Discussion 4
Suicide Terrorism
A. Key Traits of Suicide Terrorism
In no area of con temporary terrorism has religion had a greater impact than in
propelling the vast increase of suicide attacks that have occurred since 9/11. The years
from 2001 to 2005 alone account for 78! percent of all the suicide terrorist incidents
perpetrated between 1968 and 2005. And the dominant force behind this trend is religion.
Moreover, of the 25 identifiable terrorist organizations employing suicide tactics in 2015
(the last year for which complete data is available), 96! percent (24 of 25) were Islamist.
A de cade ago these movements were themselves responsible for some 80! percent of all
suicide attacks, thus confirming the trend observed by Mia Bloom in her 2005 study of
suicide terrorism, Dying to Kill, that “ there is an increasing and disturbing trend towards
Islamic suicide terrorism.” The Tel Aviv- based Institute for National Security Studies
reached an identical conclusion in assessing the continued rise in suicide terrorist
incidents for both 2014 and 2015.
At the dawn of the modern era of religious terrorism some thirty years ago, by
comparison, this phenomenon was confined exclusively to two countries: Lebanon and
Kuwait. Toward the end of the 1980s, however, suicide terrorism began to spread beyond
the Middle East— first to Sri Lanka, but then, as the 1990s unfolded, to India, Argentina,
Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, and Tanzania. It was also initially embraced by only a
couple of terrorist groups: al- Dawa, an Iraqi Shi’a group, and the Lebanese Shi’a
organization Hez bollah (mostly using its cover name, Islamic Jihad). Hezbollah’s
example of successfully driving the United States out of Lebanon with suicide attacks
subsequently inspired other groups to adopt this tactic, specifically the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or the Tamil Tigers), Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ),
and eventually, al- Qaeda. Even secular, ethnonationalist movements that later resorted to
suicide attacks have either deliberately cultivated religious imagery— such as al- Fatah in
calling its special suicide unit the al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade— combining “al- Aqsa,”
referring to the mosque in Jerusalem that, together with the adjacent Dome of the Rock,
is Islam’s third holiest shrine, and the word “martyr,” among the most potent religious
images—or, like the Tamil Tigers, evidenced characteristics like the single- minded
devotion to, and veneration of, a leader—in this case, its founder and supreme
commander for some three de cades, Velupillai Prabhakaran— that arguably have more
in common with a religious cult such as Aum than with stereotypical nationalist separatist
groups such as the IRA or the Basque ETA.
Terrorists have become increasingly attracted to suicide attacks because of their
unique tactical advantages compared to those of more conventional terrorist operations.
Suicide tactics are devastatingly effective, lethally efficient, have a greater likelihood of
success, and are relatively inexpensive and generally easier to execute than other attack
modes. The terrorist decision to employ this tactic is therefore neither irrational nor
desperate, as is sometimes portrayed; rather, it is an entirely rational and calculated
choice, consciously embraced as a deliberate instrument of warfare— the “strategic
logic” to which Robert Pape refers.
Suicide terrorism differs from all other terrorist operations because the
perpetrator’s own death is an essential requirement for the attack’s success. The suicide
terrorist is the “ultimate smart bomb,” a human missile relentlessly homing in on its
target but with flexibility in timing and access. The suicide terrorist thus has the ability to
effect last- minute changes in his or her attack plan on the basis of ease or difficulty of
approach, the paucity or density of people in or around the target, and whether or not
security personnel are present or other countermeasures are visible. Suicide terrorist
operations are also inexpensive to mount. According to one estimate, the total cost of a
typical Palestinian suicide operation during what has been variously called the al- Aqsa
Intifada (Arabic for “uprising” or more literally, “shaking off”) or the Second Intifada,
which lasted from 2000 to 2005, was about 150.
Suicide terrorism, moreover, is guaranteed to provide media coverage, given its
irresistible combination of savagery and bloodshed. Suicide terrorist attacks are also an
especially power full psychological weapon. With the exception perhaps of only WMD
terrorism, no other terrorist tactic arguably induces the same fear and paralysis in the
terrorists’ target audience. This is, of course, precisely the terrorists’ purpose: to
intimidate government and citizens alike and create a climate of profound fear and
insecurity that the terrorists seek to manipulate and exploit to their advantage. The suicide
terrorist attack is thus deliberately conceived by its practitioners to have farreaching and
profound psychological effects and repercussions well beyond the immediate victims or
object of the attack.
Second, the plan itself was a masterful act of deception that sought to turn
ordinary passenger aircraft into human cruise missiles and hence the ultimate smart
bomb. The 9/11 Commission Report specifically noted this aspect of the operation,
describing its chief architect, KSM, as having used “his imagination, technical aptitude,
and managerial skills to hatching and planning an extraordinary array of terrorist
schemes,” including the “use of aircraft as missiles guided by suicide operatives.”
Third, the 9/11 attacks were relatively inexpensive to mount. According to the
9/11 Commission, al- Qaeda spent between 400,000 and 500,000 to finance the
operation. Its effects on both the U.S. and the global economy, as well as the vast
expenditures on security measures worldwide that followed, have, of course, been
disproportionately immense. Bin Laden himself specifically lauded the cost-
effectiveness of the 9/11 attacks in the videotaped message released just before the U.S.
national elections on October! 29, 2004. After citing a statement made at a conference
held by the venerable London- based Royal Institute of International Affairs that al-
Qaeda “spent 500,000 on the event while America, in the incident and its aftermath lost
— according to the lowest estimate— more than 500 billion,” bin Laden crowed that this
meant “ every dollar of al- Qaida defeated a million dollars by the permission of Allah,
besides the loss of a huge number of jobs.” He then credited the attacks with setting in
motion America’s subsequent bud get deficit problems, stating that this sum had “reached
record astronomical numbers estimated to total more than a trillion dollars.”
Fourth, in terms of lethality and destruction, the 9/11 operation exceeded even al-
Qaeda’s grandest expectations. “I was the most optimistic of them all,” bin Laden
boasted in a videotape discovered by American troops in Kandahar, Afghanistan. “I was
thinking that the fire from the gas in the plane would melt the iron structure of the
building and collapse the area where the plane hit and all the floors above it only. This is
all that we had hoped for.” Al- Zawahiri also credited the attack’s suicide dimension with
its astonishing infliction of death and destruction. “It was the mujahideen’s desire for
martyrdom that was the unique advantage,” he explained in an audiotape released on the
first anniversary of the attack, “which resulted in the stealthy raids on New York and
Washington—by the grace of Allah. Nineteen mujahideen who desired death were able to
inflict damage upon America, such as it had never before witnessed in its history.”
Fifth, the 9/11 attacks had an indisputably power full psychological impact on the
American psyche. They shattered the country’s sense of well- being and invulnerability
that had been predicated on both America’s unrivaled superpower status and its relative
geographical isolation, separated from the rest of the world by two vast oceans. With the
attacks, al- Qaeda sought to depict the United States not only as the “paper tiger” that bin
Laden called it but also as dangerously exposed and therefore vulnerable in the face of
continued suicide onslaught. We love this kind of death for Allah’s cause as much as you
like to live,” bin Laden warned CNN’s Peter Arnett in a 1997 interview. “We have
nothing to fear. [Death] is something we wish for.” Less than a month after the 9/11
attacks, al- Qaeda’s chief spokesman, Suleimain Abu Ghaith, invoked exactly the same
image of unrelenting, future attacks to torment the United States. “The Americans must
know that the storm of airplanes will not stop, God willing,” he said. “And there are
thousands of young people who are as keen about death as Americans are about life.”
Finally, that no escape plan was required and that the 9/11 attacks were doubtless
the most media- covered news story of our time are both self-evident. It remains only to
consider briefly the role that religion played in inspiring and motivating the hijackers.
This is most clearly evidenced by the suicide note that Mohammad Atta, the operation’s
ringleader and one of the four pi lots, wrote to his confederates. It was found at Boston’s
Logan Airport seven days after the attack, in a flight bag belonging to Atta that had
missed its connecting flight from Portland, Maine, onto the ill- fated Los Angeles– bound
American Airlines Flight 11.
Although al- Qaeda is the first terrorist group to have successfully conducted
suicide attacks on land, at sea, and in the air, throughout both the 1990s and the first de
cade of the twenty- first century, the LTTE and Palestinian terrorist movements— such as
Hamas, and some of the Palestinian Popular Front organizations were among this tactic’s
foremost exponents. They not only eclipsed the earlier record established by Hez bollah
but each during that time had perpetrated more suicide attacks than all other terrorist
groups combined— including al- Qaeda. Indeed, since the LTTE first adopted this tactic
in 1987 until the group’s decisive defeat and demise in 2009, its suicide cadres were
reported to have been responsible for over two hundred attacks. The LTTE’s elite suicide
units comprised men, women and children, operated on both land and sea, and, according
to some reports, had also aspired to develop an airborne suicide attack capability. The
various Palestinian terrorists organizations employing this tactic have together similarly
been credited with carrying out more than two hundred suicide attacks since 1993.
The resort to suicide terrorism by the Tamils and the Palestinians has often been
portrayed in terrorist propaganda and world press accounts alike as two sides of the same
coin: intense outbursts of violence born of frustration, occupation, desperation, and
humiliation, caused by the intransigence and brutality of the Sri Lankan and Israeli
governments. Such explanations, however, give a distorted view of the rationale that
underlies suicide terrorism. While such grievances are real and help ensure a steady
stream of recruits, the organizational employment of suicide operations, as previously
described, is an instrumental decision. Suicide terrorism in this respect is seen by its
adherents as a particularly effective way to communicate a violent message. High- profile
attacks are thus conducted for the purpose of demonstrating the terrorist organization’s
ability and determination to use violence to achieve its political objectives. Given that the
LTTE and these Palestinian movements together arguably account for the vast majority
of suicide terrorist incidents committed respectively before and since 9/11, both case
studies are well suited to closer examination to better comprehend the dynamics of and
motivations behind suicide terrorism.
B. The “Tamil Tigers” and Suicide Terrorism
From its founding, the LTTE sought to develop the image of an elite,
professional, and ruthlessly dedicated fighting force. This image was designed initially as
much to distinguish the LTTE from other, better- established Tamil separatist groups as
to intimidate its principal set of opponents: the government of Sri Lanka and the
country’s predominantly Buddhist ethnic Sinhalese majority. During its opening period
of operations, the organization’s tactic of choice was assassination. The LTTE’s targeting
efforts were directed principally against rival Tamils and Tamil and Sinhala government
officials and security forces. Later, as an almost logical extension of these calculated
political killings, suicide bombing became the LTTE’s signature mode of attack, further
reinforcing its image as a distinctive and elite strike force. Indeed, a novel feature of this
tactic was the group’s heavy reliance on women as a suicide cadre.
The LTTE emerged in the mid-1970s in the midst of a period of renewed
intercommunal tensions that was rapidly descending into violence. Twenty years earlier,
the recently formed Ceylonese government had enacted highly discriminatory legislation
that gave preference to Sinhalese over Tamils in government hiring, university
admissions, and the attainment of key professional qualifications. Although these laws
were deeply resented, Tamil opposition was largely kept in check until 1972, when the
legislation was reinforced and further institutionalized in the Republican Constitution of
the newly renamed state of Sri Lanka.
The Sinhala ascendancy over the Tamils was now complete. Long- standing
sectarian tensions resurfaced as Tamil anger mounted over this latest act of
discrimination and disenfranchisement. Among the comparatively well- educated Tamil
youth living in and around Jaffna, the historical center of the community’s cultural
heritage, the passage of the Standardization of Education Act two years before had
already triggered intense resentment and acts of civil disobedience. In the face of growing
discrimination in university admissions quotas, a group of activists formed the Tamil
Students Front in 1970, one of the first groups to specifically advocate violence to regain
Tamil civil rights. In a relatively short span of time, this single movement initiated a
militant ethnonationalist awakening that eventually resulted in the creation of thirtysix
different extremist Tamil separatist groups.
Little is known conclusively about Prabhakaran’s background. Most
commentators agree, however, that he was born in 1954 and was the son of a tax
commissioner— not the progeny of a smuggler, as is sometimes reported. His grand
father is believed to have been a postman. Unlike many rural Tamils at the time, his
family would thus have had both an interest in learning and the means to acquire at least
some formal, if rudimentary, education. Prabhakaran has claimed that his own political
and ethnic consciousness was awakened when he was nine or ten years old, after hearing
stories told to him by his relatives about the bloody history of Tamil- Sinhalese relations
over the course of the previous de cade.
The TNT gained par tic u lar notoriety in 1975, when its gunmen murdered the
Tamil mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiyappah. The group suffered a mortal blow the
following year, however, when Thanabalsingham was arrested. Never one to repine,
Prabhakaran immediately stepped in and assumed command on May! 5, 1976. He
renamed the group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and set about reshaping it in his
own image. Prabhakaran’s immediate challenge was to distinguish the LTTE from its
thirtyplus rivals.
The next watershed in the development of the LTTE was the widespread ethnic
riots that convulsed Sri Lanka in July!1983. The riots were sparked by an LTTE land
mine ambush that killed thirteen SLAF (Sri Lanka Armed Forces) soldiers in Jaffna.
Throughout the country, the disorders escalated rapidly into the bloodiest attacks
perpetrated by Sinhalese mobs against Tamils since Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) had
achieved its in dependence from Britain in 1948. Hundreds of Tamils were killed and
thousands injured. Destruction of homes, businesses, and other property was especially
widespread. The riots proved to be a boon to the LTTE and other militant groups, for
thousands of young Tamils who previously had shunned violence now flocked to the
various guerrilla movements. LTTE propaganda hammered home the point that the Tamil
community could feel truly secure only if they had a land of their own. In the wake of the
devastation, many who had previously resisted the group’s entreaties now found
themselves drawn to Prabhakaran’s uncompromising message. Attempts by moderates
from both communities to restore ethnic amity were rebuffed. This was reinforced by
unthinking government policies that in the riots’ aftermath were viewed as unresponsive,
no conciliatory, and even hostile.
The LTTE meanwhile worked actively to continue to sow discord in an effort to
complete the isolation of the Tamil population from the central government. These acts
included allegedly provoking the government into carrying out misdirected retaliatory
attacks against Tamil targets in order to reinforce the growing ethnic divide. One way in
which the LTTE sought to capitalize on these developments was to draw recruits from the
families of those who had suffered at the hands of the security forces or the Sinhalese
mobs, offering them a venue through which to strike back. Later on, the LTTE’s efforts
to recruit individuals into its suicide units would also focus specifically on the families of
those who had been victimized by the authorities.
In 1983, in an effort to capitalize on the momentum generated by these events, as
well as to further distinguish the group from its nationalist rivals, Prabhakaran decreed
that henceforth every LTTE fighter— male and female alike— would be required to wear
a glass capsule containing potassium cyanide— a highly toxic chemical asphyxiant—
around his or her neck. Prabhakaran’s order was unambiguous: any LTTE cadre who was
in danger of being arrested was obligated to bite down on the glass vial, which would
lacerate the gums and send the deadly poison into the system, for a quick death.
Prabhakaran thus commanded his fighters to kill themselves rather than risk capture and
subsequent interrogation by the authorities.
The most significant turning point in the LTTE’s history, however, was still to
come. Sometime around the mid-1980s, Prabhakaran decided to steer the group down an
even more violent path that would greatly increase its international notoriety. Hez
bollah’s 1983 suicide attack on the U.S. Marine compound in Lebanon reportedly made a
deep impression on Prabhakaran and the Tigers’ senior leadership. A small and little-
known terrorist group was able to offset its relative weakness and in a single devastating
attack strike decisively at the world’s leading superpower. The same tactic, Prabhakaran
is believed to have concluded, could be employed by the LTTE to offset its own
numerical and material disadvantages against the Sri Lankan state. Indeed, it has been
suggested that Prabhakaran became convinced that if the LTTE did not significantly step
up its campaign by resorting to suicide attacks, it would never achieve its goal of winning
a Tamil homeland in his lifetime. “With perseverance and sacrifice,” Prabhakaran is said
to have argued, “Tamil Eelam can be achieved in 100!years. But if we conduct Black
Tiger [suicide] operations, we can shorten the suffering of the people and achieve Tamil
Eelam in a shorter period of time.”
Prabhakaran’s real genius, however, was in creating a historical narrative for the
LTTE and the Tamil people that was tailored to support suicide terrorism. Two themes, in
par tic u lar, were actively incorporated into Tiger lore. The first, as illustrated by
Prabhakaran’s own words just quoted, was the belief that extreme sacrifices would have
to be made to secure an in de pen dent future for the Tamil nation. The cornerstone of the
LTTE’s self- identity became the principle of self- sacrifice and, ultimately, martyrdom,
for the greater good of the Tamil race. This was reflected in the Tamil word thatkodai (to
give yourself), which was used in lieu of the word thatkolai (suicide) to describe the
group’s suicide operations. According to Suppayya Paramu Thamilselvan who, until his
death in 2007 as a result of a Sri Lankan airstrike was the political head of the LTTE,
these operations were regarded by the movement’s suicide cadres as a “gift of the self,” a
“self-gift,” an “oath to the nation,” that [was] offered in the name of Tamil Eelam.
The second theme that Prabhakaran incorporated into the movement’s constructed
mythology was that of “determination and invincibility.” This theme both supported and
was, in turn, supported by his decision to turn to suicide operations in 1987. The first of
the attacks was carried out on May!5 by “Captain Millar,” who subsequently became one
of the movement’s most impor tant martyrs. The target, in this case, was a former Tamil
high school that had been taken over by elements of the Sri Lankan army.
Since the organization was intent on cultivating an image of invincibility, it was
natural that the LTTE would confer a special status to its “Black Tiger” suicide units.
Those who had volunteered to join the Black Tigers were accordingly required to
demonstrate an even higher level of skill, dedication, and motivation than traditional
LTTE cadres. While everyone had to be willing to fight, in Prabhakaran’s view only a
very few had what it took to intentionally sacrifice themselves to destroy the enemy.
“Our strength is our willingness to make the supreme sacrifice,” declared Gena, the
thirty-year- old leader of the female “Black Tigresses” (also known as the Birds of
Freedom) in a 1998 interview.
From its inception, the development and strategic evolution of the LTTE was
inexorably guided by Prabhakaran’s domineering leadership and omnipresent influence.
Prabhakaran exercised direct control over virtually every aspect of organizational life,
imposing a strict, ascetic regimen on LTTE cadres that was based on unquestioned
loyalty to their leader and the goal of Tamil Eelam. This subjugation of individual will
was evidenced by the degree of control that the LTTE exerted over the personal affairs of
its rank and file. Sexual contact or relationships among unmarried cadres, for example,
were strictly forbidden and harshly punished. LTTE cadres could marry only after they
had reached a specific age determined by Prabhakaran, and then only with their
commanders’ approval. Prabhakaran’s pivotal role and unchallenged influence over the
organization were reinforced in a daily ceremony in which cadres pledged allegiance to
Prabhakaran the man, rather than to the organization or to the Tamil people or their
homeland.
Although Prabhakaran is not believed to have ever received any formal military
training, many of his followers deemed him a military genius. His knowledge of strategy,
tactics, weapons, logistics, and military administration was reportedly derived from his
voracious reading of history and military affairs. Prabhakaran’s idea to create a maritime
guerrilla commando unit, for example, was reported to have come from reading a history
of the famed Special Boat Squadron (SBS), an elite unit of the Royal Marines that is
Britain’s counterpart to the U.S. Navy SEALs (“Sea, Air, Land” teams).
Prabhakaran was also described as a film buff, with a strong preference for war
movies and other action thrillers. Once again, he was always prepared to borrow a good
idea when he saw one. Prabhakaran’s idea to design a suicide vest that would allow an
attacker to approach his or her target without being detected is said to have come from
viewing a Death Wish– like movie, released for the South Asian film market. In the
movie, a beautiful girl apparently presents a bouquet of flowers to the president of the
United States. As she offers the bouquet, she kills herself and the president with a bomb
concealed beneath her clothing.
Whatever the source of Prabhakaran’s strategic insights, it is clear that the LTTE
waged a determined and, at times, quite successful military campaign. At one time, the
group was able to field a fighting force of some eighteen thousand men and women.
Indeed, at its peak in 2004, the LTTE constituted one of the best trained and equipped
nonstate military forces in the world— complete with armored and artillery units, its own
blue- , green- , and brown- water navies, an embryonic air capability, comprising light
aircraft, a commando and special reconnaissance force, portable surface- to- air missiles,
and last but not least, the aforementioned suicide attack units. Women, as previously
noted, played a uniquely dominant role in the group’s suicide operations.
Over the years, LTTE suicide attacks were carried out to support two distinctly
different campaigns: a rural campaign and an urban campaign. In the case of the group’s
rural operations, suicide tactics were employed primarily against the Sri Lanka Armed
Forces, often as part of a larger operational plan involving guerrilla and semi
conventional forces. In the case of the group’s urban campaign, numerous and often
highly dramatic suicide attacks were carried out against critical national infrastructure
and what the Tigers referred to expansively as VIPs, such as senior elected government
leaders, prominent political figures, other high- level government officials, senior
military and police commanders, and even lower- ranking military and police intelligence
officers whose competence had attracted the attention of the Tigers.
The Tigers always insisted that “it is not the policy of the LTTE to attack civilian
targets.” “By adopting such a position,” Gunaratna explains, the group “seeks to project
to the international community that it is a liberation movement that targets only military
personnel, and not a terrorist group.” The LTTE, for example, has never taken credit for
the suicide truck bombing of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in January!1996 that killed
ninety people and wounded fourteen hundred others or for the November!1994
assassination of presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake, which claimed the lives of
fifty- four people and injured seventy- two. In 1991, as previously noted, the group also
used a suicide bomber to assassinate former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. Two
years later, a deep penetration mole wearing a suicide bodysuit similar to that worn by the
female cadre who killed Gandhi succeeded in killing Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe
Premadasa. Neither assassination was ever claimed. Government efforts to ascribe such
attacks to the LTTE resulted in denials and the counterclaim that the regime was trying to
whip up anti- Tamil sentiment.
In summary, suicide terrorism became a central tactic in LTTE planning. The
purpose of adopting this tactic was twofold: first, to distinguish the group from its many
better- established political challengers within the Tamil re sis tance and attract a solid
base of popular support, and second, to achieve a perceptual force multiplier that would
allow the LTTE to level the playing field with the Sri Lankan government. To achieve
these objectives, the LTTE worked very deliberately to cultivate an image of elitism,
professionalism, invincibility, and fanatical single- mindedness. The use of suicide tactics
to demonstrate these qualities was a central element of this policy. Prabhakaran and his
senior commanders, as we have seen, were inspired to experiment with this tactic in the
wake of Hez bollah’s stunning attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in
1983. The use of suicide operations was subsequently institutionalized to the point that it
became a hallmark of the Tamil Tigers, symbolizing the determination of the
organization, its membership, and its supreme leader. Prabhakaran’s faith in the
transformative power of this tactic, however, proved grievously misplaced. By 2009, the
three- year old Sri Lankan military campaign to eliminate the LTTE, named “Eelam IV,”
was closing in on the movement’s leader and his remaining senior commanders. On
May!17, the LTTE conceded that their long and bloody struggle had “reached its bitter
end.” The following day, Prabhakaran and 250 of his fighters were killed in the final
assault by the SLAF to seize the last remaining corner of LTTE- held territory. “We have
successfully ended the war,” the country’s defense secretary triumphantly declared as an
uneasy peace, the first in more than a quarter of a century, settled over that embattled
island.
C. The Palestinian Use of Suicide Terrorism
From the time of its founding in 1987, Hamas faced the same problem that had
confronted the LTTE: devising a means of carving out a distinctive niche in an already
crowded field of competing militant groups. Hamas’s challenge, however, was
considerably more formidable. As a latecomer to an already well- established Palestinian
liberation movement with deep popular roots, Hamas not only had to distinguish itself
from competing terrorist organizations, some of which had been fighting for de cades, but
it also had to differentiate itself from a long- standing and power full representative body
— the PLO— which had become the preeminent force in Palestinian politics. That in
2005 Hamas reportedly could claim the support of upward of 70! percent of the
Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza, and by 2006 was the dominant, ruling political
party in Gaza, is testament to the group’s success in overcoming its initial disadvantages.
As in the case of the LTTE, Hamas’s eventual adoption of suicide terrorism as a signature
mode of attack was pivotal to this pro cess.
Although Hamas can trace its ideological lineage to the Muslim Brotherhood, the
group itself arguably owes its existence to a fatal traffic accident that took place in the
Gaza Strip on December!8, 1987. That day, an other wise unremarkable collision
involving an Israeli truck and some other vehicles resulted in the deaths of several
Palestinian workers. Without warning, the mishap triggered an explosion of Palestinian
rioting. The disorders were initially dismissed by Palestinians and Israelis alike as an
ephemeral outburst of frustration. Within days, however, it was clear that events had
taken on a dynamic of their own and that the riots were spreading throughout the
occupied areas. Palestinians began to describe this outpouring of popular anger as an
intifada. The uprising was not even a week old when, on December!14, the Muslim
Brotherhood distributed a leaflet calling for sustained re sis tance.
To more clearly define its agenda and delineate itself from its mainstream
Palestinian competitors, Hamas also adopted the motto of “not [ceding] one inch” of
land, thus further emphasizing its uncompromising opposition to dialogue, much less a
negotiated settlement, with Israel. Nonetheless, the intifada’s early years were
characterized more by Palestinian youths’ throwing stones and general rioting and
popular unrest than by any sustained campaign of outright terrorism. The use of bayanat,
the Arabic word for leaflets, was one of the principal ways in which Hamas publicized
and sought to differentiate itself and its fundamentalist religious orientation from the
secular groups involved in the intifada.
By 1989, however, the intifada’s momentum was ebbing. Hamas, moreover, was
losing ground to its rivals, which now included not only long- standing secular nationalist
Palestinian groups but a new religious group— the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
Confronted by this situation, according to Israeli scholars Shaul Mishal and Avraham
Sela, “Hamas’s turn to violence was a matter of necessity.” Its opening actions, however,
were unimpressive. Lacking a bona fide military wing with the attendant organizational
ability to recruit and train fighters, obtain arms, and plan and control serious operations,
Hamas activists were able to carry out just ten attacks during its first year of dedicated
operations. While the movement managed to increase this number to thirty- two attacks
the following year, the campaign was still having little effect on its targeted constituents,
who continued to favor the group’s better- established, secular rivals.
This all changed, however, with the establishment of a proper military wing in
1991, the Battalions of Izzal- Din al- Qassam, named after a revered cleric turned
guerrilla leader whose rebellion against British rule of Palestine ended when he was shot
to death by police in 1935. The new unit began modestly enough, with the systematic
execution of Palestinian collaborators in the Gaza Strip. By the following year, it had
graduated to the murder of Israeli settlers and the use of car bombs, and was well on its
way to becoming a force in Palestinian politics. Hamas’s increasingly violent successes
spawned both imitation and competition from other Palestinian militants, especially those
who shared the group’s religious orientation. The PIJ in par tic u lar was driven to strike
out in new directions, forging ties with Hez bollah and participating in attacks on IDF
forces in south Lebanon.
The deportations also had a third major unintended consequence: with almost the
entire established Hamas political leadership in exile, the movement did not collapse, as
Israel hoped it would. Instead, the leadership vacuum was filled by the exiles’ more
violent- minded, younger followers. This new generation was concerned less with the
ideological and theological Islamization of Palestinian society, which had been the focus
of much of the organization’s initial efforts, than with the active promotion of the violent
dimension of Hamas’s struggle. Emulating the militarism of historical Palestinian
guerrilla groups like al- Fatah, they pushed an even harder line of no compromise/no
surrender with Israel and focused their efforts on increased attacks in the hope of
pressuring Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories.
Hamas was now well positioned to escalate its military campaign against Israel
and consolidate the political gains it was beginning to achieve over the PLO and other
rivals. These imperatives acquired new urgency in the fall of 1993 with the conclusion of
the Oslo Accords and the commencement of formal negotiations between the PLO and
Israel. The entire pro cess was anathema to Hamas. Not only did negotiations entail de
facto recognition of Israel and the cessation of the Palestinian military struggle, but also
the parameters of the Israeli- Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP) guiding the
discussions called for the eventual implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338, leading to formal Palestinian recognition of Israel’s right to exist.
Within a month of the signing of the Oslo Accords, Hamas initiated a new round
of bombings. Three attacks alone killed twenty- six Israelis and wounded scores of
others. The message Hamas was communicating to Israel and the PLO alike was clear:
there would be no peace and security. While these incidents were impressive in their own
right, they did little to change the basic constellation of forces between either Hamas and
the PLO or between Hamas and Israel. Indeed, in the context of this decades- old conflict,
the latest wave of bombings was neither especially significant nor extraordinary. Both
sides in the struggle had become conditioned to worse violence. Hamas was still nothing
more than a nuisance to Israel—an increasingly violent nuisance, to be sure, but a
comparatively minor nuisance nevertheless. At this critical juncture, Hamas’s challenge
— much as it was only a few years earlier for Prabhakaran and the LTTE— was to find
an operational profile that was sufficiently unique and dramatic so as to alter the strategic
balance between Palestine and Israel once and for all. The solution that Hamas, like the
LTTE, embraced was suicide bombing.
Hamas carried out its first suicide attack on April!6, 1994. The incident, which
killed eight people and wounded thirty- four others, occurred in the northern Israeli city
of Afula. It was timed to coincide with the end of the Islamic period of mourning that had
begun on February!25, when, as previously mentioned, Dr.!Baruch Goldstein, an
ultranationalist orthodox Jew, had killed twenty- nine Palestinian worshipers at the
Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron. The attack was also meant to derail the talks between Israel
and the PLO on implementing the Oslo Accords. Thereafter, another series of suicide
bombings followed, including attacks in Hadera on April!13 that killed five people; at the
Dizengoff Shopping Center in Tel Aviv in October, which claimed the lives of twenty-
two others; and at Nezarim Junction less than a month later where three people perished.
Hamas’s inauguration of suicide tactics also sharpened its rivalry with the
numerically inferior and less consequential PIJ. Fearing its own complete eclipse, the PIJ
now got into the act, too, killing twenty Israeli soldiers in a suicide bombing near
Netanya on January!22, 1995. In all these incidents— for Hamas and the PIJ alike— Hez
bollah’s influence, example, and training are evident. Khaled Meshal, Hamas’s political
leader, was quite candid about this during an interview he gave in July!2000. “We always
have the Lebanese experiment before our eyes,” he explained. “It was a great model of
which we are proud.”
The suicide attacks and the carnage that they wrought were designed to elicit an
aggressive response from Israel. By doing so, Hamas sought to lock Israel into an upward
spiral of violence that would enable the group to portray its violence as defensive and
also more effective than that of its rival Palestinian counter parts. Israel’s decision to
target Palestinian leaders who were believed to be directly engaged in planning suicide
operations fed this dynamic almost exactly as Hamas had planned. In October!1995,
Israeli agents are thought to have assassinated Fathi Shiqaqi in Malta. Three months later
they achieved an even more impor tant success when they managed to kill Hamas’s
master bomb maker, Yahya Ayyash. Ayyash, whose expertise had earned him the
sobriquet “the Engineer”— bestowed by no less a personage than Israeli prime minister
Rabin—is credited with having first proposed that Hamas engage in suicide bombing.
Rather than ending the suicide attacks, however, Ayyash’s assassination triggered
the most dramatic escalation in this campaign to date. After six months of relative quiet,
Hamas suicide bombers struck five times in two weeks, killing a total of 59 Israelis. Their
targets included public buses, populated bus stops, and Tel Aviv’s Dizengoff Shopping
Center— for the second time in seventeen months.
Thereafter, however, the pace of Palestinian terrorist operations began to wane.
Two suicide attacks were conducted in August and September!1996, and three attacks
were carried out between March and September!1997. Hamas’s relative quiescence
during this period, until the final collapse of the Oslo Accords that followed the abortive
Camp David meetings in the summer of 2000, reflected a variety of internal Palestinian
political developments. The first appears to have been the establishment of a tenuous
modus vivendi between Hamas and the governing Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas
agreed to limit its attacks on Israeli targets in return for the Palestinian Authority’s refusal
to cave in to Israeli pressure to proscribe Hamas’s political activities. The second reason
was a product of the short- lived, but for the moment, ongoing, optimism in both
Palestine and Israel about the prospects for a stable peace that persisted despite
Netanyahu’s premiership. The late 1990s were an albeit evanescent time of close
cooperation between PA security forces and their Israeli counter parts— often brokered
and overseen by U.S. government representatives.
Finally, there was Hamas’s policy of “controlled violence.” The rational basis of
this policy was clearly articulated in late 1995 by one of the group’s senior leaders based
in Gaza, Mahmud al- Zahar. In an interview given to the East Jerusalem daily al- Quds,
al- Zahar made a point of explaining how Hamas’s use of violence was a carefully
calculated means to an end. It was not, as its critics suggested, an end in itself. In every
case, he argued, the group’s decision to use force was subordinated to its larger political
objectives. If the prevailing political climate made it necessary for Hamas to put its
military option on the shelf, it was prepared to do so, at least for a period of time.
That self- restraint ended on October!30, 2000, when a Hamas suicide bomber
killed 15 people in Jerusalem. Less than a month before, the visit of prime ministerial
candidate Ariel Sharon to Jerusalem’s al- Haram alSharif or Temple Mount, triggered
what has come to be known as the alAqsa, or Second Intifada, and the escalation of
violence that continued for another five years. The appreciably greater number of suicide
attacks during this phase of the long- standing Israeli- Palestinian conflict attests to the
growing salience and importance of this tactic. According to the database maintained by
Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center, there were a total of 23 suicide
attacks between December! 31, 1993, and September!30, 2000 (e.g., the start of the al-
Aqsa Intifada)—an average of 0.24 per month. During the first 15 months of the al- Aqsa
Intifada, that is, from October!1, 2000, to December!31, 2001, there were 39 attacks—an
average of 2.6 per month. And during the entirety of 2002, when, as of January, the
Second Intifada entered a far more violent and dangerous phase as the alAqsa Martyrs
Brigade began its own campaign of suicide bombings, a total of 59 incidents were
recorded—an average of 4.9 per month. Viewed from another perspective, there were
nearly as many suicide attacks carried out against Israeli targets during 2002 as during the
previous eight years combined (62).
D. Suicide Terrorism as an Instrument of War
It is clear that the leadership of Hamas and the PIJ entered the al- Aqsa Intifada
during the fall of 2000 with the belief that a sustained suicide bombing campaign would
have the desired political effect on both the Israeli government and their own political
base that would be significantly greater than what they could expect to achieve through
more conventional terrorist attacks. Here again, as with the LTTE, the Hez bollah model
loomed large. Moreover, to Hamas’s thinking, suicide attacks were the next step in a
logical progression of escalating violence. “Like the intifada in 1987,” Hamas’s Khaled
Meshal told the BBC, “the current intifada has taught us that we should move forward
normally from popular confrontation to the rifle to suicide operations. This is the normal
development.”
Using almost identical terminology, a member of Hamas’s al- Qassam brigades
explained to Nasra Hassan, an international relief worker posted to Gaza who had closely
followed the suicide terrorism phenomenon since it had emerged in the mid-1990s: “We
do not have tanks or rockets, but we have something superior— our exploding Islamic
human bombs. In place of a nuclear arsenal, we are proud of our arsenal of believers.” As
the preceding clearly evidence, these three Palestinian terrorist movements regarded
suicide attacks as a legitimate means to offset a numerically superior, better- armed, and
better- equipped opponent. Indeed, the material and technological inferiority of the
Palestinian re sis tance was often to justify this tactic. The Palestinians, as one Israeli
scholar has observed, “are fighting with the only tools they possess.”
This is what is known in the Middle East as the “spiderweb” theory. It is the
conclusion drawn by Hez bollah about Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon and has
since been embraced by the Palestinians and others in the region as well. The phrase itself
is derived from a verse of the Qur’an about the inherent weakness of nonbelievers. “The
parable of those who take guardians besides Allah,” verse 29.41 states, “is as the parable
of the spider that makes for itself a house; and surely the frailest of the houses is the
spider’s house did they but know.” It was applied in the context of Israel’s frailty by Hez
bollah’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, who described the Jewish state as a
formidable military power, but one that is rooted in a civil society that has become
materialistic and lazy, with self- satisfied, comfortable, and pampered citizens who have
gone soft.
E. Inverted Sense of Normality and Societal Imprimatur
The Palestinian terrorist organizations have also worked hard to endow suicide
operations with a positive social imprimatur and to ensure the support for this tactic by
the Palestinian people. They have deliberately created an inverted sense of normality
throughout much of Palestinian society whereby suicide— the senseless taking of one’s
life, an act that is usually negatively regarded as aberrant, if not abnormal— becomes
something routinely accepted and applauded, and indeed endowed with demonstrably
positive connotations. The veneration routinely accorded martyrs reinforces this view.
The images of suicide terrorists emblazoned on murals and wall posters, calendars and
key chains, and postcards and pennants are but one manifestation of these efforts.
Videotapes of martyrs before their operations are routinely circulated by the terrorist
organizations as a means to call attention to the organization and its determined fighters,
to cultivate an image of invincibility and the inevitability of victory, and to attract further
recruits. The wedding announcements cited earlier are further evidence of the
recalibration of Palestinian societal values engineered by the terrorist organizations. The
reaction in Palestinian neighborhoods in Gaza when news of a successful suicide strike is
broadcast illustrates this.
The proud parents of Palestinian martyrs have a unique way of commemorating
the accomplishments of their beloved progeny. Instead of publishing announcements of
their children's achievements on the obituaries page of local newspapers, they opt to place
them in the section typically reserved for announcing weddings. This unconventional
choice speaks volumes about the reverence and honor accorded to those who have
sacrificed their lives in the pursuit of a cause deemed noble and just. By commemorating
their children's martyrdom alongside celebrations of union and joy, these parents
emphasize the profound significance of their children's sacrifice and the enduring legacy
they leave behind.
In Palestinian society, where the struggle for independence and dignity is deeply
ingrained in the collective consciousness, martyrdom holds a revered place. Those who
lay down their lives in defense of their land and people are celebrated as heroes, their
names etched in the annals of history alongside the great champions of freedom and
justice. By publishing announcements of their children's martyrdom in the wedding
section of newspapers, parents not only honor their memory but also underscore the
continuity of life and the resilience of the Palestinian people. In the face of adversity and
loss, they find solace in the knowledge that their children's sacrifices have not been in
vain, but rather serve as a beacon of hope and inspiration for generations to come.
Moreover, this tradition challenges conventional notions of mourning and
remembrance, inviting society to reflect on the true meaning of sacrifice and solidarity. It
reminds us that even in the midst of tragedy, there is room for joy and celebration, as we
honor the courage and resilience of those who have gone before us. In essence, the
decision to publish announcements of Palestinian martyrs' accomplishments in the
wedding section of newspapers is a testament to the enduring spirit of a people who
refuse to be defined by their losses, but instead draw strength from the legacy of their
fallen heroes. It is a powerful affirmation of life, love, and the indomitable human spirit
in the face of adversity.
Traditionally, during festive occasions, candy distribution takes place in the
bustling streets, adding to the lively atmosphere of celebration. As the sweets are handed
out, women often respond with traditional shrieks of joy, their voices ringing out in
jubilation and excitement. This age-old custom reflects the communal spirit of sharing
and the joy of coming together to mark special occasions.
The act of distributing candy in the streets holds symbolic significance,
representing a gesture of goodwill and generosity towards fellow community members. It
is a way of spreading happiness and fostering a sense of camaraderie among neighbors
and passersby, regardless of age or background. For women, in particular, the sight of
candy being handed out elicits a visceral response, evoking memories of childhood
innocence and delight. Their joyful shrieks serve as an expression of exuberance and
appreciation, adding to the festive ambiance and creating a sense of shared merriment.
In many cultures, the tradition of distributing candy during celebrations has deep
roots, dating back centuries and serving as a timeless symbol of hospitality and
abundance. It is a simple yet meaningful gesture that transcends language and cultural
barriers, bringing people together in moments of joy and shared happiness. In today's
fast-paced world, where communities are often fragmented and social interactions
increasingly mediated by technology, the act of distributing candy in the streets serves as
a reminder of the enduring power of human connection and the importance of celebrating
life's special moments with those around us.
The observation made by Sadl Abu Hein, a psychology lecturer from Gaza,
poignantly underscores the disturbing trend of martyrdom becoming an ambition for
young individuals within certain contexts of conflict and extremism. As a scholar with a
deep understanding of human behavior and societal dynamics, Abu Hein's words carry
weight, shedding light on the troubling phenomenon of radicalization and the
glorification of violence among impressionable youth.
The notion of martyrdom, once relegated to religious and historical contexts, has
taken on a new and troubling significance in contemporary conflicts, where extremist
ideologies propagate the belief that sacrificing one's life in the name of a cause is not only
noble but also rewarded in the afterlife. This distortion of religious teachings and ethical
principles has led to the perversion of young minds, who come to view martyrdom as the
ultimate expression of devotion and heroism. Abu Hein's observation speaks to the
profound impact of societal influences, propaganda, and indoctrination on the
impressionable minds of children and adolescents. In environments marked by conflict,
instability, and despair, where opportunities for education and economic advancement are
scarce, vulnerable youth are often susceptible to manipulation by extremist groups
seeking to recruit new followers.
Moreover, the normalization of violence and martyrdom within certain
communities perpetuates a dangerous cycle of radicalization, where young individuals
are socialized into accepting and even embracing extremist ideologies as legitimate paths
to empowerment and identity. In such contexts, the allure of martyrdom can overshadow
concerns for personal safety, rational thought, and moral integrity, leading to tragic
consequences for both individuals and societies at large. Abu Hein's observation serves as
a sobering reminder of the urgent need for intervention and prevention efforts to address
the root causes of radicalization and extremism. By investing in education, economic
development, and social cohesion, communities can provide young people with
alternative pathways to fulfillment and meaning, steering them away from the allure of
violence and martyrdom.
Furthermore, Abu Hein's words highlight the importance of fostering critical
thinking, resilience, and empathy among youth, equipping them with the tools to resist
extremist narratives and make informed choices about their futures. Through targeted
interventions, community engagement, and cross-sectoral collaboration, societies can
work together to counter the dangerous allure of martyrdom and build a more peaceful
and inclusive world for future generations.
F. Use of Religion and Theological Justification
Religion and theological justification communicated and encouraged by Muslim
clerical authorities has also played an impor tant role in positively framing popular
attitudes toward suicide operations and encouraging voluntarily acts of self- sacrifice on
behalf of their community. The sermon given by Sheikh Ibrahim Madhi on April!12,
2001, at the Gaza City mosque, which was broadcast live on Palestinian television
demonstrates the power of clerical sanction in support of these attacks. Such messages
are reinforced by Palestinian television channels, which have regularly aired promotional
spots extolling the virtues of martyrdom operations and actively encouraging Palestinian
youth to volunteer. One such segment broadcast in 2003 depicted the image of a young
Palestinian couple out for a walk when suddenly IDF troops open fire, shooting the
woman in the back and killing her. While visiting her grave, her boyfriend is also shot
dead by the IDF.
The depiction unfolds with a vivid portrayal of the aftermath of the martyrdom,
where the protagonist is portrayed ascending to heaven amidst a celestial tableau. There,
he is warmly welcomed by his girlfriend, symbolizing a reunion beyond mortal bounds.
Surrounding them are numerous other female martyrs, depicted in a joyous dance,
embodying the mythical seventy-two virgins, often referred to as the "Maidens of
Paradise," who are believed to await the male martyr in the afterlife.
This imagery, laden with religious symbolism and cultural significance, speaks to
the deeply ingrained beliefs and aspirations within certain extremist ideologies. The
concept of martyrdom, coupled with the promise of heavenly rewards, including the
companionship of virgins, holds a powerful allure for individuals indoctrinated into such
ideologies. The portrayal of the protagonist's reunion with his girlfriend in paradise
serves as a poignant reminder of the allure of martyrdom and the promise of eternal bliss
that awaits those who sacrifice their lives in the name of a cause. It reinforces the
narrative of martyrdom as a noble and heroic act, worthy of the ultimate reward in the
afterlife.
At the same time, this depiction raises profound questions about the nature of
religious belief, the manipulation of sacred texts and symbols for political ends, and the
human capacity for self-sacrifice in pursuit of ideological goals. It confronts viewers with
the complexities of faith, identity, and mortality, challenging them to grapple with the
motivations and consequences of extremist ideologies. In the broader context of
contemporary conflicts and global terrorism, the portrayal of martyrdom and its
associated rewards serves as a potent tool for recruitment and radicalization, exploiting
vulnerable individuals and inciting them to violence in the name of a distorted
interpretation of religious doctrine.
Ultimately, the depiction of the protagonist's ascent to heaven and reunion with
his girlfriend, surrounded by the mythical virgins of paradise, serves as a haunting
reminder of the seductive power of extremist ideologies and the devastating
consequences of their propagation. It underscores the urgent need for dialogue,
understanding, and counter-narratives to challenge and dismantle the appeal of violent
extremism in all its forms.
In fact, just two days before the August!18, 2003, suicide bombing of a bus in
Jerusalem by a Hamas terrorist that killed eighteen people, a music video version of this
same spot aired on the Palestinian Authority’s television station. In commentary provided
on the same station the day before the blast, an Islamic scholar explained: “When the
Shahid [martyr] meets his Maker, all his sins are forgiven from the first gush of blood. He
is exempted from the ‘torments of the grave’ (Judgment); he sees his place in paradise, he
is shielded from the great shock, and marries Dark Eyed Virgins. He is a heavenly
advocate for 70 members of his family, on his head is placed a crown of honor, one stone
of which, is worth more than all there is in this world.”
The language and terminology are, of course, reminiscent of the medieval
Assassins’ doctrine, invoking the paradise that awaits the holy warrior. Indeed, the
pleasures of alcohol— which all Muslims are forbidden in their lives on earth— and sex,
according to some accounts of interpretations— are permitted in this glorious afterlife, in
which the commandments of the sharia do not apply. Not surprisingly, perhaps, from the
time of the first Islamic suicide bomb attacks in the early 1980s, witnesses and survivors
have often recounted how the bombers were seen smiling just before blowing themselves
and their victims up.
One reason perhaps that the parents and other relatives of suicide bombers
applaud and praise the violent deaths of their progeny and relatives may be because of
their own impending salvation. For instance, it is widely believed that by becoming a
martyr the suicide terrorist is able to intercede with God and ensure that seventy members
of his family enter heaven. Barbara Victor, an American journalist, recalls in her book on
female Palestinian suicide bombers a conversation she had in January! 2003 with Sheikh
’Abd- Salan Abu Shukheudem, the chief mufti of the Palestine Authority Police Force—
a position akin to the official chaplain of a British or American police force. Sheikh Abu
Shukheudem detailed for Victor the seven rewards that, according to Islamic tradition,
are bestowed on the martyr for his or her act of self- sacrifice.
Nasra Hassan writes of a meeting she had in 1999 with a young Hamas affiliated
imam, a graduate of Cairo’s prestigious al Azhar University, who was similarly eloquent
in his depiction of the afterlife that awaits the martyr. “He explained that the first drop of
blood shed by a martyr during jihad washes away his sins instantaneously. On the Day of
Judgment, he will face no reckoning. On the Day of Resurrection, he can intercede for
seventy of his nearest and dearest to enter Heaven; and he will have at his disposal
seventy- two hour is, the beautiful virgins of Paradise.”
G. Rivalry and Competition Between Terrorist Groups
Finally, rivalries between the various Palestinian terrorist organizations also
spawned intense competition. The struggle for both political preeminence and popular
support has long characterized Hamas- PLO/PA relations. A new element was introduced
into this equation in November!2001 with the formation within Fatah and the irregular
militias under its command, known as the Tanzim, with the creation of the al- Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade as its specially dedicated suicide terrorist unit. Fears of Hamas’s
growing popularity and enhanced prestige among Palestinians had persuaded the PLO/
PA leadership that it now had to compete directly with its rival. External as well as
internal considerations likely figured prominently in this decision. First was the
dangerous erosion of morale among the PLO/PA’s fighters, who watched as Hamas’s
power and influence increased as that of their organization eroded.
The evolution of suicide tactics within the context of the Palestinian conflict
reveals a multifaceted interplay of strategic, ideological, and organizational dynamics. As
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) grappled
with internal challenges and external pressures, the adoption of suicide tactics emerged as
a complex and contentious strategy with far-reaching implications.
One significant factor driving the embrace of suicide tactics was the perceived
need to reinvigorate the PLO/PA and counter the ascendance of Hamas, a rival militant
organization known for its uncompromising stance and effective use of violence. In the
face of Hamas's growing influence and popularity, some within the PLO/PA leadership
saw suicide operations as a way to regain momentum and assert their relevance in the
struggle against Israel. Moreover, there was a strategic calculus at play, with some
proponents of suicide tactics viewing them as a means to level the playing field and
inflict significant casualties on Israeli forces and civilians. By adopting these tactics, the
PLO/PA hoped to demonstrate their commitment to resistance and their capacity to exact
a heavy toll on their adversaries, thereby bolstering their bargaining position in
negotiations and rallying support among their constituency.
Additionally, there was a belief among certain factions within the PLO/PA that
embracing suicide operations would attract a surge in recruits and galvanize popular
support, mirroring the experiences of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Both
Hamas and the PIJ had seen an influx of volunteers and supporters following high-profile
suicide attacks, which were often glorified as acts of martyrdom in the eyes of
sympathizers. However, the decision to embrace suicide tactics was not without
controversy and internal dissent. Critics within the PLO/PA warned against the moral and
strategic pitfalls of resorting to indiscriminate violence, cautioning that such actions
could alienate international allies, tarnish the Palestinian cause, and provoke harsh
reprisals from Israel.
Moreover, there were concerns about the long-term consequences of embracing a
strategy rooted in martyrdom and sacrifice. While suicide operations may yield short-
term gains in terms of media attention and propaganda value, they also carry significant
risks, including the loss of civilian lives, the erosion of moral legitimacy, and the
perpetuation of cycles of violence and retaliation. In sum, the embrace of suicide tactics
by the PLO/PA represented a complex calculus of strategic imperatives, ideological
considerations, and organizational dynamics. It reflected a desperate bid to regain
relevance, counter the rise of Hamas, and mobilize popular support, even as it raised
profound questions about the ethics and efficacy of such tactics in the pursuit of
Palestinian rights and aspirations.
In November!2001, Fatah signaled its entry into the realm of suicide terrorism by
launching a joint operation with the PIJ. Two terrorists from each group— one of whom
was a member of the Palestinian Authority’s police force, based in Jericho— blew
themselves up on a bus near Hadera. Now deprived of the means to wage a more
conventional terrorist campaign of its own choosing and now even more fearful of being
eclipsed by Hamas, al- Fatah was driven to intensify al- Aqsa Martyrs operations. Indeed,
it is probably no coincidence that within weeks of the loss of the Karine- A shipment, the
first female suicide bomber appeared. Her name was Wafa Idris, a twenty- eight- year-
old divorcée who worked as a medical secretary for the Palestinian Red Crescent.
The harrowing account unfolds with the recruitment and deployment of an
individual on a suicide bombing mission to Jerusalem, carried out in the name of the
notorious al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. In this tragic event, the consequences were
devastating: one person, an elderly eighty-one-year-old man, lost his life, while a
staggering one hundred and fourteen others were left wounded, bearing the physical and
emotional scars of the indiscriminate violence unleashed upon them.
This poignant narrative underscores the human toll of extremist ideologies and the
lengths to which militant groups will go to advance their agendas. The use of suicide
bombings, with their indiscriminate targeting of civilians, represents a particularly
heinous form of violence, inflicting widespread suffering and leaving communities
shattered in their wake.
Moreover, the recruitment and deployment of individuals, often vulnerable and
impressionable, to carry out such horrific acts speak to the insidious nature of
radicalization and the manipulation of human desperation and despair for nefarious ends.
It lays bare the tragic consequences of ideological indoctrination and the exploitation of
individuals for the pursuit of violent agendas.
Beyond the immediate casualties, the ripple effects of such attacks reverberate far
and wide, leaving communities traumatized, families shattered, and societies divided. The
loss of innocent lives and the anguish of those left behind serve as a stark reminder of the
urgent need to address the root causes of extremism and to foster a culture of tolerance,
dialogue, and mutual understanding.
In recounting this heartbreaking episode, we are confronted with the stark realities
of our world, where the forces of hatred and intolerance continue to wreak havoc on
innocent lives. Yet, amidst the darkness, there is also hope: hope for resilience, for
solidarity, and for the unwavering commitment to building a future where such senseless
violence has no place.
The al- Aqsa Martyrs operations challenged Hamas and the PIJ, and set in motion
an almost macabre competition among them of who could mobilize and deploy the
largest number of and the most effective “martyrs.” The succession of terrorist incidents
that convulsed Israel during the first part of 2002 was likely fueled by this competition.
Indeed, by any measure, 2002 was an astonishing year for Israel in terms of suicide
bombings. There were on average five successful suicide attacks per month in 2002,
nearly double the number of successful attacks during the first fifteen months of the al-
Aqsa Intifada— which itself is a figure more than ten times the monthly average since
1993.
The distribution of groups claiming credit for suicide attacks during the
tumultuous year of 2002 provides a revealing glimpse into the dynamics of conflict and
extremism in the region. Amidst a landscape marked by heightened tensions and
escalating violence, a total of fifty-nine such incidents were recorded, each leaving a trail
of devastation and despair in its wake.
At the forefront of this grim tally was the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which
claimed responsibility for a staggering twenty-five of these attacks, constituting an
alarming forty-two percent of the total. With a relentless campaign of violence, the al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade emerged as a formidable force, unleashing a wave of suicide
bombings that struck fear into the hearts of civilians and authorities alike.
Close on its heels was Hamas, a militant organization known for its
uncompromising stance against Israel and its steadfast commitment to armed resistance.
Accounting for sixteen of the recorded suicide attacks in 2002, Hamas demonstrated its
deadly efficacy in pursuing its ideological agenda through acts of terror and bloodshed.
Not far behind was the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which claimed credit for
twelve of the incidents, comprising a significant twenty percent of the total. Despite its
smaller share of the pie, the PIJ's role in perpetrating suicide attacks underscored its
status as a key player in the region's volatile landscape, willing to resort to extreme
measures in pursuit of its goals.
Beyond the raw numbers, the distribution of these attacks speaks volumes about
the complex web of rivalries, alliances, and strategic calculations that underpin the
Palestinian militant movement. Competing for influence, resources, and ideological
supremacy, these groups engaged in a deadly game of one-upmanship, each vying to
assert its dominance on the battlefield and in the court of public opinion.
Moreover, the prevalence of suicide bombings during this period underscores the
brutal tactics employed by these groups in pursuit of their objectives. Deliberately
targeting civilian populations, these attacks inflicted indiscriminate suffering and loss,
leaving scars that would linger long after the smoke had cleared.
In hindsight, the distribution of groups claiming credit for suicide attacks in 2002
serves as a sobering reminder of the human cost of conflict and the imperative of seeking
peaceful resolutions to entrenched grievances. It highlights the urgent need for dialogue,
reconciliation, and concerted efforts to address the root causes of violence, lest the cycle
of bloodshed and retribution perpetuate indefinitely.
