
saw his power slipping away. He laid plans to execute their political opponents and Tutsi
nationals. (Burkhalter, H. J.,1994) Many UN troops were already on the ground in Rwanda
however when repeated murdering of Tutsi’s, even before the genocide officially started, they
did not react. According to Human Rights Watch consultant Alison Des Forge, “when they saw
they could get away with that kind of violence in Kigali with no reaction from the UN troops
who were supposed to be responsible for security, it encouraged them to go ahead with the larger
operation.” (Burkhalter, H. J.,1994)
In the documentary “Ghosts of Rwanda” you hear from main United Nations officials,
peacekeepers, and government officials that were involved in the decision-making processes at
the start of the genocide. General Romero Dellaire, Commander of the UN assistance mission of
Rwanda was in country to negotiate peace between the Hutu and Tutsi. Upon learning of a plan
to “exterminate” the Tutsi and Belgium peacekeepers on the ground through an informant, Gen.
Dellaire informed the UN. The UN however replied with distinct orders of “no action” and urged
the General to allow the informant to know they knew of the plans, hoping to use the knowledge
as deterrent. Unfortunately, the “no action” order only solidified to the Hutu that there would be
no repercussions if they executed their plan, and they did so on April 7, 1994.
During this time, The Clinton Administration was recovering from a devastating blow in
Somalia where operations went wrong at every turn and ended in the death of 18 U.S.
servicemen in 1993. During the Somalian civil war, then-President Bush had approved of a U.S.
led collation that would deploy up to thirty-thousand troops to secure strategic points throughout
Somalia. When the Bush administration turned over the operation to the new incoming Clinton
administration, Clinton had adopted a foreign policy known as “assertive multilateralism” and
wanted to keep troops within Somalia to being national building. Despite efforts to change his
mind, throughout the summer and in the face of violence, President Clinton’s Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin stated “We went there to save a people, and we succeeded. We are staying
there now to help those same people rebuilt their nation. President Clinton has given us clear
direction to stay the course with other nations to help Somalia.” On October 3, a firefight broke
out in Mogadishu airport, killing 18 American soldiers. (Bolton, J., 1994)
In the wake of these early decisions by the Clinton Administration, it was clear that when
faced with the ensuring violence in Rwanda, they were hesitant to get involved. When President
Habyarimana’s plane was shot down on April 6, almost immediately did the plan of genocide
begin. Barriers were placed around Kigali with checkpoints for exit and entry and Prime Minister
Uwilingiyimana was hunted and murdered along with ten Belgian peacekeepers. (Burkhalter, H.
J.,1994) As killing of the Tutsi people began in mast quantities, Belgium had deployed troops to
evacuate Belgian citizens as President Clinton also ordered mass evacuations of all American
citizens and personnel.
Besides ordering the evacuation, President Clinton and his administration strangely were
quiet in the mass killings taking place in Rwanda. Holly Burkhalter states he “limited his
remarks to statements in April calling for all sides to stop the violence, suggesting-wrongly- that
the killings were a consequence of the civil war or random tribal slaughter, rather than a
calculated campaign of genocide. (Burkhalter, H. J.,1994) Even Anthony Lake, President
Clinton's national security adviser, is cited saying within the administration, there was nearly no
discussion about Rwanda at his level. "I asked some of the people from the Defense Intelligence
Agency, `So what's going on? Who's killing who? I haven't seen much about this.' And they
couldn't tell me," Lake recalls. "I should have reached out and said `Tell me more.' And I didn't.
[I was] concentrating mostly at the time on Bosnia and Haiti.” (Public Broadcasting Service)
Samantha Powers, author of A Problem from Hell: America & the Age of Genocide believes that
there were many things that could’ve been done before the genocide begun to prevent it from
starting, as well in the early days of its beginning however it was not brought up by high-ranking
officials with the power to present the issues to the President:
But for even the mildest of those measures to have been carried out, it would have
required high-level ownership of the genocide and of the U.S. response. It would have
required somebody above a kind of State Department assistant secretary level, preferably
somebody of a Cabinet-level post, who simply made it their business to put the issue in
front of the president, to put the issue and even the moral stakes in front of his or her
colleagues in Cabinet-level meetings, in principals' committee meetings.It would have
required personal risk, putting your career on the line, being associated forever with, yes,
a loser, as it were. I mean a loser in the sense that there's nothing geopolitically to be
gained by getting involved with this, and only risks on the horizon. (Public Broadcasting
Service)
It seems like a unanimous answer when asking key players in the Rwanda genocide what
went wrong is the believe that there was a complete lack of leadership from the United States
government. Even if The Clinton Administration felt as though Congress would not approve of
boots on the ground in Rwanda, there would have tremendous benefit from simply have the U.S.
leadership involved. When asked something like this could happen again or if the world has yet
to learn lessons in face of the Ghosts of Rwanda, General Dallaire stated “…I’d like to use the
example of Dian Fossey and the mountain gorillas in the northwest of Rwanda. I have this
terrible feeling that if some outfit wanted to go and slaughter 300-odd gorillas, that today, people
would react with far more consternation than they would if they started killing thousands of
black Africans, Rwandans, in the same country.” He goes on to say “I do not believe that the
developed world actually considered Africans, particularly South Saharan Africans as being total
humans…”(Public Broadcasting Service) General Dallaire’s Executive Assistant, Major Brent
Beardsley believes that the genocide that took place in Rwanda was “definitely a preventable
genocide.” He believes that “I feel that we haven't learned from our mistakes. Instead of like
when in 1945, when we said, "Never again" after seeing the Holocaust, you know, after Rwanda,
it's like "Yet again, yet again, yet again, yet again.” (Public Broadcasting Service)
Despite this feeling among many involved, the international community has attempted to
come together and add provisions as well as promote human rights advocation across the global.
Crimes of humanity are now incorporated into Article 7 of the Rome Statue of the International
Criminal Court, states:
crimes against humanity means any of the following acts when committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible
transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violence of fundamental rules of international law, torture, rape, sexually slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence, persecution against any identifiable group of collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender, enforced disappearance of persons, the
crime of apartheid, or other inhumane acts of similar character intentionally causing great
suffering. (Mingst, K. A, & McKibben, H, p. 375)
There have also been numerous Non-government organizations (NGOs) that have been formed
in the wake of human rights violations. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both
publish issues to try and put pressure on states to get involved and often form coalitions, creating
networks of advocacy and social movements. (Mingst, K. A, & McKibben, H, p. 370) However,
during the genocide in Rwanda, NGOs and more specifically the Christian churches failed to
intervene and provide support.
In Rwanda, churches were used by the Tutsi people as places for refuge however
quickly, the churches became sites for slaughter. Grenades were tossed inside, and gunfire and
machetes were used in crowds of people just outside of the churches. Timothy Longman in
Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda states that one human rights activist group believes
that “’more Rwandese citizens died in churches and parishes than anywhere else.” (CITE)
However, prior to the start of the genocide, the Church was deeply involved in IDing Rwandans
at Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, as well as involved with the President’s regime and power struggle. In
the aftermath it was seen as culpable for the tragic murdering of nearly a million Rwandans
based on its inaction. (Longman, T.)
More than just NGOs have taken on the responsibility that governments around the world
did not. While not a permanent fixture of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is another form of protection that began in the wake of the
failures across Africa in the 1990’s. Because the UN has continuously shown its inconsistence to
call to action, demonstrating that “noble principles were often convenient cloaks for hegemonic
interests” Francis Deng argued that sovereignty included its responsibility to protect its
population (Hornung, J.) By creating societal norms that dictate the meaning of sovereignty as
the simple right to responsibility. R2P was created to “develop global political consensus about
how and when the international community should respond to emerging crises against
humanity.” (Hornung, J.) Within the R2P, one of the main principals’ details that if one state
fails to protect its population from war crimes, that obligation than shirts to the international
community as a whole. When a state does no fulfill its duty to intervene as a bystander, it would
suggest that that state is complicit in the abuse.
Arguments against the R2P state that in order to officially ratified the R2P, it would need
to be modified significantly in order to get nations like China and Russia on board with its
objectives. In modifying the R2P, it would detract from its intended goals and essentially be
watered down to already existing notions. Ideally, the R2P would force governments to put the
needs for victims of crimes of humanity ahead of their own national interests. However, when
faced with that moral dilemma, history shows that nations will put their own national security
and geo-political interests ahead of humanity, nearly every time. (Hornung, J.) Obligation is
another ambiguous definition that individual states cannot agree on. While human rights treaties
state that there is a requirement to take “appropriate” action, appropriate means differ from state
to state.
Despite all the seemingly positive changes towards crimes against humanity, human
rights, and genocide, the feeling that the international community simply cannot prevent of stop
mass human rights abuses. In the awake of the Holocaust, the Convention of the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was created and defined what genocide meant to them.
However, while signed and ratified, it can be both precise and ambiguous to other states, leading
to disagreements on how to compromise or even what constitutes genocide, leaving confusion
and a lack of transparency to allow these mass murders to continue to happen throughout history.
(Mingst, K. A, & McKibben, H, p. 373-4) Regardless, action to criminalize genocide matters.
The International Criminal Court was founded to investigate and prosecute individuals of states
responsible for human rights violations. (Mingst, K. A, & McKibben, H, p. 373-4) Providing a
place where violators will face their actions and perhaps deter others from committing similar
crimes, while perhaps limited, provides some international protection. Organizations like the
UN, which has been discussed at length throughout this paper, provide clear lines of
communication throughout the international community and form alliances where states are
complicit in defending others in the face of crime or warfare.
In conclusion, it seems as though in an effort to save face from a disastrous Somalian
humanitarian effort, the United States and Clinton Administration choice to save its citizens and
military members from possible death over the Tutsi people in Rwanda. With high-ranking
officials having little to no conversations about the predicament or how to effectively stop it in its
tracks, to the media failing to report what was going on, Rwanda was abandoned by the rest of
the world. The world may never know the true toll of the genocide in Rwanda, and it remains
that the world also cannot prevent a similar situation from happening to another group of people.
Reference Page
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https://doi.org/10.2307/20045891
Burkhalter, H. J. (1994). The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administration and
Rwanda.World Policy Journal,11(4), 44–54. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209383
CWInternational. (2012, March 13).Rwanda genocide documentary. YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u3DrvrrSgHI
Hakimi, M. (2010) State Bystander Responsibility,European Journal of International
Law, Volume 21, Issue 2., Pages 341–385,https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chq037
Hintjens, H. M. (1999). Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.The Journal of
Modern African Studies,37(2), 241–286. http://www.jstor.org/stable/161847
Longman, T. (2001). Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda. Journal of Religion
in Africa, 31(2), 163-186. https://doi.org/10.2307/1581515
Mingst, K. A., & McKibben, H. E. (2022). Essentials of International Relations. W. W.
Norton & Company.
Newbury, C. (1995). Background to Genocide: Rwanda.Issue: A Journal of
Opinion,23(2), 12–17. https://doi.org/10.2307/1166500
Public Broadcasting Service. (2004, April 1).Ghosts of Rwanda | Frontline. PBS.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/
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