Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
Facts
In 1890, Louisiana required that all trains provide, equal but separate accommodations for white and
colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each train. In 1892 Plessy the plaintiff,
took a vacant seat that was designated for white passengers. Plessy was described by the court as of
mixed decent and was ordered to take another seat. Plessy refused and was ejected out of the train by a
police officer, and arrested. His bond was posted for five hundred dollars and was released. Plessy filed a
suit against the judge who convicted him, John H. Ferguson.
Issue
May a state enact a law providing for separate but equal railway cars for Caucasian and African American
persons consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Holding
Yes.
Rationale
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution was designed to enforce the equality between the races, it
was not intended to abolish distinctions based on color, or to enforce a commingling of the races in a
way unsatisfactory to either. Laws requiring the separation of the races do not imply the inferiority of
either. If the law “stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority,” it is because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it. Therefore, the statute constitutes a valid exercise of the States’
police powers. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does, however, require that the exercise
of a State’s police powers be reasonable. Laws enacted in good faith, for the promotion of the public
good and not for the annoyance or oppression of another race are reasonable
Judgement
Affirmed
Dissent
Justice Harlan
The constitution does not permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be
protected in the enjoyment of such rights. The constitution is color blind and neither knows or
tolerates classes among citizens.. there is no superior dominant, ruling class of citizens in respect
of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law
Notes
14th Amendment can only enforce legal equality not social equality
Plessy Aftermath
NAACp created strategy to attack separate but equal in Jim Crow South
oEqual pay for teachers
oAccess to graduate and professional schools
oFocused on ensuring schools were truly equal in hopes of breaking finances
Sweatt v. painter
Facts
Herman Marison Sweatt, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School but was restricted
because of his race.
Issue
Does the United States Supreme Court decide constitutional questions only when necessary to dispose
of the case at hand?
Holding
Yes.
Rationale
The Court looks for ways to dispose of a case on nonconstitutional grounds. If it becomes necessary to
decide the case on constitutional grounds, the Court tries to do so in as narrow a way as possible. The
parties to Sweatt's case dispute whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be overturned. Plessy dealt with the
respective equal protection rights of majority and minority groups. Deciding Sweatt's case on the basis of
Plessy's continuing validity would require the Court to explore the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning
and the impact of recent research on racial segregation. This analysis is unnecessary, however, because
other cases hold that the Equal Protection Clause protects individual rights rather than group rights and
guarantees an individual's right to an equal opportunity to receive state-sponsored legal education.
Thus, the Court need only make the narrow factual determination of whether Texas offered Sweatt an
educational opportunity comparable to the opportunity he was denied at the university. No matter how
comparable the two schools might be in resources or other tangible factors, they are not comparable in
the opportunities they would provide for Sweatt to network with the white students who constitute the
majority of future Texas lawyers or to obtain a prestigious degree that would give him access to top legal
jobs. By denying Sweatt equal access to these intangible benefits, Texas violated the Equal Protection
Clause. The decision of the Texas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins
Facts
In 1880, San Francisco passed an ordinance that required operators of laundries in buildings not made of
brick or stone to apply for a permit to continue operation. At the time, 320 of the laundries in San
Francisco were constructed of wood. Yick Wo and Wo Lee (defendants) were laundry operators of
Chinese descent. They and over 200 other laundry operators of Chinese descent sought permits to
continue their operations. All but one of their requests were denied. However, 80 of 81 similarly situated
laundry operators who were not of Chinese descent were granted permits. Yick Wo and Wo Lee were
fined and imprisoned after they continued to operate their laundries without permits. Yick Wo appealed
to the California Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction. Wo Lee filed a habeas corpus petition in
federal court, but the court denied relief. Yick Wo and Wo Lee appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
Issue
Does a facially neutral law that is applied in a discriminatory manner on the basis of race or nationality
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Holding
Yes. A facially neutral law that is applied in a discriminatory manner on the basis of race or nationality
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rationale
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the equal protection of the laws to all people within the United
States. The Equal Protection Clause applies not only to racial discrimination, but also to discrimination
based on a person's nationality or alienage. Equal protection is denied when a facially neutral law is
applied unequally among similarly situated people. Here, the San Francisco ordinance appears to be
neutral and fair on its face. However, the ordinance has been applied unequally to similarly situated
people. Notwithstanding the fact that Yick Wo and Wo Lee have complied with all requirements of the
ordinance, the administrators denied their petitions and the petitions of all but one of the other laundry
operators of Chinese descent, while granting permits to 80 of 81 applicants who were not of Chinese
descent. These facts demonstrate that the permits were denied for no reason other than hostility against
their Chinese nationality. Thus, the application of this ordinance has denied Yick Wo and Wo Lee the
equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, their
imprisonment is illegal, and they must be discharged from custody.
Notes
This was not under the immunities and privileges clause
Facial constitutionality
Equal protection clause
Though the law be fair on its face, and impartial in appearances, yet, if applied and administered
by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically
An ordinance that acknowledges neither guidance nor restraints is unconstitutional
Brown v. Board of Education
Facts
he present case represented a consolidation of cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Delaware. In each state, African American minors sought the aid of their state courts in gaining
admission to public schools on a non-segregated basis. In all instances, Brown and other minor African
American children (plaintiffs) had been denied admission to public schools attended by white children
under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. They alleged that this segregation
deprived them of Equal Protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1951, Brown first
filed suit against the Board of Education for Topeka, Kansas (defendant) in federal district court. The
district court ruled in favor of the Board of Education, citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 507 (1896), as
guidance. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
Whether the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the
physical facilities and other tangible factors are equal, deprives the children of the minority group of
educational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Holding
Yes. In deciding the issue it is not possible to rely on the original intent surrounding adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment because prior cases and the legislative history involved in its enactment are
inconclusive as to the true extent of its meaning.
Rationale
Additionally, it is not helpful to look at the status of public education at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, as most Caucasian children were then educated by private schools, and most
African American children were not educated at all. Very few public schools existed at the time, which
adds to the difficulty in determining the historical intentions surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment’s
effect on public education. An examination of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself is utilized to
determine the intent behind the Amendment’s application to public education. The basic language of
the Amendment suggests that it was passed to prohibit all forms of discriminatory legislation against
African Americans. In the present case, all basic attributes of the Caucasian and African American schools
are essentially the same. To determine whether the segregated schools violate the Fourteenth
Amendment as interpreted, it is necessary to examine the actual effect of this segregation on the
institution of public education as a whole. Public education has, over the years, become one of the most
valued and important public services performed by state and local governments. Children can hardly be
expected to succeed in life if they are not educated. Thus, when an opportunity for education exists and
the state has undertaken to provide it, that opportunity must then be made available to all students on
equal terms. In the present case, the opportunity for education is not equally provided to minority
students, as the existence of segregation has a profound and detrimental effect on their hearts and
minds. Modern studies confirm that the children experiencing segregation feel inferior, become less
motivated, and perform at a lower standard than children that do not experience segregation. To the
extent to which Plessy held to the contrary regarding the psychological effects of segregation, it is hereby
overturned. The African American students are deprived of equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment because of the segregation in their public education. The decision of the district
court is reversed.
Bolling v. Share
Liberty
Anything you are free to pursue is a liberty interest
Liberty cannot be restricted except for roer government objective
What if the rivilages and immunities clause had not been eroded
Brown v. Board of Education II
Facts
In its original decision in Brown v. Board of Education (I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the United States Supreme
Court held that racial discrimination in public education was unconstitutional. The Court upheld a
challenge by Brown (plaintiff) to discriminatory racial policies in public schools operated by various
boards of education (defendant) in several different states. However, in deciding the original case, the
Court left open the question of the appropriate remedy for plaintiffs based on its holding. In the present
case, the Court heard arguments from public schools requesting relief concerning the task of
desegregation. The Court sought to further explain the specific requirements imposed on public schools
in its previous holding that all schools must desegregate.
Issues
Must public schools desegregate “with all deliberate speed” in order to comply with the Court’s previous
holding that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional?
Holding
Yes. Since the original decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) one year ago, public
schools have taken substantial steps towards fully desegregating
Rationale
individual school officials are responsible for implementing constitutional principles in good faith, but
the various district courts that originally heard the cases against all schools involved in Brown are best
equipped to determine whether a good faith effort is being made. The case is remanded to those courts.
In rendering decisions on the cases, each respective district court is guided by principles of equity. The
courts are responsible for furthering the interest of plaintiffs in gaining admission to public schools as
soon as possible on a nondiscriminatory basis. The ultimate date of compliance by schools with this
interest is up to the discretion of individual courts, which should require schools to desegregate “with all
deliberate speed.” Ultimately, the continuing responsibility of monitoring compliance with the Court’s
1954 ruling is left to the district courts.
Cooer v. Aaron
Facts
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the United States Supreme Court held that racial
segregation in public schools is unconstitutional and ordered the desegregation of public schools in the
southern United States. An Arkansas federal district court, relying on Brown, ordered the desegregation
of schools in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Little Rock school board was unable to comply with that decree
after the Governor of Arkansas blocked African American students from attending a segregated school by
calling in the National Guard. The district court issued an injunction against the Governor, and African
American students were eventually permitted to attend desegregated schools with the protection of
federal troops. The Little Rock school board, represented by Cooper (plaintiff), brought suit in federal
district court seeking a postponement of the desegregation plan in the state due to the uneasy
circumstances present. The suit was challenged by Aaron (defendant), representing African American
children in Arkansas. The district court granted relief, but the court of appeals reversed. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
Whether state officials are bound by federal court orders based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the United States Constitution.
Holding
Yes. The Arkansas Governor and state legislature are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown,
and Brown is reaffirmed.
Rationale
state officials and state legislatures must comply with orders of the United States Supreme Court based
on its interpretation of the United States Constitution. Article VI (Supremacy clause of the Constitution
makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch 1) 137
(1803), the Court held that the federal judiciary, and particularly the United States Supreme Court, has
final authority in interpreting the Constitution, or saying “what the law is.” Thus, it follows that the
decisions of the Supreme Court, in interpreting the Constitution, become the “supreme Law of the Land
and are binding on state officials and legislatures. Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer
swears an oath to “support the Constitution,” and thus must abide by the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution. In Brown, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution as prohibiting racial discrimination in public schools. This interpretation is thus
binding on the Arkansas state officials and legislature. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Loving v. Virginia
Facts
In June 1958, Mildred Jeter, an African American woman, and Richard Loving, a Caucasian man
(defendants), were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. They later moved to Virginia
(plaintiff) and resided in Caroline County. The laws of Virginia, however, banned interracial marriages
within the state. In October 1958, the Lovings were indicted for violating the Virginia law. They plead
guilty and were sentenced to one year in jail, but the trial court suspended the sentence for twenty-five
years on the condition that the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return to the state together for
twenty-five years. The Lovings then moved to the District of Columbia, but filed suit in state trial court to
vacate the judgment against them on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the constitutionality of
the Virginia statutes and upheld the convictions. The Lovings appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
Issues
May a state enact a statute that prevents marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial
classification without violating the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Holding
No. State bans on interracial marriages were passed as a reaction to slavery and have been present since
the colonial period
Rationale
Such bans were affirmed by the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during a period of extreme nativism
following World War I. However, in the fifteen years preceding the Lovings’ case, fourteen states had
repealed their own similar bans on interracial marriage. In the present case, the Commonwealth of
Virginia seeks to uphold its interracial marriage ban on the grounds that it furthers a legitimate state
purpose of preserving racial integrity and preserving racial pride. Virginia also argues that the regulation
of marriage has traditionally been left to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Finally, Virginia argues
that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause suggested that it is only obligated to apply its laws
equally among different groups of people. Thus, it argues that it is complying with its obligation by
preventing interracial marriage for all people, not just Caucasians. The argument that the mere equal
application of a law is enough to overcome the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on invidious racial
discrimination is rejected. Virginia’s statute is motivated solely to restrict marriage based on race, and by
precedent, such laws have been found to be a threat to equality. At the very least such race-based
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and cannot be upheld unless they are shown to accomplish a
permissible state objective independent of the racial discrimination. In the present case, there is no
legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination that justifies Virginia’s
classification. The Virginia statutes violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.
Regents of U.C. v. Bakke
Facts
Issue
Holding
No.
Rationale
Concurrence
No. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a public university may not
discriminate on the basis of race in its admissions policies, even if doing so benefits members of minority
races. All racial and ethnic classifications are inherently suspect and must be viewed with strict scrutiny.
That is, they are only constitutional if narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. The
framers did not intend the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection to apply only to
racial minorities. The argument that the white “majority” is “preferred” in society and thus less
susceptible to the evils of racial classifications is unpersuasive. There is no principled basis for viewing
racial classifications that benefit minorities at the expense of the white “majority” as benign.
Additionally, any such preferences serve to reinforce negative stereotypes against minorities by
suggesting that they can only succeed societally and professionally with the assistance of special
preferential programs. Thus, the medical school’s program can only be sustained if it is narrowly tailored
to further a compelling state interest. The University Regents argued that the program is necessary to
“reduce the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and the medical
profession,” to counter the effects of societal discrimination, to increase the number of physicians who
will practice in underserved communities, and to obtain the educational benefits associated with an
ethnically diverse student body. The first goal is not a compelling purpose because the Constitution
expressly forbids preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin.
The second goal is invalid because the Court has never approved a classification of racial groups that
benefits people perceived as “victims” in society at the expense of other perfectly innocent people. The
third goal is unsupported by evidence that admitted more minority students will actually result in a
greater amount of physicians practicing in underserved areas. The fourth goal of increasing diversity is a
permissible purpose, but the particular medical school problem falls short because it fails to consider any
aspect of “diversity” other than race in its admissions policies. The medical school may consider race as a
“plus” in its overall evaluation of an applicant, but may not make admissions decisions solely based on
race. The admissions policy is unconstitutional and the decision of the California Supreme Court is
affirmed.
There are other ways
Gratz v. Bollinger
Facts
Gratz applied to the University of Michigan and was denied. At the time, UM had a 150-point scale to
rank applicants with 100 points needed to guarantee admission. UM gave underrepresented ethnic
groups an automatic 20-point bonus.
Issue
Is the University of Michigan’s race-conscious admissions policy constitutional?
Holding
No.
Rationale
Yes. The University’s use of race as a justification for automatically assigning twenty points to each
minority applicant is not narrowly-tailored to achieve its purpose of promoting student body diversity.
Under this system, applicants are not afforded individualized review and the extra twenty points virtually
guarantee admission to any minimally-qualified minority applicants. Thus, race is elevated as the decisive
factor in admissions decisions. Other factors such as “extraordinary artistic talent” might be worth only
five points on the scale; a very small amount compared to the twenty points given minorities simply due
to their status as such. Bollinger argues that the admissions policy is useful for managing the sheer
volume of applications received. The fact that the implementation of a program capable of providing
individualized consideration might present administrative challenges does not render constitutional an
otherwise problematic system. The University’s use of race in its admissions policy is not narrowly
tailored to achieve the University’s asserted compelling interest in diversity. Hence the admissions policy
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, along with Title VI and 42 U.S.C. §
1981. The summary judgment portion of the district court’s decision is reversed and remanded for
further consideration.
The university’s current policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents asserted interest in
diversity
Grutter v. Bollinger
Facts
Grutter applied to UMLS and was rejected. UMLS used race as a factor, giving applicants of certain
minority groups a significantly greater chance of admission than students with similar applications of
majority racial groups.
The University of Michigan Law School followed an unofficial policy that sought to achieve student body
diversity by giving substantial weight to the race of each applicant in making admissions decisions, in
addition to its consideration of other academic and non-academic variables. Barbara Grutter (plaintiff)
was a Caucasian Michigan resident who applied to the Law School with a 3.8 grade point average and
161 LSAT score. The Law School rejected her application, and she filed suit in federal district court against
Bollinger, the university president, and other university officials (defendants) alleging her denial of
admission was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district
court held that the Law School’s use of race in its admissions policy was unlawful, but the court of
appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
Is UMLS’s admissions policy constitutional?
Holding
Yes
Rationale
The Court previously addressed the use of race as a consideration in higher education admissions in its
decision in University Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 235 (1978). In Bakke, the Court was unable to reach a
majority on the question of whether it was unconstitutional to consider race as an important factor in
admissions for the purpose of remedying past discrimination against minorities. Student body diversity is
a compelling state interest that justifies the use of race in university admissions. The proper standard for
reviewing this issue is strict scrutiny. In determining that the Law School’s policy passed strict scrutiny, a
certain amount of deference is given to the Law School’s admissions department in their determination
that diversity is essential to its educational mission. The Law School cites significant benefits as reasons
for its policy, including the promotion of cross-racial understanding, the breaking down of racial
stereotypes, and the enabling of students to better understand persons of different races. Any one of
these benefits constitutes a compelling state interest for strict scrutiny. Additionally, the Law School uses
narrowly-tailored means to accomplish its purpose because it does not employ a quota system as
outlawed in Bakke to achieve diversity. The Law School provides an individual, holistic review of each of
its applicants and reasons that alternative methods of achieving the Law School’s purpose risk sacrificing
both academic excellence and other types of diversity in the school. However, the Law School should
cease racial consideration in its admissions policies after instances of past discrimination have been
sufficiently remedied. The admissions policy does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
It was upheld because it was narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest in assembling a
diverse student body. There was no fixed quota and the law school focused on
Fisher v. University of Texas 1
Facts
The University of Texas at Austin (the University) (defendant) is a prestigious institution of higher
learning. Prior to 1996, the University maintained an admissions program that considered an applicant’s
race as one of two factors in determining admission. This was held to be unconstitutional in 1996 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996).
Subsequently, the University ceased considering race as a factor in admissions. The Texas state
legislature adopted a new statute, referred to as the Top 10 Percent Law, which granted automatic
admission to all public colleges in Texas to all students in the top 10 percent of their classes at Texas high
schools. In 2004, the University revised the admissions program again, because the University
determined that there was no critical mass of minority students enrolled in the University. Under this
program, the University considers the applicant’s academic index, which is calculated from the
applicant’s test scores and high school academics, and personal-achievement index, which is based on an
applicant’s potential contribution to the University. Race was considered as a component of the
personal-achievement index. Race was not assigned a numerical value but was considered a meaningful
factor. In 2008, Fisher (plaintiff) applied for admission to the University. Fisher was Caucasian and was
denied admission. Approximately 29,500 students applied for admission that year, and only 12,843 were
admitted. Fisher sued the University, claiming that the admissions program violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the University,
and Fisher appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court,
and Fisher petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review.
Issue
May a court reviewing a public university’s race-based affirmative action program under the Equal
Protection Clause afford any deference to the university’s chosen manner of considering an applicant’s
race for the purpose of promoting diversity?
Holding
No.
Rationale
A court must engage in strict scrutiny of a public university’s race-based admissions process and afford
no deference to the university’s chosen method of considering race to promote diversity. A public college
may consider race as a factor in admissions only if the admissions program is narrowly tailored to further
a compelling governmental interest. The United States Supreme Court has previously held that the
interest in the educational benefits flowing from a diverse student body qualifies as a compelling
governmental interest. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). A public
university’s educational judgment that diversity is essential to the educational mission of the university is
entitled to deference. However, the application process must be narrowly tailored to achieve this
purpose. A university is not entitled to deference on this issue. The application process must be proven
to be narrowly tailored, and the courts must determine that the program ensures that applicants are
evaluated as individuals. Race cannot be the defining feature of an applicant’s application. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Here, the district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit deferred to the University’s decision that the University’s application process was narrowly
tailored to achieve a critical mass of minority-student enrollment. This deference is not consistent with
the strict-scrutiny standard established by Grutter. The University must prove that no workable race-
neutral alternative would produce the educational benefits of diversity. Therefore, the case must be
remanded back to the court of appeals to determine whether the application process satisfies the strict-
scrutiny standard. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is vacated, and the case is
remanded.
Notes
The university has to show that diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal, and that each applicant is
used
Fisher 2
Facts
In 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the University of Texas’s
(defendant) admissions process was unconstitutional. At that time, the admissions process considered
race, which violated the Equal Protection Clause because the consideration of race did not further a
compelling government interest. The Texas legislature then adopted a statute known as the Top Ten
Percent Law, which granted automatic admission to the university to all students from Texas high schools
who were in the top 10 percent of their classes. The plan recognized pervasive segregation in public
schools. By granting automatic admission, the plan guaranteed that there would be a significant pool of
black and Latino students granted admission to the university. A few years later, the university adopted
an additional admissions program in which race was one factor considered in admitting the portion of
the entering class that was not admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law. Fisher (plaintiff) sued the
University of Texas, alleging that the admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the admissions policy was constitutional. However,
the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals failed to apply the correct
standard of strict scrutiny. On remand, the court of appeals again found that the admissions policy was
constitutional. Fisher petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review.
Issue
Must a public university’s decision to consider race in admissions be reviewed under the strict scrutiny
standard?
Holding
Yes
Rationale
A public university’s decision to consider race in admissions must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny
standard. Under this standard, the consideration of race must be narrowly tailored to attain diversity.
Each applicant must be evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application. Additionally, if a nonracial approach could
promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense, then the
university cannot consider race. In this case, the university has attempted several race-neutral methods
to increase diversity. The university has already tried intensifying outreach efforts. It has created three
new scholarship programs, opened new regional admissions centers, increased its recruitment budget,
and organized over 1,000 recruitment events. The university tried these methods over seven years and
failed to achieve meaningful diversity. The university also tried adjusting academic and socioeconomic
factors in the admissions calculus. Fisher argues that the university should further adjust these factors.
However, the Equal Protection Clause does not force universities to choose between a diverse student
body and a reputation for academic excellence. Fisher also argues that the university should expand the
class-ranking portion of the automatic admissions process beyond the top 10 percent. However, there
are compelling reasons for the university to consider criteria beyond a student’s high school ranking.
Privileging one characteristic above all others does not lead to a diverse student body. The university has
shown that it continuously evaluates the diversity of its classes and has not yet reached the level of
diversity necessary for its goals. For example, in 2002, only 21 percent of undergraduate classes with five
or more students in them had more than one black student enrolled. Based on these circumstances, the
university’s admissions process does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Dissents
The university’s race-conscious admissions program is purportedly designed to favor racial minorities;
however, the program discriminates against Asian Americans because the university believes this
demographic is overrepresented in the student body. The university has grouped together a large
number of different ethnicities into the overarching category of Asian American, including Chinese,
Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Hmong, Indian, and other backgrounds. The university, and
the Supreme Court, should not be permitted to choose which minorities are favored and which are
disfavored. Additionally, the university’s argument regarding intraracial diversity falls short. In sum, the
university is attempting to favor certain black and Hispanic students over others. According to the
university, the minorities admitted from the Top Ten Percent Law come from urban areas and tend to
come from poor, disadvantaged families. Using an admissions program to favor privileged minorities
turns the purpose of affirmative action on its head.
Justice Thomas dissent
1. Calls for Grutter to be overturned and that no educational benefit can justify racial
discrimination in any form
Notes
Majority
1. The university
2.
Lochner v. New York
Facts
The 1897 Labor Law stated that no employee can be required or permitted to work in a biscuit, bread, or
cake bakery or confectionery establishment more than sixty hours in a week or more than ten hours in
one day, unless to make work on the last day of the week shorter. And the number of hours worked in a
week could not average out to be more than ten hours per day.
Issue
Does the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment protect liberty of
contract and private property against unwarranted government interference?
Holding
No. The general right of an employer to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of
the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Rationale
The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this Amendment, unless there are
circumstances that exclude the right. States may impose reasonable conditions on the right to contract
that further the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens. Pursuant to their constitutional
police powers, states may prohibit contracts which violate either a federal or state statute, or contracts
to use one’s personal property for immoral or illegal purposes. Additionally, precedent decisions permit
states to regulate certain types of employment when the nature of the work or the character of the
employees warrants it. Specifically, states have previously been permitted to regulate the hours of
employees in the smelting and mining fields. However, state police power is not absolute and must be
balanced against individual liberty concerns protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In the present
case, the baking profession does not present any of the concerns justifying the states’ regulation of
hours in some other professions. The regulation in question was not a health law, but was an arbitrary
interference into the individual right of employers and employees to contract
Quote
There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract,, by
determining the hours of labor,, in the occupation of a baker.
Blackstone
Life
1. A person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of life, health and reputation
Liberty
Freedom to move, changing situation,
Property
Change in the term Liberty
1961 counter culture
Due rocess
Liberty includes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
1. Marriage
2.
SCOTUS through the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, has over the course of many cases aled
the first 8 amendments to the constitution to the states
Exceptions
1. Indictment by grand jury
2. Guarantee of jury trial in civil cases
3. 3rd amendment
Dissents
There is a liberty of contract that is being violated, however the burden is on Lochner not the state. The
action can only be upheld f a reasonable person could have been supported by the law
Muller v. Oregon
Facts
n 1903, Oregon passed a statute limiting the hours a woman can work to just 10 hours if she was
employed in a laundry, factory or mechanical manufacturer. The reasoning for the law was, “the physical
organization of women, her maternal functions, the rearing and education of children and the
maintenance of the home.”
Issues
Is a state statute limiting the length of a woman’s workday constitutional?
Holding
Yes
Rationale
Women, like minors, are a special class of worker that needs protection. This statute is within the state’s
police power to protect the health of the general public because the physical well-being of women is
paramount to the production of healthy offspring.
Buchanan v. Warley
Facts
Issue
Holding
Rationale
Buck v. Bell
Facts
A Virginia law provided that a person with a mental illness could be sterilized for the benefit of the
person and society. Sterilization decisions were made by the mental hospital in which the person
resided. Carrie Buck (plaintiff) had a mental illness and was a patient at a mental hospital. After several
months of observing Buck, the mental hospital and state superintendent (defendant) ordered her to be
sterilized. Buck brought suit, claiming the law violated her substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Buck also argued the law violated her equal protection rights in that the
sterilization law was not applicable to people outside of mental institutions. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari
Issue
Is the right to reproduce a fundamental liberty?
Holding
No
Rationale
The right to reproduce is not a fundamental liberty. Substantive due process affords fundamental rights
not explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. However, any such
unenumerated rights must be fundamental liberties to be protected under a claim of substantive due
process. In this case, the right to reproduce as a mentally ill person is not a fundamental liberty.
Accordingly, Virginia’s state law permitting involuntary sterilization of a mentally ill person does not
violate the person’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, the
law does not violate Buck’s equal protection rights. Although the law is not applicable to individuals
outside of a mental institution, the law is sufficiently tailored to meet its policy goals.
O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
Facts
A New Jersey statute establishing a uniform scale for commissions payable to insurance agents was
challenged on Fourteenth Amendment due-process grounds.
Issue
Does a statute imposing limits on commission amounts payable to insurance agents violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Holding
No
Rationale
A statute imposing limits on commission amounts payable to insurance agents does not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The subject of the statute falls squarely within the
bounds of the state’s police power and should be presumed constitutional unless proven otherwise. The
plaintiff fails to provide a foundation in facts sufficient to overcome this presumption. Therefore, the
statute should be upheld.
Notes
1. Used the ends means analysis to uphold the state statute
2. Dissent
a. Burden is on the state not the plaintiff to justify a regulation
b. State can deny the right to make contracts only if some special circumstances exist that
are sufficient to indicate a necessity of the statute to eliminate these evils
c.
Nebbia v. New York
Facts
In 1933, the State of New York (plaintiff) established a Milk Control Board which had the power to fix the
prices of milk sold by New York stores. Nebbia (defendant) owned a grocery store in Rochester, New York
and was convicted of selling milk at a price below the fixed price. The County Court of Appeals for
Monroe County affirmed the conviction, and Nebbia appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue
May a state fix the price of goods sold within its borders without violating the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Holding
Yes
Rationale
During the Great Depression, the price farmers received for milk was far below the cost of milk
production. This discouraged farmers from producing milk, an essential item of a healthful diet. The
legislature thus determined, for the public good, it must set the price of milk to ensure farmers received
a fair price for their product and continued to promote healthy diets by producing milk. This interest in
encouraging milk production was balanced against the individual interest in freedom from governmental
interference in the making of contracts. However, the freedom to contract is not absolute. States
inherently possess the power to pass regulations that promote the public good. In the present case, the
milk industry in New York was severely impacted by price-cutting by retailers. To combat this problem,
the New York legislature established the Milk Control Board to fix prices. This decision was not arbitrary,
but instead promoted the public good by protecting the milk industry. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent states from enacting economic policies to promote the public
good, as long as those policies are not unreasonable or arbitrary. The policies in the present case were
not unreasonable or arbitrary, so Nebbia’s conviction in the court of appeals is affirmed.
West Coast Hotel v. Arrish
Facts
The State of Washington passed a law which regulated the minimum wages paid to female and minor
employees. Elsie Parrish (plaintiff) was employed as a maid at a hotel owned by the West Coast Hotel Co.
(defendant). Together with her husband, Parrish brought suit in Washington state court to recover the
difference between the wages she was paid by West Coast Hotel Co. and the minimum wage fixed under
Washington state law. West Coast defended the suit on the grounds that the state law violated its Due
Process right to freely contract under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Washington trial court held for
the hotel, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed. West Coast Hotel Co. appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.
Issue
May a state regulate the minimum wage paid to female employees?
Holding
Yes
Rationale
The previous decision in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), makes it unconstitutional for
states to set minimum wage laws. However, changing social and economic circumstances since that
decision warrant a fresh consideration of the issue. The liberty interest asserted by West Coast is that of
freedom to contract, but this freedom is not expressly found in the Constitution. Rather, the
Constitution, through its Fourteenth Amendment, clearly outlines the liberty interest of freedom from
actions which attack an individual’s health, safety, or general welfare. Thus, all asserted liberty interests
are ultimately restrained by the health, safety, and general welfare interests that comprise due process.
Applying this principle, the prior decision in Adkins is an improper application of the constitutional due
process provisions that govern states’ regulation of the relationship between employers and employees.
States pass minimum wage laws designed to promote the health and safety of female employees, and
this regulation thus embodies principles of due process. To hold that states cannot regulate in this way
would be to deny due process constraints on a state’s freedom to contract, and to deny protections for
the health and safety of women. Additionally, changing economic times mean that workers who are not
paid a living wage would have to rely on taxpayers for the care of their various needs. This is an
unprecedented problem because the United States is currently in the middle of the “Great Depression.”
Thus, more workers than ever are seeking community assistance, which leads to an impermissible
burden on taxpayers. Washington’s minimum wage law is upheld because it promotes the health and
safety of women, and because requiring employers to pay a living wage alleviates the burden on
taxpayers of having to care for underpaid employees. The decision of the Washington Supreme Court is
affirmed.
Notes
1. Adkins case was a departure from the presumption of constitutionality test
2. SCOTUS states that it will not act as a super legislature
3. Dissents
a. Presumption of constitutionality principal destroys the reason why the judiciary was
established
b. A judge has a independent duty to make up his own mind and adjudge accordingly
whether a law is constitutional
c. A deferential judge who accepts the views of others has surrendered that deliberate
judgement
d. The meaning of the constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic
events
e. The words of the constitution must mean today wheat they meant when written
f. Law imposed minimum wage law for women but not men
g. Women today stand upon a legal and political equality with men
h. Differences of sex affords no reasonable ground for making a restriction applicable to
the wage contracts of working women from which working men are left free to contract
Economic Liberty
Rebuttable presumption of Liberty
1. Presumed that an economic regulation was unconstitutional unless the government could
provide factual evidence to show that the regulation was reasonable
2. The means must
Presumption of Constitutionality
1. Economic regulations were presumed to be constitutional
2. The presumption can be rebutted
3. Person whose liberty was being violated had to persuade the court that the government was
acting unreasonably
US v Carolene products
Facts
In 1923, Congress passed the Filled Milk Act (FMA), which criminalized the shipment in interstate
commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so as to resemble milk
or cream. Carolene Products Co. (defendant) owned a milk processing plant. The United States
government (plaintiff) indicted Carolene Products in district court for violating the FMA. Carolene was
accused of shipping a product called “Milnut” that consisted of a compound of skim milk and coconut
oil. Carolene argued that the FMA was unconstitutional. The district court granted Carolene’s motion to
dismiss, and the United States government appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.
Issues
Is the rational-basis test the appropriate judicial review for congressional legislation of common
commercial products?
Holding
Yes
Rationale
Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919), held that state legislatures possessed authority to regulate widely
used articles of food for the benefit of the public’s welfare. There is no meaningful reason to depart from
that holding in the present case simply because the law at issue was passed by Congress and not a state.
Additionally, Congress, in passing the FMA, relied on extensive evidence that consuming inferior milk
products posed a significant danger to the health and safety of the general public. Judicial review is
improper unless it is clear there is no rational basis for Congress’s judgment. It is footnoted, however,
that although rational-basis review is applied to this case, other types of cases exist in which a stricter
review of legislative judgments is required. Specifically, the application of heightened scrutiny may be
appropriate in cases in which legislation violates the Constitution on its face, attempts to distort or rig
the political process, or discriminates against discrete or insular minorities. However, because none of
these issues are a factor, rational-basis review of the legislature’s judgment is sufficient. The FMA is
rationally related to the public’s health and safety interests in consuming nutritious milk, and the
judgment of the lower courts is reversed.
Non liberty interests have a presumption of constitutionality
Liberty interests have a presumption of liberty
Williamson v. Lee Optical
Facts
An Oklahoma state law made it unlawful for any person not licensed as an optometrist or
ophthalmologist in the state to fit lenses to a face or fashion existing lenses into a frame unless given a
prescription by a state-licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist. Lee Optical (plaintiff) of Oklahoma
brought suit in district court against Williamson (defendant), the official charged with enforcing the
Oklahoma state law, on the grounds that it violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The district court upheld the aspects of the law that prevented an unlicensed
person to provide eye examinations as constitutional, but held unconstitutional the requirement of a
prescription for an optician to simply place old lenses into new frames. The district court reasoned that
an optician’s performance of this task did not pose a significant health and safety risk to the public, and
thus the Oklahoma’s regulation of this activity was not reasonably and rationally related to a health and
safety interest. Williamson appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court.
Issue
May a state law prohibit the fitting of lenses by an optician without prescriptive authority from a
licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist without violating the Fourteenth Amendment?
Holding
Yes
Rationale
Although the Oklahoma law might be arbitrary and wasteful in many cases, it is absolutely necessary in
other cases where directions from a prescription are required for fitting glasses. Regardless, it is a
decision for the state legislature, not the judiciary, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the
prescription requirement. In conducting this balancing, the legislature could have reasonably concluded
that prescriptions are needed often enough to justify requiring them in every case where lenses are
brought to an optician. Prescriptions might not be required in every case, but this is not the test under
the Constitution for upholding the law. Rather, it is sufficient that there is a particular health and safety
evil at hand for correction and that the particular legislative measure is a rational way to correct it. The
legislature made a rational determination that the law is needed in the present case, and the judgment
of the district court is reversed.
The court would not strike down laws that regulate businesses, liberty to contract, etc., just because it
was not a reasonable means to meet the end
Substantive due process
5th and 14th Amendments prohibit deprivation of your rights
Substantive due process (sdp
1. Asks whether the governments deprivation of life liberty and property is justified for a sufficient
purpose
a. Can only take it for a valid reason
Procedural Due Process (pdp
1. Has the government followed the proper procedure to take away a persons life, liberty, or
property
SCOTUS has decided
1. Government has to provide a notice to remove the right (pdp
2. Government has to show a compelling reason that would demonstrate adequate justification for
terminating that right (sdp
Griswold v. Conn.
Facts
Issue
Holding
Rationale
Roe v. Wade
Facts
Issue
Holding
Rationale
