Intelligence can be used in many different contexts such as domestic, international, military,
covert, criminal, civil, and homeland security (Nemeth, 2017). I have only thought of
intelligence in the military and terrorism aspect but intelligence goes far beyond that. It is used in
every aspect of homeland security. Nemeth (2017) described intelligence at its base as nothing
more than information that has been assessed. There have been many positives and negatives
outcomes in the past when intelligence was being utilized. Agencies have learned throughout
history how to avoid the negative outcomes through a variety of learning experiences. As an
imagery analyst in the Air Force, I have always been taught that dissemination is the most
important part of the intelligence cycle. Meeting the deadline for products is important because
customers need the analyzed information to make timely decisions. You could have the best
intelligence product but it is useless if/when the deadline is missed. Furthermore, one of the most
biggest failures of intelligence was the terror attacks on September 11th. Pre 9/11, most agencies
kept to themselves and departmentalized most if not all of the information. This ultimately was
one of the reasons the terror attack was successful. The intelligence community's failure to share,
disseminate, and work collaboratively with other agencies became its downfall. After 9/11,
agencies collaborated and redefined traditional definitions on what intelligence is effective
(Nemeth, 2017). There are plenty of examples of events throughout history that involve proper
and improper use of intelligence.
One major event in history where the proper use of operational intelligence was successful was
the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a series of events including the
discovery of Soviet SAM (Surface to Air Missile) sites stationed across Cuba (Raschky & Wang,
2017). During this time, the U.S. and the Soviet Union leaders engaged in a tense 13-day
political and military standoff over the installation of nuclear-armed Soviet missiles in Cuba
(Haynes, 2019). After the failed invasion of Cuba, Fiedel Castro aligned himself with the Soviet
Union. So in order to deter further U.S aggression and increase the nation’s nuclear strike
capability, the Soviet Union sent nuclear missiles to Cuba. The U.S. already had nuclear missiles
in Turkey, so the Soviet Union used Cuba as a way to level the playing field (Haynes, 2019). The
U.S. suspected that the Russians were constructing installations using different maritime and
other intelligence methods. On October 14, 1962, an American U-2 imagery intelligence
collection confirmed the Soviet projects of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) (Fuelling, 2017). The range of these missiles for
the MRBMs were 600-1,000 miles and the IRBMs had a range up to 2,200 miles (Fuelling,
2017). The result of the imagery brought the world closer to nuclear war than ever before.
Without this imagery intelligence, the Soviet would have increased their first-strike capability by
about eighty percent. According to the State Department, if the Soviet succeeded at a first strike
then only fifteen percent of the US strategic forces could be assured of surviving (Fuelling,
2017). With imagery intelligence, the U.S. was able to create a blockade around the island that
prevented the Soviet Union from delivering more missiles and military equipment. Also, the U.S.
was able to strike a deal with the Soviet Union for the removal of the missiles. Cuba was
promised not to be invaded by the U.S. again if the Soviet Union removed their missiles.
Furthermore, the U.S. had to remove their nuclear missiles from Turkey. The imagery
intelligence from the Cuban Missile Crisis more than likely altered the outcome of this event.
There is no telling what could have happened if the U-2 was running late and the U.S. got the
intel later and made a more rushed decision. Without imagery intelligence it’s hard to say if the
outcome would have remained the same or not. It’s always interesting to see how different
intelligence disciplines come together and provide the bigger picture. At the end of the day,
communication is vital to ensure that proper intelligence is used to bring about the “most ideal”
outcome for the situation.
In Proverbs (ESV) 3:5-6, the Bible states “Trust in the Lord with all your heart, and do not lean
on your own understanding. In all ways acknowledge Him and He will make straight your
paths.” Relying on proper intelligence is vital to the success of any organization. However, as
Christians, our fleshly nature is designed to give us false intel and lead us down a path towards
destruction; which is why it is vital that we solely put our trust in the Lord and allow Him to
lead, guide and direct us.
References
Fuelling, C. (2017). To the brink: Turkish and cuban missiles during the height of the cold war.
International Social Science Review, 93(1), B1.
ESV Study Bible. (2008). Crossway Books.
Hayes, M. (2019). Robert kennedy and the cuban missile crisis: A reassertion of robert kennedy's
role as the president's ‘Indispensable partner’ in the successful resolution of the crisis. History
(London), 104(361), 473-503.
Nemeth, C. (2017). Homeland security: An introduction to principles and practices (3rd ed.).
(CRC Press).
Raschky, P., & Wang, L. (2017). Reproductive behaviour at the end of the world: The effect of
the cuban missile crisis on U.S. fertility. Applied Economics, 49(56), 5722-5727.
