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Intelligence failures of Pearl Harbor
In the argument of if the intelligence failures of Pearl Harbor and 9/11 were
similar, I would have to agree with Dahl and say that they were similar in the failures
that they present with. It is not easy to say if the attacks could have necessarily been
prevented; however, there could have been more preparation prior to both attacks
that could have limited the damage and loss of life that occurred during these two
historic attacks. There could have been plans put into place to be able to counter the
attacks. I would have to say that I feel like these the two tragedies are similar due to
the lack of any tactical-level intelligence and warning. There also happened to be
poor receptivity of intelligence warning coming from the decision makers. Pearl
Harbor had failures because the military leaders failed to take the best actions
necessary to provide defense against the Japanese attack. The military personnel
had gained intelligence prior to the attacks that raised red flags and alerted to some
kind of warning involving what it was that Japan was planning on doing. However,
nothing was done about it. An investigation ensued and it was from that investigation
that it was determined that the attack on Pearl Harbor happened as a result from
deficiencies that were “Supervisory, administrative, and organizational” (Dahl, 2013).
They indicated that the deficiencies hadn’t been around for a long period of time as
they “existed in our Military and Naval establishments in the days before Pearl
Harbor” (Dahl, 2013).
The attacks that took place on 9/11, destroying the World Trade Center, was similar
to that of the Pearl Harbor attack given that there were clear warning signals, alerting
to a potential threat but yet again, there was nothing done about it. It was clearly
ignored. As it is stated in the text, “even accounting for hindsight, it is difficult to
understand how the government, the public, and the scholarly community all failed to
respond to the threat posed by al-Qaeda, in a way that is eerily similar to the failures
that preceded Pearl Harbor” (Dahl, 2013). One question that remains is whether
leaders knew the severity of the threat from al-Qaeda. The former Director of Central
Intelligence was confident that the severity of the threat was known by officials
(Marrin, 2011).
It would not be unreasonable that these two attacks have their similarities when it
comes to the failures that they had. One of the main pieces that make the Pearl
Harbor and the September 11 attacks similar is that decision makers in both
situations failed to take action when they were presented with very clear tactical level
intelligence and warnings; the warnings were simply ignored. If those miliary leaders
in Pearl Harbor, as well as the government leaders during September 11, 2001
would have been more open and receptive to the warning and tactical level
intelligence that they received, like previously mentioned, there could have been a lot
smaller amount of lives that were lost on those days and damages may not would
have been as bad as they ended up being.
References
Dahl, E. J. (2013). Intelligence and surprise attack: Failure and success from Pearl
Harbor to 9/11 and beyond. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
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Marrin, S. (2011). The 9/11 terrorist attacks: A failure of policy not strategic
intelligence analysis. Intelligence and National Security, 26(2-3), 182–202.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.559140
