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I. Introduction
In the example given in the prompt, when Marilyn negligently ran over Lucinda, it
caused injury to Lucinda by breaking her leg. Such is a direct injury by Marilyn to Lucinda, and
liability attaches to allow Lucinda to recover from Marilyn to redress such. However, while
Lucinda is recovering from such injury and learning to walk on crutches, she slips, falls, and
breaks her arm. In this scenario, is Lucinda’s fall a superseding cause of her injury, and would
the answer change if it was known that at the time Lucinda fell and broke her arm she was trying
to walk across an extremely narrow walkway and doing so on a dare from her friends? These
questions are answered herein.
II. Is Lucinda’s Fall A Superseding Cause of Her Broken Arm?
Liability in civil law is generally based on the acts of a wrongdoer causing injuries to
others and the interests of society in redressing such wrongdoing to try to make injured persons
whole again. The Bible even teaches the imperative and necessity of those harming others being
liable for such:
If anyone injures his neighbor, whatever he has done must be done to him: fracture for
fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. Just as he injured the other person, the same must be
inflicted on him (Berean Standard Bible, 2016/2020, Leviticus 24:19-20).
Such commands of God reflect the biblical legal principle of an “eye for an eye” and help to
influence people to “do to others as you would have them do to you. For this is the essence of the
Law and the Prophets” (Berean Standard Bible, 2016/2020, Matthew 7:12). Nonetheless, ancient
Israelites found such hard to live by and, with approval from God, interpreted such to permit a
wrongdoer to compensate an injured person financially for an injury the wrongdoer caused.
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While the foregoing verses show the Bible requires imposition of liability on wrongdoers
who cause injury, the Bible also precludes liability where there is a superseding cause of injury
(such as by a third person) because it states that each person shall be accountable for their own
wrongs and not for the wrongs of others (Berean Standard Bible, 2016/2020, Ezekiel 18:20).
American law also generally exempts a person from liability when there is a superseding cause
of injury. NOCO Co. v. OJ Commerce, LLC, 35 F.4th 475, 483 (6th Cir. 2022). Thus, biblical law
and American law exempt a person from liability where there is a superseding cause, but was
Lucinda’s fall a superseding cause? Given the very limited amount of information provided in
the scenario, for a few different reasons Lucinda’s fall is not a superseding cause.
The superseding cause doctrine applies where “the defendant's negligence in fact
substantially contributed to the plaintiff's injury, but the injury was actually brought about by a
later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.” Exxon Co. U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517
U.S. 830, 837 (1996); Barnett v. United States, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6200, *32-33 (D.S.C.
2023)(same). In other words, if the injury was a foreseeable result from Marilyn’s negligence in
breaking Lucinda’s leg, then there is no superseding cause and Marilyn remains liable. In this
regard, it is reasonably foreseeable that breaking someone’s leg could result in them
subsequently falling and seriously hurting themselves: legs give people balance and support in
walking, and if a leg is injured or broken it can seriously reduce a person’s balance and support
in walking and easily give rise to a fall and serious injury. “If the defendant should have foreseen
the possibility that an intervening cause or one like it might occur, she remains liable” (Edwards,
2016, p. 147). Because Lucinda’s fall was foreseeable, the doctrine of superseding cause does not
apply and her fall was not a superseding cause of injury.1
1 While Lucinda’s negligence in walking with crutches was an intervening cause, her fall was still reasonably
foreseeable from the original injury because “an intervening cause is considered reasonably foreseeable when the
defendant's negligence enhances the likelihood that the intervening cause will occur.” Rupert v. Daggett, 695 F.3d
417, 426 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, Marilyn breaking Lucinda’s leg “enhance[d] the likelihood” that Lucinda would
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Moreover, Marilyn breaking Lucinda’s leg caused Lucinda to be in a physically
weakened state and especially susceptible to subsequent accidents and injuries from trying to
walk with or without crutches. “[I]f the defendant causes the plaintiff to be in a weakened state,
making him susceptible to…accidents, he will be held liable for any subsequent…accidents the
plaintiff suffers” (Edwards, 2016, p. 147). Here, Marilyn broke Lucinda’s leg, causing her to be
in a weakened state and susceptible to accidents while walking and trying to walk, which
establishes Lucinda’s fall is not a superseding cause of injury.
Those with opposing views might assert that Lucinda was negligent in trying to walk
with crutches, that in doing so she assumed the risk of injury and was contributorily negligent,
and that her fall and resulting broken arm are thus not attributable to Marilyn. Such opposing
views have no merit because “where the negligent conduct of the first actor [Marilyn] increases
the foreseeable risk of a particular harm occurring through the conduct of a second actor
[Lucinda], the fact that the harm is brought about through the intervention of another force [i.e.,
trying to walk with crutches and falling] does not relieve the first actor [Marilyn] of liability”
(Edwards, 2016, p. 150)(bracketing supplied). Moreover, Lucinda negligently walking with the
crutches is not a superseding cause because “the foreseeable negligence of others will not be
considered a superseding cause” (Edwards, 2016, p. 147) and such “ordinary negligence by the
victim or a third party will not be regarded as a superseding cause because ordinary negligence is
reasonably foreseeable.” Odisho v. Yacouba, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121786, *15 (E.D. Mich.
2022)(emphasis added). And “[o]ne's own conduct cannot be an intervening cause sufficient to
defeat a finding of causation. A superseding cause is something culpable that intervenes [and is
generally] some action of a third party that makes the plaintiff's injury an unforeseeable
subsequently fall and serious hurt herself, thus making the intervening cause reasonably foreseeable to result from
Marilyn’s negligence in breaking Lucinda’s leg.
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consequence of the defendant’s negligence.” Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 584 (7th
Cir. 2012)(bracketing supplied). Here, there was no action by a third party and Lucinda’s own
conduct, whether negligent or not, cannot be an intervening/superseding cause.
III. Would The Foregoing Answer Change If It Was Discovered That Linda Fell And
Broke Her Arm While Trying to Walk Across an Extremely Narrow Walkway
Upon A Dare from her Friends?
My foregoing answer would change if it was discovered that Linda fell and broke her arm
while trying to walk —and while learning to walk with crutches and with a broken leg—across
an extremely narrow walkway upon a dare from her friends. The reasons it would change is
because such information precludes her conduct being foreseeable and requires finding such was
a superseding cause. Specifically, it would not be reasonably foreseeable to Marilyn (or anyone
else) that Lucinda, after incurring a broken leg from Marilyn’s negligence, would then (while
recovering from such broken leg) try to walk using crutches (and while learning to use crutches)
across an extremely narrow walkway, especially in the context of a dare by her friends when
such dare inherently imports their recognition that such was obviously very dangerous for her.
Trying to walk across an “extremely narrow walkway” could be inherently dangerous in many
circumstances, even for healthy people without injured legs. See, e.g., Jovanovich v. United
States, 813 F.2d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir. 1987)(healthy person walking upon “a narrow walkway”
lost his footing and fell, resulting in “a serious injury”). Making such a walk while trying to learn
to walk on crutches with a broken leg is exceedingly more dangerous.
It would not be reasonably foreseeable that Lucinda would engage in such extremely
dangerous conduct and greatly risk seriously injuring herself, after Marilyn broke her leg. As
such, this information would indicate a superseding cause for Lucinda’s broken arm (namely,
Lucinda engaging in unforeseeable and exceedingly dangerous conduct). In such circumstances,
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she assumed an extreme risk of injuring herself and of breaking her arm, and such decision to
engage in inherently dangerous and unforeseeable conduct precludes the causal link between her
initial broken leg injury and her subsequent fall breaking her arm and establishes a superseding
cause for her broken arm.
References
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Barnett v. United States, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6200 (D.S.C. 2023).
Edwards, J.S. (2016). Tort Law (6th Edition). Cengage Learning Incorporated: Boston, MA.
Exxon Co. U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996).
Jovanovich v. United States, 813 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1987).
NOCO Co. v. OJ Commerce, LLC, 35 F.4th 475 (6th Cir. 2022).
Odisho v. Yacouba, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121786 ( E.D. Mich. 2022).
Rupert v. Daggett, 695 F.3d 417, 426 (6th Cir. 2012).
The Holy Bible: Berean Standard Bible. (2020). Biblehub.com. https://biblehub.com (Original
work published 2016).
Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2012).
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