Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)
Facts:
This case involved the litigation of the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited
providing material support or materials to certain foreign organizations that were deemed to be
terrorist organizations by the United States or engaged in terrorist activities. Those involved
included two U.S. citizens and six domestic plaintiffs which included the Humanitarian Law
Project (HLP), Ralph Fertig, Nagalingam Jeyalingam, and five other Non-Profit groups that were
dedicated to assisting persons of Tamil Descent. The plaintiffs argued that their first and fifth
constitutional rights were violated, and the material support statute was unconstitutional in
nature. The plaintiffs argued that the statute violated their freedom of speech and association due
to the criminalization of the materials that they were providing to the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan
(PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Second, they argued that the statute
was unconstitutionally vague in nature and does not apply to the offenses in question.
The activities that were deemed prohibited were (1) training the members of the PKK on
how to utilize humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes, (2) engaging in
political advocacy on behalf of the Kurds, and (3) teaching the PKK how to petition the United
Nations for relief. Additionally, other acts deemed prohibited by other plaintiffs in this case were
(1) training members of the LTTE to present claims for Tsunami relief (2) offering legal expertise
in negotiations of peace agreements (3) engaging in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils who
live in Sir Lanka
Procedural History:
The U.S. District Court granted the plaintiffs partial injunction and referred to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Courts decision and referred back tot eh
District Court who issued a permanent injunction. The Court of Appeals again affirmed the
District Courts decision in this case, and the government amended the statute to add expert
advise or assistance to justify support to a terrorist organization. The amendment was then
challenged by the plaintiffs to the District Court and the court agreed that the amendment was
unconstitutionally vague in nature. The Court of Appeals dismissed the first amendment claims
and remanded to the District Court who granted partial summary judgement. The Court of
Appeals then affirmed the District Court decision and was then appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court who rendered an opinion in this case.
Issue:
The issue that the court is to decide on is if the plaintiffs violated 18 U.S.C 2339B
(a)(1) which makes it a federal crime to knowingly provide material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization. In addition, if the statute violated the first and fifth amendment’s
rights of the plaintiffs in this case.
Rule(s):
The rules and cases that were used in this case are as follows: Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203, 211 (1961), and The Smith Act. The plaintiffs used Scales v. United States to justify the
use of the Smith Act which prohibited membership in a group advocating for the violent
overthrow of a government.
Application/Analysis:
The plaintiff utilized the Smith Act in relation to Scales v. United States and challenged
the courts decision in the case. The court dismissed this and inferred that it did not apply to the
case. The court informed the plaintiffs that 18 U.S.C 2339B does not criminalize membership of
an organization, but rather providing material support to such a group. The court determined that
the Smith Act did not apply and rejected the plaintiff’s plea. This closed the case for the plaintiffs
in this matter but did in fact authorize a partial justification to the potential unconstitutionality of
the vagueness of the amended statute in this case.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that by the plaintiffs providing their services to the PKK and TLLE
they were in violation of the 2339B statute. The court also decided that in the case the decision
was concluded on various amendments to the statute and decided that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague in nature and was interpreted as such.
In this case I agree with the decision, but also disagree with it as well. The court came to
the conclusion that the plaintiffs were in violation of the statute after various amendments to the
statute. Since this case spanned over a 12-year period of time, it does come into some muddled
results. If the government placed a vague statute into law and it was unconstitutionally vague,
then why were the plaintiffs in the wrong? If a statute is unconstitutional in any way, then it
should be disregarded and determined to be as such. In this manned the government can then
amend any statute it sees fit to and charge anyone with a federal crime.
I agree with the court’s decision due to the particular nature of the case. If the plaintiffs
were providing a service to the PKK and TLLE, it could potentially allow them to use the service
to plan and coordinate future attacks or receive money for future operations. It is unclear if the
plaintiffs were looking to support a terror organization, or if they were merely looking to
peacefully assist them in a manner to better the relationship between the organization and the
government.
Reference
Dwyer, T. P. (2015). In Legal issues in homeland security: U.S. Supreme Court cases,
commentary, and questions (pp. 107–120). essay, Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
